Annual report on MI5 (1)
01 January 1991
Annual report on MI5
artdoc August=1992
In his annual report on the Security Service (MI5) the
Commissioner, Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, says MI5 no longer
destroys any of its records, even those it opened erroneously,
in case the Security Service Tribunal (which investigates
complaints by members of the public) wants to see them.
Three cases considered by the Commissioner raised the issue of
whether or not MI5 acted unreasonably in retaining files on the
complainants and this led him to enquire into MI5's policy on
holding records on people. The general policy, he reports, `is
to retain records indefinitely in case they are of relevance any
time in the future...and they [MI5] cannot accurately predict
when files will ever be needed again. In my opinion as a general
policy this is acceptable'.
MI5's procedure is first to open a `temporary' file, with a
maximum life of three years where they are uncertain if a
permanent one is required. Then a `permanent' file is opened
using a system of colour coding which controls how files are
used. Once the `permanent' file is opened there is a period coded
`green' when the person is put under surveillance. At the end of
the `green' period it changes to `amber' when further inquiries
are prohibited but new information can be added. After the
designated `amber' period a file is coded `red' when inquiries
are prohibited and are any substantive additions. Finally,
after a period of `red' coding the file is microfilmed and the
hard copy destroyed. At this point the computer index entry in
MI5's central registry index is moved from the `Live Index' to
the `Research Index'. The Commissioner concludes that in the
`great majority of cases' retention of a file on microfilm will
be justified but that MI5's must assess each case on its merits
(it is not clear whether the Commissioner is referring to new
entries at the microfilm stage to be assessed or whether it
refers to old records).
The logic of the Commissioner becomes quite tortuous when he
comes to consider records held by MI5 which, but for the Security
Service Act 1989, would have been destroyed. `Temporary' files
which do not become `permanent' files would previously have been
destroyed after three years so too would `permanent' files on
individuals and organisations erroneously opened - now they are
retained in case the Tribunal wants to see them at some undefined
point in the future and `in appropriate cases make an order for
the destruction of the records..'
MI5 holds records on those it vets or places under
surveillance. These fall into several broad categories: those
vetted for jobs in the Civil Service, defence industry, police
and other sensitive areas; those thought to be engaged in
espionage on behalf of a foreign power, and their perceived
`supporters' or `sympathisers'; those suspected of involvement
in terrorism; a broad spectrum of those perceived to be in
positions of power and influence (including prospective
parliamentary candidates, academics, leading industrialists and
journalists - `agents of influence' in CIA parlance); and those
considered to be `subversives' or a potential threat to national
security (this last category is said to contain more than 1
million names according to a report in the Guardian).
The report gives no details of the warrants issued by the Home
Secretary to `interfere with property' (to secretly enter homes
or to bug office/homes). In the first year of the Security
Service Act there were 52 complaints to the Tribunal, none of
which were upheld and in the second year 29, none of which were
upheld.
Report of the Commissioner for the Security Service for 1991,Cm
1946, HMSO, 1992; Guardian, 21.5.92.
Statewatch vol 2 no 4, July/August 1992