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Council discusses radical expansion of Frontex mandate /// Member states debate interoperability in digital border systems

Two recent Council documents reveal internal discussions over the potential expansion of Frontex’s mandate. These come ahead of the expected formal revision of Frontex’s mandate in 2026. They give a glimpse of what member states and the Commission have in mind for the agency’s role in the EU’s future deportation machine.

The future of Frontex: hybrid threats

A note (pdf) from the Presidency to the Working Party on Frontiers on 30 October 2025 explores whether and how Frontex’s mandate should be expanded in the context of “hybrid threats”.

Describing such threats as a “key challenge at the external borders” of the EU, the note first outlines provisional definitions of “hybrid threats” and then focusses on the “instrumentalisation/weaponisation” of migration as an example.

The Presidency note refers to suggestions from unnamed member states that Frontex’s role and mandate should be expanded to counter hybrid threats. This could take advantage of, for instance, its aerial surveillance capabilities.

Framing instrumentalisation as an issue of EU security, the note runs through the various laws in place or in the works to allow states to restrict or suspend border procedures at times of alleged instrumentalisation (including the ‘Crisis and Force Majeure’ regulation and amendments to the Schengen Borders Code).

(Hybrid threats have also recently been added to forthcoming legislation updating grounds for triggering the suspension of visa-free arrangements with third countries.)

The Presidency then invites delegates to discuss:

…if and how the mandate of Frontex… needs to be amended to ensure that Frontex can effectively support Member States faced with instrumentalisation and possibly other hybrid threats, such as recent airspace violations by drones and other flying objects used for smuggling.

The Presidency suggests a few ways to do this, for instance updating provisions of the Frontex Regulation around rapid border interventions, hotspot areas and migration management support teams. It also suggests amendments to the European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) framework.

The note concludes by asking delegations several questions, including: how hybrid threats should be defined; whether and how the Frontex Regulation should be amended; whether the EIBM framework needs to be updated, and; whether a potential Frontex mandate expansion should focus on “hybrid threats beyond the instrumentalisation of migrants”.

The future of Frontex: engagement with third countries and return hubs

Another Presidency note (pdf) to the same committee explores:

• whether it should be made easier for Frontex to engage with and operate in non-EU states;
• how Frontex could be deployed to conduct deportations from one third country to another;
• what role Frontex should play in the overall return hubs system.

The note begins by laying out Frontex’s current engagements with non-EU states, from extensive deployment in the Balkans to other regions where Frontex has “limited visibility and operational footprint”. Senegal and Mauritania are cited as two examples of countries with which the Commission has been unable to secure formal Frontex status agreements.

The Presidency notes “widespread support” from member states for loosening the rules to allow for more informal Frontex deployments (pre-departure checks at third country airports or other crossing points, for instance).

Going further, the note discusses how rules may be loosened to allow Frontex return teams to be deployed in non-EU states, observing that “Member States agree” this should be allowed. The Presidency invites delegations to discuss how this could work in practice.

Giving Frontex the power to conduct deportations from one non-EU state to another was proposed during the last revision of its mandate, resulting in the 2019 Regulation. However, the plans were rejected by the Parliament and did not make it into the final rules.

Finally, with ‘return hubs’ (deportation camps) expected to be established in non-EU states, the Presidency invites delegations to discuss whether Frontex:

…should be able to assist Member States that enter into agreements with third countries on return hubs for persons with illegal stay in the EU.

The note concludes by asking delegations: what the main obstacles are to the above suggestions; how they envision looser Frontex working arrangements with third countries; whether the Frontex Regulation should be amended; and whether member states support Frontex taking part in deportations from one third country to another as well as assisting member states in deporting people to return hubs.

Member states debate proposal on interoperability in new digital border systems

As the EU continues to roll out its various interoperable digital border surveillance and control systems, delegates in the Working Party on Frontiers (WPF) and the Working Party on Justice and Home Affairs Information Exchange (IXIM), have commented on proposals from the Belgian delegation to tighten up the system.

Building on ideas emerging from interoperability-linked expert groups, the Belgian “Non-paper” (pdf)  pushes three proposals to “mitigate further risks” as the systems roll out.

These risks appear to be that:

• on the one hand, the systems may become overwhelmed, leading to bottlenecks and delays at the border as well as increased costs on member states;
• on the other, the systems may not be as effective as hoped in rejecting undesired people at the border.

There also appears concern that in “crisis situations” the systems may not be ready.

Noting that many outstanding issues remain with the system, and the legal bases for solutions do not exist as yet, the Belgian delegation urged consideration of three measures in particular:

• “Pre-launching” the Multiple Identity Detector (MID) system, an automated check to detect the use of false identities. In this context, “pre-launch” means the system would be used before an individual has been granted or refused entry via the Entry/Exit System.
• Expanding Frontex’s role in the operations of the MID system beyond a ten-month transitional period. This would require changing the agency’s mandate.
• Creating a central “Communication Solution” channel for exchanges between agencies and systems.

A compilation of delegation comments (pdf) on these proposals was presented to the WPF and IXIM groups on 24 September 2024.

Opinions of the MID pre-launch proposal are mixed:

• Norway appears sceptical and wants more review. Norwegian delegates also expressed concern over the phrase “pre-launch”, which may suggest a measure outside of the current legal basis for the systems.
• Sweden similarly disagrees with the phrase, but believes that in any case the current legal basis allows for the MID to be launched before an entry decision is made, and urges it be done that way to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of border control.
• Czechia believes there is “consensus” on the need for the pre-launch, but is more concerned about the ongoing rollout of the EES system.
• Romania and Slovakia broadly agree that some kind of a pre-launch is necessary, to shorten border check times and prevent bottlenecks.
• Malta agrees with the Commission that more examination of the topic is needed, a view that seems to be held by most member states.

On whether the role of Frontex should be extended past the one-year MID transition period, comments reflect an anxiety that the idea has not been properly thought through:

• Czechia questions how this would work in practice, both in a logistical sense and on where ultimate responsibility for decisions would sit (particularly if disputes are raised).
• Romania thinks review in other fora should take place before member states approach a decision. Delegates question what value Frontex offers that isn’t already within member states’ abilities, and how the proposal may affect national staffing numbers. They also note the feasibility study on the revision of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation
• Germany too says the extension of Frontex’s role should be carefully considered.
• Norway argues the experience and knowledge Frontex builds up during the transition period should be retained, even while acknowledging “outstanding legal questions” and concerns over data protection, among other issues. Delegates also argue against undertaking any legal changes if that will slow the overall interoperability project down.
• Sweden raises similar issues around legality and data protection, but also questions how the system would be implemented in practice, broadly implying it prefers national on-site border guards to handle the process, and wishes to avoid a situation where member states become fully reliant on Frontex. Sweden also directly questions “whether this would be the best use of the [expanded Frontex] budget.”
• Slovakia and Malta are broadly in favour, even as the former is wary of expanding Frontex’s mandate and the latter would prefer the solution be “optional” for member states.

Comments on the central “Communication Solution” proposal show a broad consensus in favour, with Czechia noting “the decision to create a new (central) communication channel is highly probable.” Concerns remain, however, with Norway flagging data and rights issues inherent to such a centralised system. Sweden echoes those concerns and also argues for concrete guidelines on what information and text can be shared on the platform, warning there are considerable legal hurdles. Sweden also argues such a channel is a ‘nice to have’ but not essential to the overall interoperability project.

Other comments include:

• Various member states support Belgium’s call for impact assessments on the above measures.
• Spain suggests an “Interoperability Rapid Response Team” be created, to be deployed in “situations of urgent intervention”, as well as a bespoke EU-managed Interoperability Fund.

A presidency note (pdf) on the state of play of the interoperability implementation has also been circulated and is on the Statewatch site.