

**C4 2013
Committee 1**

**A HYPOTHESIS
FOR AN EUROPEAN UNION
« SOUTHERN STRATEGY »**

May 2013

The exceptional events that upset the Mediterranean area opened up a new series of questions, still awaiting response. At the same time, the European Union seems willing to enlarge its area of interests to new regions (like the Arctic), while still facing hard times in managing existing operations, such as the well-known arrests in the Indian Ocean. If the South European nations want to draw the Brussels decisions-makers attention back to the Mediterranean challenges, it will be necessary to tackle this theme in an appropriate reflection, inevitably involving also the North African partners and focusing on some common priorities of the area, the security framework in the first place.

Committee composition :

- CHEM / France : Col Vincent PONS
Col Laurent LHERBETTE
- IASD / Italy : CV Domenico GUGLIELMI
Col A O Mohamed JIDDOU
- IDN / Portugal : Capt. Fernando FERREIRA SEUANES
Prof. Luís Eduardo SARAIVA
- CESEDEN / Spain : Ing. Francisco CESTEROS

Agenda :

- Synthesis
- Annex 1 : the Mediterranean challenges today
- Annex 2 : the European neighbourhood policy
- Annex 3 : EU strategy in Sahel

Synthesis

Southern European nations share a common concern about stability of southern borders of the European Union, a strategic economical area and sensitive security-wise. Dialogue and cooperation entities already exist between the EU and riparian countries of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, in the current context, it appears useful to initiate another real thinking process among EU members in order to define a “global southern security strategy”.

1. Context: The EU in crisis and dissipated order amongst members

The Crisis period, along with diversity of interests and EU members’ means of action, prevent from reaching a commonly shared vision of EU situation in southern Europe and unity in action.

a. Diversity of interests

The enlargement of the EU to 27 members diversified interests zones, decreasing, as a consequence, members’ attention towards southern Europe. Since the end of eighties, spreading towards the East, with membership of Central European nations, strongly focused EU efforts on Eastern Europe. Besides, main concerns of Central European nations are rightfully turned towards Russia whose lust for power generates at times anxiety. Up North, as per consequence of global warming, Arctic progressively stands as a new border for international relations. Opening new maritime routes, or facilitated accesses to offshore resources are purposes among many, demonstrating that the stake is not only climatic but also strategic and economical. The EU cannot ignore its arctic dimension; Denmark (through Greenland), Finland and Sweden count among the eight Arctic nations. As far as the South is concerned, the EU concentrates its security efforts on fighting piracy in Indian ocean and Horn of Africa, and on some other supporting operations of African countries security forces, without keeping a real global vision of security stakes.

b. Diversity of status and means

EU members dispose of very diverse means of action to answer security challenges. Budgets allocated to Defence have generally decreased and the crisis context worsens that tendency. We cannot escape from contributions that will remain highly variable for a security strategy. Relationships with southern countries significantly vary depending on their historic legacy. Southern Europe countries (the 6 riparian countries of the Mediterranean including Portugal) find themselves in contrasted situations¹.

c. Temptation to abandon the South

Ever since the implementation of the “5+5” Dialogue in 1990 and the Barcelona declaration in 1995, a will to develop relations between the EU and countries of the South Mediterranean bank arose in order to create a common peace and stability zone. Following 9/11 terrorists attacks, security stakes are becoming more and more important within these relationships because European countries consider that their internal safety relies on a good mastery of risks originating from the South. For all that, set up objectives struggle to be reached and neither integration of southern countries within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP: cf appendix 2), in 2004, nor the project for Union of the Mediterranean, initiated by France in 2007, manage to concretely unlock the process.

¹ France, permanent member of the UN Security Council, bears a special responsibility towards the International Community and maintains relations inherited from its colonial past with Maghreb countries. Spain, “closest” neighbour, has a singular history with Morocco and the Western Sahara issue naturally influences its perception of southern security.

2. Relevance of a “southern strategy” for the EU

Partnership processes between riparian countries of the Mediterranean are down, but security challenges remain numerous. The Arab Springs have added an unpredictable aspect to concerned countries' fate, and the Malian crisis proved that Europe could not ignore interactions between Morocco and the Sahel zone anymore. Thus, even more than at the start of the Barcelona process, the southern neighbourhood requires a renewal of EU members' southern security strategy.

a. Ambivalence of the Arab Springs

What are now commonly called the Arab Springs bare the ambivalent processes, where encouraging and more disturbing phenomenon intertwine. Popular aspirations towards more freedom reveal a global trend that could lead to more liberal and humanly respectful governments. We, nevertheless, foresee that the process will be long and will not flee from a transition period extremely crisis-prone. Moreover, revolutions have enabled Islamic movements to take part into politics. Even if they did not cause the regimes' collapse, they cleverly made a stand and their first political actions show that the ideological and religious dimensions remain highly present. The Arab Springs therefore introduced uncertainty in relationships between riparian of the Mediterranean. Cooperation processes need reinvention in harmony with new governments whose intentions still remain unclear and whose will and capacity to fight terrorism is not yet evident.

b. Inevitable interactions between Maghreb and Sahel

The shifting of Islamic activism's gravity centre from Central Asia to the Arab African zone noticeably impacts Southern Europe's stability. AQIM's cross-border activities affect southern riparian countries of the Mediterranean and their sub-Saharan neighbours. The Malian crisis accelerated European realization and revealed that Maghreb does not constitute a hermetic protection against radical Islam. The Libyan crisis and France intervention in Mali stand out as two episodes of a wider crisis that potentially reaches a vast geographical set including Northern Africa and its Sahel “hinterland” (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Soudan). The EU cannot ignore that dimension in setting up its southern strategy, even if the Islamic danger is felt in various ways among its members. A Sahel strategy of the EU already exists (cf. appendix 3) but the aim is to replace it in a bigger picture.

c. Multiplicity of security challenges (cf. appendix 1)

The Arab Springs and the Malian crisis highlighted the fragility of a zone where new threats found a fertile ground to grow. Nations of the region, often weakened, struggle to fight against drug trafficking, organized criminality and illegal migration flows. Some traffic, coming from Latin America, found in the region a zone allowing transit to Europe. Direct effects on Europe and the Mediterranean economic activity are already patent and are likely to develop with a lack of coherent strategy shared among partners of the South. As such, if the fight against Piracy seems to be reaching its goals off the coasts of Africa, the efficiency of the FRONTEX Agency still relies on the Members' goodwill to provide resources whereas by 2050, the African Continent will host 2 billions inhabitants, considering its current demography.

Another important dimension to take into account is the energy security and reliability of external provisions. Northern African countries play a major role in satisfying the European growing needs (3% per year).

3. Principles for a renewed “southern security strategy”

Following on from previous governments and already launched processes, the purpose for the EU remains stability of southern neighbourhoods. Growing economies and good governance of considered countries must not be lost of sight since they participate in stability. Nonetheless, through a renewed “southern security strategy”, the objective is to better target the action

defining a priority interest zone, while updating the dialogue and cooperation context, and delegating the implementation of the European strategy to southern European countries.

a. Redefining the priority interest zone: Maghreb and Sahel

The European Neighbourhood Policy strives to consider the Mediterranean as a whole, whereas a clear split between East and West still exists when it comes to security concerns. The Security situation of the Eastern part of the Mediterranean is strongly influenced by Turkey's surge, Russia's presence, as well as by a connection with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Differences of opinion about solving the Israeli Palestinian conflict often have been at the origins of partnership processes blockages between the EU and non-European, riparian countries, of the Mediterranean. The Western area is currently rather subject to jolts from the Sahel zone and to uncertainties of the new governments instituted by the Arab Springs. Moreover, that area is connected to the Atlantic zone. It is important to underline that this zone constitutes the closest southern neighbourhood to the EU, apart from Greece and Cyprus². Establishing a synthesis of threats from both zones is complex and merely doomed to inertia if not to failure of a global security policy. To better target the southern security strategy, facing the most immediate and direct threats, it seems interesting to confine it to the Western Mediterranean, from Morocco to Libya; while widening it in depth to the Sahel zone, from Mauritania to Sudan. Delimited as such, the priority interest zone is made of two successive circles: riparian countries of the Mediterranean and their Sub-Saharan southern neighbours.

b. Widening the dialogue and cooperation context: from « 5+5 » to « 6+10 »

A new definition of the interest zone obliges to revisit the Mediterranean dialogue's forums, while trying to rely on the existing one rather than creating new structures. The "5+5" dialogue, whose main topics are security and economic cooperation, already enables to cover the "first circle" of the interest zone³ with south bank countries. It has thus been suggested to extend that structure to countries part of the "second circle", Sahel who would be associated to "5+5" works depending on nature of the topics⁴. Additionally, and in order to give a real regional dimension to dialogue, a seat could be assigned to the EU and another one to the African Union (AU). On the European side, some countries might be interested in participating, if they share a common vision on the southern neighbourhood⁵. If we stick to the current members of the "5+5", adding countries of the Sahel and regional organizations, the forum could be widened to a "6+10" on a case by case basis: France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and EU + Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, African Union.

c. Strategy defined by the EU but with an implementation by the "Southern European countries' locomotive"

A contribution and an equitable investment from each EU member in the southern security strategy would be illusionary and counter-productive. Like about many other European matters, we have to accept the constitution of a group of countries particularly committed to the implementation of a strategy that formerly would have received the support of the 27. The roadmap would then be conceived by the EEAS, approved by the Commission and implemented by European countries of the "5+5". The objective would then be to encourage the evolution, within the EU, of the "common threat" or "common stakes" notions towards a "shared stakes" notion that is well aligned with the principle of solidarity and with the dynamic of permanently structured cooperation or reinforced cooperation.

² Greece and Cyprus can be considered as particular cases in the Mediterranean security matter. They rather fall in the Eastern Mediterranean logic, especially when considering their relationships with their mighty Turkish neighbour.

³ The « 5+5 » counts five countries from the north bank (France, Spain, Portugal Italy, Malta) and five countries from the south bank (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya). A widening towards Greece and Egypt has already been considered.

⁴ Mauritania is already part of the "5+5". Therefore we must add Mali, Niger, Chad and Sudan to cover the Sahel zone.

⁵ Belgium showed an interest for the 5+5, given the important North African and Italian population on their soil. The UK committed a lot to the Libyan and Malian crisis.

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ANNEX 1 : Mediterranean challenges today

Introduction

The Mediterranean Sea always played a double role in what concerns relations between South and North margins: on one hand this Sea has been the main communication line between Europe and Africa, and between East and West of the known ancient world. On the other hand, it has been a natural barrier that has limited the access to the other side. The Old Empires were always able to overcome this difficulty, thus the Mare Nostrum was seen more as a connection than as an obstacle. The Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs and the Ottomans and, since the Renaissance, the European powers, all of them used the facilities and opportunities provided by that Sea.

With the end of the period of empires and the stabilization of borders, the Mediterranean has seen a tremendous intensification of interconnections and interdependencies between the two margins. The opening of the Suez Canal saw the Mediterranean becoming the passage and the main route for the maritime traffic. During the Cold War, in the geostrategic point of view, the Mediterranean played a major role in the potential confrontation between the two military blocks. And now, what is the Mediterranean becoming? Can it play an important role, as important as in the past? In fact, the Mediterranean continues to be one of the major routes of international traffic, linking the East (and this includes the Far East) and the West. And security is crucial for the maintenance of this important line of communications. The stability of the Mediterranean is a major concern of its coastal countries and all those that have strategic interest in it, like the major world powers and others.

What are the main challenges concerning security in the Mediterranean area? Apart from the insecurity that can spread from the instability seen recently, one of the major challenges can be the EU turning the back to its South due to the identification of other interests, up North, concerning not only the development of the Arctic Ocean (resources and routes), but also due to the increasingly important role that the Baltic Sea is playing in the energy security of Europe.

This research work will try to identify the relevance of these challenges in three approaches. First, it will analyse the relevance to security of the political transition processes taking place in the Maghreb. Second, it will try to identify negative consequences to the South of the prioritisation of projects in the North of Europe. Finally, some of the new threats, like organized crime, human traffic and narcotics, will be considered in what concerns the contributions to the insecurity of the Mediterranean countries.

1. Security and political transition processes at the Maghreb

What is the relevance for regional security of the political transition processes that are going on some countries along the Mediterranean shores? If the Mediterranean is considered a barrier that divides the North from the South – which it has never been – then there are no consequences neither to Europe nor to the sub-Saharan Africa. But, as demonstrated above in these lines, that sea has been along the Eras a communication system.

However, nowadays, as we are witnessing processes that seem to constitute a transition in political regimes, some anxiety feelings are overcoming the neighbouring countries to the North and to the South. Moreover, insecurity is spreading to the Sahel region due to the effects of the so called Arab Spring in some countries, like Libya. This also made the regional terrorist groups inspired by Al Qaeda (or constituting a kind of Al Qaeda franchising), like AQIM, being reinforced in resources, like weaponry and volunteers.

So, although no one has the right to deny the aspirations of the peoples to liberty and free will, in fact what is being seen is the spreading of unrest and insecurity together with the increasing of violence in the region.

2. The South left behind by the European Project?

The unity of objectives of the European integration process is weakening, as the member-states of the EU's periphery see their economies being frozen by the financial crisis. In fact, some EU

members are doing very well, and increasing their welfare. The solidarity clause that was supposed to keep strong links between the 27 member-states is no longer evoked, as if out-of-fashion. There are different levels in EU like layers of an onion. The centre of EU gets stronger while, at the same time, the periphery, all the European South but also countries like Ireland, is diving into the abyss. And this is especially grave when it contaminates, and is contaminated by, the neighbouring South.

The European project is by the time being concentrating efforts in reinforcing alliances like the one between Russia and Germany for the provision of gas to Europe. There are common interests of the central powers of Europe that are crossing the times and whenever these interests were put in motion the rest of Europe and its neighbourhood suffered.

Although it is premature to say that the European Union is moving at two different velocities, it seems that Southern Europe is losing pace at the same time that the idealism conferred to the Arab spring is vanishing and facing difficult times.

3. The new threats and the Mediterranean Security

The world is now starting to see transnational organized crime and terrorism as the new foes. In what concerns Europe, geographically speaking, those threats seem coming from East and South. In one hand, to the East, the big earthquake that was the fall of the soviet Empire is still delivering its effects. In the other hand, the South is living in the aftermath of the termination of the bipolar equilibrium. Since the beginning of the liberation from colonialism until the present moment the African nations have passed through a restless process of germination of new stabilization, new rulers and new challenges. The implementation of democracies in Africa has been a hard process. Nowadays the threats to the African countries, mainly below Sahara, but also in North Africa, are beginning step by step to be materialized less in civil unrest than in criminal activities and organizations that threatens the political organization, the institutions, the economy and the social equilibrium of those societies.

But what are those threats? Some can be easily identified. Drug trafficking is considered one of the most dangerous threats to the International Community. It is dangerous, firstly, because it is a direct attack to the new generations. Also it takes enormous amounts of money from the families and the society, affecting the economy and providing the "dark side" with substantial economic resources that can be used to sabotage those societies. Finally, it uses agricultural land that could be used better in providing food.

Secondly, mass migration and new forms of slavery are grave attempts to the human rights and also contribute to the weakening of societies. The criminal nets that promote these trades take advantage of new conditions that impoverish states, like the climate change, but also of other conditions related to poor governance and the lack of the rule of law. People, being deprived of all their money (or of the family), their home and land, are sent to Europe, or elsewhere, where they are simply dumped in the shores (if they are lucky and the boats do not sank).

And thirdly, there is also terrorism. The sense of security of every common people deeply changed since September 11, 2001. Where do the terrorists get the financial resources to live and acquire what they need to prepare their attacks? Probably they get it from some States, seemingly, but also, and presumably in large amounts, from the criminal activities like the ones described above.

Those transnational criminal activities mainly taking place in Sub-Saharan Africa deeply affects security, in the Maghreb region, in Europe and globally. And these factors of insecurity, like the criminal nets, normally base their headquarters in poor and badly governed countries. Therefore, a way to help diminishing those threats to Europe and Mediterranean countries in general coming from South will be supporting efforts to increment the African development. This will increase the security of the Mediterranean Basin thus allowing prosperity to develop and peace to settle.

Final notes

There is a clear link between security and the processes of political transition taking place in some countries at the Maghreb region, mainly those where the aspirations of the peoples for security and freedom was more acute.

It is clear though that although European Union could play a major role in helping its neighbours to the South, the European crisis is dividing efforts and leaving behind, in difficult conditions, the Southern Europeans, exactly those member-states that better could bring added value to the projects of reconciliation that naturally had to be implemented after the unrest due to the regime change in countries like Libya.

Furthermore, one cannot deny that there are new threats coming from South, crossing the Great Desert and affecting the Mediterranean security, which can only be successfully faced with the collaboration of the two margins of the Mediterranean. The dilemma is that before the rising of the so called Arab Spring it was easier to control those threats, like the terrorism and the traffic of humans and narcotics. No, with pockets of power void in the region, uncontrolled armed groups are threatening both the Southern and the Northern shores of the Mediterranean.


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ANNEX 2 : The European neighbourhood today

The **European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)** was developed in 2004, with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. It is based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights.

This ENP framework is proposed to the 16 of EU's closest neighbours – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.



The ENP is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country. It is further enriched and complemented by regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives: the Eastern Partnership (launched in Prague in May 2009), the Union for the Mediterranean (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, formerly known as the Barcelona Process, re-launched in Paris in July 2008), and the Black Sea Synergy (launched in Kiev in February 2008).

Within the ENP the EU offers its neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP includes political association and deeper economic integration, increased mobility and more people-to-people contacts. The level of ambition of the relationship depends on the extent to which these values are shared.

In 2010-2011, the EU reviewed the ENP and put a strong focus on the promotion of deep and sustainable democracy, accompanied by inclusive economic development. Deep and sustainable democracy includes in particular free and fair elections, freedom of expression, of assembly and of association, judicial independence, fight against corruption and democratic control over the armed forces. The EU also stressed the role of civil society bringing about deep and sustainable democracy. The EU unveiled "more for more" principle, under which the EU will develop stronger partnerships with those neighbours that make more progress towards democratic reform.

The ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although it does not prejudge, for European neighbours, how their relationship with the EU may develop in future, in accordance with Treaty provisions.

Followings are some relevant figures related the implementation on ENP:

- In 2011, total trade between the EU and its ENP partners was worth € 230 billion;
- In 2007-2013, the EU provided partners with over € 12 billion in grant money for the implementation of the ENP;
- The EU issued 3.2 million Schengen visas to ENP partners in 2012.

The **Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)** promotes economic integration and democratic reform across 16 neighbours to the EU's south in North Africa and the Middle East.

Formerly known as the [Barcelona Process](#), cooperation agreements were re-launched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean.

The re-launch was an opportunity to render relations both more concrete and more visible with the initiation of new regional and sub-regional projects with real relevance for those living in the region. Projects address areas such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration and culture.

Along with the 27 EU member states, 16 Southern Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern countries are members of the UfM: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.

Currently meetings are co-presided over by one Mediterranean and one EU country. As of September 2010, the UfM also has a functional secretariat, based in Barcelona, a Secretary General and six deputy secretary generals.

Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, governance from the EU side has been rearranged through the EEAS (European External Action Service).

The UfM has a number of key initiatives on its agenda:

- the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, including coastal and protected marine areas;
- the establishment of maritime and land highways that connect ports and improve rail connections so as to facilitate movement of people and goods;
- a joint civil protection programme on prevention, preparation and response to natural and man-made disasters;
- a Mediterranean solar energy plan that explores opportunities for developing alternative energy sources in the region;
- a Euro-Mediterranean University, inaugurated in Slovenia in June 2008;
- the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, which supports small businesses operating in the region by first assessing their needs and then providing technical assistance and access to finance.

While Europe has no fixed borders, the European Union has developed around the idea of “*multiple and concentric circles*” based on the fulfilment of objective standards and not related to identity issues. In parallel, as far as its external projection is concerned, **the EU should identify its regional priorities, that could be represented by two “rims of interest”**. The first one stretches from Morocco through Egypt and Lebanon going up to Ukraine, while the second “*rim*” ranges from the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa to Central Asia and Afghanistan. Consequently, the CSDP should focus on preventing crises and helping the democratic transition within the first one, while stimulating a “democratic spill-over” in the second arch.

Thanks to the adoption of a comprehensive approach, the EU has enhanced its level of coordination in terms of resources allocated to crisis management and crisis response. Nevertheless, the EU should translate this comprehensive approach into a comprehensive action, through an effective reform of time-consuming crisis management procedures, which could take into account the need for flexibility and pragmatism while dealing with different

scenarios. Taking stock of the lessons learned in ten years of CSDP and from the 27 CSDP missions launched, there is a broad consensus about the importance of a better integration of military and civil aspects and components.

On the 20 march 2013, Mr. Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, presented to the European Parliament the EU Neighbourhood Policy 2013 package, as approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee. The following is a summary of that report related to the southern neighbours.

First, the process is still only at the beginning. It is clear that the transition to democracy, and its consolidation, where the transition has happened, will need time. What we have seen happening in Egypt, in Tunisia and in Libya, shows that the road to democracy is neither smooth nor short.

Second, the elections are an important, but often only a first step towards democracy. Political reforms to ensure respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of assembly, association, expression and the media are still incomplete. In particular, it is important that the transition process leads to further progress regarding the equality of women before the law and in society. The lack of judicial independence remains a strong concern in many countries and so does corruption.

Third, socio-economic reforms will need even more time to yield results – however, the lack of results in itself threatens to undermine, or slow down, the process of democratisation. Citizens expect democracy, but they also need job; the Arab Spring itself was triggered by economic frustrations as much as by political ones.

Fourth, irrespective of the difficulties, EU has to maintain engagement in the Neighbourhood. Many of its neighbours want to come as close as possible to the European Union, while EU has strong interests for Peace and Prosperity in its neighbourhood.

The challenges are still huge, but a number of partners have also made significant efforts and achieved results in the implementation of their reform commitments. It's important to respond to the different pace and direction of reforms by differentiating even more between partners, in line with the 'more for more' principle.

The European Neighbourhood Policy works when the willingness to reform is there and civil society plays an active part in the process. A stronger partnership with civil society is central to this policy, as well as commitment to work with national parliaments and other key stakeholders such as social partners and business.

EU has a valuable number of on-going negotiations of association agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas.

In the South, EU is offering integration in the extended European economic zone. This will be of course a gradual prospect, but at the end of it, EU partners should enjoy the benefits of integration in the vast EU single market.

EU launched negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with Morocco at the beginning of march 2013. Moreover, EU is planning to launch negotiations with Tunisia in the not too distant future, according to the local situation's evolution, and is continueing the preparatory process with Jordan.

EU continued to improve the mobility of people. Negotiations on a Mobility Partnership were concluded with Morocco, and have progressed with Tunisia. A dialogue on migration and mobility has started with Jordan. EU also supported the mobility of students, academics, researchers, and young people through programmes like Tempus, Erasmus Mundus and Youth in Action.

Progress on this often sensitive topic is crucial – not only because it responds to one of the key expectations of neighbours, but mobility of people brings with it the mobility of ideas and mobility of values.

Turning to EU's financial support for reforms in partner countries, the whole range of instruments at disposal have been used. Funds have been allocated to those who made more

efforts in democratic reforms and respect for human rights. The second phase of the Civil Society Facility was adopted with a new budget of EUR 45.3 million for 2012–13.

EU also continued to promote regional cooperation both in the East and in the South. In the South in particular, the EU has been active to give a new sense of direction, taking over the northern Co-Presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean, and promoting regional cooperation in the Maghreb, through concrete proposals in EU's Communication of December 2012 and participation in the 5+5 meetings.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is a good example that shows how a comprehensive approach can be used to generate coherent action involving all relevant European Union actors – the European Union's institutions, the European Union's member states, and their financial institutions.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is not offering quick fixes, but it is a comprehensive and flexible policy we have to engage with, and support partners in the neighbourhood over the coming years.

Today more than ever, slower economic growth, higher unemployment, persisting inequalities, increasing environmental challenges and often declining socio-economic indicators make an even stronger case for the kind of reforms that are at the heart of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU needs to remain engaged in its neighbourhood all the more at his point in time.

Talking about the **Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)**, we can refer to the **last release of the European Council, made on 23 July 2012**, where the following conclusions were adopted:

The Council looks forward to the imminent launch of three new CSDP missions, EUCAP Nestor in the Horn of Africa, EUCAP SAHEL Niger, and EUAVSEC South Sudan as well as the continued planning for EU support to border security in Libya. The Council underlines the concrete impact of CSDP missions and operations on the ground. Operational engagement of the Union through CSDP is a very tangible expression of the EU's commitment to contribute to promote and preserve peace and stability, strengthening the EU's overall ability to respond to security challenges with civil and military crisis management instruments.

The Council stresses the need for further dynamic progress on CSDP, decides to remain actively seized of all matters relating to CSDP and looks forward to review progress on the basis of concrete steps. The Council encourages the High Representative to take forward work on CSDP, in close cooperation with Member States.

On 31 January 2013 the Council has approved the crisis management concept for a possible new civilian CSDP mission to support capacity building for border management in Libya. This decision initiates operational planning and other preparations. A separate legal act is required to establish the mission. European experts are primarily to support Libyan authorities in developing capacity for enhancing border security in the short term. Secondly they will assist in developing a sustainable 'Integrated Border Management' concept and strategy, including necessary structures, in line with the priorities agreed with the Libyan authorities. This will be achieved in a gradually expanding and phased approach, through advising, mentoring and training. As conditions allow, the EU mission will progressively address the different land, sea and air aspects of border management, as well as the necessary coordination required by an integrated approach for decision making and effective operational conduct. Management of migration flows, human rights and links to the wider rule of law reform would also be part of the programme. HR/VP Catherine Ashton said: "A civilian mission to build Libyan capacities in border security and management is not only important for Libya, but for the entire region. The EU's plans have been discussed in detail with the Libyan authorities and their ownership is key for us." The initial mission mandate would last at least two years. Training is planned to start in Tripoli, but it could be extended to other locations, depending on the security situation and the needs of the Libyans.

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ANNEX 3 : EU strategy in Sahel

1. AREA AND ANALYSIS

The analysis covers the EU and the terrorism in SAHEL as part of the security influence in the European countries. Two questions to consider for EU security:

1. Is the SAHEL and the Mali crisis part of the internal or external security strategy of the EU?
2. Should the EU apply its security and defense policies or mobilize funds for cooperation and development?



Reference: European Union Action Service. Strategy for security and development in the Sahel.

The SAHEL is one of the most poorer regions in the world and the problems come from extreme poverty, climate change, food lack, demographic growth, water lack, productive economy lack, weak governments, terrorism inside the countries threatening population and governments, corruption, ethnic fighting, drug traffic, occidental kidnapping, tobacco traffic, and rebel groups radicalization towards an alliance with Al Qaida and sharia law imposition.

Mauritania, Mali and Niger are the countries with the most influence of the terrorist groups and of course, it affects another neighbor countries as Chad or Burkina Faso but also extends to the Mediterranean basin with clear implications in the south of Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Nigeria,

where Boko Haram (allied of Al Qaeda) is fighting against the population and the government causing cents of dead in terrorist attacks.

MAGREB's situation has an impact in SAHEL and the EU, through Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the European Neighbor Policy (ENP), has a clear focal point on this region in order to understand the risk and threat and apply the security policy accordingly.

This situation is getting more collaboration and cooperation between the countries in the EU as they see SAHEL and MAGREB as a threat to the EU stability and security, but also there has been a change, more collaboration and cooperation between EU countries and MAGREB countries in fighting together against terrorism, kidnapping, drug traffic, etc. and looking for fund to develop industry, economy and employment. EU is funding in order to get security from MAGREB inside EU frontiers.

EU has understood the situation, threat and problem and has established an investment and fund program. Civilian missions could be supported by the Common Security European Policy but the fund is low and lower and lower. Military missions are supported by each country, even some common costs could be funded by ATHENA program but the economic impact of it is very small and each country should support its own cost.

Another problem is the difference between European countries in their military and civilian capacities to support the missions and it has a big impact in the bureaucracy and logistic for the EU and takes a lot of time of coordination and efficiency of the processes.

European Development Fund (civilian funds) have been closed to 650 M€ in SAHEL (450 M€ for the 3 more western countries in SAHEL and 200 M€ in MAGREB's countries. Another 150 M€ could be placed for these 3 western countries in SAHEL through the revision of the agreement of the 10th meeting of EDF.

Another way to look for fund is through the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and mobilize fund from African Peace Facility as Commission Council has requested in its Press Release 3199th Council Meeting on November 19th, 2012.

The following figures are in place for **Mali**:

- 202 M€ special helpful from EDF fund (9th and 10th).
- 38 M€ on EDF (10th)
- 4 M€ from IfS
- 50 M€ proposed on additional resources
- Total Mali: 294 M€

Total fund from EU (EDF + IfS + Neighbor Policy) is:

- **SAHEL (Níger, Malí, Mauritania, región occidental): 606,25 M€⁶**

| Country/region | Ongoing (in million €) | | Programmed (in million €) | | Proposed Additional Resources (in million €) | Total (in million €) |
|--------------------|---------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----------|--|----------------------|
| | Country programmes ⁹ | IfS | 10 th EDF | IfS | | |
| Niger | 39,9 | | 42,2 | | 91,6 | 173,7 |
| Mali | 202 | | 38 | 4 | 50 | 294 |
| Mauritania | 21,25 | 1,2 | 22 | | 8,4 | 52,85 |
| West Africa region | | 13,7 | 66 | 6 | | 85,7 |
| Total | 263,15 | 14,9 | 168,2 | 10 | 150 | 606,25 |

⁶ European Union Action Service. Strategy for security and development in the Sahel.

- **MAGREB** (Algeria, Libia, Marruecos): 193,5 M€⁷

| Country/region | Ongoing (in million €) | Planned (in million €) | New resources | Total |
|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Algeria | 99 | | N.A | 99 |
| Libya | 24,5 | | N.A | 24,5 |
| Morocco | 70 | | N.A | 70 |
| Total | 193,5 | | N.A | 193,5 |

2. CHANGE MANAGEMENT AND PERSPECTIVES.

EU's challenges in the SAHEL region (Mauritania, Niger and Mali) are following these priorities:

- 1 Governance and crisis management: SAHEL countries have low resources from themselves and require help from outside to fight against terrorism, islamic rebel groups, drug traffic and kidnapping between others. Governance, democracy, laws and legal system added to security policy should be in place.
- 2 Regional coordination: SAHEL situation is a trans regional situation starting in the MAGREB countries and going through EU towards United Nations and African Union (UA). ECOWAS is also included in this coordination. Funds and coordination are critical and fundamental for the crisis and change management.
- 3 Security and Law: SAHEL countries have very low economical resources to fight against terrorist groups. Security policy (police, frontiers, customs, etc.) and the law system are critical. Human Rights guarantee, population security, investigation processes, judicial system are all of them part of the new government that should be funded by EU and International Organizations as seen upper.
- 4 Fight against extremism and radicalization: Extremism and radicalization are in the SAHEL countries. Fighting against them is part of the priority and occidental agenda.

In the MAGREB countries we should refer to the advanced status of the 5+5 dialogue and the European Neighbor Policy. As an example we should show: Algeria's roads, Morocco's action plans and investment plans, Libya's plans. It is part of the coordination between north and south of the Mediterranean area.

EU's strategy with Africa started in 2007 with the establishment of a Union and Action Platform of UE with Africa. Conflict prevention and peace keeping as far as conflict resolution and post-conflict building, governance and sustainable growth are points on the EU-Africa's agenda.

Without losing the global vision, we should take care about China and Russia in Africa because their actions, strategies and plans could impact natural resources guarantee for EU, investments and geopolitical positioning.

ECOWAS has developed a framework to promote governance, peace, security, emigration, strategy for fighting against drug traffic and organized crime and of course the action plan called "Praia Action Plan".

⁷ European Union Action Service. Strategy for security and development in the Sahel.

United Nations Drug and Crime Office is working with SAHEL countries on a cooperation program for law enforcement and judicial system enforcement.

ECOWAS, UN, EU, all of them coordinated and allowing the north-south cooperation programs.

Strategies on board are coming from:

- Mali: economic development of the north and Niger river delta región.
- European Security Strategy⁸, EU Council Conclusions on Security and Development⁹, The Internal Security Strategy¹⁰ y Stockholm Programme¹¹: Fight against terrorism, organized crime and stabilization of the countries with weak governments.
- Counter terrorism strategy of the EU and coordinated with counter terrorism strategy of the United Nations..

CONCLUSION

We should conclude the analysis answering the question of the beginning, Yes, SAHEL should be consider as an internal security part of the EU region and Mediterranean area. SAHEL should be considered as a threat for the EU and its European Neighbor Policy.

The second question is also answered by this analysis, in deep.

This is the reason to be involved, to join all the actors in the international arena and cooperate to stabilize the governments, the countries, fight against terrorism and establish a legal, judicial and security system.

We should also refer to Catherine Asthon´s words:

“The presence of the terrorist groups and the oppression of the local populations in the north of Mali are serious threats for the SAHEL region, for Africa and also for Europe. Due to this, we are decided to fully mobilize all our tools, in cooperation with our regional and international partners, to help Mali´s population to restore law´s empire and democratic government in all the country”.

⁸ A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security , Strategy, Providing Security in a Changing World
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/

⁹ 2831st EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting, Brussels, 19-20 November 2007,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf

¹⁰ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05842-re02.en10.pdf>

¹¹ The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens (2010/C 115/01)

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