Feature: Collusion and Britain's Irish policy
01 January 1991
Feature: Collusion and Britain's Irish policy
artdoc August=1993
Amidst increasingly visible disagreements over Northern Ireland
policy and further indications of polarisation within the North
itself, charges of collusion between loyalist groups and the
security services are gathering momentum. Some of these relate
to the early seventies while others centre on the role of
military intelligence agent Brian Nelson and the South African
weapons shipment he helped to organise in the late 1980s.
British government policy has been to secure a settlement on
devolved government for Northern Ireland through talks between
Paisley's DUP, the Ulster Unionist Party, Alliance and Hume's
SDLP; talks which in part have rested on the exclusion of Sinn
Fein and reassurances to the SDLP and Dublin that Britain has no
`selfish strategic interest' in the North and would `happily'
withdraw. Such a settlement would in theory have the approval of
the Dublin government and would come to supersede the
Hillsborough Agreement. It would become the basis of a new
consensus for Anglo-Irish and cross-border cooperation on
security policies to finally eradicate the IRA. It might also
institutionalise North/South cooperation on other matters such
as economic development, infrastructure and tourism.
Since the talks broke down, however, the prospects of
restarting them have look increasingly remote. Paisley and some
other Unionists are insisting that they will not resume talks
until the Irish government revokes Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish
constitution which states that the Irish nation consists of the
whole of the island of Ireland but that for practical legislative
purposes the jurisdiction excludes the six northern counties.
Nationalists point out that this is a weaker `territorial claim'
that Britain's own claim over Ireland under section 75 of the
Government of Ireland Act 1920.
British-Irish talks
The stalling of talks led British Labour Party spokesperson Kevin
Macnamara to publish his proposals for joint British-Irish
authority over the North. Irish Labour Party leader and Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring, has backed Macnamara and
suggested that if no internal talks are possible the British and
Irish governments have to by-pass local politicians. Prime
Minister John Major's response to the joint authority proposal
was to describe it as `a recipe for disaster'. He may well have
had his eye on the July votes on the Maastricht Bill for which
his government relied on the support of the Unionist MPs. Despite
Major's protestations that `nothing was asked for, nothing was
offered, nothing was given', Ulster Unionist leader James
Molyneaux seems well-pleased that his party has achieved a closer
relationship with Major which may result in a Westminster Select
Committee on Northern Ireland, increased powers for local
district councils and new security measures. Such a deal would
clearly discredit the idea that the British government can act
as a neutral chair of talks between the British government and
Irish nationalists.
Another factor behind the sense of disarray within the Northern
Ireland Office is the widening consensus that a proper political
settlement cannot be achieved without the inclusion of Sinn Fein
in any talks process. Some commentators point to the inclusive
basis of discussions on the new South African constitution as an
example that could be followed, and although there is
disagreement as to the basis of Sinn Fein inclusion, calls for
talks with the party have recently come from US politicians, the
Opsahl Commission, and former Prime minister Edward Heath.
Notwithstanding strong objections from the British, the Irish
President Mary Robinson met the Sinn Fein President in West
Belfast in June. This meeting actually strengthened her already
high popularity according to opinion polls and this is clearly
leading to a re-think on policy towards Sinn Fein within Irish