Security and Intelligence - new material (15)
01 July 2010
30 False Fronts Won Contracts for Blackwater, James Risen and Mark Mazzetti. New York Times 3.9.10. This report details how the infamous private security company Blackwater/Xe Services has “created a web of more than 30 shell companies or subsidiaries in part to obtain millions of dollars in American government contracts after the security company came under intense criticism for reckless conduct in Iraq.” It also details how this “reckless conduct”, exemplified by the Nisour Square massacre, has been rewarded by the CIA: “The CIA’s continuing relationship with the company, which was awarded a $100 million dollar contract to provide security at agency bases in Afghanistan, has drawn harsh criticism from some members of Congress, who argue that the company’s tarnished record should preclude it from such work.”
Blackwater’s Black Ops, Jeremy Scahill. The Nation 15.9.10. This article discusses the web of companies spawned by the Blackwater private security company, which was founded by, Eric Prince, and is now known as Xe Services, following its involvement in a series of murders and scandals in Iraq. Focussing on two of these proxies, Total Intelligence Solutions and the Terrorism Research centre, The Nation sheds light on the sensitive intelligence and security operations the company performs for a range of powerful corporations (Monsanto, Deutsch bank, Barclays bank, to name a few) and government agencies. “The new evidence also sheds light on the key roles of several former top CIA officials who went to work for Blackwater”, the outfit’s relationship with the US Special Operations Division, located in Chantilly, VA, and the loss of their government issued Secure Telephone Unit. There is also new information on Blackwater’s work for the CIA and JSOC in Pakistan. Available at: http://www.thenation.com
Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state of surveillance, Charles Raab, Kirstie Ball, Steve Graham, David Lyon, David Murakami Wood, Clive Norris. Surveillance Studies Network, 2010, pp. 50. This report finds: “Since 2006 there has been welcome strengthening of the data protection regime, a higher and better informed level of debate and scrutiny of surveillance related developments as well as a renewed political commitment to address the unwanted consequences of existing measures that raise concerns about unwarranted surveillance of the citizen.” But finds that “further safeguards are still required with further protection” and recommends: a. Increased adoption of a ‘privacy by design’ approach; b. Robust privacy safeguards as the default setting when new on line services are offered to individuals; c. A requirement for a privacy impact assessment to be presented during the parliamentary process where legislative measures have a particular impact on privacy; d. An opportunity for the Information Commissioner to provide a reasoned opinion to Parliament on measures that engage concerns within his areas of competence; e. Increased post legislative scrutiny of legislation, based on a formal report on the deployment of the legislation in practice, the value of the information collected, the impact on privacy and the continued need for such measures and e. In certain appropriate circumstances inclusion of a sunset clause in legislation that is particularly privacy intrusive.
Bombe a inchiostro, Aldo Giannuli. BUR, 2008, ISBN 978-88-17-02059-6, pp. 525. A fascinating journey into the history of counter-information in Italy from 1968 through the so-called “years of lead”. This in-depth research looks at the success of information campaigns “from below” that sought to belie official information from the institutions, starting from the Piazza Fontana bombing for which anarchists were initially wrongly accused, and a number of events during the “years of lead” in which collusion by sectors of the state’s apparatus with right-wing terrorists surfaced. It also looks at its downfall, which stemmed from its failure to acknowledge the existence of “red” terrorism until it was too obvious to ignore. Giannuli uses a wide-ranging selection of official documents and those produced by “movement” sources to shed light on a number of key events and on their repercussions. One of the key successes of Italian counter-information was that society stopped accepting official explanations as the undisputable “truth”, seeking alternative explanations when they were not convincing.