

Brussels, 30 November 2021 (OR. en)

13589/1/21 REV 1

**LIMITE** 

JAI 1195 COSI 212 ENFOPOL 411 CRIMORG 111 ENFOCUSTOM 142 CYBER 283

#### **NOTE**

From:	General Secretariat of the Council
To:	Delegations
No. prev. doc.:	12668/2/20 REV 2
Subject:	Operational Action Plan 2022: Child sexual exploitation



Delegations will find attached the Operational Action Plan 2022 on *Child sexual exploitation* developed under the responsibility of the BE driver. The draft OAP was shared with National EMPACT Coordinators (NEC) and brought to the NEC meeting for discussion on 27-28 October 2021 and adopted by COSI SG on 17 November 2021.

Pursuant to the COSI SG meeting, delegations submitted some further technical changes to be introduced into the Operational Action Plan<sup>1</sup>.

Changes compared to the previous version are marked in strikethrough or **bold and** underlined.

13589/1/21 REV 1 JRS/KB/dk 1
JAI.1 **LIMITE EN** 



### **Operational Action Plan**

### 1. Aim

This Operational Action Plan (OAP) has been created within the EMPACT framework and corresponds to the following priority:

## Child sexual exploitation

The aim of this priority is "to combat child sexual abuse online and offline, including the production and dissemination of child sexual abuse material as well as online child sexual exploitation".

This OAP outlines a list of all the operational actions that will be carried out during the year 2022 as means to implement the following strategic goals:

- CHSG 1 Criminal intelligence picture
- CHSG 2 Investigations and judicial response, with a specific focus on high-risk criminal networks (HRCN) and key individuals
- CHSG 3 Coordinated controls and operations targeting the online and offline trade in illicit goods & services
- CHSG 6 Capacity building through training, networking and innovation
- CHSG 7 Prevention and harm reduction, assistance to victims, awareness raising
- CHSG 8 External dimension: cooperation with non-EU partners

#### 2. Context

## 2.1 EU Intelligence contributions

### **Definition of criminal activity/crime area:**

Child sexual exploitation encompasses any type of sexual abuse of a person below the age of 18 (child), including production and dissemination of child sexual abuse material (images, videos, texts etc.) Online child sexual exploitation includes all acts of a sexually exploitative nature carried out against a child that have, at some stage, a connection to the online environment.

## **Policy developments:**

The fight against child sexual abuse and exploitation is of high EU priority. The Operational Action Plan supports the full implementation of the EU Directive on combating child sexual abuse  $(2011/93)^2$  and the actions to strengthen law enforcement's response to this phenomenon as highlighted in the EU Strategy<sup>3</sup> for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse.

## **Key threats:**

- The amount of self-generated sexually explicit material produced by children as a result of manipulation, coercion or extortion has increased. The normalisation of sexual behaviours online also lowers the threshold to sharing self-generated content consensually or through coercion. The impact on children from each of these behaviours can be traumatic and cause long term damage similar to that of direct sexual abuse.
- Live distant child sexual abuse refers to the phenomenon of a perpetrator paying to direct the live abuse of children through video-sharing platforms. The child sexual abuse is sometimes captured or recorded for further dissemination online, which results in the repeated re-victimisation of the child, as with other types of child abuse material.

Directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> COM (2020) 607 final

- Distribution of child sexual abuse material through Peer2Peer networks continues to be an issue.
- Some children who are sexually exploited are trafficked and then advertised on the surface web as young adults on dating websites or on ad hoc platforms where adults look for sexual encounters with minors.
- Child sexual offenders often take advantage of their better economic situation to sexually exploit children either remotely online or in person. In some cases parents and other adults sexually exploit their children to benefit from this.
- Offenders increasingly use anonymisation services and encrypted communication channels to exchange child sexual abuse material.
- Offenders possessing technical expertise share their knowledge with others via fora and private discussion groups.
- In some EU Member States, child victims are exploited through trafficking in businesses such as legal brothels.

### **Key developments:**

- There has been a continuous increase in activities related to online child sexual exploitation over recent years, further intensified during the COVID-19 lockdown.
- The number of reported incidents involving live distant child sexual abuse has steadily
  increased in recent years. Cases of live distant child sexual abuse taking place in the EU
  have also been detected.
- The amount of self-generated sexual explicit material produced as a result of manipulation, coercion or extortion has increased.
- It has been observed that a large amount of child sexual abuse material is hosted in Europe. This has been the case in the last years during which there has been a shift from North America.

- The widespread abuse of encryption tools, including end-to-end encrypted applications, has lowered the risk of detection for offenders who exchange child sexual abuse material (CSAM) in private groups on messaging platforms and dark web fora.
- The production and distribution of CSAM for profit seems to be increasing.

## **Intelligence gaps:**

- Child sexual exploitation very likely remains highly underreported. Many victims remain unidentified and their abusers undetected.
- Child sexual abuse material is usually stored password-protected locally or abusing online storage services. These hosting services are often unaware of the material hosted on their servers.
- The data on the number of children that are sexually exploited, either through trafficking or otherwise in the EU remains an intelligence gap that needs to be addressed.

## **Key locations:**

- While most of the cases of live distant child abuse take place in Southeast Asia, especially in the Philippines, this has also been detected within the EU.
- A large amount of child sexual abuse material is hosted in Europe.

## **Enabling factors/enablers:**

- Child sexual abuse material can easily be accessed on all types of devices including mobile devices.
- Fora and private discussion groups are also used to share technical knowledge.
- Online offenders use fake identities and grooming techniques to gain the victim's trust and obtain illicit content by manipulating, coercing or extorting them.

- Children now often have unsupervised access to the internet. This exposes them to potential sexual exploitation by criminals as they often do not have the maturity to assess a relationship as friendly or abusive.
- Offenders increasingly use anonymisation services and encrypted communication channels to exchange child sexual abuse material.
- Children in the most vulnerable groups such as children in migration and unaccompanied minors, children with disabilities and those coming from disadvantaged backgrounds are at higher risk of being exploited.

# Most relevant (non-EU) partners/countries of interest:

- Australia\*, Brazilo, Canada\* Cambodia, Mexicoo, Philippines, Thailand, Russiao, Ukraine\*, United States\*, New Zealando [Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro]
- e.g. NCMEC, INHOPE, WeProtect, ECPAT, UNICEF, End Violence Against Children, Missing Children Europe, AmberAlert Europe, IWF, World Childhood, World Vision, IJM, APLE, Save The Children)
- \* Operational Agreement with Europol
- ° Strategic Agreement with Europol
- <sup>^</sup>Working arrangement

## **Key areas to target:**

- Focus on fora and private discussion groups to target offenders.
- Focus on the prevention of production of self-generated sexual explicit material.

Additional elements to the intelligence picture from Driver & OAP participants:

It will be necessary to the success of this priority in tackling child sexual abuse that the scope of the problem that exists and that it is intended to deal with is made clear. That includes being very clear that both online CSEA and technology enabled child trafficking represent a significant violation of ethical, moral, social norms and legal provisions, and the human rights of every victim. The well-established disciplines and investigative approaches of law enforcement to online child sexual exploitation and trafficking in human beings are different and the interaction between the two to enhance the protection of children from sexual exploitation will require a concentrated effort.

The crime of child sexual abuse (CSA) refers to the sexual abuse or exploitation of a child, a person below the age of 18, including the production and online sharing of images of such abuse. Offenders taking advantage of their power and/or influence over the child abuse their privileged position, status, and/or relationship, in order to coerce and exploit them to fulfil the offender's own sexual and less frequently financial needs. This crime has severe consequences for the victims and their ability to overcome the traumatic experience/s, and often have adverse effects throughout their life as adults. Sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a child can take several forms; some were explained above.

Crossovers between CSEA and trafficking in human beings (THB) for child sexual exploitation are seen mostly in the abusive acts committed against victims. Perpetrators or traffickers lure, trick, force or induce victims into sexual activity against their consent sometimes abusing legal businesses in order to do so. In many occasions victims are not even aware that they are being trafficked when they respond to a job offer abroad with promising income, or when they believe they are in an honestly established romantic relationship with 'lover boys'. While THB usually entails the transport or relocation of victims from one location to another for financial gain from their exploitation, the main goal of offenders in CSEA is usually to satisfy their sexual desires, and to a lesser extent for financial gain. The idea that live distant child abuse is a form of digital human trafficking, while popular in some jurisdictions, cannot be applied as an effective description applying in all countries and regions.

## 2.2 Potential overlaps/synergies with other OAPs

The priority crime area which this OAP addresses, could potentially have an overlap/synergy with the OAP *THB* on THB (children) matters (OA 1.2 from this OAP). In the same way it could have a synergy with the OAP HRCN on HVT and the use of financial information to track organisers and users of livestream abuse platforms (OAs 2.1, 3.1 and 6.3).

This potential overlap/synergy with other OAPs will be subject to the Driver's attention. The coordination with other OAPs will be facilitated by the EMPACT Support Team.

#### 3. Structure

The OAP is essentially a coordination overview presenting the general outline of OAs, rather than the specific detail of each OA and does not include sensitive nor classified information. These details will be found in the related OA planned implementation document based on the Planning and reporting template<sup>4</sup>.

An overview of the OAs within this OAP, that should be updated whenever relevant, can be seen below.

<sup>5002/1/20</sup> REV 1 section II. Planned implementation

# Overview of OAs

No	OA	AL	Short title	
1	1.1	EUROPOL	Threat assesment	
2	1.2	EUROPOL	Strategic intelligence dashboard	
3	2.1	NL	Assess, analyse and exploit existing data from past/ongoing CSA cases to identify HVT	
4	2.2	BE	VIDTF	
5	2.3	NL	CII group	
6	3.1	UK	HVT on the darknet	
7	6.1	CEPOL	Multidisciplinary training	
8	6.2	NL	Building CSAM datasets for VI training	
9	6.3	BE	Educational approach	
10	6.4	Norway	Identification of facilitators and consumers of online live streaming CSA.	
11	7.1	EUROPEAN COMMISSION	Building an evidence base for CSA cases	
12	7.2	EUCPN	Evaluation of crime prevention projects	
13	7.3	Norway	Police2P	
14	8.1	NL	ID of TNSO traveling to ASEAN region – prep for Africa	
15	8.2	SE	ICANN	
16	8.3	ES	Operational cooperation with Latin American countries	
17	8.4	SI	Operational cooperation with Western Balkan countries	

Action leaders – relevant actors: BE, ES, NL, SE, SI, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, CEPOL, EUROPOL

Action leaders - partners: Norway, United Kingdom, EUCPN

## 4. Management, Coordination & Support

## 4.1. OAP Management

Overall management responsibility for this OAP lies with the Driver, supported by the Co-Driver(s) of the OAP as identified by COSI and set out in the list of relevant actors.

Each OA of this OAP has a designated Action Leader duly tasked and empowered for this role, assisted if required by a Co-Action Leader.

Management responsibility for each operational action is outlined in the list of operational actions.

The management of the OAP shall be in line with the EMPACT Terms of Reference<sup>5</sup>.

## 4.2. OAP support

In order to allow the Driver to focus on OAP management, Europol shall provide the support to the OAP in line with the EMPACT Terms of Reference.

Furthermore, the Coordinator(s) of CHSGs, in line with the tasks and responsibilities set out in the EMPACT Terms of Reference, will support the various Drivers/Co-Drivers with all issues related to the successful implementation of CHSGs, together with the Action Leaders and the OAP group.

### 4.3. Information management

The Europol Analysis Projects shall be the primary means by which operational data emanating from the operational actions within this plan shall be processed. Other Europol tools may also be used where appropriate.

It is recommended that all operational information exchange within the OAP shall be done using the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), which provides a quick, secure and auditable means of communication between all competent authorities and Europol. Proper access to SIENA should be ensured as necessary for the implementation of OAs.

<sup>5 8436/1/21</sup> REV 1 (will be updated following the final version of ToR)

## 5. Methodology

## 5.1 OAP drafting process

The OAP drafting process has recently been modified to adapt to changing circumstances and a continuous increase in the number of participants. The details on the OAP drafting process for EMPACT 2022+, including the engagement of the Partners in the drafting and implementation, the release of the OAP to the Partners as well as the specific steps of the OAP development can be found in the EMPACT Terms of Reference<sup>6</sup>.

The scope of the OAs included in the OAP corresponds to the EU SOCTA 2021 and additional intelligence contribution gathered by the OAP groups.

When available, the actions should also include administrative measures. Wherever possible, due use will be made of opportunities and processes for a wider inter-agency approach.

The OAP will be validated by COSI SG/COSI.

## 5.2 Implementation

The OAP will be implemented via the set of OAs and timescales contained in the OAP. The Driver, assisted by the Co-Driver, will be the authority to execute or delegate the management/leadership of a specific OA to the Action Leader, who then has the responsibility for initiating and reporting on each action to the Driver.

Member States are invited to integrate the relevant OAs developed in the OAP at the appropriate level into their national planning and to allocate resources to support a common EU approach. Similarly, the agencies and relevant EU networks, should commit the actions developed into their annual work programmes pursuant to the Council conclusions on the permanent continuation of the of the EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime: EMPACT 2022+ and the EMPACT Terms of Reference.

More specific details about the implementation can be included here as required

<sup>6 8436/1/21</sup> REV 1 (will be updated following the final version of ToR)

## 5.3 Monitoring and reporting

The reporting is composed of three steps: 1. Light reporting on the progress of the OAP,

2. Comprehensive reporting on the results of the OAP and 3. Annual fact sheets on the results of OAP.

Monitoring and reporting shall be done in line with and using the template set out in the reporting mechanism<sup>7</sup>.

5002/1/20 REV 1 - Reporting mechanism



Operational Action Plan 2022 Child sexual exploitation

## EU crime priority/OAP: Child sexual exploitation - OAP 2022

#### List of actions

#### Strategic Goal 1: Criminal intelligence picture

Objective: develop or keep updated, through the detection of intelligence gaps, the monitoring of threats (including from high-risk criminal networks – HRCN), trends and new developments (e.g. the use of new technologies), and the identification of links to other crime areas, the strategic and operational intelligence picture relating to each EU crime priority, and to integrate it in the strategic and operational planning of the relevant stakeholders.

Ref.:	Leader: EUROPOL
OA 1.1	Co-leader:

#### Participants:

BE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, IT, LU, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROJUST, Norway, Switzerland, USDSS, USFBI, Ukraine, United Kingdom

# **Activity summary of the Operational Action** (Short description – 10 lines maximum):

To draft a threat assessment focusing on offline child sexual exploitation. The aim of this priority is "to combat child abuse online and offline, including the production and dissemination of child abuse material as well as online child sexual exploitation". While the EU SOCTA 2021 considers online child sexual exploitation as a form of cybercrime, the priority also aims at tackling the offline dimension of child sexual exploitation specifically. The aim of this threat assessment is to define the scope of offline child sexual exploitation as it falls under the mandate of Europol, describe and assess the threat of offline child sexual exploitation, identify connections with online child sexual exploitation, and describe the roles and responsibilities of criminal actors involved in this criminal activity.

Linked to operational actions 1.2, 3.1, 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.

#### Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- a) Data Exchange with Europol (operational and Strategic) enhanced
- b) Threat assessment produced
- c) Findings on offline child sexual exploitation including a clear definition of the scope of the offline dimensión and its Relations with the online dimensión

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2)

3-Strategic

**Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description – 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	Timing
1) Data collection	Q2 2022
2) Data collation and analysis	Q2 2022
3) Drafting	Q3 2022
4) Review	Q3 2022
5) Dissemination	Q3 2022

# Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

May touch upon THB (children) matters

Ref.:	Leader: EUROPOL
OA 1.2	Co-leader:

#### Participants:

AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, ES, **FR.** HU, <del>IE,</del> LT, LV, PL, PT, SI, SK, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FRONTEX, Australia, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, USDSS, USFBI, Ukraine, United Kingdom

# Activity summary of the Operational Action (action continued from 2021 – OA 1.1.)

To publish quarterly, within the EUROPOL legal framework, a strategic intelligence dashboard showing recent and ongoing intelligence trends, new applications being used, significant changes in behaviour among victims or offenders

Linked to operational actions 1.1, 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.

## **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**

- a) At least quarterly publication of the strategic intelligence dashboard
- b) At least 50% satisfaction among participants and operational partners about the production and content of the dashboard
- c) At least 2 contributions by participating member per year

### Type of Operational Action

Data collection/data exchange, Strategic, Knowledge/training

## Activities under the Operational Action and timing

Activity	Timing
1) Publish the strategic intelligence dashboard at regular intervals	Q1-Q4
2) Collect participants opinion	Q1 2022

#### Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

<u>Strategic Goal 2:</u> Investigations and judicial response, with a specific focus on high-risk criminal networks (HRCN) and key individuals.

Objective: prepare and conduct investigations, coordinated actions, and prosecutions, in each EU crime priority, to detect, identify and disrupt criminal networks active in the EU, and individuals with key roles in these networks, with a special emphasis on high-risk criminal networks (HRCN) undermining the rule of law by using corruption and intimidating power in order to infiltrate a Country's legal economy and administrative management system, those who commit acts of violence and use firearms to further their criminal goals and take advantage of vulnerable groups, as well as those who launder their criminal proceeds through a parallel underground financial system.

OA 2.1 Co-leader: EUROPOL

### Participants:

AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LU, LV, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, USFBI, Ukraine

## Activity summary of the Operational Action (action from 2021 - OA 2.3)

An operational action to assess, evaluate and exploit existing data contributed as part of past/ongoing CSE actions towards the pro-active identification of priority targets and safeguarding victims. Linked to operational actions 1.2, 2.3 and 3.1.

## Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- a) At least 20 targets prioritised
- b) At least 10 actionable leads/intelligence packages produced with support of EC3
- c) At least 60 % of actionable leads resulting in arrest/searches
- d) At least 5 actions taken to safeguard victims

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2)

1-Operational, 2-Data collection/data exchange

# Activities under the Operational Action and timing (Short description- 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	
1) At least 20 targets prioritised	Q1
<ol><li>At least 10 actionable leads or intel packages produced with support of EC3.</li></ol>	Q1-Q4
3) At least 60% of actionable leads results in arrests/searches	Q1-Q4
4) At least 5 actions safeguarding victims	Q1-Q4

# Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

CHSG 2 / HRCN

Ref.: Leader: BE

OA 2.2 Co-leader: EUROPOL

#### Participants:

AT, BG, CY, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, USFBI, Ukraine, United Kingdom, INTERPOL

# Activity summary of the Operational Action: (action continued from 2021 - OA 2.1)

Collect seized CSAM from and support MS and third parties with an operational agreement in their investigations by organising a Victim Identification Taskforce at EUROPOL. Victim identification experts from the MS and operational partner countries will in a joint effort prepare intelligence packages to orientate investigations with a focus on victim identification in the MSs and operational partners' countries.

## **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**

- 1. Publishing the number of victims identified and safeguarded
- 2. At least one victim identification taskforce organised
- 3. At least 100 series created and submitted to ICSE
- 4. At least 20 intelligence packages created
- 5. At least 60% of intelligence packages lead to investigations
- 6. At least 30 likely countries of production identified

## Type of Operational Action

Operational, Data collection / data exchange

#### Activities under the Operational Action and timing

<del>_</del>	
Activity	
Collection of intelligence material	Q1, Q2
2) Organise at least one Victim Identification Taskforce	Q1 - Q4
3) Prepare and send intelligence packages to the MS and third countries	Q3, Q4

#### Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Ref.:	Leader: NL
OA 2.3	Co-leader: DK, ES, IT, EUROPOL

#### Participants:

AT, BE, CZ, DE, EL, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, RO, SE, FRONTEX, Norway, Switzerland, USFBI, Ukraine, INTERPOL

#### Activity summary of the Operational Action (action continued from 2021 OA 1.2):

Maintain an international community of expertise on CSE related to covert work on the Internet. Raise the overall knowledge and effectiveness by sharing operational knowledge on CSE related undercover work on the Internet and conduct coordinated operations.

Linked to operational actions 2.1 and 3.1.

## **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**

- a) At least two expert meeting/workshop organised per year
- b) One coordinated operation between two or more MS carried out
- c) Best practice shared
- d) High value CSE online targets identified and shared
- e) High value CSE internet networks identified and shared
- f) Number of intelligence contribution to the de-confliction tool

## **Type of Operational Action**

Data collection / data exchange, Operational

## **Activities under the Operational Action and timing**

	<del>_</del>	
1)	Organise at least Two undercover activity in 2020 based on the work of the expert group.	Q1 to Q4
2)	EUROPOL will store information on online identities contributed by the MS engaged in undercover activities. Those are defined as creating or assuming an online identity to interact with other online identities and infiltrate and target networks and the individuals involved with them. MS can contribute information on their online identities to EUROPOL, they will be notified if matches against their data occur and they can choose whether to contact the country contributing the data prompting the match. In practice the data will be dealt with under EUROPOL handling code H2 unless otherwise stated.	Q1 to Q4
3)	Organise a meeting/workshop for MS and third parties involved in the project.	Q2 to Q4

## Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)

<u>Strategic Goal 3:</u> Coordinated controls and operations targeting the online and offline trade in illicit goods & services

<u>Objective</u>: target – notably through coordinated controls and operations – criminal networks, individual criminal entrepreneurs, high impacts vendors and facilitators, their business models and other actors involved in the online and offline trade in illicit goods and services, with a special attention to those active in the markets that are related to an EU crime priority.

Ref.: Leader: UK OA 3.1

Co-leader: EUROPOL

## Participants:

AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROJUST, EUROPOL, FRONTEX, Norway, Switzerland, USFBI, Ukraine

Activity summary of the Operational Action (Short description— 10 lines maximum): As continuation from the OA 7.1 from the OAP 2021, target hidden services and open web sites and fórums that are used for CSAE offending. Provide and share intelligence for operational action across MS, specifically for targeting those offenders who are at the high end of high risk and who promote sadistic or degrading activities against children, including those who are engaged in grooming, blackmailing and inciting children to commit contact abuse on themselves or others.

Linked to operational actions 2.1 and 2.3

### Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- 1. Number of hidden services, open web sites and fórums identified
- 2. Number of intelligence packages disseminated
- 3. Number of offenders successfully disrupted
- 4. Number of victims safeguarded or protected

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2) (1-Operational, 5-Prevention)

Activities under the Operational Action and timing (Short description– 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	
1) Identify high risk environments and offenders	
2) Obtain actionable intelligence and share with MS	
3) Prepare and disseminate intelligence packages with AP TWINS	
4) Conduct arrests/operations against identified targets	

Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority CHSG 2 / HRCN

## Strategic Goal 4: Criminal Finances, Money Laundering and Asset Recovery

<u>Objective</u>: Combat the criminal use of financial structures including money laundering, facilitate asset recovery an confiscate proceeds of crime, disrupt criminal infiltration by involving specialised financial investigators, where relevant, as part of investigations in the EU crime priorities, and develop a culture of asset recovery through training and financial intelligence sharing.

The CSE EMPACT group proposed excluding the horizontal strategic Criminal Finances, Money Laundering and Asset Recovery MASP on Cybercrime - CSA/CSE as the extent of this phenomenum in relation to the overall objective related to child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation is very limited. Where Criminal Finances may exist in relation to Cybercrime - CSA/CSE (e.g. payments made by customers to gain access to live stream abuse images or to purchase CSAM offered on different platforms), criminal finances is not considered to be significant as a crime enabled by or used to facilitate these crimes. These vulnerabilities can sufficiently be covered by other objectives included in the MASP, e.g. on operational activities or prevention and capacity building.

#### Strategic Goal 5: Document Fraud

<u>Objective</u>: target criminal networks or criminal individual entrepreneurs active in the production and provision of fraudulent and false documents or identification marks by involving specialised investigators, where relevant, as part of investigations in the EU crime priorities.

The MS and operational partner experts proposed excluding the horizontal strategic objective on document fraud from the MASP on Cybercrime - CSA/CSE. The Member States' experts considered that the extent of document fraud in relation to the overall objective related to child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation is very limited. Where document fraud may exist in relation to Cybercrime - CSA/CSE (e.g. use of forged documents to set up fake identities online or to register domains) document fraud is not considered to be significant as a crime enabled by or used to facilitate these crimes. Member States' experts considered that these vulnerabilities can sufficiently be covered by other objectives included in the MASP, e.g. on operational activities or prevention and capacity building.

#### Strategic Goal 6: Capacity building through training, networking and innovation

Objective: build the law enforcement and judicial authorities' capacities and capabilities to tackle\_serious and organised crime by improving knowledge, skills and expertise based on training, networking, the sharing of good practices, and the development of innovative approaches.

Ref.:	Leader: CEPOL
OA 6.1	Co-leader:

#### **Participants:**

MS, TP, EU Agencies/Bodies in accordance with CEPOL rules and cooperation arrangements (agreed with CEPOL)

# **Activity summary of the Operational Action** (Short description – 10 lines maximum):

Carry out and implement multidisciplinary training activities related to child sexual exploitation

## Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- a) At least 3 on-site training events organised
- b) At least 5 trained/exchanged officers
- c) Level of satisfaction with training activities 80%

#### Type of Operational Action

4-Knowledge/training

# **Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description– 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	Timing
1) 1 international residential course "CSE-Undercover Operations"	Q2-Q4
2) 1 international residential course "CSE- Victim ID"	Q2-Q4
<ol> <li>1 international residential course "Strategies in Managing Child Sex Offenders"</li> </ol>	Q2-Q4
4) 2 webinars on Child Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation	Q1-Q3
5) Participation in the CEPOL Exchange Program (CEP) with a focus on CSE/CSA	Q2_Q4

## Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Ref.:	Leader: NL

OA 6.2 Co-leader: EUROPOL

#### Participants:

AT, BE, CY, DK, ES, FI, HR, IE, LU, MT, PL, PT, RO, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Norway, Ukraine, INTERPOL

# **Activity summary of the Operational Action** (Short description – 10 lines maximum):

Build CSAM data sets for training of classification software.

An internationally organized and coordinated construction of, in an unambiguous way, annotated data sets with images and videos. Divided into Training, Test and Validation sets. With this, classifiers can be trained which can be used for the classification of the ever-increasing amount of material. In addition to classification, these sets can also be the key to (partially) solving hash problems in the current situation. File content (binaries) hashing instead of actual video or video hashing. These sets can be of interest in using in photo video DNA as well.

## Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets (To Be discussed)

- a) Conclude determination of sizes of at least 1 training set
- b) Conclude determination of sizes of at least 1 test set
- c) Conclude determination of sizes of at least 1 validation set
- d) d) Determination of the anotation criteria;
- e) e) Setting up of agreed methodology and platform among the technical (software developers) and VID experts
- f) Ensuring that any of the data sets have the minimum bias

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2)

(1-Operational, 2-Data collection/data exchange,

# **Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description– 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	Timing
1) Get third party countries on-board as well	2022 Q1
Bring technical (software developers) and VID experts together to determine scope and annotation scheme/rules. Continuous process.	2022 Q2-Q4 / 2023 Q1-Q4
Cut up work load and divide amongst MS and third party countries	2022 Q2-Q4 / 2023 Q1-Q4

## Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Ref.:	Leader: BE
OA 6.3	Co-leader: DK, NL, NO, EUCPN, EUROPOL

#### Participants:

BG, CY, DE, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, LV, MT, PT, RO, SE, SK, CEPOL, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Iceland, Switzerland, Ukraine

Activity summary of the Operational Action (Short description - 10 lines maximum):

Shareable 2.0. European educational approach to educate every student (under 14) in sexting and sharing sexual explicit material of themselves and others. Added to this the new AI software Deepfakes and Deepnudes. This can be a huge international problem, where identification on forehand and knowledge about the increasing risk of seeing fake nude photos or videos's is the stake of this action and to produce raising awareness materials (such as video, website, etc.).

As part of the continued activity OA 3.3 from OAP 2021, when Europol's analysis showed connectivity in offenders' behaviour online toward children during the outbreak COVID-19 pandemic, the increased activity in prevention and awareness is still needed and delivered to different focused groups. In this regard, the setting up of a website (working title Help4U - H4U) aimed at assisting children to get relevant personalized information in a coordinated way is an additional action under this OA. The basic version of the action will be made together with five pilot countries, namely BE, DE, IE, NL, SI and Europol.

#### Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- a) Training manual for students and parents in MS language
- b) Number of schools/organisations reached.
- c) Number of youngsters and adults reached.
- d) Number of established contacts in the international school community.
- e) Number of contributions by country in pilot prevention projects.
- f) Creation of H4U website

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2) **(4-Knowledge/training, 5-Prevention)** 

**Knowledge training** 

**Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description– 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity		Timing
1)	Make a European wide usable video available, free of intellectual property. (with a translation of used text messages to be used in video)	2022
2)	Training manual for students and parents in MS language	2022
3)	Website for training trainers (police officers and or School teachers)	2023
4)	Providing beta version of Help4U	2022

Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

CHSG 2 / HRCN

OA 6.4 Co-leader: RO, EUROPOL

## **Participants:**

AT, BE, BG, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, IT, LV, PL, SI

Activity summary of the Operational Action (Short description— 10 lines maximum):

Identification of facilitators and consumers of online live streaming CSA sessions by using an innovative approach;

## Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- a) At least 1 coordinated operational action, if applicable
- b) At least 10 investigations initiated.
- c) At least 15 intelligence packages distributed

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2)

(4-Knowledge/training, 5-Prevention)

**Knowledge training** 

**Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description- 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	Timing
Gathering the necessary information;	Q1 - Q2
Organisation of one operational meeting;	Q3
Identification of appropriate public and private partners;	Q1 - Q4
Execution of investigations;	Q3 - Q4
Exploration of the possibility to provide information to safeguard and protect children in the host countries	Q1 - Q4

### Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

<u>Strategic Goal 7:</u> Prevention, awareness raising and harm reduction, early identification of and assistance to victims

<u>Objective:</u> carry out ethically acceptable and evidence-based activities aimed at raising awareness and reducing the risk of crime occurring and its harmful consequences with the ultimate goal of working towards the improvement of the quality of life and safety of individuals, groups and communities.

Ref.: Leader: EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Co-leader: EUROPOL

## Participants:

AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, EUROJUST, Iceland, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom

**Activity summary of the Operational Action** (Short description– 10 lines maximum): To develop an evidence base of child sexual abuse cases to support policy development, including the work on the:

- upcoming legislative instrument on preventing and combatting child sexual abuse, including by requiring online service providers to detect and report child sexual abuse material,
- the study to identify gaps and good practices, supporting the evaluation of the EU Directive on combating child sexual abuse

## Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

Contributing of information on 5 cases investigated between 2020-2021 by each EMPACT participant which started with a report received from NCMEC and which led to:

- a) the rescue of victims,
- b) arrest of offenders, and/or
- c) are examples of either best practices or which demonstrate issues that need to be resolved

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2) (,data collection/data exchange, Strategic,)

**Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description- 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	
<ol> <li>Develop and deploy data collection methodology including sending of a focused requests for information</li> </ol>	Q1-Q2
2) Compilation of data and drafting of report	Q3
3) Publish the report	Q4
4) Collect participants feedback on the report	Q1 2023

Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Ref.:	Leader: EUCPN
ΟΔ 7.2	

Co-leader: BE

#### **Participants:**

BG, CY, DK, EL, ES, FI, HR, HU, LT, LU, MT, PT, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPOL, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine

### **Activity summary of the Operational Action**

Development and improvement of crime prevention activities aimed at Child Sexual Exploitation, including the evaluation of these activities.

## **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets**

- a) Development of one training and one handbook on Evaluation of crime prevention
- b) Assessment of the knowledge of the participants to carry out a process and impact evaluation
- c) Assessment of the knowledge of the participants about the evaluation of crime prevention
- d) Satisfaction rate (at least 80%)

**Type of Operational Action** 4-Knowledge/training, 5-Prevention)

**Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description– 5 lines maximum per activity)

Acti	vity	Timing
	Development of a training and handbook for practitioners to enable them to evaluate crime prevention activities	Q1
	Organisation of a training for practitioners to enable them to evaluate crime prevention activities	Q2

## Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Ref.: OA 7.3	Leader: NO
	Co-leader:

#### Participants:

BG, DK, ES, FI, FR, HR, <del>IE,</del> LV, MT, NL, PT, SE, SI, SK, EUROPOL, INTERPOL

#### **Activity summary of the Operational Action**

Produce and distribute no-content files and warning files with police officers on file sharing networks from police computers in participating countries to reduce the number of CSAM distributors and files. In addition, continue with updating the helplinks.eu with resources as they become available. (action from 2021 – OA 3.2).

## **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**

- 1. Increased amount of no-content files and warning files by 25% compared to 2021.
- 2. Increased amount of uploaded data/files compared to 2021.
- 3. Preventive action achieved through at least 10% reduction in CSAM distributed on targeted file sharing networks.
- 4. Increased number of countries with available resources on helplinks.eu compared to 2021 and feedback received and analysed from participating countries.

## Type of Operational Action

Operational, knowledge/training

Activities under the Operational Action and timing (Short description for OAP - 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	
1) Continue producing and distributing non-content and warning files	Q1 to Q4
2) Expand the number of participating countries	Q1 to Q4

#### Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

<u>Strategic Goal 8:</u> External dimension: cooperation with non EU partners (non-EU countries, international organisations and partners)

<u>Objective:</u> expand the external dimension of EMPACT and the cooperation both with third countries and at global level to address common challenges. Enhance cooperation with relevant non-EU partners such as international organisations, regional fora, non-EU source, transit and destination countries, priority countries such as enlargement and neighbouring countries, and key crime markets for each EU crime priority.

Ref.: Leader: NL OA 8.1

Co-leader: ES, FR, United Kingdom

#### Participants:

AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, HR, HU, IT, LU, PL, PT, SE, SI, EUROPOL, FRONTEX, Norway, Switzerland, INTERPOL

# **Activity summary of the Operational Action** (Short description – 10 lines maximum):

(action continued from 2021 O.A. 4.1):

# Finish action in new policy cycle and determin if next cycle could be new region (eg. Africa)

Identification and investigation of TCSO's travelling to Thailand and other emerging hotspots, increase the proactive intelligence sharing of suspected / known (high risk) offenders, raise awareness among relevant partners and de-conflict with strategic partners.

## Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- a) Build an (strategic) intelligence picture of TCSO in Thailand and other emerging hotspots
- b) At least one coordinated operational action initiated in a emerging hotspot (such as Thailand) in 2022
- c) Organize an EMPACT action day awareness at airports in EU and Australia.
- d) Produce typology set(s) in cooperation with TWINS and PI units to increase TSCO detection at the EU MS borders;
- e) At least 10% increase of the MS sharing intelligence under Operation Guestship or similar initiatives

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2) 1-Operational,

Operational, Data collection / data exchange, Strategic, Knowledge/training

Activities under the Operational Action and timing (Short description – 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	Timing
Build a strategic intelligence picture and disseminate among MS and participating partners	Q1-Q4
2) Operational meeting to prepare the coordinated operational action	Q2
Carry out planned operational actions in Thailand with a representative of OA present	Q3
4) Debriefing and evaluation of operational action	Q4
5) Organize a JAD at airports in the EU	Q3

Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Ref.: Leader: SE

Co-leader: CY

## Participants:

AT, BE, BG, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LU, LV, PL, PT, RO, SI, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPOL, FRONTEX, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, INTERPOL

#### **Activity summary of the Operational Action**

Represent the EMPACT Cybercrime CSA/CSE members at ICANN meetings. Influence in meetings within GACs (General advisory committee) Public sector working group (PSWG) to persuade high level decision makers to start and increase the speed of the implementation of Standardized system for access and disclosure (SSAD). The System for Standardized Access/Disclosure (SSAD) is a new system proposed to centrally handle requests for non-public registration data. Clarify the importance within GAC about law enforcements working with CSA/CSE need to have a solution in the absolute near future. Links to the OA 7.1. (action continued from 2021 – OA 4.2)

### Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- a) EMPACT Cybercrime CSA/CSE group to participate in ICANN three meetings in 2022, engage with non-EU partners and non-LEA partners there and report.
- b) At least one presentation given at ICANNs GAC meetings to clarify the needs of the EMPACT CSA/CSE group and the importance to increase the speed of SSAD.
- c) Feedback provided /Report drafted on the work progress of SSAD.

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2) **1-Operational, 3-Strategic,** 

**Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description– 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	Timing
1) Prepare for the participation in the ICANN meetings	Q1, Q3
2) Attend the ICANN meetings and engage with GAC in PSWG	Q1 - Q4
<ol> <li>Report to the EMPACT CSA/CSE group and prepare relevant documents.</li> </ol>	Q4
<ol> <li>In the ICANN public meeting in the Hague 2022 make together with Europol m a presentation to the GNSO council about CSA/CSE work</li> </ol>	Q2

Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Ref.: OA 8.3	Leader: ES
	Co-leader: INTERPOL

#### **Participants:**

FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LU, PL, PT, EUROPOL, FRONTEX, Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Switzerland, Uruguay

Activity summary of the Operational Action (Short description- 10 lines maximum):

To take advantage of the ELIPSIA network in order to carry out several operations and exchange good practices with Latin American countries. To prepare an international awareness campaign.

(action continued from 2021 - OA 4.3)

### Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- a) To add at least two new actors from Europe and two from Latin America
- b) To maintain the contact network
- c) To hold at least one meeting with the European and the Latin American experts
- d) To carry out an awareness campaign with several countries involved
- e) To implement one coordinated operational action
- f) At least 5 Latin American countries involved in the campaign
- g) To provide at least one common training and networking for successful investigations with participation of the Latin American region

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2) (1-Operational, 5-Prevention)

**Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description– 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	Timing
To carry out at least one international CSE/CSA operation action or investigation in Latin America	
To hold at least one meeting of the network for exchanging information in this field between the countries	
To carry out a specific awareness raising a campaign in European and Latin American countries	
4) To identify CSE/CSA and experts from other countries	

Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Ref.: Leader: SI

Co-leader: HR, EUROPOL

#### Participants:

AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, HR, HU, IE, LU, PL, FRONTEX, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine

# Activity summary of the Operational Action (Short description— 10 lines maximum):

Continue the preventive and operational cooperation with the Western Balkans. The aims remains the same maintaining links with the Western Balkan countries and possibly establish new links mainly with Albania and Kosovo\* in order to improve the prevention and investigation of criminal offences of online and offline sexual abuse of children.

(action continued from 2021 - OA 4.3)

## Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and targets

- 1. To maintain a contact network
- 2. To hold at least one meeting with the European and the Western Balkan experts
- 3. To provide at least one common training and networking for successful investigations with participation of the Western Balkan region
- To explore providing of prevention of child sexual abuse and exploitation in European and Western Balkan region by implementing a shareable prevention campaign

**Type of Operational Action** (indicate the main one - maximum 2) (1-Operational, 5-Prevention)

**Activities under the Operational Action and timing** (Short description– 5 lines maximum per activity)

Activity	Timing
<ol> <li>To hold at least one meeting where a network should be strengthen in order to have information exchange in the filed between the countries</li> </ol>	Q1 - Q4
To carry out common training with Western Balkan countries     (with networking)	Q1 - Q4
<ol><li>To explore, prepare and launch specific awareness raising campaign in European and Western Balkan countries.</li></ol>	Q1 - Q4
4. Look for possibilities for a coordinated operational action.	Q4
<ol><li>To identify possible new actors from Europa in Western Balkans</li></ol>	Q1 - Q4

Links to other Operational Action Plans (OAP)/priority

Horizontal activities / Joint Action Days (JAD)

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

<u>Strategic Goal 9:</u> Administrative approach (ADDITIONAL AND TARGETED - OPTIONAL FOR EACH OAP)

<u>Objective</u>: use administrative measures against serious and organised crime in a complementary way to prevent and tackle the misuse of the legal infrastructure through multiagency cooperation by sharing information and taking actions in order to set up barriers.