

## **Outsourcing borders**

### **Monitoring EU externalisation policy**

Bulletin 10  
9 October 2025

*“To begin with optimism, and once the inadequacy of optimism is borne in by an inevitably hostile world, to retreat into abstractions.”*

Thomas Pynchon

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## Thematic and regional developments

Official EU documents summarised here, and those published with previous editions of the bulletin, are contained in our [document archive](#).

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## Border management



### EU states get ready for new migration and asylum “solidarity” measures

On 10 June the Council’s Asylum Working Party discussed “solidarity” measures introduced by the Pact on Migration and Asylum. The measures are part of the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation.

Member states will be able to demonstrate their “solidarity” by accepting applicants for international protection relocated from another EU member state, or by funding “actions in Member States related to the area of migration, reception, asylum, pre-departure reintegration border management and operational support.”

[As Statewatch previously reported](#), **solidarity can include measures in “third countries,”** such as “enhancing the capacity of asylum and reception,” supporting “voluntary” return programmes and anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling projects and operations.

At its June meeting, the Asylum Working Party was due to receive an update on the “Implementation of solidarity contributions.” The Commission gave [a presentation on the topic](#) (pdf), which was released to *Statewatch* in response to an access to documents request.

**Solidarity, however, also seems to mean secrecy.** The majority of the presentation is censored. This presumably includes any information on exactly which contributions have been made by which member states. More transparency may be forthcoming this month, when the Commission publishes the first “Annual Asylum and Migration Report.”

## Budgets and funding



### Delegations discuss how EU funds can enhance border externalisation

[A letter](#) (pdf, partially redacted) sent by the Polish presidency to the Working Party on External Aspects of Asylum and Migration (EMWP) on 12 June 2025 explores **ways the EU's budget can be more effectively used as leverage** in convincing third countries to cooperate on border externalisation measures.

The letter was looking ahead to the presentation of [proposals for the next long-term EU budget](#), and built upon discussions at previous meetings of the [SCIFA](#) and [MOCADDEM](#) working parties. It notes a desire among delegations for “experience sharing and mutual coordination” on external funding mechanisms, particularly in light of the US drastically cutting overseas aid and a general reduction of such funding globally.

The EU has various budgets relevant to the “external dimension” of migration and asylum. Particularly important are the NDICI-Global Europe fund and the Instrument for Pre-Accession, which provides funds for EU candidate states. However, [“home affairs” funds can also be used](#).

The presidency's interest was in better coordinating these mechanisms to deliver the most effective external border management outcomes – particularly with home affairs funds only offering “limited targeted possibilities” in light of safeguards which “must be respected.”

Particular attention is given to NDICI-Global Europe, given its size (nearly €80 billion) and the conclusion from the 2024 mid-term budget review that the fund was under-resourced for the tasks at hand.

While much of the substance of the letter appears to have been censored, the issues raised are reflected in the Commission's budget proposals. As [Statewatch previously explained](#), they include more flexible funding pools, a considerable increase in overall funding and new rules to financially penalise developing countries if they do not cooperate with the EU's deportation regime.

## Deportation and readmission



### EU deportation proposals: the member states sink to new depths

A new [compromise text](#) for the upcoming [deportation Regulation](#) was recently circulated by the Danish presidency of the Council of the EU. Alongside two other legal proposals currently under discussion, the deportation Regulation forms the legal basis for the EU's plan to increase deportations, in particular by forging new 'Euro-Rwanda' deportation schemes. The latest text makes even more cuts to safeguards and protections.

The summary below demonstrates the degree to which the Council is willing to reduce, limit or eliminate safeguards for people subject to deportation orders. Changes in the latest proposed version of the text:

- **remove administrative barriers to deportation** at multiple stages of the process;
- **dilute protections, human rights safeguards and legal remedies;**
- allow people to be deported with **far less information on their rights and the process;**
- place asylum seekers at greater risk of detention, and allow for **detention in prisons with no access to open air**, if considered necessary;
- enact measures designed to **keep people out of Europe** for good;
- **dilute protections for children and their families, including by removing references to the best interests of the child, [a principle of international law](#)**; and
- transfer procedural duties and obligations **from member states onto deportees.**

The presidency's compromise text reflects a desire to remove as many human rights barriers and administrative hurdles to deportation as possible. A lot of the changes can be seen simply as 'tuning up' the language of the text to remove ambiguities, but there are also significant differences in the compromise document from the previous version of the proposal.

A [full analysis of the compromise text](#) can be found on the Statewatch website.



### Danish presidency presents its compromise texts on safe third country and safe countries of origin legislation

After months of discussion with delegations, the Danish presidency presented in September compromise texts on proposals to establish an **EU list of "safe countries of origin" to which people can be deported** (the 'SCO proposal'), and to **revise the principle of the "safe third country"** (STC proposal).

These compromise texts complement the revised deportation Regulation draft (above). Together, the three proposals form the legal pillars of the EU's project to increase deportations and further outsource migration control to non-EU countries. The texts reflect a clear desire on the part of most member states to remove barriers to faster deportations.

[A full analysis of the two compromise texts can be read on the \*Statewatch\* website.](#)

Alongside the two compromise texts, *Statewatch* has obtained a compilation of comments from delegations on both the [STC proposal](#) and [SCO proposal](#) (pdfs). Both documents are dated 30 June 2025. *Statewatch* also [obtained a letter](#) (pdf) from the new Danish presidency on “outstanding issues and way forward” for the SCO Proposal, dated 4 July 2025.



## Member state comments on “safe third country” proposal

[Comments](#) (pdf) are recorded by Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Spain. They broadly match a summary of the discussions in a German diplomatic cable [obtained by \*Statewatch\*](#).

Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands emerge as the strongest voices calling for legal and administrative barriers to increased deportations be removed, particularly regarding the “connection criteria” and suspensive effect of appeals. **Austria made clear its desire for “as little formalities as possible to conclude an arrangement with third Countries”.**

**France, on the other hand, maintained its opposition to deleting the connection criteria and removing the suspensive effect of appeals.** The comments also note that the French constitution requires asylum applications filed in France be examined properly, making ‘accelerated’ STC procedures irrelevant on French territory. **French delegates appear concerned that, if a non-harmonised system were implemented, there may be more secondary movement to France** from member states with more restrictive procedures.

Other notable comments include:

- Ireland, while in favour of keeping the connection criteria, would nevertheless be willing to delete it if other member states wish to.
- The Netherlands prefers member states retaining flexibility on how to apply the suspensive effect concept.
- Portugal requested clarity on what mechanisms should be in place to prevent STCs from violating *non-refoulement*.
- Spain appeared broadly sceptical of the STC proposal overall and has a ‘scrutiny reservation’, particularly in light of ongoing deportation Regulation negotiations.
- Cyprus warned that, while it is “in favour of taking into account the best interests of the child” it is concerned that **“young undocumented persons” might claim to be underage and therefore be protected from deportation under existing legislation.** Cyprus proposed more ‘rigorous’ age assessment requirements, though the issue is largely dispensed with in the new compromise texts, **which would see unaccompanied minors in theory eligible for deportation under STC schemes.**
- Cyprus and Greece appear to favour STC agreements at the EU level, rather than multiple bilateral agreements, citing a desire for simplicity and the onerous negotiations required of bilateral deals. **Greece in particular called for the EU to be “ambitious” when it comes to STC schemes.**

- Greece is anxious that it be consulted on any deals other member states make with a country on its border.
- Romania and the Slovak Republic appear broadly content with the proposals.

## Member state comments on the “safe country of origin” proposal

[Comments](#) (partially redacted, pdf) on this proposal were more technical than on the STC counterpart. They largely address procedural issues around the application of various elements, in particular:

- whether EU candidate countries should automatically be considered ‘safe’;
- how accelerated asylum procedures are implemented;
- sources of information for designating countries ‘safe’;
- how geographic or demographic exceptions should be made in cases where conflict, persecution or other dangers exist in parts of a ‘safe’ country; and
- the process for removing countries from ‘safe’ lists if conditions deteriorate and how asylum procedures would change in that case.

Notably, the **Netherlands appeared to take significant issue with the Commission’s designation of various countries as safe**, including several candidate countries as well as Colombia, Egypt, India, Morocco, Bangladesh, Turkey and Tunisia.

It appears that, at this stage, the wording of the SCO proposal left many ambiguities in the eyes of delegates. In one notable example, Portugal asked why the Commission and Presidency “**insist on making a distinction between civilians and people**”.

## Danish presidency looks to the “way forward” on safe countries list

In [a letter to member state delegations sent on 4 July](#) (pdf), the new Danish presidency appeared optimistic about the safe countries of origin proposal. The letter notes “the will of Member States to finally deliver on an EU list of safe countries of origin and to reach a Council position”. The presidency pledged to continue pushing for progress, but cautioned **several “substantial issues” remained**.

Most notable of these issues was whether SCO provisions in the Asylum Procedure Regulation and any potential national or EU level safe country lists should be tied, with the former potentially being too restrictive for the operation of the latter.

The concern is that “if interpreted too narrowly, the operational utility of the safe country of origin concept as an efficient tool to swiftly examine specific types of asylum applications could be thwarted”. In other words, **existing rules around how to designate a country ‘safe’ may in practice restrict the EU’s ambitions to establish accelerated asylum procedures with as many countries as possible**.

The presidency also reminded delegations that the common EU list should not be considered “exhaustive”. Rather it should be better understood as a list of the most common countries of

origin, in theory offering the most efficient package to the EU overall, while leaving room for member state lists to include other countries.

The Presidency also highlights the issues of EU candidate countries, notification mechanisms and exceptions from safe lists as requiring more consideration.



## Migration partnerships



### Ethiopia and Somalia: documents outline EU and member state priorities

An “action file on Ethiopia and Somalia,” produced in June as part of the EU’s Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration (MOCADDEM), highlights ongoing work to limit the arrivals of Ethiopian and Somali nationals in the EU. Separate [presentations by the Norwegian and Swiss delegations](#) (pdf) show some of the countries’ projects in both countries.

The [EU action file](#) (pdf) is built around five objectives:

- migrant protection, prevention of irregular migration, combating migrant smuggling and strengthened border management;
- return, readmission and sustainable reintegration;
- prevention of instrumentalisation of migrants;
- strengthened migration governance and management, by addressing the root causes of irregular migration and promoting legal/labour migration pathways and related skills development; and
- sustainable and integrated responses to forced displacement and durable solutions for refugees.

Activities noted in the EU document include diplomatic engagement, **“technical” meetings between EU and Ethiopian/Somali officials (in particular with regard to readmission of deportees)**, and projects funded by both the EU and member states.

This includes agricultural and climate projects that are considered to contribute to reducing migration. It might be asked whether this is the subversion of development aid, or its relabelling in order to be seen to be ‘doing something’.

The Swiss presentation gives an overview of projects that are part of “political and strategic cooperation,” as well as those related to migration. This includes a map showing where Switzerland has deployed immigration liaison officers (ILOs). The Norwegian presentation focuses on deportation cooperation with Ethiopia and Somalia.

Numbers included in the action file demonstrate **the extremely low level of migration to Europe from Ethiopia, in comparison with other destinations**. Data collected by IOM indicates that 250,000-300,000 people migrate from or through Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia annually; 50,000-100,000 people out of the country to the south; and just 5,000-10,000 out of the country to the north, including to Europe.

The action file is due to be updated again in 2026.

## Presidency report card on Central Mediterranean

An [implementation progress report](#) (pdf, partially redacted) on the Central Mediterranean route action file, sent from the Polish Presidency to the MOCADeM roundtable of 19 June 2025, updates member state delegates on progress across various countries.

Regional action files sum up the EU's activities and future ambitions for border externalisation and other related projects in various 'partner' countries and along the most commonly-used irregular routes.

Notable items for the Central Mediterranean include:

### Egypt

- The Commission reports "work is progressing" on migration/mobility-related aspects of 2024's [Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership](#), with regular dialogue and meetings through 2024 and early 2025.
- Frontex proposes joint counter-trafficking activities with Egypt following a "familiarisation" visit with the Egyptian interior ministry.
- Three search and rescue vessels were [handed over to Egypt in April 2025](#).
- 1035 assisted voluntary returns from Egypt reported in 2024.

### Libya

- Libyan and EU delegations visited one another for "technical missions" in 2024, to discuss "progress in the area of migration and protection." The meetings are reported to have helped UN agencies access disembarkation points and detention centres.
- Assisted voluntary returns and resettlements out of Libya are reported to be continuing, "supported by the EU."
- In 2024, the Trilateral (African Union, EU and United Nations) Task Force for Libya suggested a "joint mission" to the Emergency Transit Centre in Rwanda (a [holding centre](#) for people removed from Libya by UNHCR pending relocation).
- 16,207 assisted voluntary returns reported for 2024.

### Tunisia

- Progress is "expected on all aspects" of the [EU-Tunisia MoU](#).
- 6885 assisted voluntary returns reported for 2024.

### Other items

- The report notes several Frontex-supported return flights to Bangladesh and Pakistan in April 2025.
- 7844 assisted voluntary returns reported from Algeria in 2024, 2195 from Morocco.
- The **Migrant Protection, Return, and Reintegration Programme for Sub-Saharan Africa** (MPRR-SSA) received a "top-up" of €70m in December 2024; there is a plan

to mobilise €90m out of 2025's [Rapid Response Pillar-Resilience](#), with “further use” under consideration in 2026-2027.

- There are also updates on “**Talent Partnership**” programmes with Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

## **Presidency report card on Western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes**

At the Coreper meeting on 11 June, the Polish Presidency updated delegations on the implementation of the [Western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes action file](#) (pdf).

Notable items include:

### **Morocco**

- Exchanges on the text of a working agreement with Europol took place, but formal negotiations are yet to begin.
- A meeting of the [Frontex-Morocco “mixed committee”](#) on increasing cooperation between the two sides was to be organised after summer 2025, with **a Frontex liaison officer to Morocco to be appointed by the end of 2025**.
- Discussions on the development of a Moroccan “window” of an anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking project began in 2025. The consortium will be led by Spain.
- An “information and awareness campaign” in Morocco and Tunisia for 2023-2025 reportedly offers young people “**the opportunity to design alternative, personalised and safe life paths**” rather than try to migrate. The programme cost €1.4m from the AMIF. [Safe Journey and SHABABUNA were two similar previous projects](#).
- By June 2025, Morocco had received €79.6m for budget support. A final payment of €48.5 million is expected by mid-June.

### **Mauritania**

- **Civipol is undertaking a €25m project for border control in Mauritania**, with funds from the NDICI-Global Europe “Flexible Mechanism”. Standard operating procedures on disembarkation and interception of people migrating by sea are reportedly being developed. Another €2m contract is expected in 2025.
- An additional €28m for Mauritania was contracted under the Flexible Mechanism to deal with refugee flows on its eastern border with Mali. A €5m contract for the protection of disembarked irregular migrants is reported to be under preparation.
- An operational coordination meeting took place in Nouadhibou, Mauritania on 16 April 2025 between Frontex and local coast guard staff.

### **Other items**

- Counter-smuggling cooperation is ongoing with Senegal, The Gambia, Mauritania, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria.

- Under the €35.7m Common Operational Partnership II project with Senegal, **three search and rescue vessels are to be delivered by the third quarter of 2025.**
- There has been **continued Frontex engagement (including meetings and capacity building) with Mauritania, Senegal and The Gambia** “in view of a possible conclusion of a Working Arrangement”.
- The Frontex liaison officer for Senegal may have their role expanded to include Mauritania and The Gambia.
- A **"Global Action against the Financial and Digital-based Dimensions of the Smuggling of Migrants"** is in the works. The plan was submitted to the NDICI committee in March 2025, with a contract expected to be signed by June 2025. It will cover Pakistan, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Senegal, Nigeria, Tunisia and Morocco. A [job posting](#) for the programme describes the project as taking aim at **“cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled smuggling of migrants”**.
- A new phase of the EU’s counter-trafficking/smuggling NETCOP programme in West and Central Africa is being discussed. The programme establishes and supports “an operational network between the Common Operational Partnerships (COP) and Joint Investigation Teams (JIT) in West Africa and the Sahel.
- A €1.7m project financed by the EU’s Internal Security Fund aims **“to foster migration intelligence services” in Mauritania, Senegal and The Gambia.**
- **Engagement continues with Nigeria on a re-admission agreement and anti-smuggling cooperation.** Meetings scheduled for the end of 2025. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas urged progress in a meeting with Nigeria’s foreign minister on the margins of an EU-AU ministerial meeting on 21 May.
- The joint working group on migration cooperation with Guinea met in Brussels in July 2025.
- A meeting took place in Brussels on 9 April between Frontex, the Commission and officials from Côte d’Ivoire to agree on operational arrangements around the readmission agreement. **Security attachés are reported to already be providing help with identification of people in Belgium, France, Germany and Italy,** and it is hoped this will be expanded to all member states.
- Danish- and Dutch-led regional projects (in partnership with IOM and ICMPD, respectively), are reported to be **providing capacity-building measures on the return and readmission of Moroccan, Pakistani and Bangladesh citizens from the Western Balkans.**
- Projects continue under the Regional Development and Protection Programme in North Africa and Mauritania – Phase 7 implementation runs from January 2025 to December 2027.
- **Senegal and Nigeria could be included in the second phase of the “talent partnership” programme, provided there is “continuous cooperation” on migration, including readmission agreements.**

- A note in the action plan discusses the idea of **linking up “voluntary” returnees’ reintegration with European companies’ investments in return countries**. The timeline for this idea is unclear, with “reflection” ongoing.

### Member state actions

The document also lists a series of ongoing actions from individual member states. These include:

- **Belgian projects in Côte d’Ivoire (MIGRET), Guinea (AMIS) and Senegal**, running from 2024-2028 and focusing on “sustainable reintegration of returnees” (budgets unknown).
- Numerous Danish projects, including €1.3m for child health and reintegration in Algeria (2023-2025), projects for vulnerable migrants’ protection and reintegration in North and Sub-Saharan Africa (€2.7m for each region, 2024-2025), €1.3m for child protection in Morocco (2023-2025) as well as **the €47.5m “Pathways to Protection” programme to address ‘route-based’ risks (2024-2029)** and **€13.4m for migrants stranded in Niger who have chosen to return (2023-2026)**, amid other projects.
- Denmark is funding the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) with almost €2.7m for research “along various African hotspots” with an eye to northward migration (2024-2029).
- Spanish private-sector initiatives to “address root causes” in Mauritania and Senegal (April-November 2025).
- A €4.5m Swedish-led project with UNHCR focused on a “route-based approach to manage mixed movements along the West Atlantic route.”



### Presidency report card on Western Balkans

At the MOCADDEM meeting on 19 June, the Polish Presidency updated delegations on the implementation of the [Western Balkans action file](#) (pdf).

The update shows considerable EU-coordinated activities across the region, as is to be expected given the EU candidate status of many countries there. The accession process is an opportunity for the EU to have countries on its south-eastern borders adopt the EU *acquis* on borders, immigration and visas. Prior to their accession to the EU – if and when that happens – [states in the region form a migration “buffer zone”](#).

The latest “roadmaps” on strengthening and accelerating asylum procedures have been signed or endorsed for Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, broadly covering 2025-2028, while current roadmaps for Kosovo and Serbia have been extended.

The report includes updates on the enhanced detention capacities in each country, as well as appointments of liaison officers and other coordinating officials, myriad dialogues and meetings with Western Balkan officials, and political outreach from Commissioners and senior Commission officials through 2025.

Notable items include:

### **Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)**

- The status agreement extending Frontex's cooperation with the country was signed June 11 2025. Such agreements already exist with most other Balkans countries.
- The finalisation of an operational plan for Frontex and BiH border police to be 'tentatively' agreed August 2025.
- The report urges special care be given to security in and around BiH reception centres to prevent secondary movement or smuggling.
- BiH is reported to have conducted deportations to Türkiye and Pakistan, and has concluded return agreements with both states. Negotiations are ongoing with Bangladesh.
- A €500,000 pilot project on forced returns has been extended to Serbia.

### **Montenegro**

- Second roadmap on strengthening and accelerating asylum procedures, covering 2025-2027, signed in March 2025.

### **Other items:**

- It is reported there are around 500 Frontex officials deployed in the region.
- Reference is made to a €1,4m 'Pathways EMR-WBR' programme aimed at **"changing irregular migration behaviour" using social media and an online platform**. The project is reportedly focused on Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Türkiye, **Serbia and BiH**.
- A project financed by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund ("Strengthening of Migration Management, Asylum and Return Procedures in the Western Balkans") is reported to **have increased deportation capacity in the region**.
- A Frontex-led workshop on deportations to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco and Algeria took place in January 2024. Another on India, Egypt and Iraq was planned for January 2025.
- Concern over the **irregular migration impact of visa-free travel schemes in Western Balkans countries** continues, particularly with regards to Türkiye, though "concrete commitments" have been made to align with EU visa policy. The report urges Western Balkans partners "be encouraged to take further steps in all contacts and at all levels".

### **Member state actions**

The document also lists a series of ongoing, or recently completed, actions from individual member states. These include:

- A Danish project on strengthening counter-smuggling (€2m, 2021-June 2025).
- A Dutch project to step up deportations, implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (€1m, 2024-2025).

- Swedish projects to strengthen and accelerate Western Balkan asylum procedures (€2m, 2024-2026) and visa capacity-building (€1,2m, 2024-2026).

## Other



### **Khartoum Process holds webinar on “missing migrants” data-sharing**

A webinar hosted by the French chairmanship of the Khartoum Process convened to discuss the issue of [missing migrants](#). Khartoum Process member states as well as regional and international organisations were present at the webinar on 17 September, where the need for better data and knowledge sharing was discussed.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is reported to have recommended “establishing systematic state procedures to strengthen cooperation and information-sharing between stakeholders, **as well as creating centralised and harmonised databases to facilitate coordination.**”



### **Prague Process and ICMPD oversee opening of Uzbekistan ‘Migration Resource Centre’**

On 8 September, the Prague Process announced a ‘[Migration Resource Centre](#)’ in Uzbekistan, in coordination with the Uzbekistan migration ministry and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). The stated aim of the centre is to offer information services on legal migration and also **“raise awareness on the risks of irregular migration and threats of human trafficking.”**

A workshop on counter-trafficking [was also hosted in Vienna 9-12 September](#), designed in part by ICMPD’s Anti-Trafficking Expert Team and attended by practitioners from 18 states as well as representatives of INTERPOL, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and ICMPD. It addressed, among other issues, “technology-facilitated trafficking” and the role of the media and outreach programmes in preventing trafficking.



### **Commission urges more external project funding for Africa**

At a meeting of the European Parliament’s [DEVE Committee 24 September](#), MEPs discussed Commission amendments to the NDICI-Global Europe legislation ([Regulation \(EU\) 2021/947](#)). The [proposed amendments](#) appear to address a desire for the EU’s main external financing instrument to be made more dynamic, increase a **minimum spending envelope for Sub-Saharan Africa**, and to drive **“longterm, mutually beneficial partnerships”** around Africa.



## Updates to the document archive

The [Outsourcing Borders document archive](#) hosts key documents from the Council of the EU and the European Commission.

### **External Aspects of Asylum and Migration Working Party (EMWP)**

Priorities of the incoming Danish presidency: [Presentation to EMWP meeting on 18 June 2025](#) (8296/2025, LIMITE, 18 June 2025, pdf)

### **Working Party on Frontiers**

Priorities of the incoming Danish presidency: [Presentation to WPF meeting on 5 June 2025](#) (7465/2025, LIMITE, 6 June 2025, pdf)

### **Operational Coordination Mechanism on the External Dimension of Migration (MOCADDEM)**

[Regional action file on Ethiopia and Somalia](#) (7046/25, LIMITE, 6 June 2025, pdf)

Action file to follow up on the EU Action Plan for the Central Mediterranean route: [Implementation report](#) (6407/25, LIMITE, 12 June 2025, pdf)

Action file to follow up on the EU Action Plan for the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes: [Implementation Report](#) (7045/25, LIMITE, 6 June 2025, pdf)

Action file to follow up on the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans: [Implementation report](#) (7358/25, LIMITE, 13 June 2025, pdf)

Switzerland and Norway [presentations on external engagement with Somalia and Ethiopia](#), MOCADDEM roundtable 27 May 2025 (6882/25, LIMITE, 4 June 2025, pdf)

### **Asylum Working Party**

[Commission presentations on the solidarity mechanism during the Asylum Working Party meeting on 10 June 2025](#) (7706/25, LIMITE, 11 June 2025, pdf)

Proposal to revise Asylum Procedures Regulation regarding STC concept: [Presentations from DG HOME, EUAA and the Danish Presidency to AWP meeting 10 June 2025](#) (7736/25, LIMITE, 11 June 2025, pdf)

## Other documents

Proposal for a regulation as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level - [Discussion paper: outstanding issues and way forward](#) (11147/25, LIMITE, 4 July 2025, pdf)

Proposal on the Presidency's compromise text regarding the Commission's proposal on the application of the safe third country concept (STC proposal) - [compilation of comments of delegations](#) (8974/25, LIMITE, 30 June 2025, pdf)

Proposal on the Presidency's compromise text regarding the Commission's proposal on establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level (SCO proposal) - [compilation of comments of delegations](#) (8158/25, LIMITE, 30 June 2025, pdf)

[Presidency proposed compromise text](#), Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union (19 September 2025, pdf)

[Repeal of Article 38\(6\) NDICI Global Europe financial oversight mechanism](#) (8015/25, LIMITE, 16 June 2025, pdf)

## About this bulletin

This project, carried out by *Statewatch* and *migration-control.info* and funded by *Brot für die Welt*, *Misereor*, *medico international* and *Pro Asyl*, aims to make the EU's externalisation policies, plans and practices public. In doing so it seeks to highlight their impact on the rights of people on the move, as well as democratic standards, transparency and accountability. It addresses a lack of public information by publishing relevant EU documents, in this phase primarily those produced or discussed by the Council of the EU. It also tackles the overflow of information that results from a variety of EU institutions, working groups and national governments involved in the externalisation agenda by summarising thematic and regional developments, and by analysing key issues in depth.