Networks of (in)security: how global counter-terrorism and security norms threaten civic space and human rights
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27 November 2025
Global counter-terrorism and security norms are propelling the introduction of pre-emptive, automated and algorithmic forms of surveillance and profiling, says new research published today by Statewatch. This is reinforcing racism and discrimination, inhibiting free movement, and giving authoritarian states new tools of control. The research calls for an organised response to this long-term state project, and sets out some guiding questions for future work.
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Image: Alexandre Dulaunoy, CC BY-SA 2.0
Networks of (in)security
New research published today by Statewatch analyses a growing transnational security architecture being promoted by powerful states and international organisations.
The research project, Networks of (in)security, focuses on the development of interconnected, transnational digital infrastructures that can facilitate political repression, threatening civic space and human rights.
These include tools for the surveillance of travel and travellers, and the development and spread of ‘watchlists’ of alleged, known or suspected to be involved in terrorism and organised crime.
As the research underscores, both terms are increasingly being used by states to delegitimise political opponents, dissidents and ‘undesirables’.
The research highlights four key effects of this growing transnational security architecture:
- experimental technologies are reinforcing racism and discrimination;
- state borders are being reshaped and reinforced, introducing new barriers to free movement;
- authoritarian states are receiving new tools of surveillance, control and repression;
- redress for affected individuals remains extremely difficult, if not impossible.
It calls for an organised response to this long-term state project, to defend civic space, civil liberties and human rights.
New challenges
While many states set up these kinds of systems more than two decades ago, binding counter-terrorism measures introduced by the UN over the last decade make their introduction by all UN member states a legal obligation.
These changes are being pushed by international organisations and powerful states, and are being enacted not just through formal legislation but via technology transfer, capacity-building projects, training and guidance for state officials, and the development of new technical standards.
This depoliticises issues that should be the subject of meaningful political debate, discussion and critique, the research argues.
It also highlights how the technocratic and transnational nature of these institutions, networks and systems poses new problems for transparency, accountability and redress for individuals who are targeted by states.
It also calls for new forms of critique and coalition that, at a time of growing authoritarianism, can produce effective responses to this globally-interconnected security architecture.
Impact and effects
Many of the technologies and techniques being deployed for the transnational security architecture are experimental: rules-based screening and network analysis tools, designed to assess the ‘risk’ posed by people and to map their social connections.
The research underlines that automated screening and profiling techniques reflect the biases, racism and discrimination of the societies that produce them – problems that are particularly pronounced in the fields of policing, counter-terrorism, criminal justice and immigration.
To try to find needles in a haystack, the research argues, governments are building a bigger haystack – and relying on experimental technologies to support the search.
The research also emphasises that the reconfiguration and reinforcement of state borders is fundamental to this transnational security project.
It draws attention to attempts by governments to externalise border controls through the use of digital “permission to travel” schemes that can be used to profile travellers and deny them access to transport if they are deemed undesirable.
These are intertwined with travel surveillance systems offered by a range of private companies, as well as by the UN itself, in the form of its ‘goTravel’ software.
Infrastructure at states’ territorial borders is also being reinforced, in particular through the use of biometric identity systems that capture the fingerprints and faces of travellers.
The International Organisation for Migration and, bilaterally, the US, both provide biometric border control systems to states around the world.
With far-right politics resurgent across the globe, the research emphasises that international organisations and powerful states are helping to spread technologies and techniques of repression, rather than trying to limit or halt their use.
The UN and powerful states – in particular the US, but also the UK, Japan and others – have launched formal partnerships with states with dismal human rights records, particularly when it comes to counter-terrorism and security, such as Azerbaijan, Nigeria, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.
Those partnerships include the provision of technology, training, expertise, and policy and legal guidance.
The research warns that invocation of human rights norms may be supporting the spread of these technologies and techniques, and the broader development of the transnational security architecture.
Thin references to human rights instruments, with no meaningful efforts to assess the potential adverse impacts of new technologies or the contexts in which they are deployed, can offer a veneer of legitimacy and compliance.
These problems are compounded by a substantial lack of meaningful accountability and redress, the research warns.
While state powers are being globalised, threatening further erosions of civic space, civil liberties and human rights, peoples’ rights to remedy and redress mostly remain trapped by national borders.
The ability to access, correct or delete personal data is entirely dependent on national legal frameworks that often exclude non-citizens, whether by design or by default.
This issue is compounded by the near-impossibility of individuals directly holding international organisations to account, despite their significant role in the development of new security policies.
Questions, not recommendations
The report ends with questions, rather than recommendations, arguing that there are many questions that need to be answered to support the development of new alliances, networks and campaigns of critique and contestation.
Organisations and individuals are encouraged to get in touch if they would like to work together on these crucial issues.
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