TE-SAT 2008
EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 2008

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Europol
Corporate Communications
Postbox 90850
2509 LW The Hague
Netherlands

Tel. +31-70 302 50 00
Fax +31-70 345 58 96
E-mail: corporate.communications@europol.europa.eu
Internet: http://www.europol.europa.eu

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Europol, the European Police Office, was created by the member states of the European Union as the central hub for the exchange and analysis of law enforcement information. Its existence is proof that the cooperation between member states in creating a single area of freedom, security and justice has reached a new multilateral level.

Working in close cooperation with the member states, Europol is in a unique position to provide an overview of the security situation in the European Union. Two annual public awareness reports are produced by Europol: the EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) and the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). Both have become important awareness tools for decision makers at European level.

The TE-SAT is a forward-looking document. Its aim is not only to describe the situation in the European Union regarding terrorism and related phenomena, but also to identify trends. For the first time since the adoption of a new methodology in 2006, TE-SAT 2008 offers the possibility to compare the findings of one year with those of the previous year.

As an annual product, the TE-SAT is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, awareness in the member states about the importance of such a tool is growing. It is my pleasure to note that contributions for TE-SAT 2008 have increased significantly in quantity and quality. I would like to thank the member states and Eurojust for their continuing commitment and cooperation.

Terrorism manifests itself in a variety of ways and has been an issue in the EU for many years. The impact of terrorist attacks became obvious again in 2007 with the murder of two Spanish police officers in France by the Basque separatist terrorist group ETA. Our thoughts are with their families.

The overall threat to the member states from terrorism remains serious, as demonstrated by the failed attacks in London and Glasgow and the disrupted plots in Germany and Denmark. The transnational nature of this threat requires an EU-wide response. In order to effectively meet the challenge of counter-terrorism in the EU, the member states must continue to develop robust cooperation and coordination networks to facilitate information exchange and to assist in our understanding of the challenges that face us.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies as well as to Eurojust and SitCen for their support and valuable contribution to the project throughout the year.

Max-Peter Ratzel
Director of Europol
2. INTRODUCTION

The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was established in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States as a reporting mechanism from the EU Council’s Terrorism Working Party (TWP) to the European Parliament. The first five editions of the TE-SAT were presented by the respective Presidencies of the EU Council, “based on a file and on the analyses supplied by Europol” from member states’ contributions.1

At the beginning of 2006, Europol proposed to widen the data collection for the TE-SAT in order to enhance the quality of the report. The proposal was endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 1 and 2 June 2006, and TE-SAT 2007 was based on a new methodology developed by Europol in consultation with the advisory board of 2006, consisting of the Finnish and German Presidencies, Eurojust and SitCen (the EU Joint Situation Centre).2

For TE-SAT 2008, the scope of the report has been slightly modified regarding the qualitative data, allowing the member states to report on criminal acts committed by extremists. This change has been made in consultation with the advisory board of TE-SAT 2008, consisting of the Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies, Eurojust and SitCen.

In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is an unclassified annual document which provides information on the phenomenon of terrorism in the EU. The TE-SAT discusses terrorism from a law enforcement point of view, i.e. as a “crime”, although terrorism is fundamentally a political phenomenon driven by political motives and oriented toward political ends.

The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and analyses the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It neither attempts to analyse the root causes of terrorism nor to assess the threat posed by terrorism. Furthermore, the TE-SAT does not assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures taken, despite the fact that they form an important part of the phenomenon.

The TE-SAT is an EU report and, as such, aims at providing an overview of the situation in the EU rather than describing the situation in individual member states. It seeks to establish basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks, arrests and activities in the EU.

The TE-SAT is also a trend report. Since a trend can be defined as a general tendency in the way a situation is changing or developing, the TE-SAT is a forward-looking report. As TE-SAT 2007 was the first report based on the new methodology, no comparison with previous years was possible. Consequently, TE-SAT 2008 is the first edition that attempts an analysis of trends.

The TE-SAT is based mainly on information contributed by the member states concerning and resulting from criminal investigations into terrorist offences. The TE-SAT does not contain information which is classified or which could jeopardise ongoing investigations.

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1 ENFOPOL 41 REV 2 (8466/2/01).
2 SitCen monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD proliferation.
3. TE-SAT 2008 METHODOLOGY

3.1. Definitions

Terrorism

Terrorism is not an ideology or movement, but a tactic or a method for attaining political goals. This view is also reflected in the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA). All member states had to align their national legislation with this Framework Decision by 31 December 2002. At the end of November 2007, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator reported to the European Council that, apart from Slovakia, all member states had fully completed the implementation. In Slovakia, the Framework Decision was partially implemented with the exception of the provisions concerning the liability of legal persons.

An overview of the legislation on terrorism, or current proposals of legislation, regarding the ten countries which provided information on court cases to Eurojust is described in Annex 3.

Whereas the member states have harmonised their national legislation with the provisions of the Framework Decision, the definition of terrorist acts provided in Article 1 of the Decision includes elements, such as the impact of the act concerned, which are open to interpretation. For practical reasons, the data collected for TE-SAT 2008 relies on the member states’ definitions of terrorist offences.

TE-SAT 2007 restricted its reporting purely to terrorism, disregarding extremism. The disparities currently existing between the member states with regard to the crime areas which are defined as terrorism or extremism, respectively, were reflected in the contributions to the report. As a result, the European scope of the crime areas could not be fully described. For TE-SAT 2007 this was especially true for left-wing and right-wing terrorism. For TE-SAT 2008, this problem would also have affected the reporting on the new category of single issue terrorism.

TE-SAT 2008 continues to focus on terrorism. Although not all forms of extremism sanction the use of violence, extremism as a phenomenon may be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural patterns. Criminal acts committed by extremists, with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country will consequently be included in TE-SAT 2008 if reported by the member states.

In TE-SAT 2008, this methodological modification only applies to the qualitative part. With regard to the quantitative part, the member states were again asked to provide data on arrests, attacks and activities defined as terrorism at national level.

The member states have been asked to contribute data on all individuals arrested for terrorism offences in the course of 2007. “Arrests” refers to judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by national law. That the person

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3 An outline of this Council Decision is included in the Annex 2.

4 An amendment of the Criminal Code is in preparation in Slovakia and will comprise specific provisions on this aspect.
may subsequently be provisionally released or placed under house arrest does not impact on the calculation of the number of arrests.

**Attacks have been reported by member states as failed, foiled or successfully executed.** The category “reported activities” relates to terrorist activities investigated as such in the member states.

### Types of Terrorism

Terrorist organisations in the TE-SAT are categorised by their source of motivation. However this is not always an easy task, as many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates. The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT is pragmatic and reflects the current situation in the EU. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

**Islamist terrorism** is motivated either in whole or in part by an abusive interpretation of Islam; the use of violence is regarded by its practitioners as a divine duty or sacramental act.\(^5\)

**Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups**, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) and Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), seek international recognition and political self-determination. They are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.

**Left-wing terrorist groups**, such as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army (DHKP-C), seek to change the entire political, social and economic system of a state according to an extremist leftist model. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. The agenda of **anarchist terrorist groups**, such as the Unofficial Anarchist Federation (Federaizione Anarchica Informale, FAI), is usually revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. Not all member states have distinguished between activities of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their contributions. For this reason, both categories are discussed in the same chapter of this report.

**Right-wing terrorist groups** seek to change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist rightist model. The ideological roots of European right-wing terrorism can usually be traced back to National Socialism.\(^6\)

**Single Issue Terrorism** is violence committed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within a target society. The term is generally used to describe animal rights and environmentalist terrorist groups.\(^7\)

### 3.2. TE-SAT 2008 Data

The data collection for TE-SAT 2008 covered terrorist attacks, activities and arrests in the EU in 2007 and terrorist attacks outside the EU in which EU interests were affected. In addition, Eurojust collected data on prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences in member states.

Both quantitative and qualitative data on terrorist attacks and activities was collected from the member states. Terrorism is not mass or collective violence but rather the work of small groups, however popular these groups may be. Even if supported by a larger organisation, the number of militants who engage in terrorism is usually very limited.\(^8\) However, some aspects of the phenomenon, such as attacks and arrested suspects, can also be analysed with the use of quantitative research methods. Due to the relatively small number of investigations into terrorist activities reported by the member states, terrorist activities are analysed and described mainly with the help of qualitative data, although quantitative data was also collected to support the analytical work.

Europol extracted quantitative TE-SAT data on terrorist attacks and activities as well as on arrested suspects from reports on terrorist incidents contributed by the member states. The processed data was cross-checked and, in case of gaps, complemented by open source data systematically monitored, collected and processed by Europol.

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\(^6\) Their American counterparts, white supremacist groups, are often categorised as religious terrorists. See Hoffman, Bruce (2006) *Inside Terrorism*, p. 237.


After this, Europol requested the member states to validate their national data.

Eurojust collected data on the basis of the Council Decision of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences (2005/671/JHA), according to which the member states are obliged to collect all relevant information concerning prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences and send it to Eurojust.

According to the 2005 Council Decision, the information submitted to Eurojust is in relation to final convictions. If convictions in 2007 were appealed but came to a conclusion before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceedings as one.

Ten member states provided Eurojust with information on cases in their national courts: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. The UK was not able to provide a comprehensive overview for 2007 within the timeframe set, but most high-level cases were included. Although some data is still lacking, the member states most affected by terrorist offences provided their contribution. In general, the contributions to Eurojust were of better quality compared to 2006 with a much higher level of detail. Due to differences in the data contributed to Eurojust for 2006 and 2007, however, it was not always possible to compare the findings.

The aforementioned Council Decision 2005/671/JHA also obliges the member states to collect all relevant information concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences and sets out the conditions under which this information should be sent to Europol. This information facilitates Europol’s data collection for the TE-SAT only to a limited extent, as the TE-SAT does not contain information that may jeopardise ongoing investigations.

The data contributed by the member states to TE-SAT 2008 was generally of high quality with a high level of details. In addition to the quantitative contribution, all member states also provided Europol with a qualitative contribution.

The collected data for 2007 referred to a total of 583 attacks, 1044 arrested suspects and 331 convictions for terrorism charges in the EU. It should be noted that the arrests and convictions may be related to terrorist offences that took place before 2007 and, consequently, may not be related to activities and attacks reported for the purpose of TE-SAT 2008.

Although the member states’ reporting on terrorist attacks, activities and arrests continues to vary in degree of elaboration, it can generally be stated that the data contributed by the member states for 2007 was more detailed than that for 2006. Concerning TE-SAT 2008, the main information gap is found in the number of fatalities and casualties in terrorist attacks. Regarding Islamist terrorism, reporting on group affiliation was generally missing. In a few cases, the type of terrorism was not specified. In the statistics, such cases were registered under the category ‘other’.

Gaps in the data collected by Europol may be due to the fact that the investigations into the terrorist attacks or activities concerned are still ongoing. In addition, it is a well known fact that terrorist activities are not always prosecuted as terrorist offences. Furthermore, it seems likely that terrorist attacks and activities with perceived low and/or local impact remained underreported to Europol. It is not possible to track these investigations by monitoring open sources and include them in the data, as generally only the most “spectacular” cases, in particular as regards terrorist activities, are reported in the media.

As was the case for TE-SAT 2007, the UK was not able to provide Europol with comprehensive quantitative data for TE-SAT 2008. Nevertheless, two failed Islamist terrorist attacks in 2007 were contributed. As for the TE-SAT 2007, UK authorities contributed the total number of persons arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 without any affiliation. The UK did, however, contribute a comprehensive qualitative report. TE-SAT 2008 describes and analyses the situation in the UK mainly based on this contribution.

Information on and analysis of Islamist activities on the Internet is the result of a project initiated at Europol in October 2004 within the framework of the second EU counter-terrorism task force and later transferred to Europol’s counter-terrorism unit. The description and analysis of the situation outside the EU, both for separatist and Islamist terrorism, is mainly based on open sources.
4. OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU 2007

4.1. Terrorist Attacks

In 2007, nine member states reported a total of 583 failed, foiled or successfully executed attacks. This is a 24 percent increase from what was reported in 2006. Of the 583 attacks, 517 were claimed or attributed to separatist terrorist groups in Spain and France. The vast majority of these attacks were arson attacks aimed at causing material damage. Although the number of casualties and fatalities is limited, two persons were killed in an attack claimed by the Basque separatist terrorist group ETA.

With regard to Islamist terrorism, two failed and two attempted attacks were reported for 2007. As in 2006, failed or attempted Islamist terrorist attacks took place in the UK, Denmark and Germany. Police investigations into the attempted attacks in Denmark and Germany have shown that the intended targets were likely to be located on their national territory. The failed and attempted attacks mainly aimed at causing indiscriminate mass casualties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member state</th>
<th>Islamist</th>
<th>Separatist</th>
<th>Left Wing</th>
<th>Right Wing</th>
<th>Single Issue</th>
<th>Not Specified</th>
<th>Total 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>532</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>583</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks and number of arrests 2007 compared to 2006

Figure 2: Number of failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks in 2007 per member state and affiliation
Left-wing and anarchist groups were responsible for 21 attacks in the EU during 2007. The most affected countries were Italy followed by Spain. The vast majority of the attacks were successfully executed and aimed at governmental institutions or private businesses.

The majority of attacks related to right-wing organisations are contributed as extremism. One right-wing terrorist attack was reported for 2007, in Portugal.

Single issue terrorism was introduced as a new category for 2007. Although a number of incidents were attributed or claimed by animal rights and environmentalist extremist groups, only one was contributed as a terrorist attack.

A complete list of all contributed attack and arrest data for 2006 and 2007 can be found in Annex 4 and 5.

### 4.2. Arrested Suspects

A total of 1044 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offences in 2007. This is an increase of 48 percent compared to 2006. France, Spain and the UK have reported the largest number of arrests per member state.

The number of arrested suspects for separatist terrorism has more than doubled in comparison to 2006. This increase is mainly due to the vast increase in the number of arrests in France and Spain. In 2007, Spain saw a seven-fold increase in arrested suspects: from 28 in 2006 to 196 in 2007. France went from 188 people arrested in 2006 to 315 in 2007, an increase of almost 68 percent.

Concerning Islamist terrorism, the number of arrested individuals decreased compared to 2006. In 2007, 201 persons were arrested for Islamist terrorism, compared to 257 in 2006. This decrease can mainly be attributed to a 35 percent decrease in the number of arrested suspects reported by France.
However, the UK reported a 30 percent increase in arrested suspects. Although no affiliation could be assigned, UK authorities estimate that, out of the 203 persons arrested in 2007, the vast majority were in relation to Islamist terrorism.

At the time of their arrest, all suspects were between 17 to 72 years of age. The average age was 35 years, with two thirds of the arrested being between 23 and 43 years old. Persons arrested for anarchist and right-wing terrorism offences were generally younger than 30.

The vast majority of the arrested suspects were EU citizens. A large number of these were separatist terrorists arrested in France and Spain. Furthermore, an increasing number of the arrested suspects have the citizenship of the country of arrest.

As in 2006, the vast majority of suspects were arrested for membership of a terrorist organisation. Twenty-two percent were arrested for attack-related crimes such as planning, preparing or executing an attack. As in 2006, financing, facilitation and recruitment continue to be activities of which the arrested are suspected. The number of suspects arrested for propaganda has increased. The suspects arrested for this offence are mainly linked to Islamist terrorism.

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The number of women arrested for terrorism offences is still relatively low.10 In 2007, ten percent of all arrested suspects were women. There is, however, a noticeable difference between the different types of terrorism, ranging from seven percent women among Islamist terrorists to fourteen percent among separatist terrorist groups. Eighty percent of all women arrested for terrorism were EU citizens.

4.3. Convictions and Penalties

In the course of 2007, 418 individuals were tried on terrorism charges in the member states, in a total of 143 proceedings. No consistent information was available regarding the time that had elapsed between arrests, trial and date of conviction but, in general, it can be stated that the convictions relate to events which occurred before 2007.

Of the 418 individuals, 34 were women. The vast majority of these were charged in relation to separatist terrorism.

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### Table: Number of individuals tried for terrorism charges per member state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member state</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Netherlands</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>241</strong></td>
<td><strong>419</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 In the 2007 statistical data, the gender of only 8.5 percent of the arrested remained unknown, compared to 17 percent in 2006.

11 The total number of 419 individuals tried (instead of 418) is caused by the fact that one individual was tried in both Italy and Spain.
The large difference in the number of individuals tried for terrorism charges in 2006 and 2007 can partly be explained by underreporting from the member states in 2006. Only eight member states contributed data in 2006, as opposed to ten member states in 2007.

Also noteworthy is the fact that trials with large groups of defendants took place in several countries in 2007. This was the case in Spain where 52 individuals were indicted in one trial. The trial concerning the 2004 Madrid bombings involved 29 defendants. In Italy, a court case involving 14 individuals came to its conclusion in December. In France, there were two cases against 16 and 11 individuals respectively, whilst all 17 individuals reported by Greece were tried in the same case.

Of a total of 143 court proceedings in 2007, 54 percent were related to separatist terrorism, whilst 38 percent were related to Islamist terrorism. Only one trial in 2007 concerned right-wing terrorism. This trial confirmed the sentence imposed on an individual previously convicted of the bombing of the Bologna railway in 1980.

The court proceedings resulted in 449 verdicts. The number of verdicts does not correlate directly to the number of suspects tried for terrorism charges as some suspects received more than one sentence in separate court proceedings. This applies in particular to Spain where 231 suspects received a total of 255 verdicts. These verdicts were mainly related to Basque separatist terrorism.

All verdicts reported by Belgium, Germany and the UK were related to Islamist terrorism. In Italy, this was the case for 44 of 47 reported verdicts.

Of the total of 449 verdicts in 2007, 331 were convictions. Eight of the thirty-four women tried for terrorism charges were acquitted. The percentage of acquittals increased from 15 percent in 2006 to 26 percent in 2007. This increase may be explained by law enforcement authorities working to disrupt terrorist plots at an early stage in order to avoid casualties or destruction of infrastructure and properties. Individuals planning attacks and promoting terrorist crimes may have been brought before court before they were able to reach the stage of carrying out a successful terrorist attack. It is generally more difficult to produce evidence in court for intent, propaganda and planning than for the execution of attacks. See figure 7.

Court proceedings in relation to Islamist terrorism have the highest acquittal rate: 31 percent of the defendants were found not guilty. Left-wing and separatist terrorism both have an acquittal rate of approximately 20 percent.

The Council of Europe has adopted a convention on the prevention of terrorism. Such an instrument is lacking at the EU level, and national legislations are still being developed in this regard. An overview of the current state of legislation in the EU member states which had court cases in 2007 is provided in Annex 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member state</th>
<th>Islamist</th>
<th>Separatist</th>
<th>Left Wing</th>
<th>Right Wing</th>
<th>Not Specified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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</tr>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>214</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 6: Number of verdicts for terrorism charges in 2007 per member state and affiliation
Several interesting investigations and prosecution cases came to a conclusion in 2007. On 31 October 2007, the sentences in the trial against the suspected perpetrators of the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid were pronounced. The Spanish high court, the Audiencia Nacional, convicted three main defendants on charges of mass murder with a terrorist intent and other charges. In total, 21 persons were found guilty of participating in the Madrid bombings. For one of the convicted individuals, the sentences imposed added up to 42,952 years. However, the maximum time to be served in prison in Spain is 40 years.

The year 2007 also saw the conviction of four persons in relation to the failed bomb attacks on the London transport system on 21 July 2005. The four individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment which in the UK means 40 years. The UK also had its first conviction in relation to terrorism propaganda. The three men convicted had been found in possession of materials suggesting that they were involved in the production of terrorist propaganda. The suspects were also in possession of information on how to cause explosions or build bombs. On trial, the defendants admitted to having urged British Muslims to wage violent jihad\(^\text{12}\) against all non-believers. They were sentenced to six, eight and twelve years’ imprisonment, respectively.

In November 2007, the Danish high court convicted three persons for planning a terrorist attack in Denmark. The investigation showed that the men procured fertiliser and chemicals which could be used for producing peroxide-based primary explosives. Members of the group gathered large amounts of information on the Internet regarding the manufacturing of explosives and bombs. Two of the accused were sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment, while the third received a four-year sentence. The prosecution subsequently appealed the sentences to the Danish supreme court in order to get the sentences increased.

In Belgium, a network of intermediaries for al-Qaeda was successfully prosecuted in 2007. The prosecutors made use of a judicial decision in Italy: in 2007, the Italian supreme court held that the impact of individual terrorist actions needs to be seen in the wider criminal plan of a terrorist organisation. Sentences in Italy amounted to nine and six years; in Belgium, the five individuals were sentenced to up to ten years in early 2008.

Figure 8 provides an overview of the average penalty per convicted individual in the ten member states. In 2006 and 2007, several convictions in Spain resulted in long cumulative sentences. For the purpose of this overview, Eurojust counted 40 years for all sentences exceeding this period of time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member state</th>
<th>Convicted</th>
<th>Acquitted</th>
<th>Total Verdicts</th>
<th>Acquitted %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>France</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>the Netherlands</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per member state in 2007

\(^{12}\) Throughout the report referred to as the use of violence or violent struggle, allegedly in defence of Islam.
The large difference in average penalty between 2006 and 2007 is mainly due to the fact that the number of contributing member states has increased. Another factor is that a number of very serious cases were successfully concluded in the UK. Although this prevents a general comparison, it is still possible to compare the mean average for 2006 and 2007.

As in 2006, the relatively high average for Spain can be explained by the fact that a majority of the defendants were convicted of murder or of “collateral” fatalities. In average, membership of a terrorist organisation, taken as an offence in its own right, has resulted in sentences amounting to five to ten years. The average sentence in Spain has gone down slightly from 2006 to 2007.

In the UK, of the 33 convicted individuals, twelve received a full 40 year sentence. These included the four individuals connected to the failed July 2005 London transport bombing. Thus, the average sentence imposed in the UK has increased compared to the year 2006.

The relatively low sentences in the Netherlands may be due to the fact that individuals suspected of planning attacks and promoting terrorist crimes were brought before the court before reaching the stage of successfully executing a terrorist attack.

In Greece, very high sentences were passed for one group of individuals jointly tried for different crimes. Almost all individuals were convicted of criminal association, in addition to causing explosions, attempted murder, robberies and carrying weapons. One individual received 17 lifetime sentences and another 11. All these sentences have been recalculated to count as 25 years which, according to Greek law, is the maximum term to be spent in prison.
4.4. Key Findings

- The member states reported a total of 583 attacks and 1044 arrested suspects in the EU.

- Eighty-eight percent of all reported terrorist attacks are separatist terrorist attacks targeting France and Spain. The attacks were claimed by, or attributed to, Basque and Corsican separatist terrorism.

- Arson attack was the most common type of attack perpetrated by terrorists in the EU.

- The majority of all suspects were arrested for membership of a terrorist organisation. Twenty-two percent of all suspects were arrested for attack related offences.

- The average age of arrested suspects was 35 years with two thirds of all arrested between 23 and 43 years old. The vast majority of all arrested were EU citizens.

- The number of women arrested for terrorism offences is generally low. The highest number of female arrested suspects was reported in relation to separatist terrorism.

- Most attacks and arrests related to the categories left-wing, right-wing and single issue are contributed by the member states as extremism.

- Fifty-four percent of all court cases in 2007 were related to separatist terrorism, followed by thirty-eight percent in relation to Islamist terrorism.

- Court proceedings in relation to Islamist terrorism had an acquittal rate of 31 percent compared to 20 percent for left-wing and separatist terrorism.
The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain reported that the general threat of an attack by Islamist terrorists on their territory increased during 2007. In France and Italy, the threat remains high. The UK has estimated the risk of an attack as highly likely. In addition, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal consider that the increasing activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) aiming at international targets have an impact on the threat level in their member state. Italian authorities also estimate that, due to their geographical proximity to the Maghreb, they face the risk of terrorists linked to AQIM attempting to enter the EU via Italy.

5.1. Terrorist Attacks

In 2007, Europe saw four failed and attempted Islamist terrorist attacks. The UK experienced two failed terrorist attacks, while Denmark and Germany both reported one attempted attack each.

Failed attacks – the UK

On 29 June, two car bombs failed to explode in central London. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were found in the cars, one of which was parked outside a popular night club, while the second was stationed just a short distance away. The IEDs consisted of gas cylinders, containers filled with petrol and an initiation system. Bags of nails had been placed on the gas cylinders and on the vehicle floors in order to increase the number of casualties. The UK police believe that a number of attempts were made to detonate the IEDs whilst the night-club was still open. Approximately 1,700 people were on the premises at the time.

The day after the vehicles were found, a burning car loaded with gas cylinders was driven into the Arrivals Terminal at Glasgow International airport. The gas cylinders failed to explode; a limited number of people sustained minor injuries in this failed attack. The two male perpetrators were arrested at the scene. One of the men later died in hospital from severe burn injuries, which he suffered after throwing around petrol inside the burning car.
It quickly emerged that the attacks in London and Glasgow were linked. Three men were arrested and charged in relation to these attacks. One of the men was charged with withholding information about a terrorist offence. The other two are accused of conspiracy to cause explosions.\(^{15}\) The trial is expected to start in October 2008.

**Attempted attack – Germany**

Three men — a 28-year-old Turkish national and two German nationals aged 22 and 28 — were arrested on 4 September 2007, suspected of planning several coordinated bomb attacks in Germany with the aim to cause mass casualties. At the time of their arrest, the three men were in the process of making highly powerful explosives using hydrogen peroxide and military detonators. Although the targets had not yet been definitively selected, the investigation revealed that possible targets included US military facilities in Germany. Had the suspects succeeded in building the bombs, they would have had a higher explosive effect than the bombs used in the 2004 attacks in Madrid\(^ {16}\), where 191 people were killed and 1,841 injured.\(^ {17}\)

The suspects had acquired the know-how to build the bombs mainly through specialised explosives training courses in training camps in Pakistan, run by the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Instructions for building similar bombs are also available on the Internet. The IJU, which originates from Uzbekistan, was founded in March 2002 by former members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). It is believed to have close links to al-Qaeda.

On 11 September 2007, the IJU posted a claim in Turkish on a Turkish jihadist Internet site in which they referred to the arrested suspects as members of the IJU. They also claimed responsibility for the attempted attack in Germany, naming the US Air Base at Ramstein and the US and Uzbek consulates-general in Germany as the intended targets. According to the message, the aim of the attack was to force the closure of the German Air Base at Termez in Uzbekistan.\(^ {18}\)

The Pakistani-born main suspect is alleged to have gone through training in Pakistan. After his return to Denmark, he manufactured and tested tricycloacetone triperoxide (TATP). He also made extensive use of the Internet for various operational purposes. The police investigation revealed links between the suspects and people abroad. The trial is expected to start in summer 2008.

On 11 November 2007, police arrested an additional person in connection with the case. The individual is suspected of planning to kidnap Danish citizens abroad. Allegedly, the plan was to pressurise the Danish authorities into releasing the suspects arrested in the Glasvej case.\(^ {19}\)

5.2. Arrested Suspects

For 2007, the member states reported a total of 201 suspects arrested for Islamist terrorist offences. In 2006, the number of arrested suspects reported was 257. This decrease can mainly be explained by a 34 percent decrease in arrests in France. Despite the small number of failed and attempted terrorist attacks reported for 2007, 25 percent of all suspects were arrested for offences relating to Islamist terrorism. The number of member states which reported arrests increased from nine in 2006 to fourteen in 2007.

The majority of the arrests took place in France, Italy and Spain. As in 2006, the majority of those arrested came from North African countries, such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. France, however, also reported a high number of arrests of French nationals. In Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium and Germany, the majority of those arrested had the

\(^{15}\) Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

\(^{16}\) Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

\(^{17}\) Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Eurojust.

\(^{18}\) Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

\(^{19}\) Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark.
citizenship of the country of arrest. This may indicate an increase in the number of home-grown terrorists.

As in 2006, the vast majority of the arrested suspects in the UK were in relation to Islamist terrorism. However, since these arrests were not reported as affiliated to any type of terrorism, they were not included in the statistics. For 2007, the arrests in the UK increased by 30 percent.

As in 2006, the arrested suspects originating from North Africa were often loosely affiliated with North African terrorist groups, such as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

The percentage of women among all arrested suspects remains low. In 2007 fifteen women were arrested for Islamist terrorist offences. This represents seven percent of the total number of those arrested for Islamist terrorism. As in 2006, no women were arrested for planning, preparing or executing an attack. Furthermore, no women were reported arrested for recruitment or training. Three women were arrested for an offence related to propaganda.

The statistics of offences reported for 2007 include propaganda as a new category for Islamist terrorism. Six percent of the arrested were accused of offences related to the production and spreading of propaganda. At the same time, the UK had its first convictions in relation to the spreading of propaganda on the Internet. In July 2007, three men were found guilty of using the Internet to incite murder. The men had distributed films of beheadings and published bomb-making instructions as part of al-Qaeda’s propaganda campaign.20

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Figure 10: Percentage of arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism per offence in 2006 and 2007
As in 2006, almost half of the suspects arrested in 2007—45 percent—were arrested for membership of a terrorist organisation. Another 13 percent were arrested for attack-related offences, such as planning, preparing and/or executing an attack. These arrests took place in Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.

The average age of the arrested suspects was 33 years. Two thirds of the arrested were between 23 and 43 years old. The pattern described in TE-SAT 2007 regarding the correlation between age and type of offence continues to be observed in the data for 2007: arrested suspects aged between 31 and 40 were linked to financing of terrorism and handling of false documents to a greater extent than those under 30. Activities such as recruitment and facilitation, on the other hand, were more frequently linked to arrested suspects aged between 17 and 30. All suspects arrested in relation to the publication and spreading of propaganda were younger that 31.

The vast majority of suspects arrested for an offence relating to an attack were between 26 and 30. By contrast, suspects arrested for offences related to training were mainly found in the age category 41 to 50.

The arrests in relation to financing of Islamist terrorism decreased slightly compared to 2006. In 2007, France arrested six people suspected of providing financial support to AQIM. In Denmark, two members of the al-Aqsa Association in Denmark were charged with financing of terrorism. The suspects were accused of sending money to the military branch of Hamas. Both suspects were acquitted in the city court. The case has been appealed to the high court.21

The number of suspects arrested for recruitment increased in 2007. Twenty-nine individuals were arrested in four member states: Belgium, Rumania, Spain and Sweden. The majority of those arrested were suspected of recruitment for jihad in Iraq. One of the suspects was arrested for recruitment on behalf of AQIM.

In December, the French security services arrested one Algerian and one French national suspected of shipping material—binoculars, maps, telephones, portable computers, radios and navigating systems—to AQIM. The filming equipment was intended to be used for filming future attacks. One of the suspects planned to join the organisation on location in Algeria.22

In May 2007, a French citizen of Algerian descent was arrested after contacting AQIM via the Internet. He had identified potential American and French military, political and civilian targets in France and Luxembourg, and made reconnaissance videos. A number of bomb-making components were found in his possession.23

5.3. Terrorist Activities

Radicalisation and Recruitment

The member states continue to report on EU nationals and residents who are being recruited for jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, Iraq attracted the largest number of recruits from EU member states. In Belgium, an investigation into the recruitment of suicide bombers for Iraq revealed a network of intermediaries for al-Qaeda spread across Europe and the Middle East. The investigation started in 2005 after a Belgian woman became the first European female suicide bomber in Iraq.

Routes and logistics to smuggle recruits from France, Spain and Italy to Iraq continue to be dominated by North African Islamists.24 North African cells in Europe were also found to be recruiting young EU nationals for training in North or West Africa. In June 2007, three Moroccans were arrested in Spain attempting to transfer recruits to training camps in the Sahel region.25

Dutch authorities reported an increasing number of Dutch nationals and residents willing to participate in jihad outside the EU. In the Netherlands as well as in France, the country’s military participation in Afghanistan—but also

21 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France, Denmark.
22 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
23 "Nancy: le djihadiste avait décidé de passer à l'action", Le Figaro, 14 October 2007.
25 “Spain arrests three al Qaeda suspects in Barcelona”, Reuters, 26 June 2007.
in Lebanon—is a motivating factor for the jihadists.\textsuperscript{26}

In France, police and intelligence services found increasing evidence that Somalia is becoming a new alternative destination for people willing to fight jihad.\textsuperscript{27} In early 2007, UK authorities estimated that British passport holders fighting with the Islamists in Somalia were “in their dozens”.\textsuperscript{28} There are also indications that terrorist training and planning of attacks—with a focus on the UK—is taking place in Somalia.\textsuperscript{29}

In the past few years, a number of terrorist groups have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and its leaders. Two groups have been confirmed as part of the organisation by its leadership: al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia in Iraq in September 2004 (now part of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria in September 2006 (now al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). In addition, former leading personalities of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group have, in 2006 and 2007 respectively, committed themselves to the ideals of al-Qaeda. However, the relationship between these groups and networks and the al-Qaeda leadership is characterised by different levels of autonomy, sophistication and motivation. Nevertheless, this expansion of the “al-Qaeda franchise” has the potential to constitute a threat to the EU’s security. It could provide al-Qaeda with access to new centres of support which it can motivate and exploit.\textsuperscript{30}

Over the last five years, much of the command, control and inspiration for planning attacks came from al-Qaeda’s remaining core leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan. In the UK, the plans often included the use of young, radicalised British citizens to mount the actual attacks.\textsuperscript{31} The foiled attacks in Germany and Denmark in 2007 demonstrated that contacts between networks in the EU and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region are not a problem for the UK alone.\textsuperscript{32}

The UK reported a significant and increasing number of suspects that are under investigation on suspicion of Islamist terrorism. At the time of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, approx. 250 Islamists were under investigation on charges of terrorism in the UK. Since then, there has been a major increase in numbers: from 500 people under investigation in July 2004, the figure reached 1,600 by the end of 2006.\textsuperscript{33} In November 2007, the British Security Service was looking at no fewer than 2,000 individuals posing a direct threat to national security.\textsuperscript{34}

Some of these individuals, both British and foreign, were involved in planning attacks. However, a still larger proportion provides support through financing of terrorism and making ideological and military training available.\textsuperscript{35}

Propaganda

Terrorist propaganda aims at providing a coherent interpretation of the world which justifies terrorist activities as acts of war or self-defence. It is an important tool for attracting resources and recruits to terrorist groups and networks.

The al-Qaeda leadership used the year 2007 for an unprecedented public relations campaign. In September 2007, Osama bin Laden appeared in a video tape for the first time since 2004. The video

\textsuperscript{26} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: the Netherlands, France.
\textsuperscript{27} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
\textsuperscript{28} “Backed by British money and men”, The Times, 10 January 2007.
\textsuperscript{29} “Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5 November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk
\textsuperscript{30} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
\textsuperscript{31} ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark, Germany.
\textsuperscript{33} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
\textsuperscript{34} “Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5 November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk.
\textsuperscript{35} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
was followed by several audio messages. At the same time and throughout 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri continued to issue a great number of prepared speeches and interviews through al-Qaeda’s media wing al-Sahab Media Production Company.

Since mid-2006, al-Sahab has become the exclusive label of multimedia and multilingual propaganda for al-Qaeda leading figures. The speeches published by al-Sahab are often accompanied by English subtitles. Where the speaker uses English, Arabic subtitles have been added. Al-Sahab has also started to use other languages such as Pashto and, very recently, German.

Propaganda material is also produced by supporters of Islamist terrorism who act on the Internet without necessarily being members of a particular terrorist group. Much of the material is published in several languages under the name of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). The GIMF first appeared in 2002 and was initially only publishing material in Arabic. Today, it produces documents in various languages, including English, French and German. In 2007, the German-speaking GIMF published two videos, threatening Austria and Germany with attacks unless they pulled their troops out of Afghanistan.

The recent investigation in the UK which led to the conviction of three men for using the Internet to incite murder shows how the Internet can facilitate the jihadists’ activities. The investigation revealed a large international network of people who jointly provided support to jihadist movements on a global scale without ever having met in person.

Videos and films calling on Muslims to take part in the global jihad continue to play a significant role in the recruitment process. The ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia are dominant issues for al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in relation to propaganda. The increasingly sophisticated methods of promoting this agenda, in particular using the Internet and other electronic media, have been identified as factors contributing to the increasing number of Islamist terrorists.

In Bulgaria, four persons were arrested for distribution of Islamist terrorist propaganda on the Internet. Two of the arrested were female converts. The four suspects had, among other things, translated material from Chechen sites and posted it onto their website.

Law enforcement agencies in Luxembourg have identified a group of Islamist extremists who are radicalising young Muslims. Both self-produced videos and propaganda obtained from other groups are used for this purpose.

In Denmark, a Moroccan-born Danish citizen was sentenced to three years and six months in prison in April 2007 for distributing Islamist terrorist propaganda with the purpose of instigating terrorism. The man owned his own publishing company which he used for disseminating terrorism propaganda.

In November 2007, the European Commission presented to the European Council a proposal to amend the 2002 Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism with a view to criminalising the use of the Internet to provide terrorist training.

Training

An increasing number of EU nationals attended training in Pakistan and were later involved in, or suspected of, terrorist offences in the EU. The
The majority of the arrested suspects in the foiled attacks in Germany and Denmark had received some form of training in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{44} The trial, in 2007, of the perpetrators of the failed attack in London on 21 July 2005 revealed that they had received training both in Pakistan and in the UK.\textsuperscript{45}

In 2007, Italian police arrested three Moroccans accused of providing terrorist training at a small mosque in central Italy. The training allegedly consisted of the use of arms, explosives and toxic substances in terrorist operations. During a house search, Italian counter-terrorism police found barrels of chemicals and instructions on how to pilot a Boeing 747.\textsuperscript{46} The suspects had contacts with the members of the GICM arrested in Belgium in 2005.\textsuperscript{47}

**Logistical support**

A majority of the member states continue to report on EU-based suspects providing logistical support to terrorist groups and networks based outside the EU. The logistical support generally consists of providing material, funds, and false identity documents. These types of terrorist activities are also frequent in member states which otherwise reported a general low risk from Islamist terrorism.

Although for 2007 the member states reported fewer arrests in relation to financing of terrorism than for 2006, financing activities are still frequent within the EU. Recent terrorist cases show that organisations or individuals involved in financing of terrorism use a great variety of methods to raise funds. In Italy, nine people suspected of ties with AQIM were arrested in June.\textsuperscript{48} Allegedly, the cell’s high revenues mostly originated from drug dealing and counterfeiting money. Other counter-terrorism operations in Europe uncovered the use of front companies in the real estate sector, as in Spain,\textsuperscript{49} or the transfer of funds to aid terrorist organisations, as in France\textsuperscript{50} or Germany.\textsuperscript{51}

Financing of terrorism does not only imply the transfer of money but also of material goods which, upon arrival at the final destination, can be sold and converted into money. This was noted in the investigation into a Moroccan network operating in southern Portugal and Spain. The network was involved in the theft of high value vehicles which were then shipped to North African countries and sold in order to fund local Islamist terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{52}

Besides financial support, European-based terrorist networks provide other logistical support to Islamist terrorists travelling to, from or within the EU. In France, Islamist terrorists were found to provide logistical support to AQIM.\textsuperscript{53} Italy reported on logistical support in the form of providing false documents for terrorist operations outside Italy.

Member states, such as Finland, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, which reported a generally low threat from Islamist terrorism, nevertheless highlighted the risk that their country may be used as a logistical base for terrorists operating outside of the EU. The majority of these countries, together with Romania and Estonia, also reported on the potential risk that their countries may be used as transit countries by terrorists trying to enter other EU countries. Romania reports an increase in the number of individuals attempting to enter the country illegally from Pakistan with the aim of continuing to other member states. Pakistani individuals in Romania with links to

\textsuperscript{44} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark, Germany.


\textsuperscript{46} “Italy’s underground Islamist Network”, *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*, 16 August 2007.

\textsuperscript{47} “Italy holds 3 on terror charges”, *Associated Press*, 21 July 2007.

\textsuperscript{48} “Al-Qaeda-linked cell was planning attacks in Milan”, *Adnkronos International*, 7 June 2007.


\textsuperscript{50} “13 Kurds arrested in France over terror financing”, *Agence France Presse*, 5 February 2007.

\textsuperscript{51} “German prosecutors charge man founding terror group”, *Associated Press*, 16 May 2007.

\textsuperscript{52} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.

\textsuperscript{53} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
Islamist extremism were involved in such activities. Lithuania reported an increasing number of individuals with suspected links to Islamist terrorism transiting the country in 2007.

5.4. Situation outside the EU

In 2007, French and Spanish and German nationals were killed in terrorist attacks outside the EU. On 2 July, eight Spanish nationals were killed in a terrorist attack in Yemen. Yemeni government officials believe that the attack was carried out by al-Qaeda.\(^54\) French nationals were the target of two separate terrorist attacks: one in Saudi Arabia on 26 February and one in Mauritania on 24 December. Both attacks claimed four fatalities each.\(^55\) In Mauritania, local prosecutors announced that they believed the suspected perpetrators of that attack belonged to AQIM.\(^56\) In August 2007, three police officers working at the German Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, were killed in an attack which was claimed by the Taliban.\(^57\)

**Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**

In 2007, AQIM further adapted its tactics and propaganda to the model of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Iraq. It committed several suicide attacks with high numbers of causalities. AQIM demonstrated the threat it poses to Europe by specifically targeting European citizens and international bodies in Algeria. In April 2007, AQIM claimed an attack which, according to its claim of responsibility, targeted the Interpol office in Algiers. French nationals in Algeria were specifically targeted and injured on 21 September when a vehicle convoy of a French company was attacked.\(^58\) Europeans were also amongst the fatalities and casualties of AQIM’s attack on UN offices in Algiers in December 2007.\(^59\)

On 29 December 2007, AQIM published a statement in which they criticised the Mauritanian government for their support of the Dakar Rally, referring to it as a “collaboration with the Crusaders.” In view of the possible threat against the event, the Dakar Rally 2008 was cancelled.

AQIM, which until 24 January 2007 was known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), has received massive international publicity since changing its name and adopting al-Qaeda’s modus operandi. Whilst the Algerian government and France remain AQIM’s principal propaganda targets, 2007 saw increased AQIM media-output identifying all Western nations as potential targets. In 2007, direct threats were made by both AQIM and al-Qaeda towards the Spanish autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. Both AQIM and al-Qaeda were also advocating attacks against US, French and Spanish interests in North Africa.\(^60\)

So far there has been little indication that radicalised Islamists seek to travel from Europe to join AQIM as part of the wider jihad against the West. Nonetheless, as indicated by the 2007 arrests in France, there is evidence to suggest that radicalised individuals may offer to act on behalf of AQIM to attack European targets.

**Pakistan/Afghanistan**

Al-Qaeda and affiliated pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan are increasingly recognised as one of the main drivers of Islamist extremism and terrorism in the EU. In 2007, terrorism investigations in at least three countries showed links to groups in this region.

The tribal areas of Pakistan host a number of terrorist training camps operating in support of the Afghan Taliban, pro-Taliban Pakistani groups and foreign mujahideen. Both Germany and Denmark reported that several suspects in the attempted terrorist attacks in 2007 had received training in Pakistan.

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\(^{54}\) “Muere la turista española que quedó ingresada en Yemen tras el atentado”, La Vanguardia, 2 July 2007.

\(^{55}\) Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

\(^{56}\) “Two held over Mauritanian killings”; BBC News, 11 January 2008.

\(^{57}\) Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.


\(^{59}\) “UN raises toll in Algeria bombing to 17 dead”, Associated Press, 14 December 2007.

\(^{60}\) “El ‘número dos’ de Al Qaeda incita otra vez a atacar a España”, El País, 4 November 2007.
Afghan Taliban and pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan have links to the increasingly active core-structure of al-Qaeda that is currently based in the Pashtun tribal areas in western Pakistan. There it is believed to have reorganised and rebuilt its capabilities as well as its command and control functions.61

Terrorist attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan increased significantly in 2007, compared to 2006. These attacks were mainly directed at foreign troops in Afghanistan and government troops in Pakistan. In the course of 2007, Afghanistan saw an increase in the use of IEDs and suicide bombers. Statistics on terrorist attacks in Pakistan show a three-fold increase from 2006 to 2007.62

In July 2007, the frequency of attacks in Pakistan more than doubled and remained high throughout the rest of the year. This shift happened virtually overnight and coincided with the storming by Pakistani security forces of the besieged complex of Lal Masjid, the Red Mosque, in the capital Islamabad on 11 July, during which the pro-Taliban militants inside the complex were defeated.63 The same day, al-Qaeda issued a statement calling for jihad against the Pakistani government as a response to the siege of Lal Masjid.64 Immediately afterwards, an unprecedented wave of suicide bombings struck the capital and other parts of the country, mainly targeting the Pakistani armed forces and intelligence services.65 Fighting escalated in the Pakistani tribal areas, especially in Waziristan, where Pashtun militants clashed with government troops as well as with Uzbek foreign fighters.66

Afghanistan and Pakistan in general, and the Pashtun areas in particular, are of utmost importance to EU counter-terrorism. In the past, terrorist links between Pakistan and the EU were almost exclusively focused on the UK. The foiled plot in Germany, related to an Uzbek group based in the Pakistani tribal areas, and recent cases in the UK and Denmark indicate an increasingly assertive and efficient Pakistani-based command and control of Islamist terrorism in the EU.

Somalia

In 2007, leaders of militant Islamists in Somalia, as well as the leadership of al-Qaeda, renewed the call for jihad against Ethiopian forces in Somalia and the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. In the EU, the former spokesman of the proscribed UK group al-Muhajiroun posted a statement on the Internet calling followers to join the jihad in Somalia.67 In January 2007, the US launched air strikes in the south of the country, targeting senior al-Qaeda operatives. This provoked agitation by the Islamist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the streets of London.68 In Greece, the far-left militant group Revolutionary Struggle claimed responsibility for a rocket-propelled grenade attack against the US embassy in Athens in response to US intervention in Somalia and elsewhere.69

The success of the Somali Islamists in 2006 attracted some foreign fighters to join, but the new calls to jihad likely engaged additional volunteers from abroad. More than 90 suspected foreign Islamist

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62 Approx. 10 percent of the attacks are attributed to the non-Islamist Balochistan separatist movements. “Country statistics: Pakistan”, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.
63 Ibid.
Insurgents were reported captured or killed during 2007; among them were five Swedish and five British nationals.70

The Islamist insurgents employ guerrilla tactics against military targets as well as acts of terrorism against civilian targets. The frequent suicide bombings, perpetrated by both men and women, are a new phenomenon in Somalia suggesting a foreign, al-Qaeda-driven, influence from other scenes of global jihad.71

Iraq

The overall security situation in Iraq improved during 2007. Although ethno-sectarian violence continues to be of concern, civilian casualties and attacks with IEDs decreased. The number of attacks with IEDs fell from 1,700 in June 2007 to less than 700 in December. The number of reported security incidents is now down to the same level as in 2005. Targets of terrorist activity in Iraq include Iraqi civilians as well as foreigners employed by private businesses.

Since 2005, 14 of the 667 suicide attacks have been committed by women. Although the overall number of attacks decreased, the number of women involved in suicide attacks increased in 2007.72

Kidnappings of foreign nationals in Iraq continue to be frequent. In May 2007, five British nationals were kidnapped by an Iraqi group who demanded the withdrawal of all British armed forces from Iraq.73 A German national and her son were taken hostages in Iraq in 2007. While the woman was later released, her son is still missing. An Austrian national kidnapped in 2006 is also still missing. A video of this hostage was disseminated by his captors in January 2007.

By the end of 2007, the majority of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia’s leadership and many of its fighters were foreign-born. Likewise, over 90 percent of suicide bombers were foreign terrorists.75 As the security situation improves, foreign terrorists may leave Iraq or relocate their jihadist activities to other regions, including the EU.

5.5. Key Findings

- In 2007, the EU saw two failed and two attempted attacks related to Islamist terrorism; 201 suspects were arrested.
- The failed and attempted attacks in the member states aimed at causing indiscriminate mass casualties by means of detonating a main charge composed of home-made explosives. In two cases the suspects attempted to produce TATP.
- Manuals on how to build bombs, together with Islamist terrorist propaganda, are increasingly spread on the Internet. In 2007, al-Qaeda launched an unprecedented media campaign. Islamist terrorist propaganda is increasingly available in European languages.
- Al-Qaeda’s remaining core leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan is exercising command and control on and inspiration for planning

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73 “Briton held in Iraq for 8 months is put on TV”, Times online, 27 February 2008.
attacks in the EU. A number of EU-nationals who attended training in Pakistan were later involved in terrorist offences in the EU.

- The member states are threatened with violence by Islamist terrorist groups outside and within the EU in an attempt to influence national policies in conflict areas.

- Although the majority of all arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism continue to be North African citizens, the member states reported a high number of arrested suspects with the nationality of the country of arrest.

- The number of persons arrested for recruitment increased. The majority of the suspects were arrested for recruiting for jihad in Iraq, while Somalia was reported as a new destination for jihadists.

- Suspects arrested in relation to financing of terrorism, handling of false documents and training are generally older than those arrested for recruitment, facilitation and the production and spreading of propaganda.

- The member states on the eastern border of the EU may be used as transit countries for terrorists in order to reach other parts of Europe.
6. ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

6.1. Terrorist Attacks

In 2007, 91 percent of the attacks in the EU were claimed by, or attributed to, separatist terrorist groups. A total of 532 terrorist attacks were reported in three member states: France, Spain and Germany. Of these, 97 percent were claimed by, or attributed to, Basque and Corsican separatist terrorist groups.

The number of casualties and fatalities caused by separatist terrorist attacks in Europe remains limited. However, Spanish law enforcement officials remain an explicit target for Basque separatist terrorism. In 2007, this was further evidenced by the deadly attack on two Guardia Civil officers in France.76 The attack was claimed by ETA.

France saw a slight decrease in the number of attacks compared to 2006. Spain, on the other hand, reported a 95 percent increase. This can partly be explained by the end of the ceasefire between ETA and the Spanish government. In early 2007, ETA stated that, despite the attack on the Madrid airport on 30 December 2006, they still considered the unilateral ceasefire declared in March 2006 to be valid. However, on 6 June 2007, ETA publicly announced the end of the ceasefire. In 2007, ETA claimed responsibility for a total of ten attacks in Spain and one in France.

Taldes Y attacks are perpetrated in support of ETA activities by a network of individuals with links to ETA’s youth organisation SEGI. Taldes Y attacks decreased in frequency immediately after the ceasefire of March 2006. However, during the second half of 2006, the number of attacks increased again and remained high throughout the reporting period. For 2007, the vast majority of all attacks reported by the member states in relation to Basque separatist terrorism were categorised as Taldes Y attacks. See figure 12.

In Spain, the vast majority of the attacks committed were arson attacks. Eighty-nine percent of all

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76 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
attacks were reported as successfully executed. Basque separatist terrorists in Spain mainly attack governmental and business targets. Twelve percent of the attacks were directed at critical infrastructure and the vast majority of these were attributed to Taldes Y. The majority of the attacks in Spain were carried out in the Basque region.

In France, two regions were targeted by separatist terrorist groups: the Basque region and Corsica. In the Basque region, thirty-three percent of the separatist terrorist attacks targeted private property, a decrease compared to 2006. Forty-one percent of the attacks were directed at business targets. In Corsica, fifty-five percent of separatist terrorist attacks targeted private property such as private holiday apartments. Only sixteen percent were directed towards governmental interests, a small decrease compared to 2006. See figure 13.

In Corsica, 31 percent of the attacks carried out were attributed to FLNC or FLNC UDC. Two attacks were attributed to ARMATA CORSA 1774. The remaining 154 attacks either were not claimed or could not be attributed to a particular group.

Germany reported fifteen separatist terrorist attacks for 2007. Fourteen were claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK/KONGRA-GE). The

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**Figure 12: Number of Taldes Y attacks and attacks by ETA in Spain in 2006 and 2007**

77 Governmental targets in Spain include government offices, court houses, and political parties.
78 Business targets in Spain include ATMs, bank branches, real estate agencies.
79 Critical Infrastructure in Spain includes highways and railways.
80 Private property includes holiday apartments and cars.
81 Business targets in France include real estate agencies and the tourist sector.
remaining attack was not claimed by PKK/KONGRA-GEL, but has been attributed to the organisation by German authorities. The attacks took place in February and March 2007. Most of them were arson attacks, directed at Turkish interests in Germany, such as Turkish travel agencies, banks and mosques in Bottrop, Dortmund and Hagen.

6.2. Arrested Suspects

For 2007, eight member states reported the arrest of a total of 548 people suspected of separatist terrorism offences. Fifty-seven percent of the arrests took place in France, followed by thirty-six percent in Spain.

The total number of suspects arrested for separatist terrorism in 2007 increased by over 100 percent compared to 2006. This is caused by an increase in arrests related to both Basque and Corsican separatist terrorism. In Spain, sixty percent of the arrested suspects were linked to ETA and nine percent to ETA’s youth organisation SEGI. France reported an increase of eight percent in arrests related to Basque separatist terrorism compared to 2006. The majority of the arrested were linked to ETA. Seven percent of the arrested suspects were linked to SEGI.

In France, the increase in arrested suspects linked to Corsican separatist terrorism can be explained in part by the numerous arrests carried out after

Figure 13: Targeting of separatist terrorist groups in France and Spain in 2006 and 2007
Yvan Colonna, a prominent figure within Corsican separatist terrorism, was sentenced to imprisonment. After Colonna's conviction, the youth of the island, considering him a hero, mounted a wave of violent protests. Several of the protesters were arrested.82

Twelve percent of all suspects arrested for separatist terrorism were women. For ETA the figure is eighteen percent, which is the single highest percentage for all terrorist groups in the member states, regardless of affiliation.

Suspects arrested for Basque separatist terrorism are generally younger than those arrested for Corsican separatist terrorism. Fifty-five percent of those arrested for Basque separatist terrorism in France and Spain were younger than 30 compared to only thirty-one percent under 30 for Corsican separatist terrorism. This may be explained by the fact that most reported suspects arrested relating to Basque separatist terrorism were linked to Ta'ids Y attacks.

In Spain, just over 70 percent of the suspects were arrested for membership of a terrorist organisation. This high percentage may be explained by a ruling of the Spanish supreme court determining that three or more acts of collaboration with a terrorist organisation automatically are to be considered as membership of a terrorist organisation. By contrast, in France, the majority of suspects arrested for Corsican separatist terrorism were arrested for attack-related offences.

In 2007, 38 persons were reported arrested in relation to PKK/KONGRA-GEL in five member states: Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia. The majority of all suspects were arrested for attack-related offences. The arrests caused a series of protests amongst the Kurdish populations in several of these countries. Although the majority of the protests were peaceful, in some instances violence erupted, mainly directed towards Turkish interests.83 In February, Belgian authorities arrested the EU leader of PKK/KONGRA-GEL on suspicion of financing terrorism via drug trafficking.84

In Ireland, the number of arrested suspects went up from four in 2006 to twenty-four in 2007. The majority of the arrested suspects were members of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). The arrests were linked to an increase in criminal activity by this group in 2007. The majority of the arrested were charged with membership of an unlawful organisation.85

French law enforcement arrested a total of 25 members of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE during 2007. All arrested suspects were men. The vast majority of the suspects were arrested on suspicion of financing terrorism through extortion. Seventy-two percent of the arrested were Sri Lankan citizens.86 The LTTE has a vast global network of ethnic Tamils and associates in the diaspora, with structures of fundraising, procurement and propaganda firmly in place.87 One of the core activities of the LTTE in the EU is the collection of funds from the Tamil diaspora on a monthly basis to finance military and military-related procurement.88

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82 Contribution to the TESAT 2008: France.
84 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.
85 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Ireland.
86 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
87 “Funding the “Final War”: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 18, No. 1(C), March 2006.
88 “Feeding the Tiger – How Sri Lankan insurgents fund their war”, Jane’s Intelligence review, 1 August 2007.
6.3. Terrorist Activities

For the second half of 2007, Portugal reported an unusual increase in the number of ETA activities in Portugal. The activities seemed to be confined to renting vehicles that were later used in ETA operations. This may be an attempt by ETA to avoid detection from law enforcement agencies in France and Spain. Portuguese and Spanish law enforcement agencies responded by creating joint investigation teams.89

Traditionally, ETA carries out its activities in Spain, France and, to a lesser extent, in other EU countries. France is mainly used as an operational rear base from which ETA develops its logistic means. It is also used for housing and training ETA reserve activists.

In the course of 2007, Spanish authorities noted a decrease in the use of commercial explosives in ETA-related attacks. In the past, ETA mainly used a combination of commercial explosives and home-made explosives (HMEs). Recent attacks, however, have been based mainly on HMEs.90 This change in tactics may be the result of increased security measures taken by the French authorities to protect explosive factories, depots and explosives transportation, which prevents ETA from getting access to commercial explosives.91

In summer 2007, ETA released several versions of a recruitment video which showed some of their activities. The videos were released just after ETA had called off the ceasefire. The aim was probably to encourage young people to join ETA. This method of recruitment has rarely been seen in the past and may indicate a new modus operandi for ETA.

Financing of terrorism by extortion is reported in relation to Corsican and Basque separatist terrorism as well as the LTTE. According to open sources, extortion is an important source of income for ETA. In 2007, Spanish media reported on several extortion campaigns directed at businessmen in the Basque region and Navarre.92 Fourteen of the arrests reported by France in relation to extortion were linked to Corsican separatist terrorism. The majority of the arrested suspects were members of FLNC, targeting private businesses such as real estate agents.93

In Ireland, law enforcement authorities witnessed an increase in the number of terrorism-related arrests in 2007 compared to 2006. This, however, is mainly due to an increase in criminal activity by INLA. Based on capability and intent, the threat from the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) and Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) is estimated to be moderate to substantial.94

The year 2007 saw great strides forward in the political process in Northern Ireland, including the restoration of full power to the Northern Ireland Assembly in May. An important milestone was the announcement by the nationalist party, Sinn Fein, that it would recognise and support the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and participate in policing bodies.95 In view of this historical decision, the dissident terrorist group RIRA vowed to continue attacks against Police and British forces until a full withdrawal of troops.96

89 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain, Portugal.
90 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain.
92 “ETA amenaza en nuevas cartas a los empresarios con ‘tomar medidas’ si no pagan”, El Mundo, 5 August 2007.
93 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.
94 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Ireland.
96 “Attacks on police will go on in New Year”—Real IRA’, Derry Journal, 8 January 2008.
6.4. Key Findings

- A total of 532 separatist terrorist attacks were perpetrated and 548 suspects were arrested for separatist terrorism. The vast majority of attacks and arrests relating to separatist terrorism were reported by France and Spain.

- The vast majority of all attacks by Basque and Corsican separatist terrorists mainly aim at causing material damage. Spanish law enforcement officials are however explicitly targeted by Basque separatist terrorists.

- The vast majority of reported separatist terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure are committed by youth organisations related to ETA. In Spain, only a very small number of Basque separatist terrorist attacks are directed towards private interests. This is, however, one of the main targets for Basque and Corsican separatist terrorists acting in France.

- Traditionally, ETA used a combination of commercial and home-made explosives. In 2007, the use of commercial explosives in ETA attacks decreased.

- Basque separatist terrorists continue to use France as a logistical base. However, in 2007 some activities were also noted in Portugal, indicating an attempt to escape France and Spanish law enforcement.

- With 18 percent, ETA has the highest percentage of women arrested compared to all other terrorist groups in the member states.

- Financing through extortion is reported for Basque and Corsican separatist terrorist groups as well as LTTE.

- In Germany, separatist terrorist attacks are mainly perpetrated by Kurdish separatist terrorist groups. In 2007, the attacks were motivated by the escalation in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.
7. LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

7.1. Terrorist Attacks

In 2007, left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups carried out 21 attacks in five member states. The targeted member states were Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain. Eighty percent of all left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks were successfully executed. There have been no reports on fatalities or casualties in relation to these attacks.

In TE-SAT 2007, a large number of the reported anarchist attacks were contributed by Greece. However, Greek authorities regard the vast majority of these attacks as extremism rather than terrorism. Therefore, they are not included in the 2007 statistics. For TE-SAT 2008, Greece reported two attacks as anarchist terrorism.97

Greece reported two attacks as anarchist terrorism: the attack on the American embassy on 12 January and the attack on a police station in New Ionia on 30 April. Both attacks were reported to have been committed by the anarchist terrorist group Revolutionary Struggle.

Taking into account the difference in the number of attacks reported by Greece, it is still possible to conclude that there has been a decrease in the number of left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks compared to 2006. In both Italy and Germany, attacks have gone down by approx. 50 percent.

In 2007, 55 percent of all left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks were arson attacks. The majority targeted businesses or governmental interests. Only one attack was directed at private property or individuals. See figure 15.

Attacks by GRAPO in Spain decreased compared to 2006. In 2007, only one attack was attributed to GRAPO in Spain. In 2006, Spanish authorities reported five attacks attributed to GRAPO and one claimed by the organisation. The attributed attack in 2007 was the kidnapping of a bank manager for ransom.98

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97 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Greece.
98 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain.
In Germany, unidentified individuals attacked representatives of a private company which produces naval ships for private and military use. In Hamburg, high-value company cars of two managers were damaged. One of the cars was set on fire. In addition, the attackers vandalised the house of one of the managers. In the past, similar attacks were linked to left-wing terrorism.99

Italy reported an increased threat from left-wing groups and individuals using the same strategies and ideologies as the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades). These groups mainly target high-ranking Italian businessmen and politicians. The arrests in February 2007 leading to the dismantlement of the Partito Comunista Politico-Militare (PCP-M) sparked a series of incidents in solidarity with the arrested. Italian authorities reported that these incidents brought together several rival groups adhering to different ideologies. One such example is the Fronte Rivoluzionario per il Comunismo (Revolutionary Front for Communism), which supports a revolution based on armed struggle.

On 5 March 2007, the Fronte Rivoluzionario per il Comunismo attempted an attack in Milan.100 A home-made explosive device was found in front of an unoccupied police station. The Fronte Rivoluzionario per il Comunismo claimed responsibility for the attempted attack, stating that it was in retaliation for recent arrests.101

The Partito Comunista Combatente (PCC), a smaller left-wing group with the same ideology as the Red Brigades, claimed two attacks in 2007.102 The PCC justifies its attacks as blows against imperialism within Italian economic policy and Italy’s “contribution to the NATO strategy”.103

Italian authorities have also noted a revival of anarchist revolutionary ideologies, particularly among groups and individuals united under the banner of the Federazione Anarchica Informale (FAI).104

In Austria, on 12 March 2007, a device looking like a pipe bomb was found in the underground parking of a bank. The pipe bomb later turned out to be a dummy. A message attached to the device demanded amnesty for members of the Red Army Fraction (RAF) imprisoned in Germany.105

Extremism

In the second semester of 2007, extremist anarchist activities in Greece mainly took the form of arson attacks against low-profile targets. The main targets were bank branches, vehicles and political party offices. The number of attacks, however, decreased significantly compared to the first semester of 2007. The activities appeared to be isolated and decentralised. The targets seemed to be randomly chosen. As in previous years, the attacks only caused material damage.106

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99 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.
100 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
102 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
104 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
105 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Austria.
106 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Greece.
In Estonia, extremist left-wing groups were responsible for extensive vandalism and mass riots in relation to the relocation of a Soviet-era war memorial, the Bronze Soldier, in Tallinn in April 2007. The Estonian embassy in Moscow was also attacked and vandalised. Four persons were charged with organising the riots. The trial is ongoing.\textsuperscript{107}

### 7.2. Arrested Suspects and Terrorist Activities

Forty-eight individuals were arrested for left-wing and anarchist terrorism in five member states: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Spain and Italy reported a total of twelve suspects arrested for anarchist terrorism. All other arrests were reported as left-wing.

The vast majority of the arrests were made in Italy and Spain. As for all other affiliations, the vast majority of the suspects were arrested for membership of a terrorist organisation. Twelve percent of the suspects were arrested for arson attacks.

Six of the arrested suspects were women. Only one woman was arrested for an attack-related offence: she was linked to anarchist terrorism and was involved in an arson attack. This is the only attack-related offence for which a female suspect was reported arrested, regardless of affiliation.

### Extremism

In 2007, the G8 summit was held in Heiligendamm in Germany. G8 meetings traditionally attract large crowds of left-wing and anarchist activists from all over the world. Demonstrations against the summit occasionally turned violent.\textsuperscript{108} Both Belgium and Sweden reported the arrest of a number of their nationals during the meeting. Germany reported two investigations relating to left-wing extremist groups planning attacks against the summit in 2007.

In 2007, Italy observed a merger of anarchist terrorist groups and single-issue extremist groups linked to e.g. anti-militarism, immigration, environmentalism and social rights. This merger may eventually mean that single-issue groups, which to date have only been involved in social protest, will change their activities and become more involved in subversive activities.\textsuperscript{109}

In Belgium, anarchist extremists took part in actions organised by animal rights extremists. In the course of these activities, the anarchists engaged in acts of vandalism. The principal left-wing extremist group present in Belgium is the Secours Rouge (APAPC), which contains former members of the Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC). The activities of the Secours Rouge are mostly related to public order. Nevertheless, it should be noted that former CCC members released from prison publicly declared that they continue to believe that armed struggle is necessary.\textsuperscript{110}

Sweden reported on activities by extremist autonomous groups prepared to use violence as a means to achieve their political goals. Several different ideological currents exist within this environment with anarchism being most prominent. Both men and women are active within these groups. The majority are under 30 years old. Swedish authorities have reported that activists belonging to these groups are willing and able to use incendiary bombs against symbolic targets.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{107} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Estonia.
\textsuperscript{108} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.
\textsuperscript{109} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
\textsuperscript{110} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.
\textsuperscript{111} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Sweden.
7.3. Key Findings

- For left-wing terrorism and anarchist terrorism, five member states reported 21 attacks and 48 arrested suspects. No casualties were reported.

- Attacks in Italy and Germany decreased by almost 50 percent. In Spain, attacks committed by GRAPO decreased significantly with only one attack committed in 2007.

- Although the number of attacks decreased, Italy noted a general increase in the threat from left-wing terrorist groups inspired by the ideology of the Red Brigades. Italian authorities also noted a revival of anarchist revolutionary ideologies.

- In Greece, two terrorist attacks were committed by the Revolutionary Struggle. Both attacks caused material damage. Anarchist extremists in Greece continue to commit arson attacks against low level targets, causing material damage. The number of anarchist extremist attacks decreased significantly in 2007.
One right-wing terrorist attack was reported for 2007. The attack took place in Portugal where right-wing terrorists vandalised a Jewish cemetery in September 2007. The attack on the cemetery seems to have been part of an initiation rite by self-proclaimed Hammerskin Friends for the purpose of pleasing and impressing the leaders of the Portuguese branch of the Hammerskins.\(^\text{112}\)

A total of 44 suspects were arrested for right-wing terrorism in Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal. Of these, 31 were arrested in Portugal as part of the operation against the Portuguese section of the Hammerskins. Twenty-seven of the suspects were arrested for possession of illegal weapons, racial discrimination, promotion of racial hatred and Nazi propaganda. The Portuguese investigation also revealed a European network of sympathisers communicating via the Internet.\(^\text{113}\)

With one exception, all arrested suspects for right-wing terrorism were male. The female suspect was arrested in the Netherlands for possession of illegal firearms. The arrested were between 18 and 30 years of age, except for two suspects who were 40 and 42 years old. This means that, generally speaking, suspects arrested for right-wing terrorism are relatively young.

\section*{Extremism}

Reported incidents relating to right-wing extremist continued to increase in a number of member states. Dutch authorities report an increase in reports of right-wing extremism in 2007, but estimate that the level of violence remains fairly stable.\(^\text{114}\)

Poland has reported a slight increase in right-wing extremist activity. The groups are mainly active on the Internet, where they have established international contacts. The most active right-wing group is Blood and Honour and its fighting unit Combat 18.\(^\text{115}\)

In the course of 2007, Italy observed an increase in activity by right-wing extremists. This increase manifested itself mainly in acts of vandalism and attacks against left-wing parties and organisations. Forza Nuova is the most prominent right-wing extremist group active in Italy.\(^\text{116}\)

Swedish authorities reported an increase in violent clashes between various left-wing/anarchist movements and extreme right groups during 2007. The increase in violence is thought to mainly be the work of the right-wing extremist groups.\(^\text{117}\)

\textit{8. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: the Netherlands.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Poland.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Sweden.
\end{itemize}
In Germany, the Saxony Minister of the Interior banned the right-wing group Sturm 34 on the basis that it is in opposition to the constitutional order and that its objectives and activities run counter to criminal law. The group consists of approx. 40 to 50 members and 100 sympathisers. Members of the group stated that they considered violence as a means of reaching their objectives. In June 2007, right-wing extremists in Germany attacked and physically assaulted five persons who suffered severe facial injuries.118

UK authorities reported that the number of incidents involving right-wing extremists linked to explosives, weapons or prohibited items has increased in the last ten years. In 2007, the UK authorities reported a total of seven right-wing extremists arrested for a range of explosives-related offences. During various house searches, police found CS gas canisters and explosive pyrotechnics but also training manuals, a downloaded Internet article on the recovery of home-made explosive devices and a recipe for a simple hydrogen peroxide/chapati flour explosive mixture.

In October 2007, UK police found a quantity of nail bombs during a house search into the home of a right-wing extremist. Documents recovered at the address indicate that he was planning to attack mosques in the area.

In the UK, a number of the arrested individuals could be classified as “lone-wolves”. These individuals share an ideological or philosophical identification with an extremist group, but do not communicate with the group they identify with. While the lone wolf’s actions aim to advance the group’s goal, the tactics and methods are conceived and directed without any outside command or direction.

In the UK, most of the groups involved in right-wing extremism have a relatively small membership base and many individuals are members of a number of like-minded groups. Thus, successful prosecutions are likely to have a ripple effect and, in the short term, diminish the ability of the various groups to engage in street demonstrations and protests.

Both the UK and the Netherlands reported on increased hostility against Muslim communities from right-wing extremists.119 The failed car bombings in June 2007 by Islamic extremists fuelled the right-wing extremists in the UK and resulted in protest activity. However, according to UK authorities, these attacks were generally not coordinated by any right-wing organisation but rather the result of individual acts of racism and criminality.120

8.1. Key Findings

- For 2007 the member states reported one right-wing terrorist attack and 48 arrested related to right-wing terrorism.
- Suspects arrested for right-wing terrorism are generally younger than arrested suspects in other types of terrorism.
- A majority of member states reported right-wing activities as extremism and not as terrorism.
- Activities from right-wing extremist groups are increasing.
- In the UK, an increasing amount of right-wing extremists are involved in activities linked to explosive devices and home-made explosives.
- A few member states reported increased hostility towards Muslim communities from right-wing extremists.

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118 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.
120 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
One single issue terrorist attack was reported for 2007. The attack took place in Portugal and was committed against a transgenic corn field. Over 100 people took part in the attack; more than one hectare of the field was destroyed.121

Extremism

In an incident in February, environmental extremists in Bulgaria sent letters to a number of newspapers claiming to have placed explosive devices in several locations throughout the ski resorts in Bansko. The unknown perpetrators demanded an end to “the destruction of the nature in the area”.122

Italy reported an increase in activity from environmental extremist groups against governmental infrastructure projects. This includes vandalism and sabotage of critical infrastructure.123

In 2007, European animal rights extremists were involved in arson attacks, letter bombs, and product contamination, as well as widespread acts of vandalism. Threats against employees, and their family members, of companies which are perceived to be involved in the mistreatment of animals are commonplace.124 The same applies to academic research institutions, such as universities, scientists, university staff and students.125

In May 2007, European law enforcement arrested 30 animal rights extremist activists in a joint operation involving law enforcement agencies in five EU countries. The operation was part of an investigation into Europe-wide Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) activities, led by SHAC leaders in the UK. Those arrested were suspected of conspiracy to blackmail Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) and associated companies. The blackmail consisted of a concerted effort by extremists, including criminality against target premises and other modi operandi to achieve their ambition to close HLS. The arrests took place mainly in the UK.

SHAC was founded in 1999, with the sole aim to force the closure of the contract research organisation HLS. SHAC targets include suppliers, customers and financial institutions linked to HLS. In the EU, SHAC is currently known to have a presence in Belgium126, Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK.127

UK government officials stated that animal rights extremism is a serious concern and that activists

121 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.
122 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Bulgaria.
123 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
126 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.
127 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
could be charged under the Terrorism Act 2000, if appropriate. UK animal rights extremists are perceived to hold a pivotal role in the animal rights scene in the EU and UK activists are frequently taking part in extremist activities throughout Europe.

In 2007, UK law enforcement recorded 229 criminal incidents relating directly to animal rights extremism. The pharmaceutical industry remains the main target. The majority of the incidents were recorded as criminal damage. These were often directed against targets that have also been the subject of suspicious incidents, and threatening communications in the form of letters, e-mails and telephone calls.

Since August 2007, in the UK there have been a number of serious offences connected with animal rights extremists. A series of six claims of product contamination targeting pharmaceutical companies with links to HLS also affected France, Spain and Austria.

In November 2007, two improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) destroyed the vehicles of two Oxford University professors. They were targeted by animal rights extremists. An additional IID was placed under a third vehicle, but failed to ignite.

In January 2007, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) organised a tour through various cities in Italy. This was a campaign against chain stores believed to sell furs and companies accused of conducting animal experiments. In October 2007, ALF also claimed responsibility for breaking into a laboratory and releasing several animals, as well as for the criminal damage caused to the buildings.

According to the statistics published on animal rights extremist websites, the member states most targeted by animal rights extremists, besides the UK, are Italy, France, Spain and Sweden. In 2007, Estonia was included on the websites as a target country. Nevertheless, this data originates from animal rights extremist-owned websites. Therefore, it may not be representative of the actual problem experienced by a particular member state. In October 2007, a French ALF cell claimed responsibility for a fire bomb in the Netherlands. This type of attacks confirms that animal rights extremists are not limited by national boundaries.

Making threats via the Internet is likely to be a method increasingly favoured by animal rights extremists, due to the high level of anonymity and reduced levels of financial requirement and personal risk.

9.1. Key Findings
- Portugal reported one single issue terrorist attack linked to environmentalist terrorism.
- A majority of all member states reported single issue activities as extremism and not as terrorism.
- The UK animal rights extremists are perceived to hold a pivotal role in the animal rights scene in the EU. UK activists frequently take part in extremist activities throughout the EU.
- Attacks by single issue extremist groups mainly targeted private property and individuals linked to targeted companies.
- Italy reported an increased activity of environmental extremist groups targeting governmental infrastructure projects.

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129 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
130 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.
131 Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.
132 Ibid.
The number of terrorist attacks in the EU is increasing. During 2007, 583 terrorist attacks were committed in the EU. Of these, 91 percent were perpetrated by separatist terrorists. As in 2006, the vast majority of all attacks were committed by Basque and Corsican separatist terrorists in Spain and France. Separatist terrorist attacks continue to mainly cause material damage. However, ETA continues to specifically target Spanish law enforcement and governmental officials. This was evidenced by the fatal attack on the two Spanish Guardia Civil officers in France in 2007.

The number of suspects arrested for terrorism in the EU is increasing. The number of arrested suspects has increased from 706 in 2006 to 1044 in 2007. As for the increase in attacks, this can partly be attributed to the increased activity of Corsican and Basque separatist terrorism groups. This trend is also reflected in the statistics reported by Eurojust: in 2007, 54 percent of all court cases were related to separatist terrorism. However, the general increase in arrests can also be explained by the 30 percent increase in arrests in the UK. The vast majority of these arrests were in relation to Islamist terrorism.

The use of home-made explosives in terrorist attacks is increasing. In the vast majority of all terrorist attacks carried out by means of explosive devices, the main charge was composed of home-made explosives. As in 2006, this continues to be the main type of explosive used by Islamist terrorists. For 2007, however, this was also noticed in relation to separatist terrorism, especially in the case of ETA. As in 2006, investigations into attempted attacks in the member states revealed the use of TATP, a highly volatile explosive which requires a certain level of expertise in handling. This corroborates the information that several of the EU suspects received training in bomb-making.

More terrorism propaganda is being produced and distributed over the Internet than ever before. Propaganda continues to be an important tool for terrorists in order to attract new recruits and give logistical support. Manuals on how to build bombs, together with ideological propaganda, are increasingly spread on the Internet. For 2007, propaganda is also a new offence reported by the member states in relation to arrested Islamist terrorist suspects. The unprecedented al-Qaeda media campaign during 2007 produced propaganda in a number of European languages, indicating increasing efforts to reach non-Arabic speaking Europeans. Although propaganda material is available in increasing quality and quantity, there is no proof that this in itself leads to increasing radicalisation of the targeted audience. The availability of great quantities of propaganda material, easily accessible through the Internet, however, does facilitate the tasks of propagandists and recruiters and may lead to a general increase in the number of Islamist terrorists in the EU.

Islamist terrorism in the EU continues to aim at causing indiscriminate mass casualties. Most investigations into failed and foiled Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU in 2007 showed that Islamist terrorists continue to aim at causing indiscriminate mass casualties. This is not only observed in the choice of targets but also in the methods and explosives used. In the failed attack in London, nails added to the IED would have assured a maximum number of casualties. In the attempted attack in Germany, the suspects tried to build a bomb with a higher explosive effect than the ones used in the Madrid attacks in 2004, the attack
which has so far caused the highest number of causalities and fatalities in the EU.

Islamist terrorism in the EU is increasingly influenced by Pakistani-based al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and networks. In 2007, member states observed an increasing number of plots confined to a single member state but with links to al-Qaeda-affiliated groups based in Pakistan. In the past, terrorist plots linked to groups/networks operating in Pakistan have been almost exclusively concentrated on the UK. In 2007, investigations into attempted terrorist attacks indicated an increasing influence of this region, and even Pakistani-based command and control on Islamist terrorism in the EU. The attempted attack in Germany also showed the emergence of a Pakistani-based group with links to al-Qaeda, which had not previously been involved in attacks within the EU, able to provide logistical support to Islamist terrorists in member states.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have a large impact on the security environment of the EU. As seen in the statements posted by the German-speaking GIMF, member states are threatened with violence in an attempt to influence national policies on the engagement in conflict areas. The recruitment of EU nationals and residents for participation in jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq is still significant. Iraq remained the main destination for jihadists in 2007. As in 2006, reports suggest that Somalia is becoming a new additional destination for jihadists. Member states that have military presence in Lebanon also note that Islamist terrorist groups increasingly focus on this aspect. This indicates that the number of theatres of jihad is increasing.

Youths continue to be responsible for the vast majority of Basque separatist terrorist attacks. The vast majority of attacks in relation to Basque separatist terrorism are Taldes Y attacks. The perpetrators are generally linked to ETA’s youth organisation SEGI and are younger than arrested suspects relating to other forms of separatist terrorism. With the exception of two attacks, all attacks on critical infrastructure were Taldes Y attacks. The two remaining attacks were claimed by ETA and SEGI, respectively. It is also noteworthy that Taldes Y attacks continued throughout the ceasefire. All arrests in relation to Taldes Y attacks were reported by Spain.

Basque separatist terrorists continue to use France as a logistical base. Although ETA showed some activity in Portugal during 2007, France continues to be the main logistical base for Basque separatist terrorism. There is a noticeable difference in the choice of targets attacked by Basque separatist terrorists in France and Spain. While Spain only reports a very small number of Basque separatist terrorist attacks directed towards private interests, this is one of the main targets for Basque separatist terrorism in France. In addition, private interests continue to be the main target for Corsican separatist terrorists. As evidenced by the ETA attack in France in December, Spanish law enforcement officials are nevertheless targeted both in France and in Spain.

The Kurdish-Turkish conflict has an impact on the security situation in the EU. In Germany, separatist terrorist violence continues to be perpetrated mainly by Kurdish separatist terrorist groups. The development in the Kurdish-Turkish conflict in 2007 had an impact on the security situation in the EU. This was demonstrated by the increasing number of attacks against Turkish interests in Germany, following the escalation in the conflict in 2007.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks in the EU are decreasing. Spain and Italy continue to be more affected by left-wing terrorism than other EU member states. In 2007, the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by left-wing and anarchist terrorists decreased. The recent increase in the threat from left-wing groups inspired by ideologies of the Red Brigades in Italy, however, may lead to an increase in attacks in 2008.

Activities by right-wing terrorists and extremists in the EU are increasing. Investigations into right-wing extremist and terrorist activities have shown international contacts which indicate a European network of right-wing activists. A few member states have also reported a general increase in hostility towards Muslim immigrant communities.
### Annex 1

#### Abbreviations

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<td>ALF</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>BR-PCC</td>
<td>Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Comunista Combattente</td>
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<td>Cellules Communistes Combattantes</td>
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<td>CIRA</td>
<td>Continuity Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>DHKP/C</td>
<td>Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi</td>
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<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</td>
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<td>Federazione Anarchia Informale</td>
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<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse - Union des Combattants</td>
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<td>GIMC</td>
<td>Groupe Islamic Combattant Marocain</td>
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<td>GIMF</td>
<td>Global Islamic Media Front</td>
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<td>GRAPO</td>
<td>Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat</td>
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<td>HME</td>
<td>Home Made Explosives</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IID</td>
<td>Improvised Incendiary Device</td>
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<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>INLA</td>
<td>Irish National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
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<td>Partito Comunista Politico-Militare</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers' Party</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Red Army Fraction</td>
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<td>RIRA</td>
<td>Real Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>SHAC</td>
<td>Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty</td>
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<td>SitCen</td>
<td>European Union Joint Situation Centre</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sri Lankan Army</td>
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<td>TATP</td>
<td>Triacetone Triperoxide</td>
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<td>TKP/ML</td>
<td>Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist</td>
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<td>TWP</td>
<td>Terrorism Working Party of the European Council</td>
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<td>VBIED</td>
<td>Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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Annex 2
Excerpt from the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism

According to Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (2002/275/JHA), terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed.

Terrorist offences are committed with the aim of:
- seriously intimidating a population, or
- unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act, or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

Terrorist offences include:
1. attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;
2. attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
3. kidnapping or hostage taking;
4. causing extensive destruction to a Government or a public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
5. seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
6. manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into and development of biological and chemical weapons;
7. release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
8. interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;
9. threatening to commit any of the acts listed above.

Paragraph 2 of Article 2 obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that directing a terrorist group, participating in its activities including supplying of information or material resources, or by funding its activities are punishable.

Article 3 obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offences include aggravated theft, extortion and drawing up false administrative documents with a view to commit certain terrorist offences.

According to Article 4, inciting or aiding or abetting offences referred to in the Framework Decision should also be made punishable.
Annex 3
Implementation of the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism in member states which provided Eurojust with information on convictions.

Belgium
At the start of 2007, a Royal Decree entered into force making it easier for the financial administrative authorities to freeze the assets of individuals involved in terrorist offences, as described in the 19 December 2003 Act on Terrorism. A second new bill was published on 15 May 2007 on the insurance against damage caused by terrorist acts. This new law supports the victim of a terrorist act in receiving compensation. Also, a Royal Decree of October 2006 entered into force on 15 June 2007, allowing a check of financial transactions, in order to fight money laundering and financing of terrorism.

Denmark
After the introduction of the first anti-terrorism package on 31 May 2002, the Danish Parliament passed an updated package on 2 June 2006. In the Criminal Code, the definition of the concept of terrorism has been laid down in Section 114. Recruitment for terrorism, as well as training, instruction and teaching have been criminalised in Sections 114c and 114d. Aiding and abetting to terrorism is punishable with up to 6 years in prison according to Section 114d. Through amendments to the Administration of Justice Act, investigative powers have now been strengthened for both the police and the intelligence service. The amendment in 2006 also allowed a less restricted access to exchange of information between the Security Intelligence Service and the Defence Intelligence Service. In September 2007, a new provision of the Administration of Justice Act entered into force, allowing for the storage of Internet and telecommunications data for an one-year period.

France
Since 9 September 1986, the French law has provided for the possibility that the prosecution, investigation and judgement of terrorist offences take place in Paris. In practice, all terrorist cases are centralised in Paris. Since then, the French legislation concerning incrimination of terrorist acts (including financing of terrorism) as well as rules governing the criminal proceeding have been regularly amended, most recently in January 2006. Terrorist acts are defined by Articles 421-1 to 422-7 of the Penal Code. French law refers in particular to existing offences that are qualified as terrorist acts “where they are committed intentionally in connection with an individual or collective undertaking the purpose of which is seriously to disturb public order through intimidation or terror”. The law also provides for the participation in a group or association in order to prepare any act of terrorism. Concerning the criminal proceedings, it should be noted that, since 2004, specific provisions have applied to terrorist offences. They mainly concern surveillance, infiltration, custody, searches, interception of telecommunications, taking of audio recordings and visual images in specified vehicles and places, and measures to freeze property.

Germany
At the end of 2003, the Criminal Code was updated to implement the 2002 Council Framework Decision. In September 2007, new provisions in criminal law were proposed to extend the criminalisation of preparatory terrorist acts (falling under Sections 129 a and b of the Criminal Code), and punish with up to 10 years in prison instead of 6 months. With these proposals, training and receiving of training will be criminalised. Also, the manufacturing or possession of weapons or fluids and gasses which can be used for preparing to commit terrorist acts will be criminalised. A further provision will be introduced criminalising incitement to terrorism on the Internet and penalising this crime with up to 3 years in prison.

Greece
Article 187a of the Greek Criminal Code contains some of the provisions implementing the Council Framework Decision. In this section, threats to commit terrorist acts are criminalised, when they are serious enough and cause terror. Also, the setting up and membership of a structured organisation of more than three persons, acting together and planning to commit terrorist acts is made punishable with up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Article 187 provides that perpetration of the acts
mentioned in article 187a may carry up to a life sentence. After serving 25 years, the convicted person can be released from prison on the basis of article 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Special investigation techniques are allowed under article 253a of the Criminal Procedure Code. Prosecutions on the basis of article 187a are brought before the Council of the Court of Appeal.

Ireland

Terrorist acts are prosecuted under the Offences Against the State Acts 1939 to 1998, in combination with the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. The Criminal Justice Act 2005 provides for Ireland’s compliance with the Council Framework Decision of 2002. The Offences Against the State Acts provide, amongst others, for the offences of membership of, providing assistance to, and directing un unlawful organisation. The Criminal Justice Act strengthens the possibilities to deal with international terrorism and regulates that groups that engage in, promote or encourage the commission of a terrorist activity are unlawful organisations under the Offences Against the State Acts. Terrorist offences are tried at the Special Criminal Court which was established under the Offences against the State Acts.

Italy

Terrorism is defined under Article 270 of the Criminal Code; the definition dates back to 1980. An amendment in 2001 extended the definition of terrorism to include violence against international organisations and foreign States. On 31 July 2005, a new definition and new offences (such as recruitment and training) were introduced reflecting elements of the Council Framework Decision of 2002. New measures to prevent and combat financing of terrorism were introduced in 2007, according to Directive 2005/60/CE. On 29 December, new measures concerning expulsion in case of terrorism were adopted.

Spain

In October 2007, the government of Spain passed a law in accordance with the Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006: Law 25/2007 on Electronic Communications. The object of the law is the regulation of the providers of public electronic communications services (fixed network telephony, mobile telephony and Internet) concerning their obligations with respect to the retention of data while providing a service, as well as the possibility to make that data available to the persons in charge of an investigation (with the permission of a judicial authority). The law will apply to the traffic and localisation of both legal entities and natural persons and to the related data necessary to identify the subscriber and registered user. It will not apply to the content of the electronic communications or to the information consulted using an electronic communications network. The provider will have to keep the data for a year, with a possibility to extend the period to 2 years or to reduce it to 6 months. The companies will have 6 months after this law has entered into force (7 November 2007) to prepare the equipment required to comply with the law.

the Netherlands

A bill allowing increased possibilities for investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes came into force on 1 February 2007. The new law penalises the establishment of a new terrorist organisation, as well as participation to or leadership of a terrorist organisation. Conspiracy to commit terrorist crimes and recruitment for the Jihad is also specifically criminalised. Further preventative measures have been introduced in the criminal procedure law. On the basis of a Decision on investigation of terrorist offences, of the same date, further executive measures may be proscribed by special legislation. Finally, at the end of 2006, a new bill was introduced allowing witnesses protected by the intelligence services to testify in court, thus facilitating the use of intelligence materials in terrorism proceedings.

United Kingdom

The UK is one of the countries where anti-terrorism legislation has been in place for many years. The Terrorism Act of 30 March 2006 put in place a number of new offences, including preparatory acts, training, encouragement to terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications. In 2007, new proposals were put forward to change the
counter terrorism legislation. The main elements proposed in the new bill are: a possible extension of pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects beyond the current limit of 28 days; a requirement for convicted terrorists to provide the police with personal information on their release from prison and to notify any changes to this information; introduction of a foreign travel order that will enable convicted terrorists to be banned from traveling overseas; changes to enable post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects and the drawing of adverse inferences from a refusal to say something that is later relied on in court; enhanced sentences for those convicted of terrorist related offences; putting the police counter terrorist DNA database on a sound statutory footing and making other changes to enable the full use of DNA in terrorist cases.
Annex 4: Failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks in 2006\textsuperscript{133} and 2007 per member state and affiliation.

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\textsuperscript{133} Excluding disputed data concerning attacks in Belgium and Greece for 2006.
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