EU: Europol set to become "operational"?
01 March 2000
The Europol Working Party is considering a report on the effect of the Conclusions of the Tampere Special European Council on Europol's role. The report, "First reflections concerning the Tampere Conclusions as far as they relate to Europol" looks at the "necessary or desirable changes that are required to the Europol Convention" to effect the Treaty of Amsterdam as supplemented by the Tampere Conclusions.
The report in setting up joint investigation teams (Tampere Recommendation 44) clearly seeks to avoid amending the Europol Convention as this would require consulting the European Parliament and ratification by national parliaments. "In view of the urgency" it sees a way out by preparing a "framework" decision which could be fast-tracked - the European parliament and national parliaments would be consulted but it would take only a few months rather than years).
In parallel the report seek to set up the European Police Chiefs "operational Task Force" (Tampere Recommendation 44). To set up a permanent body, capable of liaising with Europol would require the Europol Convention to be amended. So it is suggested that it could be set up as a "working party of the [Europol] Management Board." The report then sets out "Scenario for Joint Teams" and defines the terminology. It says:
"'Operational' in this context consists of all actions that form part of the operation as such, based on the normal role of law enforcement organisations. This is eg information exchange, collating and analysing of information and intelligence etc
'Executive actions' are understood as actions pursued by law enforcement officers in order to facilitate an investigation where specific powers have been granted by national law, such as surveillance, searching, arrests etc. Executive actions may have a direct impact on the constitutional rights of individuals.
'Restricted executive powers' means actions pursued during an investigation that do not have an essential impact on constitutional rights of individuals, such as interviewing suspects, examination of files etc.."
The idea that the interviewing of suspects do not involve constitutional rights is highly questionable.
Under the heading: "Members of the operation" it defines "Lead authority" as "Europol or an organisation or body from one of the participating Member States.."
While under the heading: "Member states participating in executive actions resulting from the operation" it sets out:
"A centralised investigation will be based at and coordinated from Europol.
Decentralised investigations are based at and coordinated from locations other than Europol."
These statements more than suggest that under a "centralised investigation" Europol could take part in "executive actions" as defined above. The report ends with the following:
"A further element for reflection in this respect is the validity, under the different legal systems, of evidence gathered by joint teams. It should be ensured that - under certain circumstances - information lawfully obtained by an official while part of a joint investigative team which is not otherwise available to the competent authorities of the Member States concerned may be used for the purposes for which the joint investigation team has been set up as well as other well defined purposes for which the use of the information is needed."
First Reflections concerning the Tampere Conclusions as they relate to Europol, ref: 13370/99, EUROPOL 48, 25.11.99.