Dutch police and security service at odds
01 July 1991
On May 1, 1991, the Dutch commission Blok installed in March 1990 by the heads of the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) and the Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst (CRI) to advise on the cooperation of the two services in the field of counter-terrorism published its findings.
To the present day, the two services have been quarrelling over questions of competence and priorities caused primarily by the ambiguity in their respective mandates. This conflict now seems to have been settled, with the police and the justice department gaining in influence over counter- terrorist policy and operations. The commission has decided that the Bijzondere Zaken Centrale (BZC, Special Branch of the central police information service CRI) has a legitimate interest in proactive information gathering, that is running informants and conducting other operations without concrete indications of serious preparatory activities for terrorist operations (which include violent political activism). This in spite of the fact that the administration explicitly stated in parliament four years ago that the BZC should not have such a mandate since it is not an intelligence service.
Since the legitimization of proactive BZC operations by the commission confirms the existence of a grey area where both services have competence, an intensification of cooperation between BVD and BZC is sought. At a policy level, the heads of both services should have periodical discussions. At the operative level, coordinating meetings should be intensified, with the national public prosecutor for terrorism holding a leading position. Also, the separate services should no longer supply information to the justice department and (local) police without first consulting their counterpart.
Shortly before publication of the report it was decided to replace the top of the BZC, the commissioners B.N. Barendregt (head of BZC), C Feenstra (deputy head) and J. Mast (coordinator). Official sources refused all comment, but it seems likely that the officers had to make way for a new team in order to facilitate the intensified contacts with the BVD. In the near future, the BVD too is expected to announce several replacements in its upper strata. One BVD director recently commented off-record to Intelligence Newsletter: "this is not a booming business at present." Now that there are still career opportunities in the international field several top officials are considering leaving for Brussels or other promising European posts.
The recent developments could be interpreted as supporting the views expressed by both BVD officials and some leading parliamentarians that the dangers of excessive intelligence operations in Holland are more virulent in the growing number and intensity of pro-active police operations than in BVD activities. Also, the leading role of the public prosecutor could result in a dominance of the justice department's views on counterterrorism policy, thus weakening the long-term approach favoured by the intelligence service.