



House of Lords
House of Commons
Joint Committee on
Human Rights

Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (second Report)

Twentieth Report of Session 2010–12

*Report, together with formal minutes and
appendices*

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The Joint Committee on Human Rights

The Joint Committee on Human Rights is appointed by the House of Lords and the House of Commons to consider matters relating to human rights in the United Kingdom (but excluding consideration of individual cases); proposals for remedial orders, draft remedial orders and remedial orders.

The Joint Committee has a maximum of six Members appointed by each House, of whom the quorum for any formal proceedings is two from each House.

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Current Staff

The current staff of the Committee is: Mike Hennessy (Commons Clerk), John Turner (Lords Clerk), Murray Hunt (Legal Adviser), Lisa Wrobel (Senior Committee Assistant), Michelle Owens (Committee Assistant), Anna Browning (Committee Assistant), Greta Piacquadio (Committee Support Assistant), and Keith Pryke (Office Support Assistant).

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Footnotes

In the footnotes of this Report, references to oral evidence are indicated by 'Q' followed by the question number. Oral evidence is published online at <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/publications/>. References to written evidence are indicated by the page number as in 'Ev 12'.

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Summary

The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (“TPIMs Bill”) gives effect to the recommendation of the Government’s Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers that the current system of control orders should be repealed and replaced with a system of less restrictive and more focused measures. In March 2011 the current control order regime was renewed until the end of December this year. The Government wants TPIMs to be available by the time the control orders legislation lapses.

We reported on this Bill on 19 July 2011. In this, first, Report we welcomed those aspects of the Bill which would modify in significant ways aspects of the predecessor control order regime. In our view, these would make it less likely that the regime will be operated in a way which would give rise in practice to breaches of individuals’ human rights.

However, we also expressed some significant human rights concerns about the proposed TPIMs regime. Some of these concerns were centred upon the lack of a requirement for prior judicial authorisation; the need for the process to incorporate a “full merits review”; the need to assure the right to a fair hearing in terms of those subject to a TPIMs notice being given sufficient information about the allegations made against them; and the lack of a requirement for the new system to be debated or agreed annually by Parliament.

The Government responded to our Report by Command Paper on 1 September 2011. We are reporting again on the Bill in the light of this response and the views expressed during the debate on Second Reading in the House of Lords. We focus principally on the issues on which the Government response gave little or no reassurance and on which amendments are likely to be debated during the Bill’s Committee stage in the Lords.

On the issue of prior judicial authorisation, we support the amendments tabled in the House of Lords by Lord Lloyd of Berwick which in our view replace executive orders with prior judicial authorisation of the kind which both human rights law and our common law constitutional tradition require.

On the issue of the standard of proof, we state that, in our view, reasonable belief is too low a threshold for the imposition of such intrusive measures as are envisaged in the TPIMs Bill. The standard should be the balance of probabilities. We therefore support the amendment to clauses 3 and 6 to be moved in Committee by Lord Lloyd, to the effect that the decision of the court as to whether the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity is to be taken on the civil standard of proof, that is, the balance of probabilities.

Furthermore we recommend that the Bill be amended to make clear on the face of the Bill that the review to be conducted by the courts, at the review hearing referred to in the text of the Bill, is a “merits review” (as opposed to a supervisory review) and to delete the requirement that the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review. We therefore support the amendments to clause 9 to be moved by Lord Pannick in Committee to that effect.

With regard to ensuring a fair hearing, we support the amendments to be moved in Committee by Lord Pannick which would introduce into the relevant provisions:

- (1) an overriding requirement that rules of court must provide that the individual on whom the measures are imposed is entitled to be given sufficient information about the allegations against him or her to enable him or her at the review hearing to give effective instructions to his or her representatives, and information to the special advocate, in relation to those allegations; and
- (2) a requirement that a direction be given at the directions hearing that the Secretary of State shall provide the individual who is the subject of the TPIMs with sufficient information about the allegations against him or her to enable them to give effective instructions to their legal representatives, or information to the special advocate, in relation to those allegations at the review hearing. A direction requiring that such disclosure is made even earlier in the process, at the preliminary hearing, would be even more effective, because it would ensure that the individual can give effective instructions before the review hearing.

Whilst we welcome the fact that the Government has moved to amend the Bill since our first Report to require renewal of this new scheme, we believe that this period of renewal—at five years—is too long and we therefore support the amendments to the Bill to be moved in Committee to replace this five year period with an annual review.

Bills drawn to the attention of both Houses

1 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Date introduced to first House	23 May 2011
Date introduced to second House	6 September 2011
Current Bill Number	HL Bill 91
Previous Reports	16 th Report of 2010–12

Introduction

1.1 The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (“TPIMs Bill”) was brought from the House of Commons on 6 September 2011.¹ We reported on the Bill in our 16th Report of this Session. The Government responded to our Report on 1 September 2011.²

1.2 We now report again on the Bill in light of the Government’s response to our first Report and the views expressed during the debate on the Bill’s second reading in the House of Lords. We focus in particular on the issues on which amendments are likely to be debated during the Bill’s Committee stage in the Lords.

(1) *Prior judicial authorisation*

1.3 In our first Report on the Bill we welcomed the Government’s restatement of its commitment to the priority of prosecution, but were concerned that TPIMs remained outside of the criminal justice process. We recommended amendments to the Bill designed to ensure that TPIMs are only available as part of an active, ongoing criminal investigation.

1.4 In its reply, the Government states that it has given careful consideration to proposals, by Lord Macdonald, Liberty and us, to bring TPIMs into the criminal justice process, but has concluded that there are a number of difficulties with linking the imposition of restrictions to an ongoing criminal investigation.

1.5 We remain of the view that the restrictions imposed by TPIMs are serious interferences with a number of rights, including the right to respect for private life, and that the imposition of such restrictions on individuals can only ever be justified if they are the product of robust due process. We note that the House of Lords Constitution Committee is of a similar view.³

1.6 The Government is correct that there are other examples of civil preventative restrictions imposed on individuals, in order to protect the public from criminal behaviour, where the individuals have not necessarily been convicted and are not necessarily subject to any other ongoing criminal justice process. In relation to those other powers, however, the restrictions are imposed, not by the executive, but by independent courts. The problem

1 HL Bill 91.

2 *The Government Reply to the Sixteenth Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Session 2010–12 HL Paper 180, HC 1432, Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill*, (Cm 8167, September 2011).

3 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 19th Report of Session 2010–12, *Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill*, HL Paper 198 (15 September 2011).

with TPIMs, from both a human rights and common law constitutional perspective, is that they are essentially executive orders interfering severely with individuals' most fundamental liberties, on the basis of information not available to the individual, without any prior judicial authorisation. **There is no "well established principle" across our legal system of executive-imposed restrictions on individuals who are not subject to any ongoing criminal process. On the contrary, the well-established principle is that executive restrictions on liberty are such a radical departure from our common law tradition that they always require prior judicial authorisation after proper legal process. It is for the Government to justify this Bill's departure from that fundamental principle.**

1.7 Much of our concern can be met, therefore, by ensuring that TPIMs are not executive orders with limited ex post judicial oversight, but are authorised in advance by independent courts following a process which satisfies the minimum requirements of due process. We are encouraged that the Government, in its Reply to our first Report on the Bill, broadly agrees with our overall assessment of what the role of the court should be in relation to TPIMs, but we strongly disagree with the Government's view that no changes to the Bill are needed to achieve this because the Bill as currently drafted will deliver what we recommend.

1.8 As currently drafted, the Bill provides for executive orders which are subject to ex post judicial oversight. Moreover, that oversight is to be supervisory only, interfering with the Minister's decision only where it is "obviously flawed" and applying the principles of judicial review. What we recommend is entirely different: like our predecessor Committee when it considered the original control order legislation in 2005,⁴ **we recommend prior judicial authorisation**, in which the Minister makes an application to an independent court, and it is for the court itself to decide whether the measures should be imposed. We note that this is also the view of the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords and was the view of a number of those who spoke at second reading in the Lords.⁵ **We also note that Lord Lloyd has tabled amendments to the Bill which have the effect that TPIMs are imposed by the court on the application of the Home Secretary. We support those amendments which in our view replace executive orders with prior judicial authorisation of the kind which both human rights law and our common law constitutional tradition require.**

1.9 The Government accepts in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill and in its Reply to our first Report on the Bill that "the principles applicable on an application for judicial review" have been interpreted by courts in control order cases as requiring a particularly high level of scrutiny. The court will make its own decision as to whether the facts relied on by the Secretary of State amount to reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity, and must apply "intense scrutiny" to the Secretary of State's decision as to the necessity of the obligations imposed in the control order. In other words, the Government accepts that the applicable principles in TPIMs cases are quite unlike those generally applicable on judicial review. In a recent control order case, Collins J. observed that, as a result of judicial interpretation, the statutory

4 See Ninth Report of 2004–05, *Prevention of Terrorism Bill: Preliminary Report*, HL Paper 61/HC 389, paras 10–17; Tenth Report of 2004–05, *Prevention of Terrorism Bill*, HL Paper 68/HC 334, paras 2–17.

5 Lord Goodhart HL Deb 5 October 2011c1155; Lord Pannick c1168; Lord Lloyd c1187.

definition of the court's jurisdiction in the 2005 Act "does not mean what Parliament intended it to mean."⁶

1.10 We are astounded that the Government is asking Parliament to re-enact in this Bill legislative language to which the courts have given a meaning which is not what Parliament originally intended. It is not clear whether Parliament is to be assumed by courts to have reasserted its original intention about that language by re-enacting it, or is to be assumed to know that the language it is using does not mean what it says. Either way, this is not a satisfactory way to legislate to ensure human rights compatibility. **If the Government accepts that a judicial re-interpretation of legislative language is justified in order to render it compatible with the ECHR (as here), it ought not to re-enact the same language, but use different language which reflects the compatible interpretation and does not require to be read as meaning something quite different from what it says. Parliament should bear in mind that human rights law requires statute law to be both accessible and readily intelligible on its face, and take this opportunity to re-write the statutory language so as to define with clarity the true nature of the judicial function in relation to these measures.**

1.11 We also recommend one further amendment designed to ensure that at the merits review hearing sight is not lost of the priority of criminal prosecution. The Bill as drafted requires the police to secure that the investigation of the individual's conduct, with a view to a prosecution of the individual for an offence relating to terrorism, is kept under review while a TPIM notice is in force, and there is a new statutory duty on the police to report to the Home Secretary on this review.⁷ However, there is no mechanism in the Bill to ensure that the progress of the criminal investigation is reported to the court which has the function of determining whether the TPIMs are necessary and proportionate.

1.12 **We recommend an amendment to the Bill which would require the Secretary of State to make available to the court at the merits review hearing the report of the police concerning its review of the criminal investigation of the individual. The following amendment to the Bill would give effect to this recommendation:**

Clause 8, Page 4, Line 27, after sub-clause (6) insert '(6A) Directions under subsection (5) must provide for information to be provided to the court at the review hearing concerning the progress of the criminal investigation in to the individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity.'

(2) Standard of proof

1.13 The Bill provides for the imposition of TPIMs on an individual if the Secretary of State "reasonably believes" that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. The Government says that this is a higher threshold than the "reasonable suspicion" threshold in the control orders legislation, but accepts that it is lower than the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities.

⁶ *BC v Secretary of State for the Home Department; BB v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2009] All ER (D) 140.

⁷ Clause 10(5).

1.14 In our Report on the Terrorist Asset Freezing Bill, we recommended that the standard of proof be increased from “reasonable belief” to the balance of probabilities.⁸ We note that the threshold for other “civil” preventative orders, such as Serious Crime Prevention Orders and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, is already the balance of probabilities. **In our view, reasonable belief is too low a threshold for the imposition of such intrusive measures as are envisaged in the TPIMs Bill. The standard should be the balance of probabilities. We support the amendment to clauses 3 and 6 to be moved in Committee by Lord Lloyd, to the effect that the decision of the court as to whether the individual is, or has been involved in terrorism-related activity is to be taken on the civil standard of proof, that is, the balance of probabilities.**

(3) Full merits review

1.15 As currently drafted the Bill also defines the court’s function at the “review hearing” as an essentially supervisory one: the court “must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.”⁹ In our first Report, we recommended that the court’s function at this hearing be defined as a full merits review of whether, in the court’s view, the conditions for imposing TPIMs are satisfied.

1.16 The Government, in its Reply to our first Report, accepts that there should be “a particularly high level of scrutiny” by the court at this review hearing, but it does not agree that the requirement that the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review should be deleted from the Bill. It argues that there is no reason to doubt that courts will continue to apply intense scrutiny in TPIMs cases, as they have in control order cases, and that “continued reliance on case law” is the best way to deliver that intense scrutiny.

1.17 We disagree with the Government’s reasoning. The surest way to deliver the intense scrutiny that the Government says it intends is to write it explicitly into the Bill. We therefore recommend that the Bill be amended to make clear on the face of the Bill¹⁰ that the review to be conducted by the courts at the review hearing is a “merits review” (as opposed to a supervisory review) and to delete the requirement that the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.¹¹ We support the amendments to clause 9 to be moved by Lord Pannick in Committee to that effect.

(4) The right to a fair hearing

1.18 In our first Report on the Bill we pointed out that the Bill, as drafted, fails to give effect to the judgment of the House of Lords in *AF (No. 3)*, which held that, in order for control order proceedings to be fair, “the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations.” We recommended that the Bill be amended to require the Secretary of State, at the outset of the proceedings, to provide the individual who is the subject of TPIMs with sufficient

8 See e.g. Fourth Report of 2010–12, *Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill (Second Report)*, HL Paper 53/HC 598, paras 1.3–1.9.

9 Clause 9(2).

10 In clause 9(1).

11 Clause 9(2).

information about the allegations against him or her to enable them to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations.

1.19 The Government in its Reply has rejected this recommendation. It argues that “the right to a fair trial of individuals subject to a TPIM notice is already fully protected by the provisions contained in the TPIMs Bill and the application of existing case-law as appropriate by the courts.” It says that the judgment of the House of Lords in *AF (No. 3)* was a judgment about the requirements of the right to a fair hearing in Article 6 ECHR in the particular context of the stringent control orders in the cases before the court. As such, the Government argues, the judgment in *AF (No. 3)* does not require any “read down” of the legislation, and there is no need to make any legislative provision in the TPIM Bill to give effect to the judgment.

1.20 We do not accept the Government’s analysis. The Government’s premise is that the disclosure obligation in *AF (No. 3)* does not necessarily apply to all TPIMs because some will not be sufficiently “stringent” to engage Article 6. This is an argument that the Government has already made and lost before the High Court in relation to “light touch control orders”.¹² In our view, the *AF (No. 3)* disclosure obligation applies in *all* proceedings concerning TPIMs and should not be left to the court to decide whether the obligation applies on a case-by-case basis, and the Bill requires amending to make this clear. In our view two amendments are necessary to give practical effect to the principle in *AF (No. 3)*.

1.21 First, **the provision in Schedule 4 of the Bill¹³ which the Government says is designed to ensure that TPIM proceedings will operate in a way that is compatible with Article 6 ECHR, requires strengthening to give effect to the *AF (No. 3)* decision. We support the amendment to be moved in Committee by Lord Pannick which would introduce into that provision an overriding requirement that rules of court must provide that the individual on whom the measures are imposed is entitled to be given sufficient information about the allegations against him or her to enable him or her at the review hearing to give effective instructions to his or her representatives, and information to the special advocate, in relation to those allegations. This amendment will ensure that the *AF (No. 3)* disclosure obligation applies in all proceedings concerning TPIMs.**

1.22 Second, in our view an additional amendment is required to give concrete effect to the disclosure obligation in *AF (No. 3)* sufficiently early in the proceedings to make it practically effective. As we pointed out in our first Report on the Bill, the Public Bill Committee in the Commons heard evidence from two special advocates whose evidence was that, to ensure fairness, the legislation should require the Secretary of State to consider and acknowledge the Article 6 disclosure obligation at the outset of proceedings rather than simply leaving it for the special advocates to make the running and for the court to address at a much later stage in the proceedings.

1.23 **We agree with the special advocates that the Secretary of State ought to be required to apply her mind to what disclosure Article 6 requires at the very outset of the proceedings, instead of much later in the course of the review hearing, by which time**

¹² *BB and BC*, above n. 6.

¹³ Paragraph 5 of Schedule 4.

the measures will have been in force for a considerable time and the practical value of the procedural protection of *AF (No. 3)* considerably diminished. We note that the amendment to clause 8 to be moved in Committee by Lord Pannick which would require a direction to be given at the directions hearing that the Secretary of State shall provide the individual who is the subject of the TPIMs with sufficient information about the allegations against him or her to enable them to give effective instructions to their legal representatives, or information to the special advocate, in relation to those allegations at the review hearing. This goes some way to meeting the concern expressed by the special advocates to the Public Bill Committee. That concern would be met completely if the direction proposed by Lord Pannick were given earlier in the process, at the preliminary hearing, to ensure that the individual can give effective instructions *before* the review hearing takes place.

(5) Annual review and renewal

1.24 In our first Report on the Bill we recommended that the Bill be amended to require annual renewal and so ensure that there is an annual opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise and debate the continued necessity for such exceptional measures and the way in which they are working in practice.

1.25 The Government has amended the Bill to require that the legislation be renewed by Parliament (by affirmative order) every five years,¹⁴ but has refused to accede to the considerable pressure to make it subject to annual review and renewal like the control order regime it replaces.

1.26 We note that the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, in his recent report to the UN Human Rights Council, observed:¹⁵

“Regular review and the use of sunset clauses are best practices helping to ensure that special powers relating to the countering of terrorism are effective and continue to be required, and to help avoid the ‘normalisation’ or de facto permanent existence of extraordinary measures.”

1.27 We remain of the view that TPIMs are an extraordinary departure from ordinary principles of criminal due process, and we support the amendments to the Bill to be moved in Committee which would replace the five year sunset clause currently in the Bill with a requirement of annual review and renewal.

¹⁴ Clause 21.

¹⁵ UN General Assembly Human Rights Council, 16th Session, A/HRC/16/51 (22 December 2010), para 19.

Conclusions and recommendations

(1) Prior judicial authorisation

1. There is no “well established principle” across our legal system of executive-imposed restrictions on individuals who are not subject to any ongoing criminal process. On the contrary, the well-established principle is that executive restrictions on liberty are such a radical departure from our common law tradition that they always require prior judicial authorisation after proper legal process. It is for the Government to justify this Bill’s departure from that fundamental principle. (Paragraph 1.6)
2. We recommend prior judicial authorisation (Paragraph 1.8)
3. We also note that Lord Lloyd has tabled amendments to the Bill which have the effect that TPIMs are imposed by the court on the application of the Home Secretary. We support those amendments which in our view replace executive orders with prior judicial authorisation of the kind which both human rights law and our common law constitutional tradition require. (Paragraph 1.8)
4. If the Government accepts that a judicial re-interpretation of legislative language is justified in order to render it compatible with the ECHR (as here), it ought not to re-enact the same language, but use different language which reflects the compatible interpretation and does not require to be read as meaning something quite different from what it says. Parliament should bear in mind that human rights law requires statute law to be both accessible and readily intelligible on its face, and take this opportunity to rewrite the statutory language so as to define with clarity the true nature of the judicial function in relation to these measures. (Paragraph 1.10)
5. We recommend an amendment to the Bill which would require the Secretary of State to make available to the court at the merits review hearing the report of the police concerning its review of the criminal investigation of the individual. The following amendment to the Bill would give effect to this recommendation:

Clause 8, Page 4, Line 27, after sub-clause (6) insert ‘(6A) Directions under subsection (5) must provide for information to be provided to the court at the review hearing concerning the progress of the criminal investigation into the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.’ (Paragraph 1.12)

(2) Standard of proof

6. In our view, reasonable belief is too low a threshold for the imposition of such intrusive measures as are envisaged in the TPIMs Bill. The standard should be the balance of probabilities. We support the amendment to clauses 3 and 6 to be moved in Committee by Lord Lloyd, to the effect that the decision of the court as to whether the individual is, or has been involved in terrorism-related activity is to be taken on the civil standard of proof, that is, the balance of probabilities. (Paragraph 1.14)

(3) Full merits review

7. We disagree with the Government's reasoning. The surest way to deliver the intense scrutiny that the Government says it intends is to write it explicitly into the Bill. We therefore recommend that the Bill be amended to make clear on the face of the Bill that the review to be conducted by the courts at the review hearing is a "merits review" (as opposed to a supervisory review) and to delete the requirement that the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review. We support the amendments to clause 9 to be moved by Lord Pannick in Committee to that effect. (Paragraph 1.17)

(4) The right to a fair hearing

8. The provision in Schedule 4 of the Bill which the Government says is designed to ensure that TPIM proceedings will operate in a way that is compatible with Article 6 ECHR, requires strengthening to give effect to the *AF (No. 3)* decision. We support the amendment to be moved in Committee by Lord Pannick which would introduce into that provision an overriding requirement that rules of court must provide that the individual on whom the measures are imposed is entitled to be given sufficient information about the allegations against him or her to enable him or her at the review hearing to give effective instructions to his or her representatives, and information to the special advocate, in relation to those allegations. This amendment will ensure that the *AF (No. 3)* disclosure obligation applies in all proceedings concerning TPIMs. (Paragraph 1.21)
9. We agree with the special advocates that the Secretary of State ought to be required to apply her mind to what disclosure Article 6 requires at the very outset of the proceedings, instead of much later in the course of the review hearing, by which time the measures will have been in force for a considerable time and the practical value of the procedural protection of *AF (No. 3)* considerably diminished. We note the amendment to clause 8 to be moved in Committee by Lord Pannick which would require a direction to be given at the directions hearing that the Secretary of State shall provide the individual who is the subject of the TPIMs with sufficient information about the allegations against him or her to enable them to give effective instructions to their legal representatives, or information to the special advocate, in relation to those allegations at the review hearing. This goes some way to meeting the concern expressed by the special advocates to the Public Bill Committee. That concern would be met completely if the direction proposed by Lord Pannick were given earlier in the process, at the preliminary hearing, to ensure that the individual can give effective instructions before the review hearing takes place. (Paragraph 1.23)

(5) Annual review and renewal

10. We remain of the view that TPIMs are an extraordinary departure from ordinary principles of criminal due process, and we support the amendments to the Bill to be moved in Committee which would replace the five year sunset clause currently in the Bill with a requirement of annual review and renewal. (Paragraph 1.27)

Formal Minutes

Tuesday 18 October 2011

Members present:

Dr Hywel Francis MP, in the Chair

Lord Bowness

Lord Dubs

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Lord Morris of Handsworth

Mike Crockart

Mr Dominic Raab

Mr Virendra Sharma

Mr Richard Shepherd

Draft Report, *Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (Second Report)*, proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1.1 to 1.27 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Twentieth Report of the Committee to each House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House of Commons and that Lord Lester of Herne Hill make the Report to the House of Lords.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 25 October at 2.00 pm]

Declaration of Lords Interests

No members present declared interests relevant to this Report.

A full list of members' interests can be found in the Register of Lords' Interests:
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldreg/reg01.htm>

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

Session 2010–12

First Report	Work of the Committee in 2009–10	HL Paper 32/HC 459
Second Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Identity Documents Bill	HL Paper 36/HC 515
Third Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill (Preliminary Report)	HL Paper 41/HC 535
Fourth Report	Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Bill (Second Report); and other Bills	HL Paper 53/HC 598
Fifth Report	Proposal for the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (Remedial) Order 2010	HL Paper 54/HC 599
Sixth Report	Legislative Scrutiny: (1) Superannuation Bill; (2) Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill	HL Paper 64/HC 640
Seventh Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Public Bodies Bill; other Bills	HL Paper 86/HC 725
Eighth Report	Renewal of Control Orders Legislation	HL Paper 106/HC 838
Ninth Report	Draft Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (Remedial) Order 2010—second Report	HL Paper 111/HC 859
Tenth Report	Facilitating Peaceful Protest	HL Paper 123/HC 684
Eleventh Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill	HL Paper 138/HC 1020
Twelfth Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Armed Forces Bill	HL Paper 145/HC 1037
Thirteenth Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Education Bill	HL Paper 154/HC 1140
Fourteenth Report	Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011	HL Paper 155/HC 1141
Fifteenth Report	The Human Rights Implications of UK Extradition Policy	HL Paper 156/HC 767
Sixteenth Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill	HL Paper 180/HC 1432
Seventeenth Report	The Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011: Stop and Search without Reasonable Suspicion (second Report)	HL Paper 192/HC 1483
Eighteenth Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Protection of Freedoms Bill	HL Paper 195/HC 1490
Nineteenth Report	Proposal for the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2011	HL Paper 200/HC 1549
Twentieth Report	Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (second Report)	HL Paper 204/HC 1571