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Deportation and readmission

France, other member states, displeased with limited use of Article 25a visa sanctions /// Deputy home commissioner updates parliament on readmissions cooperation /// The Commission targets Guinea for Article 25a sanctions /// Ukraine and the EU are working on a Frontex status agreement /// The EU is beginning to think about ‘returning’ Ukrainian refugees /// Frontex submits report card for 2025

France, other member states, displeased with limited use of Article 25a visa sanctions

An informal note from the French delegation to a meeting of the Visa Working Party on 19 September 2025 (pdf) discusses “visa sanctions” as a tool for garnering deportation cooperation. Visa sanctions can be invoked under Article 25a of the EU’s Visa Code.

The note praises the “clear progress” made in using Article 25a to pressure countries into deportation cooperation:

“Over time, third countries have proved to be quite sensitive to visa measures taken by Member States as a response to limited cooperation on readmission, and taking such measures at EU level should maximize their effect”.

The Schengen Barometer+ report under 'Border management' reports improved deportation cooperation from Bangladesh and Iraq, apparently in response to threats of Article 25a sanctions.

The French delegation bemoans, however, that only two countries have so far been subjected to visa sanctions. Apparently speaking on behalf of other member states, it makes their displeasure clear:

“our collective expectations have not been fully met. The fact that Article 25a has only been used against Gambia and Ethiopia so far, has limited its credibility and impact.”

It also argues that the particular measures under Article 25a – increasing visa costs and processing times and suspending facilitation agreements – “may not be strong enough”.

To address these concerns, the French delegation suggests:

• Making it quicker and easier to invoke Article 25a sanctions, with more clarity on cooperation targets for third countries (in a proposed recital of the amendment: “(Article 25a) activation should not be considered as exceptional, whenever diplomatic outreach has not led to the desired increase of readmission cooperation of a given third country”)

• Gradually ratcheting up the pressure by introducing harsher penalties

• More union-wide cooperation on Article 25a measures

• Stressing to third countries that poor readmission cooperation will affect Commission assessments of migration risk, potentially increasing the issuance of visa refusals entirely. In other words, ‘do what we say or no visas at all’: “Commission’s assessments must be taken more seriously by our partners and used as a basis for measures”

The note goes on to propose various amendments to Article 25a along the above lines.

Deputy home commissioner updates parliament on readmissions cooperation

Johannes Luchner, deputy director-general at DG HOME appeared before the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee of the European Parliament on 26 January, to discuss deportations cooperation with third countries. His comments offer some insights:

On cooperation with specific countries:

• In December 2025 negotiations were launched with Kazakhstan on a deportation agreement, in parallel to a visa Facilitation Agreement. Negotiations are similarly ongoing with Nigeria, though with several issues still outstanding. The commission will attempt to “resuscitate” the matter with Nigeria

• ‘Non-binding readmission arrangements’ exist with Afghanistan, Guinea, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, the Gambia and Côte d'Ivoire

• Since May 2026, joint committees and working groups were held with Guinea, Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, Bangladesh, Armenia and Pakistan, as well as technical dialogues with Somalia and Senegal. Dedicated workshops have taken place with Egypt, Côte d'Ivoire and Ethiopia. The next joint working group with Ethiopia will take place 18 February in Addis Ababa

• “Substantial and sustained progress” has been observed with Bangladesh, and the Commission withdrew its proposal for Article 25a visa sanctions in November 2025

• Cooperation has improved with Côte d'Ivoire

• Ethiopia's cooperation has “substantially improved” since visa sanctions were adopted in 2024

• Cooperation with Western Balkans EU candidate countries, as well as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, is generally described as satisfactory

• Visa sanctions remain in place for the Gambia, despite “continuous dialogue”. After the commission proposed visa sanctions in July 2025, there has been “strong political commitment” from Guinea to cooperate on readmission, though this commitment is yet to “translate into operational reality”

• The Commission proposed visa sanctions on Senegal in 2022. Since then, multiple discussions are yet to produce “sustained progress”

• The Commission also proposed visa measures for Somalia in 2024, though this does not appear to have produced the desired result.

Other noteworthy statements:

• Luchner alluded to the possibility that the ongoing digitalisation of the EU’s border systems may allow quicker assessment of cooperation in the future

• When asked, with reference to Afghanistan, how the Commission ensures that people who are deported are not then prosecuted or executed, Luchner stated this is done by “raising the question, not only once, but several times” and referred to those assurances being limited to “oral engagement”

• Luchner also confirmed that he, along with Belgian delegates, visited Kabul in January 2026 to discuss deportations. He said the Taliban were willing to work with them on the matter. Mehdi Kassou, director general of the NGO BelRefugees, has written an incisive commentary for the Belgian news site Le Soir and it has been republished in English by ECRE

The Commission targets Guinea for Article 25a sanctions

A proposed Council implementing decision (pdf) of 15 July 2025, discussed at the Visa Working Party meeting of 19 September 2025, concluded that “cooperation has remained insufficient” on deportations with Guinea, despite diplomatic overtures and “clear messages” from the EU. It therefore proposed Article 25a visa sanctions.

A full analysis of the proposal and its implications by researcher Cezary Dziółko will soon be on the Statewatch site.

Statewatch has requested comment from the Commission on the current state of Article 25a measures against Guinea and had not received an answer at the time of this bulletin. Comments from the Deputy Home Affairs Commissioner (above) suggest the relationship has not improved.

Ukraine and the EU are working on a Frontex status agreement

A heavily redacted note from the Commission to the Working Party on Frontiers meeting of 5 November 2025 (pdf) reports that Ukraine “has now firmly indicated its interest” in negotiating a Frontex status agreement. This would allow Frontex to deploy border guards and other officials in Ukraine.

The note goes on to explore the opportunities and implications of such cooperation. It also notes that after the Commission recommends opening negotiations, it typically takes one to two years before a status agreement enters into force.

The EU is beginning to think about ‘returning’ Ukrainian refugees

Temporary protection for Ukrainians in Europe is projected to end on 4 March 2027. Around 4.5 million people benefitting from temporary protection are living in the EU+ region as of August 2025. EU policymakers’ attention is turning to how these people can be encouraged to return to Ukraine before the deadline.

To that end, a discussion paper (pdf) was circulated by the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU and discussed at the 27 October 2025 meeting of the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum.

The paper broadly outlines the issue, and expresses a desire that “timely discussions” take place ahead of the March 2027 deadline, to avoid millions of people suddenly finding themselves without residence status in the EU.

There is a strong emphasis on voluntary returns and readmission support, with an additional emphasis on the EU’s overall recovery support to Ukraine. Various incentives and programmes are explored to encourage voluntary returns.

While the concept of forced returns is studiously avoided in this paper, it does note very low, and decreasing, return intentions among Ukrainians in Europe and alludes to the possibility of Frontex assisting “in cases where organised departures would be needed”, though this would appear for the moment to be in reference to mass ‘voluntary’ returns.

Frontex submits report card for 2025

At a meeting of the Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion held on 13 January 2026, Frontex presented its 2025 report card “Implementation of Frontex activities in the field of return” (pdf).

The presentation gives a broad overview of the agency’s activities in 2025. Highlights include:

• 63,493 Frontex assisted-returns in 2025, of which around 23,000 were forced. Overall returns increased around 50% from 2023 (39,231)

• 5911 Syrians ‘voluntarily’ returned with Frontex assistance in 2025 (operations were resumed 17 March). More than three quarters of these people were returned by Cyprus and Germany alone

• 10 people ‘voluntarily’ returned to Afghanistan by 24 November 2025

• The launch of two new projects: ‘Vulnerability Check Application’ and ‘RECAPP’

The presentation also lightly sketches out the process for a Frontex qualitative assessment, the results of which are to be disseminated to DG Home by 13 March 2026. Frontex has also published its Annual Brief for 2025, a broad outline of migratory trends in 2025 and projections for 2026.