Metropolitan Police Trafalgar Square debriefing report (1)
01 January 1991
Metropolitan Police Trafalgar Square debriefing report
artdoc June=1991
The Metropolitan Police have published a report on the anti-poll tax
demonstration that ended in violent street battles between police and
protesters on 31 March, 1990. The report, by Deputy Chief Commissioner John
Metcalf, acknowledges that the police lost control of the situation. It
catalogues a succession of mistakes and technical problems, such as
communication and command failures, as well as a lack of coordination
between the various police units. Metcalf writes:
officers working under different lines of command were often unaware
of tactics used by other officers on different units. These
difficulties were exacerbated by inadequate communications systems as
attempts were made to coordinate police movements.
Tactical errors inflamed the situation early on as Metcalf admits when he
notes that "The arrival of mounted police in Whitehall near Downing Street
coincided with the demonstrators becoming increasingly hostile towards
police." The volatile effect of the arrival of mounted police is documented
in several eye witness reports from demonstrators printed in Poll tax
riot:10 hours that shook Trafalgar Square.
If the police began to lose control at Whitehall the scene at Trafalgar
Square was little better. On three separate occasions police vans were
driven at speed through the crowd and were attacked by protesters who
claimed that they caused injuries; a claim that the report denies. The
eventual dispersal of thousands of demonstrators into the West End, where
extensive looting took place, receives minimal explanation, although by
this point the police acknowledge that they had little idea of what was
going on as
the Control room was swamped with hundreds of messages from the
Central Control Complex at New Scotland Yard and from surrounding
stations. The system became severely overloaded and computer response
time was delayed by over five minutes.
In his conclusion Metcalf argues for `more use of existing preventative
legislation.' A further tightening of venues for assemblies and rallies,
and routes of marches, only recently made more stringent under the Public
Order Act, is called for. Metcalf also ominously suggests that: Perhaps
society should consider whether, where there are already many alternative
means of influencing public opinion, it wishes to allow marches with a
potential for violence and disorder to take place in the heart of the
capital.
Metropolitan Police Trafalgar Square Riot Debriefing, March 1991; Poll Tax
Riot: 10 hours that shook Trafalgar Square, Acab Press, 1990.
Statewatch no 2, May/June 1991