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Clear, hold, build: the UK’s new ‘neighbourhood’ policing strategy built on colonial military practice

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11 May 2026

The UK's new policing strategy, “Clear, Hold, Build”, has deep roots in colonial and military strategy. While it has been re-branded as a successful, community-centric approach, it has resulted in police targeting of some of society’s most marginalised groups. This historical analysis shows how its imperial doctrine represents an introduction of colonial military methods meant to dominate, rather than uplift, local communities.

Introduction

Clear Hold Build (CHB) is a new policing strategy that was introduced in January 2024 and has since been rolled out to every police force in the UK. It was hailed as a new and innovative method created by the Home Office, to counter serious organised crime impacting local communities.

In reality, this neighbourhood policing scheme actually takes its name from and was explicitly inspired by an American counterinsurgency strategy used against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Iraq and Afghanistan. Documents explaining the creation of Clear Hold Build also spell out how this nationwide policing method took inspiration from colonial military practices used to subjugate native populations in Algeria, Morocco and Malaysia.

A French general in Morocco

General Herbert Lyautey entered Marrakech in an armoured car in October 1912, just after the city fell to French forces. Six months earlier, Lyautey had been named Resident-General – that is, governor – of French Morocco, a colonial protectorate. 

He spent much of his 13 years in office “pacifying” the country. Upon his retirement in 1925, the  The New York Times lauded him as “a statesman whose work as colonial administrator has won more admiration and praise from more critics of more nations than any other colonizer of modern times.”

Lyautey’s pacification strategy built upon his previous military exploits in Algeria and Madagascar. It involved a combination of military force, economic incentives and administrative changes. These tactics were targeted at specific areas of the country, and then brought into line before being extended and connected, thus expanding the zone under colonial control. This method was taken up with gusto by other imperial powers in the century following Lyautey’s retirement.

The strategy has not only travelled around the globe. It has also shifted roles, from the realm of the military, to that of the police. In that guise, it has arrived on the streets of England and Wales.

“Clear, Hold, Build”

In January 2023, Suella Braverman, at the time the home secretary for the Conservative government, announced a new policing strategy against serious and organised crime in England and Wales: “Clear, Hold, Build”.

Braverman told parliament the plan was part of “a relentless focus on cutting crime, with no politically correct distractions. It means common-sense policing,” In a government press release, she celebrated the strategy as a way to take on “depraved criminals” and “create a brighter future for young people.”

Clear, Hold, Build (CHB) consists of three stages, as explained by the College of Policing:

Clear – interventions (arrests and relentless disruption) that target organised crime group members, their networks, business interests, criminality and spheres of influence. The police use all powers and levers to impede their ability to operate. This creates safer spaces to begin restoring community confidence.

Hold – interventions, counter-measures and contingency plans to consolidate and stabilise the initial clear phase. This stops remaining or other organised crime group members from capitalising on the vacuum created. It improves community confidence by ensuring spaces remain safe. Visible neighbourhood policing in hotspot areas provides continuing reassurance that police are still present.

Build – a single, whole-system approach to delivering community-empowered interventions that tackle drivers of crime, exploitation of vulnerabilities and geographic places where crime occurs. This improves living, working and recreational environment in the community for residents. It empowers them to work with stakeholders to generate resilience and build a safer community.

The College of Policing notes that though these phases “may initially happen in succession, they should afterwards be repeated as required. They may be implemented at the same time and recur continually but with different intensity through the life of the project.”

As the definition indicates, the police are not the only agency involved. The Home Office describes CHB as “ a model for uniting the resources of the police, partner agencies and the local community.” As noted by the council of the London borough of Tower Hamlets, the “clear” phase can involve “high visibility patrols, community and local business engagement, use of covert tactics and legislative powers open to both police and council enforcement officers.”

CHB was originally tested by West Yorkshire Police between 2020 and 2021 before it was expanded to a further seven forces between 2021 and 2022. It was supposed to be adopted by every police force in England and Wales by March 2024.

From Marrakech to Manchester, via Malaya and Mosul

Lyautey was not the first to deploy this model, and he would certainly not be the last.

In 1948, the British government announced the advent of the Malayan Emergency. The conflict was known to the Malayan National Liberation Army and its supporters as the Anti-British National Liberation War.

British military strategy in the conflict drew upon Lyautey’s work in Morocco. In Malaya, it was referred to as the “ink spot” or “oil spot” strategy. Military units were deployed to take control of targeted areas (“ink spots”), until the number of areas increased and they joined together, like ink spreading across blotting paper.

This effort has been considered by some as a success – but if the British won the battle, they lost the war. Malaya gained independence in 1957.

Similar methods were adopted by the US in Vietnam, and were later revived in the US-led military invasion of Iraq.

In 2006, as many had predicted prior to the invasion, the US occupation of Iraq was not going according to plan, with increasingly deadly results, in particular for Iraqi civilians. At the time, David Petraeus was a general in the US army and saw an opportunity for a new approach.

He drafted the US army’s first new field manual on counterinsurgency in 20 years.^[1] Drawing on US strategy in Vietnam, the British in Malaya, and Lyaeutey in Morocco, it introduced the concept of the “clear-hold-build operation.”

This, says the text, “is executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations.” It aims to “eliminate insurgent presence” and “reinforce political primacy.” The manual describes how the “clear” stage needs to involve “isolating the area to cut off external support and to kill or capture escaping insurgents.” The stated aims of CHB were to achieve “populace control” and “enforce compliance.”  Petraeus is now retired and a partner at KKR, a global investment company associated with boycotts due to its investment in Israeli businesses.

The anthropologist David Price has argued that this reinvigoration of counterinsurgency doctrine was “designed to convince a weary public that the war of occupation could be won: it is an attempt to legitimize war by ‘academizing’ it.’”[2] Another scholar – David Ucko, who currently works for NATO and whose work is directly referenced in Home Office documents on CHB – has described it as part of a lineage of “‘progressive’ occupation.”

Ucko also argued that deploying a CHB model means “the grass is mowed, and the armed struggle must start over – often with great effort. Neither side shines, but the insurgent suffers more, and the state gets to survive.” This metaphor has also been advanced by the academic Roger Petersen. He has argued that in some regions “militants and terrorists are as inevitable as grass growing in the front yard” and that “all a state can do is develop a machinery to cut the grass, a lawn mower so to speak.”^[3]

Anyone familiar with the Israeli occupation of Palestine will likely have heard this terminology of “mowing the lawn” before. It is therefore unsurprising that CHB has also reportedly been used as the basis of Israeli military operations against Palestinian people in Gaza, with Petraeus himself pitching his exploits in Iraq to Israeli officials. According to The Times of Israel, Petraeus said at a March 2024 event in Jerusalem:

The foundational concepts of counterinsurgency are that you clear an area, you hold it, and you hold it in a very significant manner… You wall it off. You create gated communities, as we call it… You use biometric ID cards because you’re trying to separate the enemy, the extremists, from the people. That’s the fundamental idea.

The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, a publication which features a host of American and Israeli generals, admirals and diplomats on its board of advisors, stated in May 2025 that CHB would be implemented in a renewed offensive in Gaza as part of “Operation Gideon’s Chariots.”

It was not wholesale policy transfer, however. The article noted that the IDF “appears to be borrowing from the US Army’s ‘clear, hold, build’ counterinsurgency doctrine though without a ‘build’ component.” Rather than build, the plan sought to deport: it included a “voluntary transfer plan” for Palestinians in Gaza.

From the military to the police

The brutal military origins of CHB are no secret. Official bodies acknowledge that its roots lie in “a three-phase military operating model.” In a February 2024 meeting with a Northampton community group,  

Its transfer from the military to the police appears to have been facilitated by a former detective turned Home Office policymaker, Shane Roberts. Roberts describes himself as the “creator” of CHB, responsible for its design, development and implementation as a local policing scheme.

  how he took “some original inspiration” from Hubert Lyautey. Roberts describes Lyautey’s career of colonial enforcement for the French empire as “a track record of helping harmonize communities,” noting his ability to work in “challenging social conditions.”

Roberts goes on to say:

…as Lyautey commented, if these follow-through steps were not taken, efforts would be in vain as simply clipping weeds results in only a temporary illusion of progress: what mattered was addressing the root.

Lyautey’s actual words  were a little more brutal, and were arguably precursors to the modern-day phraseology of “mowing the lawn.” The marshal argued that “after the plough has passed, the conquered land must be isolated and enclosed so that the good seed that is resistant to the bad can be sown.”[4]

Despite this language of conquest and domination, Roberts “believed these principles had wider utility and could potentially be replicated in a community-based response to tackle SOC [serious and organised crime].”

Community branding

CHB has subsequently been presented to the British public as a novel way to protect neighbourhoods from the threat of organised crime. In an effort to distance the doctrine from its military origins and from the very fact that it is a policing initiative, police forces have made significant efforts to give it a friendly face.

The College of Policing website advises using names that “resonate with the local community” and “do not sound too police led.” This includes rebranding efforts in Derbyshire, Gwent and Cumbria as that saw the adoption of the names ‘Project Unity’, ‘Respect Rhymney’ and ‘Happy Hopeful Hindpool’ respectively. In Chatham, Kent, a CHB initiative was launched as part of a “family fun day”.

Central to this approach has been the incorporation of local schools. Police officers have visited schools, setting up competitions in which schoolchildren create logos and slogans for local CHB initiatives.

One such logo was drawn by an 11-year old at Broadford Primary School as part of a mandatory competition which included over 90 schoolchildren. A teacher involved in the event told Statewatch:

If I'm honest they probably could've done with an introduction by the police to the competition, although we sold it and made it exciting perhaps they would have been more motivated if it was explained and introduced by those judging it?

The 11- year old winner of this rebranding competition was awarded with a certificate and a challenge coin, presented by local police officers and her head teacher. The winner was also congratulated for her efforts by Julia Lopez, MP for Hornchurch and Upminister, who stated “I have invited her and her family to join me for some tea and cake here in the Palace of Westminster, followed by a tour of Parliament.”

Targeting organised crime, or the homeless?

CHB was launched with the stated intention of targeting serious and organised crime. However, in reality this police strategy has resulted in the targeting of some of society’s most marginalised groups.

In Tower Hamlets in London, the adoption of a CHB framework was used to justify police action against unhoused people in the area. After clearing an area of tents in which people had been living, the Metropolitan Police published a statement stating that CHB “creates a space that can be used by everyone.” They further stated that “we are offering support and exploring suitable, sustainable accommodation options.”

However, the force said in response to a freedom of information request that “11 people and tents were moved with different outcomes, ranging from dispersal to a different location, to placing persons in accommodation.” Their response also stated that “a number of people abandoned their tents. These were placed in storage but were not claimed so were subsequently disposed of after 7 days.”

Official evaluation

One year following the national launch of CHB, the Home Office published an evaluation of the impacts and influence of this strategy in practice, drawing on the views of policing stakeholders, crime analyses and community surveys. The Home Office concluded that overall CHB can be an “effective approach for reducing crime.”

The evaluation highlighted enthusiastic responses from police officers. One said:

But the community feeling and what it feels like to police that area… it feels different to walking police round that area and I don’t know how I would measure it... I've had people come up and hug me in the street, which would never have happened.

Another told the evaluators:

A lot of warrants conducted a lot of arrests which I think compared to before we did it they were very low numbers whereas if you looked at how much money wise in drugs we’ve seized now it’s through the roof. It’s something that I could never have imagined our small team would ever get to a number that high.

However, the evaluation’s statistical data, taken from community surveys in the year following the rollout of CHB, offers a less rosy picture. Only 11% of participants said that their local areas had become a more pleasant place to live following the launch of CHB, with 51% responding it had become less pleasant. Only 10% of those surveyed said criminal investigations in the local area had improved, while 30% said it had gotten worse. And just 10% said the police had got better at listening to the concerns of the public in the local area, while 35% said they had got worse.

CHB has also led to some fierce critique. Lambeth Cop Watch told Statewatch that the strategy:

…has brought nothing new to Lambeth; only a doubling-down on the same failed, harmful, and racist approaches that have defined policing for decades.

We are seeing regular violent arrests on our streets, particularly targeting some of the most marginalised – unhoused people, people who have no alternative but use drugs outdoors, those sex working to survive…we are seeing those most affected by the lack of welfare support criminalised.

Conclusion

Clear Hold Build highlights a new spirit in the UK government’s approach to policing. This repurposed imperial doctrine represents an introduction of colonial military methods which were originally created to dominate, rather than uplift, local communities. It provides disturbing insight into the mindset of both government and police institutions which see these tactics as suitable for safeguarding local neighbourhoods.

This policy also forms part of an invisible militarisation of local police. UK police forces adopting the equipment and appearance of the military have long been a point of focus. However, this strategy transforms community policing into a military process in a way which is both more invasive and harder to spot.

Finally, efforts to spread Clear Hold Build internationally may see this colonial doctrine as the new standard of community policing beyond the borders of the UK.

Footnotes

^[1] Petraeus, David H., and James F. Amos. Counterinsurgency: U. S. Army Field Manual. DIANE Publishing Company, 2007.

[2] Price, “Faking Scholarship,” in The Counter- Counterinsurgency Manual: Or, Notes on Demilitarizing Anthropology, by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2009). p. 71.

^[3] Petersen, Roger. ‘The Future of American Military Intervention’. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, no. 18 (2021): 180–95, p. 189.

[4] Hubert Lyautey, Du rôle colonial de l’armée (Paris: Armand Colin, 1900), pp. 6, 10–12 (translation in Ucko, ‘Beyond clear–hold–build’, p. 527).

Annex

Lambeth Clear Hold Build full statement:

Lambeth Cop Watch statement on the “Clear, Hold, Build” policing tactic 

The deployment of “Clear, Hold, Build” in Lambeth under the so-called “Stronger Communities Project” is a textbook example of how state violence is repackaged as community safety. This tactic has brought nothing new to Lambeth; only a doubling-down on the same failed, harmful, and racist approaches that have defined policing for decades. We are seeing regular violent arrests on our streets, particularly targeting some of the most marginalised – unhoused people, people who have no alternative but use drugs outdoors, those sex working to survive. Lambeth Council “is at the forefront of the national housing crisis”(1), with the council struggling to find homes for those who need them. Rather than investing in fixing this crisis, we are seeing those most affected by the lack of welfare support criminalised.  

1. Hotspot policing entrenches racialised over-policing 

“Hotspot” policing in Lambeth means the aggressive concentration of police powers in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods with higher racialised populations. Research (2) has shown that hotspot mapping coincides more closely with levels of deprivation than crime rates. Recent evidence (3) shows that police “more frequently stop and search members of the public in places where the well-off and the economically precarious co-exist”. As areas like Brixton get increasingly gentrified, we are witnessing this happen in real time, as our neighbours become more regularly targeted by policing and stigmatising messages of “anti-social behaviour”. This kind of policing inevitably results in disproportionate stop-and-search, targeting of “known offenders,” and selective enforcement of low-level offences like cannabis possession. Our members regularly witness the targeting of young people, particularly young Black boys, with very little justification for the stops. The result is not safety but a deepening of mistrust, the normalisation of state harassment, and the further criminalisation of already over-policed communities.  

2. Incentivising high-intensity arrests undermines safety 

Clear, Hold, Build rewards officers for making high-intensity arrests, escalating situations instead of defusing them. The pressure to deliver visible enforcement leads to dangerous and unnecessary interventions, prioritising headline-friendly arrest numbers over the actual wellbeing of residents. Public safety cannot be built on the back of police aggression.  

3. Targeting low-level “anti-social behaviour” reinforces bias 

From fly-tipping to other petty offences, the focus on low-hanging fruit under the banner of “anti-social behaviour” rests entirely on the high discretion of individual officers. These powers are consistently exercised in ways that disproportionately impact marginalised groups, making “anti-social behaviour” policing another vehicle for racialised enforcement and criminalisation. Unhoused people are most likely to bear the brunt of these policies.  

4. Schools must remain police-free spaces 

While education on violence against women and girls is important, police have no place delivering it in schools. For many young people - especially those from communities heavily targeted by policing - the presence of officers is re-traumatising and undermines trust in educational institutions. “Scared straight” tactics, still favoured by many officers, are harmful, ineffective, and have no role in safeguarding young people. Schools should be spaces of care and safeguarding, not state surveillance. 

5. Diversionary programmes and racial disparities 

Although diversionary schemes could, in theory, offer a step away from criminalisation, the reality is far from equitable. Black people are more likely to be arrested than white people following stop-and-search, less likely to be offered out-of-court disposals, and more likely to receive penalty notices that carry lasting consequences. Requiring admissions of guilt for diversionary options compounds these inequalities. Without addressing these systemic disparities, diversion becomes just another point at which racism is reproduced. 

Policing does not and cannot build safe communities. The “Clear, Hold, Build” model simply entrenches racialised targeting, criminalisation of poverty, further erosion of trust, and the embedding of police power in spaces where it does not belong. 

True community safety will never come from more officers, more powers, or more surveillance. It will come from community-led initiatives to meet our collective housing, food, youth services, mental health support, and educational needs - not from strategies designed to “clear” people out, “hold” them in jails, and “build” over their lives. Copwatch stands for full decriminalisation of drug use and sex work, which will allow those needing support to access services, rather than be stuck in a cycle of criminalisation and precarity. See our “What to do instead of calling the police” guide for a more detailed description of alternatives: https://ugc.production.linktr.ee/e59cc080-853d-4e82-ba2c-88ff328217b6_dont-call-the-police-resource.pdf 

1. Source:https://love.lambeth.gov.uk/new-report-reveals-scale-of-housing-budget-pressure-faced-by-councils/ 
2. Source: Shiner, M., Carre, Z., Delsol, R., & Eastwood, N. (2018). The Colour of Injustice: ‘Race’, Drugs and Law Enforcement in England and Wales. https://www.release.org.uk/publications/ColourOfInjustice 
3. Source: Joel H Suss, Thiago R Oliveira, Economic Inequality and the Spatial Distribution of Stop and Search: Evidence from London, The British Journal of Criminology, Volume 63, Issue 4, July 2023, Pages 828–847, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azac069