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How the EU coordinates migration control around Africa: a million little deals

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19 May 2026

Every year the European Commission produces a report summarising the state of external migration cooperation. Divided by regions and then countries, the report offers insight into the latest projects, spending and diplomacy the EU is using to pursue its goal of keeping people from reaching Europe. The January 2026 edition – covering activity in 2025 – reveals the EU continues to put significant effort into securing deportation agreements with African nations. It is also working to re-establish a diplomatic presence in the Sahel region, with an eye to restricting people moving through the region.

Image: Sasha Kaunas, Unsplash

This article is published as part of Statewatch's Outsourcing Borders project, funded by Brot für die Welt, Misereor and Pro Asyl. Sign up to the Outsourcing Borders newsletter here.

The 2026 edition of the report: “Update on the state of play of external cooperation in the field of migration policy” (pdf) was presented to the Council of the EU’s Working Party on External Aspects of Asylum and Migration on 21 January 2026.

The update nominally covers all world regions but has a particular focus on Africa and the Western Balkans. Because Africa is the origin continent of most irregular migrants arriving on the EU’s southern shores, it is the focus of most EU efforts to prevent people moving. The Western Balkans, on the other hand, is a transit region where most countries are in the (long) process of moving towards EU member status. As such, Western Balkans nations are actively engaging with the EU on migration- and border-related matters, whereas cooperation with African nations varies to a large degree.

The details found in this document reflect what is already known about the EU’s current priorities when it comes to migration. Namely: there is a very strong desire to increase deportations of undesired foreigners from the EU. In that light, it is unsurprising to see considerable diplomatic and political effort put into securing ‘readmissions agreements’, also known as deportation agreements, that would clear some of the existing hurdles to more deportations.

At the same time, a lot of EU engagement around the Sahel region is reported in this document. The EU’s leaders clearly feel anxious about the loss of influence in the region, in light of several coups d'état, growing resentment against Europe, and the increasing influence of other actors such as Russia. This matters to the EU because many people come from, or travel through, Sahel countries on their way to Europe. The EU set out its ‘renewed Sahel strategy, in a document obtained by Statewatch, which articulates these anxieties. That document attempted to impress on EU policymakers the need to be sensitive to Sahel countries’ needs and interests, in order to pursue a ‘partnership’ strategy that will be convincing. This ‘external cooperation’ document, however, makes it clear that for the EU there is one main priority: keeping people where they are.

Notable updates on Africa from the January 2025 edition of the document (pdf) include:

• In Cabo Verde, a meeting of the committee dealing with deportations was expected to take place in the first quarter of 2026. In November 2025, Cabo Verde and Frontex (the EU’s border agency) launched an “aerial surveillance pilot project”, apparently to improve maritime surveillance.

• In Cameroon, a national migration policy is reported to still be in development with the support of the EU. (The EU is involved in shaping many such policies with African nations, it being a simple way to try to push its externalisation agenda abroad). Cameroon already has deportation agreements with Spain, France and Belgium but agreed in 2024 to explore a deal with the EU as a whole. A series of reported diplomatic meetings in recent years suggests the EU is actively pursuing this agreement.

• Ethiopia, a country which has been subject to visa sanctions because of its perceived lack of cooperation on deportations (see here for a full explainer of how EU visa sanctions work), hosted EU diplomats several times to discuss the matter.

• In Mauritania, there has been significant activity. Mauritania is seen by the EU as a ‘key partner’ for mobility restriction, given its location and long coast near the Canary Islands. It is reported that “thanks to Mauritania’s efforts” (namely intercepting migrant boats with EU support), arrivals to the Canary Islands decreased 60%. Mauritania is reportedly still negotiating a ‘working arrangement’ with Frontex which would give the agency greater influence over border control there.

The report notes “recent agreements” on irregular migration between Mauritania and Senegal, another ‘key partner’ on migration. This reflects the EU’s ‘whole-of-route’ strategy – trying to influence borders and mobility along the whole ‘route’ travelled by irregular migrants. The report also notes the need to resume cooperation with neighbouring Mali, given how many Malians enter or pass through Mauritania. Mauritania is also reported to be working on a national migration policy.

Mauritania is apparently calling for further EU financial support, given increased flows from Mali and increased maritime operations. In return, Mauritania appears to be promising to prevent more departures. Two “migrant transit centres” refurbished with EU money were delivered at the end of 2025.

Of particular note is a comment about public perception regarding EU-Mauritania cooperation: "Many critical comments have been made against the EU in terms of alleged abused of (human rights) in Mauritania. All this requires a discreet level of visibility and prudent communication".

• Regarding Mali, an origin country of significant numbers of people on the move, EU support to Mauritania is described as “remarkable” but insufficient. It therefore recommends more measures “upstream” in Mali.

The mandate for an EU civilian mission (EUCAP SAHEL Mali) was renewed to January 2027, with migration described as a ‘priority’. The report recommends a whole raft of measures for migration control in the region, including: “advising, training activities and infrastructure support being provided to various Malian actors (...), such as the Border Police Directorate, the National Border Directorate and the Brigade for the Suppression of Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings (BRTMTEH)”. In this context, a regional EU-funded counter-smuggling programme (MISPEAC) has been extended to Mali, and the EU are discussing greater diplomatic engagement, specifically with migration in mind. Further financing for these projects is reported to be “under consideration”.

A meeting with Altaï Consulting regarding Mali is reported to have taken place in December 2024. Altaï is described as “working with the EU institutions, in charge of identifying avenues for new EU financing in the area of migration”.

• In Niger, cooperation is reported to have resumed in May 2025, after relations were cut following Niger’s 2023 coup. Five projects are reported to have been signed, covering: “migration (technical assistance), the private sector, education, communication and (environmental programme) the Great Green Wall”. Various diplomatic meetings are reported through 2025 and 2026, and the EU has expressed its desire to “continue collaborat(ing) with Niger”.

• Nigeria, which recently signed deportation agreements with the EU and UK, is described as still being on the ‘priority list’ for a Frontex working arrangement. (Statewatch has learned that there has been resistance in the Nigerian government to the EU’s externalisation agenda, as there is concern about the impact it might have on peoples’ ability to move around West Africa.)

• Senegal, which has received significant funding from the EU for migration control (see a Statewatch analysis of EU-Senegal cooperation here), continues to work with the EU at the diplomatic and technical levels. Negotiations are reported to be underway for an EU-Senegal strategic and comprehensive partnership covering migration.

• Frontex is reported to still be negotiating a working arrangement with The Gambia. Visa sanctions enacted by the EU, in light of the Gambia's perceived 'poor' deportation cooperation, continue.

• Somalia is described as a priority country for deportations. The idea that such deportations will ‘deter’ potential future migration is mentioned.

• Frontex is still negotiating a working arrangement with Morocco. A Frontex Liaison Officer was deployed to Rabat at the end of 2025.

• Algeria, one of the North African countries typically the least interested in working with the EU on migration, appears to be slowly warming to the idea. Algeria is a priority country for a working arrangement with Europol (that would involve cooperation on crime and likely data exchange). While Algeria has nominally expressed interest in this, it appears a long way off. Algeria has apparently shown interest in cooperation on counter-smuggling, though with a preference for development-focussed measures rather than border control. EU efforts on this matter apparently “have not yielded results so far”.

• The first €1bn instalment of a €4bn support package to Egypt was reportedly released by the EU on 15 January 2026.

• In Libya, there continues to be significant EU engagement. The mandate of the military mission EUNAVFOR MED IRINI (which nominally exists to enforce an arms embargo on Libya), is confirmed to now include: “the capacity building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea and the gathering of information on the business model of human smuggling and, since 11 March 2025, (to) contribute to maritime situational awareness on other illicit activities”. The mission’s mandate has been extended to 31 March 2027. Further, “fruitful dialogue” is reported on a monthly basis with units of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard operating in both the east and west of the country. Further capacity building is expected to begin, in collaboration with other EU missions in Libya (EUBAM Libya and EUDEL Libya).

Under the EU’s new external funding instrument NDICI-Global Europe, Libya is reported to be “benefitting from bilateral and regional actions, adopted between 2021 and 2024, amounting to approximately EUR 220 million”. Further funding can be expected under the “Multi-Annual Measure for Migration in the Southern Neighbourhood for 2025-2027” (which has an overall budget of €675m).

• Alongside updates from Africa, the report also notes that discussions on deportations, ‘voluntary’ and forced, are reported to be ongoing with Iraq, at both political and technical levels.

 

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