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Deportation and readmission

The future of Frontex /// Incentivising self-deportation /// Forced returns to Syria /// Returns to Ukraine

In this edition of Outsourcing Borders, several documents, initially censored by the Council but obtained in full by Statewatch, go into more detail on the expected overhaul of the mandate of the EU’s border agency Frontex.

The future of Frontex: member state priorities

A note (pdf) from the Danish presidency to the permanent member state representatives (COREPER) on 12 December summarises the conclusions of discussions held with Council preparatory bodies on member state priorities for Frontex.

The note lists three “guiding principles” that member states broadly agreed on for the Frontex overhaul. These principles are (using the note’s wording):

• The starting point should be the operational needs of Member States.

• The focus should remain on the agency’s core functions relating to external borders and return.

• Cooperation with third countries is a key issue to address, including a Frontex role in returns from third countries to other third countries.

Key take-aways from the discussion summaries include:

• Member states are reported to have various concerns about increasing Frontex staffing (see below);

• There is broad support for expanding Frontex activities in, and between, third countries, including route-based deportations and ‘return hubs’;

• Member states support loosening the rules around Frontex status agreements to allow more flexible deployment in third countries (the note also suggests that ‘successful’ short-term deployments could pave the way for full status agreements);

• There is clear appetite for Frontex to be involved in pre-departure checks in third countries, for people travelling to the Schengen zone;

• Some member states support greater Frontex involvement in reacting to the ‘instrumentalisation’ of irregular migration, as well as drone disturbances and undersea sabotage. Other member states though are reported to be wary of this (the note does not specify which ones);

• Member states are divided on whether and how Frontex governance and oversight needs to be improved (see below);

The future of Frontex: the standing corps

A note from the Danish presidency to a 2 December meeting of the Working Party on Frontiers addresses the ‘standing corps’ – Frontex’s uniformed force. The force’s headcount is expected to triple to 30,000 officers in the period ending 2029, and be equipped with more surveillance and patrolling equipment.

The presidency document (pdf) mostly invites member states to comment on what they want from Frontex and how they envision an expanded force complementing their own national border forces.

The COREPER note mentioned above observes that most member states “do not perceive at this stage an added value or operational need for any significant enlargement of the standing corps”. The note goes into further depth on concerns member states have with the standing corps discussion, and shows that member states are interested in Frontex using more digital- and AI-based tools.

The future of Frontex: governance and oversight

A similar document (pdf) to the same working committee addresses Frontex governance. With it is expected that Frontex will be given more responsibilities – including a more active hand in deportations outside of the EU – the presidency apparently feels that its governance structure needs to be re-thought:

“Given its current workload and possible new responsibilities of the Agency, the Presidency would like to discuss with delegations whether there is a need for modifications to the internal governance of the Agency, for instance with regard to return.” (This passage was censored by the Council)

To that end, the paper explores Frontex governance under three themes:

• External oversight, Management Board, and operational planning

• Fundamental rights

• European Integrated Border Management

The COREPER note mentioned above reports, in a passage initially deleted by the Council, that member states are divided on what level of overhaul is needed, particularly with regards to external oversight and concerning Article 46 of the Frontex regulation, which covers situations where fundamental rights violations may require a Frontex operation be suspended, terminated or not embarked upon at all.

An in-depth analysis of the Frontex overhaul by researcher Marloes Streppel is available on the Statewatch site.

Self-deportation – just a matter of incentives

The new Cypriot presidency has taken on increasing ‘voluntary’ returns as one of its key priorities. To that end, a preliminary discussion paper (pdf) from the presidency to delegates circulated on 12 February 2026 explores ways to increase incentives for people to self-deport.

After broadly laying out the background of recent deportation efforts, and the EU’s persistently low return rate (the note also mentions the rather fanciful concept of irregular migrants ‘reintegration support shopping’ between member states), the paper goes on to various recommendations. These include:

• De-linking reintegration support from deportation orders, meaning people could be incentivised to leave before an order is given;

• Making reintegration support ‘degressive’, meaning that the longer people go without self-deporting, the less nominal support they will be offered;

• An increasing role for Frontex in coordinating mass voluntary returns;

• Increased inter-agency cooperation to address inefficiencies and limit the possibility of absconsion;

• Strengthening forced deportation capacities and other pre-deportation enforcement measures, in order to make ‘voluntary’ returns seem more appealing (“voluntary return is most effective when integrated into a broader framework that also includes robust and effective measures to enforce return decisions, as a genuine alternative”);

• Increased use of EU-wide digital border systems and databases

Voluntary returns are expected to be discussed further at the meeting of the Schengen Council on 5 March 2026.

Member states discussed forced returns to Syria

A note (pdf) from the Danish presidency of the Council to member states on 6 October 2025 explores the issue of people returning, or being forced to return, to Syria since the fall of the Assad regime.

While no longer hugely relevant six months on, it is worth noting that among the discussion points are the observation that while intentions to return to Syria increased after the fall of Assad, they subsequently declined given the security situation. The note also shows clearly that member states were pushing for forced deportations of Syrians by this point in 2025.

Member states continue to discuss Ukrainian returns

A note (pdf) from the Danish presidency to the meeting of the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) on 26 November 2025 shows continued discussion about what to do with the millions of Ukrainian recipients of temporary protection in Europe when the programme ends in 2027.

The note, a follow-up to the Council’s recommendations on the matter, mostly concerns itself with member states offering other residence statuses to Ukrainian citizens living on their territory, and issues regarding people with special needs. It does, however, also make reference to ongoing efforts to plan for coordinated ‘voluntary’ return programmes for those Ukrainian citizens who are not offered an alternate status when temporary protection ends.