EU: "Interoperability" - the end of checks and balances on EU databases

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It has been apparent from some time that the so-called "principle of availability" between of law enforcement and other agencies would extend to planned EU databases. In November the European Commission produced a Communication (COM (2005) 597) on "improved effectiveness, enhanced operability and synergies among European databases".

"Interoperability"is defined as the exchange of data, information and knowledge; ""Interoperability" is a technical rather than a legal or political concept". "Synergies", technically, apparently means: "a mutually advantageous conjunction of several elements". "Economically" it means: "an increase in the value of assets or an economy of scale". "Organisationally" it means: "combining previously distinct resources". And the "principle of availability" means that law enforcement and security agencies can access information and intelligence from anywhere in the EU.

The databases discussed are SIS II, VIS (Visa Information System) and EURODAC (fingerprints of refugees over 14 years old). The legitimation for access by agencies is variously stated as terrorism, organised crime, serious crime or just crime in general.

There are two kinds of way databases can be searched: alphanumeric and biometric. EURODAC is a biometric database of fingerprints but it is said that "the quantity of data sent to EURODAC is a surprisingly low fraction of the total migratory flow". VIS too will use biometric searches of photos (not very reliable) and fingerprints (accurate but error rate increases with size of database). The biometrics planned for SIS II will only be used to confirm identity.

Alphanumeric searches are currently used (eg: machine readable passports or searching for a name) and planned for SIS II (and used on lots of check/watch lists). However, as has been obvious for some time:

the probability of not obtaining correct results increases with the size of the database. The more names there are in the database, the harder it is to find a person and the more likely it is to identify a person wrongly"

It will come as no surprise that the "shortcomings" identified by law enforcement and security agencies are that they need access to EURODAC and VIS. The Communication identifies other "shortcomings": neither VIS nor SIS II "can identify persons illegally remaining in the EU". And, on biometrics:

Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and DNA databases allow [accurate biometric] identification. As such databases now exist in most Member States, the Commission services are currently working on a proposal to interlink national databases

This begs a lot of questions. The basis on which fingerprints are gathered and held vary from state to state - in the UK the fingerprint and DNA databases will increasingly hold data on people who have been arrested but never charged and those charged but acquitted. As to DNA databases, the UK has the largest database in the world with 5.24% of the population (March 2004) other EU states have less than 1% - how long will it be before DNA will be demanded in order to get a passport or ID card? The Prum Treaty signed by seven EU government already allows for the exchange of fingerprint and DNA data without a positive alphanumeric search first (the Commission wants the SIS II to have this power too).

The Communication says there will be "no registration of EU citizens at European level" and that national passport/ID databases cannot be searched for terrorism or crime - well, they will in the UK under the ID Card Bill for starters. Indeed everyone resident in the EU - citizens, third country nationals, those given permission to stay and visitors - will all in time have biometric passports and/or ID cards. Every flight in and out of the EU by everyone will be recorded under the planned PNR (passenger name record) system.

It also says that the standards for searching EURODAC, SIS II and VIS should be "significantly higher<

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