COVER NOTE

From: European External Action Service (EEAS)
To: Political and Security Committee (PSC)
European Union Military Committee (EUMC)

Subject: Exercise Instructions (EXINST) for the EU Crisis Management Military Exercise in 2021 (MILEX 21)

Delegations will find attached the Exercise Instructions (EXINST) for EU Crisis Management Military Exercise in 2021 (MILEX 21), as agreed by the EUMC on 19 March 2021.

Encl.: EEAS(2021)217 REV 2
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EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS (EXINST) FOR THE EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT MILITARY EXERCISE IN 2021 (MILEX 21)
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SECTION 1
ORGANISATION
A. BACKGROUND

1. Name
EU Crisis Management Military Exercise in 2021 (MILEX 21).

2. Scope, focus and form.

MILEX 21 is a military thematic Exercise that involves specific aspects of a crisis situation. This is an Exercise with a focus on the EU’s ability to respond to and manage crisis and the interaction between the EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ), at the military strategic level, and the EU Force Headquarters (FHQ), at the military operational level.

The form of MILEX 21 is a Command Post Exercise (CPX) that involves the EU Institutions and bodies, as well as Member States (MS), and focuses primarily on testing the crisis management procedures. It only implicates personnel in EU Headquarters and does not engage actual deployment of personnel under a simulated theatre of operations. It practices CSDP military operations decision-making, planning, coordination and co-operation in a realistic manner.

3. Training Audience (TA)

For MILEX 21, Greece will provide the EU Exercise Operation Commander (OpCdr) and the EU OHQ. This EU OHQ will be designated as the EL EU OHQ in the Exercise documentation and will be reinforced with augmentees from the EU MS.

Similarly, the EU Exercise Force Commander (FCdr) and the EU FHQ are provided by Greece. This EU FHQ will be designated as the EL EU FHQ in the Exercise documentation and will be reinforced with augmentees from the EU MS.

4. Dates and location

The Exercise will be conducted from 07 (Monday) to 18 (Friday) June 2021.

Directing Staff of the Exercise (DISTAFF) will be located in Brussels, EL EU OHQ will be located in Larissa (Greece), and the EL EU FHQ will be located in Nea Santa Kilkis (Greece).
5. Authorities
- Official Scheduling the Exercise (OSE): High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission, Mr. Josep BORREL FONTELLES.
- Official Conducting the Exercise (OCE): Director General EUMS, Vice Admiral Hervé BLÉJEAN.
- Exercise Director (ExDir): Director of EUMS Concepts and Capabilities Directorate, Brigadier General Georgios BIKAKIS.
- Exercise OpCdr: Commander of the Hellenic First Army (HFA) and the EL EU OHQ: Lieutenant General Petros DEMESTICHAS.
- Exercise FCdr: Commander of the 71 Airmobile Brigade and the HELBROC BG: Brigadier General Vasileios TSAMIS.

B. CONCEPT

MILEX 21 will be composed of a Preparation Phase and a Conduct Phase.

6. Preparation Phase¹
The EUMS has established an Exercise Planning Team (EPT) to carry out the detailed planning and organisation of MILEX 21, including the elaboration of the Exercise planning and scenario scripted documents in cooperation with the EL EU OHQ. This EPT is composed of planners from all EUMS Directorates/ACOS. Representatives from the United Nations, wider EEAS and EU Commission (CION) are invited to contribute to and support the EPT.

All scenario documents, including the Initiating Military Directive (IMD), will be available to the EU MS and TA prior to the Conduct Phase of the Exercise through the MILEX 21 AGORA website.

7. Conduct Phase²
The EUMS will establish a DISTAFF under the authority of the ExDir. DISTAFF is to direct, monitor and control the Exercise in order to allow that the TA achieves the aim and objectives of the

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¹ Depending on the COVID-19 pandemic, planning meetings could be organized in virtual format if necessary and in accordance with the limitations and restrictions to movement, presence and social proximity imposed by National Governments and EU Institutions.
² Ibidem
Exercise. Details of the DISTAFF organisation, functions and arrangements will be included in the DISTAFF Instructions (DI-INST).

Conduct Phase will be organized as follows:

- From 07 to 08 June, an in-processing and Work-Up Staff Training (WUST) will be organised in each HQ.
- On 08 June, a DISTAFF element will be deployed to Larissa until 11 June in order to monitor the Exercise, support the EL EU OHQ and liaise with the DISTAFF in Brussels.
- From 09 to 16 June, the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ will develop parallel operations planning at their corresponding levels.
- From 15 to 16 June, representatives from the EU Partners Countries will observe the Exercise at the EL EU OHQ. This Observation Event will be conducted by the EUMS with the support of the EL EU OHQ.
- On 17 June, the EL EU OHQ will organise a Distinguished Visitors Day (DVD). The OpCdr will present his/her draft CONOPS and Provisional Statement of Requirements (PSOR) to the OCE and the FCdr will present his/her draft CONOPS to the OpCdr. The CONOPS and PSOR will be sent to the ExDir (ENDEX).
- On 18 June, the EL EU HQs will conduct a Hot Wash Up (HWU) and the out-processing.
Additional DISTAFF elements may be deployed to the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ during the Conduct Phase. Response Cells (RCs) will be set up within the DISTAFF to contribute to the generation of responses to the Requests for Information (RFIs) and reactions and to simulate the EU Integrated Approach to a crisis/conflict.

C. INTELLIGENCE

The EU Concept for Military Intelligence Structures in EU Crisis Management and EU-led Military Operations/Missions (Ref. 1) and the EU SOP OHQ/J2 (Ref. 2) will form the basis for the military Intelligence in MILEX 21.

An Intelligence Response Cell will be established within the DISTAFF to handle Intelligence injects and to provide replies to Intelligence related RFIs.

D. GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT

8. General

The EU Concept for Geospatial Information (Ref. 3) will form the basis for the Geospatial Support to the Exercise.

Dedicated training and information on Geospatial support to CSDP Military Operation/Missions will be organized during Preparation and Conduct Phases.

9. Preparation Phase

A Geospatial data package containing harmonized database and products will be produced by the EU SATCEN and the Multi-National Geospatial Support Group (MNGSG) and provided before the Conduct Phase. Geospatial support will be coordinated and agreed between EUMS EPT and the EL EU OHQ. It consists of maps of a fictitiously created continent called Augustia, which is located to the south of Europe.

EU SATCEN will provide access to a Geo Web Portal on the Internet (GeoHub). The instructions on how to request the access to the Geo Web Portal will be provided by EU SATCEN.
10. Conduct Phase

In addition to the Geospatial data package, the EL EU OHQ and FHQ will have direct access to other EU SATCEN and MNGSG products through the GeoHub. The optimal distribution and access to data in the GeoHub is limited by the networks on which the TA is operating. The access to Geo Web Portal can be requested from EU SATCEN.

The data distributed on DVD or USB pen drive will be used by the TA.

E. COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS).

11. General

As reflected in paragraph 21 of the EXSPEC (Ref. 4), one of the general Exercise objectives is to Exercise and evaluate permanent and alternate CIS arrangements (links) and procedures between the EUMS, EL EU OHQ the EL EU FHQ and other EU bodies in accordance with the EU Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations and Missions (Ref. 5).

During MILEX 21, the EL EU OHQ and FHQ will use the existing permanent CIS architecture.

12. Security

In accordance with the security rules for protecting EU Classified Information (Ref. 6), MILEX 21 participants have to apply the security regulations and use encrypted information systems or tools as appropriate to send or receive EU Classified Information (EUCI).

All CIS used in MILEX 21 should have undergone the appropriate accreditation process to guarantee that all the security measures have been implemented and that a sufficient level of protection of EUCI and CIS has been achieved in accordance with the regulations.

Transfer of information between CIS of different security domains will be accomplished by an "Air Gap" interface. Transfer of EUCI between two security domains is only possible if the recipient’s system is accredited to manage the classified document to be transferred.
13. CIS architecture

For EUCI, including up to SECRET UE/EU SECRET

The EU OPS WAN will be the main communication interface for the exchange of EUCI between the EUMS EPT/DISTAFF and the EL EU OHQ. The Secure Office Local Area Network (SOLAN)\(^3\) will be used for the exchange of EUCI within the EUMS/EEAS. SOLAN/EC3IS is interconnected with the EU OPS WAN. The EU OPS WAN supports Secure VTC (SVTC) between the EUMS EPT/DISTAFF in Brussels and the EL EU OHQ.

Information can be exchanged via e-mail with attachments and via the web based Information Management Application, Collaborative Application for Management of EU-led Operations (CAMEO) within the MILEX 21 Shared Data Area (SDA).

In case of need for new CAMEO accounts, a request must be sent to the MILEX 21 CIS POC at least 1 month prior to STARTEX. The procedure for granting access to CAMEO MILEX 21 SDA can be initiated by sending a request at least three weeks prior to STARTEX to: MILEX21@eeas.europa.eu. The request must contain a list of the functional/personal accounts that are foreseen to need access to the MILEX 21 SDA.

The EL EU OHQ Classified Mission Network (CMN) will be extended to the EL EU FHQ and will provide the main communication means for the exchange of EUCI between the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ. Information will be exchanged via e-mail with attachments and through access to a common file server. CMN supports SVTC.

CMN supports Classified Voice communications, which will be available only between the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ.

It is not planned to deploy the EU Deployable Package (DP) due to the existing/planned communication links between the EUMS EPT/DISTAFF and the EL EU OHQ and between the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ.

\(^3\) The transition from SOLAN to EC3IS could be finalized before the Conduct Phase of the exercise. In case this transition is completed in time, the system used for exchanging EUCI will be EC3IS.
For EU unclassified information, including **LIMITE**

Internet connected workstations/LANs can be used for the exchange of unclassified data including LIMITE. An online collaboration system (AGORA) will facilitate the exchange of information and will host the MILEX 21 dedicated Website.

Unclassified Voice will be available between the EUMS EPT/DISTAFF and the EL EU OHQ.

14. Responsibilities

**EUMS CIS&CD Directorate**

The EUMS CIS&CD Directorate will support the EL EU OHQ for all CIS requirements related to the EU communication systems and will coordinate all the EUMS EPT/DISTAFF CIS requirements.

The CIS&CD Directorate will coordinate the provision of access to the required CIS to the United Nations personnel, participating in the Exercise.

**EL EU OHQ**

EL EU OHQ will be responsible for the CMN and its extension to the EL EU FHQ, and for the coordination of all EL EU FHQ CIS requirements.

**EL EU FHQ**

EL EU FHQ will be responsible for the CIS at its level and will provide the secure environment for the CMN extension to the EL EU FHQ in accordance with the CMN SECOPS.

15. Support

**Operational and Technical Support on EU OPS WAN and SOLAN/EC3IS**
The MILSAT (Military Security Administration Team) of the EUMS CIS&CD Directorate in Brussels will be the Point of Contact for the first line technical support of SOLAN/EC3IS and EU OPS WAN between the EUMS EPT/DISTAFF and the EL EU OHQ, as well as for their corresponding services (E-mail, CAMEO, ELMA and SVTC).

The MILSAT will try to identify the source of the problem and either solve it up at their level of responsibility or escalate it to the next level of support.

The MILSAT will be available during working days/hours (08.00 – 18.00, Brussels time) in the EUMS Kortenbergh 150 building. Outside working days/hours, a NCO duty officer will arrive upon urgent request within 2hrs.

Phone number: +32 2 584 2828
Email: (unclassified): EUMS - SIC SAT (eums.sat@eeas.europa.eu)
Email (EU OPS WAN): MIL-SAT

Operational and Technical Support on EEAS-Net and AGORA

The EEAS IT HELPDESK will provide first line support for all EEAS-Net and Agora related issues during the working hours (08.00 – 18.00, Brussels time).

Phone number: +32.2.584 33 33
Email: EEAS-IT-HELPDESK@eeas.europa.eu

Operational and Technical Support on CMN

The EL EU OHQ is responsible for providing first and second level technical support for any incidents related to the provided services both in the location of the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ.

16. Testing

Prior to STARTEX, a communication test will be conducted in order to check the CIS connectivity between the different entities and to confirm the identity of the distant end users.
The test, commonly scheduled between the EUMS EPT/DISTAFF and the EL EU OHQ, will focus on the ability to exchange information between the EUMS EPT/DISTAFF, EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ personnel using the EU OPS WAN and the CMN.

F. FINANCIAL ISSUES

17. General

As reflected in paragraph 22 of the MILEX 21 EXSPEC (Ref. 4), one of the Exercise objectives at the EL EU OHQ level is to practice Athena Mechanism's procedures for financing CSDP Military Operations/Missions.

The common costs of the Exercise shall be financed through Athena Mechanism following rules and procedures similar to those for CSDP Military Operations/Missions in accordance with article 16 of the Council Decision establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common cost of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena) (Ref. 7).

The EU Exercise OpCdr will carry out his duties on behalf of Athena Mechanism in relation to the financing of the Exercise common costs. He/she is to implement the appropriations relating to the Exercise common costs and may award contracts and enter into contracts as well as open a bank account on behalf of Athena Mechanism for the Exercise. He/she may delegate his/her duties as authorising officer to the ACOS J8 OHQ and to the FCdr.

18. Requirements for common budget

Participants in MILEX 21 covered by the common cost budget are:

- DISTAFF (EEAS/EUMS personnel), Brussels and Greece.
- EL EU OHQ, Larissa (Greece).
- EL EU FHQ, Nea Santa Kilkis (Greece).

The potential transport/travel costs to deploy CIS experts and equipment to the EL EU FHQ for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the links with the OHQ have to be financed through the common budget (Athena).
The costs for travels and accommodation of the Key Leader Training that may be organized immediately before STARTEX, liaison and EUMS DISTAFF officers, and Exercise OpCdr and FCdr for their duties will be financed through Athena budget, as well as the travels and accommodation of the HQs J8 personnel for the closure of the accounts after the ENDEX.

A Distinguished Visitors Day may take place during the Conduct Phase. For these requirements, the incurred expenditures for hospitality and representation are to be provided.

19. Instructions

ACOS J8 EL EU OHQ, supported by EUMS LOG Directorate, is responsible for the preparation, presentation, conduct and closure of the budget on behalf of the EU Exercise OpCdr. In accordance with paragraph 43 of MILEX EXSPEC (Ref. 4), the budget proposal is to be submitted to the Athena Administrator NLT 31 March 2021.

ACOS J8 EL EU OHQ and ACOS J8 EL EU FHQ will use the Athena accounting software ATRIUM. The training on the ATRIUM system for the J8 personnel involved in the Exercise will be provided by the Athena Secretariat prior to the Conduct Phase of the Exercise.

Management of the dedicated MILEX 21 budget title approved by the Athena Special Committee will be the main part of the practice of the financing of the EU military crisis response and management activities through the Athena Mechanism (in all financial areas) at both OHQ and FHQ level. Interaction between J8 HQs Cells will be practised.

Preparation of the Concept for funds management and indication of areas for contracting support to the Operation will be practiced during the Conduct Phase of the Exercise.

G. EU PARTNERS

20. Partner Countries participation in or observation

EU Partner Countries will be invited to participate in or observe the Exercise during the Conduct Phase in accordance with paragraph 48 of the MILEX 21 EXSPEC (Ref. 4) and the paragraph I.22 and I.23 of the EU Exercise Policy (Ref. 8).
This participation in or observation will be organised by the EUMS supported by the EL EU OHQ, and will include generic and specific briefings related to CSDP Integrated Approach, Military Operations/Missions, scenario and the operations planning carried out in all the functional areas developed by the EL EU OHQ.

EU Partners Countries' participation in or observation of MILEX 21 will be performed in accordance with article 3 of the HR decision of 19 April 2013 on security rules applicable to the EEAS (Ref. 9).

21. UN participation in or observation

During the Preparation and Conduct Phases, participation in or observation by the United Nations will enhance EU - UN cooperation. LIMITE documents produced in the framework of this Exercise may be released to UN, in accordance with the para H "INFORMATION MANAGEMENT" and based on the need to know of the UN.

United Nations will participate in the Exercise with personnel from the UNHQ. This personnel will establish a generic UN Field Mission HQ adapted to the Exercise scenario and act as subject matter experts on UN related issues.

As per invitation, UN personnel will participate to the Information Session to EU Partner Countries and Organisations, envisaged during the Preparation Phase, as well as to the Observation Event at the EL EU OHQ during the Conduct Phase.

22. NATO observation

In accordance with paragraph 46 of the MILEX 21 EXSPEC (Ref. 4), NATO may be invited to observe MILEX 21 on the basis of reciprocity regarding NATO Exercises. Arrangements for NATO observation will be implemented in accordance with MILEX 21 EXSPEC (Ref. 4) and the paragraph I.21 of the EU Exercise Policy (Ref. 8).

H. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

23. Internet online tool
MILEX 21 AGORA webpage will compile Exercise messages and documents and will be managed by the EUMSEPT/DISTAFF. An access to this webpage can be granted on request to MILEX21@eeas.europa.eu.

24. Type of documents and classification

Real life ("NO PLAY") messages or documents
- During the Conduct Phase of MILEX 21, messages and documents related to real events or persons are to be handled through the appropriate network using the lowest appropriate level of classification.
- Each participant originating or receiving an EU Classified Information (EUCI) must apply the related EU Security Rules in place (Refs. 10, 11 and 12).
- If needed, the mention "NO PLAY" can be used.

Scenario related messages and documents
- In order to provide a permanent and comprehensive picture of the Exercise to the EU MS, during the Conduct Phase of MILEX 21, the scenario related messages and documents will be uploaded to MILEX 21 AGORA webpage.
- Therefore, the scenario related messages and documents must be marked EXERCISE – EXERCISE – EXERCISE at the top and bottom of each page, and will have the distribution mark LIMITE.
- In the case of sensitive, non-public documents that could be shared with UN, the following marking must be used:

```
EXERCISE – EXERCISE – EXERCISE
MILEX 21
LIMITE
RELEASABLE TO UN
```

25. Information flow architecture

From STARTEX to ENDEX, the exchange of information between the EUMS DISTAFF in Brussels and the EL EU OHQ will be based on the EU Operations Wide Area Network (EU OPS WAN) for classified and non-classified information. The relevant nodal points for receiving official information will be:
- MILEX 21 EUMS DISTAFF Information Management Cell (IMC).
I. POST-EXERCISE REPORTING

26. Reporting

As reflected in paragraph 21 of the EXSPEC (Ref. 4), one of the general Exercise objectives is to extract observations that might lead to review and improve the relevant EU policies, concepts and procedures as appropriate. A comprehensive reporting and evaluation process will be conducted in accordance with the EU Military Lessons Learnt at the Political Strategic Level Concept (Ref. 13), and the EU OHQ SOP Chapter 7 (Ref. 14).

Reporting of the Exercise will be developed in accordance with the paragraph 40 of the MILEX 21 EXSPEC (Ref.4), and European Union Exercise Policy (Ref. 8).

ExDir, OpCdr and FCdr are to provide their First Impression Reports (FIRs) to the OCE. Supporting actors (EU SatCen…) are also encouraged to provide FIRs to the OCE. All FIRs must be addressed to the OCE according to the timelines established in paragraph 28 table, using "MILEX21@eeas.europa.eu" address and the template provided in Appendix 1.

These FIRs will provide the basis for a draft Final Exercise Report (FER). FER will include the FIRs as annexes. It will be timely disseminated to the EU MS in order to be finalised at EUMC level after the Post Exercise Discussion with the participation of the EU MS. Finally, the FER will be submitted to the PSC for endorsement.

27. Evaluation

Each stakeholder is responsible for the collection of Lessons Observations (LO) and the conduct of the lessons analysis at its level:

- EUMS DISTAFF for LO at the political strategic level.
- EL EU OHQ for LO at the military strategic level.
- EL EU FHQ for LO at the operational level.

LO should be elaborated in accordance with the template provided in the Appendix 2 with the appropriate classification level.

### 28. Timelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By 30 June 2021</td>
<td>FIRs sent to OCE</td>
<td>ExDir, OpCdr, FCdr and supporting actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July 2021</td>
<td>Draft FER distributed to the TA and the MS</td>
<td>EUMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Post Exercise Discussion (PXD)</td>
<td>TA and Exercise experts from the EU MS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>FER approved</td>
<td>EUMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>FER endorsed</td>
<td>PSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### J. EL EU OHQ / FHQ MANNING AUGMENTATION

A first Manning Conference based on the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ augmentees' requirements will be conducted during the MPM on 11 March 2021.

The outcome of the Conference will be provided to the EU MS in a separate document. Additional Manning Conferences may take place if needed.

Further contacts and joining instructions concerning augmentees will be directly coordinated between the EU MS providing augmentees and the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ.
Appendix 1 to Section 1

FIRST IMPRESSION REPORT (FIR)

1. GENERAL

2. INITIAL OVERVIEW

3. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EXERCISE AIM

4. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OVERALL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

5. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AT OHQ LEVEL (for EU OHQ)

6. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AT FHQ LEVEL (for EU FHQ)

7. EXERCISE PLANNING ISSUES
   a. Planning organisation and meetings
   b. Planning documents
   c. Financing of the Exercise
   d. Scenario
   e. Pre-Exercise Activities
   f. EU Partner Countries participation in or observation

8. EXERCISE CONDUCT PHASE
   a. Military Planning Process
   b. Coordination
   c. DISTAFF activities
d. Partners observation phase

9. COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

   a. Information Management

   b. Work with the different IT systems

10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS (AS APPROPRIATE)

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### LESSON OBSERVATION TEMPLATE – MILEX 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Classification:</strong></th>
<th>Mark as necessary. Observations classified at or above EU RESTRICTED must be sent by appropriately means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name:</strong></td>
<td>Provide name and contact details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisation:</strong></td>
<td>Insert Directorate/Branch as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date:</strong></td>
<td>Insert date of lesson observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity:</strong></td>
<td>CPX MILEX 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong></td>
<td>Provide a brief but specific headline of the Lesson Observation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observation:**

- Provide a short factual statement to describe what happened and how that differed from expectations.
- The observation can be positive (i.e. something that was observed to work better than expected or a work around) or negative (i.e. something happened that should not have or something did not happen that should have).
- Details should be left to the discussion paragraph. Observations should be restricted to single issues.
- Multiple issues should be divided into separate observations and cross referenced to each other in the discussion section.

**Explanation:**

- Explain how and why the observed issue differed from expectations.
- The discussion amplifies the Lesson Observation above and answers the, “who, what, where, when, why and how,” questions about it.
- Provide the reasons for success or failure and the circumstances surrounding the issue.
| **Discussion:** | The description should explore all contributory factors, i.e. the analysis of the observed issue. It can include the history of the event, the context and the environment, and any actions taken to work around a problem should be explained in detail.  
- If a problem could not be solved explain why.  
- This paragraph should describe: the manner and impact of the issue on organisational performance i.e. did the issue have Significant, Moderate or Minor impact? |
| **Conclusion:** | Provide a summary statement of the lesson that has been learned from the experience and the investigation into the root cause(s) of the issues described in the observation and discussion. |
| **Recommendation:** | The recommendation should outline the suggested remedial action(s) by proving explicit advice on what must be done to repeat the success or to avoid and/or solve the problem.  
- Identify exactly what needs to be changed (DOTMLPF-I) and how this should be done. Propose a suitable lead or action body.  
- The recommendation should follow on logically from the conclusion so that if someone were to follow the recommendation, they would reap the benefit of learning themselves and their organisation. |
SECTION 2

EXERCISE SCENARIO
K. TRAINING OBJECTIVES
## EL EU OHQ Training Objectives for CPX “MILEX-21”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>OHQ Training Objectives</th>
<th>PRIORITY (1 – 3)</th>
<th>TA / CJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>To practice the conduct of the Strategic Analysis Briefing (SAB) during the Handover-Takeover (HOTO) process for the transfer of planning authority from the political strategic level (EUMS) to the military strategic level (OHQ).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>To interact with the EEAS respective functional areas or other external actors during the EU Operations Planning Process (EU OPP) if necessary.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>To establish the appropriate links with the respective EL EU FHQ functional areas, in order to facilitate the parallel EU OPP.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>To exercise the Request For Information (RFI) procedure via the OHQ Information Management Cell (IMC).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>To follow the current OHQ SOPs and IPs in order to identify any shortfalls for improving the establishment/functioning of the OHQ and to report such shortfalls as Lessons Observations for further analysis within the Lessons Learned (LL) Process.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>To exercise the coordinated development of the OHQ Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) tailored to the operation.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>To activate the OHQ including manning with multinational personnel (Primary Augmentees - PA).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>To perform all personnel related activities such as manpower, management and personnel services, and to practice the drafting of all PERSONNEL REPORTS, RETURNS and RESPONSES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>To organize the Out processing procedure after ENDEX.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>To develop and maintain a detailed collection plan to address OpCdr’s Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and other Intelligence Requirements as appropriate.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>To incorporate and manage all the geographic data and information provided by the GEO entities in planning issues on intelligence &amp; security.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>OHQ Training Objectives</td>
<td>PRIORITY (1–3)</td>
<td>TA / CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>To produce a final version of Rules of Engagement Requirements (ROEREQ) in close co-ordination with LEGAD.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>To draft the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>To conduct the Logistic Planning, related to all logistic functions including Medical-Manning and Finance, in close coordination with the respective OHQ’s Directorates and Branches.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>To form a functional and reliable Strategic Planning Group (SPG), in size and nature, in order to develop all the necessary planning products such as the Operational Design (military-strategic level), the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)/Measures of Performance (MOPs), the Strategic Planning Directive (SPD), the Concept of Operation (CONOPS) and the Provisional Statement of Requirement (PSOR).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>To establish a functional and realistic Battle Rhythm for the OHQ staff.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>To establish the permanent and alternate Communications and Information Systems (CIS) links and services between the EL EU OHQ, the EL EU FHQ and other relevant EU bodies, in accordance with the IERs (developed under the Training Objective no. 6 above).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>To conduct Cybersecurity planning, concepts, incident coordination and management at the OHQ level.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ3-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>To organize induction training (WUST) for all the OHQ personnel before STARTEX.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>To establish a LL mechanism within the HQ in order to collect Lessons Observations (LO) from all functional areas in order to be exploited within the OHQ level or to be submitted to EUMS for further analysis.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>To organize the Hot Wash Up (HWU) after the ENDEX.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>To present the budget proposal to ATHENA Special Committee and implement the accounting software ATRIUM for the budget execution, according to ATHENA Financial Rules.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>To establish liaison between OHQ CIMIC personnel and all civil and military actors at all appropriate levels, providing a detailed list.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>To monitor the Humanitarian Clusters in the AOO in order to provide all the necessary CIMIC Inputs/Assessment during the EU OPP.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EL EU FHQ TRAINING OBJECTIVES FOR CPX “MILEX-21”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>FHQ Training Objectives</th>
<th>PRIORITY (1-3)</th>
<th>TA / CJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FHQ activation for Crisis Management Planning (CJOPG formation)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>To practice the interaction between EL EU FHQ and the EL EU OHQ during the parallel planning process.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>To practice military operations planning at the operational military level, establishing a functional and realistic Battle Rhythm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>To develop a draft CONOPS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cyber security planning, incident coordination and management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ3-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>To exercise the coordinated development of the FHQ Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) tailored to the operation.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>To exercise the deployment, establishment and exploitation of the FHQ Communication and Information Systems (CIS) tailored to the CSDP Military Operation, in accordance with the IERs (developed under the Training Objective no. 6 above).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Augmentees induction training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Staff procedures implementation, including Staff training on SOPs and IPs handling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Decision making process implementation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>To exercise the Request For Information procedure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
L. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
SECTION 2 - L - 1

ROADMAP TO REGION CRISIS
The table below summarises the most important events of the crisis in Seglia in chronological order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 2001</td>
<td>Seglia was ruled by the Socialist Party of Seglia for 40 years until <strong>Ecfuamezi XEFI</strong> was elected president in 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ecfuamezi XEFI is re-elected and amends Seglia’s Constitution to increase executive power and weaken the opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>General unrest and large public backlash, after the president’s decision to run for a third presidential term, resulting in his defeat in December. <strong>Nedl TEMM</strong> wins the elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Freeland starts negotiations to join the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>EU economic and diplomatic sanctions on Kronen due to its systematic violations of human rights and international law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Under TEMM’S presidency, a constitutional referendum confirms the presidential term for five years with a maximum of two consecutive terms for future presidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>After the defeat in Middle East, the Newborn Extremist State (<strong>NEXSTA</strong>) is founded in North <strong>Proxyland</strong> and gets hold of part of the territory in complicity with local war lords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>TEMM wins his bid for re-election in December 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>The situation in the south of Seglia and at the border with Proxyland deteriorates as attacks from NEXSTA, operating from Proxyland, increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Criminal organisations of human traffickers and migrant smugglers consolidate their power opportunistically and expand in Seglia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Terrorist attacks in South Seglia provoke people’s unrest and Kronen profits from the situation by increasing its interference in Seglia’s internal affairs, notably by instigating the opposition radical parties aligned to Kronen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution 1000/2019 condemns the terrorist attacks and the suffering imposed to the local population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Freeland joins the Partnership for Peace programme of NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>In March 2019, <strong>Yo KOPQOPH</strong>, who rules Kronen since 1989, is re-elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2020</td>
<td>First casus with COVID-19 contamination are reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2020</td>
<td>In Seglia, the humanitarian situation keeps worsening, with civilians caught in the fighting between NEXSTA and government security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2020</td>
<td>UN arms embargo on Proxyland (<strong>UNSCR 1001</strong>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2020</td>
<td>Kronen reinforces ties with Proxyland in the domain of defence and energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2020</td>
<td>EU Delegations and communication networks have received cyber attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2020</td>
<td>Freeland fulfills all the requirements to become an EU MS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>A <strong>terrorist attack</strong> on a ship transporting a United Nations international organisational (WFP) humanitarian aid to the <strong>Dottea harbour</strong> results in the closure of the harbour for several weeks, putting at risk the economy of Seglia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td><strong>Terrorist attack</strong> on three <strong>villages</strong> in South Seglia by NEXSTA. Hundreds of people are massacred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td><strong>Terrorist attacks</strong> by NEXSTA on embassies (of countries supporting Seglia) located near to the UN premises/installation. The UN Country Team (UN CT) and UN personnel in Seglia no longer secured as a result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>Some <strong>merchant vessels</strong> transiting in vicinity of Seglian SLOC suffer an <strong>unsuccessful hijacking by NEXSTA.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>Proxyland is accused by the international community of trading oil and weapons with terrorist group NEXSTA that uses land and maritime assets from southern Seglian coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td><strong>Letter from the President of Seglia</strong> to both the UN SG and the HR/VP requesting international support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>An ICRC report on the <strong>dire humanitarian situation</strong> in the border region of Seglia and Proxyland shocks the international community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>EU MS agree to the HR/VP suggestion to explore options for a <strong>possible CSDP deployment in Seglia.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>A <strong>large scale cyber attack</strong> is conducted against the websites and systems of the various State bodies, private sector organisations and media outlets in Seglia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>Proposed UNSC Resolution, authorising the EU intervention in Seglia, is aggressively contested by Kronen and Proxyland. Kronen puts political pressure on non-permanent UNSC members to vote against the resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2021</td>
<td>Due to Nexa's terrorist attacks threatening the presence of the UNCT personnel and movement restrictions, <strong>UNSC Resolution 1002</strong> on Seglia authorising international support, including EU intervention with any means, is adopted despite Kronen's campaign with non-permanent UNSC Members. The UN mandated the EU to take over UNCT political and military engagements between Seglia and Kronen and other interlocutors with the United Nations, providing liaison elements to EUHQs to support the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2021</td>
<td>HR/VP announces that the EU is exploring options in support of the young democracy of Seglia and requests the EEAS to issue a Political Framework for a Crisis Approach for Seglia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2021</td>
<td>At the midday briefing, journalists are told that the &quot;EU is committed to promoting stability, security and development&quot; with partner countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2021</td>
<td>A <strong>cyber attack</strong> defaces websites and social media accounts (Twitter, Facebook) of the EU Delegation in Seglia, spreading fake information about the implication of the EU in Seglia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2021</td>
<td>Political Framework for a Crisis Approach (PFCA) in Seglia is presented to and approved by the PSC. PSC invited HR/VP to draft a Crisis Management Concept (CMC).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March 2021 | Information manipulation from Kronen and general disinformation coming from different sources against the EU’s "illegal intervention" in Seglia increases to the point of becoming a trend topic on social networks.

March 2021 | Reaction of Kronen to the possible intervention of the EU on Augustian soil is publicly stated in all international committees and official forums.

April 2021 | On 1st April, Freeland officially becomes an EU Member State.

April 2021 | Freeland is subject to malicious cyber activities directed towards their critical infrastructures in the energy sector.

April 2021 | The threat of NEXSTA is even more present with targeted attacks on EU interests, both on European soil and in Augustia. The terrorist organisation also campaigns against the intervention of the EU in Seglia. Some of these attacks directly impact UN installations and movement of UN personnel.

April 2021 | Proxyland seems to profit from the situation trying to destabilise the EU markets and threatening the EU through reductions of gas supply.

April 2021 | Proxyland threatens the EU via Twitter with possible cuts of gas supply if the EU launches a military operation in neighbouring Seglia. The markets react negatively to this statement.

April 2021 | Draft Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP military operation in Seglia is issued by the EEAS and presented to the PSC.

April 2021 | PSC discussed on CMC and requested a Military Advice to EUMC and recommendations to PMG.

April 2021 | The Council approved a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible EU military operation in Seglia.
SECTION 2 - L – 2
CRISIS SUMMARY
1. The West Augustian nation of Seglia is bordered by Freeland and Proxyland. Relatively dry, its shoreline runs along the Atlantic Ocean at the Augustian’s westernmost point. Up to half of its population of 15.7 million (2020) is concentrated in the west, with Seglia City anchoring a well-defined core area and other urban area in the south around Dotea.

Political Overview

2. The President of the Republic of Seglia, TEMM won his bid for re-election in December 2016.

3. A dozen other parties hold seats in the national Assembly, among them the radical opposition is formed by the Seglia Liberation League (SLL), a group of parties (18%) favorable to Kronen, mainly but not only, due to the ethnicity reason, that demand an anti-western policy.

4. **Presidential elections are scheduled in December 2021.** This will be a crucial event to confirm stability of Seglia as a young democracy with a steady progress for development. These elections represent a major challenge for the Government.

5. The latest terrorist activities provoking unrest in the South and the increasing interference of Kronen in Seglia’s internal affairs, notably by instigating the opposition radical parties, might strongly affect the future election process.

Security Front

6. The government of Seglia is currently struggling in terms of security, particularly in the South.

7. Internally, institutional corruption is still seriously hampering development; particularly regarding the rule of law (corruption index has increased from 29 in 2010 to 45 in 2019).

8. Unequal distribution of wealth and social services in Southern provinces are seen as urgent matters that need to be addressed to prevent the attractiveness of radicalism promoted by "Newborn Extremist State" (NEXSTA) groups in the South.

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4 Additional background information are available in the Country-book, that will be delivered to Target Audience in due time.
9. On top of this, NEXSTA has found a safe haven in neighbouring northern Proxyland after the loss of its territory in the Middle East, militants are infiltrating the south of Seglia using guerrilla tactics to spread terror and impose its rule on villages that are not under the protective umbrella of Seglia security forces.

10. Relations between Seglia and its neighbour to the south east, Proxyland, are tense mainly due to the difficulty of managing a porous border.

11. Part of the population is fleeing northwards to safer provinces with no NEXSTA presence or towards Freeland, hoping to use it as a springboard towards Europe. There is an increase in criminal organizations taking profit of the migration flows and illegal traffic and smuggling, particularly of human beings and drugs that is on the rise.

12. Seglia is reinforcing ties with the EU in the domain of security and defence. Since the current government came to power in 2011, several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU to support the Security Sector Reform initiative, managed by UN with national ownership.

13. Criminal organisations of human traffickers, drugs and migrant smugglers are consolidating their power opportunistically and expanding in Seglia.

14. On 19th December 2020, a recent terrorist attack from NEXSTA to a ship carrying humanitarian aid at the Dottea harbour resulted in the closure of the harbour for several weeks, putting at risk the economy of Seglia.

15. The incident took place on Seglia territorial waters but this, along with other incidents of armed robbery and attempts for hijacking, show that NEXSTA is able to threaten sea lines of communication. Few days later NEXSTA perpetrated two terrorist attacks in the vicinity of the Western (EU) Embassies and the UN premises, against the UN Country Team (UN CT). Consequently, UN personnel in Seglia has considered at risk.

16. The President of Seglia has sent a letter to both the UN SG and the HR/VP requesting international support, in particular from the EU, including the deployment of armed forces.

17. The EU is considering accommodating the request of the Seglian Government to provide support to Seglia. EU Member States have agreed to draw up a proposal for EU engagement in Seglia and the EEAS has started working on its political strategic planning.

18. The consequences of the EU announcement of possible involvement in Seglia were not long in coming. On 22nd January 2021, a massive cyber-attack took place against Seglia's state institutions and media. At the same time, some malicious cyber activities were conducted against the EU Delegation in Seglia.
19. Information manipulation from Kronen and general disinformation coming from different sources against the EU's "illegal intervention" in Seglia has increased to the point of becoming a trend topic on social networks.

European Union

20. The EU has a fundamental interest in the peace, stability and prosperity in Augustia, including Seglia as a prerequisite to ensure democratization of the region. In the field of Counter-Terrorism and prevention of radicalization, EU holds political dialogue with Seglia with a view to strengthen the support of Seglian' efforts in the Security Sector Reform and development of the country.

21. Terrorist attacks, perpetrated by NEXSTA have increased across Europe in recent months, following its move into Proxyland. Despite the geographic setbacks, the group is spreading its influence across West Augustia and the Mediterranean Sea. Threats against the presence of EU citizens and EU interests in Augustia are common in NEXSTA narrative.

KRONEN

22. Kronen is a powerful state with a strong centralized government. It occupies 70% of the Augustian continent. It is not a nuclear power and has no permanent seat in the UN but it is a country increasingly assertive about its potential economic, world power and military

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5 Additional background information are available in the Country-book, that will be delivered to Target Audience in due time.
strength. Kronen is ruled by Yo KOPQOPH who has won repeatedly elections since 1989, recently in March 2019, in the face of an almost non-existent political opposition.

23. Over the last decade, Kronen has been developing a much more assertive global posture, searching for an increased geopolitical role worldwide to overcome internal crisis and improve its international market trade.

24. However, its political and economic interests and values clash with those of the EU and the rest of the western world. Kronen’s systematic violations of human rights and international law have been repeatedly criticised by the EU and the international community.

25. Kronen is frequently accused of being behind hybrid attacks to harass western countries, and to weaken their economic and geopolitical influence. It has been frequently mentioned as an aggressor performing malicious cyber activities with security and economic implications for the EU.

26. The Kronen government has very advanced offensive cyber capabilities and most likely supports international groups of hackers and activists. It also controls the national media. Some state or state sponsored groups of cyber criminals are believed to promote Kronen interests. Other groups’ activities include disseminating propaganda, developing tools for intelligence agencies as well as hacking into networks and systems in support of Kronen security objectives.

27. After NEXSTA was pushed out of the Middle East, Kronen changed strategy in the Western Augustian region. It has put in place an internal “zero tolerance policy” to avoid any return of extremist fighters back to Kronen.

28. At the same time, Kronen has facilitated the establishment of a new haven for terrorists in North Proxyland. Many analysts agree on the risk that Kronen might indirectly use NEXSTA as a proxy, in the future, to directly target Europe through creating a flow of refugees in a wave of sectarian violence, or terrorist acts.
29. Freeland is a NATO partner since 2019 and after finishing negotiations in 2020, Freeland has officially become an EU Member State on 1 April 2021.

30. Freeland is currently facing new challenges, notably security concerns caused by the threat that NEXSTA could expands to the north.

31. Freeland is also being targeted by the rising anti-EU cyber and information manipulation campaign promoted by Kronen and its allies in Augustia.

32. Proxyland is a dictatorship, ruled by General Podumet NEFASU since 1992.

33. Proxyland is inclined to make fast deals with external powers, notably Kronen on the supply of weapons and has on some occasions threatened to nationalise the oil and gas companies which are partly western owned.

34. The population in the country lives under the strong repression of the militarized police and the Army, while the North East of the country is completely ruled by tribal warlords, although they have sworn fidelity to Podumet NEFASU.

35. The tribal warlords are important actors to understand the cohesion of Proxyland, as they are the warrants of the oldest traditions of the people of Proxyland. They control the illegal trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs and have links to extremist groups including NEXSTA.

36. Proxyland, as an authoritarian state hostile to the EU, seems to profit from the situation, trying to destabilise the EU markets and threatening the EU through reductions of gas supply.

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6 Additional background information are available in the Country-book, that will be delivered to Target Audience in due time.
37. NEXSTA is a global terrorist group belonging to a religious sect, whose main political objective is to establish a worldwide dominion. Their ideology clashes with western culture, values and lifestyle, which it considers decadent and a threat to their fundamental religious values.

38. Their primitive modus operandi is to gradually impose their radical religion and culture by means of persuasion, force or coercion.

39. NEXSTA was able to get a foothold in North Proxyland, finding a safe haven to finance its operations through illegal trafficking of oil, gold, human beings and drugs. The terrorist group also receives support from international sympathizers.

40. Relations of NEXSTA and the Government of Proxyland are opportunistic. NEXSTA needs a safe haven to re-settle and re-configure its strategy to spread its influence worldwide, while Proxyland uses NEXSTA as an exchange currency to deal with the tribes in the North-East and as an aggressive foreign policy tool.

41. The successful attack on the harbour of Dottea has provided NEXSTA with an important breathing space to further empower the terrorist organisation, not only economically but also morally. It also shows that NEXSTA is able to carry out limited sea operations.

42. In addition, there are some evidences that NEXSTA uses its sea assets to smuggle weapon to its fighters in both Proxyland and Seglia.
SECTION 2 - L - 3

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
Resolution 1000 (2019)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7816th meeting, on

18 November 2019

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its grave concern about continuous attacks by terrorist groups in Seglia, in particular against civilians, women and children, including sexual and gender-based violence,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed,

Expressing serious concern about the insecurity and deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation in the region, which is further complicated by the presence of terrorist groups and their activities, as well as by the proliferation of weapons, from within and outside the region, that threaten the peace, security and stability of regional States,

1. Condemns the recent and repeated terrorist attacks in Seglia;

2. Stresses the need to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Seglia and to facilitate unhindered access and delivery of assistance to all in need in the entirety of the territory of this state in accordance with humanitarian principles;

3. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Security Council  Distr.: General

12 June 2020

Resolution 1001 (2020)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 8424th meeting,
on 12 June 2020

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1000 (2019) concerning the situation in Seglia,


Recalling its previous resolutions on strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council and the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict,

Welcoming the Unity Government in Seglia and its efforts towards cohesion and development demonstrated since 2011,

Welcoming the support and investment of the International Community, and particularly the European Union, to the development and democratic progress of the region,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Seglia, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Expressing its concern about the deteriorating security situation in the South of Seglia and at its porous borders with Proxyland,

Expressing its grave concern about continuous attacks of the so-called NEXSTA terrorist group, in particular against civilians, women and children, including sexual and gender-based violence,

Expressing grave concern at the situation in Seglia-Proxyland border and condemning the violence and use of force against civilians,
EEAS(2021)217 REV2
LIMITE

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the governments in the region,

Recalling the Proxyland authorities’ responsibility to protect its population,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands an immediate end to the violence in the region;

2. Condemns the recent and repeated terrorist attacks in the South of Seglia;

3. Condemns the flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Proxyland, including to NEXSTA;

4. Underscores that the governments in the region have a primary responsibility to protect their populations, including from attacks by militias and armed groups and stresses the importance of ensuring the full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian workers to people in need in accordance with international law;

5. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Proxyland, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories.

6. Calls upon all States, in particular States neighbouring the Seglia-Proxyland border, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Proxyland, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
7. **Decides** to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by this resolution, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by this resolution and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;

8. **Encourages** Member States to take steps to strongly discourage their nationals from travelling to the North Proxyland to participate that could reasonably contribute to the violation of human rights;

9. **Decides** that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution or designated by the Committee established, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

10. Decides that the measures contained in paragraphs above shall apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee, taking into consideration the exemptions on a case by case that might be determined by the Committee;

11. **Calls upon** all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to facilitate and support the humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Seglia-Proxyland border region,

12. **Authorises** the international community, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives required to sustain peace, security and stability in Seglia;

13. **Affirms** that it shall keep the Proxyland actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution,

14. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex I

Travel ban


6. Refjeg Em-Fen, Tezof Nujennif, Date of birth: 1952. Place of birth: Gusejap, Proxyland. Cousin of Podumet Nefasu. In the 1980s, Refjeg Em-Fen was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement.

Resolution 1002 (2021)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 8512th meeting, on 18 February 2021

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1000 (2019) concerning the situation in Seglia, and 1001 (2020) imposing an arms embargo to Proxyland,


Recalling its previous resolutions on strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council and the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, particularly in Augustia,

Welcoming the effort of Seglia's government and Seglia's people towards democracy and development demonstrated since the 2014 Constitutional referendum,

Welcoming the support and investment of the International Community, and particularly the European Union, to the development and democratic progress of the Republic of Seglia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Seglia, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Expressing deep concern at the continuing deterioration of the security situation in the South of Seglia, and further expressing its grave concern about the consequences of instability in its porous border with Proxyland and the deteriorated maritime security, and stressing in this regard the need for the international community to respond swiftly,

Expressing its high concern about continuous attacks of the so-called NEXSTA terrorist group, in particular against civilians, women and children, including sexual and gender based violence and against members of UN organizations and other humanitarian actors;
Reiterating the vital role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and their key role in re-establishing the fabric of societies recovering from conflict,

Underlining the need to continue prioritizing efforts and the importance of measures to rebuild confidence within and between the security forces and the population,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its determination, that terrorism in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Reaffirming the necessity to put an end to the ongoing proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, all kind of illicit activities in land and at sea, and recognizing that among these migrants may be persons who meet the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

Recognizing the ongoing terrorist and criminal organisations in the region and, noting the letter of the President of Seglia requesting international assistance to counter illegal activities off its country, and expressing its grave concern about the development of a powerful criminal and terrorist structures in the region.

Reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“The Convention”), sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out, including countering piracy and armed robbery at sea,

Expressing deep concern at the threat posed by unsecured arms and ammunition, which poses a risk to stability in the South of Seglia, including through transfer to terrorist and violent extremist groups,

Determining that the situation in Seglia constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Welcoming the support of the International Community, and particularly the European Union, to address the deteriorated situation in the South Seglia,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns the flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Proxyland in violation of the arms embargo, including to NEXSTA and other terrorist groups in the region;

2. Condemns the recent attack in Dottea harbour and repeated terrorist attacks in the South of Seglia; an in the sea lines of communications;
3. **Urges** member states to coordinate and combat by all means, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts;

4. **Urges** the international community, non-governmental organizations and civil society to increase humanitarian assistance to civilians affected by displacements in Seglia;

5. **Underscores** that the governments in the region have a primary responsibility to protect their populations, including from attacks by militias and armed groups and stresses the importance of ensuring the full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian workers to people in need in accordance with international law;

6. **Authorises** the international community, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives required to sustain peace, security and stability in Seglia;

7. **Urges** States parties to The Convention and the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) and its protocols to implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and illegal activities at sea;

8. **Authorizes** the European Union to deploy a military operation in Seglia, taking all necessary measures within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment from its initial deployment and for a period of two years from the declaration of its full operational capacity;

9. **Calls upon** Member States, including neighbouring countries of Seglia, to take appropriate measures to support the action of the European Union;

10. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.
SECTION 2 - L - 4

POLITICAL LETTERS
Letter of the President of the Seglian Government

Seglia City, 19 January 2021

Your Excellency, Mr Josep Borrell Fontelles,

The people of the Republic of Seglia, who made a serious commitment with their democracy in its 2015 constitutional referendum, is currently facing unprecedented challenges.

I am well aware of the important support the European Union has been providing to my country in terms of humanitarian assistance, civil protection, and development programs. On behalf of the Seglian people, I would like to thank you once more for supporting Seglia in its legitimate quest for a better future.

The Seglian people are determined to build their own democracy, after years of political instability. Our wish is strong and we need to rely on the support of the international community to take the further steps towards the recovery of trust and the establishment of the foundations of our young democracy.

Despite the unfailing effort of our security forces, the border with Proxyland allows for hostile infiltrations of the so-called NEXSTA group. As you know well, the aim of this group is to spread violence and fear, obtaining control of Seglian territories including the coastline for their deplorable aims.

The deadly attacks last month to the villages in South Seglia and the harbour of Dottea have shown the increased capacity of this terrorist group to hit the heart of Seglia, its people and its recently flourishing economy.

The Republic of Seglia cannot tolerate any kind of terrorist group operating on its territory and it will show the utmost determination to force back the terrorist threat in order to avoid a spill-over to the north, and avoid the use of our coast to carry on illicit maritime activities. Unfortunately, resources are lacking and our security forces need appropriate assets to fulfil their missions, and provide security in the south region including the coast and the ports.
In addition, deployment of troops to the southern border has weaken the protection of the Dottea harbour, vital hub for transport of goods and hydrocarbons not only for Seglia, but also for the southern part of the possible next EU member state, Freeland.

Finally, instability in the border has also led to large numbers of migrants crossing our border on their way to the EU. The Republic of Seglia is doing its very best to provide these people with their utmost necessities, in full respect of their human rights and dignity. However, the young democracy of Seglia cannot always be asked to solve the problems of other countries. We cannot carry this burden alone and need the commitment and financial support of the EU.

On the other hand, as you are well aware, by the end of this year the people of Seglia need to vote for a new president who will take over my legacy. This is an important moment in history for Seglia and I honestly fear that the current security situation and political interference from neighbouring countries may hamper the good preparations of fair and peaceful elections. Besides this a massive cyber-attack had taken place against Seglia's state institutions and media a few days ago.

As you have stated in many occasions “there is no development without security”, I come to you to request the support of the EU with all its means and tools to help improve our peace and security, threaten by the above-mentioned issues.

As friends of the EU, we act in your interest and we trust that you will support us with all means at your disposal.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my gratitude for the EU efforts to support the proud people of Seglia,

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely Yours

Nedl TEMM
President of the Republic of Seglia
M. EU PLANNING DOCUMENTS
SECTION 2-M-1

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRISIS APPROACH
Political Framework for Crisis Approach of SEGLIA (14 March 21)

I. Background.
1. As a consequence of the deterioration of the crisis in Seglia, the EEAS was tasked by the High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) to prepare a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) on Seglia in view of Political and Security Committee (PSC) debate.
2. Its purpose is to provide a platform for a shared analysis of the situation in Seglia, including challenges and structural risks of conflict, as well as the definition of how the EU can best contribute, over the short, medium and long term, to prevent conflict and build peace in Seglia and more broadly in Augustia.
3. These considerations build on the existing EU-Seglia political, security, development and economic cooperation and on the findings of the recent EEAS and European Commission (EC) joint conflict analysis workshop, which was organised by the EU Delegation to Seglia and are in line with the principles of EU's integrated approach to external conflict and crisis.
4. The following PFCA document has been jointly developed by the EEAS Regional Desk and the Integrated Approach to Security and Peace Department (ISPD) with contributions from other EEAS services and in co-operation with the European Commission. This collaborative process ensures that the EU's integrated approach is key for the EU response.
5. This PFCA is a direct response to the EU High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) H.E. Borrell’s request to the EEAS to issue a Political Framework for a Crisis Approach to be presented to the PSC as a consequence of the latest events in Seglia, the letter from the Seglia President to the EU HR/VP of 19 January 2021; and the UNSC Resolution 1002 on Seglia authorising international support, including EU intervention with any means.

II. Analysis and appreciation of the situation
6. Seglia has long been one of the most stable democracies in Augustia, but there is a considerable and growing risk of violent conflict with the upcoming elections (December 2021) amid the COVID pandemic.
7. Seglian government is separated in two main cities. Seglia City is the political capital where the presidential institutions and the parliament are located and Dottea which is the economic capital. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Decentralization & Local Government and Ministry of Maritime Economy, Maritime Transport, Fisheries & Fish are located in Dottea.
8. This situation develops in a context shaped by a number of structural risk factors and conflict
drivers such as group-based inequalities, vulnerability to hybrid threats and the spread of small arms as well as external factors of insecurity, notably the infiltration of "Newborn Extremist State" (NEXSTA) and regional actors with competing ideological and economic interests.

9. The outcome of the election remains unpredictable, with no candidate expected to receive a majority in the first round, and many undecided voters. This uncertainty may create fear of defeat or exclusion, raising the appeal of violence as a means to tip the balance. In this context, presidential elections in Seglia assume a winner-takes-all character, with a high cost of losing in the eyes of the frontrunners.

10. The COVID pandemic will weaken sources of resilience and increase vulnerabilities:
   - Limited access to health services, particularly in rural areas, food insecurity and the socio-economic impact of containment measures risk to further undermine social cohesion and increase humanitarian needs.
   - Armed factions in the South and extremist groups, notably NEXSTA, may also seize the opportunity for limited control over parts of the territory, further pushing their agenda and control by also taking advantage of the situation to mobilise vulnerable groups.

11. In the absence of a conflict prevention approach, including non-violent dispute resolution mechanisms and a strategy to ensure a proportional use of force by the security forces, incidents of violence during the electoral period risk becoming catalytic and fuel tensions.

12. In the short term, conflict prevention and stabilization efforts need to consider the escalation of violence due to the spread of NEXSTA activities to the northwest reaching key cities like Dottea, as well as the access to the coast from where NEXSTA can increase maritime activities.

Conflict dynamics

13. Political instability related to leadership transitions has been one of the primary sources of violence in Seglia in recent decades. The number of casualties and fatalities resulting from political violence is generally low, although there has been a recent uptick due to political instability related to leadership transitions, and the activities of violent extremist groups, most notably NEXSTA.

14. Moreover, several neighbouring countries and regional powers have a stake in the political trajectory of Seglia, and actively shape its conflict dynamics.

15. The security situation has significantly deteriorated over the past months once NEXSTA gained the ability to maintain a safe haven in northern Proxyland, an increasing its presence in small areas in the south of Seglia arriving till the coast, using guerrilla tactics to spread terror.

16. NEXSTA tries to create some support from locals by providing basic services and education while imposing new draconian laws in the villages that are not under the protective umbrella of
the Seglian security forces. NEXSTA has also state sponsors, namely Proxyland and Kronen.

17. NEXSTA has strengthened its presence throughout Augustia. NEXSTA has shown considerable interest in improving its cyber capabilities and recently extended its portfolio to illegal gold mining activities. Population displacements have increased in the region due to the income prospects offered by illegal gold mining ventures. Recently NEXSTA was found able to operate at coastal waters including Seglian territorial waters.

18. It seems that NEXSTA is trying to gain hold of some territory of Seglia as these attacks are no longer temporary and the terrorists have started settling in the villages and preparing a defensive posture against Seglian Armed Forces.

19. NEXSTA fighters also continue to attack ferociously civilians in areas under their control, including through acts of Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV). The security and humanitarian situation keeps worsening, with civilians caught in the fighting between NEXSTA and government security forces. The fighting severely hinders the ability of international humanitarian organisations to access the people in need. Aid workers increasingly become targets of violent attacks.

20. NEXSTA has previously demonstrated only rudimentary cyber knowledge and is currently focused on propaganda. NEXSTA have shown considerable interest in improving their cyber capabilities, including through the use of hackers for hire. EU cybersecurity entities are focusing on gathering technical details of their cyber tools.

21. As its stronghold in the Middle East has been severely targeted by the intervention of the international community, NEXSTA is now following a decentralized strategy, spreading its fighters and networks all over the world. Intelligence reports hint at the risk that many NEXSTA fighters with an EU passport are returning to Europe. NEXSTA looks for new strongholds, particularly in states with low governance or aligned interests like Proxyland, to establish new bases of operations to continue its campaign.

22. NEXSTA has previously demonstrated experience in exploiting the scarcity of natural resources such as water and food, as well as the poor social and economic conditions, as tools to bolster the recruitment efforts (e.g. through the promotion of social care for the lower classes).

23. NEXSTA is getting more assertive in its strategy to get hold of its new safe haven in North Proxyland and its neighbourhood, where the central government has lost nearly all influence. NEXSTA is finding new ways to finance its operations through illegal activities including illicit activities at sea. Part of the illegal revenue is spent to bribe members of Proxyland’s ruling clan and army generals to secure their inaction.

24. The threat of NEXSTA is even more present with targeted attacks on EU interests in Augustia.
The terrorist organisation also campaigns against the intervention of EU in Seglia.

25. Seglian Political Landscape, Political transitions and ideological differences have been a source of instability in Seglia’s past. Recent statements by former President XEFI and the radical opposition party **Seglia Liberation League (SLL)** in the national assembly have increased tensions and even triggered sporadic violence. The SLL party holds approximately 18% of seats in the Assembly, and is **favourable to Kronen**, mainly but not only, due to a shared ethnicity, similar demands of an anti-western policy, and calls for “an iron fist to wipe out terrorism” in the southeast.

26. **Seglian Security and Defence Forces**:
   - Seglian Army is unable to cover the full extent of the national territory, especially in the South where NEXSTA is increasing its presence. Additional battalions from the Seglian Army have recently been deployed to the South of Seglia to counter the infiltration of terrorist cells through the southern east border with Proxyland. This deployment has weakened the military protection of the harbour of Dottea and the northern part of the country.
   - In addition, the best trained Seglian battalion and about 350 Seglian police officers are deployed abroad as part of the UN missions.
   - There is no border police and the troops deployed to the border with Proxyland have no expertise in border management. As a result, smuggling from Proxyland and infiltration by NEXSTA present growing challenges.
   - Seglian Navy is weak and subjected to shortages, unlikely to be able to provide the necessary security for Seglian maritime infrastructures and their SLOC’s.

27. Although the Seglian Army is known for its professionalism, competence and observance of republican values, it is in general terms inefficient. The main challenge of the Seglian Security Forces is their inability to cover the full extent of the national territory, especially in the South where the NEXSTA is increasing its presence. This security vacuum has led to the absence of government authority and state services to the population.

28. Additional battalions from the Seglian Army have recently been deployed to the South of Seglia to counter the infiltration of terrorist cells through the southern east border with Proxyland. This deployment has weakened the military protection of the northern part of the country.

29. **Proxyland** is a dictatorship, ruled by **General Podumet NEFASU** since 1992, who took over power after a coup d’état which ended a short revolution fuelled by demands for social change in 1992. During the nineties, NEFASU, in alliance with Kronen, openly supported rebel movements all around the world.
30. The lack of state authority and services and the sporadic fighting between tribes in the North East of Proxyland, has contributed to a dire humanitarian situation with acute malnutrition and food insecurity, displacement, poor water, sanitation and health (WASH) conditions and frequent flare-up of communicable diseases. The situation has worsened by the influx of NEXSTA fighters, which also led to a security crisis. This crisis is characterised by frequent attacks against civilians, including acts of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).

31. Relations of the Government of Proxyland with NEXSTA are complex and opportunistic. NEFASU plays the game of delegating the warlords in the northeast to contain and coexist with NEXSTA in exchange of various favours.

32. The narrative of NEFASU, supported by Kronen, is that Proxyland has never been able to develop itself due to the continuous exploitation of its people by western countries and interference of the European countries in Proxyland’s politics.

33. The borders between Proxyland and Seglia are porous and checkpoints are inefficient. There is a steady and unhindered flow of illegal activities, including the smuggling of migrants, the trafficking of weapons, drugs, gold, and oil products from Proxyland to Seglia.

34. Proxyland's initial reaction to the possible EU intervention in Seglia is aligned to Kronen's foreign policy, although President of Proxyland NEFASUs has a short-term vision focused on regional interests and a monopoly in the energy sector that can enable him to stay in power.

35. The relations between Seglia and its neighbour Proxyland are tense mainly due to the difficulty of managing the border setting an ideal stage for a consistent volume of unhindered transnational organised crime activities, including the smuggling of migrants and the trafficking of weapons, drugs, gold, and oil products between Proxyland and Seglia.

36. The situation in the south of Seglia and at the border with Proxyland has deteriorated as attacks from the terrorist organisation NEXSTA, operating from Proxyland, have increased. These attacks are increasingly including the abduction of girls and women who are victims of human trafficking/smuggling and occasionally used as human bombs.

37. People flee from Proxyland towards Seglia, hoping to use it as a springboard towards Europe. With Freeland joining the EU next April, there is high risk that this will lead a stronger flow.

38. Kronen has been accused of undermining the TEMM government and supporting the campaign of the Seglia Liberation League. There are also some indications of financial support to the moderate opposition party of former President XEFI, although both Kronen and XEFI describe those allegations as “fake news.”

39. Kronen has been developing an assertive global posture, searching for an increased geopolitical role worldwide to overcome internal crisis and improve its international trade market. However, its political and economic interests and values clash with those of the EU.
and the rest of the western world.

40. Kronen’s systematic violations of human rights and international law have been repeatedly criticised by the EU and the international community. Economic and diplomatic sanctions are already in place by the EU since 2014. These include travel bans individuals, whose bank accounts in the EU have also been frozen. Furthermore, certain categories of goods are placed under sanctions.

41. Western Augustia represents the first priority for Kronen's geopolitical ambitions. The Government is taking advantage of the political void of some countries and is extending its reach up to the Atlantic, as the north of Kronen, except the northern coastline, is almost a non-populated desert.

42. Kronen's armament industry is expanding and is aggressively exploring new market opportunities, including in countries which are on the brink of a civil war and the UN has imposed weapons embargo.

43. Kronen's energy supply companies are lobbying the Government to gain more influence over oil and gas terminals in the Western Augustian region, particularly the new resources found in Seglia, to supply its growing and non-self-sufficient national market demand.

44. Kronen is frequently accused of being behind hybrid attacks to harass western countries, and to weaken their economic and geopolitical influence. In many cases, attribution cannot be confirmed with a sufficient degree of certainty and most of these attacks are well below the threshold of acts of warfare.

45. Kronen use of such proxies complicates attribution (making it harder to determine who is behind an attack), constraining potential cyber deterrence against government entities. However, several EU MS have shared the conclusions of their investigation, attributing some of the recent cyber-attacks directed towards their critical infrastructures to Kronen.

46. Kronen has also reportedly Social Media Manipulation capabilities, including a special unit in the Armed Forces that has dedicated personnel using content-BOTS to manipulate public opinion through Social Media posts.

47. NEXSTA groups hardly infiltrate in Kronen due to the heavy securitisation of the border and an extremely strict migration policy. Religious groups (other than the traditional Kronen religion), non-governmental organizations and international civil society organisations are closely scrutinized by the security forces. Several international human rights NGOs have been expelled and others prosecuted in the last years blamed for carrying out seditious activities.

48. The reaction of Kronen to the possible intervention of the EU on Augustian soil is publicly stated in all international committees and official forums. Yo KOPQOPH, president of Kronen, accuses Seglia of being powerless to manage its internal affairs and accuses the EU
of seizing the opportunity to spread its influence in the neighbouring continent with the risk of destabilising the fragile West Augustian region.

49. Kronen publicly rejects rumours being behind the information manipulation campaign and the string of recently increased cyber-attacks, but "understands the reaction in social networks and people around the world who are fed up with the abuse of power and intervention by Western countries in Augustia's affairs".

50. Concerning the action of NEXSTA in Seglia and the recent increase of terror attacks in the EU, Yo KOPQOPH explained that this is a direct consequence of the permissive action of Seglia, its deplorable policy to counter terrorism and the worrying policies by the EU.

51. According to the president of Kronen, NEXSTA is contained and isolated and this is thanks to the determined military action of Kronen at the border and its good relations with Proxyland.

52. Freeland is a Seglian ally in the north. It has a long history of stability and democracy. The country became a NATO partner in 2019, and embraces western values. Freeland has also shown its engagement with the EU participating in many missions and operations. The country has a strong interest in maintaining regional stability to maintain trade and economic activity.

53. Freeland has declared its support to the EU engagement in Seglia even though its capacities are very limited. The country which will join the EU is still under development and, although trained within western standards, its armed forces are insufficiently equipped.

54. Freeland has fulfilled all the requirements to become an EU MS and will join the European Union in April 2021.

55. With inefficient sea terminals and lacking a well-developed highway network, the south of Freeland is partially dependent on the delivery of goods through Seglia City and Dottea harbours. The attack on the Dottea harbour temporarily challenged the economy of the youngest EU member state.

III. Political Situation.

56. Seglia is a bastion of democracy in Western Augustia. The country has experienced several decades of relative political stability and peace, despite a few isolated flare-ups of violence. Despite its volatile neighbourhood, the scope and intensity of political violence in Seglia has remained limited. Seglia has a long history of participating in international peacekeeping.

57. The President of the Republic of Seglia is the head of state and head of government. Seglia was ruled by the Socialist Party of Seglia, for 40 years until Ecfuamezi XEFI was elected president in 2001. He was re-elected in 2006 and amended Seglia's constitution over a dozen times during his two 5-year terms to increase executive power and weaken the opposition. His decision to run for a third presidential term sparked a large public backlash that led to his defeat in December 2011 runoff with Nedl TEMM.
58. Under TEMM's government, a 2015 constitutional referendum has confirmed the presidential term for five years with a maximum of two consecutive terms for future presidents. TEMM won his bid for re-election in December 2016, but the race for the presidency in 2021 is wide open.

2021 Electoral Process:

59. The next presidential elections are scheduled in December 2021. This will be a crucial event to confirm stability of Seglia as a young democracy with a steady progress for development. In previous elections, poor understanding of electoral legislation and security mandates resulted in the excessive use of force or even in the escalation of violence when police responded to minor electoral violations.

60. Both XEFI and TEMM are ineligible to run in the 2021 elections, but are carefully selecting their protégées to carry forward their legacies and remain powerful voices within their respective party.

61. TEMM has recently put forward a long-standing loyalist within his party, Vlad LISASI, as his party's frontrunner. LISASI is a familiar actor in Seglian politics, as he previously served as the Minister of Justice in the TEMM government. However, he may lack TEMM's charisma to attract a wide voter base, particularly within the large group of young first-time voters.

62. A promising police reform and the installation of new election commissioners have done little to address the crisis of confidence in Seglian election authorities. Despite existing plans or commitments, the relevant institutions remain unable to ensure electoral justice and adequately combat offenses related to vote buying and the abuse of state resources. Gross mismanagement, real or perceived, and delays in processing and investigating election-related complaints are possible triggers of postelection protest.

63. Entrenched corruption, collusion, and impunity create a growing sense of injustice and voter apathy. Particularly in southern and eastern Seglia there is little trust in central government institutions. The opposition parties seem eager to mobilize their supporters based on the growing frustration with regular corruption scandals and the lack of tangible change in the lives of many low-income and middle-income Seglians.

64. Moreover, the Seglian State's vulnerability to cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns exposes the presidential campaign and elections to manipulations, using the COVID pandemic as a catalyst to create mistrust in the authorities and instability.

EU's cooperation with Seglia:

65. Seglia is reinforcing ties with the EU in the domain of security and defence. Since the current government came to power in 2011, several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU to support the Security Sector Reform initiative, managed by the
UN with national ownership.

66. The EU engages in political dialogue with Seglia’s Departments of Home Affairs, Justice and Defence in order to strengthen Seglian efforts in the field of Counter-Terrorism and the prevention of radicalization.

67. The EU also funds the development of the harbour of Dottea, as an economic hub for Seglia and Western Augustia (gas, petrol, goods...), and to facilitate European trade to and from the region. The Dottea harbour has a strategic relevance, as it is responsible for 80% of Seglia’s export and import.

68. Any turbulence causing the disruption or closure of the harbour facilities, and or the SLOC in the Seglian territorial waters could cause the lack of delivered goods and lead to instability in Seglia as well as southern Freeland, a region that is highly dependent on the delivery of goods through this harbour.

IV. Economic Situation.

69. Seglia’s economy is largely natural resource-based. Key industries include the fishing sector, construction and mining, while tourism is a significant service sector and offshore oil and gas exploration is underway.

70. Economic growth in Seglia has been over 6% since 2015, and the forecast remains optimistic, particularly with oil and gas production expected in 2021. Looking ahead, growth should accelerate substantially when production of offshore oil and gas begins in 2021.

71. Public debt continued to increase, but Seglia remains at low risk of distress, partly due to GDP rebasing. Debt is estimated to have increased from 54.4% of GDP in 2018 to 60.4% in 2019. This is partially linked to Eurobonds issuance in good financial conditions. Continued growth and fiscal discipline would help reduce debt as a share of GDP since 2019.

72. Seglia receives technical support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to assist with implementation of the Emerging Seglia Plan (ESP). The PSI implementation continues to be satisfactory as concluded by the IMF’s fifth review in December 2017. Financial markets have signalled confidence in Seglia through successful Eurobond issuances in 2014, 2017, and 2018.

73. President Nedl TEMM inherited an economy with high energy costs, a challenging business environment, and a culture of overspending. President TEMM unveiled an ambitious economic plan, the ESP, which aims to implement priority economic reforms and investment projects to increase economic growth while preserving macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and a challenging business climate are among the perennial challenges that may slow the implementation of this plan.

74. The government is focusing on 19 projects under the ESP to continue government’s goal for
structural transformation of the economy. Key projects include the Vjit - Vuace Highway, the new international airport opened in December 2017, and upgrades to energy infrastructure. The cost of electricity is a chief constraint for Seglia’s development. Electricity prices in Seglia are among the highest in the world.

75. Currently Seglia remains dependent on Proxyland for gas. However, Seglia’s energy sector enters a new area after recent discoveries of oil and gas. Thanks to these new discoveries, the country could turn into the new energy hotspot of the continent. There are strong signs of hope for Seglia to become a key state capable to provide stability and economic growth in the region, notably through the harbour of Dottea.

V. Social Situation.

76. Despite the country’s recently improved economic performance, poverty remains high and predominantly rural.

77. Seglia has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Because of the country’s high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Seglian youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged.

78. The unequal distribution of wealth and social services in Southern provinces present urgent challenges. Particularly concerning is the unequal access to political power of various vulnerable communities: women, youth, pastoralists and IDPs, particularly in the more vulnerable rural areas in South Seglia, which lacks the presence of proper Government structures and services.

79. The unequal provision of state services increase the appeal of radicalism promoted by NEXSTA groups in the South. The opposition parties also seem eager to mobilize their supporters based on the growing frustration with regular corruption scandals and the lack of tangible change in the lives of many low-income and middle-income Seglians living in the south and northeast of the country.

80. Part of the affected population in the south of Seglia, mainly vulnerable groups, is fleeing towards safer provinces where national security forces are more presents and public services are better.

81. Public services in the south of Seglia are structurally underfunded and can hardly maintain their presence and provide basic services to the populations.

82. Despite a National Strategy for Gender Equality and Equity (NSGEE), updated in 2016 and aligned with the ESP, there remains also a number of setbacks to women’s economic empowerment, notably access to land and land tenure security; financing mechanisms and markets.
83. In rural areas, the distribution of employment in different economic sectors reveals women’s involvement in agriculture, livestock farming and the environment where they represent 70% of the national workforce.

VI. Security situation.

84. The rule of Nedl TEMM since 2011 has brought relative stability to the country. Seglia has increased cooperation with its neighbours and overseas particularly with the EU, in the economic, political, social and cultural domains. There are strong signs of hope for Seglia to become a key state capable to provide stability and economic growth in the region.

85. The government of Seglia has been struggling to ensure security across its entire territory, particularly in the South. Seglia has so far been spared of major extremist attacks or other regional security shocks, but the activities of violent extremist groups like NEXSTA operating from neighbouring Proxyland and the increasing number of radicals entering the country risk further fuelling instability.

86. NEXSTA militants are infiltrating the south of Seglia using guerrilla tactics to spread terror and impose its rule on villages that are not under the protective umbrella of Seglia security forces.

87. On 19th December 2020, a recent terrorist attack from NEXSTA to a ship carrying humanitarian aid at the Dottea harbour resulted in the closure of the harbour for several weeks, putting at risk the economy of Seglia. The situation was restored, but this new attack has shown the increased capability of the terrorist group to target and strike also strategic objectives.

88. The incident took place on Seglia territorial waters but this, along with other incidents of armed robbery and attempts for hijacking, show that NEXSTA is able to threaten sea lines of communication. It’s possible that NEXSTA will extend its activities beyond Seglia’s territorial waters. There are some evidences that NEXSTA uses its maritime assets to smuggle weapon to its fighters in both Proxyland and Seglia.

89. Due to high levels of climate vulnerability and low levels of human development, NEXSTA might also further exploit the interplay between climate change and violent extremism to boost population displacements and competition for land and water.

90. The COVID crisis is likely to further weaken government control over these areas, may risk strengthening NEXSTA and exacerbating the prevalence of insecurity.

91. Relations between Seglia and its neighbour to the south east, Proxyland, are tense mainly due to the difficulty of managing a porous border. People flee from Proxyland towards Seglia, hoping to use it as a springboard towards Europe mainly through Freeland. There is an increase in criminal organizations taking profit of the migration flows and illegal traffic and
smuggling, particularly of human beings, that is on the rise.

92. Activism by terrorist groups in neighbouring Proxyland and the increasing number of radicals entering the country are factors that risk fuelling instability.

93. There is no border police and the troops deployed to the border with Proxyland have no expertise in border management. This is the main cause why smuggling from Proxyland and infiltration by NEXSTA still continue.

94. Amid the challenges it is facing, Seglia is reinforcing ties with the EU, demonstrating a clear interest in strengthening its capacities in the domain of security and defence. Although the Seglian Army is known for its professionalism, competence and observance of republican values, it is unable to cover the full extent of the national territory, especially in the South where the NEXSTA is increasing its presence. This security vacuum has led to the absence of government authority and state services for the population.

95. Additional battalions from the Seglian Army have recently been deployed to the South of Seglia to counter the infiltration of terrorist cells through the southern east border with Proxyland. This deployment has weakened the military protection of the harbour of Dottea and the northern part of the country and the coastline. In addition, the best trained Seglian battalion and about 350 Seglian police officers are deployed abroad within UN missions.

96. Since August 2020, EU delegations and communication networks have been attacked by several cyber-attacks. Likewise, a number of EU MS have been subject to cyber-attacks of different but concerning nature and intensity directed towards their critical infrastructures.

97. The competent authorities are currently investigating whether these attacks are due to criminal activities or orchestrated by a specific state actor or a non-state actor (a terrorist organization). To this point, many of these cyber-attacks are possibly attributable to non-state actors but also to Kronen or Proxyland given certain indicators, such as the functionality, motivation and execution of the attacks. The cyber-attacks are supported by fake news on social media with a view to creating distrust and chaos.

VII. Humanitarian Situation.

98. The lack of state authority and services and the sporadic fighting between tribes in North East Proxyland have contributed to a dire humanitarian situation with acute malnutrition and food insecurity, internal displacement, poor water, sanitation and health (WASH) conditions and frequent flare-up of communicable diseases. Around 4,000 refugees have also crossed from Proxyland into the South of Seglia.

99. Seglia historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West Augustian migrants more often use Seglia as a transit point to North Augustia – and illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand Proxyland refugees.
100. Part of the affected population is fleeing northwards to safer provinces with no NEXSTA presence. As of 1st February 2021 around 20,000 people are on the move, mainly women, children and elderly people who are defenceless against the increasing number of aggressive actions conducted by the attackers. The **massive displacement** has led to the opening of three IDP camps, with the government unable to meet IDPs' increasingly pressing needs.

101. Increased violence and insecurity caused by NEXSTA fighters' attacks in the South of Seglia has led to serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. Humanitarian actors have themselves been targeted. Displacement is ongoing of about 10,000 Seglians, who moved towards the North of the country, settling in three IDP camps. Overcrowding is a major concern in the camps, and the COVID pandemic further increased risks and vulnerabilities. Access of humanitarian aid and health workers has been further affected by COVID-related restrictions and impediments.

**VIII. Human Rights and Gender.**

102. Seglia is home to many civil organizations and networks promoting human rights, helping the provision of basic services, and offering a voice to vulnerable communities, in particular women and youth.

103. Although the government has become gradually less comfortable with domestic criticism by civil society and media outlets, the freedom of expression and assembly remain largely respected.

104. The Government of Seglia made significant progress for the promotion of a gender-sensitive environment, through the adoption of the Parity Law, the Standard Operating Procedures on GBV, a National Action Plan on GBV/Human Rights and the Empowerment of Women, and the validation of the new National Strategy for Gender Equality and Equity. These measures have been developed and implemented under the technical leadership of the Ministry of Woman, Family and Childhood.

105. However, the Seglian government has in some cases failed to enforce international human rights treaties it has already signed, some of which protect women's health services and rights. In addition, women's groups in Seglia have not made sexual health a priority.

106. Moreover, instability in the south has also led to gross human rights violations being committed by non-state armed groups and criminal organisations. The spread and misuse of small arms fuels both criminal and political violence. These weapons, in the hands of combatants who have a history of indifference for the principle of civilian immunity, lead to egregious violations against innocent people.

107. In recent years migrants from Proxyland and Kronen have been using Seglia as a transit point to Freeland – and sometimes illegally to Europe. The country is also hosting several
thousands of refugees fleeing unsecure zones in North Proxyland and state repression in Kronen.

108. In the South, attacks against civilians, including acts of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) are frequent. The hallmarks of NEXSTA among years have been abduction, brutal disfigurement of people, rape and murder. Hundreds of missing people are believed to be dead.

109. Protection needs are increasing, leading to gender-based violence and child protection issues.

IX. Impact of the crisis on EU current interests, values and objectives in the region.

110. The EU has a fundamental interest in peace, stability and prosperity in the region. A stable and peaceful Seglia would make hugely positive contribution to security and democratisation across the region.

111. The deterioration of the security environment in Southern Seglia, and the progressive effects on ports and SLOC is not only affecting to Seglia, but also its neighbouring countries in the Continent, with direct or indirect negative impact on the EU's strategic interest and security.

112. In an ever interconnected and interdependent world, the EU’s internal and external security are intrinsically linked. As detailed in its Global Strategy, the EU has a vested interest in building resilience in its neighbourhood, prevent external conflicts and crises and address global threats to security, democracy and the respect of human rights such as violent extremism and organised crime.

113. Political violence amid the COVID-19 crisis is likely to undermine human security in Seglia and the wider Augustia region in the EU’s neighbourhood.

114. A security vacuum created by instability would open the door for NEXSTA seeking to extend its control in Seglia and expanding its presence in Western Augustia, whilst broadening the geopolitical influence of Kronen and providing a vacuum in which the criminal networks operating in Proxyland can thrive.

115. Kronen and Proxyland have been suspected of either backing or directly launching cyber-attacks targeting the EU and several MS. This cyber offensive directed towards critical infrastructure has been accompanied by fake news on social media with a view to creating distrust and chaos.

X. Objectives to the crisis. What the EU wishes to achieve, and why.

EU Political Interest

116. The European Union has a key interest in building peace and sustaining security in Seglia - a partner with whom the EU has established strong historical, political, cultural and commercial
Seglia is also an important ally geo-strategically speaking. It has a critical role for the stability of the broader region and can help fight the expansion of NEXSTA and other hostile state and non-state actors in Augustia.

With Freeland expected to join the EU next April 2021, it will be sharing a border with an EU MS.

Finally, a peaceful Seglia is also in line with EU economic and strategic interests, as it allows for the diversification of EU's gas supply sources and routes for more energy security and trade.

**EU Political Objective**

120. The EU political objective is to promote peace, democratic governance, rule of law, the protection of human rights and inclusive and sustainable development in Seglia, which are all essential conditions for lasting political stability and economic prosperity. In this context, the EU aims to support the government of Seglia restoring the security conditions for obtaining a political stability and inclusive and sustainable development.

**EU Strategic Objective**

121. The EU strategic objective is to create the conditions for a stabilised security situation in Seglia, where state structures are enabled to Exercise their functions, in particular in the areas of border management, rule of law and humanitarian assistance.

**XI. Risks. What are the risks of the EU not taking action, and what are the risks of taking action, including on the conflict itself.**

122. As a long-standing and close partner of Seglia, the EU cannot ignore the current – albeit limited- deterioration of political stability in the eve of its presidential elections amid the COVID crisis and the spread of NEXSTA, which may also affect the northwest and reach key cities like Dottea.

123. EU not taking action:

- Political instability in Seglia leads to:
  - A humanitarian crisis, starting in the South and spreading to the rest of the country against the backdrop of the COVID pandemic;
  - Radicalisation of vulnerable or marginalised communities in the South of Seglia leading to violent inter-communal conflicts;
  - NEXSTA expands its regional presence and operations in Seglia; finds new sources of financing to fund its criminal activities targeting the EU and uses the access to...
maritime borders to launch new offensives;
✓ Political instability/violence spill over to Freeland (EU candidate country joining the Union in April 2021) and the wider region;
✓ With the Dottea Harbour representing an important trade hub, any disruptions or maritime insecurity would hurt the Seglian economy but also the wider Augustian region as well as the economic interests of Seglia’s trade partners, including the EU.

• Reputational risks for EU and its MS with respect if a regime, engaged in a strategic partnership with the EU and has demonstrated a shared commitment to EU values, succumbs to violence.

124. EU taking low level action:
A limited engagement would not achieve the desired impact; while at the same time expose the EU for targeting by non-state and state actors. Even if the security forces manage to ensure stability during the electoral period, this would not guarantee a lasting solution and address the multiple threats and challenges to human security, ranging from terrorism and organised crime to climate change. To prevent the attractiveness of radicalism promoted by NEXSTA, curtail organised crime and forced displacements, the EU should fully support Seglia to develop a comprehensive and holistic response.

125. EU taking comprehensive action:

• EU taking comprehensive action based on an Integrated Approach to the prevention of conflict in Seglia may lead to targeting of EU interests and citizens. More specifically, NEXSTA is following a decentralized strategy, spreading its fighters and networks all over the world. Intelligence reports indicate that many foreign fighters with an EU passport are returning to Europe. Kronen and its non-state proxies are also targeting the EU. Kronen has already publicly denounced the EU’s efforts to support Seglia to develop more efficient, accountable and responsible Armed Forces that will operate in accordance with international law, in particular human rights, gender and International Humanitarian Law. The Kronen leadership has called upon Seglians to resist this "EU illegitimate interference and this return to the old colonialism policies that ravaged the Augustian countries."

• If mission objectives are not reached, the EU also risks losing credibility and political clout. Such a situation may negatively impact the so far fruitful cooperation and partnership with the Seglian government.

XII. The Way Forward.

126. EU action in favour of stability and peace ranges from supporting conflict prevention, crisis
response and peacebuilding to making broader EU engagement in fragile and conflict affected
countries conflict sensitive. It includes diplomacy and political dialogue alongside stabilisation
and support to security (focusing on SSR and Rule of Law, Counter terrorism and Hybrid
threats) as well as inclusive and sustainable development

127. Humanitarian aid is an integral part of this approach but only contributes indirectly to conflict
prevention and peacebuilding activities and will be provided based on the affected populations’
needs in Seglia, namely refugees but also other vulnerable groups touched by the effects of
the COVID pandemic.

128. Developing a comprehensive framework for possible conflict prevention and peacebuilding
efforts in Seglia implies drawing on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus when
designing a plan of actions for supporting short-term stability and longer term peace related
objectives for the country and the wider Augustia region, which will be sharing a border with
the EU as Freeland joins the Union in April 2021.

129. When defining its intervention logic, the EU needs to take into account the relations between
Seglia and its neighbours to strengthen border management, support a regional energy
cooperation scheme to ensure peace dividends and foster the respect of human rights. EU
practices an integrated approach, which understands all involved actors’ dynamics and
addresses the root causes of the crisis, to gradually build on stability and prosperity in the
whole region. The approach is mindful of consequences (including unintended) of its
interventions and works with the large spectrum of societal stakeholders, government and civil
society, including non-state security providers, as appropriate.

130. In the short term, the EU should engage in supporting stabilisation actions. This would have
multiple dimensions, namely:

• Support stabilisation actions in the South to ensure a secure environment for the holding of
  safe, free and fair elections, counter any instability created by NEXSTA or electoral
  violence

• Contribute to the improvement of the humanitarian situation aggravated by the COVID-19
  pandemic and the respect of human rights and more particularly the protection of
  refugees in Southern Seglia whilst ensuring a strong gender dimension.

• Support security measures against hybrid threats, which may be aimed at critical
  infrastructure, including disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks.

• Conflict sensitive communication and sanitary measures to ensure a safe environment

• Intensive Stratcom/Info Ops/KLE campaign to better position the EU on the media battlefield
  and prepare our actions.

131. In the medium term, the EU engagement in support of peace in Seglia should focus on
building the capacity of the Seglian state with a view to:

- Delivering basic services, ensure social cohesion, and drive sustainable, gender sensitive and inclusive development by creating jobs for youth, especially in regions left behind.
- Increasing resilience against hybrid threats and the protection of critical infrastructure
- Facilitate Security Sector Reform (SSR), Rue of Law (RoL), as well as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) activities targeting NEXSTA defectors in the South
- Build capacities for effective Seglian Armed Forces, reinforce border management, address organised crime and offer alternatives to the illicit trade in the border areas.

132. In the long term, the EU engagement should be further expanded and focus on:

- Monitoring and addressing potential socio-economic impact of COVID
- Build capacities for inclusive governance and social accountability systems
- Addressing regional rivalries by fostering more economic integration with intra Augustian energy cooperation and trade to ensure peace dividends for the whole region and a stronger partnership with the EU.

133. EU action should include the creation of conditions to increase the commitment and capacity of Seglian Security and Defence Forces in combating terrorism in the South of Seglia.

134. Resource implications will clearly be dependent on which activity is subsequently undertaken.
SECTION 2-M-2

PSC CONCLUSIONS ON PFCA
SUJET: COPOL – RELEVE des conclusions du COPS (Bruxelles, 15 mars, 2021)

SEGLIA

The PSC:

- Received a presentation by the EEAS and the Commission of the Political Framework Crisis Approach (PFCA) for the SEGLIA crisis, as well as the update on the latest political developments and the security situation in the country;
- Welcomed the PFCA as a basis to guide the EU’s way forward in the response to the SEGLIA conflict;
- Invited the EEAS and the Commission services to take work forward urgently along the lines outlined in the PFCA, as well as the PSC discussion and to create a Crisis Management Concept;
- Will revert to the implementation during spring 2021.
SECTION 2-M-3

CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT (CMC)
Council of the European Union

Brussels, 20 April 2021

(OR. en)

10713/21

LIMITE

COPS 281
CIVCOM 127
EUMC 165
POLMIL 115
CFSP/PESC 714
CSDP/PSDC 424
RELEX 630
JAI 690

COVER NOTE

From: European External Action Service (EEAS)

To: Political and Security Committee (PSC)

Subject: EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE
Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible CSDP action in SEGLIA

Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2021) 1002.

Encl.: EEAS(2021) 1002

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE

10713/21
Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible CSDP action in SEGLIA

REFERENCES

A. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1000, dated 18 November 2019, condemning the terrorist attacks and the suffering imposed to the local population.


C. Letter of the President of the Republic of Seglia to the EU HR/VP, dated 19 January 2021, requesting the support of the EU to help improve peace and security in Seglia.

D. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1002, dated 18 February 2021, authorising international support, including EU intervention with any means to sustain peace, security and stability in Seglia.

E. Political Framework for Crisis Approach to Seglia, issued by the EEAS in 14 March 2021.
I. BACKGROUND

1. The European Union has a vested interest in durable peace and stability in Augustia, where Seglia is now the prime partner to ensure democratization in the region, after Freeland has officially joined the EU in April 2021.

2. Seglia has experienced several decades of relative stability and peace, despite a few isolated flare-ups of political instability and limited violence related to leadership transitions in the last twenty years. With the start of the 2021 election cycle, as voter and candidate registration started in mid-2020, an uptick in the number of incidents has been observed, indicating the possibility of a coming turbulent election process.

3. The government of Seglia is also struggling to ensure security across its territory, particularly in the South where the continued presence of the violent extremist organisation "Newborn Extremist State" (NEXSTA) constitutes a severe threat to regional stability, also as a consequence of Seglia’s reduced capabilities in border management and effective control over the territory. The ongoing COVID crisis in the region is likely to further weaken government control over these areas, to the benefit of NEXSTA and other criminal organizations profiting from migration flows from its southern neighbour Proxyland and illegal traffic and smuggling, particularly of human beings, which is on the rise.

4. The EU is actively supporting the UN-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) Initiative in Seglia. Since 2011, several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU in this remit, under Seglian ownership, while keeping an ongoing political dialogue in the field of Counter Terrorism and Prevention of Radicalization.

5. As far as the economic dimension is concerned, the EU funds the development of the harbour of Dottea, the economic hub for Seglia and Western Augustia, accountable for 80% of Seglia’s export and import, and a strategic asset for trading with the EU.

6. Seglia’s energy sector, so far dependent on Proxyland, is entering a new era after recent discoveries of oil and gas, which could turn the country into a new energy producer on the continent when production will start in in the second half of 2021. The harbour of Dottea will play a key role in this transformation. The December 2020 terrorist attack from NEXSTA against a ship carrying humanitarian aid from the WFP at the entrance of the harbour, which caused its closure for several weeks, highlights the need for a better protection of this crucial infrastructure, which constitutes a permanent target for NEXSTA.
7. Institutional corruption, collusion and impunity in Seglia are seriously impacting on the trust of citizens towards central authorities, particularly in the more vulnerable rural areas in South Seglia. Unequal distribution of wealth and unavailability of state services in the Southern provinces are seen as urgent matters that need to be addressed to diminish the allure of radicalism.

8. In January 2021, the President of Seglia officially requested support from the HR/VP. The EEAS acknowledged the request and activated the Crisis Response Mechanism, as well as a number of conflict-prevention/crisis management related activities, resulting in the Political Framework for Crisis Approach to Seglia in March 2021.

9. The content of this CMC is based on extensive fieldwork by the Fact Finding Mission deployed in April 2021, to continue exploratory work regarding the current situation in Seglia and to look at possible Areas of Engagement. It has been prepared by ISPD with the support and contributions of other EEAS services (EUMS, the relevant Geographical Desk and the EUDEL in Seglia) and in cooperation with the European Commission.

10. The CMC is in line with and supportive of the international response and firmly set in the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1001 and 1002 and the letter from the President of Seglia to the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), requesting specific support and assistance on behalf of the Government of Seglia.

11. The CMC aims at describing CSDP activities to address the conflict in Seglia within the EU Integrated Approach. It defines the political strategic objectives for CSDP engagement and provides CSDP options to meet EU objectives.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

Political Situation

12. Seglia was ruled by the Socialist Party of Seglia for 40 years, until Ecfuamezi XEFI was elected president in 2001. XEFI was re-elected in 2006 and amended Seglia's constitution several times to increase executive power and weaken the opposition. His intention to run for a third presidential term caused broad popular discontent, with isolated violent protests that ultimately led to his defeat in 2011 when Nedl TEMM was elected.

13. After TEMM’s confirmation for a second term in 2016, both him and XEFI are ineligible for the next presidential elections, consequently, both of them are carefully selecting their protégées to preserve their access to power through their respective parties.
14. Entrenched corruption, collusion, and impunity create a growing sense of injustice and voter apathy. Particularly in southern Seglia there is little trust in central government institutions. The opposition parties seem eager to mobilize their supporters based on the growing frustration with regular corruption scandals and the lack of tangible change in the lives of many low-income and middle-income Seglians.

15. An additional factor for the increasing mistrust in the authorities is the State’s permeability to cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, possibly using also the COVID pandemic as a catalyst to create further instability.

**Economic Situation**

16. Seglia’s economy is largely natural resource-based. Key industries include the fishing sector, construction and mining, while tourism is a significant service sector and offshore oil and gas exploration is underway.

17. Economic growth in Seglia has increased significantly since 2014 and is expected to maintain the current trend, with a GDP increasing by around 7% over the last three years combined. This is partly a consequence of linking foreign investments and international cooperation to the development in key areas such as infrastructures, electricity, agriculture, drinking water and health, according to the Emerging Seglia Plan (ESP).

18. The ESP is Seglia’s new development strategy and economic policy reference framework and is based on three strategic pillars:

   ✓ structural transformation of the economy and growth;
   ✓ human capital, social protection and sustainable development; and
   ✓ governance, institutions, peace and security.

19. Seglia’s energy sector is entering a new era after recent findings of oil and gas, which would likely turn the country into the major energy hotspot of Augustia. The first gas production is anticipated to start in 2021, while the first oil production could take place between 2021 and 2023. In this context, the modern port of Dottea, developed almost entirely through EU funds, will play a key role.

20. Despite the country’s recently improved economic performance, poverty remains high and predominantly rural. Most of the poor live in rural areas, where poverty is deeper and more severe. Rural areas are sustained principally by agriculture. In urban areas, the poor are mainly unemployed or working in the informal sector, typically in trade.

21. The increased instability in border areas, the growing perception of inequalities and injustice, the terrorist threat and the growth of illegal activities are posing additional challenges to the
Government of Seglia to deliver efficiently and in a timely manner on their development goals for the South.

22. The increase of illegal activities and terrorist attacks at sea starts to put in danger the preservation of freedom of navigation off the coast of Seglia and the protection of the global EU supply chain and of maritime trade.

**Humanitarian Situation**

23. Seglia has made important progress to cope with poverty, to promote gender equality and women empowerment reducing child mortality, to ensure environmental sustainability and to establish a global partnership for development. However, the situation in the south of Seglia has deteriorated as attacks from NEXSTA have increased resulting in limited attendance to school, especially that of girls. In other cases, there are reports about abduction of girls and women who are subjected to acts of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV). The humanitarian situation keeps worsening, with civilians caught in the fighting between NEXSTA and government security forces or used as human shields or suicide bombs by the terrorist group.

24. The humanitarian situation in Seglia is particularly alarming along the southern border. Some 4,000 migrants have recently crossed over from Proxyland, due to the poor living conditions in their country, and are trying to reach the EU. Seglia is also hosting refugees fleeing state repression in Kronen.

25. Increased violence and insecurity caused by NEXSTA's attacks in South Seglia has led to serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. About 10,000 Seglians are leaving the area and moving towards the North of the country, through the mainland to safer provinces, where national security forces are more present, settling in three IDP camps. Overcrowding is a major concern in the camps, as the spread of communicable diseases, including COVID-19, is further increasing risks and vulnerabilities and impedes full access to humanitarian aid and operators due to prevention related restrictions.

26. Public services in Southern Seglia structurally underfunded and exposed to threats, can hardly maintain their presence and provide basic services to the populations. Protection needs are increasing.

**Human Rights Situation**

27. Within this complex scenario, human rights violations and abuses have been widespread and manifested largely in extrajudicial killings, violence against women and children, abduction and trafficking of children, recruiting child soldiers, arbitrary detention and torture, according to
several international or non-governmental organisations operating in the region. Freedoms of assembly and of expression have also suffered restrictions.

28. Instability and insecurity in the South has led to gross human rights abuses being committed by non-state armed groups and criminal organisations, thanks also to the large availability of small arms, fuelling both criminal and political violence. These weapons, in the hands of combatants who have a history of indifference for the principle of civilian immunity, lead to frequent violations against innocent people in areas under their control, including with the abduction of girls and women who are subjected to acts of SGBV and have been reportedly used as sex slaves, forced brides and human bombs in the areas under NEXSTA's control.

29. Despite the significant progress for the promotion of a gender-sensitive environment over the latest decades, notably the Gender Parity Law in 2011, the Seglian government has in some cases failed to enforce international human rights treaties it has already signed, some of them related to protecting women's health services and rights. Researches show that women are still the main victims of GBV in Seglia and some key issues are still open concerning women's participation to governance and politics.

Security Situation

30. Despite the progress made in order Seglia to become a key state capable to provide stability in the region, the Government is struggling in terms of security and capacity to manage not only its Southern region, but also its coast and territorial waters.

31. The government of Seglia is struggling with corruption and poor leadership, particularly in the Police and Judicial system, that provokes social unrest and allows radicalism to flourish in the Southern provinces and hampers an effective provision of security across the entire Seglian territory.

32. Law enforcement agencies suffer from a chronic personnel shortage and police officers seem poorly prepared to deal with security issues and management of borders. Some general training has been provided, but police officers still lack critical knowledge about procedures and relevant policing strategy.

33. So far, the country has been spared of major extremist attacks or other regional security shocks, but the activities of violent extremist groups like NEXSTA operating from neighbouring Proxyland constitute a significant factor for instability in the region. NEXSTA militants are increasingly infiltrating the south of Seglia, maintaining some temporary bases, using guerrilla tactics to spread terror and impose its rule on villages that are not under the protective umbrella of Seglian security forces.
34. The capacity of NEXSTA to attack objectives in Central Seglia has substantially increased. Having connections with Organized Crime Groups and the support of part of the local population in South Seglia and some coastal waters, NEXSTA is able to target central parts and the coast of Seglia, as well as to conduct limited actions against Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC's).

35. The borders between Seglia and Proxyland are porous and checkpoints are inefficient. There is a steady and unhindered flow of illegal activity, including the smuggling of migrants, the trafficking of weapons and drugs. For the past few years, episodes of violence perpetrated by NEXSTA have caused extensive suffering to the people of Seglia.

36. Apart from the terrorist activities carried out by NEXSTA in the South, there is an increase of criminal organisations along the border with Proxyland taking profit of the rise of the substantial irregular migration flows, illegal trafficking and smuggling.

37. The Armed Forces of Seglia consist of about 18,000 disciplined and well-trained personnel, with half of the troops in the Army, which represents a low percentage of the population compared to similar countries. Although the Seglian Army is known for its professionalism, competence and observance of republican values, it is unable to cover the full extent of the national territory.

38. This is particularly true in the South where the security vacuum has led to the absence of government authority and state services for the population. Consequently, additional Army battalions have recently been deployed to Southern Seglia to counter NEXSTA’s increasing presence and influence. It is worth noting that Seglia has no border police and the troops deployed to the border with Proxyland have no expertise in border management.

39. The best trained Seglian battalion and about 350 Seglian police officers are currently deployed abroad within UN missions and the recent reinforcements to the South have resulted in weakening the military protection of the harbour of Dottea and the northern part of the country.

40. The maritime security situation starts to be deteriorated and it could affect the normal delivery of merchant shipping cargoes. The Seglian Navy is not able to control the situation at sea and the threat of piracy and armed robbery still remains.

41. In this framework, some intelligence reports assess that several international cargo ships have delivered hundreds of weapons through Seglian ports and the Seglian coast. These weapons have reinforced NEXSTA capabilities, trying to establish a piracy structure off the south coast of Seglia.
42. In its quest for new sources of financing NEXSTA has recently extended its portfolio to illegal gold mining activities and was also found trying to operate at coastal waters including Seglian territorial waters. NEXSTA activities are of a hybrid nature, ranging from terrorism or promotion of irregular migration, to threats to the humanitarian assistance or to energy security. Taking advantage of strong links with Organized Crime Groups, NEXSTA is present not only in southern Seglia but also in some parts of the Seglian coast where, they are able to conduct activities at sea provoking risks and threats to international maritime security.

43. Kronen plays a significant role in Augustia, covering more than 80% of its territory, and has been developing an assertive global posture, searching for an increased geopolitical role worldwide to overcome internal crisis and improve its international trade market. However, its political and economic interests and values clash with those of the EU and the rest of the western world.

44. Kronen’s systematic violations of human rights and international law have been repeatedly criticised by the EU and the international community. In turn, the EU announcement of getting involved in Seglia, Kronen leadership has accused the EU of seizing the opportunity to spread its influence in the neighbouring continent with the risk of destabilizing the fragile West Augustian region, calling upon Seglians to resist to the EU illegitimate interference.

45. Kronen publicly rejects rumours being behind the information manipulation campaign and the string of recently increased cyber-attacks, in particular against Seglia’s state institutions and media. At the same time, some malicious cyber activities were conducted against the EU Delegation in Seglia and a number of EU Member States flagged an increase in the number of cyber-attacks directed towards governmental infrastructures as well as to private ones, particularly in the energy sector.

46. The COVID-19 pandemic also affects the security sector, weakening sources of resilience and increasing vulnerabilities. Against this backdrop, armed factions in the South and extremist groups, notably NEXSTA, may also seize the opportunity to further extend control over parts of the territory, by also instrumentalising the situation to mobilise vulnerable groups.

Engagement of the international community

United Nations

47. Despite the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1000, 1001 and 1002, the UN has a limited presence in the area, leaving the field open to regional actors such as the EU. The UN office in the capital of Seglia is dealing mainly with managing the SSR under national ownership and IDP related activities. The terrorist attacks, in December 2020, have
hampered the UN activities. An additional temporary effort is dedicated to supporting the incoming elections.

Other Stakeholders

48. Seglia receives technical support from the International Monetary Fund under a Policy Support Instrument to assist with the implementation of the Emerging Seglia Plan.

49. The U.S. and several European nations have been assisting Seglia in an effort to strengthen its security forces and help prevent terrorism and illegal immigration. The U.S. has conducted combat training and humanitarian missions with the Seglian Army. Spain, France, the United Kingdom and the U.S. have all assisted Seglia in strengthening its maritime security.

50. Bilateral cooperation projects on armaments, equipment and training for the armed forces are currently ongoing with the United States, France, and Germany, on a smaller scale.

Existing EU engagement

51. The long term stability and prosperity of a democratic Seglia is of strategic interest to the EU and a cornerstone of the EU neighbourhood policy in Western Augustia. Thus, the EU continues to deploy its wide-range of means to support the political and socio-economic development in Seglia.

52. Seglia is reinforcing ties with the EU in the domain of security and defence. Since the current government came to power in 2011, several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU to support the Seglian SSR Initiative, managed by the UN with national ownership.

53. The EU engages in political dialogue with Seglia’s Departments of Home Affairs, Justice and Defence in order to strengthen Seglian efforts in the field security, fight against terrorism, and the prevention of radicalization.

54. The EU also funds the development of the harbour of Dottea, as an economic hub for Seglia and Western Augustia, and to facilitate European trade to and from the region. The Dottea harbour has a strategic relevance, as it is responsible for 80% of Seglia’s export and import. Any turbulence causing the disruption or closure of the harbour facilities could cause the lack of delivered goods and lead to instability in Seglia as well as southern Freeland, the youngest EU Member State (MS), a region that is highly dependent on the delivery of goods through this harbour.
Political Action

55. The EU is preparing its response to Seglia’s requests for increased support as set out in the letter of the 19 January 2021 addressed by the President of Seglia to the HR/VP. The EU has acknowledged the request of President TEMM and the Foreign Affairs Council has called on the HR/VP to submit a proposal to MS for CSDP engagement.

56. EU actions are in line with the UNSCR 1002 (2021), adopted by the Security Council, which invites the international community, and in particular the EU, to support Seglian Government in its effort to suppress NEXSTA activities.

57. The EU will continue using its diplomatic tools, including the EU Delegation supported by EU Member States with diplomatic representations on the ground, and in close coordination with other regional and international actors, aiming at contributing to consolidate the political stability and socio-economic development in Seglia in the framework of a regional approach.

58. The EU Commission, within the context of the upcoming adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) is examining current assistance programmes and considering options for future cooperation priorities, with a view to adapting its support to political and other socio-economic and governance-related efforts.

III. EU APPROACH

EU Political Interest

59. The EU has a fundamental interest in preventing conflict and stabilising crisis situations in those third states on its borders which might spill over into EU territory, in this case through Freeland, and in promoting democracy and effective governance. Fragile states with loose control over their territory, where terrorist organisations may find a safe haven, pose a serious risk to the EU and its citizens.

60. The EU's interest in Augustia is to secure the stability of Seglia by promoting democracy, good governance, rule of law, human rights and economic development, which are essential conditions for lasting internal political balance and economic prosperity.

61. Preventing a further escalation of violence in Seglia will not only reduce human suffering, but will also protect the development gains and objectives that the EU and its MS, as well as other international partners, have so far contributed to
62. A peaceful Seglia is also in line with EU economic and strategic interests, as it allows for the diversification of EU's energy supply sources and routes leading to improved energy security and increased trade. The EU is concerned by the current humanitarian crisis in Seglia, including the situation of refugees and IDPs in the camps and their increased vulnerability due to the impact of the COVID pandemic.

63. A stable and peaceful Seglia would make significant contribution to security and democratisation across the region. Improving the security situation, by supporting the Government of Seglia, will deter the infiltration of NEXSTA operatives into Seglia and prevent them from using Seglia as a possible staging area for the preparation of terrorist activities against the EU and harass the international freedom of navigation at the sea.

64. An EU action in the region would significantly contribute to the fight against terrorism and the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) by disrupting NEXSTA activities including NEXSTA interest in the maritime domain.

65. Finally, the EU has an interest in preventing Kronen from expanding its anti-West zone of influence in the European Neighbourhood.

**EU Political Objective**

66. The EU overall political objective is to further support the development and the democratic process in Seglia, strengthening the government's ability to ensure peace and security in the country, enhancing resilience against external interference and promoting the international core values of the rule of law, democracy and human rights.

67. The EU is committed to support Seglia in improving the security situation, in particular in the south, border areas, and Seglian coastline deterring the infiltration of violent extremist organizations and their activities into Seglia’s territory and managing regional migration flows that are currently spilling over into the EU.

**EU Strategic Objective**

68. The EU strategic objective is to create the conditions allowing a stable, safe and secure Seglia, where state structures are capable of exercising their functions, in particular in the areas of border management, rule of law and humanitarian assistance, concentrating on the fight against terrorism, criminal organisations and illicit activities.

**IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE EU ACTION**

**Mission Concept**
69. In order to achieve EU Strategic Objectives, the envisaged CSDP action calls for the deployment in Seglia of a CSDP executive Military Operation working under the relevant UNSCRs, the invitation of Seglian authorities and the existing EU engagement in the ongoing SSR.

70. A CSDP Military Operation will contribute to support the Seglian Armed Forces to create a safe and secure environment in order to achieve the overall stabilisation of the southern part of the country, especially around the city of Dottea, and ensure Seglia's sovereignty on its territory including maritime domain, countering threats and mitigating risk of illegal or threatening activities. It will also contribute to the arms embargo.

71. The CSDP Military Operation will also support Seglian security forces to ensure the protection of the strategic infrastructure of Dottea harbour and to support law enforcement agencies efforts in vulnerable areas, including cyber protection.

Assumptions

72. Member States will provide the necessary resources to plan and conduct the proposed action.

73. The security situation remains largely permissive in Seglia, with the exception of the South.

74. The required legal basis for the EU CSDP action and the presence of EU personnel are agreed with Seglian authorities based on the formal invitation of President TEMM. Privileges and immunities are initially granted by exchange of letters to be followed by dedicated SOFA for the executive Military Operation.

75. The Seglian authorities, in particular the Ministries of Defence, will maintain a continued commitment to cooperate in developing joint strategies and operational activities.

76. Appropriate coordination with humanitarian actors will ensure that humanitarian access is not impaired and humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence are respected.

77. Proxyland and Kronen governments will not intervene directly in Seglia.

78. Continued European public support for the CSDP actions.

79. Given the high threat level in the region, robust and extensive Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be granted to the CSDP Military Operation.

Military Area of Operation (AOO)

80. The Military AOO will include the South of Seglia and its territorial waters, as well the SLOC in the vicinity of South Seglian coast, and its airspace over them. The EU Operations
Headquarters (OHQ) will be located in Europe and the EU Force Headquarters (FHQ) will be located in Seglia, subject to further Military Operations planning.

**Tasks**

81. The proposed military tasks are to:

- Contribute to establish of a safe and secure environment in the South, especially around the city of Dottea, and at sea including territorial and international waters off the coast of Seglia.

- Contribute to prevent further spread of the NEXSTA threat and prevent radicalisation violent extremism, piracy and illegal activities at sea.

- Support Seglian Security Forces (SSF) in developing their capacity to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism, in particular in South Seglia to ensure the protection of critical infrastructures within the Dottea harbour and ships entering or leaving the harbour; support SSF.

- Provide strategic advice to Seglian relevant authorities on the military aspects and support them to strengthen and develop related capabilities for the Security Forces, with particular reference to inclusivity, accountability, human rights and gender principles, International Humanitarian Law and Protection of Civilians.

- Support and protect, if requested, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in close coordination with EU (DG ECHO) and non-EU stakeholders, in particular the UN (OCHA) and in accordance with internationally agreed humanitarian civil-military coordination guidelines.

- If required, support in security aspects all EU actors operating in Seglia, especially the Head of the EU Delegation in Seglia.

- Provide strategic level advice to the Seglian civilian Security Forces in the area of Cyber Security and countering disinformation.

- Protect the Sea Lines of Communications off the coast of Seglia allowing the freedom of navigation.

**Integration of Human Rights and Gender**

Sequencing

83. The CSDP Military Operation would deploy as quickly as possible, and not later than 30 days after the Council Decision to launch the Operation, to improve the security, deterring and disrupting NEXSTA activities.

Force Protection for the Military Operation

84. A significant force protection capability (including with Force Health Protection) is required to operate in South Seglia in order to face the threat to personnel.

85. A detailed threat assessment with constant updates of the situational picture is needed to evaluate these threats. This shall be taken into account in subsequent operations planning.

Desired End - State

86. The CSDP Military Operation will achieve its desired end state when:
   ✓ Government of Seglia control over the southern part of the country is re-established.
   ✓ Seglia authorities have developed the military capabilities to protect population and critical infrastructures over the entire territory.
   ✓ Insecurity factors at sea are reduced to a level allowing freedom of navigation.

EU Exit Strategy

87. The EU Exit Strategy for the proposed CSDP action consists of creating the conditions in which Seglia will be self-sufficient in terms of government capabilities required to manage the borders of the country and to ensure its sovereignty and security within these borders.

88. To that end, the projects initiated within the CSDP action will be monitored and coordinated at the political and strategic level to ensure their long-term sustainability in the framework of the Integrated Approach. At the end of the CSDP action, other EU instruments will be used to ensure continuity of EU action.

Assessment of CSDP Action
89. A holistic Strategic Review will be conducted mid-mandate. Based on the initial achievements of the CSDP engagement, it will assess progress towards the desired end-state and identify options for further extending CSDP action within Seglia as required, taking also into account emerging consequences of the COVID pandemic.

Possible Timelines

90. The initial mandate of the CSDP Military Operation will be for 2 years, with a Strategic Review at mid-mandate, as long as the Operation is mandated by a UNSCR resolution.

91. Regular reports on the conduct of the actions will be presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) every six months by the Military Operations Commander.

Duration

92. Subject to further planning, the foreseen duration of the CSDP Military Operation will be at least two years from the date of its Initial Operating Capability (IOC) with a Strategic Review at mid-mandate to calibrate, confirm or change efforts and transition to the next possible stages.

Risks to Mission Accomplishment

93. EU fails to generate the required Operation personnel and capabilities;

94. Tight timeline, especially in the initial stage, which is highly demanding, given the distances, geography and logistics;

95. Non-inclusive dialogue processes leading to fractures within the Government of Seglia and subsequent loss of consensus in support of the EU action.

96. Political instability in the pre- or post-election period generated by real or perceived election fraud, also as a consequence of hybrid interference, with particular regards to disinformation campaigns.

97. Further, of the security situation in the South of Seglia is likely, and threats to neighbour Freeland cannot be excluded, as a consequence of an increased support to NEXSTA by Kronen.

98. Increase in the migratory pressure and worsening of IDP situation leading to a deteriorating humanitarian situation, in particular in the South.

99. Increased activity of NEXSTA could threaten the political and security situation.

100. The impact of the COVID pandemic is to be extensively assessed by EU actors, in coordination with the Host Nation authorities, as well as the elaboration of contingency plans.
to overcome a surge of the outbreak in the EU and/or in the region that may affect the entire CSDP Operation, including partial withdraw of the personnel from the AOO.

101. The impact of the COVID risk could be further exacerbated by a disinformatin campaign led by Kronen directly and/or through its non-state proxies.

V. **ORGANISATION AND RESOURCES**

**Command and Control**

102. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) will Exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR/VP, the political control and strategic direction of the CSDP Military Operation.

103. The EU OHQ and the Operation Commander (OpCdr) should be identified as soon as possible ahead of the Council Decision, to permit parallel planning and thus the deployment timelines to be met.

104. The OpCdr will Exercise command and control of the CSDP Military Operation at the military-strategic level.

105. The Force Commander (FCdr) will assume responsibility and Exercise command and control of the CSDP Military Operation at the operational level. He/she will Exercise command and control over the personnel, teams and units from contributing states as assigned to him/her, deployed to Seglia, together with administrative and logistical responsibility over assets, resources and information put at the disposal of the mission.

**EU Coordination**

106. The CSDP Military Operation will contribute to the EU Integrated Approach in the region and will act in coherence with other EU instruments including humanitarian aid, development funding as well as Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability (IcSP) delivered in Seglia.

**Coordination and Cooperation with External Partners**

107. The UNSC has underlined the need for a coordinated and inclusive approach by all the main stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive solution to the problems of the region to properly
address the security and humanitarian issues. Nevertheless, a proper co-ordination mechanism under UN leadership has yet to be established in the region. The CSDP Operation will coordinate their activities in such a framework, if established, with full respect for Seglia ownership and EU decision-making autonomy.

108. The CSDP Operation will liaise with UN OCHA on Humanitarian Civil-Military Cooperation.

**Participation of Non EU-Countries**

109. Third States will not be invited to join the Operation at this stage. This situation will remain under review and will be specifically addressed in the framework of the first Strategic Reviews.

**Resources and Indicative Composition**

110. The CSDP Operation is explicitly tailored to deliver its specific mandates; there is not resourced or mandated to act as a responder to support the Host Nation fighting the COVID. Any support in this sense, would require additional capabilities and capacities.

111. The exact number and the organization of the Military Operation will be identified in further planning documents. EUMS and/or designated OHQ will contact MS to sense availability of necessary resources.

112. The Covid-19 Pandemic will influence the CSDP contribution due to the additional required preventive measures. This represents a key issue for further planning of the CSDP operation, as it will influence the time and resources needed to deploy, sustain and redeploy materials and personnel. It will also have effect on the expected Host Nation Support, Contracted support, camp and lodging infrastructures and force/staff organisation (capacity and capability).

113. The composition of the Military Operation will be subject to further military planning.

**Legal Framework**

114. The EU legal framework will be provided by respective Council Decisions establishing and launching the CSDP Military Operation based on:

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1001 (12 June 2020);
- Letter of the president of Seglia to the EU HR/VP (19 January 2021);
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1002 (18 February 2021);
- Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to be concluded with Seglia, in particular to provide privileges and immunities to the CSDP Military Operation and its personnel.

**Financing**

115. The common costs of the CSDP Military Operation, including preparatory phase, will be financed through the Athena Mechanism.

116. The preparation of Reference Amount shall commence without delay by relevant actors in order to be proposed to and approved by Council.

**Information Strategy**

117. A coherent EU Information Strategy, including public master messages, should be crafted by the EEAS Strategic Communication Division, in close cooperation and coordination with the EU Delegation, Geo Desk, and OpCdr in consultation with the Commission. EU bodies will aim to inform all local, regional and international audiences of the EU intentions, actions, and results.

118. A broader communication strategy should be developed and rolled out in coordination with the Government of Seglia.
Title / Subject

Military Advice on Draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a Possible CSDP Action in SEGLIA

[Ref. prev. doc.]

Delegations will find attached the Military Advice on Draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a Possible CSDP Action in SEGLIA, as agreed by the EUMC on 14 April 2021.
Military Advice on Draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a Possible CSDP Action in SEGLIA

References:

A. Letter of the President of the Republic of SEGLIA to the EU HR/VP, dated 19 January 2021, requesting the support of the EU to help improve peace and security in SEGLIA.

B. Political Framework for Crisis Approach to SEGLIA, issued by the EEAS in 14 March 2021.

C. Draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible CSDP action in SEGLIA, dated 05 April 2021.

D. PSC Conclusions on 07 April 2021 inviting the EUMC for a Military Advice on the draft Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP action in SEGLIA.


A. INTRODUCTION AND AIM

1. The EU, regarding the UNSC resolutions has acknowledged the request from the President of SEGLIA to the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) for increased support and assistance on behalf of the Government of SEGLIA (Ref A) and has decided to activate the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism to assess the EU response.

2. In view of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) debate, a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) on SEGLIA was developed by EEAS (Ref B) in order to provide a platform for a shared analysis of the situation in the country. This includes challenges and structural risks of conflict, as well as the definition of how the EU can best contribute, over the short, medium and long term, to prevent conflict and preserve peace in SEGLIA and more broadly in AUGUSTIA.

3. Subsequently, EEAS prepared a draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible CSDP action in SEGLIA (Ref C) based on extensive fieldwork by the Fact Finding Mission deployed.
4. On 07 April 2021, the PSC invited the EUMC to provide its Military Advice on the CMC (Ref D).

5. This paper aims at providing Military Advice on the Draft Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP action in SEGLIA.

B. CONSIDERATIONS

Operational Requirements

6. The EUMC concurs with Ref. C that the situation in SEGLIA requires an enhanced CSDP engagement in order to demonstrate EU's full commitment to relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1001 and 1002 (Ref. E and F respectively) in response to the letter of the President of the Republic of SEGLIA to the HR/VP (Ref. A).

7. The EUMC acknowledges the deteriorated and further worsening security situation in SEGLIA, especially in the South and border areas, where the Seglian Armed Forces (SAF) are not able to act sufficiently in the entirety of SEGLIA's territory without external support. To that end, the EUMC agrees that a CSDP Executive Military Operation, as reflected in Ref. C, is appropriate from a land and sea perspective, capable of and suitable for contributing to the achievement of the EU political and strategic objectives.

8. The EUMC notes with caution the special circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic which is impacting the security sector, weakening sources of resilience and increasing vulnerabilities. The level of its impact and the restrictions in-theatre are to be taken into consideration during the subsequent planning, identifying risks and threats, as well as the possibility of additional requirements.

9. The EUMC considers that the military Area of Operations (AOO) limited to the territory of SEGLIA, its territorial waters, as well as the international waters and SLOC in the vicinity of Seglian coast, is adequate for the mission accomplishment but might be extended with an Area Of Interest (AOI) spanning at its Exclusive Economic Zone for monitoring and coordination purposes. Moreover, special considerations will have to be implemented in case the neighbouring EU Member State FREELAND's territory is violated by extremist groups.

Tasks

10. The EUMC highlights that the demanding and diverse tasks presented in the CMC will be further analysed during the military planning process. Supplementary implied tasks and associated force requirements will be introduced in the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) and will finally be determined by the EU OHQ within the Operations Plan (OPLAN).
11. The EUMC underlines that the CSDP Executive Military Operation will focus on establishing a safe and secure environment in Seglia, by preventing further spread of terrorist organisations (NEXSTA) and protecting the National Critical Infrastructure. This operation will present mainly a land dimension. Nevertheless, a maritime response will be needed for disrupting illegal activities from or towards the coast.

12. The EUMC considers as very valuable additional tools in the CSDP Executive Military Operation a Carabinieri/Gendarmerie-type Unit and a Crime Information Cell (CIC) to exchange information, and support SEGLIAN Security Forces in an integrated approach to reach the strategic objective.

13. The EUMC stresses the importance for protection of the strategic infrastructure of Dottea harbour, which constitute crucial elements for the stability in the area. To this end, coordination with local authorities is of paramount importance for an efficient employment of the resources provided.

**EU Coordination**

14. The EUMC emphasises the need for an integrated approach with close liaison and coordination between the military EU HQs as well as with other EU instruments, military or civilian operating in Brussels or in the Theatre, including the EU Delegations in the region.

15. The EUMC considers that close coordination and cooperation among the EU Force Headquarters (EU FHQ) and the EU Delegation in SEGLIA should be taken into account from the beginning of the planning by EU FHQ and maintained until the end of the CSDP Executive Military operation, as a precondition for success.

16. The EUMC supports United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UN OCHA) leadership role among all humanitarian actors (state and non-state) in their efforts to guarantee that humanitarian access is not impaired. It stresses the support, if requested, for the delivery of Humanitarian Assistance to the people of SEGLIA, while the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence are respected.

**Complex Situation**

17. The EUMC notes that NEXSTA represents the most important and immediate instability factor in Southern SEGLIA. NEXSTA still maintains a number of fighters not only in AUGUSTIA, but also on European soil, thus posing an additional threat. Moreover, NEXSTA's increased operational capacity in central SEGLIA, as well as in coastal areas, indicates a diverse ability to operate in various terrains.
18. The EUMC agrees that the CSDP Executive Military Operation will have to face activities of hybrid nature, including but not limited to terrorism, promotion of irregular migration, humanitarian violations, cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, organisation of violent demonstrations and sabotages in national infrastructure. COVID-19 pandemic may be exploited by NEXSTA to extend their operational capabilities and provoke social unrest hampering the CSDP Executive Military Operation. All these cumulatively constitute an overall challenge to the EU initiatives and this situation clearly portrays a nexus between internal and external dimensions for European security.

19. The EUMC underlines that the CSDP Executive Military Operation has to take into consideration the support provided to NEXSTA by PROXYLAND, in terms of weapons and oil, and by KRONEN on cyber capabilities. This support might increase in the future.

20. Therefore, the EUMC stresses the need for comprehensive, updated and detailed threat assessments on the current capacity of NEXSTA, either in SEGLIA or abroad. The involvement of other stakeholders in the region, in relation to NEXSTA, should be monitored continuously.

**Force Composition and Protection**

21. The EUMC highlights the need for the Member States’ (MS) clear commitment to provide the CSDP Executive Military Operation with sufficient and appropriate means, land and maritime, and personnel in order to perform its tasks, taking into consideration the limited time available for force generation and integration. Further analysis of the military strategic objectives during the development of the IMD is needed in order to describe the required capabilities and priorities in more details.

22. The EUMC emphasises that the Force Protection requirements (including the Force Health Protection) will have to be analysed, taking into account the threat assessments, the different main activities of the Operation members, while performing their tasks, and the availability of other security providers, such as SAF.

**Force Sensing and Generation**

23. Until the EU OHQ is formally appointed by the Council, the EUMC deems that informal Force Sensing for the operation must start immediately at political level in order to facilitate an early consideration of the estimated capability and manning requirements and shape the planning depending on responses.

24. The Operation Commander (OpCdr) will call a Force Generation Conference to fulfil new requirements at his own appreciation.
Legal Issues

25. The EUMC considers that, given the deteriorated situation and the executive nature of the CSDP Military Operation a detailed set of robust and wide-ranging Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the accomplishment of the different tasks will be required. A legal framework about the handling of detainees also needs to be clearly defined at a later stage.

Command and Control (C2)

26. The EUMC emphasises the importance to identify, as soon as possible, the EU OHQ and FHQ, and subsequently to integrate both EU HQs in the operational planning activities at an early stage.

27. The EUMC considers that this type of operation requires a military C2 architecture sufficiently robust and flexible to deal with both the current situation and any deterioration during the Operation. To achieve this objective, the principle of subsidiarity and of clear delineation of tasks should be applied preferably at theatre level.

28. The EUMC notes that NEXSTA, probably with the support of some state actors in the region, has shown considerable improvement of its cyber capabilities and therefore stresses the need for cyber resilience throughout the whole EU military chain of command, including the possibility of using the Cyber Rapid Reaction Team (CRRT).

Readiness

29. The EUMC considers that the readiness of the EU military forces to be deployed in SEGLIA within 30 days after the Council Decision to launch the Operation is feasible, but largely dependent on MS' commitments to the Force Generation and Integration, and Strategic Deployment processes.

30. EUMC recalls the lack of capacity and expertise of the SAF to manage the borders with PROXYLAND. Every delay in implementing a CSDP action will facilitate an increase of irregular migration and of smuggling and a further deterioration of the security situation. Consequently, EUMC stresses the need to follow the timelines set.

Transition Strategy

31. The EUMC underlines that the initial mandate of the CSDP Executive Military Operation will be of two years from the date of its Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with a holistic Strategic
Review at mid mandate to calibrate, confirm or change efforts and transition to the next possible stages. The military end-state will be achieved once SAF have developed self-capacity to mitigate NEXSTA’s presence in their territory and protect the population and the national infrastructure of SEGLIA. Key parameters would include the level of attacks to local establishments, the small arms smuggling and the human trafficking network.

**Risks to Mission Accomplishment**

32. The EUMC concurs with the CMC about the risks that the EU CSDP action may face in the future and calls for vigilance and commitment from MS and the Operation staff against those elements that could jeopardise mission success. To this end, accurate evaluation of the conflict dynamics, intense collaboration at all levels and coordinated Information Strategy are proposed. These risk mitigations include planning for a Strategic Reserve Force.

33. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on operational resilience and on capability requirements has to be extensively assessed.

**Initiating Military Directive**

34. The EUMC emphasizes that key issues for the OpCdr will be described in detail in the IMD, including a thorough handover between the EUMS and the OpCdr, as described in Ref. G.

**C. RECOMMENDATIONS**

35. The EUMC recommends:

a. that above mentioned Considerations be applied in subsequent planning of the EU CSDP Operation, and in decisions regarding its establishment and launch;

b. to start a force sensing process at political and/or military level as soon as possible;

c. that, in view of the complex situation, the diversity of actors and involved EU entities, an integrated approach should be considered, using all EU instruments of power, to start with collaborative planning and leading to a coordinated campaign plan.

d. Member States to commit to and provide adequate personnel and capabilities, covering efficiently the land and maritime security needs, as precondition for mission success;

e. to agree, as soon as possible, on the identification of the EU OHQ and the FHQ, in order to facilitate the possibility of timely and comprehensive intervention;

f. to consider the establishment of the Crime Information Cell (CIC) and of a Carabinieri/Gendarmerie type unit and;
g. to use the term EUFOR SEGLIA as a functional name of the CSDP Executive Military Operation.

36. The PSC is invited to consider this Military Advice and to agree its recommendations.
02. CONTENTS

ITEMS DEBATED

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XXX

OTHER ITEMS APPROVED

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Seglia – Crisis Management Concept ................................................................. 3

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8 • Where declarations, conclusions or resolutions have been formally adopted by the Council, this is indicated in the heading for the item concerned and the text is placed between quotation marks.
• Documents for which references are given in the text are available on the Council's internet site (http://www.consilium.europa.eu).
• Acts adopted with statements for the Council minutes which may be released to the public are indicated by an asterisk; these statements are available on the Council's internet site or may be obtained from the Press Office.
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Seglia – CSDP military operation

The Council approved a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible EU military operation in Seglia.
ANNEX 1
ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS
<table>
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EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

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European Union Military Staff

LIMITE

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

EPG  Exercise Planning Guide
EPT  Enhanced Planning Team
EQ  Exercise Qualifier
ERW  Explosive Remnants of War
CSDP net  Common Security and Defence Policy Network
EU  European Union
EU DEL  EU Delegation
EU EOM  EU Election Observation Mission
EU FHQ  European Union Force Headquarters
EU MS  European Union Member States
EU OHQ  European Union Operation Headquarters
EU SATCEN  European Union Satellite Centre
EUFOR  European Union Force
EUMC  EU Military Committee
EUMS  European Union Military Staff
EUSR  European Union Special Representative
EW  Electronic Warfare
EXINST  Exercise Instructions
EXO  Executive Officer (in EUMS)
EXSPEC  Exercise Specifications
FA  Framework Agreement
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ANNEX 2
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