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## **OUTCOME OF PROCEEDINGS**

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From: General Secretariat of the Council  
On: 27 April 2016  
To: Terrorism Working Party

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Subject: Summary of discussions

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### **Joint TWP/COTER**

#### **1. Adoption of the agenda**

The agenda was adopted, as set out in CM 2344/16.

#### **2. Latest incidents of significant interest**

Six delegations took the floor to give an update of incidents of significant interest, including recent arrests of presumed terrorists, ongoing proceedings and the number of individuals (either nationals or individuals having their usual residence in the Member States concerned) travelling to Syria and Iraq. The Netherlands informed the group that it had just adopted new legislation strengthening measures against foreign (terrorist) fighters (F(T)Fs), introducing administrative travel bans, possibilities to revoke licenses and expanding the grounds for revocation of Dutch citizenship.

### **3. Update on the work of TWP and COTER**

- Presentation by the Presidency on ongoing activities

The TWP chairman informed the group on the agenda for the June JHA Council within the area of counter-terrorism (CT). The Presidency planned to submit a roadmap consisting of three parts (introduced by a cover note): 1) law enforcement; 2) CT and travel, and 3) migration and borders. Secondly, in relation to the so-called "master document" to be presented during the last half of 2016, it was announced that there would be a bigger role for COSI in coordinating CT action; this would most probably affect the TWP, meaning "rather more work than less".

Finally, the Presidency informed about the project for the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG) to establish a digital platform for real time information exchange, including an analytical tool and a physical platform of intelligence officers stationed together in the Netherlands.

Bringing together TWP and COTER in occasional joint meetings, was viewed as positive and key for continued discussion.

### **4. Information exchange at national level: Counter Terrorism (CT) - infobox and related initiatives**

- Presentation by the Presidency

The Presidency gave a presentation on a Dutch initiative, a so-called CT infobox which was a cooperation/network that had been set up after the Madrid attacks in 2004, bringing more than 100 databases and players together, serving as a data exchange platform "allowing to see hidden links". Its purpose was "to improve the official information position in respect of persons posing a potential terrorist or radical threat to Dutch society, and to enable appropriate action to be taken against them". No transfer of powers to the infobox from the many authorities involved; the strength of the infobox: a closed "box"/forum bringing together expertise that could exchange information on specific cases and look at it from different angles making it a flexible, adaptable instrument which was seen as very useful.

## 5. **The link between internal and external aspects of CT**

- CT expert Jordan

The JHA Council of 4 December 2014 had emphasised the importance of coherence between internal and external aspects of CT. Concerning Jordan, the EEAS CT expert indicated that it was a country which needed less capacity building and more partnership. In general, he encouraged the EU to define its role well before and not during projects, to set benchmarks and think of methodology. The CT framework was there, but techniques to implement it/put it into practice in third countries could be improved.

## 6. **"Drivers of radicalisation"**

- Presentation by INTCEN [*CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL*]

Delegations took note of the presentation made by INTCEN.

## 7. **Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) - State of play and the link between the various levels of activities (local, national, EU)**

- Presentation by RAN

The quality manager of LOCAL, one of the Radicalisation Awareness Network's (RAN) nine subgroups, set up in October 2015, gave a presentation of the subgroup's work so far. The local dimension was critical, prevention and early detection of radicalisation seemed to be very effective at local level, and de-radicalisation best addressed locally. Interaction between policy-makers and (first line) practitioners was crucial. An example of such an approach could be found in a brief English summary of the fifty-page "Copenhagen City Anti-Radicalisation Action Plan - Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort", presented last autumn in Copenhagen. Practical guidelines would be published by RAN at the end of 2016.

The Commission encouraged the Presidency to get an overview of what was already in place in Member States, referring to the questionnaire distributed under the Luxembourg Presidency last year; the information collected should be updated. Furthermore, the Commission announced that the RAN annual conference most probably would be held on 8 June 2016, back-to-back with the JHA Council in Luxembourg.

## **8. Local approach of the municipality to countering radicalisation (to be confirmed)**

- Presentation by local authorities

The mayor (since 2007) of the small Belgian city Dendermonde (30 km from Brussels, 40-45 000 inhabitants) made a presentation of Dendermonde's approach to counter radicalisation. A tragic shooting incident in a crèche on 23 January 2009 had made the city introduce measures viewed as relevant also in relation to radicalisation: a local and integrated approach covering a diverse list of partners, for example police, schools, imams, etc. Information exchange was a "*sine qua non*", meaning more eyes and ears to monitor developments. Radicalisation was a process that could be stopped/prevented, and "the broken link between the individual and the society repaired". So far, no one from Dendermonde had left for Syria.

## **9. Aviation security**

- Presentation by the Commission

The Commission informed on the work undertaken in relation to risk assessments: context: the downing of MH 17 on 17 July 2014. At the time of the accident, no integrated risk assessment had been available, and no clear prohibition was issued. Aviation authorities at national, international (ICAO), NATO (Eurocontrol) and EU level did not rely on the same risk picture. EU could add value by regularly conducting a joint risk assessment of specific regions, even if assessments were only snapshots in need of updates and recommendations and would not replace a dynamic rapid alert system. Such risk assessment had now been undertaken for a number of regions.

Another topical issue discussed was how to clarify the division of tasks in security-restricted area and the public part of airports. At EU-level, the AVSEC (aviation security) committee had held a meeting on 31 March 2016, where a number of Member States had expressed scepticism about access controls on the "landside". ICAO was also looking into strengthening landside security, defining "landside", who was in charge, which measures could be used, etc.

Finally, the soft target manual from May 2014 would be updated and turned into a short and brief practical guidance.

## 10. AOB

UK had circulated two papers. The first related to "Explosives canine detection capability", the potential of sniffer-dogs in relation to explosives -a cheap and workable solution according to UK offering to provide assistance to interested Member States.

The second UK paper dealt with awareness raising tools to support implementation of EU Regulation 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, UK offering bilateral information exchange support to Member States in practical implementation of the Regulation as well as sharing the existing awareness raising tools.

Both paper were welcomed, in particular, by the Commission.

The last TWP meeting under the Dutch Presidency would take place on 7 June 2016.

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