JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises
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1. Introduction

Events in Africa, in Europe's neighbourhood and beyond point to a dramatic and deteriorating global security situation, with more than 1.5 billion people living in fragile and conflict affected regions worldwide. On current trends, this number is projected to grow to 2 billion by 2030. Countries in fragile situations have not reached the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), making violent conflict and poor governance continuing crucial developmental challenges. Fragility and violence have also been fuelled by new threats such as terrorism and organised crime.1

Coordinated external action that makes use of the European Union's (EU) diplomatic, security, development and humanitarian tools is essential to restore confidence and ensure that partner countries' institutions are equipped to meet the challenges. The EU's external action instruments have different and complementary roles. The link between security and development is a key underlying principle of the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises2 and complementary to the internal security policies, maritime security and others. However, the EU's comprehensive approach needs to be strengthened to cover gaps in the current EU response. For example, this may be the case where training has been provided by Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, but its sustainability and effectiveness has been hampered by a lack of basic partner country equipment.

In addition, it is important to note in this context that there are a number of significant political frameworks relevant to both security and development, some of which are under review. This includes, for example, the European Neighbourhood Policy3, the post-2015 development framework, the Strategic Review on Foreign Policy but also the Maritime Security Strategy and the European Agenda on Security.

On the basis of the December 2013 European Council conclusions4 and the April 2014 EU-African Union (AU) Summit Declaration5, this Joint Communication identifies shortcomings and proposes remedial measures. While it addresses the issue of equipment to support partner countries' security

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3 JOIN (2015)6 final, Joint Consultation Paper, Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, 04.03.2015
5 Council 8370/14, Annex 1, Fourth EU-Africa Summit Declaration, 2/3 April 2014, 02.04.2014
capacity building, it does not address the provision of lethal weapons. The EU will not provide such equipment.

2. The security-development nexus in EU policies

As stated in the Treaties, the EU’s external action objectives are, _inter alia_, "to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security […]" and also "to foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty." The Treaties also set out a consistency requirement between different policy areas under those objectives.

The primary objective of the EU's development policy is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty, but development policy also addresses sustainable development, inequalities, social injustice and human rights violations. This is essential in addressing the root causes of insecurity and conflict. At the same time, development cooperation objectives have to be taken into account in other EU policies that are likely to affect developing countries. In support of this, the 2011 Commission Communication on "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change" and the related 2012 Council conclusions, recalled the need to tackle the challenges of security, fragility and transition as a matter of priority.

The EU is also responsible for defining and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. The CSDP, which forms an integral part of the CFSP, provides the EU with operational implementation capacities. The EU may use CSDP assets on missions outside its territory for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and perform as such a wide range of tasks.

The need for mutually reinforcing interventions in the areas of security and development is clear. The EU has consistently underlined that "security is a precondition for development" and that "without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace." Creating and fostering the political, social and economic conditions for stability is essential for a country's security and a prerequisite for its development. This security-development nexus is central to maximising the effectiveness of the EU's external action.

For any country to ensure its security and development, it must have or acquire adequate capacities in all critical sectors, including security and defence. This will not only stabilise that country but also enable it to contribute constructively to peace, stability and crisis prevention in its region.

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6 Art. 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
7 Art. 21(3) TFEU; Art. 205 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
8 Art. 208 TFEU
10 Council 9369/12, Council conclusions, "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change", 14.05.2012
11 Art. 42 TEU
12 Art. 43 TEU
13 Council 15895/03, European Security Strategy, 08.12.2003
2.1 Current efforts in capacity building

Current security capacity building efforts in partner countries span across a number of policy areas. They call on different instruments and focus on building effective, legitimate and sustainable institutions, including effective justice and security sectors, border control and coast guards. Capacity building activities include, *inter alia*, access to international instruments, political dialogue, technical cooperation (including joint research and innovation), training (knowledge transfer\(^{15}\) and skills development\(^{16}\)) and the provision of essential equipment and material. Training in the security sector seeks to improve a partner's ability to ensure stability and the protection of citizens. It can take the form of pre-service training; it can also be integrated into operational phases through mentoring or in-service training and support. Equipment provided to partners may range from communications hardware, life support and field amenities, medical, transport and other facilities to force protection equipment.

EU support to the security-development nexus has gradually expanded over the years, with interventions across different EU policies and instruments.

The mandates of several of the 34 CSDP missions and operations conducted so far have included building the capacities of peace and security actors in partner countries. For example, capacity building is at the core of the mandate of three CSDP missions launched by the EU in 2014. The EU's advisory mission for civilian security sector reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) provides strategic support, advice and mentoring. The EU's military advisory mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) supports the authorities of that country in preparing the coming security sector reform. It does so by assisting the national military to build capacity, raise standards and move towards the goal of becoming modernised, effective and accountable armed forces. The EU's civilian CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) supports the restructuring of the Malian domestic security forces (i.e. the police, the 'gendarmerie', and the 'garde nationale'). The objective is to help the Malian authorities ensure constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace. The mission combines training activities and strategic advice.

In the last decade, EU's development cooperation has substantially increased its financing and engagement in supporting justice and security sectors in partner countries, using a wide range of instruments around the world.

Peace and security actions are currently financed by the EU budget, *inter alia*, through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace\(^{17}\) (IcSP) and its precursor, the Instrument for Stability\(^{18}\) (IfS). For example, the IcSP provides, as part of a larger capacity building project, equipment to the Cameroon police to support the fight against Boko Haram (as the latter is a destabilising factor in West Africa and as such puts at risk EU and partner countries' development and stability).

As part of the wider EU approach towards the Sahel, a comprehensive IfS project has provided basic equipment and support (training and mentoring) to develop the capabilities of police forces in Niger, enabling them to function independently. This has been part of a comprehensive support programme, including fostering peace and reconciliation initiatives, demining and socio-economic reintegration.

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\(^{15}\) Including on prosecution, mutual legal assistance, victims' support and fair trial.

\(^{16}\) Including on management and governance.


Within the European Development Fund\(^{19}\) (EDF), the African Peace Facility\(^{20}\) (APF) provides support to the African Union and regional economic communities to prevent and if necessary manage crises. Funding covers, *inter alia*, operational costs for African peacekeeping operations (excluding salaries), the financing of training and exercises, command, control and communication systems, or fact-finding missions. Since its creation in 2003, the APF has channelled more than EUR 1.2 billion to African peace-building efforts.

Recent examples of financial support to African-led peace support operations include the African Union Mission in Somalia\(^{21}\) (AMISOM). AMISOM has been supported with around EUR 800 million since 2007. It plays a critical role in providing minimum security conditions for the political process in Somalia and for the provision of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian actors. It also helps creating favourable conditions for reconstruction, reconciliation and sustainable development in the country.

Finally, EU financial support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) seeks to strengthen the capacity and effective functioning of APSA and to improve cooperation to prevent and, if necessary, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa.\(^{22}\)

These examples show that security sector capacity building may be focused on civilian and/or police forces but also on the military. Security-related functions may follow different organisational structures in different countries. For instance, civil protection, border control and coast guard functions may be military, civilian or hybrid in nature.

### 2.2 Challenges to effective delivery on the ground: the pilot cases

As far as EU capacity building support to military forces is concerned, pilot cases were identified in Mali and Somalia to explore current challenges. Initial findings indicate training and equipment needs as well as a requirement for improved coordination, both at operational and strategic level.\(^{23}\)

**Pilot case Mali**

The objective of the EU Training Mission in Mali\(^{24}\) (EUTM Mali), financed through Member State contributions and the Athena mechanism\(^{25}\), is to train Malian soldiers, enabling them to form an

\(^{19}\) Art. 15 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11\(^{th}\) European Development Fund, OJ L 58, 03.03.2015

\(^{20}\) Art. 11 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement on "Peace building policies, conflict prevention and resolution" and the relevant Council conclusions provide the legal basis for the APF; Decision No 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the 9\(^{th}\) EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, OJ L 345, 31.12.2003

\(^{21}\) Financial support has also been provided for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) or the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA);

\(^{22}\) This involves supporting African mediation structures and initiatives; supporting the Panel of the Wise, the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, and the African Standby Force; and reinforcing the capacity of the African Union and African Regional Organisations in the areas of financial management for peace support operations, planning, human resources, information sharing and analysis.

\(^{23}\) The gap analysis and risk management frameworks are ongoing and could lead to the development of options for concrete improvements, taking into account the current legal and institutional framework.

\(^{24}\) Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), OJ L 14, 18.01.2013

\(^{25}\) Art. 41 TEU sets the principles for the financing of EU civilian and military crisis management operations. Operations having military or defence implications cannot be financed from the Union budget. The common costs of such operations are currently covered by Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 of 27 March 2015 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having
effective and democratically accountable national armed force that can help stabilise the country. Military and training advice focuses on operational training, command and control, logistical chains and human resources. There is also training on international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians and human rights. Capacity building is provided to the Malian Armed Forces operating under the control of legitimate civilian authorities in the south. Once trained, battalions are deployed to the north of the country for at least six months.

However, the trained units lack communication equipment, thus hindering command and control. Soldiers do not have protective equipment against mines and explosive devices. Other needs and requirements include ambulances, water tanks and fuel trucks to ensure autonomy and the ability to operate independently. Basic essentials, including accommodation, food and medical support are also lacking. Assistance in providing such equipment and support is necessary to ensure that trained battalions do not have to rely on the support of the local population.

In some cases, ad hoc solutions have been found, such as the provision of vehicles by other donors in Mali, but this has not been consistent, nor is it a sustainable long-term solution. Where such ad hoc funding has not been possible, no alternative funding sources have been identified to fill the gaps.

**Pilot case Somalia**

In Somalia, the EU is engaged with various instruments. Through the APF, the EU is the main financial contributor to the AMISOM operation, which is run by the African Union. Moreover, the EU operates three CSDP missions in Somalia and the wider region, focusing on military training, counter-piracy and maritime capacity-building.

EUTM Somalia – CSDP mission focussing on military training in Somalia – was launched in April 2010 to support and develop the Somali security sector by strengthening the Somalia Armed Forces through the provision of targeted military training.²⁶ In 2014, the EUTM transferred its advisory, mentoring and training activities to Mogadishu, where training is conducted in the Jazeera Training Camp (JTC), operated by AMISOM.

The living conditions and teaching facilities in the camp for a long time were inadequate. Their improvement, including construction works, took a considerable amount of time, while the basic support (e.g. water, food, beds, mattresses and blankets) was lacking. These gaps had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the training and carried a reputational cost for the EU.

As a military CSDP operation, the EUTM is financed and staffed by contributing Member States, complemented by the Athena mechanism for common costs.²⁷ The JTC is considered to be an AMISOM facility for training the Somali Security Forces in line with AMISOM's mandate. This is because APF has an exclusive regional focus with no possibility for support at national level. The

²⁶ Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, OJ L 44, 19.02.2010. In January 2013, the EUTM's mandate was extended for a third time, until March 2015, and expanded to include strategic advice and mentoring. Since 2010, EUTM has trained around 4000 Somali army personnel. Its current strength in personnel (trainers and related personnel) is 125 (provided by 10 Member States and Serbia).

²⁷ The mission budget of common costs until August 2011 was EUR 4.8 million; from August 2011 until December 2012 it was EUR 4.8 million; common funding for the period February 2013 until March 2015 will total EUR 11.6 million. The cost increase is largely due to the move to Mogadishu, including set-up and force protection costs.
assumption is that if the funds had been made available directly, a higher priority would have been given to reaching acceptable standards for the training camp and progress would have been made sooner.

These pilot cases illustrate only some of the challenges that need to be overcome: a lack of available funding, the limitations to which financing under the APF in particular is subject, and the practical difficulties resulting from a patchwork of different instruments used in the same context.

3. Improving the delivery of capacity building in support of security and development

3.1 The framework

From the point of view of primary law, two fundamental principles need to be considered.

The same action cannot be financed both by a CFSP measure and an instrument based on Articles 209/212 TFEU. This means, to give an example, that capacity building in the security sector under a potential new instrument may be undertaken in the framework of the EU’s development cooperation if its objective and content fall within the scope of development policy.

The Treaties exclude the possibility of using the EU budget for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications (see Article 41(2) TEU). This makes the European Development Fund and the African Peace Facility as instruments outside the EU budget particularly relevant in the current efforts to "bridge" the gap between CSDP and various development instruments when attempting to comprehensively address security-development nexus issues. In addition, financing of capacity building in the security sector under Articles 209 and 212 TFEU is not per se excluded, regardless of the civilian or military nature of the beneficiary but requires a case-by-case assessment.

Beyond primary law, the framework which applies to EU external action in the field of security capacity building is the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) and the legal bases of the external financing instruments. Relevant instruments within the EU budget include:

- The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace\(^{28}\) (ICsP);
- The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance\(^{29}\) (IPA);
- The European Neighbourhood Instrument\(^{30}\) (ENI);
- The Development Cooperation Instrument\(^{31}\) (DCI); and
- The Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights\(^{32}\) (EIDHR); as well as
- The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget.

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Finally, the definition of Official Development Assistance\(^{33}\) (ODA) potentially limits spending on security capacity building, insofar as ODA criteria generally exclude military expenses. This restriction is particularly relevant in the context of the MFF, where the EU should aim to ensure over the period 2014-2020 that at least 90% of its overall external assistance is counted as ODA.\(^{34}\) In addition, the DCI contains specific ODA targets\(^{35}\), and a restriction on the procurement of arms or ammunition, or operations having military or defence purposes\(^{36}\). The EDF requires that programming is so designed that, as far as possible, it meets the criteria for ODA.\(^{37}\) In addition, Member States are declaring their contribution to the EDF as in compliance with ODA criteria.

### 3.2 Making more of our current instruments

**Existing instruments within the EU budget**

A significant part of external assistance programmes funded by the EU's development and technical cooperation instruments already tackles security and development challenges\(^{38}\). In the current MFF, nine national and eight regional or thematic programmes aim to support conflict prevention and resolution and peace and security-related activities. In addition, in 45 countries programmes are being developed with a broader focus on governance and the rule of law, including possible support to transition from missions and operations under CSDP to other instruments.

However, under the IcSP, IPA, ENI, DCI and EIDHR, financial support in favour of capacity building in the security sector is subject to various limitations, as explained above. As a consequence, there is currently no EU budget instrument designed to provide a comprehensive financing to security capacity building in partner countries, in particular its military component.

This has been the case for the past decade. When in 2004 the European Commission proposed an earlier Instrument for Stability\(^{39}\), it did propose to extend the legal basis to the financing of long-term support for capacity building in the field of military peace support operations. However, the final text did not contain references to military or peace-support operations due to opposition from the co-legislators. Civil society had also voiced opposition.

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\(^{33}\) The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a forum for the coordination of aid efforts. It has established an internationally agreed upon definition of ODA. This allows donors to distinguish between official transactions made as ODA and other official flows. Discussions are ongoing on a potential revision of ODA definitions.

\(^{34}\) EUCO 37/13, European Council conclusions, 7/8 February 2013, 08.02.2013

\(^{35}\) Art. 2(3) and (4) of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council

\(^{36}\) Art. 3(13) of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council

\(^{37}\) Art. 1(3) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 indicates that the programming shall be designed so as to fulfil to the greatest extent possible the criteria for ODA, taking into account the Union's aim to ensure that over the period 2014-2020 at least 90% of its overall external assistance be counted as ODA.

\(^{38}\) During the period 2001-2009, over EUR 1 billion was spent supporting justice and security sector reform programmes. In 2013, more than half of the total EU bilateral development aid was disbursed in fragile and conflict-affected countries, a vast majority of which was on the African continent.

\(^{39}\) On the basis of Art. 308 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), which has been replaced by Art. 352 TFEU as a consequence of the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
**Existing instruments outside the EU budget**

Outside the EU budget, the EDF provides further operational resources to implement the EU's development cooperation policy with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.\(^{40}\)

The APF was set up in 2003 under the EDF and is to date the most far-reaching instrument to address the security-development nexus, also providing support to military activities.

Nonetheless, the APF remains an exceptional and temporary instrument. Member States have repeatedly raised the issue of its financial sustainability and of the need to consider alternative funding options to EDF.\(^{41}\) In addition, in the APF Multi-annual Action Programme 2014-2016\(^{42}\), the financing of "ammunitions, arms and specific military equipment, spare parts, salaries for soldiers and training for soldiers" is excluded. Additional limitations include the legal requirement for the 11\(^{th}\) EDF to be reported as ODA "to the greatest extent possible".\(^{43}\) Finally, the APF has an exclusive regional and geographic focus (the African Union and regional economic communities); it is therefore not possible to finance support at the national level or outside Africa from the APF. However, the EU and partner countries and regions have identified peace and security or security sector reform as a priority sector in several regional and national indicative programmes under the EDF.

While financing security capacity building, including of the military, is possible under the APF, it is subject to a number of other limitations which may prevent the effective use of this Facility in addressing all situations with which the EU is confronted.

Last but not least, resources for EU military operations are also allocated outside the EU budget by Member States, either directly by those participating in CFSP/CSDP operations or through the Athena mechanism. Athena manages the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations under the CSDP. These costs concern, *inter alia*, headquarters' implementation and running costs, infrastructure, logistics and mission support. Currently, Athena does not cover the costs incurred by a partner country supported through a mission or operation. Recently, the Council adopted a review of the Athena Council Decision which, *inter alia*, allows the Athena mechanism to implement EU budget funds, in conformity with existing rules and procedures.\(^{44}\)

**Coordination and coherence**

Despite the limitations described above, more could be achieved within the existing framework through the application of a more coherent and a more coordinated approach.

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\(^{40}\) "Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and its Member States", signed in Cotonou on 23.06.2000

\(^{41}\) Council 10342/11, Council conclusions on the replenishment of the African Peace Facility for the period 2011-2013, 13.05.2011; Council 13935/12, Council conclusions on the replenishment of the African Peace Facility for the period 2012–2013, 24.09.2012; Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 (Art. 15 states that at the end of the first pluri-annual action programme, the Union and its Member States will review the results and procedures of the African Peace Facility and discuss options on future funding possibilities. In this context, and in order to put the African Peace Facility on a sounder footing, the Union and its Member States will hold discussions addressing both the issue of funds for Peace Support Operations, including those financed from the EDF, and of sustainable EU support to African-led Peace Support Operations beyond 2020).


\(^{43}\) See footnote 37

\(^{44}\) See footnote 25
EU support to security sector capacity building needs to be underpinned by EU external action principles. These include: (i) ownership by the partner country and alignment to the partner’s long-term development strategies; (ii) respect for human rights and adherence to international humanitarian law; and (iii) coherence with other EU actions as part of a broader EU comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises. In addition, it is important to use context analysis to prevent offer-driven capacity building support, develop a risk management methodology and ensure broad support from the international community and coordination with other actors on the ground.

While respecting the existing institutional and legal frameworks, the following practical measures could improve coordination within the EU, including with and among Member States at strategic and operational levels:

i) Enhance information sharing of ongoing and planned capacity building support activities in the broader crisis prevention management areas (including support to justice and security sectors) conducted through the bilateral cooperation of Member States, the EU development and technical cooperation instruments and CSDP activities.

ii) Extend information sharing to the EU’s multilateral partners (including the UN, NATO and OSCE) and other third countries and strategic partners with whom the EU shares convergent and complementary priorities.

iii) Draw on the introduction of the Political Framework for Crisis Approach process to intensify the ties between services handling development cooperation and security policy matters. This will foster a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s engagement in a given context before deciding upon new CSDP or non-CSDP actions.

iv) CSDP actions should make better use of development cooperation expertise. Equally, development programmes can benefit from CSDP and Member State expertise. This includes ensuring coherence, including between the work of the instrument-specific management committees and the work of the CSDP Council working parties.

v) Organise more regular and systematic interaction between EU delegations and the CSDP mission and/or operations at partner country level. Establish joint reporting to respective management chains in headquarters. Standardise the secondment of CSDP mission and operation liaison officers to EU delegations and include this in the staffing and calls for contributions for the CSDP missions and operations.

To support and implement these commitments, the following initiatives should be further developed through relevant proposals from the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative):

i) An EU-wide strategic framework, shared by CSDP and development cooperation policy, for Security Sector Reform. A common Security Sector Reform policy framework should respect the regulatory constraints of existing instruments. This framework might usefully draw on lessons learnt.

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45 Taking into consideration the eight areas identified by the Joint Communication on the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises of December 2013: (i) develop a shared analysis; (ii) define a common strategic vision; (iii) focus on prevention; (iv) mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU; (v) commit to the long term; (vi) link policies and internal and external action; (vii) make better use of EU Delegations; (viii) work in partnership.
from programmes/missions/operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan in terms of the transition from CSDP to other instruments.

ii) A shared evaluation, monitoring and results framework for security capacity building and Security Sector Reform-related activities, irrespective of the policy framework under which they are conducted.

iii) A dedicated risk management methodology on EU support to the security sector of partner countries or organisations. This could draw, for example, on the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy\textsuperscript{46} developed to guide UN engagement in support of the security sector, and on the risk management framework developed for EU Budget Support operations\textsuperscript{47}.

4. Way forward: a new commitment to deliver on peace and stability with our partners

The EU remains committed to its ambition to play a key role in ensuring international peace and stability, preventing conflicts and creating conditions for global sustainable development.

Enabling partner countries and regional organisations to increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves through efficient EU support to their security capacity building is one of the most important tools in this endeavour.

Building on experience so far, it is time to step up efforts. We expect the European Council of June 2015 to provide further political commitment and guidance on better addressing the security-development nexus.

The European Commission and the High Representative are committed to implementing the measures on coordination and coherence of existing instruments outlined in this Joint Communication. Under the comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, this will be fully effective only if matched by corresponding efforts with and among Member States on their own instruments at strategic and operational levels. A "unity of effort" is required so as to ensure the EU’s collective ability to engage at the right time and with the appropriate mechanisms and resources for a specific context in a partner country or with a regional organisation.

Given the broad nature of the challenge, existing limitations should not only be addressed through \textit{ad hoc} arrangements. Instead, the European Commission and the High Representative are of the opinion that the practical feasibility of the three following actions should be considered:

i) A proposal to adapt the African Peace Facility to address its limitations;

ii) The establishment of a facility linking peace, security and development in the framework of one or more existing instruments;

iii) A dedicated instrument to this effect.

Any proposals would have to be subject to prior impact assessments which should analyse, \textit{inter alia}, potential political, reputational and budgetary consequences, as well as the impact on fundamental


\textsuperscript{47} Budget support guidelines, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation Directorate-General, European Commission, Brussels, September 2012
rights. The Commission's political commitment to propose to budgetise the EDF needs to be taken into account with regard to this debate.

Member States are also invited to consider extending the Athena mechanism to include capacity building in partner countries.

It is important that the follow-up to this Joint Communication involves a wide range of stakeholders from the fields of foreign policy, defence, development and humanitarian assistance.

The European Commission and the High Representative call on the European Parliament and the Council to support the approach set out in this Joint Communication and to fully engage in the move towards more coherent and effective EU engagement in capacity building in support of security and development.