


2013



# Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report



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document.





# Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report



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European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation  
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1  
00-124 Warsaw, Poland  
T +48 22 205 95 00  
F +48 22 205 95 01  
[frontex@frontex.europa.eu](mailto:frontex@frontex.europa.eu)  
[www.frontex.europa.eu](http://www.frontex.europa.eu)

Warsaw, November 2013  
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#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The AFIC Joint Report 2013 has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

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## List of abbreviations used

<b>AFIC</b>	Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community
<b>AFISMA</b>	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
<b>AQIM</b>	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
<b>BCP</b>	border-crossing point
<b>BGR</b>	Bulgaria
<b>CAAT</b>	Airport Anti-Traffics Cells
<b>CARA</b>	Italian Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers ( <i>Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo</i> )
<b>CEMAC</b>	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa ( <i>Communauté Économique et Monétaire des États de l'Afrique Centrale</i> )
<b>CEN-SAD</b>	Community of Sahelo-Saharan States
<b>CIA</b>	Central Investigation Agency
<b>CILSS</b>	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
<b>CM</b>	Council of Ministers
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security Defence Policy
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>DST</b>	Niger's Directorate of Territorial Surveillance
<b>EB-RAN</b>	Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network
<b>ECCAS</b>	Economic Community of Central African States
<b>ECOWAS/CEDEAO</b>	Economic Community of West African States ( <i>Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i> )
<b>EDF</b>	European Union Document-Fraud
<b>EDF-RAN</b>	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
<b>ENPI</b>	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
<b>EPN</b>	European Patrols Network
<b>ETC</b>	Emergency Travel Certificates
<b>EUBAM</b>	European Union Border Assistance Mission
<b>EUCAP SAHEL Niger</b>	European Union CSDP Mission in Niger
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUR</b>	euro
<b>EUROMED</b>	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
<b>EUTM Mali</b>	European Union Training Mission in Mali
<b>FCFA</b>	Communaute Financiere Africaine franc
<b>FNCI</b>	Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire
<b>FRAN</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
<b>Frontex</b>	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
<b>FSP ALCAO</b>	Priority Solidarity Fund in Support of the Fight against Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa
<b>G8</b>	Group of Eight: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the United States of America
<b>GIS</b>	Ghana Immigration Service
<b>GMPC</b>	Nigeria's General Multi-Purpose Card
<b>GPS</b>	Global Positioning System
<b>GRC</b>	Greece



<b>IBM</b>	Integrated Border Management
<b>IBSS</b>	Integrated Border Surveillance System
<b>ID</b>	identity document
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IMI</b>	International Migration Institute
<b>INTERPOL</b>	International Criminal Police Organization
<b>ISO</b>	International Organization for Standardization
<b>JO</b>	Joint Operation
<b>JORA</b>	Frontex Joint Operations Reporting Application
<b>MINUSMA</b>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
<b>MNLA</b>	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
<b>MUJAO</b>	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
<b>NGN</b>	Nigerian naira
<b>NID</b>	Nigeria's National Identity Database
<b>NIMC</b>	National Identity Management Commission
<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>Q</b>	quarter of the year
<b>SAC</b>	Schengen Associated Country
<b>SALW</b>	small arms and light weapons
<b>SAR</b>	Search and Rescue
<b>SASEMAR</b>	Spanish Maritime Security and Rescue Society ( <i>Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Marítima</i> )
<b>SFU</b>	Nigeria's Special Fraud Unit
<b>TUR</b>	Turkey
<b>UAE</b>	United Arab Emirates
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>UXO</b>	unexploded ordnance (bombs, bullets, shells, grenades, land mines, naval mines, etc.)
<b>WAEMU/UEMOA</b>	West African Economic and Monetary Union ( <i>Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine</i> )
<b>WB-RAN</b>	Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network



## Executive summary

The 2013 AFIC Joint Report is structured around three main topics, analysed both from European and African perspectives.

The first topic, i.e. a comprehensive update regarding the main changes (compared to early 2012) in migratory routes connecting Africa and the EU, is presented in Chapter 2. The chapter primarily considers developments as to the four main characteristics of each route under observation, i.e. location, size, composition and *modi operandi*, and provides insight into the related changes in Europe and Africa.

As general observation, AFIC experts clearly emphasise that, while the main sea and air routes remain more or less active, there is a permanent adjustment of *modi operandi* and shifting of migratory hotspots depending on local circumstances.

More precisely, when it comes to the main findings of this chapter, a few observations should be pointed out. Firstly, after the introduction of additional operational measures in Greece in August 2012, the overall detections of irregular migrants arriving in the EU from Turkey dropped considerably, including with regards to the nationals of AFIC partner countries. There are, however, some indications that the actual irregular flow of African nationals en route from Turkey might be greater than detection figures would suggest.

Secondly, there seems to be little evidence that the drop in the Eastern Mediterranean was compensated by increases at other major entry points in the Mediterranean (e.g. Italy, Malta and Spain). While the pressure definitely rose in the Central Mediterranean

(6 435 detections during the first half of 2013 or 85% more than in the same period of 2012), analysis of the main nationalities detected on different routes reveals that there is a limited overlap between the prevailing nationalities, the profiles of migrants and the average duration of migration before detection. In other words, the profile and migration strategies of African nationals detected in the Eastern Mediterranean are not consistent with the profile and strategies of African migrants detected elsewhere in the Mediterranean and remain quite distinct.

Thirdly, notwithstanding the mentioned changes in size and composition, the most interesting changes regarding routes are linked to prevailing *modi operandi*, often in response to increased operational activities by both North African and European authorities. For example, there seems to be some evidence that European maritime search and rescue operations are acting as a pull factor and are increasing the use of unseaworthy vessels by migrants and facilitators alike. These include inflatable toy boats and very old wooden fishing boats, both significantly increasing the risk of loss of life at sea.

Fourthly, changes in Africa are less dramatic and often remain localised. In Ghana, for example, land-based routes towards the EU have shifted eastwards as a result of several compounding factors (the Mali crisis, new public transport routes and increased border surveillance). The Gambia reported a strong displacement from maritime routes (towards the Canary Islands) to land-based routes (towards Libya or Morocco); while the Syrian crisis started to affect some North African countries as well (e.g. increased arrivals of Syrians to Morocco).



The second main topic of the report is addressed in Chapter 3, which looks into the impact of the Mali crisis on the border security in the wider Sahel region and the related movements of migrants towards the EU. Without any doubt, the crisis in Mali has put the wider Sahel region at risk of destabilisation and insecurity due to a possible dispersal of terrorist and/or separatist movements beyond Mali. The most affected countries in the region have taken the possible spill-over from Mali very seriously and have devoted a lot of efforts to securing their borders with this country. However, there is a significant gap between the required resources to properly secure regional borders and those that are actually available.

The Libyan crisis provoked additional adverse effects on the security of the entire Sahel region, primarily through the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, unmanageable return migration of many sub-Saharan migrants and a growing vulnerability of Libyan southern borders with Chad, Algeria, Sudan and Niger.

In Mali itself, however, there are signs of partial normalisation after the August 2013 presidential elections. Traditional migratory routes through northern Mali are likely to reopen in the near future. Overall, the impact of the Malian crisis on the external borders of the EU remained limited and often not directly linked to developments in the country.

Finally, Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the specific issue of document fraud, which is the third main topic of the report. Out of all detections of nationals from AFIC partner countries by European authorities, more than half (57%) were detected using fraudulent documents on entry to the Schengen area from third countries. Most began their

journey from their home country, and in the case of detections at the air border, a large majority of detections tended to involve migrants arriving on direct flights from their home countries.

Importantly, in document fraud cases, AFIC nationalities tended to be detected with authentic documents more frequently than non-AFIC nationalities. Several AFIC partner countries claimed that a very common *modus operandi* was observed: an AFIC national applies for and receives an authentic multiple entry visa for travel to the EU; once in the EU the authentic passport with the visa within is sent back to the African country, where a counterfeit exit stamp is affixed before the document is supplied to a migrant with similar physical characteristics, who then uses it as an impostor.



The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information obtained by intelligence on *modus operandi* used for migrant smuggling and it's reasonably foreseeable that its disclosure could harm the implementation of future measures to counter this type of cross border crime during operations coordinated by Frontex. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The 2013 AFIC Joint Report concludes with a listing of possible priority areas that deserve further discussion by relevant decision-makers in Europe and Africa. These are focused on how to minimise loss of life at sea, tackle the threat of terrorism at the regional borders in Africa and improve administrative capacity to detect and/or prevent document fraud.



# 1. Introduction and methodology

## 1.1. Introduction

The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community was set up in 2010 to provide a framework for regular knowledge and intelligence sharing in the field of border security between Frontex and African countries. The concept of this collaboration was broadly based on the model of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and the two already-established regional risk analysis networks: the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network (WB-RAN) and the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN).

A conference initiating this network with selected African states from West and North Africa as well as Immigration Liaison Officers based in some African countries, took place in Madrid on 14 and 15 April 2010. Participants of the conference agreed to name the network the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community, in short the AFIC.

Frontex organised two additional events in 2011: a workshop aiming at familiarising Af-

rican delegates with Frontex and especially with the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit, and a meeting also involving EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. The event was structured around three topics: (1) Changes in the trends of human trafficking in Africa and its links to Europe; (2) Changes in people smuggling from or via Africa to Europe; and (3) Other cross-border security threats.

Encouraged and impressed by the results achieved within the AFIC in 2011, it was felt in the community that the time was right in 2012 to aim at the first AFIC Joint Report. In April 2012, Frontex organised a workshop in Warsaw, where an agreement was reached on the topics, the scope and the reporting deadlines for the first AFIC Joint Report. The second workshop, held to review the draft AFIC Joint Report drawn up on the basis of data collected by each participating African country and Frontex, took place in Madrid in August 2012.


The year culminated with the AFIC Annual Conference in Lisbon in November 2012. The

The non-disclosed photo shows the participants in the meeting and its disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the persons concerned and constitute a violation of EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. Thus, the information is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001.



Figure 2. **Nigeria, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are the most populous AFIC partner countries**

General map of AFIC partner countries with their respective populations and border length indicated. Please note the distinction between North AFIC countries (AFIC North) and sub-Saharan AFIC countries (AFIC Sub) is made for purely analytical purposes to facilitate the recognition and analysis of different migration patterns in North and sub-Saharan Africa



Source: CIA World Factbook, July 2013

conference was used to launch the AFIC Joint Report 2012 and was opened to a wider audience, which besides North African countries also included representatives of relevant international organisations active in the African continent (the African Union and the Arab Maghreb Union).

Out of 22 African countries invited, 17 countries participated effectively in the kick-off meeting in 2010. In 2011, 12 countries attended the workshop and 14 attended the thematic meeting. The AFIC Annual Conference in 2012 was attended by representatives from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea,

Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Tunisia.

## 1.2. Methodology

In 2013, joint activities of the AFIC were largely modelled on the successes of 2012 (two workshops, one annual conference and one Joint Report). New partners also joined the AFIC during 2013, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cameroon participating in the meetings.

The first AFIC workshop in 2013 organised in May in Warsaw (see Fig. 1) was designed as a



structured brainstorming with all AFIC partners actively participating in the discussions. As was the case in 2012, AFIC experts decided to adopt a thematic approach for the second annual AFIC Joint Report. The following three topics were agreed:

1. Main migration routes from Africa to the EU – update on 2012;
2. Situation in the Sahel – impact of the Mali crisis on regional border security and movements of migrants;
3. Document fraud.

Based on the results of the workshop, additional information was requested from AFIC partners in order to gather more data and cover possible intelligence gaps on the chosen topics. Thirteen replies were received, which were then incorporated into the second Joint Report.

The contributions from African partners were complemented by information from Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations, the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and the European Union Document-Fraud (EDF) project. Open-source information was also used to provide a background for the subject.

The second workshop in Lisbon served the purpose of discussing the draft and improving its quality by adding additional and more specific information from AFIC partners. The participants were briefed on the concept for the November 2013 Annual Conference and were asked to provide their views on the subject, including the further development of the AFIC. The workshop also provided an opportunity for the so-called 'threat-scanning exercise', whereby AFIC partners were asked to provide a list of the main border security threats in their respective jurisdictions. The results of the exercise were used to improve the quality of Chapter 5 (Conclusions).

The Annual Conference for 2013, where the final report was presented, was held in Warsaw at the end of November 2013. The conference's aim was to bring AFIC activities and deliverables closer to the policy cycle discussions in Africa and Europe, in particular with regards to projects mentioned in the annex of this report. Furthermore, the second Joint Report supported the strategic debate on how to strengthen cooperation between the EU and African countries regarding migration management.

## 2. Main migration routes from Africa to the EU – update on 2012

### 2.1. Introduction – migratory routes and drivers of change

Migration of people always causes profound changes in societies affected by the movements. The context in which this happens is dynamic with a plethora of factors that are determining the actual location, composition, size and seasonality of migratory movements.

While oversimplified push and pull migration models can go far in describing the underlying causes of migratory movements, they remain insufficient to provide explanation why the movements occur at specific locations, why they occur at very specific times and what their composition is (e.g. mixed flows). These are all very important considerations when analysing irregular migratory routes and deciding on appropriate and cost-effective mitigation measures, also designed to protect vulnerable groups of migrants.

AFIC experts stressed these issues during workshop discussions. They also agreed that any strategic update on the main routes between Africa and the EU should take into consideration the following starting premises:

1. Migration pressure from Africa to Europe is a rather constant phenomenon. Demographic pressure, economic development (or lack thereof), limited opportunities and geography (relatively short distances to Europe) are all conducive to large pools of would-be migrants existing in Africa.
2. Routes are primarily shaped by four factors: size of the flow, composition of the flow, location of nexus and entry points,

and *modi operandi*. Therefore, the analysis of routes always requires a thorough understanding of changes of these four factors.

3. Any changes in migratory routing, location of nexus points, transit countries and means of transport are largely temporary.
4. Permanent changes regarding location of nexus and main entry points are rare and often caused by factors such as new border barriers or natural disasters.

In summary, discussions among AFIC experts clearly indicate that, while the main routes remain more or less active (see maps in Fig. 3 and 9 for more details), there is a permanent adjustment of *modi operandi* and shifting of migratory hotspots depending on local circumstances.


This update on the main migration routes from Africa to the EU builds upon the main findings from the AFIC Joint Report 2012 and is structured around the mentioned starting premises identified jointly with AFIC experts. In particular, the focus of this update is on analysing changes related to the four factors that shape the routes (location, size, composition and *modus operandi*), with a separate overview of the situation in Europe and Africa.





Figure 3. Comparison between detection data for the first half of 2012 and the same period in 2013 at the main routes used by irregular migrants from Africa to the EU indicates a sustained decline in the Eastern Mediterranean

Main routes used by irregular migrants from Africa to the EU and main changes in flows between 2012 and 2013



\* The Greek operation Aspida effectively and significantly increased the manpower, assets and equipment deployed to the Evros region in order to curb the rising flow of illegal border-crossing from Turkey. The fourth phase of this operation was launched in April 2013 and is planned until September 2013. It involved 400 Greek police officers. The third phase, which ended in March 2013, involved 1 100 officers, while the second and first phases involved 1 400 officers. In addition to the operation Aspida, the operation Xenios Zeus is still focused on detecting migrants inland in urban areas around Athens.

## 2.2. Changes in Europe

### 2.2.1. Size, composition and location of the flow

#### Eastern Mediterranean


By far the single biggest difference in terms of size and composition of the flows at different routes is the one associated with land and sea borders between the EU (Bulgaria, Greece) and Turkey. More precisely, when Greek authorities started to implement the operations Aspida\* (improved border enforcement at land borders with Turkey) and Xenios Zeus (inland checks) in August 2012, the number of arrivals overland from Turkey dropped considerably and shifted towards the Aegean Sea and the Bulgarian-Turkish land borders.

During the first half of 2012 (before the Aspida operation) roughly six out of ten illegal border-crossings in the EU used to be detected in this Eastern Mediterranean region. In the same period of 2013, the region's share of overall EU detections of illegal border-crossing dropped to 21%.

This drastic change is well demonstrated by Figure 4, which shows a significant drop in detections of illegal border-crossing by migrants arriving in Greece and Bulgaria from Turkey. What the figure does not show is a significant change in the composition of the much reduced flow. Namely, before the Aspida operation most nationalities detected in Greece were those of South Asia (Afghans, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis). This changed significantly after August 2012, when Syrians became the dominant group of migrants (in connection to the escalation of the Syrian crisis).




The non-disclosed parts contain sensitive information obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Member State(s). Its disclosure would harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.



When it comes to migrants from North or sub-Saharan Africa, two things are important to mention. Firstly, similarly to other nationalities, the number of their detections dropped considerably in 2013. For example, there were more than 4 400 detections of illegal border-crossing by North and sub-Saharan Africans reported during the first half of 2012 by Greece and Bulgaria, compared to fewer than 650 during the same period in 2013. Secondly, most of the flow of North and sub-Saharan Africans from Turkey is now headed towards Bulgaria. This shift is particularly strong for sub-Saharan Africans (mostly claimed Malians and Ghanaians).


#### **Hidden flow hypothesis**

However, there remains one important question: Where did the missing sub-Saharan and North African migrants go after August 2012? One plausible answer is: nowhere. More precisely, there is a possibility that a proportion





The non-disclosed map reveals the area covered by the Bulgarian border surveillance system. Its disclosure would undermine the operational and tactical features of Bulgarian border surveillance activity. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



The non-disclosed note reveals the technicalities of the Bulgarian border system. Its disclosure would undermine the operational and tactical features of Bulgarian border surveillance activity. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The non-disclosed text contains information related to the map above that was not disclosed. The reasoning for its non-disclosure presented therein is applicable to this figure.



of the flow routed to Bulgaria and/or Greece goes undetected. Therefore, the number of arriving irregular migrants from Africa could in fact be greater than the detection figures suggest. These groups of migrants might be more prone to try to enter Greece or Bulgaria undetected given that Greek measures also increased migrants' risk of repatriation if detected (see Section 2.2.2. Changes in *modus operandi*).




In addition, more detections occur further away from the border line itself, which could be another indication that a proportion of the flow might go undetected.

This notion of possibly undetected flows is somewhat corroborated by contributions from some AFIC partners (notably Ghana), who state that departing by air from Africa to Turkey is quite a popular option for those that

Figure 7. **Most of the countries in Africa are now eligible for Turkish e-visas**

Overview of 54 countries eligible for Turkish e-visas since June 2013



Source: Turkish Foreign Ministry, June 2013

can afford the trip (see Section 2.3. Changes in Africa – AFIC views).

Flying to Turkey became even more attractive after the Turkish authorities launched an e-visa system in June 2013 (see Fig. 7). The system covers a large proportion of the African continent, where Turkish Airlines is expanding its air connections to Istanbul (see map in Fig. 9).

This apparent easiness of travelling from Africa to Turkey by air is well illustrated by interviewed Ghanaian nationals in Bulgaria. They

claim that the Accra-Istanbul direct connection (daily flights since the beginning of 2013) makes the routing through Turkey very easy, relatively cheap (approx. EUR 700 for a return ticket) and much quicker compared to other traditional routes.



When it comes to migrants from North Africa, during the first six months of 2013, most false declarations of nationality by migrants

The non-disclosed passage contains an information on *modus operandi* of irregular migrants. Releasing it would hinder the effectiveness of future operations. It thus cannot be disclosed pursuant to the first indent of Art. 4(1)(a).





arriving in the Aegean Islands were associated with Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian nationals. They often claimed to be either Syrian nationals or stateless Palestinians in order to avoid possible repatriation. This means that the number of North Africans arriving in Greece from Turkey could be underestimated.

Finally, one additional indication of a possible undetected flow from Turkey is the fact that during 2013 detections of the two groups of African nationals increased significantly on the so-called Western Balkan route (see Fig. 8).

This route is used by irregular migrants who enter Greece illegally from Turkey and then move from Greece to those EU Member States where they actually want to settle (the so-called 'secondary movements'). Operational intelligence indicates that compared to using intra-Schengen flights or ferries, travelling overland through the Western Balkans is usually cheaper. This price difference is so important that some migrants whose destination is Italy prefer to travel through

the Western Balkans, which is a long detour (see box). In addition, changes in the asylum policy of Hungary acted as a pull factor (for all nationalities though).

Before August 2012, detections on the Western Balkan route had usually mirrored (with a short time lag) those made at the borders between Turkey and Greece, both in terms of size and composition (same nationalities with roughly the same relative shares).

This changed after August 2012 and detections of North Africans (AFIC North) and sub-Saharan Africans (AFIC Sub) rose dramatically in the Western Balkans (mostly at the Hungarian-Serbian border) during the first half of 2013 while dropping precipitously at the Turkish borders with the EU.

One possibility is that most of the African migrants detected in Hungary during 2013 had entered Greece prior to the Aspida operation's launching in August 2012 and only decided to move towards other EU Member States in 2013. While this is definitely the case for Pakistanis, no such reliable information exists for the two groups AFIC nationals. Therefore, the increase in detections at the Hungarian-Serbian border could be indirectly signalling that there is indeed an undetected flow of irregular migrants arriving from Turkey.

#### **Displacement hypothesis**

On the other hand, one equally plausible explanation behind the described changes could be the so-called 'waterbed effect' of the Aspida and Xenios Zeus operations.


The waterbed effect means that if additional or new measures are taken at one major entry point in the Mediterranean, the flows should shift to other entry points in response. The waterbed effect can cause a full displacement, that is to say a geographical shift equal in

#### **The Western Balkan route becomes more affordable**

Frontex Joint Debriefing Teams that are stationed in Bari (Italy) were able to interview several migrants who arrived at the asylum registration centre (CARA) in August 2013. Their statements suggest that they had taken the longer land route through Western Balkan countries when travelling from Greece to Italy instead of a much shorter maritime passage. The reason was the price difference between the two options. Namely, the land route cost them half the price (EUR 1 500-1 800) of the sea route (EUR 3 000).

Figure 8. **Detections of North Africans and sub-Saharan on the Western Balkan route (mostly the Hungarian-Serbian border) are growing rapidly while detections of the two groups on the Eastern Mediterranean route (mostly the Turkish borders to Greece and Bulgaria) saw a significant decline in 2013**

Detections of North Africans (AFIC North) and sub-Saharan (AFIC Sub) on the Western Balkan route (left-hand chart) and on the Eastern Mediterranean route (right-hand chart)



Source: FRAN data as of 1 September 2013

size and composition to the original flow, or – much more commonly – a partial displacement (geographical shift different in size and/or composition). There are many historical precedents that seem to point to the existence of such displacements.

As described earlier, there is no doubt that a partial displacement was registered in Greece and Bulgaria given that the detected flows from Turkey have shifted to Aegean Sea and the land border with Bulgaria.

Elsewhere in the Mediterranean the situation is not as clear. The analysis of detection data from other main entry points in the Mediterranean reveals that during the first half of 2013 detections doubled in the Central Mediterranean compared to the same period in 2012 while the numbers remain roughly the same in the case of the Western Mediterranean route (see Fig. 9).

Both observations need closer examination. In particular, what needs further attention is the apparent correlation of the drop in detections in Greece after the Aspida and Xenios Zeus operations in August 2012 and a subsequent increase in detections in Italy, Malta and Spain.

### Increase in the Central Mediterranean

The map in Figure 9 clearly indicates that sub-Saharan nationals in particular have started to re-emerge among detected nationalities in the south of Italy and Malta during 2013, most notably Gambians, Malians and Nigerians. Their number were 95% higher compared to same period in 2012 (see Annex Table 1 for details). However, by far the biggest group of detected migrants in Italy came from the Horn of Africa (Eritrea and Somalia).


This would suggest that Libya's importance as the last departure country grew exponentially during 2013. However, while one can identify a degree of correlation between the drop in the Eastern Mediterranean and the corresponding increase in the Central Mediterranean, there is no causal relationship between the two.

More precisely, the apparent reopening of the Central Mediterranean maritime route in 2013 has been facilitated by factors that have little or no connection to operational measures in Greece. These factors include: (a) rapid erosion of institutional capacity in Libya due to an ongoing political and



Figure 9. **Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing by North African and sub-Saharan nationals on major routes show a correlation between the drop in detections in Greece after the launching of the Aspida and Xenios Zeus operations in August 2013 and a subsequent increase in detections in Italy, Malta and Spain**

Main routes used by North AFIC, sub-Saharan AFIC country nationals and other irregular migrants to reach the EU with yearly totals (map) and monthly detections of AFIC country nationals on particular routes (graph) in 2012 and the first half of 2013





security crisis there; (b) progressive instability in Egypt; and (c) relatively low costs of travel from West Africa to Libya (see box).

Furthermore, the analysis of prevailing nationalities both on the Eastern Mediterranean route before August 2013 (Afghans, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis) and subsequent detentions in Italy and Malta (mostly migrants from the Horn of Africa, sub-Saharan and Egyptians) do not show any substantial overlap. The only notable exception to this rule is a recent appearance (July and August 2013) of Syrian migrants in the Central Mediterranean on boats that have departed from Egypt.\*

#### **Stable trend in the Western Mediterranean?**

FRAN data on detections of illegal border-crossing to Spain suggest a fairly stable trend in maritime arrivals from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

The Spanish authorities reported 490 detections of sub-Saharan migrants during the first half of 2013, compared with 475 detections during the corresponding period of 2012. The main sub-Saharan nationalities were Malians

#### **Travelling from West Africa to Libya on a budget**

Compared to other available options to reach the EU, the trip from West Africa to Tripoli was reported by migrants interviewed during the JO EPN Hermes 2013 as less costly, at about USD 1 000. One of the reasons for this relatively low cost is the fact that migrants from West African countries often make their own way to Agadez in Niger using available public transportation. Some claimed to have paid as little as USD 45 to get from Agadez to the Libyan border. Many reported to have taken their journey in stages, stopping over in different cities doing menial jobs to finance the next leg of their travel.

**Importantly, a large proportion of the total costs to reach Tripoli are allegedly associated with bribes paid to different uniformed officials in Libya. Some migrants even suggested that corrupt Libyan officials are directly involved in facilitating maritime departures towards Italy.**

or claimed Malians (see Chapter 3 on the Sahel and Mali) with a sharp increase in comparison with the corresponding period of the previous year (only 25), followed by Cameroonians and Guinea-Bissauans.

As regards North African migrants, the number of detections went clearly down to 618 in the first half of 2013 from 1 016 in the first half of 2012. All detected North Africans were Algerian (545) and Moroccan (73) nationals.

These numbers could lead to the conclusion that migratory pressure on the Western Mediterranean route remains relatively


\* At the beginning of 2013, UNHCR reported that ~15 000 Syrian refugees had asked for assistance whilst finding refuge in Egypt. A few months later the number of Syrians seeking help in Egypt rose dramatically to 95 578 registered refugees and 14 911 Syrians who are still awaiting registration. Egypt's introduction of a travel visa for Syrians was aimed at controlling and mitigating these influxes.



The non-disclosed elements contain sensitive information obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Member State(s). Its disclosure would harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.



The non-disclosed map reveals the operational area of the JO Indalo 2013. Its disclosure would undermine the operational and tactical features of future operations in the same area. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



modest. However, a more detailed analysis of FRAN dataset in combination with contributions from AFIC experts and other available sources (operational, JO EPN Indalo and Minerva 2013, open sources) allows for a different picture to emerge.

When FRAN data from Spain are broken down by border type (sea, land), it becomes im-

mediately evident that maritime detections of migrants arriving on boats from Morocco or Algeria in the first half of 2013 decreased by 36% compared to the same period in 2012. The decreasing trend, however, was not uniformly spread across different sections of the southern maritime border of Spain.

#### **Prevention of maritime crossings by Moroccan authorities reported in the media**

On 17 July 2013, Moroccan patrol vessel intercepted six small boats with 40 sub-Saharan migrants trying to cross illegally to Spain. During the first 17 days of July alone, Moroccan forces responsible for monitoring the Strait of Gibraltar intercepted nearly 200 African immigrants aboard more than twenty boats or small rafts.

The arrival of good weather meant that African immigrants were increasingly trying to reach the coast of Cadiz aboard small boats.



This shift is important since it is most likely caused by the combination of weather, sea currents and increased operational efforts by Moroccan and Spanish authorities, in addition to Frontex-coordinated operational activities held in the area (JO EPN Indalo 2013).

Due to increased operational measures, more migrants are using small inflatable boats without engines (see Section 2.2.2. Changes in *modus operandi*). These boats are much more affected by sea currents and prevailing winds

The non-disclosed text contains information related to the map above that was not disclosed. The reasoning for non-disclosure presented therein is applicable to the blanked text.

### Border fence in Melilla stormed by migrants

Only in one incident during September 2013, more than 300 migrants tried to cross the six-metre border fence in Melilla. Around 100 made it to the Spanish territory leaving at least six Spanish officers injured in the process. The event was recorded by security cameras.



This part contains information regarding the ongoing investigation. Its non-disclosure is thus justified by the third indent of Art. 4(2).

than bigger vessels. In 2013, the winds and the currents were primarily westward, which explains the shift towards the Cadiz region.



What is interesting is the fact that most incidents occur outside operational areas and are very often reported by Moroccan authorities.

In fact, Moroccan authorities are participating in the JO EPN Indalo 2013 for the first time by providing reports on detections of migrants detected en route to Spain. These reports suggest that the number of would-be migrants willing to depart from Morocco to Spain is far greater than FRAN data on arrivals in Spain would indicate.



All of these migrants were from sub-Saharan Africa, mostly from Senegal, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Cameroon.

The increased level of operational activity of Moroccan authorities both at sea and inland is also indicated by intelligence gathered from

migrants interviewed in the context of the JO EPN Indalo 2013. As a result, migrants are also considering other options to illegally enter Spain (see Section 2.2.2. Changes in *modus operandi*).

### Ceuta and Melilla

Moroccan and Spanish authorities report that a growing number of migrants were established in settlements near the Spanish enclave of Melilla during 2013. At the end of June, the government representative in Melilla, Abdelmalik El Barkani, said at a press conference that the migrants had attacked the fence 'very aggressively' and had thrown rocks at Moroccan security forces which, in addition to the Spanish Guardia Civil, detained migrants who had not yet made it to the city. There have been many sightings of sub-Saharan Africans close to the fence, according to the Spanish authorities.

In July 2013, attempts to cross the fence in Melilla have increased to such an extent that the Spanish authorities had to reinforce the number of police officers and supply additional equipment used for border surveillance. In addition, Spanish Government plans to upgrade the border fence with a mesh that prevents scaling attempts.


The non-disclosed text contains information related to the map above that was not disclosed. The reasoning for non-disclosure presented therein is applicable to the blanked text.

The non-disclosed text contains relevant information on border control activities implemented by a Third Country and obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Third Country. Its disclosure would harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.





The non-disclosed text contains information on irregular migration routes and *modus operandi* and was obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Third Country. Its disclosure may harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.



FRAN data from Spain clearly demonstrate this increased pressure at the land borders of Melilla and Ceuta (see Fig. 10). However, given the specific geographical circumstances of the two Spanish exclaves in Africa, Spain reports the nationality of migrants as unknown. Still, it is safe to assume that a large majority of migrants attempting to jump the fence in Melilla or Ceuta come from sub-Saharan Africa.

When preventions of maritime departures in Morocco and attempts to illegally enter Melilla and Ceuta are added to the overall numbers reported by Spain, it becomes clear that irregular migration pressure at

this route in 2013 is likely to be higher compared to 2012.

This increased pressure from sub-Saharan Africans could be linked to the so-called 'recidivism'. Moroccan authorities observe that many migrants are detected more than once, which means they make multiple attempts of illegal border-crossing towards the EU.

Namely, after detections for illegal border-crossing in Morocco, migrants that cannot be returned to their home countries, are driven to border areas with Algeria, however, many

The non-disclosed text refers to information obtained by intelligence on *modus operandi* used by migrants to circumvent border controls and its disclosure could harm the implementation of future operations aiming border control. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

come back to departure points around Nador, Ceuta and Melilla soon after and try their chances once more.

This is an indication of increased operational measures and also determination of many sub-Saharan migrants to eventually reach Europe. Therefore, the increases in migratory pressure might be predominately linked to the number of cases and not necessarily to the number of persons.

#### **No major displacement between the routes after all**

The analysis of nationalities detected on different routes reveals that there is a limited overlap between the prevailing nationalities, profiles of migrants and average duration of migration before detection. For example, migrants detected at maritime borders in the Central and Western Mediterranean tend to migrate in stages financing the next leg of their journey by working in temporary settlement countries such as Libya or Morocco. This 'pay-as-you-go' migratory strategy is quite distinct from migration strategies employed by migrants who use the option of air travel to Turkey.

Likewise, it is safe to assume that those transiting through Turkey tend to have more financial means at their disposal and can travel quicker to their intended destination in the EU. In addition, they are much more likely to be eligible for Turkish visas (and/or Schengen visas) than those who choose the land route. This point was clearly mentioned by the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In essence, the two flows are not complementary and remain quite distinct.

Combined, these observations should lead to a conclusion that the Aspida and Xenios Zeus operations have caused only partial displacement in the wider border region between Turkey and the EU and have significantly

impacted detections on the Western Balkan route (and other routes of the so-called secondary movements).

It is yet too early to assess if the two operations have significantly reduced the appeal of Turkey as one of the most important transit countries. Besides, indications from operational activities of Frontex and the input received from AFIC partners suggest that many migrants are simply waiting in Turkey for the end of the operations in Greece or are postponing their migration plans, hence not opting for other migratory routes.

#### **2.2.2. Changes in *modus operandi***

##### **Central Mediterranean**




In the Central Mediterranean, there are basically two types of arriving irregular migrants. Those that would like to avoid detection once in the EU and those actively seeking to be detected while still at sea. The main difference between the two groups is that the first one is often facing a very high repatriation risk if detected. This is particularly true for Egyptian nationals arriving illegally in Italy, as they are usually immediately returned to Egypt.





The non-disclosed figure refers to the information blanked in the previous page. For coherence purposes and in light of the justifications presented therein it is not disclosed.



When approaching the area of Calabria (southern Italy), migrants were transferred from the iron fishing vessel back to the wooden boat and sailed off north on their own unaccompanied by crew members, while the iron fishing boat left the area and turned south.

© Reuters and Italian Navy



Figure 13. **Migrants crammed onto a rubber dinghy as they are rescued by the Italian Navy close to Libyan shore about 180 miles off the southern coast of Lampedusa**

#### *Search and rescue (SAR) as a pull factor?*

The majority of migrants that are increasingly departing from Libya usually do not face immediate repatriation risk (if detected for illegal border-crossing). As stated before, these migrants mainly come from sub-Saharan Africa or from the Horn of Africa.



The non-disclosed map reveals the area of the Joint Operation Hermes 2013. Its disclosure would undermine the operational and tactical features of future Joint Operations in the same area. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



The non-disclosed text refers to information obtained by intelligence on *modus operandi* used by migrant smugglers in circumventing border control and its disclosure would undermine the adoption of future measures in border surveillance activity. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



The analysis of the geographical location of points where boats carrying migrants were detected during the JO EPN Hermes 2013 clearly confirms this pattern. Namely, migrants were increasingly detected closer and closer to Libyan shores. Furthermore, eight out of ten incidents during 2013 (involving more than 8 000 migrants up the end of August 2013), were the so-called 'Search and Rescue' (SAR) cases. This would indicate that calling for help and being taken to the nearest safe port in the EU (usually Lampedusa, Italy) is a part of a re-emerging *modus operandi* that was already in use in 2008 and 2009.

In one such incident, more than 200 migrants were rescued fairly close to Libyan shores. In fact, most of the incidents involving rescued migrants occurred south of the main operational area in the JO EPN Hermes 2013 (see Fig. 14).

Importantly, this method encourages facilitators to provide increasingly unseaworthy vessels to migrants. The practice, therefore, significantly increases the risk of loss of life for migrants, especially if the rescuers are not able to respond quickly enough, as demonstrated so tragically in early October 2013 when hundreds of migrants died in the waters close to Lampedusa.

### Western Mediterranean

#### *Use of small, toy boats still on the rise*

In response to more measures taken by different authorities in Spain and Morocco, mi-



© A. Carrasco Rágel (EFE)

Figure 15. **Small toy boats used by migrants rescued off the coast of Tarifa (Cadiz)**

grants who attempt to cross the 14-kilometre stretch from Tangier to Cadiz have been increasingly using smaller boats. These boats are very affordable, which makes them perfect for multiple attempts in case the first one is not successful. Furthermore, they are easy to buy and do not require an engine, fuel, compass or GPS devices to navigate.

In addition, such smaller boats can be hidden during transport to the place of departure. Their size also makes them perfect for departures from rocky beaches, which are usually not patrolled as frequently given that larger boats cannot depart from there. These boats are mostly used by Moroccans, Algerians, Chadians, Malians and Cameroonians.


Even though the boats are designed for three passengers, they are usually packed with up to ten people. They are unstable and migrants often need to be rescued.

#### **Spanish SAR as a pull factor?**

Spanish SAR area stretches southwards up to parallel 35.5°N. Spanish SAR vessels (SASEMAR) can therefore operate very close to the Moroccan coast. This makes them visible to the migrants waiting across the Strait of Gibraltar, and encourages them to attempt the crossing, knowing that they would be rescued.




The non-disclosed picture refers to the name of a participant in the Joint Operation. Its disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the person concerned and constitute the violation of EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. Thus, the information is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001.



These conclusions are corroborated by the location of some of the reported rescue incidents. Furthermore, open sources suggest that during the first half of 2013, Spanish SAR vessels rescued 340 migrants compared to 90 in the same period of 2012. In addition, several migrants were rescued while swimming in the sea without a boat in sight, probably due to the fact that the Spanish SAR assets were in their visual range. As in the case of Central Mediterranean, such behaviour significantly increases the risk of loss of life.

The non disclosed text refers to relevant information obtained by intelligence on modus operandi used for migrants smuggling. Its disclosure could undermine the implementation of future measures to counter this criminal activity during future border control operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



### ***Avoiding border control using wetsuits***

Operational intelligence from the JO Minerva 2013 suggests that migrants coming from Morocco to Spain might be increasingly using neoprene wetsuits to hide in water to avoid border checks in the main sea ports (see Fig. 17). Several would-be migrants were detected in the harbour of Tangiers hidden among the rocks. They carried their dry clothes in plastic bags with the intention to put them on upon boarding the ship clandestinely after border checks were concluded.

### **Eastern Mediterranean**

#### ***Change in modus operandi***

Migrants crossing the Greek-Turkish land border before the launch of the operation Aspida (August 2012) primarily used the services of facilitators to travel from Istanbul until they reached the border close to Edirne (Turkey). After crossing the border illegally on foot, they would report themselves to the Greek authorities. There was practically no detrimental effect of detection for them since they did not face repatriation risk and they were also issued an order to leave Greece, which allowed them to stay in this EU Member State for a maximum of 30 days. During this period, they usually travelled to Athens before planning further legs of the journey.




Source: JO Minerva 2013

Figure 17. **Wetsuit used while hiding in harbour waters to avoid border controls**

Figure 18. **ECOWAS free-movement protocols are still not fully implemented**

ECOWAS member countries with implemented visa-free regime, common travel certificate and committees for monitoring free movement of persons and vehicles. Countries marked with ECOWAS Brown Card logo have implemented the card, which covers third-party liability for injury, death and property damage caused by visiting motorists from other ECOWAS members



Once migrants cross the border, facilitators accompany them until they reach the main roads, where they are supposed to be picked up by other members of the facilitation network and transported to Athens. This change in *modus operandi* has led to an increase in the number of facilitators apprehended compared to previous years.

### 2.3. Changes in Africa – AFIC views

Intra-regional migratory movements of people and goods in West Africa are significantly larger compared to movements beyond the region itself (towards the EU, for example).


They are greatly facilitated by ECOWAS protocols on free movement and the fact that borders in this region remain extremely porous.

In comparison to Europe-bound migration, intra-regional movements are cheap, require much less planning and tend to be more circular. These differences, however, are narrowing somewhat with the increasing number of air connections from Africa and a growing importance of the internet as a source of information regarding migration (see box on social media and internet in West Africa).

However, further improvement of cross-border mobility of bona fide travellers and the prevention of irregular movements in the region remain major challenges. Firstly, while a lot of progress has been made in recent years, free movement of persons and goods within the ECOWAS sub-region has not yet been fully implemented (see Fig. 18).

The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information obtained by intelligence on *modus operandi* used for migrant smuggling, and its disclosure could undermine the implementation of measures to tackle this criminal activity in future joint operations at the external borders. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.





### Social media and internet lower the threshold for international migration

Several studies, using survey methods, indicate that social media and internet access facilitate international migration. Based on empirical findings, one study\* concludes that social media and growing internet penetration, (see map below showing mobile internet use in West Africa) are transforming migration networks and thereby lowering the threshold for migration.

While this is very difficult to measure empirically, the mentioned study suggests that migrants often make the 'go or postpone' decision based on information obtained through social media and the internet.

'This is the effect of the internet. People see the photos: the others are in Europe. You share the pictures, you want the whole world to see how you live, how good you are, and the others are asking themselves: 'Why not go to Europe?' – Cameroonian migrant, 28 years, male\*\*

In the case of migrant networks that are crucial in any migratory movement, for example, one author suggests\*\*\* that the information on upcoming rounds of legalisation, availability of informal jobs and accommodation, or illegal ways of crossing borders can spread very quickly, thus affecting migrants' migration strategies and lowering the costs and risks of migration. Social media and internet access can therefore be expected not only to strengthen people's ability to migrate, but also to feed their aspiration to migrate.

### Growing mobile internet penetration in West Africa

One recent study\*\*\*\* concluded that mobile internet penetration in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire has been growing at a phenomenal pace over the past five years (see map below). The study found that mobile subscriptions in all the three countries more than doubled between 2007 and 2011, with the combined total now standing at over 130 million.

\* Rianne Dekker and Godfried Engbersen, *How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration*, IMI Working Papers Series, Paper 64, November 2012

\*\* Myriam Cherti and Peter Grant, *The myth of transit: Sub-Saharan migration in Morocco*, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, June 2013


\*\*\* Frances Cairncross, *The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution is Changing Our Lives*, Harvard Business School Press 2001

\*\*\*\* An analysis of Mobile Technology in West Africa: The Case of Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, iHubResearch, October 2012



Figure 19. A truck or a bus from Lomé to Ouagadougou could get stopped 23 times on average (not counting regular BCPs): 14 times in Togo (746 km) and 9 times in Burkina Faso (276 km)

Map illustrating the extent of the problem of road checkpoints in West Africa



Source: UEMOA, May 2013

AFIC experts mentioned that issues such as language divides, boundary disputes between ECOWAS states, inconvertible currencies and rising domestic unemployment levels have all contributed to the current lack of political will to proceed with its full implementation.

Secondly, intra-regional movements are also negatively impacted by different illegitimate checkpoints, causing delays, cost increases and major frustration for travellers on primary transport corridors in West Africa.

According to the 22<sup>nd</sup> Road Governance Report (UEMOA, May 2013\*), the overall number of road checkpoints in the region that are not in accordance with UEMOA directive\*\* saw a slight decline during the last quarter of 2012 compared to the three months before. However, important disparities were observed. For example, while Abidjan-Bamako is the fastest transport corridor with an average of less than one road checkpoint per every 100 km,

travelling between Bamako and Ouagadougou one can expect to be stopped about three times over the same distance.

The map above (see Fig. 19) clearly demonstrates the extensive nature of this problem that is affecting all major transport corridors in the region. The mentioned report also states that bribe payments remain stable in the region regardless of the slight reduction

\* The Road Governance initiative on primary trade corridors is a joint effort of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) further to a decision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS/CEDEAO) to establish, among others, observatories of abnormal practices in the region. This initiative was implemented in 2005 with technical and financial assistance from the USAID West Africa Trade Hub.

\*\* UEMOA directive 15/2005/CM/UEMOA

The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information obtained by intelligence on *modus operandi* used for migrant smuggling, and its disclosure could undermine the implementation of measures to tackle this criminal activity in future joint operations at the external borders. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



### **Democratic Republic of the Congo: principal migratory routes towards the EU**

#### **Air route**

The international airports of Djili (Kinshasa), Luano (Lubumbashi), Bangboka (Kisangani) and Gumed in North-Kivu are the principal exit points of the DRC nationals departing towards the EU or Turkey.

The airport of Kinshasa is directly connected to several European and African capitals by Brussels Airlines, Air France, Turkish Airlines, Royal Air Maroc, Ethiopian Airlines, South African Airways and Kenya Airways. In turn, the flights departing from airports in the interior of the country, are used by migrants from the neighbouring countries.

#### **Land route**

The DRC has a border with nine countries and has quite a number of border crossing points. This results in an intense movement of people across the border in both directions. Some migrants use this route on their way towards Europe.

#### **Countries with special relations with EU Member States**

There are countries in Africa which enjoy special relationship (due to historical or economic reasons) with some EU Member States. DRC migrants are aware of these relations and use these 'privileged' countries to try to get to Europe.

#### **Transit through North Africa**

The travellers who have not met the conditions to obtain a visa to travel to the EU or Turkey in their home country often move to North African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya), where they settle and wait for their chance to cross on boats and reach the EU.

itime routes to land-based routes. While in the past most of the irregular flow was exiting the Gambia towards Senegal and further on towards the Canary Islands by sea, it has now shifted towards the land route across Senegal, Mali and further on towards Libya and/or Algeria and Morocco.

This observation is consistent with available operational data and is further corroborated with statements made by migrants interviewed already in the EU.

#### **■ Niger**

Information provided by Niger somewhat confirms migrants' description of the route transiting through Niger towards Libya.

According to authorities in Niger, migrants travel to Agadez mainly on public buses. From Agadez onwards, those who have passports continue towards official BCPs while undocumented migrants use irregular routes. For the migrants without valid documents, there are well organised facilitation services available in Agadez. From Agadez the journey continues to Libya on the route Dirkou/Gatroun/Sabha and from Sabha either to Tripoli or Benghazi. The migrants are usually transported in smaller vehicles, such as pick-up trucks. The desert areas at the border with Libya are highly difficult to control and, according to Niger, the

in the overall number of illegitimate road checkpoints. Given the high average number, Bamako-Ouagadougou was the most bribe-intensive corridor over the past four quarters.

#### **Main changes in irregular migration routes (location, *modi operandi*) in comparison with 2012**

#### **■ The Gambia**

By far the most significant change reported by the Gambia is linked to a shift from mar-

Source: Nigeria's representative in AFIC



Figure 20. **Illela border control post between Nigeria and Niger**

The non-disclosed text contains information obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Third Country, its disclosure would undermine the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.

level of control by Libyan authorities is currently not high.

#### ■ Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

There seem to be no major changes in the main overland routes of irregular migration from DRC towards Europe. According to DRC authorities, the only notable exception to this general rule is the growing appeal of the air route connecting West Africa to Turkey and further on to Greece (see box for details).

No noticeable changes have been reported as regards irregular migration directly affecting the DRC. A large proportion of this flow (estimated 70%) originates in neighbouring Congo (Brazzaville). Once in the DRC, Congolese migrants obtain false DRC documents and try to use them to enter Angola. According to DRC authorities some of the transiting migrants on their way to Angola work in the diamond mines to get funds for another leg of their journey.

#### ■ Morocco

From the Moroccan point of view the main area of illegal border-crossing is the eastern border of the country with Algeria.

A new trend identified by Morocco is the increase in Syrian nationals arriving from Algeria. This route is chosen mainly because of the visa-free regime between Syria and Algeria, which makes it possible for Syrian nationals to reach Moroccan borders via Algeria fairly easily. Most Syrians are believed to be staying with their relatives in Morocco.



Source: Moroccan authorities

Figure 21. Moroccan authorities confirm the increased use of 'toy boats': this photo shows a typical case detected in June 2013 which involved migrants using small inflatable toys and wooden paddles to try to cross the Strait of Gibraltar

While these phenomena may be indicating future changes in nationalities using the Western Mediterranean route, there were no detections of Syrian, Iraqi or Pakistani nationals on this route in the first half of 2013. However, as is the case for the Central Mediterranean, where a growing number of Syrian nationals are departing from Egypt towards Italy, Syrians can soon become a more commonly detected nationality on the route between Morocco and Spain.

#### ■ Nigeria

The Nigerian community of illegal migrants in Morocco is organised along ethnic lines. The community is composed of Yoruba, Igbo, Edo, Afe-Esan and Aniome groups and is plagued by strife, rivalry and violent infightings.

Nigerian authorities reported that travelling from Nigeria to Morocco often starts from Kano, Sokoto or Kastina in the northern part of Nigeria, from where would-be migrants continue to Niger.

The non-disclosed text contains information on recent trends for migrant smuggling and was obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Third Country. Its disclosure would undermine the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.

The non-disclosed text contains information on *modus operandi* used by migrant smugglers in a Third Country and was obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Third Country. Its disclosure may harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.





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Source: Nigerian authorities

Figure 22. **An abandoned farm house where Nigerian illegal migrants take refuge in Morocco**



Information from Nigerian authorities suggests that Nigerian migrants often solicit services from Moroccan nationals, colloquially called 'Arabos', for maritime crossings towards Spain (EUR 1 200–1 300 per person). *Arabos* also facilitate Western Union transfers and take up to 30% commissions for their services.

#### ■ Ghana

There are some indications that more would-be irregular migrants opt for the air route linking Ghana with Turkey (going towards Greece); however, the actual size of this flow remains unknown and therefore difficult to compare to other routes.

These observations are very consistent with the previously described developments in Bulgaria, where Ghanaian nationals are becoming the main sub-Saharan nationality detected for illegal border-crossing from Turkey.



Authorities from Ghana note that destinations in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain) have recently become attractive for would-be migrants from Ghana. This development is quite curious since it further points to effects of the ever-expanding air travel options in Africa.

In terms of traditional land-based routes, Ghanaian authorities point out to a relocation of the irregular flow towards North Africa and further on towards the EU. Namely, they are now observing that the main smuggling route has diverted from the northern border (Ghana/Burkina Faso/Mali/Algeria or Libya) to Ghana's eastern frontiers (Ghana/Togo/Benin /Niger/Libya).



These observations are also supported by statements by Ghanaians who are regularly repatriated from Benin (through the Aflao border post at the border with Togo). All these migrants were trying to reach Libya. They use foot paths to cross during the night to Togo through the eastern border in Aflao area.

#### ■ Cameroon

There is a growing concern in Cameroon regarding irregular movements of mostly West African migrants trying to illegally migrate to the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, all of which are countries of the



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Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).

These migrants first go to Mali, where they procure Malian travel documents given that Cameroon and Mali have a bilateral agreement on freedom of movement (Cameroon is not a member of ECOWAS). They then enter Cameroon, predominately from Nigeria. Once in Cameroon, a great proportion of them try to go Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.

Many migrants also engage in a rather dangerous maritime crossing from Nigeria or Benin to Gabon. There were several tragic incidents reported during 2013. At least 45 migrants from Benin, Nigeria and Burkina Faso died in one such incident when their boat sank off the Nigerian coast.

#### ■ Guinea

During 2013, authorities in Guinea detected cases of migrants



A second method, also discovered in 2013, consists in buying two plane tickets with two different identities. One for the route Conakry/Casablanca/Conakry and the second for Casablanca/Paris or Madrid or Lisbon.



Figure 23. Aflao border-crossing point at the Ghanaian-Togolese border

#### **Gabon and Equatorial Guinea as destination countries for economic migrants from West Africa**

Gabon is likely one of the most politically stable countries in the immediate region. Its economy is largely dependent on the oil sector and is predicted to grow robustly from 2013 onwards.

Gabon's economic growth is underpinned by strong capital investment in the construction of the country's first special economic zone and other infrastructure. These projects are likely to attract more migrants from West Africa to Gabon in the future.

Having declined steadily for a number of years, oil production in Equatorial Guinea is once more on an upward trajectory. The government is also focusing on large infrastructure projects, including the construction of Oyala, the new capital city. This means that the construction sector will remain robust and attractive to would-be migrants from West Africa.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit



## 3. Situation in the Sahel – impact of the Mali crisis on regional border security and movements of migrants

### 3.1. Introduction

The Sahel region is one of the poorest regions of the world. It faces simultaneously the challenges of extreme poverty, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, violent extremism and radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats.

The ongoing Mali crisis, which has resulted in the significant number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Mali and a large exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries, only adds to the sense of convergence of multiple crises in the Sahel.

The infographic in Fig. 25 clearly depicts a vast and overarching humanitarian emergency that the entire Sahel region is facing. It also gives an indication of irregular migratory movements from the region towards the EU (analysed separately in Section 3.3. below).



Figure 24. Some of the 50 000 Malian refugees in Niger live in Tabareybarey camp


### 3.2. Security concerns for the Sahel – AFIC views

The crisis in Mali has put the wider Sahel region at risk of destabilisation and insecurity due to a possible dispersal of terrorist and/or separatist movements beyond Mali into areas where government control is limited. Furthermore, as clearly mentioned by Niger during the first AFIC conference in Warsaw, the situation is further complicated by the cumulative effect of highly volatile situation in Libya and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

All AFIC experts clearly emphasise that the affected countries have taken the possible spill-over from Mali very seriously and have devoted a lot of efforts to secure their borders with this country.

Mauritania's measures are a typical example of responses of all regional governments. Mauritania started to crack down on terrorist sympathisers and stepped up its border patrols after the January 2013 military intervention in Mali. More precisely, Mauritanian border guards and gendarmes instigated more frequent night patrols along their border with Mali in order to prevent infiltrations and check arriving Malian nationals to make sure that terrorists are not posing as refugees. Mauritanian army units completed their deployment along the country's border with Mali to help border guards and gendarmes secure the area.

Figure 25. Sahel and Mali crises in numbers



\* UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), FRAN data as of 25 August 2013

\*\* Refusals of entry at air borders

Notes: 2012 refers to January–June 2012, 2013 refers to January–June 2013





The non-disclosed text contains information on border control activities implemented by a Third Country and was obtained via bilateral cooperation with that Third Country. Its disclosure may harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.



Figure 26. **Mauritanian army and gendarmerie securing the border with Mali**

The government of Mauritania is also actively promoting enhanced regional border management and, in this regard, hosted an African Union ministerial conference on security cooperation in the Sahel-Sahara region on 17 March 2013. In August 2013, Niger and Mauritania also signed a military cooperation agreement, aimed at containing the spread of terrorism in the region.

In Burkina Faso, the military enhanced air surveillance of the country's 1 000-kilometre-long border with Mali and efforts were made to ensure that militants were not posing as Malian refugees given that the flow of refugees to Burkina Faso was quite large.



Still, many AFIC experts stress that these valid and very important efforts should be seen in the context of the region's geography and resource realities. More precisely, there is a significant gap between the required resources



Figure 27. **Seme border control post between Nigeria and Benin**

to properly secure regional borders and those that are actually available.

A case in point is the situation of Niger's Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST), responsible for the management of national borders as well as the elaboration and application of regulations in the field of movement of persons (entry, exit, internal and international migration, refugees, trafficking in human beings, etc.).



Furthermore, unofficial border-crossing points in the region vastly outnumber the official ones. For example, information provided by Benin clearly suggests that for every official border-crossing there are at least 10 unofficial ones. In the case of the border between Benin and Niger there are three official and at least 36 unofficial border-crossing points. Likewise, Guinea reports that while there are altogether 18 official border-crossing points at their land borders, the number of unofficial crossing points is so large that it cannot even be estimated.



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Severe deficiency of means to perform border patrolling is of course not new and was highlighted by many other AFIC experts.



In addition to these capacity problems, AFIC experts also stress that, apart from some notable exemptions (see box on regional cooperation), new border security measures are often taken in isolation and are not well coordinated or communicated.

#### **Imported violent extremist actions remain a significant threat to the entire region**

The entire region remains vulnerable to imported violent extremist actions, as demonstrated by a series of attacks in Niger in May of 2013. Two suicide bombers struck the Agadez military base and a plant in Arlit run by the French nuclear group Areva. The attacks were the first in Niger since a France-led offensive, also involving the Nigerien army, began in January 2013 aiming to push back extremist rebels in neighbouring Mali.

These attacks show that while militants' capability has been considerably degraded since the military intervention in January 2013, they still pose a considerable security threat.

#### **Libyan crisis is not over**

AFIC experts were almost unanimous in stating that the Libyan crisis still has a significant impact on the security of the wider Sahel region, primarily through proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW\*), unmanageable return migration of many sub-Saharan nationals and a growing vulnerability

#### **Attempts to enhance regional cooperation**

Four countries of the Sahel, namely, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, have established two mechanisms aimed at addressing transnational threats and enhancing intelligence cooperation: a common operational joint chiefs of staff committee located in Tamanrasset, Algeria, and a unified fusion and liaison cell. However, those mechanisms still need to become fully operational.

The UN Secretary-General believes that regional security, regional development cooperation and greater regional integration can only be achieved in close cooperation with the African Union, ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, CILSS, the Arab-Maghreb Union and other relevant subregional actors.

Source: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region, 14 June 2013

of Libyan southern borders with Chad, Algeria, Sudan and Niger.

The continuing insecurity in southern Libya, especially in the vast area bordering Algeria and Niger, is believed to be a possible safe haven for terrorists in the region. In fact, the recent (August 2013) merger of violent criminal groups from the Sahel region\*\* shows that militants may now be using south west Libya (border area between Libya, Niger and Chad) as a base for their Saharan activity. If true, this in turn could impact traditional migratory route from Niger to Libya in the future.

Furthermore, the ongoing bomb attacks against police and military installations plus Justice Ministry's offices and courthouses, could be interpreted as an important challenge to the transitional authorities in Libya. Moreover, a number of prison breaks in Benghazi, Sebha and Tripoli further underline Libyan institutional weaknesses and challenges ahead regarding border and migration management, internal security and regional cooperation.

Proliferation of SALW is also affecting countries beyond the Sahel, such as Sierra Leone

\* According to the UN, small arms are personal weapons that can be operated by only one person. They usually include revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, submachine guns and light machine guns. A light weapon refers to heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable launchers of antitank and anti-aircraft missile system, and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre

\*\* Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Signataires par le sang (also known as the Masked Men Brigade) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), both being offshoot of al-Qaaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have formed a united group calling itself al Mourabitoune (or Les Almoravides in French).



© Bourima Hama/AFP/Getty Images



Figure 28. **A Nigerien soldier walks near a piece of wreckage from the 23 May attack on an army base in Agadez**

where armed robberies (using arms originally from Libya) have increased significantly. Similarly, Cameroon reports an increase in heavily armed groups coming by sea and using weapons originally from Libya. Likewise, armed militias in Plato state (Nigeria) are believed to be using arms from Libya.

#### **Mali: Signs of normalisation and relative stability**

Several AFIC experts from the neighbouring countries (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire) assessed that the situation in Mali is slowly normalising regardless of the fact that the country is still facing many challenges.

In June 2013, the government of Mali signed a peace agreement with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. This development officially marked the end of the conflict that began with a coup d'état in March 2012, followed by Tuareg rebels and extremists occupying Mali's desert north.

As a sign of this new relative stability in Mali, the presidential elections, organised in July and August of 2013, were conducted in a credible and transparent manner without any major security incidents.

Mali also started to offer cash incentives to prompt public servants to return to the northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Around 300 government workers are eligible for one-off grant of USD 500. The offer will expire in October 2013. The workers will be paid once they report to duty and are registered. France has offered to support this scheme.

#### **Reviving the economy in Gao and Timbuktu should lead to more refugees returning home**

Health, education, agriculture, housing and security service have been re-established in Gao and Timbuktu. Banks, tax and customs departments are expected to resume operations by the end of 2013.

In response to the improving situation, Malians are slowly returning from neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. More than 8 000 people who returned on their own were registered between 25 June and 12 July in Mali's Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in

#### **EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya**

**In May 2013, the Council of the EU gave the green light for EUBAM Libya, a new mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country's borders. This civilian mission responds to an invitation by Libya and is part of the EU's comprehensive approach, a strategy to support the Libyan post-conflict reconstruction.**

Mali, this was the most significant number of returnees since reports emerged of first spontaneous returns.

In Mauritania, authorities are working with the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to finalise plans to help Malian nationals staying in refugee camps near Fasalala to return home. The first contingent of 30 families returned from Mauritania to suburbs of Timbuktu and Goundam in Mali during July 2013.

#### International efforts to stabilise Mali

The 12 600-strong UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilisation of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap. The main focus will be put on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of state authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections. Most of AFIC partner countries are contributing military personnel to the mission.

Complementing the UN's efforts, the EU has allocated over EUR 660 million to the region under the 10th European Development Fund (2007–2013). In the framework of its Sahel strategy, the EU has further mobilised additional financial resources for development and security-related projects worth EUR 167 million.

In the framework of the Strategy, the EU also launched a civilian CSDP\* mission 'EUCAP SAHEL Niger' in July 2012 in order to contribute to the fight against crime and terrorism in Niger, Mali and in the whole region. The mission was launched at the request of Niger's government in the summer of 2012. Li-



Figure 29. **Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won Mali's presidential election after his rival Soumaila Cisse conceded defeat in a runoff vote. Observers declared the poll to be 'credible and transparent'**

aision Officers were deployed to Nouakchott (Mauritania) and Bamako (Mali).

In February 2013, the EU decided to launch the EU military Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) for a 15-month mandate. More than 200 instructors from 22 EU Member States were deployed. In addition, the EU provided immediate support of EUR 20 million to early recovery, restoration of state authority and basic services in Mali already in February 2013. Development aid will resume gradually and some EUR 250 million have been mobilised for this purpose.

### 3.3. Impact of the Sahel's humanitarian emergencies and the Mali crisis on migratory flows towards the EU

When compared to other migration flows that affect the external borders of the EU, irregular migratory flows stemming out of the recent Mali crisis and the ongoing humanitarian emergencies in the Sahel region are relatively low in volume. In terms of illegal border-crossings, all nationals of countries of

\* Common Security and Defence Policy



**MINUSMA in figures**

**Current strength (31 July 2013):** 6 294 total uniformed personnel, 5 494 military personnel, 800 police officers (including formed units).

**Countries contributing military personnel:** Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Togo, the UK and the United States.

**Countries contributing police personnel:** Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, France, Germany, Guinea, Italy, Jordan, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and the United States.



© Blagole Grujic

**Figure 30. The July 2013 ceremony in Bamako (Mali) marked the transfer of authority from the forces of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). A MINUSMA peacekeeper, wearing his new blue beret, poses with the Malian Republican Guard**

the Sahel region combined amounted to 2% of the total EU for this particular indicator in the first half of 2012. This is largely due to the existence of several limiting factors such as:

- high prices of facilitation in relation to purchasing power;
- long distances between Mali and the EU; and
- significantly enhanced border security in Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania.

Most of the migratory movements are therefore limited to the immediate region itself. To demonstrate this point one only needs to compare more than half a million of Malian registered refugees in the region and less than 3 000 asylum applications by Malians in the EU during the first half of 2013.

However, as shown in Figure 25, Malian nationals, in particular or those declaring themselves as Malians (see box on nationality swapping), have been detected in increasing numbers in a variety of indicators designed to measure irregular migration pressure affecting the external borders of the EU.

For example, compared to the same period in 2012, there was a sevenfold (631%) increase in the overall number of asylum applications made by Malians in the EU during the first six months of 2013. Malians were largely targeting Spain and, to lesser extent, also Germany and Italy. The most significant increases occurred after the military intervention started in January 2013. On the other hand, no such massive spikes in asylum intake were observed after the March 2012 coup d'état and subsequent takeover of the north by the militants (see Fig. 31).

One factor possibly explaining the unprecedented rise in asylum applications could be linked to attempts by Malian nationals with prior illegal stay in the EU to legalise their stay. Namely, Malians who are residing illegally in the EU could increasingly submit *sur place*\* asylum applications in several EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries.


Other indicators, such as detections of illegal stay in the EU, fraudulent document use on entry into the EU and detections of illegal border-crossing, also showed a similar increasing

\* A 'refugee *sur place*' is someone who falls within the Geneva Convention's definition of a refugee some time after they left their home country. This means, for instance, a person already outside their country of origin when a change of circumstances occurs in their home country which gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.



Figure 31. **Monthly levels of EU migration indicators for Malians only started to pick after the launching of the French military operation in January 2013**

Monthly levels of several migration-related indicators for Malian nationals detected in the EU against important events (numbers indicate the highest values)



Source: FRAN data as of 28 August 2013



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### 'Nationality swapping' linked to claimed Malians



Mauritanian border control authorities encounter such cases on daily bases. They are able to detect them through profiling and interviews. Most of the fraudulent users of Malian documents speak different dialects than Malian nationals and are also reluctant to cooperate when asked about their origins.



This type of abuse of genuine Malian documents should also be considered when arrivals to the EU are concerned. A recent return case (from France to Niger), reported by Nigerien authorities, clearly indicates that migrants are using fraudulently obtained Malian documents to pose as Malian nationals once in the EU. In the mentioned case, a migrant from Niger was claiming asylum in France as Malian. The French authorities were able to identify his real nationality and have subsequently returned the person to Niger.



Fraudulently obtained genuine documents from Mali reported by Mauritania

During the first half of 2012, detections of illegal border-crossing by Malian nationals at the external borders of the EU remain fairly modest (below 50 per month) and largely concentrated at the Greek land border with Turkey. This changed after the Greek authorities started to implement the Aspida operation in August 2012 (explained in Section 2.2.1, discussing changes in routing). Almost immediately, the flow of Malians and other nationalities shifted towards the Bulgarian-Turkish land border. Malian nationals also started to use sea routes to reach southern Spain and Italy in the Central Mediterranean.

The detections of Malian nationals in Bulgaria have to be taken with some reservation given that screening activities in the context of Frontex JO Poseidon Land in Bulgaria revealed cases of false declaration of nationality involving persons claiming Malian nationality. In fact, by claiming asylum as Malians they hope to be transferred to open asylum centres, where they receive accommodation and food. As they know they are not entitled to humanitarian protection, claiming Malian nationality also serves to prolong the entire procedure.


Combined with information coming from AFIC partner countries (see box on nationality swapping), this would indicate that the flow of genuine Malians might in fact be overestimated.

As indicated by Figure 32, this maritime flow intensified particularly in the Central Mediterranean (departures from Libya and arrivals in Italy). However, available data do not indicate any meaningful correlation between the events in Mali and subsequent arrivals at the external borders of the EU. Malians seem to show the same trend as other sub-Saharan migrants departing from Libya. This clearly suggests that the underlying reasons of the increased Malian flows are driven by considerations beyond the actual conflict in

pattern in 2013. The latter indicator is particularly interesting since it provides some clarity on the actual routing and its changes.

Figure 32. **Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing of Malian nationals show a shift towards the Central Mediterranean**


Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing of Malian nationals by border section in 2012 and 2013



Source: FRAN data as of 28 August 2013



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the country (e.g. re-emergence of facilitation networks and deteriorating institutional capacity in Libya) and are also not linked to the measures taken in Greece.

In conclusion, there is a high likelihood that more francophone Africans will falsely declare themselves as Malians when detected for illegal-border crossing across the wider Mediterranean region. Ascertaining the correct country of origin of irregular migrants will therefore remain a significant challenge for border control authorities in Morocco and EU Member States.

When compared to other nationalities, Malian nationals are likely to remain a relatively small group. Migration towards the EU will continue to be largely governed by factors beyond the situation in Mali (see box).



## 4. Document fraud

### 4.1. AFIC nationalities and document fraud

Over the last year, which amounts to the periods of Q3 2012 to Q2 2013 (see Fig. 33, grey arrow), there were just over 1 800 detections of AFIC nationals using fraudulent documents to enter the EU/Schengen area from a third country. This figure was split between 650 or so detections of migrants from the North AFIC countries and 1 200 detections of migrants from sub-Saharan AFIC countries.\*

The number of detections has remained reasonably stable since the beginning of 2011. Figure 33 shows the number of detections per quarter of AFIC nationals (bars) and all other nationalities combined (line). There is some evidence for some seasonal variation in detections of AFIC nationals using fraud-

ulent documents, with detections increasing from a low point in the second quarter of each year to peak in the first quarter of the following year. In contrast there has been an increase in detections of other nationalities since the end of 2011 mostly related to changes in *modi operandi* in response to increased operational activity at the land border from August 2012.

On average, AFIC nationals were detected with fraudulent documents more frequently than would be expected based on their relative frequencies. Specifically the figure of 1 800 detections amounted to just over a fifth (22%) of all detections during the reporting period, despite the fact that AFIC countries (n=22) only represent 9% of all countries\*\* and AFIC nationals amount to just 8.4% of the global population.

\* Please note the distinction between North AFIC and sub-Saharan AFIC countries is made for purely analytical purposes to facilitate the recognition and analysis of different migration patterns in North and sub-Saharan Africa.

\*\* ISO 3166-1

Figure 33. **Detections of AFIC nationals using fraudulent documents to attempt entry to the Schengen area/EU have remained relatively stable over the last two years, with some evidence for a seasonal trend**

Detections of AFIC nationals using fraudulent documents on entry at the external border from third countries, by quarter (bars, left-hand scale) and total detections for all other nationalities combined (line, right-hand scale), with the grey arrow indicating the current reporting period




Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 September 2013



Figure 34. **Compared to other nationalities, migrants from sub-Saharan AFIC countries were proportionally more likely to be detected with fraudulent documents than other nationalities**

Refusals of entry, detections of illegal-border crossing and detections of document fraud by North AFIC and sub-Saharan AFIC nationalities and other nationalities in the last four quarters



Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 September 2013

\* Regular passenger flow would shed more light on these tendencies.

An analytically useful question is 'Do AFIC nationals prefer document fraud over other methods of illegal entry to the Schengen area/EU?' To answer such a question, it is possible to compare AFIC nationals with other nationalities in terms of the proportion of detections of each nationality that are made at BCPs (document fraud, refusals of entry) compared with the proportion made between BCPs (illegal border crossing). Figure 34 shows three categories of nationality (AFIC North, AFIC sub-Saharan, and Others), together with the proportions of detections of document fraud, illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry. Comparison of the different proportions can shed light on the preferred (or at least the most detected) *modus operandi* for illegally entering the EU, by nationality type. A much higher proportion of AFIC nationals from sub-Saharan countries were detected with fraudulent documents (24%) compared to both AFIC nationals from North African counties (13%), and all other nationalities combined (11%). This might suggest that document fraud is a more preferred *modus operandi* for

sub-Saharan migrants, or at least that travellers from sub-Saharan countries are proportionally more likely to be detected with document fraud.\*

Similarly, both categories of AFIC nationals were proportionally more frequently detected illegally crossing the external border between BCPs (48% and 45%) than were all other nationalities combined (33%), suggesting that illegally crossing the external border between BCPs may be a preferred *modus operandi* for AFIC nationalities, at least compared to other nationalities.


In contrast, AFIC nationals were proportionally less likely to be refused entry compared to all other nationalities combined. This effect is slightly harder to explain but may be related to the fact that, given the high expense and long distance travelled particularly by sub-Saharans before reaching the EU, these migrants tend to ensure that they can fulfil all entry requirements before they begin their journey; clearly a refusal of entry is more costly to a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo than to a national of Ukraine or Albania.

More Nigerians and Moroccans were detected than any other AFIC nationality, with Nigerians almost exclusively detected at the air border but at a wide range of EU airports, and Moroccans were detected at all three border types. Figure 35 shows detections of each AFIC nationality (bars) with the proportions detected at each border type, and also the percentage change in detections compared to the previous reporting period (dashes). Tunisians, and to a lesser extent Algerians were the only other nationalities to be detected at the sea border in any significant numbers.

Migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo represented a special case, as many were detected at the land border

Figure 35. **In the first six months of 2013 AFIC nationalities were most commonly detected at the external air border (light-blue bar), and most were increasingly detected compared to 2012 (dashes)**

Detections of AFIC country nationals using fraudulent documents at the sea, land and air border (bars) in the first half of 2013 compared to 2012 levels (dashes)



Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 September 2013

despite this country not bordering with the EU – most detections at the land border were reported by Slovakia, presumably of migrants entering from Ukraine. In 2012 migrants from the DRC were detected at the Latvian land border with the Russian Federation in very significant numbers but this flow has subsided in recent reporting periods.

During the first six months of 2013, the top three most detected AFIC nationalities were detected in similar or lower numbers than during the same period in 2012 (see Fig. 35). While most of the remaining nationalities were increasingly detected using fraudulent documents, particularly migrants from Togo (163%), Guinea (132%) and the Gambia (130%).

## 4.2. Detection points


Detections of migrants using fraudulent documents are made at land, sea or air BCPs and nationalities tend to vary in the extent to which their detections are distributed among these border types. For example, of all detections of non-AFIC migrants with fraudulent documents, nearly two-thirds tend to be detected at airports (63%), followed by just over a third detected at the land border (see Fig. 36 overleaf). As far as non-AFIC migrants are concerned, sea BCPs are rarely targeted with fraudulent documents.

Data exchanged within the EDF-RAN and illustrated in Figure 36 suggest that AFIC migrants from sub-Saharan countries targeted the air border much more often than other categories of nationality (94%), and also that AFIC migrants from North African



**Figure 36. Compared to other nationalities, AFIC migrants from sub-Saharan countries were proportionally more commonly detected with fraudulent documents at the air border compared to other border types, whereas AFIC migrants from North African countries were more commonly detected at sea BCPs**

Detections of North AFIC and sub-Saharan AFIC nationals and other nationalities using fraudulent documents at sea, land and air border BCPs in the last four quarters



Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 September 2013

countries targeted the sea border much more commonly than other categories of migrant (22%). This is explained by the long-distance migration undertaken by sub-Saharan nationalities and by the proximity of North African countries to the sea border of the EU. Overall, AFIC migrants were detected proportionately much less frequently at the land borders than non-AFIC migrants.

Between Q3 2012 and Q2 2013 Italy detected the most AFIC nationals using fraudulent documents on entry at the external border, closely followed by Spain and then France. However there was considerable variation in the distribution of detections of travellers from AFIC north and sub-Saharan countries among EU Member States. Figure 37 shows how detections of AFIC nationals were distributed among Member States, with travellers from AFIC north countries being detected almost exclusively by Italy (air border) and Spain (air, land and sea borders), while sub-Saharan nationalities were detected in lower numbers across a wider range of EU Member States (air border).

Detections of travellers from the AFIC North countries were mostly reported from the Italian air border (with very few detections being at the Italian sea border) and from the Spanish sea border mostly at Ceuta and Melilla (see Fig. 37, left panel). In fact, more than 60% of all detections of migrants from the north AFIC countries were reported from the Italian air border or the Spanish sea border.

Detections of travellers from the sub-Saharan countries were almost exclusive reported from the air borders of France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and the UK as shown in Figure 37 (right panel).

#### INTERPOL launches new technology to detect fraudulent travel documents



A new police tool has been launched by INTERPOL and the G8, enabling the INTERPOL community to exchange information on fraudulent identity and travel documents. Known as Dial-Doc (Digital INTERPOL Alert Library – Document), the technology makes it easy for officials in any of INTERPOL's 190

member countries to check if a travel document is fake, through comparison with worldwide images of counterfeit documents.

Dial-Doc will play a central role in the swift provision of information to law-enforcement agencies, particularly in the fields of border management and the fight against identity fraud, human trafficking, terrorism, and financial crime.


Up until now, INTERPOL member countries have circulated their own 'alerts' relating to fraudulent travel documents. Dial-Doc is the data processing platform which regulates this information and makes it accessible to all INTERPOL member countries in a user-friendly manner.

Source: [interpol.int](http://interpol.int)



Figure 37. **AFIC north nationalities were mostly detected in Spain and Italy (left), detections of AFIC sub-Saharan nationalities were more equally distributed among several Member States (right)**

Detections of North AFIC and sub-Saharan AFIC nationals by Member State of detection (external border, all border types) - depth of colour indicates levels of detection during the last four quarters



### 4.3. Routes

More than half (57%) of all AFIC nationals detected with fraudulent documents were detected on entry to the Schengen area from third countries (see Fig. 38). This is much higher than the proportion of all other nationalities detected on entry to the Schengen area from third countries (40%) and suggests that AFIC nationals are less likely to be using fraudulent document for travel within the Schengen area than are other nationalities.


The proportion detected on entry at the external border was even higher for AFIC nationals from North African countries (64%) than for AFIC nationals from sub-Saharan countries (51%), who were proportionally more often detected on intra-Schengen flights (20%) than nationals of North African countries (11%).

Overall AFIC nationals were detected using fraudulent documents attempting entry to the UK from the Schengen area proportionately much less frequently than other nationalities suggesting that, on average, final destination countries for AFIC nationals may be in the Schengen area.

Of all AFIC nationalities, migrants from Benin, Tunisia, Mali and Guinea tended to be proportionately most often detected at the external border (entry & exit), in each case

Figure 38. **Over the last year, more than half of all detections of AFIC nationals were on entry to the Schengen area from a third country**


Detections of AFIC nationals using fraudulent documents during the reporting period, by type of journey



Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 September 2013



The non-disclosed element contains detailed information regarding the operational and tactical features of the *modus operandi* regarding irregular migration, in particular document forgery and its disclosure could harm the implementation of future border control operations coordinated by Frontex. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



The non-disclosed text contains reference to the non-disclosed map above.

more than four-fifths were detected at the external border [REDACTED]. Migrants from Benin were detected in low numbers but in contrast there were significant detections of Tunisians at the Italian external border, and of migrants from Mali and Guinea at the Portuguese external border.

Conversely, migrants from Mauritania were the only nationality to be most often detected on intra-Schengen flights (57%) although this was from a very low base. The largest absolute numbers of detections on intra-Schengen flights were of Nigerians, even though detections on this travel type represented just 20% of all detected Nigerians (see Fig. 39).

Not all nationalities were commonly detected travelling between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States such as the UK. However, at least a fifth of all re-

ported nationals from Nigeria, Cape Verde and Algeria were detected making this type of journey, which suggests that for these nationalities at least, the UK represented a final destination country. Only Senegalese nationals were common users of document fraud in transit areas, in other words, while on journeys from one third country to another.



The non-disclosed parts contain sensitive information obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Member State(s). Its disclosure would harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.



The non-disclosed parts contain sensitive information obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Member State(s). Its disclosure would harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.



It is well known that most migrants detected with fraudulent documents at the external border originally began their journey from their home country, and in the case of detections at the air border, most detections tend to be of migrants arriving on direct flights from home countries.



The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information on *modus operandi* and migration routes used by migrant smugglers. Its disclosure could undermine the implementation of measure to counter irregular migration during future border control operations coordinated by Frontex. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.








Figure 41. **Sub-Saharan nationalities were detected arriving on flights from sub-Saharan and North African airports, whereas North AFIC nationalities were only detected leaving North African airports**

Detections of AFIC nationals using fraudulent documents at the external border between Q3 2012 and Q2 2013 by nationality (blue shading) and airport of embarkation (circle size)

The main airports of embarkation in North Africa were Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis, Cairo and Istanbul. Of these airports, there were more sub-Saharan than North African migrants detected arriving on flights from both Istanbul and Casablanca and there were significant numbers of sub-Saharans detected on flights from Tunis. The most commonly detected sub-Saharans arriving on flights from Istanbul were from Nigeria and Ghana, on flights from Casablanca – Nigerians and Congolese, and from Tunis – Ivorians. Nevertheless, in each case, the most detected single nationality arriving on flights from any AFIC country were nationals of that country.





The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information on *modus operandi* and migration routes used by migrant smugglers. Its disclosure could undermine the implementation of measure to counter irregular migration during future border control operations coordinated by Frontex. In this regard the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



The number of AFIC nationalities detected using fraudulent documents at the external border can also be visualised by airports of departure. Figure 41 shows the number of AFIC nationals detected during the reporting period arriving on flights from specific airports by the size of the circles. In addition, the circles are broken down into AFIC nationals from North African and sub-Saharan countries. This map clearly shows that sub-Saharan nationalities are often detected arriving on flights from North African airports, but North African nationals are almost never detected arriving on flights from sub-Saharan airports. The exception is the main airport in Cape Verde, from where small numbers of Moroccans have departed.

These detections, which took place upon arrival at EU airports, only show a part of the picture of document fraud on these routes. This is because large numbers of migrants are also detected at the airports of embarkation in third countries, either by national staff, private companies or by Immigration Liaison Officers deployed by EU Member States.



According to information provided by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, nationals who do not meet the conditions of obtaining a visa of the EU in their countries of origin, often move in the countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya), where they

The non-disclosed text contains information on *modus operandi* of migrant smuggling and was obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Third Country. Its disclosure may harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.

request the services of the facilitation networks to organise their crossing to Europe in boats or by plane.

#### 4.4. Documents

There is an important distinction to make between false documents and authentic documents, both of which are commonly detected in the hands of AFIC, and other nationalities. According to EDF definitions, false documents include:

1. Counterfeits – documents that have been produced by an unauthorised agent;
2. Forgeries – documents that were genuine but have been altered in some way;
3. Stolen blanks – stolen substrates that have been personalised;
4. Pseudo documents – documents that have been issued by an unrecognised authority.

It should be noted that all false documents in some way contain the evidence of intervention by an unauthorised agent be it in creating the document as a whole or altering a previously genuine document. Hence all false documents have at least one detection point which renders them different in some way compared to the genuine version. Examples include photo substituted passports reported by Morocco being used particularly in and around Tangiers, particularly related to the ferry connection to Algeciras.

In contrast, authentic documents remain entirely genuine and so there are no details that need to be described forensically. Authentic documents were issued by a recognised authority but are being used in an illegal way. Authentic documents used fraudulently include:

1. Fraudulently obtained: issued based on a fraudulent application;
2. Impostor: used by an unauthorised holder.


Nationalities vary in the extent to which they are detected with false and genuine



The non disclosed text contains information on *modus operandi* of migrant smugglers and was obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Third Country. Its disclosure may harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.

Figure 42. **AFIC nationals varied in the extent to which they were detected with false or authentic documents**

AFIC nationalities detected with fraudulent documents between Q3 2012 and Q2 2013, by proportions of false and genuine documents (includes all document and travel types). Figures at the top show the total number of detections in the reporting period




Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 September 2013

documents. Figure 42 shows some of this variation among AFIC nationalities, with migrants from Benin being detected with the highest proportion of false documents (but from a low base) and migrants from the Gambia being detected with the highest proportion of genuine documents.

Figure 42 also shows that AFIC nationalities tended to be detected with authentic documents proportionately much more frequently than non-AFIC nationalities. For example, on average non-AFIC nationalities were detected with authentic documents just 17% of the time, whereas 12 of the 22 AFIC nationalities were detected with authentic documents on more than a third of occasions.

However counterfeit documents were still very common, particularly when it came to

visas and residence permits.



Also related to counterfeit documents was a detection of a Nigerian passenger in September 2013 who attempted to board an Iberian airlines flight from Lagos to Europe. The passenger was in possession of his own authentic Nigerian passport but also a counterfeit Belgian residence permit (see Fig. 43). According to several reports this type of fraud is common.

The non-disclosed text contains information on *modus operandi* used for migrant smuggling and was obtained via bilateral cooperation with a Third Country. Its disclosure may harm the future cooperation with such country. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.

## Impersonation



The Ghanaian authorities also confirmed that there has been a recent increase in the quality of the counterfeit border crossing stamps. Therefore, the only way to prove that the stamp is authentic is to compare the stamp's code with the one that was used at the BCP on the day the stamp was apparently used.

Also from Ghana was the case of two Syrian imposters in September 2013 who attempted to check-in for a flight to Amsterdam with genuine Swedish passports. According to other reports this case was not an isolated incident as it was the third case in three days. The first two groups consisted of man, wife and one child that succeeded to reach Amsterdam.

The Moroccan authorities shared information relating to their own passports being sold to Algerians for use in gaining access to Ceuta and Melilla, particularly as border-inhabitants of the Moroccan regions of Nador and Tetuan currently do not need visas to visit Melilla and Ceuta, respectively.\*

## Document origins

Many AFIC partner countries shared information as to the origin of fraudulent documents detected on their territory. For example, colleagues in Niger reported that they had detected several counterfeit EU residence permits that had been manufactured in the



Figure 43. Counterfeit residence permits were often used to board flights to the EU

EU and then sent to Niger for distribution among would-be migrants. Similarly Guinea claimed that lots of false Portuguese passports were sent to their country each year from Portugal.



Elsewhere in Cape Verde, there were multiple cases of many nationalities such as Syrians and Nigerians, travelling with fraudulent documents that were thought to have been produced or sourced in the EU. There were also several reports of travelling to Portugal with no visas and then claiming for asylum upon arrival.

\* EUR-Lex  
42000A0922(04)

## 4.5. Abuse of legal channels

According to information provided by some AFIC partner countries (Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cameroon), the most commonly encountered type of frauds are fraudulently obtained





### Nigeria launches General Multi-Purpose Card

Nigeria has launched an ambitious suite of initiatives to combat identity fraud.

Director-General of the NIMC Mr. Onyemenam announced that more than 70% of Nigerians do not exist in any official database, and about the same percent of documents in circulation used for identity are fake. Also, he stressed that there was no issuing authority that provides real-time or timely verification of cards/documents.

He emphasised that the National Identity Management System will not only allow for an identity authentication but also verification, through a National Identity Database (NID) and the upgrading of the identity card to a smart card to be known as the General Multi-Purpose Card (GMPC) which will support multiple ID application which is known as identity management.



Other benefits, he said, are streamlining biometric-linked projects in the public sector, eliminating duplicated/multiple/ghost identities, reducing identity theft and related fraud.

Source: National Identity Management Commission, Nigeria




Figure 44. False Nigerian passports and false Italian residence permits were the most commonly detected documents being used by a single nationality

documents and ID fraud. These cases can be related to irregular migration but are often more commonly associated with concealing the identity either of members of organised crime groups or of the victims of trafficking. Most AFIC partner countries including Cameroon, Mauritania and others, agreed that in many cases poorly documented civil status registers renders them vulnerable to nationality swapping and fraudulently obtained documents.

There are also difficulties associated with families, tribes and ethnic groups whose geographic distribution overlaps with national boundaries, such that ascertaining someone's true identity can be very problematic. For example, Sierra Leone stated that they often have members of the Fula tribe turning up at the Department of Immigration asking for Sierra Leonean passports based on the fact that they claimed to have been born in Sierra Leone, but were displaced during time



Table 2. **Document fraud**

Detections reported by nationality, type of fraud, country of issuance and type of document

Nationality	Fraud type	Country of issuance	Document type	Jan-Jun 2013
Nigeria	False	Nigeria	Passports	75
Nigeria	False	Italy	Residence Permits	71
Nigeria	Authentic	Nigeria	Passports	62
Nigeria	False	Italy	ID Cards	62
Morocco	False	Morocco	Passports	61
Congo (Dem. Rep.)	False	Congo (Dem. Rep.)	Passports	61
Nigeria	False	Italy	Passports	55
Algeria	False	France	Passports	53
Mali	Authentic	Mali	Passports	52
Morocco	False	Italy	Residence Permits	51
Morocco	Authentic	Spain	ID Cards	46
Algeria	False	Algeria	Passports	46
Senegal	False	Senegal	Passports	46
Egypt	False	Greece	Residence Permits	46
Ghana	False	Italy	ID Cards	45
Others	n = 860			3 012
<b>Total</b>				<b>3 844</b>

Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 September 2013

of conflict. Similarly, officials from Mauritania shared information relating to many families being mixed between neighbouring countries which rendered issuance procedures vulnerable to fraudulent applications.

Each AFIC partner country that shared information on the subject, stated that they tend to detect their own fraudulently obtained documents rather than those issued by other countries. Indeed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo so far in 2013 some 62% of all detected documents were issued there. This is consistent with the situation in EU Member States and may be because, on the one hand, officials are more familiar with their own documents and have more opportunities to investigate the application procedure and, on the other, due to linguistic similarities between the border guard and the holder of the document, which facilitates questioning at the kiosk.

In Cameroon two principal cases of documentary fraud were generally encountered

at the borders. The first was fraud by substitution of identity with fraudulently obtained documents and the other was fraud by usurpation of someone else's identity i.e. impersonation. These cases of fraud generally used documents such as passports, identity documents and residence permits. It should be stressed here that Cameroon is attempting to computerise the process of issuing civil status. The success of this project could considerably reduce the acts of forgery of civil status for the document fraud industry.

#### Nationality swapping

There were multiple reports from a very wide range of AFIC partner countries relating to nationality swapping in order to mislead border control authorities. For example, Ghanaian reports included details of Syrians arriving from Egypt claiming to be Swedish, Lebanese and Palestinians claiming to be French and Nigerians claiming to be either from Sierra Leone or Liberia.



## Nigeria: Two Nabbed for Visa Fraud

**Special Fraud Unit, SFU, has arrested a graduate of the Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, and a 40-year-old United Kingdom ex-convict over alleged visa scam.**

Recovered from the suspects were fake travel documents, which included letter of appointment, statements of accounts, fake visa, fake arrival and departure stamps of Benin Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana and United Kingdom.

According to spokesperson for the Unit... 'the 26-year-old graduate... had applied for visa with a fake United Kingdom Entry Clearance visa on his passport. He later applied for a Spanish visa with a fake UK Entry Clearance Visa on his passport in an attempt to use deception to obtain the visa. The visa was checked by a trained forgery officer and discovered to be forged.'



## A UK Entry Clearance Visa

He said: 'I paid NGN 300 000 to obtain the UK visa. But it failed. He promised to compensate me with a Spanish visa, which unknown to me were forged.'

The second suspect... admitted to procuring visa and other documents like hotel reservation, insurance certificate, ticket, invitation letters, employment documents and statement of account for prospective travellers to London, Spain and France.

Source: [allafrica.com](http://allafrica.com), 20 September 2013

The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information on the *modus operandi* used for migrants smuggling, and its disclosure could harm the implementation of future border control joint operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

One of the most commonly reported cases of nationality swapping was related to Nigerian nationals attempting to assume another nationality and obtain a passport of another West African country. The widespread effects of Nigerians involved in document fraud are at least partially explained by their high population size.\* Indeed Nigerians alone account for 30% of the entire population of the AFIC community, although the Nigerian representatives claimed that this figure was much higher.



There were many reports of Nigerian organised criminal groups being present in most AFIC partner countries, who try to get passports of each country to supply to other Nigerians. Hence this is a widespread phenomenon. This activity means that document fraud by Nigerians is underestimated in the EDF data even though Nigerians already rank top and constitute 15% of all detections of AFIC nationals by EU Member States.

Many AFIC partner countries stated that there were very large populations of Nigerian living in their countries, for example, Côte d'Ivoire claimed to have significant numbers resident, as did Cameroon and Sierra Leone. According to a number of international organisations, there are several million Nigerians expatriated across West Africa.

The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information on the *modus operandi* used for migrants smuggling, and its disclosure could harm the implementation of future border control joint operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



#### Fraudulently obtained passports

One of the most common types of document fraud is the obtaining of passports based on fraudulent breeder documents such as birth certificates. Most AFIC partner countries confirmed that it is often possible to get original birth certificates based on fraudulent applications and containing false identities. These certificates are then used to obtain first ID cards and then later passports.



Figure 45. **Fraudulently obtained passports are the most commonly detected type of document fraud in Sierra Leone**



#### Senegal: Biometric Visas Required to Visit the Country

The law of reciprocity in terms of immigration will come into action starting July 1st 2013. From that date on, Senegal will require biometric visas to anybody wanting to enter the territory except those from the CEDEAO [ECOWAS] zone or from countries with whom Dakar signed bilateral agreements of free movement.

To ensure that the law is applied, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has assured that 10 border surveillance posts and biometric visa productions will be in place by June 26th, at the latest.

The biometric visa will cost FCFA 32 500 [EUR 50] and can be requested in the Senegalese embassies and consulates or online via the website [visasenegal.sn](http://visasenegal.sn) starting June 15th. The person requesting the visa can pay online and go through the pre-enrolment process.



© AFP Philippe Huguen 2006

Two key innovations are here, the ability to request for a visa through the internet and the ability to get a response on your computer with bar codes. A bar code will help in the identification of the person asking for a visa and if the latter after enrolment has stated a preference in retrieving the visa upon arrival in the Dakar airport. The visa retrieval can be done in 5 minutes.

Source: [en.afriqueitnews.com](http://en.afriqueitnews.com), 12 June 2013







The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information on the *modus operandi* used for migrants smuggling, and its disclosure could harm the implementation of future border control joint operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



#### **Gambia to have biometric passports in order to stop forgery, says immigration official**

Your next copy of the Gambian passport could be a biometric one, making it harder or impossible to forge, the Immigration Department said. Xinhua News quoted a government official saying the new passport will cost about USD 100 and will last for a period of five years.

'The passport's critical information is both printed on the data page of the passport and stored in the chip. Public Key Infrastructure is used to authenticate the data stored electronically in the passport chip making it expensive and difficult to forge when all security mechanisms are fully and correctly implemented,' the government official said. 'We want to discourage forgery of documents in the country and also to avoid easy access to passport by the young people who do take clandestine journey to Europe through back way.'

This will be the second time Gambia introduces a biometric identification system following the 2011 introduction of digital national identity cards, residential or work permits and driving licenses.

Visas, birth, death and marriage certificates will also be using the biometric system, according to a government website.

Source: dispatch.gm, 26 June 2013

The most commonly encountered type of document fraud in Sierra Leone involves the acquisition of Sierra Leonean passports and Emergency Travel Certificates (ETCs) to conceal nationalities or true identities. The key nationalities associated with this activity are Nigerians, Guineans, Lebanese and few Liberians. The fraud process commences with the fraudulent acquisition of Sierra Leonean birth certificates. This automatically makes the individual eligible to obtain a national identification card, which in addition to the birth certificate is a prerequisite to acquire Sierra Leonean passports or ETCs. This type of fraud includes false declaration of identity and false acquisition of the travel documents (passports and ETCs).

In some cases, they obtain these documents in furtherance of aiding human trafficking/people smuggling.

Also the Sierra Leone and Lebanese mafias obtain documents for Lebanese and other Middle-Eastern nationals to conceal their true identities. Security services believe the documents are obtained for normal migration purposes and possibly to facilitate movement of persons linked with terrorism.

#### **Fraudulently obtained visas**

Nigerian reports included information about visa smuggling, which consists in obtaining a regular visa by fraudulent means. Others have resulted to the use of counterfeit residence cards to smuggle migrants into destination countries posing as nationals returning home.



The non-disclosed text refers to relevant information on the *modus operandi* used for migrants smuggling, and its disclosure could harm the implementation of future border control joint operations. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Several AFIC partner countries claimed that many migrants only travel to the EU with fraudulent documents so that upon return to their home country they can present a completed trip to the West as evidence of legitimacy in support of a visa application to North America, which was their final destination all along.

#### 4.6. Biometric passports

According to information provided by many AFIC partner countries, the introduction of biometric passports has decreased the incidents of document fraud, specifically impersonation.

According to information provided by Nigeria, the introduction of the e-passport in 2007

by the Nigerian Immigration Service and the increased use of technology at the airports have led to a reduction in migrants trying to travel with forged documents. However, migrant smugglers have resorted to the use of look-alike strategy, i.e. impersonating the original owner of the travel documents. This is a common and cheaper means to smuggle migrants as the migrant is made to travel with the travel documents of another person that bears a resemblance.

Some AFIC partner countries including Guinea and Ghana, reported that they have started to interview all applicants for new passports but this is a costly mitigation in terms of time and resources. All AFIC partner countries who have introduced biometric passports claim that there was a noticeable drop in instances of document fraud.



## 5. Conclusions

The preceding analysis of the three topics provides a unique perspective of the most pertinent issues that this community of experts from the African continent and Frontex consider important. The perspective is unique given that it brings together extensive quantitative data on irregular movements, intelligence from joint operational activities or criminal investigations in Africa and Europe and provides exclusive qualitative insight by the AFIC experts.

Mostly descriptive in its nature, our joint analysis also contains several clues as to possible priority areas that deserve more discussion among relevant decision-makers in Europe and Africa.

### 5.1. Saving lives at sea

The 3 October 2013 tragedy in the vicinity of Lampedusa clearly showed the limits of search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean. While learning the lessons from this disaster and preventing such events in the future is of paramount importance, it is clear that no amount of additional SAR assets at sea will prevent future tragedy given the described increased propensity on the part of facilitators to provide unseaworthy boats to departing migrants (see Section 2.2.2. Changes in *modus operandi*).

The key to saving more lives is to balance the increased SAR capacity with more efforts to prevent unauthorised departures (in full respect of the 'non-refoulement' principle), in particular from Libya. This approach requires direct cooperation between North African and European countries and support by Frontex.

An example of relative success to save lives by preventing unauthorised departures is the case of the SEAHORSE project (Spain, Mauritania, Senegal) and the police cooperation between Spain and Mauritania (Joint Investigation Teams operating in the main departure areas of Mauritania).

### 5.2. Tackling the threat of terrorism at the regional borders in Africa

Most of AFIC partner countries stress that preventing terrorist movements is of utmost importance in the fight against proliferation of instability throughout the wider Sahel region. From the point of view of AFIC countries, this is by far more a sophisticated threat to their border and internal security than irregular cross-border movements of migrants.

Borders, however, remain extremely porous in the region. Likewise, some AFIC partner countries mention the fact that ECOWAS free-movement protocols are often abused, making any attempt to control or monitor legal movements even harder. Furthermore, concealing one's real identity by fraudulently obtaining genuine travel documents of another country adds additional complexity to the issue of terrorist movements in the region.

### 5.3. Improving administrative capacity to detect and/or prevent document fraud

Most of AFIC partner countries cite a lack of basic infrastructure to prevent and/or detect document fraud. This vulnerability ranges from issues related to equipment and databases (or lack thereof) to general lack of

expertise on how best to detect fraudulent documents by border authorities.

These shortcomings often limit detections only to those documents that are issued by the country of detection. Border authorities are familiar with their own national documents, but they lack the capacity to detect fraudulent documents issued by other countries.

One of the most common types of document fraud is to obtain a passport based on fraudulent breeder documents such as birth certificates. Lack of adequate civil registries allows for this method to be used extensively (e.g. the case of documents from Mali or Sierra Leone). There are also other factors that contribute to this problem. More precisely, there are many difficulties associated with tribes and ethnic groups whose geographic distribution overlaps with national boundaries, such that ascertaining someone's true identity or country of origin can be very problematic at times.

#### **5.4. Non-exhaustive list of the main difficulties linked to border management**

To conclude, the following non-exhaustive list of the main difficulties linked to border management was drafted by AFIC partner countries during the threat-scanning exercise held at the second AFIC Workshop in Lisbon:

- insufficient human and technical resources, both in terms of their number and quality;
- prevalent corruption;
- political instability in many countries of the region;
- porosity of the borders;
- poor and often uncoordinated bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation;
- lack of judicial remedies to back up prosecution efforts.



## 6. Annexes

### 6.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing of nationals from AFIC partner countries by quarter and route

Annex Table 1. Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections reported by route	Jan-Jun 2010	Jan-Jun 2011	Jan-Jun 2012	Jan-Jun 2013	% change Jan-Jun 2013 vs. Jan-Jun 2012
<b>Western Balkan route</b>	<b>1 274</b>	<b>1 674</b>	<b>2 874</b>	<b>11 713</b>	<b>308%</b>
Other	1 214	1 472	1 942	9 267	377%
AFIC North	48	196	903	1 388	54%
AFIC Sub-Saharan	12	6	29	1 058	3548%
<b>Eastern Mediterranean route</b>	<b>19 041</b>	<b>17 633</b>	<b>22 345</b>	<b>7 266</b>	<b>-67%</b>
Other	17 328	13 237	17 943	6 620	-63%
AFIC North	1 543	2 810	3 158	356	-89%
AFIC Sub-Saharan	170	1 586	1 244	290	-77%
<b>Central Mediterranean route</b>	<b>329</b>	<b>47 723</b>	<b>3 476</b>	<b>6 435</b>	<b>85%</b>
Other	63	12 498	2 022	3 953	95%
AFIC Sub-Saharan	0	9 843	24	1 469	6021%
AFIC North	266	25 382	1 430	1 013	-29%
<b>Circular route from Albania to Greece</b>	<b>18 721</b>	<b>2 207</b>	<b>2 942</b>	<b>4 187</b>	<b>42%</b>
Other	18 659	2 204	2 942	4 187	42%
AFIC Sub-Saharan	28	0	0	0	n.a.
AFIC North	34	3	0	0	n.a.
<b>Western Mediterranean route</b>	<b>1 466</b>	<b>2 459</b>	<b>2 516</b>	<b>2 523</b>	<b>0.3%</b>
Other	483	1 061	1 025	1 415	38%
AFIC North	582	719	1 016	618	-39%
AFIC Sub-Saharan	401	679	475	490	3.2%
<b>Apulia &amp; Calabria</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>1 876</b>	<b>1 798</b>	<b>1 790</b>	<b>-0.4%</b>
Other	408	1 518	1 452	1 429	-1.6%
AFIC North	1	358	346	360	4.0%
AFIC Sub-Saharan	0	0	0	1	n.a.
<b>Eastern borders route</b>	<b>473</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>737</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>-24%</b>
Other	469	439	723	556	-23%
AFIC Sub-Saharan	4	0	2	2	0%
AFIC North	0	6	12	0	-100%
<b>Western African route</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>4.7%</b>
AFIC Sub-Saharan	4	1	0	40	n.a.
Other	0	1	1	3	200%
AFIC North	17	176	42	2	-95%
<b>Other</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
Other	1	1	0	2	n.a.
AFIC Sub-Saharan	0	0	0	2	n.a.
AFIC North	0	0	0	1	n.a.
<b>EU total</b>	<b>41 735</b>	<b>74 196</b>	<b>36 731</b>	<b>34 522</b>	<b>34 523</b>

Source: FRAN data as of 5 September 2013



## 6.2. List of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active in 2013

BORDER TYPE	AREA	TERM
<b>Air border</b>		
JO Focal Points Air 2013	16 EU/SAC airports at the external air border	20 March 2013 – 28 February 2014
JO Flexi Force 2013	19 EU/SAC airports at the external air border	4 April – 3 July 2013
<b>Sea border</b>		
JO Poseidon Sea 2013	Greece	1 April 2013 – 31 October 2013
Focal Points Sea 2013	Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain	1 May – 15 October 2013
JO EPN Hermes 2013	Italy	6 May – 7 October 2013
JO EPN Indalo	Spain	16 May – 31 October 2013
JO EPN Aeneas 2013	Italy	3 June – 30 September 2013
<b>Land border</b>		
JO Neptune 2013	Hungary, Croatia	18 June – 15 July 2013
JO Poseidon Land 2013	Greece, Bulgaria	27 March 2013 – 1 January 2014
JO Focal Points Land 2013	Selected Border Points at the EU's external land border	1 April 2013 – 1 January 2014
Project Coordination Points 2013	Croatia, Moldova, Ukraine	10 April – 26 December 2013
<b>Return-related activity</b>		
Project Attica 2013	Greece, Bulgaria	27 March 2013 – 27 March 2014



### 6.3. Most commonly detected types of boats used for illegal maritime migration in 2013

Based on Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations

#### Western Mediterranean

1. Typical 'toy boat' used by sub-Saharan migrants when illegally crossing from Morocco to Spain. This particular incident occurred in the Spanish SAR area. Migrants were rescued about four kilometres off the Moroccan coast (close to Tangiers port).



2. This kind of wooden paddles are commonly used for propulsion and steering.



3. An inflatable rubber boat used to transport migrants at the Western Mediterranean.



### Eastern Mediterranean

1. Transport of migrants from Turkey to Greece in the Aegean Sea is often done using speed boats such as the one on the photo. This boat was used to transport migrants to the island of Lesbos in August 2013.
2. This speed boat was used to bring a group of 15 migrants to the Greek Island of Kos in June 2013 and was subsequently abandoned.
3. Sailing boats and yachts such as these detected in the Frontex JO Aeneas are often used to carry migrants from Turkey straight to Italy



### Central Mediterranean

1. Long rubber dinghies (10–12 meters) are used for maritime crossing from Libya to Italy or Malta. In most cases, a distress call is made from such a boat soon after departure from Libya.
2. Boats arriving from Egypt are usually wooden ships. This incident occurred in August 2013 and most likely involved the so-called 'mother ship' *modus operandi*.



### Western African

1. A Mauritanian type *cauyco* rescued in August 2013 at Tenerife (Spain) with 26 sub-Saharan migrants aboard.
2. A Moroccan type *patera* which departed from Morocco towards the Canary Islands (Spain) in September 2013.





## **6.4. Finding synergies between the AFIC and other relevant international initiatives**

One of the main ambitions of the AFIC community since its very inception has been to share its unique knowledge and insights with the most relevant international entities, thus feeding into pertinent political processes. By doing so, the AFIC aims to contribute to a sounder and more evidence-based decision-making. The initiatives listed below represent a selection of those where synergies with the joint analytical work of this community of experts could be identified.

### **6.4.1. EUROMED**

Starting in 1995, the EUROMED Partnership intends to foster cooperation and promote the debate on a regular basis about the migration issues between the EU and the nine European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) South countries from the Middle East and North Africa region. The EUROMED Migration III, which aims to promote peace, stability and economic prosperity in these areas, will run from January 2012 until December 2014. In addition to the 28 EU Member States, there are nine ENPI South countries participating in the EUROMED Migration III project: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

### **6.4.2. Rabat Process**

The Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development Process (Rabat) aims to promote the cooperation between origin, transit and destination countries of migrants coming from West and Central Africa. In June 2013 the European Commission in Brussels organised by a preparatory workshop, which gathered the representatives of Belgium, Burkina Faso, Spain, France, Italy, Senegal, the European Commission and of the consortium implementing the Project Support Commission

of the Rabat Process. Focused on border-related issues, this project tries to deliver tools (e.g. i-Map) and develop activities to foster the exchange of information and to promote good practices on border management-related issues. The meeting identified several priority areas to improve border management such as: simplification of border procedures, implementation of a common identification card for ECOWAS and the establishment of a single visa for UEMOA, development of national strategies for border management, establishment of joint border patrols, implementation of secure information exchange networks, development of annual training plans and establishment of centres for detecting document fraud as well as deployment of biometric systems.

### **6.4.3. Dakar Mini Group**

The Dakar Mini Group was set up under the EU's French Presidency in the second half of 2008 and intends to bring together French, UK, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and South African liaison officers in order to share information concerning drug-related issues and strategic analyses to tackle these problems.

### **6.4.4. Priority Solidarity Fund in Support of the Fight against Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa (FSP ALCAO)**

The FSP ALCAO was set up by France in October 2012 in Conakry and integrates countries such as Guinea, Mauritania, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Cape Verde. Its main goal is to reinforce the measures adopted to combat cocaine trafficking, build the capacities of investigative bodies and improve regional and international cooperation. The fund will also focus on the development of new procedures to strengthen the capacities of the CAAT (airport anti-drugs unit), as well as the development of training courses to help border guards to easily identify traffickers and other forms of criminal activities.



#### **6.4.5. The ECOWAS donors' conference**

The ECOWAS donors' conference aims to gather the necessary funds needed for ECOWAS to implement its action plan on the fight against drugs and drug trafficking (Praia plan). The EU intends to contribute EUR 16 million to tackle this issue and to promote a closer cooperation between West African countries within a common framework.

#### **6.4.6. Fight against money laundering**

The fight against money laundering is another high priority topic as the fight against trafficking. To tackle this problem, the EU launched a EUR 1.8-million project to be implemented in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Cape Verde, intended to help law-enforcement authorities to improve their money laundering investigations and to combat organised crime more effectively. This project wants to ensure the security of electronic information exchange and reinforce the EU's Cocaine Route Programme launched in 2009.

#### **6.4.7. The European Union Sahel Strategy**

The EU is pursuing a comprehensive approach to the crisis in the Sahel region, using as a reference the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel presented to the Council in March 2011. The EU strategy is based on the assumptions that development and security are interconnected and can be mutually supportive and that the complex crisis in the Sahel requires a regional answer.

It has proven a useful tool to enhance the coherence of the EU approach to the crisis, with a particular focus on Mauritania, Niger and Mali. There are four main lines of action of the strategy:

1. Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution;
2. Political and diplomatic action;
3. Security and the rule of law; and

4. Countering violent extremism and radicalisation.

The Strategy notes the following main issues related to security and the rule of law in the region:

- the insufficiency of legal frameworks and law-enforcement capacity at all levels;
- ineffective border management;
- lack of modern investigation techniques and methods of gathering;
- transmitting and exchanging information;
- obsolete or inexistent equipment and infrastructure.

#### **6.4.8. EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya**

According to the European External Action Service, EUBAM Libya is a new mission under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country's borders. This civilian mission responds to an invitation by Libya.

The strategic objective of EUBAM Libya is to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of their land, sea and air borders in the short term, and to develop a broader Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy in the long term.

The strengthening of the Libyan borders should be seen in the wider regional perspective considering the specificities of the Maghreb and Sahel regions, which will be considered in the implementation of the mission's mandate. Libya's porous borders affect its neighbouring countries and vice-versa. The Libyan authorities will be supported in their efforts to establish links with Libya's neighbours and cross border activities such as joint patrols and border checks could be envisaged.

The mission will also coordinate its activities with the other CSDP missions in the wider region, including EUCAP SAHEL Niger and EUTM Mali.













European Agency for the Management  
of Operational Cooperation  
at the External Borders of the Member  
States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1  
00-124 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00  
F +48 22 205 95 01

[frontex@frontex.europa.eu](mailto:frontex@frontex.europa.eu)  
[www.frontex.europa.eu](http://www.frontex.europa.eu)



Risk Analysis Unit

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