



Monitoring activities over the maritime and air domains - Potentials of new OPD rules

24 June 2021

Author:

Agenda


- Maritime Domain
 - What we do,
 - Comprehensive support to MS
- Air Domain
- Points of discussion;




What we do

Risk analysis & intelligence-driven

- Pre-frontier maritime areas
- Suspicious vessels



Comprehensive assessment in support of MS



Assessment of vessel:

- Route and behavior at sea
- Hot spot of criminal activities (criminal hotspots / transshipment areas / EU sanctioned activities)
- Identification numbers (e.g. IMO/MMSI)
- Ship documentation (checking consistency and possible impersonation)



Assessment of cargo:

- Nature of cargo (phosphate or fertilizer for instance are a valuable information regardless of the above)
- Notice of arrival
- Shipper documentation (cargo manifest, bill of lading)

Comprehensive assessment in support of MS



Assessment of entities:


- Ownership
- Shippers and agents
- Other shipping stakeholders
- Possible criminal connections



Assessment of crew:

- Crew list (checking consistency over calls and nationality)
- Criminal connections

Case Study



• Vol characteristics

IMO	0000000	MMSI	000000000
Call sign	X0000	Flag	Cameroon
Vessel type	• General Cargo	• Year	• 1994
Length, breadth	103.77 x 18.5m	• Draught	• 9.00 m

• Indicators of interest

Blacklisted flag	• Yes	Single vessel operator	Yes
AIS gaps/ Dark activity	• Yes	Operator involved in criminal activities (Source: MS or Europol)	• Yes
Geographical area	• Yes	Master of the ship arrested 2 years ago for drug smuggling	• Yes
First visit	• Yes	Type of cargo suspicious for smuggling	• Yes
Abnormal Behavior	• Yes	Link with other Vols/companies	Yes


Description:

The vessel X, **Cameroon flag**, was operating in the wider area of India, Indonesia, Philippines. **After changing her ownership and name on 19.08.2019 she changed her operating area** sailing for a first time in the Med and the Black Sea. Her flag was also changed on 19.07.2020.

Her current ownership is based in Lebanon. The vessel during the monitoring period faced a technical issue on 12-01-2021 approaching Dacca anchorage area just like another potential Vol flying **Cameroonian flag "A"**. A significant **AIS gap** and **Abnormal Behavior** was also detected during tracking period from 16/01/21 to 29/01/21 when the vessel stopped transmitting in North of Cyprus whilst en route to Tripoli [LB]. For a vessel having Lebanese beneficial/ commercial owners and Technical and ISM management (the same company) that **behavior is assessed as suspicious**. Moreover, this company is **also related to another potential Vol "XX"/ IMO 0000001** flying the Togolese flag. Based on analysis of Europol, the master of the ship has links with a criminal network active in drug trafficking from Middle East to Europe. As informed by MS "Y", one of the crew members has been arrested for migrant smuggling. Based on the cargo manifest the vessel is carrying coffee which, based on previous seizures, has been proved as suitable for concealing drugs.

Open sources/ Media coverage: "XYZ shipping company purchases new vessels using money from drugs shipping" or "XYZ", O national, was behind the cargo of cocaine

Joint assessments – Exchange of data




- Identification of suspects of cross-border crime
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- Arrests of criminals

Air domain



- The project is under development.
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- Similar principles to the maritime domain.
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- Your experiences on the subject..?



Points of discussion

Do you have at national level a definition/criteria of the term “reasonable grounds” (or similar) for assessing a person as a suspect of committing/being involved in cross-border crime? Can you elaborate?

Do you have any chronological limitations in retaining the available operational personal data? Are you running periodical assessments for deciding whether this data should be retained or deleted? Which are the criteria that you use for assessing the necessity of maintaining stored this data?

Exchange of OPD with other EU/international entities such as EMSA, EFCA, MAOC-N, Interpol, UN Offices would be considered beneficial towards the envisaged outcome. What’s your views on the subject?

Which would be the proposed channels from your side for exchanging OPD with Frontex?

***Thank you for
your attention!***

*"If you want to go fast, go
alone. If you want to go
far, go together."*

African proverb

