TEXTE EN

COMMUNICATION DE LA COMMISSION AU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN ET AU CONSEIL SUR LE RECRUTEMENT DES TERRORISTES:
FAIRE FACE AUX FACTEURS CONTRIBUANT A LA RADICALISATION VIOLENTE

Communication de M. FRATTINI

Cette question est susceptible d’être inscrite à l’ordre du jour de la 1715ème réunion de la Commission le mercredi 21 septembre 2005.

Destinataires : Membres de la Commission
MM. FAULL, CHENE, RICHELLE, TAVARES, ROMERO REQUENA, MANSERVISI, VAN DER PAS, CAVACO SERVINHO, BARBASO, Mme QUINTIN, M. ZOUREK, MM. COLASANTI, SCHENKEL, SCHAUB, M. CARVOUNIS, MEADOWS, LANDABURU, MITSOS, O’SULLIVAN, PETITE
NOTE DU SECRETARIAT GENERAL

PREPARATION DU DOCUMENT

Direction générale responsable
JLS Justice, Liberté et Sécurité

Services consultés
pour accord

ADMIN Personnel et Administration : Avis favorable (cf./4)
AIDCO EuropAid - Office de coopération : Avis favorable (cf./4)
BEPA Bureau des conseillers de la politique européenne : Avis favorable
BUDG Budget : Avis favorable (cf./4)
DEV Développement : Avis favorable (cf./4)
EAC Education et Culture : Avis favorable (cf./4)
ECHO Aide humanitaire : Avis favorable
ELARG Elargissement : Avis favorable
EMPL Emploi, affaires sociales et égalité des chances : Avis favorable (cf./4)
ENTR Entreprises et industries : Avis favorable (cf./4)
INFSO Société de l'information et médias : Avis favorable (cf./4)
JRC Centre commun de recherche : Avis favorable (cf./4)
MARKT Marché intérieur et services : Avis favorable (cf./4)
PRESS Service Presse et Communication : Avis favorable
REGIO Politique régionale : Avis favorable
RELEX Relations extérieures : Avis favorable (cf./4)
RTD Recherche : Avis favorable (cf./4)
SG Secrétariat général : Avis favorable (cf./4)

pour avis

SJ Service juridique : Avis favorable

Langue originale : EN
MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMISSION

The Hague Programme outlines the means by which a common area of freedom, security and justice can be strengthened over the forthcoming 5 years. It stipulates that The Council with the assistance of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator should, by 1 January 2006, together with the Commission and experts of the Member States, develop a long term strategy to address the factors which contribute to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist activities. The Council also requested that a report on the subject be produced for them by June 2005.

Following the attacks in Madrid, the European Council adopted a Declaration on 25 March 2004, on Combating Terrorism, covering a wide range of actions. This includes a regularly updated Action Plan on combating terrorism which, amongst other things, highlights the need to look at the prevention of the potential for terrorist recruitment. Clearly, the London attacks in July this year continued to reinforce the need to address this complex problem with a well-thought approach.

The Action Plan includes under Objective 6, that the Commission should identify factors which contribute to recruitment to terrorism and to finalise a report on this, including the possible adoption of an agreed set of recommendations.

Following the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002) the Commission has adopted Communications addressing the areas of Preparedness, Prevention and Response relating to counter terrorism. These have been on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against Terrorism and the Preparedness and Consequence Management in the fight against Terrorism. This document intends to add to the work on the prevention of the emergence of terrorism, and complements the Commission’s Communication on the financing of terrorist activities and more recently, explosives and firearms (subject to adoption).

Therefore, the Communication is another element in the Commission’s preventive strategy adds to the preventative strategy of the Commission’s counter terrorism work.

The aim of work on radicalisation is and aims to look at potential reasons and factors that contribute to leading people to joining terrorist groups or networks that wish to carry out terrorist acts.

The Communication: “Violent Radicalisation—Terrorist Recruitment, addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation” reports on the Commission’s ongoing work in the area and proposes possible ways in which work in various fields within its competence could be channelled more effectively into addressing the issue, seeks to raise issues to help understand how recruitment into terrorism might take place and suggest preventive measures to address the origins of the problem at its source. The Annex to the Communication merely provides a

preliminary analysis of the possible factors contributing to violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment.

The actions and recommendations presented in the Communication are a combination of soft and hard measures and are to be viewed as complementary to, and in support of, current national efforts. The Commission however believes that the EU, with its span of policies in various areas that could be used to address violent radicalisation, is well placed to gather and spread at European level the relevant expertise that is being acquired by the Member States in addressing this problem. Furthermore, the measures being proposed are not to be considered as exhaustive and in the future more measures could be proposed particularly when the research into the problem, some of which will be financed by the Commission, progresses.

In summary, the Communication:

(1) describes the EU instruments that are already available in the field of broadcast media and the internet and whose use could be enhanced to stem further the spreading of terrorist propaganda

(2) describes the education, youth engagement and European citizenship programs that are available that can have an indirect effect on preventing violent radicalisation from taking root in youngsters via the promotion of inter-cultural understanding and a European identity that nevertheless respects and promotes cultural diversity

(3) shows how enhancement of integration policies, which are stand-alone policies, could have ancillary effects on the prevention of violent radicalisation and stresses the importance of dialogue between the State and religions

(4) encourages more cooperation between the law enforcement authorities and security services of the Member States at operational, intelligence and policy levels and suggests more sharing of best practices and expertise via EU Structures

(5) supports more extensive analysis of violent radicalisation and foresees the creation of networks of European experts in the field and the financing of studies on related topics that will be a basis for better policy-making in the future

(6) describes how the EU's external relations policy is being enhanced to reduce those factors in foreign countries which might contribute to the emergence of a terrorism 'breeding ground'

The Communication therefore aims to identify existing areas of work that can be focussed to deal with issues relating to radicalisation. These include:

i) creating more schemes engaging especially with youth under existing EU schemes (e.g. Socrates, YOUTH);

ii) suggesting the possibility of engaging in inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogues in civil society;

iii) working more with the media, especially relating to the internet which can be used at every stage of the process from influencing people to take on radical opinions, right the way through to the actual carrying out of terrorist attacks;
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

concerning

Terrorist recruitment: addressing the analysing-and-preventing factors contributing to violent radicalisation
1. INTRODUCTION

"Violent radicalisation" is the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism as defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. The term 'radicalisation' is the recognised term used across Member States and in EU institutions to describe this concept. The recent terrorist attacks in London of July 2005, and Madrid in March 2004, have reinforced the priority treatment of addressing violent radicalisation as part of a comprehensive approach to the preventive side of fighting terrorism.

One of terrorism's perverted aims is to sow division, hatred and tension among people. The terrorist acts perpetrated in Madrid and London, by persons who abusively invoke Islam, are cases in point. As noted in the Charter on Fundamental Rights, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity and is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law.

Fighting terrorism, in all its forms and irrespective of the aims or 'ideals' it purports to advance, is also therefore an ideological struggle because terrorism has the potential to subvert the very founding principles of the European Union. Although Europe has experienced different types of terrorism in its history, the main threat currently comes from terrorism that is underlined by an abusive interpretation of Islam. Nevertheless, many of the motivational factors for violent radicalisation and the remedies dealt with by this Communication are equally valid for all violent radicalisation, that leads to terrorist attacks whether of, to name a few, it is for nationalistic, anarchic, separatist, extreme left or extreme right kind purposes or whether it has subversive end-goals in mind but hides behind an abusive interpretation of Islam.

Europe has seen dark times in its history. The European Union was born out of the ashes of war and genocide, of racism and nationalism and on the need to solidly cement peace amongst enemies. It therefore rejects violence and hatred and will never tolerate racism or xenophobia in whatever form or against whatever religion or ethnic group. It is therefore important to maintain the crucial balance between different fundamental rights in this area, particularly the right to life on the one hand, and the right to freedom of expression and privacy on the other. Europe must continue to support human rights and the rule of law and reject any form of relativism insofar as fundamental rights are concerned. Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious and flagrant violations of fundamental freedoms and any arguments that attempt to justify certain violent practices as an expression of diversity must also be unconditionally rejected.

InterestInternational organisations, such as the UN, EU institutions and the EU Member States have become increasingly interested in this subject has increased in recent years. It is admittedly a very complex question with no simple answers and which requires a cautious,
modest and but well-thought approach. In this Communication, the Commission reports on its ongoing work in this area and proposes possible ways in which work in various fields within its competence could be channelled more effectively into addressing the issue. The Annex to the Communication merely provides a preliminary analysis of the possible factors contributing to violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. Certainly, more in-depth research and analysis into the phenomenon is required.

As specifically requested by the Hague Programme, this document is the Commission’s initial contribution to the development of an EU long term strategy (whose presentation by the Council is foreseen for the end of 2005) to address the factors which contribute to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist activities. The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism (adopted by the European Council in June 2004 and revised every six months) includes under Objective 6, that the Commission should identify factors which contribute to recruitment to terrorism and to finalise a report on this, including the possible adoption of an agreed set of recommendations. Furthermore, the Hague Programme, adopted by the European Council in November 2004, outlines the means by which a common area of freedom, security and justice can be strengthened over the forthcoming five years. It stipulates that the Council with the assistance of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator should, by 1 January 2006, together with the Commission and experts of the Member States, develop a long-term strategy to address the factors which contribute to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist activities. The Council also requested that a report on the subject be produced for them by June 2005.

This document therefore is the Commission’s initial contribution and presents policy initiatives that could address possible factors contributing to violent radicalisation and that could increase our scientific knowledge of the subject. The actions and recommendations presented in this document are a combination of soft (e.g. inter-cultural exchanges among youth) and hard (e.g. prohibition of satellite broadcasts inciting terrorism) measures and are to be viewed as complementary to, and in support of, current national efforts. The Commission however believes that the EU, with its span of policies in various areas that could be used to address violent radicalisation, is well placed to gather and spread at European level the relevant expertise that is being acquired by the Member States in addressing this problem.

This document deals with the preventive side of counter-terrorism and complements the Commission’s Communication on the prevention of financing of terrorist activities and more recently that on ensuring greater security of explosives. It does not aim to deal with criminal law initiatives based on Title VI of the Treaty of the European Union that already exist, as for instance, the already adopted Framework Decision on Terrorism, or the Proposal under discussion for a Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia. That proposal, which aims to ensure that intentional conduct relating to racism or xenophobic acts, including incitement to violence or hatred, public insults, condoning racism and xenophobia and participating in racist or xenophobic groups, is punishable as a criminal offence in Member States.

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2. Strengthening Community Policies to Address Violent Radicalisation

2. Proposals and Recommendations

The Commission considers that the development and implementation of a European Strategy on violent radicalisation and the recruitment of terrorists will necessarily be a sustained effort and that the measures proposed, both in the short and long term, in this Communication are not meant to be exhaustive in nature. In the future other measures could be proposed, particularly in the light of better knowledge acquired on the subject.

It is therefore proposing both short and long-term actions with the objective of developing work areas that aim at achieving long-term results. The core areas of immediate focus are broadcast media, the internet, education, youth engagement, employment, social exclusion and integration issues, equal opportunities and non-discrimination and inter-cultural dialogue. Furthermore, in order to acquire greater knowledge in the field, the Commission will support more extensive analysis of scientific research on violent radicalisation that will serve as a basis for better policy-making in the future. Finally, the external relations component to tackling the problem of violent radicalisation is a crucial aspect of a future EU strategy in this area.

2.1. Broadcast Media

In line with following the envisaged adoption of by the Commission of a Financing Decision for its first pilot project on fighting terrorism9 (the “Financing Decision”), the Commission plans to organise a conference in the near future on the media’s role in relation to violent radicalisation and terrorism, for which researchers active in the field would also be invited, before the end of 2005.

European law already prohibits incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality in broadcast10. [DG INFSO: could you propose/explore to add incitement, whether direct or indirect, to commit acts of terrorism and encouraging support/sympathy for terrorism to the Directive?] This includes third country programmes (mostly satellite television) if they use either a frequency, satellite capacity or an uplink appertaining to a Member State.12 Member States are responsible for the implementation of these rules and the recent cases of the prohibition to retransmit channels like Al-Manar or Sahar-1 within Europe, show that the division of tasks and the effective application of these rules works quite well, and furthermore, that the cooperation between Member States and the competent regulatory authorities is essential and should be further developed. [DG INFSO/RELEX: It seems however that Al-Manar is still transmitted in all of Europe via foreign satellite providers Arabsat (Saudi Arabian) and Nilesat (Egyptian). Could we envisage concrete practical solutions for this? Can we think of innovative ways to bring pressure to bear on this type of behaviour?]

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9 Commission Financing Decision on the Pilot Project “Fight Against Terrorism”, soon to be adopted, specifies the way in which the Commission intends allocating the € 7 million budget in its counter-terrorism policy.
10 Commission Financing Decision on the Pilot Project “Fight Against Terrorism” was adopted on 18th August and specifies the way in which the Commission intends allocating the € 7 million budget in its counter-terrorism policy.
11 Art 22a Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (Television without Frontiers Directive)
12 Article 24 of the "Television without Frontiers" Directive
13 The re-transmission of Al Manar by all relevant EU Member States with satellite capacity, in this case France (Antenne), the Netherlands (NSS) and Spain (Hispasat), has been prohibited.
On the invitation of the Commission, the presidents of the national regulatory authorities in the field of broadcasting came together on the invitation of the European Commission for the first time in March 2005 to give a pan-European drive to combat incitement to hatred in broadcasts. They agreed on concrete measures [INFSO: any concrete examples? Similar exercise on incitement to terrorism or can the results of that exercise be transposed to terrorism? If so, how?] to strengthen their cooperation, which the Commission will support. They agreed on mutual and immediate information exchange especially through the establishment of a working group and a restricted internet forum. [DG INFSO: how will cooperation be strengthened?]. In addition, the Commission will propose a modernized directive by the end of 2005, which will further improve the effective application of European law, especially with respect to the prohibition of incitement to hatred in third-country programmes. [DG INFSO: sentence rather ambiguous - pls clarify]

2.2. The Internet

The incitement to commit terrorism is a crime under the European Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and the implementing legislation of Member States. The use of the internet to incite people into becoming violently radical or as a vehicle for terrorist recruitment is extremely worrying in view of the internet’s its-global reach, real-time nature and effectiveness.

The objective to remove terrorist propaganda from the internet can be duly taken into account in the E-Commerce Directive. Article 3 (4) - (6) covers the possibility to take appropriate measures against violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment occurring via the internet. This provision envisages case by case derogations to the Internal Market clause which Member States may use to take measures, such as sanctions or injunctions, to restrict the provision of a particular online service from another Member State where there is a need to protect certain identified public policy interests such as prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, including the protection of minors and the fight against any incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality, and violations of human dignity concerning individual persons. Therefore, measures may be adopted against services provided illegally in the context of terrorism. Article 15(2) of the Directive allows Member States to establish obligations for information society service providers to immediately inform competent public authorities of specific alleged illegal activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service.

Furthermore, every Member State has the obligation to ensure effective supervision of operators established on its territory and to adopt necessary measures, in accordance with EC law, to prevent criminal activities. The use of the internet in relation to violent radicalisation will also be discussed in the framework of the E-commerce Expert Group meeting planned in November 2005.

What is more, Member States are allowed to require an access and (mere) transmission provider, as well as caching and hosting service provider to terminate or prevent an

14 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (Directive on electronic commerce) of 17/7/1
15 Communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank on the application to financial services of Article 3 (4) to (6) of the Electronic Commerce Directive, COM (2003) 249 final
16 Intermediaries defined in Article 12 (f) of the E-Commerce Directive (mere conduit)
17 Intermediaries defined in Article 15 (f) of the E-Commerce Directive
18 Intermediaries defined in Article 14 (f) of the E-Commerce Directive
infringement. In particular, national courts and administrative authorities may issue injunctions requiring the removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it. Furthermore, black lists, based on clear criteria laid down by law to define which content is illegal, have been drawn up by certain bodies or police forces in some Member States to assist ISPs in identifying sites hosting illegal content (such as child pornography or racist content) and are being used by ISPs on a voluntary basis. This type of self-regulatory practice is an example that could be transposed to the prevention of violent radicalisation and which Member States could share with others.

The Commission encourages Member States to make use of those of these enabling provisions in the Directive in the most effective way to address violent radicalisation in Europe. In view of the importance of maintaining the delicate balance with the internal market principles of this Directive, the exchange of good practices and expertise in this area is crucial. The Commission is willing to consolidate such Member State practices into guidelines for effective implementation of the Directive in relation to this problem.

2.3. **Education, youth engagement and active European citizenship**

Programmes Although Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive prohibits the Member States from imposing on internet service providers covered by Arts. 12 - 14 of the Directive (mere conduit, caching and hosting service providers) any general obligation to monitor the information they transmit or store, or a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity, efforts must be made to see how the Union can contribute to the international effort to eradicate terrorist propaganda from the internet. The objective of Article 15 is to avoid imposing obligations on internet service providers, which would either be technically impossible or immensely costly and which, consequently, would harmfully affect the provision of basic internet services and hamper the development of internet and e-commerce. That same article was certainly not intended to give terrorists the opportunity to recruit people more easily or to allow the crime of incitement to commit terrorism under the above-mentioned Framework Decision. [DG INFSO/MARKT: could we envisage ways of making the important pro-business aspects of this article compatible with stemming dissemination of terrorist propaganda? Can this be explored? Can we use policies relating to closure of paedophile sites as models?]

The prohibition of incitement to hatred is currently limited to broadcasts. This is a serious weakness that needs to be urgently addressed, when one considers that similar audiovisual content is freely available over the Internet. Therefore, the Commission has announced a modernisation of the Television without Frontiers Directive [TWFD], in its Communication "i2010", which should take account of technological developments. The Commission intends to propose by the end of 2005 a modernized directive containing basic rules for all audiovisual content services, especially the protection of minors and human dignity, including the prohibition of incitement to hatred. The concept of an overarching framework is underpinned by the fact that some policy objectives now pursued by the TVWF Directive seem to be essential minimum standards with which any form of delivery of audiovisual content should comply. [INFSO: and to commit terrorist acts and to fuel sympathy for terrorism?].

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19 Articles 12(1), 13(2) and 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive
20 Article of the Television without Frontiers Directive
2.3. Education and youth engagement

The continuation of various EU-sponsored projects which aim to engage with youth in the EU Member States is important, particularly in relation to those youngsters who might face additional disadvantage. Such programs targeted at youngsters in their most formative years and at an age in which they are most vulnerable to fall prey to violently radical ideas, can have very fruitful outcomes. The promotion of cultural diversity and tolerance can help to stem the development of, for instance, violently radical mind-sets, of, for instance, a nationalistic, racist or religious type.

An objective of the “Youth” Programme is “to develop understanding of the cultural diversity of Europe and its fundamental common values, thus helping to promote respect for human rights and to combat racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.” The European Commission ensures that such themes - the fight against racism and xenophobia as well as the promotion of diversity - are regularly applied to the calls for innovative projects. The “Youth” programme therefore contributes towards preventing violent behaviour from taking root in young people.[DG EAC: can programme be used to promote also the prevention of violently radical tendencies?]

The Programme “Culture” Programme also finances activities linked to the promotion of intercultural dialogue as well as activities to enhance the cultural diversity of Europe by promoting understanding among people from different countries. Promoting intercultural dialogue will be one of the axes of the proposed new programme [DG EAC: can positive engagement of Islam – Muslims be considered in concrete projects?] “Culture 2007-2013.” [22]

At the same time, the Commission is carrying out many projects under the “Socrates” Programme which SOCRATES – programme – which deal with developing concepts of European citizenship and inter-cultural understanding that. Such projects enable people coming from different backgrounds to share a common European identity that nonetheless respects and promotes cultural diversity. These activities are treated in more detail in the school and adult education actions of the programme (“Comenius” and “Grundtvig”). One of the objectives of these programmes, that of promoting “intercultural awareness”, contributes in some ways to addressing the problem of violent radicalisation of marginalised and ‘hard to reach’ groups in society. [There are also projects helping to give people of all ages tools for effective integration, tackling social marginalisation and building a European identity.] DG EAC: re-word sentence or delete. [DG EAC: can positive engagement of Islam – Muslims be considered in concrete projects?]

The Commission has recently launched a proposal to adopt a new programme “Citizens for Europe” to promote active European Citizenship and one – One of its objectives of the programme is to enhance mutual understanding between European citizens respecting and celebrating cultural diversity, while contributing to intercultural dialogue. If [Should the programme be adopted, the Union would provide financial assistance to organize events, 21 Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the Culture 2007 programme (2007-2013), (COM (2004) 479 final of 14.07.2004)
create networks and promote exchange of good practices, notably which could contribute to celebrate Europe’s fundamental values and major achievements thereby contributing in an indirect way to the array of soft measures – reinforce the action against violent social radicalisation. [DG EAC - again, can one focus this programme on positive engagement of Islam – Muslims?]

2.4. Encouraging Social Integration and an Inter-cultural Dialogue and Dialogue with Religions

2.4.1. Integration

In the large majority of cases third-country nationals have integrated well within the Member States of the EU. However, if integration fails it can provide fertile ground for violent radicalisation to develop. As discussed in the Annex, alienation from both the country of origin and the host country can make it more likely for a person in those rare instances where this has not happened, it does not at all mean that it will lead to terrorism. In order to look for a sense of identity and belonging elsewhere such as in a powerful extremist ideology.

Integration policies - which are stand-alone polices having their own specific goals - could have positive ancillary effects on preventing violent radicalisation. The tackle those cases where integration has been less successful, the Commission is committed under the framework of the Hague Programme to take action to promote more vigorous integration policies within the Member States for third country nationals, based on the implementation of the Common Basic Principles on Integration adopted by the JLS Council in November 2004. The Commission has will-set out its proposals in a Communication adopted in September to be issued later in 2005. 

Under the financial perspectives 2007-2013, the Commission has also proposed a European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals aimed to cover targeted actions in this area.

A holistic approach to integration is necessary that includes not only access to the labour market for all groups but also measures which deal with social, cultural, religious, linguistic and national differences. The right to non-discrimination, as further developed by the EU anti-discrimination Directives, is also a key aspect of integration. While 20% of the European Social Fund budget is already being allocated to improving equal opportunities in employment for disadvantaged groups, other policies that may prove helpful relate to increased. However, since terrorism can occasionally have integration failure as its fertile ground, the Commission considers that integration policies – which are stand-alone polices having their own specific goals – could have positive ancillary effects on preventing violent radicalisation. As discussed in more detail in the Annex to this document, alienation from both the country of origin (or of the country of origin of the parents or grandparents) and the host country can make a person’s search for something beyond in terms of identity and belonging – possibly a powerful ideology as is an abusive interpretation of Islam – that encourages violent radicalisation – more likely and enticing.


In this regard, the Commission believes that European policies can effectively contribute to complementing Member States’ efforts to address violent radicalisation. Education and information have a very important role to play, especially engaging with youth and other specific groups. It also means prioritising integration to include not only access to the labour market for all groups, including minorities, but also integration measures which deal with social, cultural, religious, linguistic and national differences. Increased regeneration of deprived areas and neighbourhoods, improved social housing conditions and encouraged access to education and protection from social exclusion are other policies that may prove helpful. Furthermore, a fulfilling quality of life and ensuring individuals are engaged with society, on a personal level, are key to preventing recruitment to radical groups (see Annex).

2.4.2. Dialogue between the State and Religions

Dialogue is not often spontaneous, especially when dealing with important values and principles. It is therefore necessary to learn how best to exchange views and opinions and to create a method of communication to eliminate barriers and develop understanding of cultural diversities based on religious ideas (particularly when dealing with radical, extremist and fundamentalist concepts). This is both of general interest and a necessary condition for starting inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue from a solid basis.

The EU respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States (Declaration No.11 to the Treaty of Amsterdam). The relationship between the State and Churches and religious associations is not an EU a-Union-competence. At the same time, there is a tradition of inter-faith dialogue between the Commission and faith-communities and -religions, churches non-confessional organisations communities of conviction. The Commission has for some years established a wide network of different contacts with a large number of confessional and non-confessional partners coordinated this dialogue. On a regular basis during the Commission organises conferences, seminars and other sorts of meetings to strengthen the mutual understanding and to promote European values. In 2003, Italian Council Presidency a Conference of EU Home Affairs Ministers was held on “The inter-faith dialogue – a social cohesion factor in Europe and an instrument of peace in the Mediterranean area”27 whose 28. The aim of the conference was to discuss establishing the intention of the Presidency to establish a “European Forum for inter-faith and faith-governments dialogue”. The Commission, for instance, organised an conference on anti-Semitism. There was also a conference on Anti-Semitism organised by the Commission in February 2004 where the pledge to fight and monitor anti-Semitism was reinforced by the European Union.

The Commission will build on some of these initiatives in order to discuss further those that can potentially be linked to the prevention of violent radicalisation.29

2.4.3. Law European Year of Intercultural Dialogue

The Commission will launch a proposal to establish 2008 as the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The Year aims at making Europeans sensitive to the questions related to the Intercultural Dialogue as well as to use better EU programmes in promoting the positive

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27. Held in Rome, 30-31 October 2003
29. The Commission has also launched a proposal to establish 2007 as the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All that would help to raise awareness, focus political attention and mobilise key stakeholders.
values resulting from such a Dialogue. Topics raised in this Communication could be the object of particular attention at the events to be supported by the Union during the Year.

2.4.4.2.5. **Diversity within law enforcement authorities and security services**

Schemes should be considered which involve the police and law enforcement authorities engaging more at the local level with youth. Those Member States that promote the recruitment of people from different backgrounds should also encourage other Member States to do so by sharing their best practices, even in those Member States that do not officially identify ethnic minorities. This could be a way of improving--trying to--gain a--mutual understanding and respect between people them across all Member States.

More The development of preventive work in the area of counter-terrorism should be encouraged across Member States, along with further cooperation between operational, intelligence and policy levels. The Commission urges Member States that have already attained good results to share their experiences and best practices with others via EU structures. Member States have obligations to cooperate with bodies like Europol while cooperation with the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) is also strongly encouraged. As regards policy initiatives, the Commission will gather and assess the Member States’ best practices and consolidate them into periodic guidelines for all the Member States.

2.5.2.6. **Experts Research-Networks**

In line with the soon to be Pursuant to the recently-adopted Commission Financing Decision for a pilot-project on fighting terrorism, the Commission will allocate funds to establish a network of experts researchers, universities and think-tanks for the sharing of research and policy ideas within the area of violent radicalisation. The network will advise the Commission and the EU on this policy and should submit a preliminary contribution on the state of knowledge on violent radicalisation in the beginning of 2006. Scientific Research on Violent Radicalisation by the end of 2005.

The In accordance with the same Financing Decision, the Commission will also launch a public tender for studiesresearch projects in this area that will include ‘motivational and desisting factors for violent radicalisation’ and ‘socio-economic factors contributing to violent radicalisation’. It is possible there is a likelihood that the Pilot Project will be continued inextend to 2006. Both the networks and the studies will inter alia take stock of research completed or ongoing in the ECThereafter, Security Research should also be given an important role under the Commission’s Proposal for a Framework Research Programme and other research programmes. Such stock-taking of relevant knowledge should also be pursued in the ‘Security and Safeguarding Liberties’ Programme for the future financial perspectives and new research in this domain should be pursued in the 7th Framework Research Programme on Research from 2007 onwards.

2.6.2.7. **Monitoring and collection of data**

The Commission has consulted the Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights via a questionnaire, and has received dis-expecting feedback in the form of a study about the link between violent radicalisation and fundamental rights within the legal framework of Member States.

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The Commission will utilise make the best use of the work and expertise of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) in areas such as migrants' experiences, racist violence and Islamophobia. The Commission will also ask the EUMC for both in the short and the long-term. For instance, studies on different manifestations of hatred towards fundamental constitutional values of the EU (such as religious freedom and equality between men and women) can provide some insight into some of the causes for certain types of violent radicalisation, as can also, more generally, attention to migrants' experiences, racist violence and Islamophobia. Furthermore, the transformation of the EUMC into a Fundamental Rights Agency will widen the possibilities for reaching wider areas (for instance, police interaction with different communities), which will be useful due to the multi-faceted nature of violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment.

2.7.2.8. External relations

Dialogue. We live in an environment of open borders and global communications where the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. In recognition of this, dialogue—be it and, where appropriate, technical assistance to third countries and regional partners should be an integral part of our approach to addressing the issues of violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. As part of its external policy, the EU already has an active role in fighting violent radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists with third-country partners, albeit in an indirect way. The Community and Member States together are the largest donors of development aid in the world, which, in addition to its primary development role, also promotes is a valuable means of promoting positive messages and addresses some of the root causes linked to the emergence of terrorism. Development assistance can have an impact on the environment that terrorist groups seek to exploit. It can help erode the support base for terrorist networks and movements through its focus on reducing inequalities, support for democratisation and respect of human rights in addition to actions on good governance, the fight against corruption and security system, poverty reduction, reform, education and participation in the political and development processes.

Furthermore, steps must be taken to prevent state fragility at an early stage, long before a possible 'breeding ground' for terrorism might emerge. The Community will step up its assistance to support partner countries and regional organisations' efforts to strengthen early warning systems, governance/institutional capacity building and promotion of human rights protection to enable them to engage effectively in a preventative approach. It will also improve its ability to recognize early signs of state fragility through improved joint analysis, joint monitoring and assessments of difficult, fragile and failing states with other donors. This is an integral part of a comprehensive external action approach to security and development.

In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU action plans with the Mediterranean countries include a number of anti-radicalisation measures. Possible factors contributing to the radicalisation of populations have been addressed on numerous occasions.

31 The EUMC is currently preparing a report on 'Migrants' Experiences of Racism and Discrimination'.
32 The EUMC presented in April 2005 a report on Racist Violence in the 15 Member States
33 The EUMC is currently preparing two reports on this issue
34 The EUMC is currently preparing a report on 'Migrants' Experiences of Racism and Discrimination'.
35 The EUMC presented in April 2005 a report on Racist Violence in the 15 Member States
36 The EUMC is currently preparing two reports on this issue
during bilateral and regional exchanges. This dialogue can be deepened in the framework of the institutions created by the Association Agreements with Mediterranean countries.

More widely, Commission technical assistance supports, amongst other things, institutional capacity building, the fight against corruption, the rule of law (including the implementation of relevant UN Security Council Regulations relevant to countering terrorism). This is primarily part of a long-term commitment to partner countries reflected in multi-annual programmes. There is the potential to further develop these relationships particularly the Commission’s presence on the ground and its knowledge of the national and regional dimension to further assist our partners and ourselves in the fight against violent radicalisation.

Political dialogue and country strategies can therefore be developed to address, where appropriate, violent radicalisation and recruitment issues as an integrated part of a long-term country-owned security agenda. Decisions on geographical areas and projects can build on existing relationships to maximise the Community’s impact. The Commission needs to examine the related projects currently being funded in third countries and see what more can be done particularly (but not exclusively, given the widespread nature of the threat) in neighbourhood country programmes to add focus to countering terrorism, violent radicalisation and recruitment issues. This work would be designed to complement Member State and third country activities. [DG RELEX: could this be made a bit more concrete in terms of what type of revision of the programs could be made to address violent radicalisation in those countries?]

There cannot be any doubt that on the external-relations front, there is a need to better develop and implement a strategy to promote cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and developing countries, particularly those—in which Islam is the predominant religion. Since in this context it is important to acknowledge that the prime target for ‘Islamist’ Islamist extremists is often moderate Islam, supporting—Supporting moderate Islamic groups and moderate Islamic thinking both at home and abroad is therefore important. A better understanding of political situations external to the EU is needed. The Commission is giving greater prominence to the need to fight racism and xenophobia in its cooperation with third countries in the field of human rights. This is reflected in the funding priorities established under the EU’s European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, a thematic instrument complementary to the political dialogue and country strategies agreed with partner countries’ governments. The EU could adopt the same approach in promoting the values on which it is based to other states without, however, imposing any of its own models on them those states.

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ANNEX

Introduction

Violent Radicalisation is defined under section 12, above. In order to understand its historical and psychological roots one needs to look at a wide range of movements, organisations and struggles, with political, religious, national and ethnic motivations, or combinations of these. Radicalisation has become a particular area of focus recently-due to its link with combating terrorism. Europe has a long experience of fighting terrorism. Examples such as the ETA, the IRA and the Brigade Rosse come to mind. Terrorists under many guises and invoking different ideologies and motives have claimed victims in many Member States. The ideologies and propaganda have varied and included extremism of different types — whether from the extreme left or right, anarchist and religious or in many cases nationalist. All these groups have tried to terrorise democratic societies to concede political transformations by non-democratic means. While they sometimes invoked aspirations shared by wider parts of the population, the use of terrorism has always been rejected both by societies as a whole and by the very groups whose interests the groups purportedly sought to promote.

Terrorism is never legitimate. It therefore always attempts to justify itself by abusively referring to views, aspirations or beliefs which may, themselves, be legitimate and which it most often insidiously deforms. The Commission believes that there is no such thing as “Islamic terrorism”, nor “catholic” nor “red” terrorism. None of the religions or democratic political choices of European citizens tolerates, let alone justifies, terrorism. The fact that some individuals unscrupulously attempt to justify their crimes in the name of a religion or an ideology cannot be allowed in any way and to any extent whatsoever to cast a shadow upon such a religion or ideology. Stating this fact clearly is, in the Commission’s view, the first requirement for the Union in the fight against violent radicalisation.

In the recent past, terrorist groups, abusively claiming their legitimacy in the name of Islam, have been known to operate both within and outside Europe and often reasons for their acts are claimed to be related to political situations. Both military and civilians have been victims within Europe of terrorist attacks. Terrorist organisations are known to have had cells within Europe, long before the Madrid train attacks on 11 March 2004 or the London attacks of 7 July 2005. There are also alleged links between those who orchestrated the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, and the Madrid attacks. To date, it appears that organisations are trans-national, logistically well organised and well-funded. Moreover, the range of nationalities involved in various stages of the sophisticated organisation of the attacks indicate how global such terrorist organisations have become and also indicates how those involved may be European citizens, whose motivations defy simplistic categorisation; not being socially-excluded, socio-economically disadvantaged, unemployed or living in deprived suburbs of large cities or inner-city housing estates, or from immigrant families.

It is important to remember that certain regional terrorist activities, such as attacks related to the Israel-Palestine conflict, are not necessarily linked to global networks. So-called “Islamic” terrorists should not be automatically discussed together, or be seen to be carrying out “joined-up” terrorist acts together for one cause. The common “religious” denominator, and the actual religion itself, are often not the basis upon which attacks have been carried out. Small-scale organisations and groups across Member States advocate radical beliefs or encourage young people to take social or political action against Islamophobia or perceived anti-Islamic politics. The same goes for radical beliefs (often voiced in verbally violent terms).
against, for instance, immigration or globalisation. Not all the groups that express such beliefs carry out terrorist attacks. Those who do, however, often exist at local levels within Member States, as opposed to globally with sophisticated financing, sponsorship and planning. Terrorist organisations and networks rely on volunteers, logistical networks and funds from others who have raised money as they have similar views. They also have been known to deal in other areas of organised crime, in order to finance terrorism.\footnote{Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the Prevention of and the Fight against Terrorist Financing (2004) 700 final}

There is also a potential distinction between trans-national groups having funds\_global, well organised groups with prominent figures\_heads, such as Al-Qaeda, who seems to have sophisticated operating means, and logistics, on the one hand, and local or is thought to be well-funded, as compared with independent groups able to conduct or small-scale operations, on which are much more locally based. Often organic links are perceived between the other. This distinction latter and the former, when there is often no evidence that this exists. However, the technological means of our global information society enable Al-Qaeda to continue to exert ideological and operational influence exerted by organised groups on locally-based groups. The success recorded by the organised ones and their diffusion through the global information society is an incitement to actions for smaller on such localised groups.

1 Factors contributing to radicalisation

The reasons for becoming involved in groups which use terrorism against others as a way of expressing their ideas often stem from a combination of perceived or real injustice or exclusion. Focusing on fighting under a common political, religious, national or ethnic banner enables people to find affiliations with groups, and with these groups, carrying out acts of violence can become part of partaking in a cause. Other reasons can be found in the misinterpretation of writings or ideologies, or gaps between what one reads or has been told and the reality of ones contemporary social context.

On a more individual psychological level, not feeling accepted in society, feeling discriminated against and the resulting unwillingness even to try to identify with the values of the society in which one is living, can also lead to feelings of alienation or low self-esteem – a gap which might also be filled by making contact with the powerful ideals and purpose-driven motivations of certain groups or movements. Often the desire to engage with a particular locus of identity that represents one’s opinions can be a powerful motivating force. The phenomenon is very much similar irrespective of the powerful ideal; be it neo-nazism, nationalist or separatist causes, social revolution or extreme interpretations of religions. It is clear that not all those who come into contact with radical groups will in turn become radical themselves. The number of people who actually try to commit terrorist acts of whatever nature or gravity is small. It is important to keep in mind that it is always possible for an individual to renounce violent radicalisation, and many do. A successful policy to combat violent radicalisation needs therefore to understand such processes, but never justify violence.

One needs to investigate the ease by which people come into contact with violent radical groups. Some come into contact with them when they go to university. Away from the familiar environment and support structures of friends and family they start to become aware of politics and pressure groups. Those looking for recruits often take advantage of this situation. Others find them and are influenced when they are surfing the internet, via entering chat rooms or reading inflammatory articles on websites, which encourage and motivate
people into wanting to change situations of perceived injustice or inequality. Places of worship or political party/organisation cells can also be breeding grounds for terrorist recruitment, as in a similar way, they can become places where people become exposed to new ideas through sermons or lectures. Of those individuals who do become involved in groups or organisations, not all will then actually become ready to act on certain beliefs or opinions, or be influenced by what they hear and subsequently become involved in terrorist activities. It is the very small proportion of people who actually go from being violently radical to wanting to carry out terrorist acts that should be kept in mind during discussions of on violent radicalisation. However, an awareness of the causes of the problem is important.

Those people who attempt to influence others into joining terrorist groups should also be investigated and fought with determination. The Commission is already working to find ways of preventing the financing of terrorism through charities and non-profit organisations.

The role of media is significant in this area in a number of ways. Firstly, some media – notably radio, satellite television and the internet - disseminate propaganda which contributes to violent radicalisation. Typically this conveys a reductionist and conspiratorial worldview where inequity and oppression are dominant and entire countries, religions or societies are depicted in a way which denies them human dignity and presents them as collectively guilty. Some form of self-regulation principle or possible code of conduct within the media might be beneficial.

Secondly, the media can play a role in facilitating recruitment into terrorist groups, by giving expression to terrorist views and organisations and facilitating the contact between radicalised individuals, e.g. via the internet.

Thirdly, the media have an influence in the way they inform the general public about terrorist acts. Terrorism exploits open societies and the media are the main vehicle through which it attempts to affect citizens and leaders alike. Journalists face the difficult responsibility of reconciling their duty to inform the public with the need not to facilitate the aims of terrorists. These concerns, which are not new, remain an issue of reflection within the profession. Moreover, if certain groups feel they are being targeted via the media, this might reinforce their desire to become hostile in return.

Investigating the means by which terrorist cells or networks develop today and maintain themselves - facilitated by global communications such as the internet and mobile phones - and what factors enable new recruits or volunteers to become involved are also areas for analysis investigated since the emergence of political terrorism in the 70’s and the development of modern technologies. Based on this previous work and on detailed studies made by security forces of the radicalisation process of every suspected terrorist placed in custody, research must now turn to the development of new tools – both operational and legal – for those involved in the fight against this process. Such new tools, e.g. the standard questionnaires developed by the G8 Practitioners group, should be used by law enforcement and security services to carry out a detailed study of the radicalisation process of every suspected terrorist placed in custody and to provide useful and comparable information to understand more precisely the factors intervening in the radicalisation process and terrorist recruitment research. We need to define new tools to further investigate this area, within the realms of the security services, operational forces and also policy-makers.
Security services and police forces within the Member States have been studying the phenomenon of violent radicalisation concentrating on recruitment hotspots like prisons, religious centres and schools. We should therefore draw upon such expertise but at the same time not limit ourselves to it.

2 **ROOT CAUSES OF RADICALISATION**

Precisely identifying the root causes of violent radicalisation is a very hard task and experts are only starting to understand the phenomenon. Violent radicalisation can often be a combination of an individual’s negative feelings of exclusion, existing alongside positive mobilising feelings about becoming part of a group and taking action for change.

Social factors such as exclusion - perceived or real - are often partial reasons given for becoming prone to radical opinion or joining radical movements. It can be one’s own perceptions of injustice or discrimination about one’s situation that is seen to affect certain groups and that mobilises people into action.

Factors relating to exclusion, which can relate to being part of minority or immigrant groups – either individually or shared by the group with which one identifies or belongs to as a whole – can result in feelings of being discriminated against within the European societies in which people live. Similar feelings can also occur to those that feel their identity is threatened by immigration, globalisation or, in the case of separatists, insertion within wider, often undesired political societies.

Feelings of “belonging” and of identity are often fragmented and personal allegiances can cause confusion. For example, young people born to immigrant parents and brought up in Europe often have different expectations of the country in which they live from those of their parents. Many do not feel allegiance to their parents or grandparents’ countries of origin, religion or cultural background, and thus can only really be part of the country where they have grown up and live, but yet on—occasion—they may sometimes still encounter discrimination within these societies, often due to their cultural, linguistic, religious, national and physical differences.

All young children of whatever background want to “fit in” with others. It is only later on, as older teenagers, that feelings of wanting to rebel become more likely. The resulting alienation from both parental roots and country of origin and the society in which they live, can lead to a desire to identify with a more motivating or powerful locus of identity. It is this crisis of identity that can be seen as being a strong motivating force for many to become involved in organisations with strong beliefs who wish to avenge certain people or society in general, through terrorist acts.

Political beliefs, national, linguistic, religious identity and self expression, or combinations of the above, are often the motivating factors behind wanting to try to change the status quo. The sense of finding an identity and belonging can be stronger and more significant as a locus of difference, than simply inheriting an ethnic identity, or acquiring or being born into a citizenship especially for children who have had no personal or first-hand experience of their parents’ country of origin. For some young people from Muslim immigrant families, Islam becomes something different from the Islam of their parents, and as they find out more about it, it becomes a positive and more accessible means of expression for an individual. Many of
society’s perceptions of immigrant Islam in Europe are cultural norms which have been taken from the countries of origin of immigrants, as opposed to the religion per se. For some Muslims, the quest for a “pure” Islam is important and they do so by engaging with organisations and groups from which they feel they might learn new things.

It might be that a small percentage of these organisations take advantage of this and become fora for influencing young people. It is this false attribution of certain values and practices to Islam that creates negative stereotypes in the media and society about the religion, particularly since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the U.S. This can contribute to negative stereotypes, thus fuelling grounds for attacks on Muslims on the one hand and exacerbating feelings of discrimination within Muslim communities on the other.

The quest for a pure, simple ideology might also be felt by those that feel left out of social and economic change. Individuals, particularly young people from poorer, or excluded backgrounds, may feel a strong attraction for the “certainties” of extreme (or anti-globalisation) ideologies, although of course it is not only individuals in these categories who are found to have turned to violent radicalisation.