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Exporting carceral migration “management”: €30 million from the EU to Senegal for migration control

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Country/Region

20 November 2025

€30 million from the EU's aid budget has been provided to Senegal for migration control. An examination of European Commission documents makes clear the main focus of the funding: border surveillance and control, maritime interception of people trying to leave Senegal to travel to European territory, and reception/detention infrastructure.

Senegal's former president, Macky Sall, in the European Parliament in 2012. Image: European Parliament, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

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Key points

• In October 2024 the EU announced it would provide €30 million from its aid budget to Senegal
• The funding focuses on stepping up the fight against migrant smuggling: measures to enhance border surveillance and control, maritime interception, and reception/detention infrastructure
• The funding priorities align with some of those supported by the Senegalese government elected in April 2024, but also fit neatly into longer-term dynamics of cooperation with the EU and other external actors
• Ultimately, the plans can be seen as contributing to a new era of carceral EU migration “management” in West Africa

EU budget boost for Senegal

In October 2024, Jutta Urpilainen, the former European Commissioner for International Partnerships, visited Senegal. During the visit she announced that the Commission would be providing a fresh €30million to support Senegalese authorities in their fight against irregular migration.

According to Urpilainen at the time, the funding will “strengthen capacity to provide relief to migrants, fight trafficking, and raise awareness.” Recent reporting by Andrei Popviciu and documents obtained through requests to EU institutions offer more detail on the EU’s and Senegal’s plans.

The funding will come from the EU’s “Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement in Subsaharan Africa Action” (pdf), part of the EU’s almost €80 billion Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI).

Most of it will be distributed through the second phase of the Common Operational Partnership (pdf) (Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint), a police cooperation project. While the first phase of the POC project focused on the fight against criminal networks tied to smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, the second phase now also includes efforts to curb terrorism.

The budget increase follows “high-level discussions” between the EU and Senegal defining “common interests in the areas of border management, prevention, smuggling, and information communication.” These common interests are also influenced by long term cooperation between the EU and Senegal in the field of migration control, and the longstanding role of external actors in Senegalese migration and border governance.

Peak in arrivals on the Canary Islands and long-term EU involvement

Urpilainen’s announcement came in the context of an all-time high in arrivals on the so-called Atlantic Route to the Canary Islands from Senegal, Mauritania, and Morocco. In 2024 this was the deadliest migration route in the world. The increase in arrivals took place in the context of the EU and Senegal’s long engagement on containing and constraining mobility.

Beyond the Common Operational Partnership (COP), the EU has a broader stake in migration “management” in Senegal. Its long-term engagements include so-called capacity building projects seeking to enhance border and surveillance infrastructure. Development aid has been deployed to curb the so-called root-causes of migration.

The EU previously also had an operational presence in the country. From Between 2006 and 2018, Frontex conducted surveillance of Senegal’s maritime borders (pdf) under its Operations Hera II and III. Spain’s Guardia Civil are still present, with at least four boats deployed.

Diverging and converging interests in Senegal–EU migration cooperation

Hoping to re-deploy Frontex to Senegal, in July 2022 the Council of the EU authorised negotiations on a “status agreement”. This would let Frontex conduct border surveillance operations in the country. Negotiations on a working arrangement on technical cooperation between Frontex and Senegal were noted in EU documents as early as 2016.

The reinstalment of Frontex (pdf) remains a key priority of the EU, but is a contentious issue (pdf). In absence of an agreement to monitor Senegalese waters, Frontex entered into discussions with the Authorities of Cape Verde regarding aerial surveillance on the so-called Atlantic route (pdf).

The flights were officially launched in November 2025, aiming “to enhance situational awareness over the Atlantic.” This is despite reported internal concerns over human rights protection, in particular in regard to the principle of non-refoulement, raised by Frontex's Fundamental Rights Officer, Jonas Grimheden.

Cooperation on deportation is another contentious topic between Senegal and the EU. To enhance pressure on this front, the Commission proposed ‘visa sanctions’ in 2022. They have not yet been approved by the Council. The EU is also stalling the launch of a Talent Partnership (pdf) with Senegal, which would open legal migration routes.

In recent years there have been demonstrations in Senegal in relation to European immigration policies. Protesters have denounced the unjust treatment of visa applicants by European and other embassies, calling for swifter and less stringent application procedures, the suspension of outsourcing, and the reduction of waiting times.

Civil society actors, including the Senegalese branch of Amnesty International, have expressed serious concerns over the potential deployment of Frontex. Others, such as Boza Fii, have actively organized against its presence.

The linkage of migration governance, growing social inequality and extractivism, most notably industrial fishing, has also been clearly noted by Senegalese civil society. Meanwhile, the loss of lives along the Atlantic route remains a major concern for affected communities.

Convergence despite contention: stopping illegalised migration

The EU considers that the Senegalese government has a clear interest in “developing an effective system of border management, including maritime, land borders and international airports.” Indeed, cooperation in the field of border and migration control between the two sides has been going on for years.

In March 2024, the party Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l'éthique et la fraternité (PASTEF) won both the presidential and parliamentary elections. The party has an an ostensibly anti-imperialist and neo-sovereigntist agenda.

The current focus on stopping illegalised departures follows initiatives taken up by the previous government. In late 2020, Senegal launched its Interministerial Committee for the Fight against Irregular Migration (Comité Interministériel de Lutte contre la Migration Irrégulière, CILMI), which formulated the country’s 2023 Strategy to Fight Irregular Migration.

After a tragic shipwreck costing the lives of at least 37 passengers in September 2024, Senegal’s president Bassirou Diomaye Faye reasserted the government’s commitment to stopping migrant smuggling. In April this year the prime minister, Ousman Sonko, announced the government’s intention to penalize smugglers more harshly.

The additional budget support announced by the EU in October 2024 is set to support these and related initiatives, propping up an increasingly restrictive approach towards illegalized emigration.

Funding migration control: from a Trust Fund to a Flexible Mechanism

As noted, the €30 million will be distributed via the EU’s Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement in Subsaharan Africa. This is part of the near-€80 billion Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation (NDICI) budget.

The Flexible Mechanism follows on from the EU Trust Fund for Africa, and is designed to:

1. 1. Strengthen partner countries’ cooperation with the EU on migration and forced displacement
   2. Support partner countries’ national and sub-national capacities to tackle migration and/or forced displacement challenges identified in migration dialogues with the EU

The funding provided through the Flexible Mechanism comes with strong conditions attached (pdf). Country interventions depend not only on the displacement situation faced by the country concerned, but also on its relations with the EU and level of engagement on:

• the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings;
• hosting migrants and/or displaced people in line with EU and international standards;
• reinforcing “migration management capacities”;
• deportations and reintegration;
• legal migration and the implementation on the Global Compact on Refugees.

€30 million for border control, surveillance, and detention

A European Commission “concept note” (pdf), released following an access to documents request, offers more insight into what will be funded by the €30 million budget increase. Four key objectives (table 1) are supposed to be achieved across five axes (table 2).

Most of the actions seek to enhance the border control and surveillance powers of the Senegalese security forces, raising serious concerns regarding the potential for human rights abuses. Similar issues arise with the actions linked to enhanced protection and assistance to migrants.

Table 1: Four key objectives of the action (compiled by author)

Four key objectives
Fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking by reinforcing maritime, land and air borders	Provide rescue and assistance to migrants in danger, especially on the maritime route	Ensure that migrants, most notably the most vulnerable, benefit from adequate protection in respect of their dignity and human rights	Sensitise populations to the dangers of irregular migration and existing alternatives

 Table 2: Principal axis of the action (compiled by the author)

Axis 1	Rescue at sea and securitisation of the maritime border
Axis 2	Securitisation of land borders
Axis 3	Fight against fraudulent documents
Axis 4	Protection and assistance of migrants
Axis 5	Prevention of irregular migration through an awareness campaign

Enhancing border control, surveillance, and intelligence capacity

Under the Flexible Mechanism, numerous measures to reinforce border control and surveillance at Senegal’s maritime, riparian, land, and air borders are foreseen. Measures include the acquisition of border patrol boats for the police and gendarmerie (some with search and rescue capacity), and the building of the infrastructure needed to manage and maintain the vessels. It was expected that 15 boats would be provided by mid-2025.

Increased securitisation of the land border entails construction and rehabilitation of border posts. There is significant emphasis in the documents “interconnection of these posts” and facilitating communication between gendarmerie, police, and customs, as well as material support to the territorial brigades of the gendarmerie.

Support will also be provided to what might seem rather unusual actors in a border control context: the National Agency for Maritime Affairs (Agence Nationale des Affaires Maritime) and the Fisheries Directorate (Direction des Pêches).

This is linked to the development of a regulatory framework for the registration of small boats and motors. The aim is to enhance state control over vessels and to facilitate investigations if they are used for illegalised maritime migration.

Financing and training (new) migration control actors

There are further steps aimed at strengthening of intelligence and investigation work. The regional branches of the National Division to Fight Migrant Smuggling and Assimilated Practices (Division Nationale de Lutte contre le Traffic de Migrants et Practices Assimilées) will have their “operational capacity” reinforced, building on previous EU funding.

The National Division to Fight Migrant Smuggling was founded in January 2018. It initially received bilateral support from France. Follow-up support came from the EU’s Common Operational Partnership. The Division is part of Senegal’s border police (Direction General de la Police de l’Air et des Frontières).

With around fifty police officers working under the authority of a police commissioner, it has become the key security actor in the country’s efforts against migrant smuggling. Besides its headquarters in the capital, the EU has funded regional branches in Rosso, Karang, Tambacounda, Kédougou, Saint Louis, Saly, and Ziguinchor.

Additionally, the creation of a new border patrol unit (Unités de Patrouilles Frontalières) will be supported. In line with long-ongoing negotiations, “synergies” with Frontex are expected.

Finally, the EU funding aims to improve investigations on fraudulent documents. To do so, the creation, equipping and training of a Division of Investigation against Fraudulent Documents at the heart of the Police de l’Air et des Frontières is planned.

Finally, there will be funding for information campaigns aimed at deterring illegalised migration. These will be based on the experience gained through the EUTF funded ‘Tekki fii’ project.

Building so-called “reception centres”

The Commission “concept note” further reveals that the EU also plans to fund the construction of four reception centres for “rescued/ intercepted migrants”.

Given the EU’s track record both within and without its borders, any proposal to fund “reception centres” requires close scrutiny. Examined in context, there is a very strong risk that “interception for search and rescue” will become “interception for detention”.

The proposed locations for the “reception centres” are Saint Louis, M’bour, the port of Dakar and Dakar airport. The funding will also support the development and implementation of a Standard Operating Procedure on disembarkation of rescued people. This was recently developed by the International Organization for Migration, alongside the development of procedures and internal directives.

The “protection” element of the action pertains predominantly to the treatment of people once intercepted and detained. The intention is to contract civil society organisations to monitor the treatment of migrants and advise security forces on their rights.

A de facto detention infrastructure?

There is a significant risk that the so-called reception centres will end up as a de facto detention infrastructure. The “concept note” specifies that migrants should stay in these centres for the first 72 hours after rescue/interception.

The document contains a reference to a distinct zone for “smugglers” in the centres. Here, interviews for investigative purposes would be carried out and people may be detained for longer periods.

How this will work in practice remains to be seen, and may lead to the long-term detention of migrants. The Senegalese legal framework (Law 2005-06 of 10 May 2005) does not meaningfully distinguish between smugglers and migrants.

Article 12 of the law says migrants should be excluded from prosecution only if they were not aware that they were committing an offence. Recent research, longer-standing work and recent reporting highlight that migrants have been prosecuted under the law.

A proposal to amend the law was technically adopted in 2019. This would have introduced a distinction between smugglers and migrants, thereby aligning the Senegalese legal framework with the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. However, it has not yet been legally adopted.

The idea of building “reception centres” as such is not new. It first appeared officially in Senegal’s National Strategy for the Fight against Irregular Migration. The strategy calls for “administrative detention centres” at border crossing points.

Currently, post-interception practice involves holding migrants in police custody for between 72 and 96 hours. With police stations often ill-equipped to host larger groups, accommodation in classrooms has been noted.

A report by the IOM on disembarkation assistance highlights the crude detention/assistance logic at play:  “Migrants often hide in local populations, which slows down the investigation and does not allow for appropriate support for the victims.”

Whatever the Senegalese government’s own political rationales, external partners have encouraged more prosecutions for migrant smuggling.

One of the indicators used to measure the success of EU funding under the Flexible Mechanism (pdf) is the number of cases investigated and prosecuted. The number of convictions was used as an indicator in a previous Joint EU–Senegal Strategy Document that guided cooperation and programming.

Maritime containment rather than enhanced sea rescue capacity

The concept note also foregrounds the need to enhance search and rescue capacity and the imperative of saving lives at sea.

Measures foreseen include improving of surveillance capabilities and setting up a coordination centre for maritime operations in Dakar, which will have four antennas in coastal regions: Saint-Louis, Petite-Cote, Saloum, and “South”.

The coordination centre will focus solely on cases related to smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, and piracy.

It will coexist with Senegal’s main Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre and its secondary rescue centres. These operate under the High Authority for the Coordination of Maritime Safety, Maritime Security and Protection of the Marine Environment (Haute Autorité chargée de la Coordination de la Sécurité maritime, de la Sûreté maritime et de la Protection de l’Environnement marin), established in 2006.

The Decree establishing the High Authority gives it responsibility for coordination in all areas relating to safety, security, and environmental protection within maritime and inland waters under Senegalese jurisdiction (article 3). In normal circumstances it is responsible for ensuring the operational readiness of the main Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre and the secondary rescue centres (article 6).

The Order on the Organisation and Functioning of the High Authority (also approved in 2006) further defines its role. It should coordinate all missions carried out by the specialised bodies, gendarmerie, national police and the navy that promote a secure maritime environment. This includes the safeguarding of persons (article 15 and 16).

However, coordination of migration-related maritime incidents is carried out by a parallel structure coordinated by security forces. Interventions at sea with a “migration mandate” (relating to both interception and rescue) are the responsibility of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, which is supported by the Spanish Guardia Civil.

Interceptions, meaning the act of stopping, detaining, or redirecting a vessel before it reaches its intended destination represent nearly all cases coordinated under this framework. Interception is distinct from rescue, the latter being life-saving assistance to a vessel and its occupants that are in distress or danger at sea.

Interception itself can be deadly and dangerous, as illustrated in 2023 case in which 17 passengers of a boat lost their lives. Furthermore, a recent study published by Statewatch and the Transnational Institute finds that 92.3% of all interceptions carried out under Frontex’s Operation Hera II amounted to pushbacks.

The EU-funded action proposes enhancing search and rescue capacities and protecting migrants’ lives. However, it misses the chance to invest in Senegal’s overall maritime coordination infrastructure, focusing instead on the country’s migration interception infrastructure. This mirrors the EU’s wider “Rescue-Through-Interdiction/Rescue-Without-Protection’ Paradigm.”

This comes at the same time that artisanal fishing along Senegal’s coasts, an important economic sector increasingly under pressure, is becoming more dangerous and deadly. This demise is linked to industrial overfishing and oil and gas exploitation along the Senegalese coast. It is an important factor in many young people’s decision to leave.

An investment the country’s overall search and rescue coordination infrastructure could have at least contributed to enhancing the human security of all actors present in the Senegalese maritime space.

Lip service to human rights

The underlying aims of the €30 million budget are interception, detention and an instrumental concern for human life. The initiative maps onto longer-term developments predating the change of government in 2024, marked by the long-term involvement of external actors, often operating with EU funding.

The intervention is indicative of a wider regional trend of EU-funded actions enforcing detention and disregarding human rights concerns. This comes in the guise of “fighting migrant smuggling,” which is both a condition for and objective of EU financial support.

Together, these factors constitute the building blocks of a new era of carceral EU migration “management” in West Africa.

Author: Leonie Felicitas Jegen, PhD candidate, University of Amsterdam

Documentation

• CIVIPOL and FIAPP, Programme operationnel Conjoint - Phase II (undated, pdf)
• AVENANT N° 01 A LA CONVENTION DE CONTRIBUTION NDICI AFRICA 2023/450 852 (17 December 2024, pdf)
• ANNEX 10 to the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the multiannual action plan in favour of Sub-Saharan Africa for 2022-2024 Part 1: Action Document for the Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement (17 December 2024, pdf)
• Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa: Note conceptuelle: Prevention de la migration irreguliere depuis le Senegal (3 October 2024, pdf)
• Frontex response to European parliamentary questions on "operations by Frontex vessels in Senegal’s territorial waters" (5 May 2022, pdf)

Further reading