28 March 2012
- European Parliament adopts highly critical report
- Amnesty International say extradition agreement flawed
The meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) in Luxembourg on 6 June mandated the Presidency to sign the controversial agreements with the USA on extradition and mutual legal assistance. This will be followed by the formal signing of the agreements at the EU-US Summit on 25 June. Any future bilateral - between an EU member state and the USA - "will have to be compatible with these EU-US agreements." A new version of the two agreements, together with some limited explanatory notes is now available (dated 3 June 2003): EU-US agreements (pdf)
The draft agreements have been under discussion since last summer but were not de-classified from their "Confidential" status until 6 May 2003 after a long campaign by civil society (see: EU: Council capitulates and releases draft EU-US agreements: Report) Only then were national parliaments and the European parliament - who under the EC Treaty's Articles 24 and 38 do not have to be consulted - able to discuss the issues raised. The UK parliament is still taking evidence on the issue.
On Tuesday 3 June the European Parliament at its plenary session adopted a critical report by a large majority (Report on EU-US agreements (pdf). The vote was 356 MEPs in favour of the report, 63 against and there were 35 abstentions. An attempt to call on the Council to reject the draft agreements was supported by 174 MEPs but 243 were against.
The Resolution agreed by the parliament says that:
"it is paradoxical to sign an agreement with the United States when several European Union citizens are still being held at the US military base at Guantanamo Bay, quite unlawfully under both US and international law and without the slightest guarantee that they will receive a fair trial"
The parliament has called for the signature to the agreements to be made conditional on finding a fair solution on those held at Guantanamo Bay.
It also calls for: an absolute guarantee that authorisation for extradition cannot be given where a person might be brought before a military tribunal or who might face the death penalty; guarantees on the correct use of data supplied and the rights of a data subject to get access to data held on them and for the right of erasure or correction to be included; that joint monitoring committees be established at parliamentary level; and that EU member states should give priority to obligations under the International Criminal Court rather than an non-EU state.
Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor, comments:
"The Council of the European Union intends to go ahead and authorise the signing of these agreements as they stand at the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 5 June, the views of the European Parliament will simply be ignored. When they come back to national parliaments for ratification they will not be allowed to change a dot or comma.
The agreement on extradition leaves open the question whether EU member states can extradited people who may face the death penalty and is silent on the issue of handing over evidence which may be used in a case where the death penalty may result.
The agreement on mutual legal assistance contains no data protection rights for those on whom information is gathered or who are put under surveillance as a result of a request from the USA. No rules are laid down for the accountability and scrutiny of what will be in effect self-regulating joint investigations teams"
Statewatch analysis of the EU-USA agreement on extradition
The scope of the draft agreement between the EU and the USA on extradition introduces a sentence threshold not a list of offences.
(Article 4) The agreement will apply to any suspected offence which carries a prison sentence of one year or more - an exceptionally low standard for the arrest and deportation of a suspect to another continent. This extends to an attempted offence, conspiracy or participation and to "any other offence specified in the request" if this is also punishable by a one year sentence - thus an extradition request could contain a "shopping list" of suspected offences meeting a very low threshold.
(Article 5) Requests for extradition will be through "diplomatic" channels but requests for "provisional arrest" can be made between Ministries of Justice (Article 6) whereby a person is arrested and held for a "hearing" before being extradited.
(Article 9) People already charged with an offence and whose case is before a court in the EU or who are in prison in the EU can be extradited for trial in the USA (Article 9: "Temporary surrender").
It is the draft (Article 10) on requests for extradition which led to the suspension of negotiations. This contains the simple statement that requests for extradition received by one EU member state from another member state falls under the European arrest warrant which not only means that extradition is virtually automatic (without legal processes examining the justifiability of the grounds for removal), it also allows for requests for search and seizure of evidence from the property of the suspected person. The US side asked to be treated the same way as an EU member state, the EU side said that this was almost impossible, the US side insisted, so the negotiations have been put on hold. The Article makes no mention of Special Courts (Military Tribunals).
(Article 11) If a person consents to extradition ("simplified extradition") then they can be handed over "without further proceedings".
(Article 12) Both the USA and the EU agree to "suspects in transit", that is, a suspect can come through either state on their way to a third state. This covers also people coming from third states.
(Article 13) On the sensitive issue of capital punishment the draft agreement was that extradition can be granted on "condition that the death penalty shall not be imposed on the person sought" or if this condition cannot be met on "condition that the death penalty if imposed shall not be carried out". If the requesting state (ie: the USA) does not accept these conditions: "the request for extradition may be denied" (emphasis added) - which is hardly cast-iron compliance with the ECHR. Moreover, the issue of the supplying of evidence to the USA by EU member states in cases where the death penalty may result is not addressed.
(Article 16) The agreement will "apply to offences committed before as well as after it enters into force". It will thus be retrospective without any time limit.
Analysis of the agreement on mutual legal assistance
The draft EU-US agreement on mutual legal assistance covers a range of areas of cooperation from the exchange of banking information to joint investigation teams. Its scope is very broad and general thus, for example, "mutual assistance shall be afforded to national administrative authorities investigating" matters for a criminal prosecution. (Article 8) could include requests for surveillance or the interception of communications (in conjunction with Article 5).
This agreement will apply to all EU member states even those which do not have bilateral agreements with the USA or who do not have agreements on the provisions of this agreement.
(Article 3) says the agreement will apply to all EU Member States (including those who join).
(Article 4) will allow the USA to request banking information and effectively "extends the provisions of the Protocol to the EU Mutual Legal Assistance Convention of 2000 to the USA" (Home Office letter)
They can ask an EU state to:
"ascertain if the banks located in its territory possess information on whether an identified natural or legal person suspected of or charged with a criminal offence is the holder of a bank account or accounts"
Request are to be made between "central authorities" in the EU Member States and "national authorities in the United States" - potentially through "Financial Intelligence Units".
Requests for banking information can apply to any alleged crime. On an ad hoc basis a state can limit the provision of information to offences "under the laws of both the requested and requesting states" and/or to "offences carrying a minimum of a four year sentence". However, these limitations do not apply to accounts "associated with terrorist activity" nor where there are a series of "serious criminal activities" punishable under the law of both states.
(Article 5) Article 5 covers the setting up of EU-US joint investigative teams and says:
"The Contracting Parties shall, to the extent that they have already not done so, take such measures as may be necessary to enable joint investigative teams to be established and operated in the respective territories of the United States and each [EU] Member State, for the purpose of facilitating criminal investigations or prosecutions involving the United States and one or more Member States.
The procedures under which the team is to operate, such as its composition, duration, location, organisation, functions, purpose and the participation of team members of a State in investigative activities taking place in another State's territory shall be as agreed between the competent authorities concerned.
The competent authorities concerned shall communicate directly for the purposes of the establishment and operation of such teams except that where the exceptional complexity, broad scope, or other circumstances involved are deemed to require more central coordination as to some or all aspects, the States may agree upon other appropriate channels of communication to that end.
Where the joint investigative team needs investigative measures to be taken in one of the States setting up the team, a member of the team of the State may request its own competent authorities to take those measures without the other States have to submit a request for mutual legal assistance. The required legal standard for obtaining the measure in that State shall be the standard applicable to its domestic investigative activities."
Commentary: joint investigative teams
1. The draft article on joint investigative teams says that the contracting parties shall take measures to establish them:
"to the extent they have already not done so"
which suggests that a number of joint investigative teams have already been set up and are operational.
2. Joint investigation teams will be self-regulating, their composition, functions and purpose will not be laid down and subject to any democratic scrutiny. There is no mention of legal liability or judicial review for actions taken by US agents nor members of these teams drawn from EU member states.
3. EU law enforcement officers in the joint teams from the state where the operation is being conducted will be allowed to circumvent formal requests for mutual assistance by directly requesting surveillance by other national agencies, the interception of telecommunications, search warrants, arrest and detention. No mechanisms for accountability are set out.
4. As the composition of the teams is left entirely to officials in the EU and the USA - and their scope extends beyond crime to include terrorism and internal security - they could be comprised of police, customs, immigration and drugs agents plus internal security agencies (like MI5, the FBI and CIA) - and the could operate as free-ranging anti-terrorist or anti-protestor squads.
Under Article 7 requests for "mutual legal assistance", for example, telecommunications surveillance or search of home or office can be made by fax or e-mail. This is only to require "formal confirmation" when "required by the requested state" - so the norm is likely not to require formal confirmation.
Article 8 extends the concept of mutual assistance beyond that of the law enforcement agencies to "administrative" or "regulatory" authorities.
Article 9 covers the so-called "extensive" data protection clause. In total it reads as follows:
Article 9: Limitations on the use to protect personal and other data (see footnote A:)
1. The requesting State may use any evidence or information obtained from the requested State:
(a) for the purpose of its criminal investigations and proceedings;
(b) for preventing an immediate and serious threat to its public security;
(c) in its non-criminal judicial or administrative proceedings directly related to investigations or proceedings:
i. set forth in subparagraph (a)
ii. for which mutual legal assistance was rendered under Article 8;
(d) for any other purpose, if the information or evidence has been made public within the framework of proceedings for which they were transmitted, or in any of the situations described in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c); and
(e) for any other purpose, only with the prior consent of the requested State.
2. a. This Article shall not prejudice the ability of the requested State to impose additional conditions in a particular case where the particular request for assistance could not be complied with in the absence of such conditions. Where additional conditions have been imposed in accordance with this paragraph, the requested State may require the requesting State to give information on the use made of the evidence or information.
b. Generic restrictions with respect to the legal standards of the requesting State for processing personal data may not be imposed by the requested State as a condition under subparagraph (a) to providing evidence or information.
3. Where, following disclosure to the requesting State, the requested State becomes aware of circumstances that may cause it to seek an additional condition in a particular case, the requested State may consult with the requesting State to determine the extent to which the evidence and information can be protected.
4. A requested State may apply the use limitation provision of the applicable bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in lieu of the present article, where doing so will result in less restriction on the use of information and evidence than provided for in this article.
5. Where a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in force between the United States of America and a Member State on the date of signature of this Agreement, permits limitation of the obligation to provide assistance with respect to certain tax offences, the Member State concerned may indicate, in its exchange of written instruments with the United States described in Article 3, paragraph 2, that, with respect to such offences, it will continue to apply the use limitation provision of that treaty. [Footnote to Article 9.5: This paragraph is intended to apply solely to Luxembourg].
Footnote A: The Contracting Parties will exchange diplomatic notes to explain that subparagraph 2b should be construed in the sense of paragraph 269 of the Cybercrime Convention Explanatory Report. Paragraph 269 in the Cybercrime Convention Explanatory Report says:
"269. In line with this approach, it was understood that apart from those grounds set out in Article 28, refusal of assistance on data protection grounds may be invoked only in exceptional cases. Such a situation could arise if, upon balancing the important interests involved in the particular case (on the one hand, public interests, including the sound administration of justice and, on the other hand, privacy interests), furnishing the specific data sought by the requesting Party would raise difficulties so fundamental as to be considered by the requested Party to fall within the essential interests ground of refusal. A broad, categorical, or systematic application of data protection principles to refuse cooperation is therefore precluded. Thus, the fact the Parties concerned have different systems of protecting the privacy of data (such as that the requesting Party does not have the equivalent of a specialised data protection authority) or have different means of protecting personal data (such as that the requesting Party uses means other than the process of deletion to protect the privacy or the accuracy of the personal data received by law enforcement authorities), do not as such constitute grounds for refusal. Before invoking "essential interests" as a basis for refusing co-operation, the requested Party should instead attempt to place conditions which would allow the transfer of the data. (see Article 27, paragraph 6 and paragraph 271 of this report)."
Commentary: data protection
1. The data protection provisions, such as they are, in paragraph 2: the first allows requested states to impose restrictions on the use of information and require information on the use made of the information supplied, the second, allows for no such general restrictions to be imposed (in this instance, the fact that the USA does not have a data protection law cannot be used as an excuse for not supplying information).
2. The scope of information to be exchanged is extensive, for the purpose of any criminal investigation, threats to public security, "non-criminal judicial or administrative proceedings", for "any other purpose" if it covers the former categories, and for "any other purpose" with the prior consent of the requested state.
3. Where a bilateral agreement with the USA would allow "less restriction on the use of information and evidence" then it may be used.
4. No rights of access to data held or rights of correction and deletion are included. Rights expressly guaranteed by the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and the EU Data Protection Directive.
5. No conditions on who can have access to the information supplied by EU states to the USA are included.
6. No conditions are set out to prohibit "added value" or "intelligence" or unfounded suspicions being added are set out.
7. No conditions are set out prohibiting passing information to third parties.
In short,there are no effective data protection provisions worth speaking of and nothing to ensure that the considerable body of EU data protection legislation is respected.
Article 10 says that a request and its contents should be kept confidential which impacts on data protection above and also makes it impossible to have any independent scrutiny of the implementation of the agreement.
Article 12 says that the scope of the agreement:
"shall apply to offences committed before as well as after it enters into force"
In short it is retrospective without time limit - unlike, for example, the International Criminal Court.
1. Draft agreements between the European Union and the United States of America on extradition and on mutual legal assistance, 9153/03, 3.6.03
2. Draft agreements between the European Union and the United States of America on extradition and on mutual legal assistance, 8295/1/03, 2.5.03.
3. Procedure regarding the draft Agreements on judicial cooperation with the USA: 8296/1/03 (Word) 8296/1/03 (pdf)
4. European Parliament report adopted on 3 June 2003: Report on EU-US agreements (pdf)
5. EU: Council capitulates and releases draft EU-US agreements: Statewatch report
6. Text of the letter from the UK parliament's Select Committee on the European Union (House of Lords) and the Europe Scrutiny Committee (House of Commons) to the Greek Presidency of the Council of the European Union: Joint letter
Earlier correspondence: Letter from Home Office Minister, Bob Ainsworth, to Select Committee on the European Union, 27 March 2003: Home Office letter (pdf) and Letter from Lord Grenfell, chair of the Select Committee on the European Union to the Home Office Minister, 3 April 2003: Letter (Word)
7. Statewatch exclusive reports in April 2003:
EU-USA agreements - the drafts on the table: Full report and documentation
- two agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance being negotiated in secret
- extradition to USA to apply to any suspected offences bringing just a one year sentence
- USA successfully opposed any reference to the International Criminal Court or to Special Courts (Military Tribunals)
- "A broad, categorical, or systematic application of data protection principles to refuse cooperation is.. precluded"
- FBI and other US agencies to operate in EU in joint investigation teams with full powers of search, surveillance and arrest
EU-USA and UK-USA: Full report and documentation
UK parliament Committee refuses to scrutinise agreements in secret
UK agrees new treaty with USA on extradition
UK and USA prepare for "simultaneous attacks"
8. Statewatch exclusive report in August 2002
EU-US agreement being negotiated: Special Statewatch Report
Secret agreement on criminal matters, investigative procedures and joint teams being negotiated without the the European or national parliaments being consulted. Statewatch refused access to full-text of document because: “the interest of protecting the Council’s objectives outweighs the interest in “democratic control”"
Spotted an error? If you've spotted a problem with this page, just click once to let us know.
Statewatch does not have a corporate view, nor does it seek to create one, the views expressed are those of the author. Statewatch is not responsible for the content of external websites and inclusion of a link does not constitute an endorsement. Registered UK charity number: 1154784. Registered UK company number: 08480724. Registered company name: The Libertarian Research & Education Trust. Registered office: c/o MDR, 88 Fleet Street, London EC4Y 1DH, UK. © Statewatch ISSN 1756-851X. Personal usage as private individuals "fair dealing" is allowed. We also welcome links to material on our site. Usage by those working for organisations is allowed only if the organisation holds an appropriate licence from the relevant reprographic rights organisation (eg: Copyright Licensing Agency in the UK) with such usage being subject to the terms and conditions of that licence and to local copyright law.