UK Chief Surveillance Commissioner 2004-2010   Bookmark and Share
Property "interference" and covert human information sources

Reports of the Surveillance Commissioner

- Chief Surveillance Commissioner report: 2010-2011 (pdf)
- Chief Surveillance Commissioner report: 2009-2010 (pdf)
- Chief Surveillance Commissioner report: 2008-2009 (pdf)
- Chief Surveillance Commissioner report: 2007-2008 (pdf)
- Chief Surveillance Commissioner report: 2006-2007 (pdf
- Chief Surveillance Commissioner report: 2005-2006 (pdf)
- Chief Surveillance Commissioner report: 2004-2005 (pdf)
- Chief Surveillance Commissioner report: 2003-2004 (pdf)

The Commissioner is responsible for "property interference and covert surveillance" (including covert human intelligence sources, CHIS). The Commissioner is not responsible for property warrants, intrusive surveillance, directed surveillance or CHIS carried out by MI5, MI6 or GCHQ: see: Report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner for 2009 (pdf) which gives no figures at all. The Surveillance Commissioner thus covers the police and other law enforcement agencies, local government and national agencies.

In the Annual Report (2009-2010) the Commissioner says that there were:

- 2,701 "property interference authorisations" plus 666 renewals, a total of : 3,367
- 398 "intrusive surveillance authorisations" (eg: bugging bedrooms) plus 71 renewals, a total of 469
- 13,780 "directed surveillance authorisations" by the police ("Covert", but not intrusive) plus 2,413 are already in place, a total of 16,193
- 8,477 "directed surveillance authorisations" given by "other public authorities"
- 4,176 "covert human information sources" for the police, with 3,527 already in place, a total of 7,703

Only 17 "authorisations" concerned "terrorism"

The Commissioner is clearly unhappy with the way his role is being treated by the government. First, he is threatening to public the official guidance on surveillance on his website as it "is not readily available to those who need it" and second, the Cabinet Office has decided to take over his website on which he comments: "It is essential that I remain independent and be seen to be independent".

In 2009-2010 the Commissioner was not particularly happy with the authorisations for "property interference":

"Authorising Officers should not be too ready to accept that authorisation is unnecessary where surveillance is conducted in a public place."

"Greater precision in articulating why the activity is proportionate is still required in many authorisations. A failure to detail other less intrusive means considered suggests that minds are either not applied rigorously or that some tactics are considered routine"

And is particularly critical of the handling of CHIS on which he comments:

"There are too many occasions when inspections reveal poor tradecraft in managing CHIS. Infrequent physical meetings and reliance on communication by text messages are rarely adequate. There have also been instances where law enforcement officers have pretended to be the CHIS when communicating with his associates online, without properly providing the CHIS with an alibi. It seems to me that this is an unsafe practice."

"Some law enforcement agencies remain confused regarding the process by which a CHIS is granted authorisation to participate in crime."

"My inspections have revealed a number of occasions when meetings with a potential CHIS have been conducted over a protracted period without authorisation. In many cases, the information provided has been deemed sufficient to warrant reward. If the value of the information provided by a person warrants reward, in most cases the use and conduct of the individual should be authorised."

"I have criticised the use of template applications and authorisations before. They are frequently inaccurate, especially when requesting a wide variety of available tactics without justification."

"Cancellations are sometimes conducted poorly. An Authorising Officer should provide specific directions for the disposal or retention of product; ensure that all surveillance equipment has been recovered; ensure that those conducting surveillance have been instructed to cease and assess whether the surveillance achieved the objectives set out in the application."

Background: Acts of Parliament

- Police Act 1997 (Part III)
- Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Parts II & III)

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