Development of the EUBAM mission in Libya

Preliminary remarks by the questioners

In June of this year the EU launched the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). The German Federal Police are also participating in this mission. Among its objectives is the establishment of a hitherto non-existent body of "Border Guards", a gendarmerie that is under the command of the military but is deployed domestically. In addition to their border security duties, the guards are to be deployed inter alia to secure "sensitive infrastructure". The portfolio also encompasses special operations such as those for which training is also provided within the framework of EUBAM (Libya Herald, 8 November 2013).

The EUBAM mission is followed with a critical eye, not least because the human rights situation in Libya remains extremely poor. The security authorities, to the extent that they even exist in the true sense of the word and have not been replaced by militias, are at times involved in human rights abuses. Especially in regard to the treatment of refugees, there appears to have been no improvement compared to the Gaddafi era. The mission therefore harbours the risk of not improving the legal situation but instead contributing to the strengthening of groups, including militias, that are inimical to human rights.

In light of this, the questioners doubt whether the mission's approach of also recruiting persons with an explicitly military background is promising. The French website Mediapart has meanwhile published the secret Concept of Operations "Plus" (CONOPS PLUS) (http://www.mediapart.fr/files/EUBAMRapportAVRIL2013.pdf), a paper from the European External Action Service (EEAS) that was distributed as Council Document 8182/4/13 to all delegations of the EU Member States. This document dated April 2013 contains numerous details which as late as in summer the Federal Government claimed to have had no knowledge of (Bundestag printed paper 17/14417). In the document, for instance, it is reported that while the Libyan police law is the basis for EUBAM, the law is not even available in English. According to the EEAS, 19,000 ex-fighters are in future to be under the responsibility of the Libyan Ministry of Interior alone; at least 6,000 are to be integrated into the Border Guards.
According to the Concept of Operations dated 18 April 2013, the EUBAM mission was to present a report after half a year.

In view of the scope of the Minor Interpellation, the questioners declare their consent to an extension of the answer deadline.

Preliminary remarks by the Federal Government:

Operational concepts and other planning documents of CSDP missions are confidential. The Federal Government does not comment on any documents that circulate in the Internet and purport to be confidential EU documents. The following remarks are therefore not to be construed as an opinion on the document quoted in the preliminary remarks by the questioners.

We address the following questions to the Federal Government:

1. How have the implementation and execution of the EUBAM mission developed in the view of the Federal Government, and what problems and deficits does it identify?
   The political situation in Libya is uncertain. The security situation has deteriorated since the establishment of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) in May 2013. Under Gaddafi the Libyan government propagated "open borders". There are consequently only very rudimentary border security structures in Libya, or none at all. In light of this, the CSDP mission EUBAM Libya was unable to take up its work at the originally envisaged pace. Despite the difficult working conditions, EUBAM Libya has thus far already trained approximately 300 Libyan border security personnel and conducted workshops and seminars.

2. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, how is the term "integrated border management" precisely defined in connection with EUBAM?
   Integrated border management is the pooling of and support for all units and authorities which support each other in their work and jointly contribute to enhancing the control of a country’s authorities over its external borders.

3. How many staff members did the mission have by the beginning of August, and how many does it presently have? To the knowledge of the Federal Government, how are any significant deviations from the planning (the mission was to have been fully staffed by the end of November 2013) to be explained, and which conclusions has the mission leadership drawn therefrom?
At the beginning of August 2013, the staff of EUBAM Libya comprised 22 persons (data as of 4 August 2013). Currently (data as of 28 January 2014) the mission has 45 staff members. The planning for the build-up of the mission was adjusted in line with the developments in the security situation in Libya. For further details, please see the reply to question 1 above.

4. **To the knowledge of the Federal Government, which maritime, air and land borders are currently under the official control of which authorities or ministries, which are still outside governmental control, and what impact does the military state of emergency in several provinces have on the situation?**

The border crossing points to the Republic of Tunisia and the Arab Republic of Egypt are under the control of the Ministry of Interior; the other land borders are not under governmental control. The Tripoli and Misurata airports are under the control of the border police, which report to the Ministry of Interior. The coastline is under the control of the Coastal Security Police of the Ministry of Interior as well as the Naval Coast Guard of the Ministry of Defence. The Federal Government possesses no information on the situation in Benghazi and Sabha.

5. **To what extent can the Federal Government confirm from its participation in EUBAM and various meetings with all ministries the assessment of the EEAS that the Libyan army is largely intact, even after the unrest (Council Document 8182/4/13)?**

To the Federal Government’s knowledge, the European External Action Service assumes in the EUBAM Libya planning documents that the Libyan army is no longer intact. The Federal Government shares this assessment.

6. **To the knowledge of the Federal Government, how many members of non-governmental armed groups have thus far been integrated into the Border Guards (BG), and what further such measures are envisaged?**

   **Where are the new Border Guard personnel stationed, and in which numbers?**

The Federal Government cannot provide any reliable numerical information concerning the ongoing integration process.

The Federal Government possesses no robust information on the stationing of the respective Border Guard personnel.

7. **To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, is it true, as described in Council Document 8182/4/13, that the BG "are more involved in military stabilisation duties than in border security as such"?**
The Federal Government possesses no information in this regard.

8. **What is the mandate of the BG, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, and to what extent is it envisaged that they will in future no longer be placed under military command as a fourth armed force?**

To the knowledge of the Federal Government, the mandate of the Border Guards is to secure the inland range of 50 kilometres away from the border line, the perimeter of the border crossing points and sensitive infrastructure. They are presently under the command of the Ministry of Defence as a fourth branch of the armed forces alongside the army, air force and navy. The Federal Government possesses no further information.

**a) Which Libyan laws or other agreements, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, regulate the competencies and the areas of responsibility of the BG?**

As in the case of all post-revolutionary Libyan security forces, a new regulatory framework will have to be created for the Border Guards.

**b) To what extent is it true that the BG is to also secure "sensitive infrastructure" and assume further duties within the country (Council Document 8182/4/13)?**

The Border Guards are charged with securing power plants and drinking water installations.

**c) What training of BG, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, has been conducted under the direction of the Italian Carabinieri at the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza (Council Document 8182/4/13)?**

The Federal Government cannot provide any reliable information about the bilateral activities of its European partners. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, "train the trainers" courses are to be conducted by the Italian Carabinieri in the second and fourth quarter of 2014.

9. **To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, were the training curricula for the Naval Coastal Guard (NCG), BG and Customs developed by August 2013 and implemented by the beginning of November 2013 as planned?**

**a) What statements do these curricula make with regard to human rights and the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (please give the full wording if possible)?**

**b) What in particular do the curricula for the NCG state with regard to the right to leave a country, including one's own?**

**c) How are the curricula structured in other respects, and what priorities are set?**

To the knowledge of the Federal Government, the development of the training curricula for the Border Guards, the Naval Coastal Guard and Customs has not yet been concluded.
10. Is the first six-monthly report, which was supposed to have been presented at the beginning of November, meanwhile actually available? If so,

a) to what extent is it public or available for inspection by members of the German Bundestag,

b) which statements are made therein,

c) which deficits are mentioned, and which conclusions are drawn,

d) which recommendations are made, and

e) which changes in regard to the continuation of EUBAM will result therefrom?

The six-monthly report of EUBAM Libya dated 18 November 2013 is a non-public document of the European External Action Service. It analyses the activities of the mission thus far and outlines the planning for the next six months. The challenges for the work of EUBAM Libya mentioned in the six-monthly report include the precarious security situation and the uncertain political situation in Libya. One of the conclusions is to consider moving parts of the mission to Malta temporarily. The recommendations in the six-monthly report aim to improve the effectiveness of EUBAM Libya and strengthen the regional thrust of the mission. EUBAM Libya is to take the precarious security situation and the uncertain political situation into account in its further activities.

11. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, how many staff members or employees of the EUBAM mission possess specific military knowledge, and to what extent is this needed by EUBAM?

Several staff members of EUBAM Libya have a military background. The Search and Rescue (SAR) units of the Maltese coast guard, for instance, belong to the Maritime Squadron. In addition, some police officers of the Member States can be deployed under military command, such as the Italian Carabinieri. Their knowledge is helpful for understanding the Libyan structures, the operational processes of the Libyan Border Guards and Naval Coast Guard, and the Libyan Search and Rescue structures.

12. To what extent is it true, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, that the Libyan Intelligence Service also wishes to cooperate with the EUBAM mission, and what recent knowledge does the Federal Government have concerning its composition (Bundestag printed paper 17/14417), which is described in Council Document 8182/4/13 as a merger of civilian and military services?

The Federal Government does not comment on the activities of foreign intelligence services.
13. Does the Federal Government meanwhile possess information as to whether an English translation of the Libyan police law is available and if so, what information? To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, is the police law currently being revised?

The Federal Government possesses no information regarding this matter.

14. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, how high are the costs incurred thus far to secure the EUBAM mission in proportion to the overall costs?

   a) Insofar as the security expenditures are significantly higher than the originally estimated 50 percent, what are the decisive reasons for this?

   b) How high are the expenditures incurred thus far, or as of the date of the last compilation, to secure the EUBAM mission?

   c) In this context, how high are the expenditures for private security services (in absolute figures)?

In this regard please see the annex, which is classified as "Restricted". The Federal Government does not possess any further information regarding this matter.

15. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, which private security services are utilised by the EUBAM mission (please specify the firms as well as the number of staff)? What references do these firms have, to the knowledge of the Federal Government? To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, were the contracts modified in regard to other clients in the year 2013, and what were the decisive reasons for this?

In order to ensure the security of EUBAM Libya, the Head of Mission concludes contracts with private security providers on his/her sole responsibility.

16. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, what weighting has the EUBAM mission given to maritime, land and air borders, and how does this weighting manifest itself (please be as specific as possible)?

The mandate of the mission is to support the Libyan authorities in the development of their capacities for enhancing the security of the land, maritime and air borders. EUBAM advisors are to be assigned to all areas.

17. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, with which Libyan authorities and with which specific departments has EUBAM worked thus far (in the broader sense)?
To the knowledge of the Federal Government, EUBAM Libya has thus far worked with the following Libyan authorities: Ministry of Interior (police, border police, Coastal Security Police), Ministry of Defence (Border Guards, Naval Coast Guard), Ministry of Finance (Customs Department, Customs Maritime Unit), Ministry of Transport (Port and Maritime Transport Authority, telecommunications authority).

a) **What was the nature of the cooperation, and what specific forms of support did EUBAM provide?**

EUBAM Libya provided advisory services and conducted occasional training measures.

b) **Which conclusions, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, has the EUBAM mission drawn from its experience thus far?**

There is a continued long-term need for advisory services to enable the Libyans to modify the structures and operations of their security authorities on their own responsibility and in line with a sustainable strategy.

18. **In what form and to what extent does EUBAM convey the importance of respect for human rights to the staff of the Libyan border authorities and to what extent does this also apply to the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees enshrined in the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees?**

Conveying the importance of respect for human rights has consistently been an integral part of advisory services and training measures. To this end, EUBAM Libya has created the position of Rule of Law/Human Rights/Gender Advisor.

19. **To the knowledge of the Federal Government, with which – or with which further – instruments is EUBAM seeking to improve respect by the Libyan authorities for human rights and especially for the rights of refugees?**

In addition to advisory services in the form of thematic instruction, EUBAM Libya also conducts seminars, in some cases jointly with other organisations such as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

20. **In which place in the pertinent EU resolutions is the task of the mission to be found that has been cited by the Federal Government, namely to eliminate the commingling of military and police interests (see the Federal Government's reply to question 24 in Bundestag printed paper 17/14417), and why does the Federal Government believe that such a task can be accomplished precisely by training the BG, an explicitly military force, to perform border security duties?**
The EU’s security policy planning documents contain statements regarding the tasks of EUBAM Libya. One of these tasks is the elimination of the commingling of military and police interests through advisory services and the initiation of restructuring measures. EUBAM Libya supports restructuring in the area of border police duties through specialist advisory services provided within the scope of the remit of the interministerial "Border Management Working Group". At the same time, the mission must take account of the distinctive features of Libyan structures and actors in its work.

21. To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, have there been contacts with militias or tribal organisations (please give the reason for the initiation of contact, the name(s) of the militia(s) and the nature of any cooperation, if applicable)? If there were no such contacts, did the EUBAM mission not show any presence at all at the 23 of 25 border crossing points (reply to question 16c of the minor interpellation in Bundestag printed paper 17/14417) which, according to the statements of the Federal Government, are under the control of militias? And if it did show such a presence, what kind and with what objective?

To the knowledge of the Federal Government, EUBAM Libya has thus far been in contact with official Libyan authorities, including some that have integrated militias. This is true in the case of the border crossing Ghadames at the tripoint where Libya, Tunisia and Algeria meet. The mission visited this border crossing and on a subsequent visit conducted a training course there for 73 staff (including twelve women) of the Libyan border management agencies. Whether and in what form a presence is possible in Ghadames is currently being explored.

22. Which of the contacted authorities or agencies, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, rely largely or partially on groups of former insurgents?

The personnel of the police, army and Border Guards consist to a large extent of former insurgents.

23. How does the Federal Government itself and, to its knowledge, the leadership of the EUBAM mission, assess the attitude towards human rights of such army or police units influenced by former insurgents?

Through the provision of training and advisory services, the mission is to support the Libyan government in enhancing the performance of its border police authorities and organisational units and bringing them into compliance with international standards and "best practices".

24. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, what additional deficits exist with regard to respect for human rights by Libyan security authorities?
The Libyan government that has been in office since November 2012 is endeavouring to improve the human rights situation. Due to weak institutions and the lack of a state monopoly on the use of force, however, effective protection of human rights is not sufficiently ensured. Misconduct, especially on the part of militias, often goes unpunished. The Libyan government is endeavouring to bring all detention centres under government control and has condemned arbitrary arrests and torture. In April 2013 the General National Congress passed a law criminalising torture and enforced disappearances. Nevertheless, roughly 8,000 detainees, most of them held without due process, still remain in detention centres, some of which are operated by militias. There have been reports of torture and ill-treatment predominantly in non-governmental detention centres, in some instances resulting in death.

25. To what extent, in the assessment of the Federal Government or of the EUBAM mission leadership, can the heavily armed groups operating along Libya's south-western border even be combated with traditional police resources? To what extent should military means be utilized, and what is EUBAM's role in this context?

EUBAM currently cannot operate along Libya's south-western border for security reasons. For the same reasons, the Federal Government does not possess any information of its own concerning the situation there.

26. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, how many personnel each from the BG, the NCG and, if applicable, other forces have meanwhile been trained by or with the assistance of EUBAM (please specify the scope and content of such training)? How high is the total number of personnel from these forces, or how high is it intended to be?

As of 28 January 2014, EUBAM had provided border security training for a total of 300 personnel from the Libyan authorities. More precise figures on the individual training measures are available as of 27 November 2013, pursuant to which more than 211 persons had been trained, 20 of them women. Of these 211 trained border security personnel, 47 were from the border police, 27 were from Customs, 50 were police from the Ministry of Interior, 52 were from the Naval Coast Guard, twelve were from the Border Guards, 17 were from various airports and six were from the port authorities. EUBAM Libya plans to train further border security personnel within the scope of the current mandate.

27. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, which other actors (NATO, G8, UN, third countries, NGOs, IOs, GONGOs, private firms, etc.) are meanwhile or will in the foreseeable future be active in the area of training of Libyan security forces (please state as specifically as possible the remit and the figures for financial, personnel and material resources expended)? To what extent are their activities and those of EUBAM in fact coordinated with the UN Support Mission in Libya, and which deficits exist in this context?
The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic, the Italian Republic and the Republic of Turkey have offered the Libyan government training for security forces. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, the Italian, Turkish and American training has already begun; the others plan to start training this spring. For more details please see the reply to question 19 above. The Federal Government is not aware of any deficits in the cooperation with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). NATO is currently examining possibilities for implementation of advisory services for institutions of the Libyan security sector. Close coordination with international actors, especially with the United Nations and the European Union, is ensured.

28. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, how many Libyan security forces personnel have meanwhile been trained (within the scope of EUBAM or otherwise) in Member States of the European Union (please specify BG, NCG and other forces as well as scope and content of training)?

Thus far EUBAM Libya has not conducted any training of Libyan security forces personnel in Member States of the European Union. For more information, please see the reply to question 27 above.

29. Which further details can the Federal Government provide concerning the meeting at the EU agency FRONTEX at the beginning of June 2013 as well as the further meetings?

The delegation that visited the agency FRONTEX in June 2013 consisted of seven representatives of Libyan authorities and a staff member of the EUBAM Libya mission. The representatives of the Libyan authorities were from the Ministry of Interior, the Border Guards, the Naval Coast Guard and Customs.

a) Who from the Libyan side was involved, and (insofar as authorities were involved) to which ministry did the delegates belong?

Please see the reply to question 29 above.

b) Where did the meeting take place?

The meeting took place on the premises of the agency FRONTEX in Warsaw.

c) What is to be the specific contribution of FRONTEX to the development of the Libyan border security capabilities?

The specific contribution will depend on the outcome of the needs assessment that is being compiled by the EUBAM Libya mission in close cooperation with the Libyan authorities. Advisory services and support by the agency FRONTEX will probably be provided in the areas of risk analysis and border police training.

d) To what extent are the Libyan border authorities to cooperate with FRONTEX?
Initially there will only be indirect cooperation via the EUBAM Libya mission. Please see the reply to 29 c) above.

Direct cooperation between the agency FRONTEX and the Libyan border authorities will not take place until a working agreement has been concluded between the two parties. Please see the Federal Government’s reply of 14 May 2013 to question 8 b) of the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group in Bundestag printed paper 17/13462.

e) Which agreements or memoranda of understanding were concluded or notified?
Please see the reply to question 29 c) above. Support by the agency FRONTEX was notified in the areas mentioned therein.

f) To what extent was FRONTEX also involved in the drafting of "CONOPS PLUS" (Council Document 8182/4/13)?

The basis for the drafting of CONOPS PLUS was the "Technical Assessment Mission" (TAM) conducted by EUBAM Libya, in which FRONTEX was involved. FRONTEX participated in the drafting of the document in an advisory capacity.

g) What is the status or regulatory content of the working agreement between FRONTEX and Libya?

The negotiations have not yet progressed any further. For further information please see the reply to question 29 d) above.

30. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, have reports regularly been submitted to the Political and Security Committee as envisaged and if so, what was the subject and essential content of the reports? Which deficits and problems and which recommendations were mentioned therein?

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the European Union was informed as envisaged about the status of EUBAM Libya's work. The German Bundestag is regularly informed about the meetings of the PSC in accordance with section 7 subsection 3f of the Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters concerning the European Union. For more information please see the reply to question 1 above.

31. How many personnel of the Federal Police or other German authorities have thus far participated in the EUBAM mission and for which periods of time?

One Federal Police officer has been assigned to the EUBAM Libya mission since April 2013 (data as of 31 January 2014) and one Land police officer since 24 January 2014. A second Federal
Police officer left the country on 4 February 2014. From April to December 2013 a civilian expert was seconded to the EUBAM Libya mission as well.

a) Which reports have they compiled thus far, and to whom were the reports directed?

Within the scope of the general reporting obligation, staff members of the EUBAM Libya mission compile the necessary documents and send these to the European External Action Service. There is no obligation to report directly to Germany.

b) What is the subject matter of these reports, and which deficits, problems and conclusions do they contain?

The reports are not transmitted to the EU Member States. They are part of the internal communication between a CSDP mission and the EEAS.

32. Since the beginning of the EUBAM mission, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, have there been any security-related incidents in which mission staff members were involved and if so, what kind and with what consequences?

The Federal Government is not aware of any security-related incidents in which mission staff members were involved.

33. What is the nature of German activities in the area of reactor safety in Libya? Which divisions of which authorities are involved, and which measures are still to be implemented?

On behalf of the Federal Foreign Office, the Reactor Safety Association (GRS) is carrying out a project in cooperation with the Libyan Atomic Energy Agency to upgrade the physical security of the Libyan government research reactor in Tajoura in order to protect the nuclear material there from unauthorized access and theft. In addition to an analysis for modernisation of the installation, the support measures include initial and further training of staff of the responsible Libyan authorities. An extension of the installation is envisaged in a later phase to include a storage facility for radioactive material that meets modern security standards. The Federal Government furthermore supports activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to enhance nuclear security at border crossing points in order to prevent the smuggling of nuclear material.

a) To the knowledge of the Federal Government, where and how are secured radioactive materials stored, and which companies are responsible for this?

The project phase for construction of a storage facility for radioactive materials has not yet begun. For further information, please see the reply to question 33 above.

b) To the knowledge of the Federal Government, which safety-critical incidents have already occurred in this context?

No safety-critical incidents have occurred in the context of the project activities.

c) To what extent is the control of radioactive material also integrated into EUBAM?
The control of radioactive material is not envisaged in the mandate of EUBAM Libya. This is a duty incumbent upon the Libyan authorities in cooperation with the IAEA.

\[d\) What is meant with a “proactive” media policy (Council Document 8182/4/13)?\]

According to the Federal Government’s understanding of the term, a proactive media policy encompasses active communication with representatives of the media.

34. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, which efforts has the EUBAM mission itself undertaken to communicate information on its work in Libya? To what extent are new social media utilised, as envisaged, and what is the content of such utilisation (please also specify URLs or Facebook pages if available)?


35. To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, has EUBAM endeavoured to research reports (www.maltatoday.com dated 12 October 2013) that refugees from Libya who had set out across the Mediterranean and capsized off the coast of Lampedusa had been fired upon from a Libyan boat as they departed, and what information did it obtain in the process, especially with regard to the identity or affiliation of the gunmen?

The Federal Government has no knowledge of this matter.

36. To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, is it true, as reported by Human Rights Watch (Tagesspiegel, 18 November 2013), that several thousand refugees have been held in prisons in Libya, in some cases for years, although they have not been accused of any criminal offence (aside from the charge of crossing into the country illegally, perhaps)?

The Federal Government is aware that some illegal migrants are arbitrarily arrested and detained indefinitely, in some cases under very bad conditions. Others are arbitrarily deported from Libya to third countries. There is no possibility of applying for asylum in Libya.

\[a\) To what extent does the Federal Government expect EUBAM to even address this problem?\]

The task of EUBAM Libya is to support the Libyan authorities in the development and operational implementation of an integrated border management strategy. The mission’s mandate does not encompass any general advisory services in regard to the legal regime and the legal status of migrants. For further information, please see the reply to question 18 above.

\[b\) What has EUBAM done to address this problem, and what were the mission’s findings?\]
The Federal Government possesses no information on this matter.

c) What has EUBAM done to facilitate the release of the refugees from detention, and how many refugees have actually been freed as a result of EUBAM's intervention?

The Federal Government possesses no information on this matter.

d) To what extent has the Federal Government or have other EU Member States taken corresponding reports by EUBAM as cause for intervention, and with what success? How many refugees have been freed as a result of such intervention?

The Federal Government possesses no information on this matter. In talks with the Libyan authorities, the Federal Government – like the EU – regularly brings up the great importance of respect for human rights. This also includes the treatment of prisoners.

e) Who (authority, militia, etc.), to the knowledge of the Federal Government, is responsible for the reported detention practice?

To the knowledge of the Federal Government, the police, judicial police or militias are variously responsible for detention practice in the various parts of the country.

37. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, what is the personnel strength of the Libyan Naval Coast Guard, to whom does it report, and how many boats, aircraft and helicopters does it have at its disposal?

The Libyan Naval Coast Guard reports to the Ministry of Defence and has a personnel strength of approximately 3,000. The Federal Government does not possess precise information on the number of boats, aircraft and helicopters.

38. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, who is currently responsible for which areas of the 1800-kilometre maritime border (also territorial waters), and at which official exit points is it possible to legally leave the country? To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, are certain regions of the coast under particular surveillance, for instance to detect boats with refugees setting out in the direction of Europe?

Both the Naval Coast Guard and the Coastal Police operate along Libya's maritime border. There are presently no departures from the seaports designated as official exit points for persons wishing to leave the country. A few launching sites for refugees bound for Europe are known, but people leaving the country do not limit themselves to these sites. The Federal Government has no knowledge of any particular surveillance measures in certain regions.

39. What does the Federal Government know about a "three-phase plan" of the Navy and the Naval Coast Guard (Council Document 8182/4/13)?
The Federal Government possesses no information about such a plan.

a) What knowledge does the Federal Government have about a project for re-establishment of radar capability, and upon what is the "Vessel Traffic Management and Information System" based which is to be integrated as well?

The Port and Maritime Transport Authorities, the General Telecommunication Authority and the Naval Coast Guard operate radar systems. The radar system of the Naval Coast Guard is presently being evaluated. The "Vessel Traffic Management and Information System" is under development. Operated by the Port and Maritime Transport Authorities, it will serve to enhance the safety of maritime transport.

b) To what extent does the Federal Government have new knowledge as to whether or how Libyan maritime coordination centres are to be connected to similar infrastructure in Italy?

Within the framework of the EU SEAHORSE Programme, in which the Kingdom of Spain is playing a leading role, maritime coordination centres are to be established in Tripoli and Benghazi.

40. Which conclusions does the Federal Government draw from the statements of the EEAS that the SEAHORSE Programme was instituted to "increase the capacity of the authorities of the North African countries to tackle irregular migration" (Council Document 81824/13)?

Close cooperation and coordination with the countries of origin and transit countries play a key role in dealing with the issues associated with irregular migration. The Federal Government, together with its European partners and the EEAS, takes the view that the risks to refugees posed by irregular migration and associated illicit trafficking activities in the Mediterranean should be limited as much as possible.

41. What is the position of the Federal Government and, to the extent known, of the EU institutions and EU Member States in general regarding activities of the Libyan security forces or, respectively, of the NCG in Libya’s own coastal waters and on the high seas to hinder boats crossing from Libya to Italy or Malta?

The Federal Government does not have sufficient knowledge of the operational activities of Libyan authorities in the country’s own coastal waters or on the high seas in order to comment on or judge such activities. For further information, please see the reply to question 40 above.

42. Which bilateral or multilateral agreements, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, has Libya concluded with neighbouring states that, in the opinion of the Federal Government
or of the participants in EUBAM, are of significance for a restructuring of the Libyan security architecture?

The Federal Government has no knowledge of its own regarding such agreements. EUBAM Libya concerns itself with this topic in order to be able to offer advisory services.

43. Does the Federal Government know in this context whether there was an agreement dated 8 January 2013 between Libya, Tunisia and Algeria on common border security issues and corresponding technical upgrading and, if so, what knowledge does it have as to the content of this agreement?

The Federal Government possesses no information regarding the above-mentioned agreement other than the general information presented in the media.

a) To the knowledge of the Federal Government, which deportation agreements has the Libyan government accordingly concluded with other countries?

The Federal Government possesses no information regarding this matter.

b) To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government do corresponding arrangements also exist between local tribes and neighbouring countries (Council Document 8182/4/13)?

The Federal Government has no knowledge of its own regarding any border control arrangements between local tribes and neighbouring countries.

c) To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, does the upgrading of border surveillance (also by EUBAM) also serve to hinder the smuggling of cheap fuel into the neighbouring countries, and what importance does the Federal Government attach to this problem?

The improvement of border surveillance is important in the regional context of smuggling of weapons, drugs and human beings as well as cross-border terrorist activities. The importance of the smuggling of cheap fuel must be appropriately assessed in this context.

44. Which memoranda of understanding, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, were reached in the years 2012 and 2013 with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to support the Libyan transition process, and who was involved?

Libya has been a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 1958. According to the IMF report dated 2 May 2013 on the annual Article IV Consultation, discussions were held between 2012 and 2013 between the Libyan government and the IMF as well as the World Bank on technical assistance in the areas of financial sector reform, public finances, national statistics, subsidy reform
and recovery of stolen assets. The Federal Government has no knowledge of what was specifically agreed or who was involved in which talks.

45. **Who from the German side participated in the International Ministerial Conference on Support to Libya in Paris on 12 February 2013, what content was discussed, and what commitments were made there?**

Germany was represented at the conference by the then State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office. The Federal Government underscored the importance of adoption of a new constitution and of national reconciliation for the further political process and offered support in this context. It also committed assistance in the control of small weapons and ammunition, mine clearance, destruction of chemical weapons and the securing of sources of radiation.

46. **What can the Federal Government communicate regarding the content and implementation of EU programmes addressing the topics of security and migration in Libya?**

   a) **What is the status of implementation of the "Crisis Response Capacity Building/Operational Centre" of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), what does it involve and how is it to be organised?**

The "Regional Crisis Response Centre" is a joint project of the European Commission and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A centre has been established at the Secretariat of the Arab League in Cairo for the prevention and management of political, social and economic crises as well as environmental disasters. The Federal Government has no knowledge of any further details.

   b) **What is the status of implementation of the project "Strengthening democracy, good governance and civilian culture in the security and justice sectors" of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), what does it involve and how is it to be organised?**

In December 2012 the European Commission approved a package of measures in the amount of EUR 25 million to support the transition process in Libya. It encompasses three programmes addressing the areas of education, health care and security/rule of law. The programme mentioned by the questioners is to support the Libyan government in mastering the challenges in the area of security and national reconciliation. The project is set to run for four years and is being implemented by the International Management group (IMG). It consists of five components: Security Strategic Capacity, Security Human Resource Management and Training, Judicial Capacity Enhancement, Local Security Governance and Integrated Crime Fighting Capacity.
c) What is the status of implementation of the project "Enhancing Local Risk Detection and Crime Investigation Capability" of the Instrument for Stability (IfS), what does it involve and how is it to be organised?

According to information from the European Commission, the project mentioned by the questioners is being implemented by INTERPOL. It is set to run for 18 months and has been allocated funding in the amount of EUR 2.2 million. The Federal Government has no knowledge of any further details.

d) What is the status of implementation of the programme "SAHARAMED", what does it involve and how is it to be organised?

The SAHARA-MED (Prevention and Management of Irregular Migration Flows from Sahara Desert to Mediterranean Sea) programme is being implemented by the Italian Ministry of Interior, the Greek immigration authorities and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The objective of the programme is to improve migration control on Europe's southern border. The Federal Government has no knowledge of any further details.

e) To what extent is a fingerprinting system also being set up within the framework of SAHARAMED?

The Federal Government possesses no information regarding this matter.

47. To what extent, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, are other countries also involved in building the Libyan security architecture within the framework of bilateral measures providing training of or support for the military, the intelligence services, the police or Customs?

Please see the reply to question 27 above.

a) What knowledge does the Federal Government have, aside from the information in Council Document 8182/4/13, regarding a "Border Security programme" of the U.S. Department of State, and in which countries bordering Libya is training taking place?

The Federal Government is aware of U.S. training measures in the area of land border security. The objective of these measures is to impart basic border security skills to the Libyan security forces. A training course for Libyan border security personnel was conducted at the U.S. Consulate General in Frankfurt at the end of January 2014.

The Federal Government has no knowledge of its own regarding the U.S. Department of State's programme in the countries bordering Libya.

b) What knowledge does the Federal Government have, aside from the information in Council Document 8182/4/13, regarding a "Partnership for Peace" programme launched by Turkey?

The Federal Government is not aware of a Turkish "Partnership for Peace" programme.
c) To the knowledge of the Federal Government, what is the status of corresponding partnerships with Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar?

The United Arab Emirates have provided support to Libya in the military, humanitarian and security sectors ever since the beginning of the revolution. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates most recently stated in December 2013 that the United Arab Emirates were conducting training measures for Libyan police and military personnel. According to information of the EEAS, at least 230 Libyan officers have thus far been trained by personnel from the United Arab Emirates, and at least 16 Libyan trainers have received training as well.

The Federal Government has no knowledge regarding a current bilateral partnership of the State of Qatar to help build security structures for the military, police, intelligence services or Customs in Libya.

The Federal Government has no knowledge regarding bilateral measures of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to help build the Libyan security architecture.

d) What knowledge does the Federal Government have, aside from the information in Council Document 8182/4/13, regarding an electronic land border control system that is now finally to be delivered by the Italian firm SELEX, and how is this being addressed by or even integrated within the framework of EUBAM?

Please see the Federal Government’s replies of 7 January 2014 to questions 42 and 43 of the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group in Bundestag printed paper 18/254. The Federal Government possesses no further information regarding this matter.

e) How many coast guard patrol boats, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, have already been restored or newly supplied by the Italian government (Council Document 8182/4/13)?

Please see the Federal Government’s replies of 7 January 2014 to questions 42 and 43 of the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group in Bundestag printed paper 18/254. The Federal Government possesses no further information regarding this matter.

f) What knowledge does the Federal Government have, aside from the information in Council Document 8182/4/13, regarding a system to prevent weapons smuggling by water ("water-space management")?

The Federal Government possesses no information regarding this matter.

g) What knowledge does the Federal Government have, aside from the information in Council Document 8182/4/13, regarding the connection of Libyan control centres to a maritime "Italian Operational Centre"?

The Federal Government possesses no information regarding this matter.
h) What knowledge does the Federal Government have regarding the conduct of the joint maritime exercise "Shahin" in the Mediterranean in the years 2012 and 2013, in which France also participated (Council Document 81824/13)?

The Federal Government possesses no information regarding this matter.

i) To what extent is Algeria still "interested in the installation of a border surveillance system" (Bundestag printed paper 17/13462)?

The Federal Government does not possess any relevant information. For further information, please see the Federal Government’s answer of 14 May 2013 to the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group in Bundestag printed paper 17/13462.

j) What was the outcome of a project co-financed by the EU to build and equip border posts and mobile surveillance units in Mauritania (Bundestag printed paper 17/13462)?

The project is being continued. By November 2013, among other things, 47 border posts had been built or renovated in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Within the framework of the project, the effectiveness and professionalism of border controls are to be improved and cooperation with the border authorities of the Republic of Mali is to be better coordinated. For further information, please see the Federal Government’s answer of 14 May 2013 to the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group in Bundestag printed paper 17/13462.

48. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, what budget is the EUBAM mission to be given in the year 2014, and how is it broken down?

The budget envisaged for EUBAM Libya after the first year of the mandate is not available to the Federal Government (as of 4 February 2014). For further information, please see the reply to question 14 above.