



# FRAN Quarterly

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# FRAN Quarterly

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#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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# **Table of contents**

### Executive summary #5

- 1. Introduction #8
- 2. Methodology #9
- 3. Summary of FRAN indicators #10
- 4. Situational picture in Q1 2012 #12
  - 4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing #13
  - 4.2. Routes #17
  - 4.3. Clandestine entry (1B) #24
  - 4.4. Detections of facilitators #26
  - 4.5. Detections of illegal stay #28
  - 4.6. Refusals of entry #28
  - 4.7. Asylum claims #30
  - 4.8. Document fraud #30
  - 4.9. Returns #33
  - 4.10.Other illegal activities at the border #34
- 5. Statistical annex #39



### List of abbreviations used

BCP border-crossing pointDATV Direct Airside Transit VisaDRC Democratic Republic of Congo

**EDF-ARA** European Union Document-Fraud Annual Risk Analysis

**EDF** European Union Document-Fraud

**EDF-RAN** European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network

**EU** European Union

**EUR** euro

**FRAN** Frontex Risk Analysis Network

**fYROM** former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

**ID** identity document

IOM International Organization for Migration

Joint Operation

MPs Members of Parliament

MS Member State

**NGO** non-governmental organisation

**OCTA** Europol's Organised Crime Threat Assessment

**OFPRA** French Agency for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons

RAU Frontex Risk Analysis Unit SIS Schengen Information System

**UK** United Kingdom

**UNHCR** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USD United States dollar
US United States of America

WB-RAN Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network

WB Western Balkans

### Note

As some Member States are unable to distinguish between the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) and Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), 'Congo' and 'Congolese' are used as collective terms for these two countries throughout this report unless otherwise indicated.

# **Executive summary**

Most irregular-migration indicators collected within the FRAN community decreased between the last quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012. For instance, detections of illegal border-crossing continued to decline for the third successive quarter to the lowest level since data collection began. Most of this downward trend was due to changes at the sea border, whereas in contrast detections of illegal border-crossing at the external EU land border were actually higher in Q1 2012 than in most other first quarters. Other significant declines included refusals of entry, which also fell to the lowest level since data collection began. The only exception to this suite of decreases was increased detections of facilitators of irregular migration, which contrasts against a steady decline in reports of this indicator over the last two years.

Throughout most of 2011, detections of illegal border-crossing into the EU were dominated by disparate events on both the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes. However, during the first quarter of 2012, detections on the Central Mediterranean route fell to pre-Arab Spring levels with little more than 1 500 detections, but with increasing numbers of migrants from Somalia. Also, independent third-country monitoring identified Libya as a country with medium but increasing risk of irregular migration to the EU and so there remains considerable risk in the Central Mediterranean region. Despite seasonal decreases on the Eastern Mediterranean route, in Q1 2012 detections were still some 25% higher than during Q1 2011, totalling over 8 000 detections and nearly two-thirds of the EU total. Correspondingly, on the Western Balkans route detections were 50% higher than during Q1 2011, as the flow was dominated by detections of non-European migrants, most of whom originally entered the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean route. During 2011 the Western Mediterranean route steadily became increasingly important but in Q1 2012 detections fell to a level broadly comparable with the same period in 2011.

Overall in Q1 2012, the migrants most commonly detected illegally crossing the external border of the EU were also the nationalities with the most significant increases compared to a year ago in Q1 2011; migrants from Afghanistan (+22%), Bangladesh (+150%), Algeria (+40%) and Somalia (+77%). As the rate of increase was lowest for the top nationality, the total share of detections of Afghan migrants fell from 26% at the end of 2011 to just 16% during the first quarter of 2012. Also notable at the EU level were increased detections of migrants from Syria compared to a year previously (+467%), and far fewer Pakistanis (-82%) than were reported in recent months. Most nationalities associated with the Arab Spring, were detected in much lower numbers at the sea border compared to the beginning of 2011, particularly Tunisians, Egyptians and Algerians.

On the Eastern Mediterranean route, the increased detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the situation a year ago, were almost exclusively (96%) at the land border. Irregular migration in this region has followed a strong seasonal pattern almost mirroring that of previous years, with the first quarter of each year recording the lowest, and the third quarter the highest, detections in each year. Given its undisputed status as the hotspot for irregular migration into the EU in Q1 2012, nationalities that contributed to the increase in this region compared to a year previously, were similar to those at the EU level:



Afghans (+42%), Bangladeshis (+175%), Syrians (+476%), and Somalis (+238%).

According to interviews conducted under JO Poseidon Land Extension 2011, many detected Afghan migrants did not travel directly from their home country but were instead previously resident in Iran, having left after permissions to work were no-longer renewed. Given the large number still resident there, there is no reason to expect that this flow, the most significant of any to the EU, is likely to be reduced in the foreseeable future. For a short period in late 2010, many Algerian migrants started taking low-cost flights to Istanbul and then crossing the land border into Greece. This flow resumed during Q1 2012, rendering Algerians the third most-detected nationality both on this route and in the EU as a whole.

In the presence of widespread seasonal decreases, only three nationalities were detected in significantly higher numbers compared to the previous quarter: Bangladeshis, Syrians and Somalis. The sharp increase in detections of migrants from Bangladesh, now ranked second at the EU level, was due to individual, (usually) male workers seeking employment in Greece having departed from the Persian Gulf following reductions in their earning potential in that region. In contrast, Syrians were detected in large groups, including some families, in Greece and the Western Balkans region, reflecting escalating conflicts in their home country where the situation is tantamount to civil war; according to independent third-country analyses, Syria is clearly of both critical and increasing risk of irregular migration to the EU. Migrants from Somalia were detected in increasing numbers in the Italian Pelagic Islands and Malta, often having taken six months to travel from Somalia to Tripoli, where intelligence suggests several thousand Somalis are currently residing. Each of these three flows show significant signs of increasing in the short term.

In recent quarters we reported a sharp increase in detections of migrants from Pakistan. However, In Q1 2012 Pakistani migrants were detected in much lower numbers. These young male migrants were targeting the EU for employment opportunities but having been unsuccessful, many are now returning home voluntarily or being effectively returned from Greece.

As Greece is a Schengen exclave and rarely a final destination, many migrants were detected for the second time as they made secondary movements to other EU Member States. For example, nearly all of the nationalities detected at the Greek land border with Turkey were also increasingly detected throughout the Western Balkans region (except Bangladeshis, who have Greece as a final destination) where in Q1 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing were 50% higher than year ago. In contrast detections of migrants landing in the Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria fell to their lowest level in over a year, suggesting that the Western Balkans was the preferred route for secondary movements, at least during the first quarter of the year. The Western Balkans is also an increasingly important region in terms of crossborder crime, particularly the smuggling of vehicles out of the EU via Slovenia.

The number of asylum claims rose during nearly every quarter of 2011 but in the current reporting period applications fell by 25% compared to the previous quarter, to a level that was broadly comparable to a year ago in Q1 2011. Asylum applications tend to drop at the beginning of each year but this drop was of significant magnitude. Unsurprisingly nearly all Member States reported fewer applications in Q1 2012, compared to the previous quarter, particularly Austria (-80%), but the top three reporting Member States received more applications than during the same period in 2011: Germany (+10%), Sweden (+23%), Switzerland (+63%). The most

significant increases of a single nationality in any Member State were in the number of applications submitted by Serbian nationals and Pakistanis both in Germany. Presumably the latter is related to the peak of Pakistanis detected illegally crossing the border in late 2011, which has now to some extent subsided.

At the EU level refusals of entry fell by 15% compared to both the previous quarter and the same quarter in 2011, to the lowest level since data collection began. Nevertheless refusals in the top three reporting member States actually increased compared to a year ago: Poland (+15%), Spain (+10%) and France (+10%), suggesting that most of the reduction was distributed thinly among the other Member States. Much of the reduction at the EU level was the result Albanian nationals who were suddenly refused in much higher numbers in Q1 2011, immediately subsequent to being granted visa-free travel to the Schengen area. Since that time refusals of Albanians have been steadily decreasing. The majority of refusals continue to be issued by Member States at the external border to nationals of neighbouring third countries, e.g. Ukraine, Russia, Serbia, Belarus, Croatia and increasingly Morocco. Some of these nationalities, especially those at the Eastern land borders, as well as EU nationals, are increasingly involved with the smuggling of petroleum, driven in part by increasing price differentials which boost profitability.

Overseen by the new European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network, Frontex now exchanges very detailed data and performs EU-level analyses on all detections of document fraud on entry and exit at the EU external borders, and on all international flights. Recent analyses showed an increase in document fraud throughout 2011, particularly counterfeit EU residence permits, and impostors using passports on entry at the air border from third countries. In early 2012 Ukrainians, Moroccans and Iranians were increasingly detected on entry to the EU/ Schengen area from their home countries, using counterfeit stamps, authentic ID cards, and forged EU passports, respectively. Document fraud was also very common on flights within the EU/Schengen area. For example, Albanians were increasingly detected on exit from the Spanish and Italian air borders and on entry to the UK and Ireland – mostly with forged Italian ID cards; and Afghans and Iraqis were increasingly detected on exit from Athens and on entry at the German and Belgian air borders – mostly with counterfeit ID cards or forged EU passports. The former reflects movements of Albanians to the UK following their visa free status to the Schengen area, while the latter adds important details to secondary movements of migrants that originally entered the Schengen area into Greece from Turkey.



### 1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders based on the irregular migration data provided by Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

- feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
- a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at the EU level; and

 material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

The report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first – to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU and second – to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated among sections to serve as context.

# 2. Methodology

The present 15<sup>th</sup> issue of the FRAN Quarterly is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between October and December 2011, based on data and information provided by 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Other available sources of information such as Frontex Joint Operations were also used.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay, and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of thirdcountry nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member

### Monthly data were collected on the following indicators:

1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs

- 1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
- 2 detections of suspected facilitators
- 3 detections of illegal stay
- 4 refusals of entry
- 5 asylum applications
- 6 detections of false documents

7A return decisions for illegally-staying third-country nationals 7B returns of illegally-staying third-country nationals

FRAN data used in the tables and charts are as of 18 May 2012

States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations in Q1 2012. Namely, for sea borders they were Aeneas Extension 2011, Hermes Extension 2011, Poseidon Sea Extension 2011, Focal Points Sea 2011; for land borders – Focal Points Land Extension 2011 and Poseidon Land Extension 2011, Poseidon Land 2012; and for the air border – Focal Points Air 2012. Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each above mentioned operation), were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.



# 3. Summary of FRAN indicators


Table 1. Summary of FRAN indicators

As reported by Member States

		2010	2011				2012 Q1		
FRAN indicator		Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on	
								prev. year	prev. qtr
1A	Illegal entries between BCPs	27 536	32 923	41 273	38 530	28 325	13 635	-59	-52
1B	Clandestine entries at BCPs	65	74	60	64	84	103	39	23
2	Facilitators	1 718	1 856	1 941	1 546	1 614	2 107	14	31
3	Illegal stay	86 440	82 327	86 750	88 037	93 834	88 463	7.5	-5.7
4	Refusals of entry	27 907	28 699	30 076	30 325	29 011	24 635	-14	-15
5	Applications for asylum	57 954	53 193	61 574	67 413	71 874	54 340	2.2	-24
7A	Return decisions issued	:	50 970	55 716	57 389	67 310	69 904	37	3.9
7B	Effective returns	:	34 745	35 076	37 639	41 585	40 103	15	-3.6

Source: FRAN data as of 18 May 2012

Figure 1. Evolution of FRAN indicators



Source: FRAN data



# 4. Situational picture in Q1 2012

- Consistent with seasonal expectations, most indicators exchanged within the FRAN community decreased between the last quarter of 2011 and the first of 2012
- Particularly noteworthy, in Q1 2012 there were fewer detections of illegal bordercrossing than in any other quarter since data collection began
- Nevertheless there were more detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU external land border (11 203) than in most other first quarters
- On the Eastern Mediterranean route, detections of illegal border-crossing increased by more than 25% compared to the same period the year before
- In the Central Mediterranean numbers of detected illegal border-crossings fell to pre-Arab Spring levels, but with a rising importance of Somali nationals
- The most detected nationality at a single border section was Bangladeshis detected at the Greek-Turkey land border
- Fewer refusals of entry were issued than since data collection began
- The only indicator to be reported in increasing numbers compared to the previous reporting period was detections of facilitators of irregular migration

- Overall the number of applications for international protection fell sharply compared with the previous quarter, but actually increased in the top three Member States - Germany, Sweden, Switzerland
- Migrants from Afghanistan were the most commonly detected migrants illegally crossing the external border, with 16% of total detections and a 22% increase compared to the same period in 2011
- At the Greek land border with Turkey:
  - two-thirds of all Afghans were detected
  - the influx of Pakistani migrants was much reduced
  - bucking the seasonal decrease, were increased of detections of migrants from Syria, Bangladesh and Somalia compared to the previous reporting period
- Algerians were detected in increasing numbers, at not only the Greek land border with Turkey, but also the Romanian border with Serbia and the Spanish land border with Morocco
- Detections of document fraud on entry to the EU increased compared to a year ago, particularly for migrants from Ukraine, Morocco and Iran

# 4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing


Overall in Q1 2012 there were fewer detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU-level since data collection began. The total of 13 365 detections of illegal border-crossing was a 50% (largely) seasonal reduction compared to the previous quarter, and a reduction of 60% compared with a year previously in Q1 2011 during the beginning of the Arab-Spring influx (Fig. 2). The vast majority of detections were at the EU external land border (82%), rather than sea border. While useful for summary purposes, these EU-level figures conceal considerable variation within and between Member States, nationalities and the major irregular migration routes.

In Q1 2012 the majority of detections (56%) were restricted to a single border section – the land border between Greece and Turkey, where, despite recent decreases related to inclement weather, detections were 30% higher compared to same period in 2011. The second most common border section in the

EU for detections of illegal border-crossing was also in Greece, but bordering with Albania, from where around 8% of detections were reported - a broadly stable trend compared to Q1 2011. This border section between Greece and Albania has become steadily less important at the EU level since visa free travel was granted to Albanian citizens in December 2010 (although there is some evidence that document fraud (counterfeit stamps) is increasingly being used at this border section to extend periods of stay in Greece). In contrast, the land borders between Serbia and both Hungary and Romania have become increasingly important over the last year, due to increased secondary movements of migrants that originally entered the Schengen area in Greece.

Consistent with the majority of reporting periods either side of the Arab-spring, at the EU level the most commonly detected migrants were from Afghanistan, detections of whom increased by 22% compared to a year ago. In the previous FRAN Quarterly a sharp increase was reported in detections of migrants from

Figure 2. Overall in Q1 2012 there were the fewest detections of illegal border-crossing since data collection began; nevertheless, detections at the land border were higher than in most first quarters






Source: FRAN data



Figure 3. Despite increased detections of illegal border-crossing in several Member States, there was an overall decline driven by far fewer detections in Italy

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q1 2011 and Q1 2012 for nine Member States shown by circle size; gradient of lines indicates percentage change



\* This seasonal pattern was not apparent in 2011 during the Arab-Spring revolution

Source: FRAN data

Pakistan, whose number more than doubled between Q4 2010 and Q4 2011. However, in Q1 2012 detections of migrants from Pakistan were much reduced compared the previous quarter (-82%), to such an extent that detections of this nationality at the EU level were almost as low as before their influx began.

In contrast, in Q1 2012 migrants from Bangladesh (+150%) and Syria (+467%) were detected in much higher numbers compared to year earlier, almost exclusively in Greece. Nationals of Albania were detected as illegal border-crossers much less frequently than in previous years. Nevertheless in Q1 2012 there were still ranked fourth at the EU level with 1177 detections – a slight increase compared to their first quarter of via-free travel to the EU in Q1 2011.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FRAN indicator 1A - detections of illegal bordercrossing, and the proportion of detections between the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. The first quarter of each year is usually associated with weather conditions much less favourable for approaching and illegally crossing the external border of the EU. The combination of these two effects tends to produce the lowest number of detections during the first quarter of each year\*. The fact that Q1 2012 saw an exceptionally low number of detections of illegal border-crossing was due to particularly low detections at the sea border (2 432), where fewer detections were reported than ever before since data collection began. In contrast, and despite the low overall number of detections of illegal border-crossing, at the land border there were 11 203 detections in Q1 2012, which is in fact a rather high figure for the first quarter of the year; detections at the land border in Q1 2012 exceeded those for the first quarters of both 2011 and 2009, and were broadly comparable with those reported in 2010.

The low number of 13 365 detections of illegal border-crossing in Q1 2012 was the result of combined detections in 14 Member States, many of which experienced differing trends.




Figure 4. In Q1 2012 two-thirds of all detections of illegal border-crossing were reported by Greece

Figure 3 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing among Member States during the first quarters of both 2011 and 2012 (size of circles), and also the degrees of change between the two reporting periods (slopes). In Q1 2012 eight Member States experienced increases in detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same pe-


riod last year, while six Member States reported reductions.

In Greece more than two-thirds of all detections at the EU-level were reported, almost exclusively at its land border with Turkey. However the largest and most significant increases compared to a year previously (al-



Figure 5. Despite increased detections of most of the top nationalities, there was an overall decline in detections of illegal border-crossing with far fewer detections of Tunisians

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q1 2011 and Q1 2012 for eight nationalities shown by circle size; gradient of lines indicates percentage change



though from lower bases) were reported by Romania and Hungary mostly at their land borders with Serbia (related to the flow in Greece), and to a lesser extent by Lithuania where Georgian nationals were more frequently detected attempting to enter from Belarus (not shown). Following the current cessation of the effects of the Arab-Spring, the most significant decrease in detections of illegal border-crossing was reported by Italy, but decreased detections were also reported by Slovakia where fewer Somalis and Moldovans were encountered at the land border with Ukraine (not shown).

Without question, in early 2012 the migrants that were detected with the most increasing frequency were from Syria (+467%) (Fig. 5). In Q1 2012 more migrants from Syria were detected than ever before (715) and five times more than the number during the same period in 2011 (this may be an overestimation as there is some evidence that other nationalities may be claiming to be Syrian, particularly in the Western Balkans region). The vast majority of Syrians (83%) were detected at the land border between Greece and Turkey. Also important in early 2012 was the increasing detections of migrants from Bangladesh (+150%), Palestine (+100%), Somalia (+77%) and Congo (+63%) (Fig. 5), all of which were most commonly detected at the Greek land border with Turkey, with the exception of migrants from Somalia.

Detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level were dominated by detections at the Greek land border with Turkey. However, detections at the Hungarian land border with Serbia are becoming increasingly important. For the first time since data collection began and following nearly a three-fold increase compared to the same period in 2011, in Q1 2012 the most commonly detected nationality at a single border section was Bangladeshi migrants who were almost

exclusively detected at the Greek land border with Turkey.

The most significant increase was in numbers of detected Syrians at the Greek land border with Turkey.


### 4.2. Routes

Detections of illegal border-crossing on the Central Mediterranean route peaked dramatically during 2011 following dynamic developments in North Africa known as the Arab Spring. In contrast on the Eastern Mediterranean route, detections have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern over the last two years. Throughout 2011 detections in the Western Mediterranean steadily increased. As illustrated in Figure 6 all three major migration routes reported fewer detections in Q1 2012 compared to the previous quar-

ter, probably related to seasonally inclement weather.

In Q1 2012 there were 8 219 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route, an increase of 26% compared to the same period in 2011 (Fig. 6). In Q1 2012 this was the undisputed hotspot for illegal entries to the EU. Elsewhere, detections on the Central Mediterranean route fell significantly to just 1589, compared with the dramatic peak during the first nine months of 2011. Detections in the Western Mediterranean continued their steady increase and remained nearly 10% higher compared to the same period in 2011. The largest increase was in the Western Balkans region (not shown), where 1780 detections were almost double the number compared to year previously, which contrasts to the Eastern Borders, Western Mediterranean and circular migration between Alba-

Figure 6. All major irregular migration routes reported decreasing detections in Q1 2012 Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration route



Source: FRAN data



nian and Greece, all of which showed less dramatic increases compared to the same quarter in 2011.

These routes not only differed in their magnitudes over time but also in the composition of detected nationalities. Consistent with previous periods, detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route were dominated by migrants from Afghanistan, and more recently Bangladesh, Pakistan, Algeria and Syria. The Western Balkans route was mostly affected by secondary movements of these migrants and so the most commonly detected migrants in this region were also from Afghanistan, Algeria and Pakistan, as well as some local to the region such as Serbs. Elsewhere, detections in each region tended to be of migrants from neighbouring countries. For example, at the Eastern Borders the most commonly detected migrants were from Georgia and Moldova, while in the Western Mediterranean detections were mostly of Algerians and Moroccans (as well as sub-Saharans).

As illustrated in Figure 6, detections on the Western Mediterranean route became increasingly important throughout 2011, but still at a lower level than in previous years. In Q1 2012 detections in this region declined, but as there are reports of large numbers of migrants congregating outside of these Spanish cities, pressure could be expected to resume at any time.

The major migration route with the most significant increases in Q1 2012 was the Western Balkans route where detections decreased slightly compared to the previous quarter but were twice as high as a year ago in Q1 2011. The four most commonly and increasingly detected nationalities at a single border section were Afghans in Hungary, Algerians in Romania, Serbs in Hungary and Moroccans in Romania, all at their borders with Serbia.



### Greece opens detention camp for immigrants as election looms

ATHENS (Reuters) – Greece opened its first purpose-built detention centre for illegal migrants in April in Athens, a week before a national election where illegal immigration has emerged as a key issue. About 130,000 immigrants cross the country's porous sea and land borders every year, the vast majority via Turkey, and the authorities are forced to release those who are arrested because of a lack of permanent housing.

With Greece in its fifth year of recession and worries over rising crime levels, illegal immigration has become a major issue in the run up of the May 6 election. On Sunday, the first 56 immigrants were brought to the



Greek police escort migrants to be checked for their documents after a 'sweep' operation in central Athens Photograph: John Kolesidis/Reuters

Amygdaleza detention camp in western Athens, a police official said. Dozens more are expected at the camp in the next few days, which can house up to 1 000 people, the official said. Amygdaleza is the first of about 50 camps that Greek officials say will be built by mid-2013. It consists of dozens of containers that were originally set up to house people hit by natural disasters such as earthquakes. 'We are sending a message in every direction that the country is not unfenced anymore,' Civil Protection Minister Mihalis Chrysohoidis said at a rally in Athens.

www.af.reuters.com 29 April 2012



#### 4.2.1. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since data collection began in early 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained its status as a hotspot of irregular migration. Detections have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern invariably peaking in the third quarter of each year and at the border between Greece and Turkey, with a shift from the sea border to the land border. Unusually, at the end of 2011 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route remained almost constant between the third and final quarters of the year, resulting in the first recorded example of a sustained peak of detections at that time of year. This was due to an unexpected increase in detections at the Greek land border with Turkey, particularly in October.

The Greek land border with Turkey is not the only border section on the eastern Mediterranean route. In Q1 2012 migration pressure towards Bulgaria did not see a seasonal reduction despite some very severe weather in the region during January and February. According to Bulgarian reports, in comparison to the same period in 2011, there was a small reduction in detections of illegal border-crossing at Bulgarian-Turkish land border but a large increase at the Bulgarian-Greek land border.

Afghan migrants have consistently featured highly on the list of most detected nationalities on the Eastern Mediterranean route but over the second half of 2011 there was a massive increase in the number of migrants from Pakistan detected on this route, and in the beginning of 2012 there were increased detections of Bangladeshis and Syrians. In 2010 there was an increase in Algerian migrants (most of whom were taking flights to Istanbul), which subsided during the first half of 2011. In Q1 2012 this flow rebounded (Table 2) and Algerians were the third most-detected nationality both on this route and at the EU level.

Nationalities that contributed to the overall increase compared to the year before included Afghans (+42%), Bangladeshis (+175%), Syrians (+476%), and Somalis (+238%). Data collected during JO Poseidon Land 2012 suggest that detections started to increase between March and April 2012, consistent with seasonal increases reported in previous years as weather conditions tend to improve. Operational data also confirm that Bangladeshis represented a growing proportion of total detections – 18% of the total during the first four months of 2012. Most interviewed Bangladeshi migrants were workers claiming to have departed from the Persian Gulf following reductions in their earning potential in that region. In contrast, Syrians were demographically mixed, including some entire families.

Figure 8 illustrates a selection of third countries coloured with respect to the number of nationals detected at the Greek-Turkish land border in Q1 2012 under JO Poseidon Land. The countries with the most detections are marked with darker shading, while those with fewer detections are indicated by lighter shades. The map clearly shows the very wide geographic range of third countries whose citizens were detected illegally crossing the EU border into Greece. According to operational data, the most commonly detected migrants were from Afghanistan and Bangladesh each with some 17% of the total. This is in contrast to recent periods, in which Afghans alone often constituted nearly 50% of the flow (Q3 2011). This does not imply that detections of migrants from Afghanistan have decreased on this route - quite the contrary, detections of Afghans have actually increased compared to Q1 2011, but to a lesser extent than other nationalities. For example, there have been much sharper increases in detections of migrants from Bangladesh, Syria and Somalia.






Figure 7. In Q1 2012 the most commonly detected migrants at the Greek land border with Turkey were from Afghanistan and Bangladesh

A selection of third countries of origin of migrants, where the depth of colour illustrates the number of detections under JO Poseidon Land 2011 extension at the Greek-Turkish land border in Q1 2012. The percentage of total is show for top ten nationalities

Migrants from Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria and Syria were the most detected nationalities on the Eastern Mediterranean route, each with a differing detection profile over time. Figure 9 illustrates detections of these nationalities over time at the land border between Greece and Turkey reported during JO Poseidon Land. This graph clearly shows the seasonal detection patterns of migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also the extent to which detections of Syrians and Bangladeshis have increased despite problems associated with migrating during the winter months. This would suggest that detections of these nationalities are likely to increase even further as weather conditions improve.

The most frequently migrants reported from the Western Balkans were from Afghanistan, Algeria and Pakistan. Early reports suggest that some migrants in this region are beginning to falsely claim Syrian nationality (see Section 4.2.6. Western Balkans).

### 4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean massively fluctuated in size and composition during 2011, largely dependent on the political and civil unrest across North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Libya. Since Q4 2011 the situation has been much reduced following improved cooperation between Italian and Tunisian authorities concerning the return of Tunisian nationals. Indeed, in February the Italian Central Directorate of Immigration and Border Police went to Libya in order to verify the conditions for the renewal of cooperation on irregular immigration. Further, in April, the Italian Minister of Interior met the Libyan Minister of the Interior, and signed an official report on the various operational areas such as education, the possible restoration of reception centres, the border monitoring through the revival of Sahara-Med project, the voluntary return and

repatriation, the realisation of a project for birth registration, evaluation of the possibility of establishing a joint working team responsible for the voluntary return, repatriation, reintegration, economic, and respect for human rights.

Despite these positive developments, across the region, the 'Arab Spring' trio, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt continued with their difficult political transition processes. Importantly, the institutional capacity to tackle irregular migration in North Africa still remains relatively weak.

According to the FRAN data, in Q1 2012 there were just 1 589 reported detections of illegal border-crossing on the Central Mediterranean route, an 20% decrease compared the previous quarter but a massive 93% reduction compared to the peak in last year Q2 2011. Hence, detections on this route are now broadly comparable with a pre-'Arab Spring' levels.

### 4.2.3. Western Mediterranean route


Irregular migration in the Western Mediterranean region increased throughout 2011 from just 890 detections in Q1 2011 to 3 568 detections in Q3. As has been the case in most years, late in 2011 detections fell but were still some 80% higher than during the same period the year before. In Q1 2012 there were 967 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which is broadly comparable with a year previously.

Nearly half of these detections were at the land border between Spain and Morocco, where detections were some 30% higher than a year ago. Most of these were Algerian or unknown nationalities assumed to be sub-Saharans.



Figure 8. Seasonally reduced detections were apparent for most nationalities, with the exception of migrants from Syria and Bangladesh

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs for the top five nationalities



### 4.2.4. Western African route

During 2011 detections on this route fell to just 24 in Q2 but rose again to finish the year at 112 detections. These changes were due exclusively to variable detections of migrants from Morocco. In the first quarter of 2012

there were just 12 detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, exclusively of Moroccan nationals.

### 4.2.5. Eastern land borders

The Eastern land borders route is, in effect an amalgam of detections of illegal bordercrossing reported by Lithuania, Slovakia, Romanian, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia. Despite the length of the total border section, detections tend to be lower than on other routes. In Q1 2012 there were 185 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which is less than 1% of the total at the EU level. This number of detections is broadly comparable with the first quarters of both 2010 and 2011 and so the trend, at least for the total number of detections, is very stable despite considerable variation within and between nationalities and border sections.

Previous FRAN quarterlies described increased detections of migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo along the eastern borders, and in addition the EDF-ARA 2012 also showed increased detections of Congolese migrants using fraudulent documents throughout 2011. In Q1 2012, there were no detections of Congolese migrants attempting to illegally cross the eastern borders between BCPs although at the beginning of 2012 more than half of all migrants detected with forged documents at their land borders were from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Irregular migration of nationals of West African and sub-Saharan countries (Congo, Cameroon, Guinea and Angola) from Russia to Finland and Baltic countries has continued during Q1 2012. There were also migrants from Algeria attempting illegal entry to Finland from Russia mainly via land border.

Generally, the reduction in irregular immigration in the first month of the year was in-



### Bangladeshis protest at France's crackdown on immigration

France's crackdown on the growing number of migrants from Bangladesh – up by 122% from 2010, according to the latest figures – has met with protests from a largely unobtrusive community often employed in catering or street sales of fruit and vegetables. Until recently the vast majority of Bangladeshis migrating to France came as asylum seekers. But the interior ministry concluded that many of these applications were 'unfounded' and largely driven by economic motives, prompting the French Agency for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Per-



The French Police with a family of suspected irregular migrants

sons (OFPRA) to put Bangladesh on its list of safe countries... with no protection against deportation, even if they appeal against a rejected application.

The rise in immigration from Bangladesh is part of a larger trend, with growing numbers of asylum seekers and serious overloading of French detention centres, which have been underfunded for years. All the more reason, according to the interior ministry, to change the status of Bangladesh.

www.guardian.co.uk 6 March 2012

fluenced by the long holidays in the Russian Federation at the beginning of January 2012, leading to a decrease in the total number of persons crossing the border, which also decreased irregular migration. In February 2012 it had already reached the average monthly activity of 2011.

### 4.2.6. Western Balkans

During the first three months of 2012, detections of illegal border-crossing between at common and regional green borders in the Western Balkans decreased by roughly one quarter compared to the previous three months. This seasonal variation is hardly surprising since it remains broadly in line with the long term winter lows/summer highs trend. Nevertheless, when the detections in 2012 are compared to the same period in 2011, a clear increasing trend emerges. To be exact, there were 6 401 detections reported by both WB-RAN and neighbouring FRAN members during the first three months of 2012, which in turn represents almost a 50% increase compared to the first quarter of 2011.

Predictably, the border sections between Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia remained under the most extensive pressure with almost 150% more detections compared to the first quarter of 2011. Almost all other border sections with more than 1 000 detections on both sides reported various degrees of increases compared to the first quarter of 2011. In particular, Romania-Serbia was the only section reporting an increasing trend both compared to the previous three months (17%) and the same period in 2011 (953%).

Non-European migrants *en route* from Greece to other Member States (secondary movements) were by far the most numerous given that almost 7 out of 10 illegal border-crossings at common and regional borders were linked to Afghans, Algerians, Pakistanis, Moroccans, Somalis, and claimed Palestinians and Tunisians (in descending order).

Algerians in particular increased from 403 detections during the last quarter of 2011 to almost 850 during the quarter under the observation. Most notably, the detections of



# 44

## Would-be immigrants to Europe can go almost anywhere — for a price

Many migrants are briefly arrested [after crossing the river Evros], detained or surrender to the police... Those who cross near Alexandroupolis go to the railway station, where they may visit the Café Paris and meet a young Moroccan who matches migrants with onward transport. The price for being smuggled from Athens to France in a secret lorry compartment is EUR 4 000. Getting out by aeroplane is 'very difficult'. An increasingly popular option is to go via the Western Balkans. The rate from Alexandroupolis to Austria, along a route managed by Greeks, Albanians, Serbs and Moroccans, is EUR 2 800.

Despina Syrri, a researcher, says that some procure fake passports with visas for Europe's Schengen zone. Many smuggled themselves on to lorries heading by ferry to Italy. But these options are all getting harder. That is why thousands now move north through [the former Yugoslav Republic of] Macedonia and Serbia towards Hungary. Smaller numbers trek through Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro and Croatia.

Anosh crossed the Evros last year and bought a fake Romanian passport in Athens for EUR 400. He boarded a ferry to Italy, but was rumbled on the Italian side when the police got their Romanian translator to quiz him. Sent back to Greece, he and a group of Afghans paid a guide EUR 500 each to help them walk into [the former Yugoslav Republic of] Macedonia. There they stayed in a safe house for two days and, after a taxi ride to the border, were shepherded across the hills into Serbia for another EUR 200.

In 2008 51 people applied for asylum in Serbia. Last year the number was 3 134. The true figure crossing into Serbia must be several times higher. Rados Djurovic, who runs Serbia's Asylum Protection Centre, says that few of the asylum-seekers want to stay in Serbia. They apply because it gives them a chance to rest, to get medical care, and to move around legally until they work out how to leave and where to go. Most important, they get an identity card that allows them to receive money, via a wire-transfer agency, to continue their journey.

www.economist.com 2 March 2012

Algerians rose both at Romania-Serbia and Greece-Albania borders. In the case of Albania's detections, Algerians became the main nationality with more than 30% share. Both developments are further confirming a growing diversification of secondary movements through the Western Balkans and further on to the neighbouring EU Member States.

### 4.3. Clandestine entry (1B)

Restricting indicator 1B (detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs) to the external land and sea borders of the EU and also to detections that are confirmed clandestine entries (hiding in transport or other means) results in extremely low detections for the whole of



Figure 9. Yacht intercepted in Elafonissos Island (151 irregular migrants on board) after crushing into a rocky beach



Figure 10. Sailing boat intercepted in Agkistri Island (60 irregular migrants on board) after being stranded in shallow waters


ce: JO Poseidon Sea (22 April

the EU in Q1 2012 (102). However this is still the second highest figure since data collection began in 2008.

For the first time since data collection began, the Belgian sea border reported the most detections among border sections mostly because of unusually high numbers of Filipinos in addition to the steady trend of Algerians. This increase may be the result of a single incident or it may be a new trend. As is the case for most FRAN indicators, indicator 1B is only concerned with detections on entry to Member States. The most commonly de-

tected migrants were from Algeria. During interviewing these migrants stated that they travelled from Algeria or Morocco to Spain by boat or hidden in a lorry.

Compared to detections of illegal border-crossing, detections of clandestine entry at external EU border are very low, but cases of clandestine movements detected within the EU suggest that numbers of clandestine entries at the external border may be much higher than detections suggest. For example, within the EU/Schengen area there were 837 detections of clandestine border-crossing



The crisis in Libya poses other security challenges for the region as it is compounded by the effects of food insecurity and the continued regional fallout of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and, most recently, the political coup in Mali. In addition, for many years, Libya had hosted Tuareg rebels (numbers unconfirmed) who were fighting in Mali and Niger. Some were incorporated into Gaddafi's southern battalions while others reportedly received support from Libya to conduct cross-border operations. The return of armed fighters, mainly in Mali and Niger but also in Chad, is a major security concern for the subregion.

Furthermore, cooperation between Libya and the European Union was a primary focus of the EU's migration policy in the fight against irregular migration along Europe's southern borders. Given Libya's high level of cooperation in this regard, prior to the crisis, questions are now being raised about the extent to which the current regime will continue to cooperate. The situation also raises further questions for the EU, in terms of its migration policies in the region. In particular, the crisis in Libya, as well as the uprisings in other North African States, provides an opportunity for States to analyse the impact and consequences of 'outsourcing' migration regulatory policy to non-EU partners and to examine how the human rights dimension, often sidelined by such policies, can be better integrated.

IOM 2012 Migrants caught in Crisis: The IOM Experience in Libya 19 April 2012



reported in Q1 2012 – split between the land borders (383) and the highest ever level at the sea border (461).

An increase in Syrian clandestines was reported during Q1 2012, which, although small in numbers compared to the top nationalities, represented a significant increase over the previous reporting period.

### 4.4. Detections of facilitators

Detections of facilitators of irregular migration have been falling steadily for the last two years. According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, in which case facilitators are able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as bordercrossing. However, in Q1 2012 detections in-

creased to 2 107, the highest number since mid-2010. In previous years it has not been uncommon for an increase in detections of facilitators of irregular migration to be observed between the last quarter of one year and the first quarter of the next year, but the increase in Q1 2011 was particularly marked.

This increase was the combined result of more detections in Spain, Greece, Hungary and Sweden compared to year ago. The majority of Member States tend to most frequently detect domestic facilitators, i.e. of their own nationality. Spain and Hungary both reported increased detections of Romanian facilitators compared to a year previously. Greece detected several different nationalities of facilitators in increasing numbers such as Albanian. Pakistani and Polish.

In the last FRAN Quarterly there was a detailed description of detections of Albanian migrants using Spain as a departure point



### New visa introduced for Arab Spring nationals (UK)

Tough new visa rules have been introduced for travellers from countries caught up in the Arab Spring unrest.

Under the changes Syrian, Libyan and Egyptian citizens will have to apply for a visa if they are travelling through UK airports. The transit visa regime, introduced in response to threats to national and border security, covers passengers who are only in the UK to change flights and never leave the airport.

The three countries, which have seen major upheaval following the Arab Spring wave of protests, have been added to the list of nations covered by the Direct Airside Transit Visa (DATV) requirements.

[British] Home Secretary Theresa May told MPs: 'We see this as a necessary measure to protect the security of our borders. The situation in Syria continues to pose a serious concern to us and the wider international community. Libya and Egypt are emerging from a period of instability. The implementation of the DATV regime allows us to run comprehensive checks on those transiting the UK, and prevents high harm individuals from travelling here. Since the original introduction of the DATV there has been a noticeable fall in transit passengers destroying their travel documents before claiming asylum. The visa process means that we are able to collect pre-travel information as part of the application process which makes identification and checks more robust.'

www.independent.co.uk 13 March 2012

77




Figure 11. The increased flow at the Greece-Turkey border still has an impact on detections at different border sections in the Western Balkans and the neighbouring EU Member States

towards to the UK and Ireland. In Q1 2012 a criminal Romanian – Albanian network operating in the southern Spanish region of Andalucía was dismantled. In Q1 2012 detections of facilitators in Sweden and Slovenia both al-

most doubled compared to the same period in 2011. In Q1 2012 Slovenian authorities concluded an investigation of a facilitation network of three Afghan nationals, who were facilitating the irregular migration of other





### Joint Spanish-Moroccan police stations to be formed

Spain and Morocco have agreed to open joint commissioners' offices in Tangiers and Algeciras from May [2012]. The interior ministers from both countries gave the announcement on Tuesday [28 February 2012] in Rabat. Jorge Fernández Díaz and his Moroccan counterpart, Mohand Lanser, gave little details about the composition of these 'centres of police cooperation'. Morocco is the first country outside the EU with which Spain has come to such an arrangement. There are already similar offices established with France and Portugal. The talks between the interior ministers today centred on illegal immigration, organised crime and drug trafficking. Fernández Díaz underlined the 'support' of the Spanish Government for the process of 'political and democratic reforms which are being brought in by King Mohamed VI' in Morocco, and described them as 'an example for the Arab world and many other countries'.

www.typicallyspanish.com 28 June 2012





### Swiss army opens doors to asylum seekers

The Swiss military is making more than 5 000 beds available on a temporary basis to handle an overflow of asylum seekers in Switzerland.

Defence Minister Ueli Maurer said on Monday that the accommodation would be made available as quickly as possible. Discussions have been under way since April 2011 between the federal immigration department and the department of defence, civil protection and sport over ways to expand facilities for asylum seekers.

Switzerland has faced an increase in the number of people seeking asylum in the mountain country, particularly since the Arab spring revolutions. The military beds are housed in more than 20 surplus barracks around the country, including those in mountain regions. However, these rudimentary facilities must be modernised to conform with the latest fire protection and other building standards, the defence department said in a news release. The Swiss defence department has at its disposal more than 100 sites with quarters above and below ground, offering a total capacity of around 35 000 beds.

www.thelocal.ch 28 February 2012



Afghan nationals. They mainly operated from a Slovenian asylum centre abusing the international protection system. The network was very international operating in Afghanistan, Iran, Greece, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria. Routes took place from asylum centres in one country to another country and so on. Illegal border-crossings took place at night, mainly near BCPs and further transportation took place the following day. Identity fraud was common among these irregular migrants. In most cases destination countries were Italy, the Netherlands and Germany.

### 4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q1 2012 there were 88 463 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is a stable trend compared to the year before (+7.5%). This is consistent with a stable but slightly declining longer-term trend over the last two years. However, this long-term decline masks much variation among Member States. Spain reported the most detections of illegal stay, followed by Germany, France and Greece.

The biggest changes among these Member States were an increase of around a third in Germany, and of two-thirds in Greece (Fig. 12). In Germany there were fewer detections of Afghans and Serbs, but increased detections of Ukrainians and Vietnamese. In Greece the increase was due to more detections of Afghans, Pakistanis, Algerians and Bangladeshis – all related to the flow at the Greek external land border, and also increased detections of Albanian migrants. Also significant but from a lower base was a three-fold increase in detections of illegal stayers in Hungary mostly of Serbs, Ukrainians, Macedonians, and Afghans.

### 4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q1 2012 a total of 24 635 refusals of entry were issued at the external borders of the EU. This represents around a 15% decrease




Figure 12. A stable trend of detections of illegal stayers in Q1 2012 compared to the same period in 2011 concealed increases in Greece, Germany and Sweden

compared to both the previous quarter and Q1 2011. Consistent with previous reporting periods, in Q1 2012 there were slightly more refusals at the land (49%) compared with the air borders (46%). The smallest proportion of refusals was reported from the sea border (5%) where detections in Q1 2012 were


around 40% lower than during the same period in 2011.

Despite the reduction compared with the same period in 2011, each of the top three reporting Member States issued more refusals during the first quarter of 2012. However the



### Iraqis in look-alike Swedish passport scam

Two men, aged 38 and 30, have been arrested in Malmö on suspicions of smuggling Iraqi migrants into Sweden using other people's Swedish passports





polisen) to the TT news agency. The case involves Iraqi citizens who travelled to Sweden using genuine Swedish passports bought from their original owners. However, the Iraqis were no longer carrying the passports upon their arrival at airports in Sweden, and proceeded to seek asylum. The arrested men used passports that had been issued to people who had come to Sweden earlier and become Swedish citizens.

The smugglers then gave the passports to other Iraqis who had looks similar to those of the original passport owners and then used the false passports to fly to Sweden. The passports true owners have sold them to the people smugglers, usually for 10 000 kronor (USD 1 450). The passport sellers then simply claimed they'd lost the documents before applying for new ones. 'We have examples of people who have "lost" their passports once a month,' said Fransson. Police had been keeping surveillance on the men for several months, but the smuggling has potentially been going on for years.



vast majority of other member States issued fewer refusals than during the same period in 2011. Consistent with previous reporting periods, the most frequently refused migrants were from Ukraine, Albania, Russia and Serbia with either steady or declining trends. The only nationalities to be refused entry in significantly increasing numbers were Moroccan and Georgian.

### 4.7. Asylum claims

The number of claims for international protection rose during every quarter of 2011 but more recently at the beginning of 2012 the number of applications fell by 24%. Despite this short-term reduction the number of applications submitted in Q1 2012 was still comparable to a year ago during the first quarter of 2011.

Nearly all Member States reported fewer applications for international protection in Q1 2012 compared to the previous quarter. At the EU level the migrants that submitted the most applications for international protection were from Afghanistan, Serbia, Pakistan and Somalia. The most significant increases at the EU level compared to the same period in 2011 were of applications submitted by migrants from Pakistan (+47%) and Syria (+80%).

### 4.8. Document fraud

Frontex and the FRAN community have been exchanging data on detections of false-document users since the beginning of 2009. However, it soon became apparent that this indicator had become insufficient to effectively describe and analyse increasingly complex *modi operandi* related to document fraud. Hence, following a brief pilot project in 2011, in January 2012 Frontex and the FRAN community embarked on a much more detailed and ambitious data-exchange project in the field of document fraud, to be overseen by a new specialist sub-network of the FRAN known as the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The aim of this more comprehensive data exchange was to 'upgrade' analyses of document fraud at the EU level from the previous FRAN indicator 6 (False-document users) to a new, more sophisticated data exchange reflecting increasing complexity in this field. Key developments include:



### Police smash people-trafficking [smuggling] gang who smuggled Iranians into Britain for £16 300 each

Police have smashed a gang of people traffickers who sneaked Iranian families into Britain using false passports. The criminals charged each adult £16,300 for passage into the UK via Turkey, Greece and Spain. Twenty-two people including the alleged head of the gang have been arrested in an operation involving the UK Border Agency and Spain's National Police. The Iranians were smuggled into the EU through the border between Turkey and Greece, hidden in luggage compartments on buses or in freight lorries.



All those making the journey to the UK were first taken to the Canary Islands, where they were instructed on what to do when they arrived in Britain. They were ordered to destroy their false passports during the flight and to delay reaching passport control for as long as possible to make it difficult for British officials to discover where they had come from. They were instructed to claim asylum in the UK and to tell British officials they feared for their lives if they were forced to return home to Iran, Spanish police said.

www.dailymail.co.uk 24 April 2012

- 77
- creating a standardised classification scheme for different types of fraud (Fig. 13)
- 2) differentiating between different types of documents,
- 3) generating the ability to count detections of individuals and/or documents,
- 4) including the abuse of genuine documents,
- 5) increasing the scope to include all international flights,
- 6) reporting detections on entry, exit and transit.

The first round of data exchange covered the period of Jan-Dec 2011, and was used, together with 2009 and 2010 data collected during the 2011 pilot project (R063), to generate the EDF-ARA which was released on 18 May 2012 (R023). At the time of going to press, 28 Member States or Schengen Associated Counties are exchanging monthly

data during 2012, on every detection of document fraud used to illegally cross the external border of the EU and Schengen area. These data are used here to provide a quarterly update on the extent and nature of document fraud in the EU.


### 4.8.1. Entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries

According to a sample of 23 Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, in Q1 2012 there were 1 995 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries. This was a 10% increase compared to the same period in 2011. The most common type of fraud was false stamps which also increased the most between reporting periods in 2011. Consistent



Figure 13. Hierarchical categories of document fraud, according to EDF definitions; irregular documents (green) are not currently included in the scope of the EDF indicator

Colours of boxes indicate increasing levels of analytical detail



\* The EDF data do not currently include fraudulently obtained visas with the results of the EDF-ARA 2012, abuse of visas continued to decline\*.

### 4.8.2. Between the EU and the Schengen area

In Q1 2012 there were nearly 600 detections of fraudulent documents detected between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States. The vast majority were on entry to the EU from the Schengen area and on exit from the Schengen area towards non-Schengen EU Member States. Overall these flows all increased compared to Q1 2011.

There continues to be a significant trend of Albanians travelling towards the UK or Ireland from Schengen airports. Ireland is assumed to be a transit country on route to the UK.

There were nearly 1 000 detections of fraudulent documents on international flights within the Schengen area in Q1 2012. By far the most detected migrants were from Afghanistan

with double the number reported in Q1 2012 compared with the same period in 2011.

Increasing numbers of migrants from Ukraine and Afghanistan were presenting counterfeit work permits with their applications for Schengen visas, in order to substantiate their residence in countries neighbouring the external border of the Schengen area. Also, purchased invitations were becoming more common. It is clear that a large number of Afghan nationals, who are staying legally in Russia, are trying to get to Schengen area, where they intend to claim for international protection upon arrival. As well as migrants from Ukraine and Afghanistan, nationals of Armenia and Vietnam legally residing in countries neighbouring the external border of the Schengen area are also making efforts to move to the EU.

### 4.9. Returns

In Q1 2012 there were 69 904 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which was an increase of more than a third compared to the same period in 2011. However this figure is an underestimation of the total number of decisions reached in the EU, as data on decisions were unavailable from, *inter alia*, France and the Netherlands, where it is assumed that relatively high numbers of decisions were reached.


Most Member States had a different top nationality for number of return decisions reached, reflecting differential irregular migration pressure among Member States. At the EU level, more than 150 nationalities were issued return decisions in Q1 2012; Figure 19

shows the number of decisions and effective returns by type, for the top 20 nationalities. The migrants most commonly subject to return decisions in the EU were from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria and Morocco, and increasingly also from Bangladesh. However the most commonly returned migrants were from Albania, Serbia and India. This non-overlap is mostly due to the situation in Greece, where many migrants were subject to the decision to leave but no return was effectively enforced.

In Q1 2012 a total of 40 103 third-country nationals were effectively returned to third countries, which is a 15% increase compared to the same period in 2011. Of this total, forced returns accounted for 49% and voluntary returns 44%.

Figure 14. Nationalities that typify the detections at the Greek-Turkish border were subject to the most decisions to leave in Q1 2012, while Albanians, Serbians and Indians were actually returned in the highest numbers







# 4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

#### 4.10.1. Central Mediterranean route

As in previous years, the Central Mediterranean route of irregular migration was mainly affected by drug trafficking in cocaine and hashish, trafficking in human beings, as well as smuggling of tobacco products, alcohol and counterfeit items including clothes, footwear, toys and electronic goods. In Q1 2012 this area was covered by one Frontex-coordinated operation, however border checks were

not preformed, therefore information on recent developments is not available.

#### 4.10.2. Western Mediterranean route

The Western Mediterranean and Western African routes were mainly used for the smuggling of drugs from South and Central America, as well as North and Western Africa. The drugs were then distributed in other European countries. Smuggling of cigarettes, and to a lesser extent, trafficking in stolen vehicles on exit from Europe were also systematically reported. In Q1 2012 Frontex was not running any operational activities in this region.

The Western Mediterranean route, together with the South American and the Caribbean routes, remains active for cocaine trafficking. Cocaine was transported both by air couriers and air freight. In light of recent reports, cocaine mainly comes from Caribbean countries and South America.

In March 2012 a large shipment of drugs was detected at Schiphol Amsterdam Airport. In total, 300 kg of cocaine were detected hidden in air containers coming from South and Central America.

### 4.10.3. Eastern borders route

Although the eastern borders of the EU were not heavily affected by irregular migration, there was a stable trend in detections of other illegal activities. This section of the border is greatly affected by smuggling of tobacco products, stolen vehicles on exit from Europe, and to a lesser extent smuggling of drugs, alcohol and petroleum products. This area of Europe is also a transit, and occasionally a destination, for trafficking in human beings. In the reporting period, there were two active Frontex-coordinated operations: Focal Points Land and Poseidon Land 2011.



# Up to 50 000 migrants 'exploited student visa flaw to work in UK'

Up to 50 000 migrants may have exploited flaws in a new student visa system in its first year to come and work in the UK, a report by Whitehall's spending watchdog says.

Under a system introduced in 2009, each student must be sponsored by a licensed college and cannot change institution without gaining permission. But the audit office said the system had been brought in 'before the key controls were in place' and that 'in its first year of operation, between 40 000 and 50 000 individuals may have entered the UK... to work rather than to study.'

But immigration minister Damian Green said: 'This government has introduced radical reforms in order to stamp out abuse and restore order to the uncontrolled student visa system we inherited.' He added: 'These measures are be-



ginning to bite, we have already seen the number of student visas issued drop considerably in the second half of 2011, compared to the same period in 2010.'

www.bbc.co.uk 27 March 2012



According to Focal Points Land Extension data in 2011 smuggling of cigarettes was largely detected at the land Eastern external borders of the EU. In Q1 2012 a vast increase of detections at the Turkish border with the EU significantly decreased the share of detections of contraband tobacco products smuggled through the eastern border (Fig. 15); however, the absolute number of incidents has been continuously increasing (by 37% in Q1 2012 compared to Q4 2011). In reverse to observations made in Q4 Focal Points Land data show that the actual number of seized cigarettes decreased, whereas, Latvian bimonthly report indicated the opposite trend.

Comparing absolute numbers of detections of smuggled cigarettes in Q4 2011 and Q1 2012 a slight change in the distribution of incidents can be observed. The number of detections at Moldovan border decreased while Ukrainian and Belarusian increased.


Similar to Q4 2011, incidents of cigarette smuggling across the green borders were reported at the Ukrainian and Moldovan border with Romania; however, smuggle through natural borders significantly dropped down compared to the summer season due to harsh weather conditions and low quality of borderland infrastructure.


Focal Points Land 2011 data indicate that the Eastern European borders were also an important point of exit from the EU for stolen vehicles and machinery, as more than half of all detections of stolen vehicles at external border of the EU were reported from this section of the border.


The same source indicates that the number of stolen vehicles detected at eastern land borders of the EU decreased as compared to Q1 2011 (-23%) but remained on the same level as in Q4 2011.

Figure 15. According to operational data, cigarette smuggling to the EU mostly targeted the eastern land border

Share of total detections of smuggled cigarettes in Q1, Q4 2011 and Q1 2012 by border section with third countries







Source: JO Focal Points Land 2011 and 2012





Figure 16. Detection of abandoned cigarettes at the bank of the river Bug (Polish-Ukrainian border) – cigarettes are smuggled in original boxes of producer (packed 50 cartoons in one box) and wrapped in black plastic

Comparing detections of smuggled vehicles in first quarters of 2011 and 2012, a change in the distribution of incidents along external border of the EU can be observed. In Q1 2012 a Ukrainian section of the border became the most important point of exit for stolen vehicles replacing the border with Belarus (Fig. 18).

Due to increased petrol prices in the EU, and to a lesser extent in third countries, petrol smuggling was more profitable in Q1 2012 than in Q4 2011 (see Tab. 2). In particular, for EU countries neighbouring with Belarus and Russia the price difference between quarters increased. Although the smuggling of alcohol is generally decreasing, some individual cases of illegal imports are occasionally reported. In the first quarter 2012 there was a rise in detections of smuggled weapons and ammunition. In Q1 2012 there were 129 weapons confiscated which represents some 95% of all detections in 2011. This significant growth in detections is the result of a single, large detection of weapons and ammunition. In terms of the number of incidents related to confiscation of weapons and ammunition the situation remains unchanged and as reported in 2011 when the vast majority of detections



Figure 17. Polish Border Guards during road inspection of the lorry transporting furniture from Poland to Germany (in the area of former checkpoint Świeck at Polish-German border) detected 30 000 cartons of cigarettes smuggled from Ukraine and Belarus

of weapons and ammunition were made at Slovenian-Croatian border.

#### 4.10.4. Eastern Mediterranean route

The Easter Mediterranean route tends to be an important area for the detection of drugs, smuggled cigarettes, and stolen vehicles on exit from the EU and also a common point of entry for victims of trafficking. According to Europol's OCTA 2011 report, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, belong to the south-eastern crime hub, which has significantly expanded in recent years, as a result of a rise in passenger traffic via the Black Sea region, the proliferation of Balkan routes for smuggling illicit commodities to and from the EU, and a significant increase in irregular immigration via Greece. These developments in the region have been conducive to the formation of a Balkan axis for trafficking to the EU.

This route is an important point of entry for smuggled drugs: heroin from Pakistan and Afghanistan transported through Turkey, marijuana grown in Turkey and, to a lesser extent, also cocaine and opium. This confirms information collected during Focal Points Land

2011. According to the same source, in Q1 2012 smuggling of heroin and cannabis mainly was reported (Fig. 19).

In Q1 2012 the Eastern Mediterranean route was reported as an active point of entry for tobacco products. Both tobacco and cigarettes were smuggled hidden in cars or lorries by individual smugglers. The great majority of smugglers were of Bulgarian nationality and small numbers of Romanians, Turkish and Iranian nationals were reported.

Petrol prices in Western Balkan countries remain on a similar level to neighbouring European countries and are not a sufficient incentive for smuggling practices (see Tab. 2).

# 4.10.5. Western Balkans route and circular route from Albania to Greece


The Western Balkans region, due to its geographical location and its well-established Albanian crime networks known to cooperate widely with other OCGs, is under a particularly high risk of cross-border criminality, smuggling of excise goods, drugs, weapons and explosives, stolen vehicles and trafficking in persons.


The Western Balkan region is recognised as a hub for drug trafficking to and from the EU (Europol OCTA 2011 report). Heroin originating from the Middle East is transported through Turkey, and cocaine from Latin America is stockpiled before being transported to the EU. The Western Balkans region, particularly Albania and Kosovo are producers of cannabis cultivated for EU consumption. Synthetic drugs and forbidden substances are smuggled from Europe to the Western Balkan region.


During Focal Point Land Extension 2011, smuggled drugs were mainly reported at the Turkish border with Bulgaria and to a lesser extent at Croatian-Slovenian border.

Figure 18. In recent reporting periods, most stolen vehicles tend to be headed for Ukraine

Share of total detections of stolen vehicles on exit in Q1, Q4 2011 and Q1 2012 by borders with third countries







Source: Frontex JO Focal Points Land 2011 and 2012



Although more incidents were reported from the Turkish border, the total amount of seized drugs was smaller than at the Croatian section of the external border. At the Western Balkan border detections were mainly of small amounts of synthetic drugs like amphetamine, cannabis, and other substances like testosterone and diazepam.

According to Focal Points Land Extension 2011 data, the Western Balkans route was the second important route for the smuggling of stolen vehicles on exit from the EU, and constitutes about one-third of all detections in 2011. In Q1 2012 Focal Point Land Extension 2011 data suggest that the number of stolen vehicles detected along the Western Balkans route increased compares with Q1 2011 (+60%).



Figure 19. In January 2012 at Edirne BCP a lorry driver was apprehended transporting about 2 kg of heroin on his body

Table 2. Increased price differentials between EU Member States and Russia, Belarus and Albania increases potential profitability for petrol smugglers

Price of Euro-Super 95 fuel in Q4 2011 and Q1 2012 in Member States and neighbouring third countries and respective price differences (in EUR)

		2011 Q4			2012 Q1	
Border	EU Country	Third Country	Price difference	EU Country	Third Country	Price difference
Finland-Russia	1.53	0.70	0.83	1.70	0.74	0.96
Lithuania-Belarus	1.30	0.52	0.78	1.43	0.68	0.75
Poland-Belarus	1.22	0.52	0.70	1.40	0.68	0.72
Estonia-Russia	1.27	0.70	0.57	1.42	0.74	0.68
Poland-Russia	1.22	0.7	0.52	1.4	0.74	0.66
Slovakia-Ukraine	1.46	0.94	0.52	1.57	1.09	0.48
Hungary-Ukraine	1.31	0.94	0.37	1.82	1.37	0.45
Greece- fYROM	1.64	1.29	0.35	1.51	1.09	0.42
Romania- Moldova	1.23	0.89	0.34	1.82	1.42	0.40
Greece -Albania	1.64	1.31	0.33	1.40	1.09	0.31
Romania-Ukraine	1.23	0.94	0.29	1.28	1.09	0.19
Poland-Ukraine	1.22	0.94	0.28	1.28	1.11	0.17
Hungary- Serbia	1.31	1.31	0.00	1.51	1.36	0.15
Slovenia- Croatia	1.33	1.35	-0.02	1.51	1.49	0.02
Hungary-Croatia	1.31	1.35	-0.04	1.49	1.49	0
Romania- Serbia	1.23	1.31	-0.08	1.31	1.36	-0.05
Greece-Turkey	1.64	1.77	-0.13	1.28	1.36	-0.08
Bulgaria- fYROM	1.14	1.29	-0.15	1.30	1.42	-0.12
Bulgaria- Serbia	1.14	1.31	-0.17	1.82	1.94	-0.12
Bulgaria-Turkey	1.14	1.73	-0.59	1.30	1.94	-0.64

Source: European Commission Oil Bulletin (no 1586) and open source data for third countries.

# 5. Statistical annex

#### **LEGEND**

Symbols and abbreviations: n.a. not applicable

: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF data as of 18 May 2012, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both

27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries



#### Annex Table 1. Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections reported at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

							20	L2 Q1	
	2010		20	11			% cha	inge on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of tota
All Borders									
Afghanistan	6 255	1 764	4 606	9 323	7 301	2 153	22	-71	16
Bangladesh	703	562	1 799	1 370	1 192	1 407	150	18	10
Algeria	3 050	908	1 066	1 613	2 570	1 275	40	-50	9.4
Albania	6 198	1 017	1 156	1 411	1 554	1 177	16	-24	8.6
Pakistan	2 421	1 051	2 821	5 629	5 874	1 045	-0.6	-82	7.7
Somalia	773	573	1 035	604	799	1 017	77	27	7.5
Syria	243	126	274	602	614	715	467	16	5.2
Morocco	1 079	747	847	1 031	1 155	612	-18	-47	4.5
Tunisia	323	20 476	4 489	3 573	291	493	-98	69	3.6
Not specified*	422	1 482	7 506	2 104	808	321	-78	-60	2.4
Others	6 069	4 217	15 674	11 270	6 167	3 420	-19	-45	25
Total All Borders	27 536	32 923	41 237	38 530	28 325	13 635	-59	-52	
Land Borders									
Afghanistan	5 489	1 344	3 986	8 355	6 711	1 775	32	-74	16
Bangladesh	694	556	763	1 176	1 080	1 392	150	29	12
Algeria	2 664	678	760	1 069	2 164	1 227	81	-43	11
Albania	6 133	1 014	1 144	1 379	1 539	1 176	16	-24	10
Pakistan	2 384	943	2 136	5 154	5 548	915	-3.0	-84	8.2
Syria	210	88	188	400	578	676	668	17	6.0
Somalia	759	153	279	380	686	464	203	-32	4.1
Morocco	866	516	519	453	748	425	-18	-43	3.8
Not specified	414	299	580	1 131	737	307	2.7	-58	2.7
Palestine	1 187	126	100	141	285	267	112	-6.3	2.4
Others	3 970	2 818	3 313	3 474	4 388	2 579	-8.5	-41	23
Total Land Border	24 770	8 535	13 768	23 112	24 464	11 203	31	-54	
Sea Borders									
Somalia	14	420	756	224	113	553	32	389	23
Afghanistan	766	420	620	968	590	378	-10	-36	16
Tunisia	70	20 245	4 298	3 374	96	357	-98	272	15
Morocco	213	231	328	578	407	187	-19	-54	7.7
Egypt	292	321	658	425	544	186	-42	-66	7.6
Pakistan	37	108	685	475	326	130	20	-60	5.3
Guinea	51	53	432	305	122	77	45	-37	3.2
Algeria	386	230	306	544	406	48	-79	-88	2.0
Côte d'Ivoire	37	76	1 086	410	162	43	-43	-73	1.8
Eritrea	2	538	112	25	5	39	-93	680	1.6
Others	898	1 746	18 224	8 090	1 090	434	-75	-60	18
Total Sea Border	2 766	24 388	27 505	15 418	3 861	2 432	-90	-37	

<sup>\*</sup> The "Not specified" group includes those of unknown nationality, however it includes persons suspected to be from countries in the Horn of Africa (1 172 in Q1 2011) and from countries in both Central Africa and the Horn of Africa (6 923 combined in Q2 2011).

#### Annex Table 2. Clandestine entries at BCPs

Detections reported at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

							2 Q1		
	2010		20:	11			% chai	nge on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
<b>Border Type</b>									
Land	33	27	29	40	63	67	148	6.3	65
Sea	32	47	31	24	21	36	-23	71	35
Top Ten Nationali	ities								
Afghanistan	6	7	3	18	30	50	614	67	49
Philippines	8	0	0	1	0	15	n.a.	n.a.	15
Algeria	11	25	11	13	6	8	-68	33	7.8
Serbia	0	1	0	1	2	8	700	300	7.8
Turkey	5	3	6	14	1	5	67	400	4.9
Iraq	1	1	6	1	6	4	300	-33	3.9
Morocco	2	5	4	2	4	3	-40	-25	2.9
Albania	5	2	1	1	5	3	50	-40	2.9
Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	1.9
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.0
Others	27	30	29	13	30	4	-87	-87	3.9
Total	65	74	60	64	84	103	39	23	



# Annex Table 3. Facilitators

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

							12 Q1		
	2010		20	11			% cha	ange on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Place of Detecti	on								
Inland	1160	1498	1521	1013	1114	1489	-0.6	34	71
Land	285	112	159	195	159	216	93	36	10
Land Intra EU	115	79	89	103	94	138	75	47	6.5
Sea	53	49	65	117	93	129	163	39	6.1
Air	63	91	80	88	108	82	-9.9	-24	3.9
Not specified	42	27	27	30	46	53	96	15	2.5
Top Ten Nationa	alities								
Italy	216	180	138	116	134	202	12	51	9.6
Spain	62	51	66	92	111	140	175	26	6.6
Romania	126	65	77	68	58	136	109	134	6.5
France	80	131	133	76	64	95	-27	48	4.5
Morocco	83	120	93	86	91	90	-25	-1.1	4.3
China	91	146	72	52	105	88	-40	-16	4.2
Not specified	107	57	62	48	88	88	54	0	4.2
Turkey	43	51	40	66	47	83	63	77	3.9
Albania	69	47	74	41	59	73	55	24	3.5
Pakistan	46	64	84	51	38	59	-7.8	55	2.8
Others	795	944	1102	850	819	1053	12	29	50
Total	1718	1856	1941	1546	1614	2107	14	31	

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

							201	L2 Q1	
	2010		20	11			% cha	inge on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Place of Detecti	on								
Inland	72 113	67 161	70 063	69 572	76 512	72 520	8.0	-5.2	82
Air	7 488	7 328	7 452	9 361	8 985	8 695	19	-3.2	9.8
Land	1 967	2 814	4 353	5 259	5 214	4 731	68	-9.3	5.3
Land Intra EU	2 991	2 787	2 772	2 032	1 639	1 347	-52	-18	1.5
Sea	1 637	1 768	1 981	1 519	1 325	1 040	-41	-22	1.2
Between BCPs	242	469	129	292	159	130	-72	-18	0.1
Not specified	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Top Ten Nationa	alities								
Afghanistan	5 075	4 947	5 822	6 777	7 750	6 345	28	-18	7.2
Morocco	5 528	5 789	5 497	5 026	5 575	6 047	4.5	8.5	6.8
Tunisia	2 028	3 533	7 682	5 289	6 360	4 705	33	-26	5.3
Algeria	3 686	3 840	3 623	3 925	4 010	4 247	11	5.9	4.8
Serbia	4 845	2 990	2 838	2 596	4 360	3 784	27	-13	4.3
Pakistan	2 472	2 476	2 838	3 720	3 587	3 752	52	4.6	4.2
Ukraine	2 311	2 416	2 906	3 788	3 737	3 202	33	-14	3.6
Albania	4 281	2 216	2 524	2 382	3 085	3 167	43	2.7	3.6
Nigeria	2 230	2 376	2 169	2 054	2 191	2 438	2.6	11	2.8
China	2 619	2 508	2 386	2 241	2 148	2 407	-4.0	12	2.7
Others	51 365	49 236	48 465	50 239	51 031	48 369	-1.8	-5.2	55
Total	86 440	82 327	86 750	88 037	93 834	88 463	7.5	-5.7	



# Annex Table 5A. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry reported at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

							20	L2 Q1	
	2010		20	)11			% cha	inge on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
All Borders									
Ukraine	3 930	3 529	3 861	4 499	3 921	3 788	7.3	-3.4	15
Albania	1 287	4 943	4 513	3 550	2 941	2 261	-54	-23	9.2
Russia	2 698	1 832	2 465	2 710	2 214	1 839	0.4	-17	7.5
Serbia	1 766	1 962	1 685	1 816	1 743	1 555	-21	-11	6.3
Belarus	1 593	1 318	1 501	1 549	1 615	1 106	-16	-32	4.5
Morocco	566	831	1 112	1 211	1 014	1 058	27	4.3	4.3
Croatia	936	1 051	1 072	766	867	1 032	-1.8	19	4.2
Brazil	1 374	1 373	1 230	1 103	1 071	1 012	-26	-5.5	4.1
Turkey	803	669	761	1 145	672	578	-14	-14	2.3
Georgia	1 258	421	686	558	1 136	567	35	-50	2.3
Others	11 696	10 770	11 190	11 418	11 817	9 839	-8.6	-17	40
Total All Borders	27 907	28 699	30 076	30 325	29 011	24 635	-14	-15	
Land Borders									
Ukraine	3 648	3 337	3 561	4 191	3 608	3 503	5.0	-2.9	29
Russia	1 745	1 178	1 431	1 794	1 510	1 289	9.4	-15	11
Serbia	1 463	1 601	1 298	1 483	1 394	1 288	-20	-7.6	11
Albania	693	2 876	3 057	1 884	1 161	1 192	-59	2.7	9,9
Belarus	1 566	1 300	1 462	1 504	1 574	1 080	-17	-31	8.9
Croatia	877	987	1 013	713	815	979	-0.8	20	8.1
Morocco	195	520	787	869	651	666	28	2.3	5.5
Georgia	1 165	375	635	496	1 065	493	31	-54	4.1
fYROM	616	764	667	680	537	400	-48	-26	3.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	246	350	402	424	343	347	-0.9	1.2	2.9
Others	1 222	1 152	1 252	1 791	1 100	832	-28	-24	6.9
Total Land Border	13 436	14 440	15 565	15 829	13 758	12 069	-16	-12	

Annex Table 5B. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry reported at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

						201	L2 Q1		
	2010		20	11			% cha	nge on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Air Borders									
Brazil	1 347	1 358	1 204	1 079	1 056	1 003	-26	-5.0	8.9
Albania	312	827	736	796	944	617	-25	-35	5.5
United States	524	495	562	605	557	461	-6.9	-17	4.1
Not specified	290	273	352	397	508	435	59	-14	3.9
Nigeria	526	406	357	393	388	374	-7.9	-3.6	3.3
Russia	329	266	386	459	348	373	40	7.2	3.3
Turkey	385	362	328	282	331	355	-1.9	7.3	3.2
China	387	278	254	336	256	305	9.7	19	2.7
Venezuela	331	226	376	308	424	301	33	-29	2.7
Paraguay	332	411	316	272	333	297	-28	-11	2.6
Others	7 962	7 101	7 411	7 168	7 894	6 702	-5.6	-15	60
Total Air Border	12 725	12 003	12 282	12 095	13 039	11 223	-6.5	-14	
Sea Borders									
Albania	282	1 240	720	870	836	452	-64	-46	34
Russia	624	388	648	457	356	177	-54	-50	13
Morocco	76	65	96	98	75	138	112	84	10
Philippines	206	170	85	254	230	130	-24	-43	9.7
Not specified	18	26	61	34	29	40	54	38	3.0
Kiribati	0	0	0	1	6	36	n.a.	500	2.7
Iraq	14	8	7	33	35	35	338	0	2.6
Serbia	16	34	21	78	77	34	0	-56	2.5
Tunisia	25	43	24	19	39	28	-35	-28	2.1
India	23	11	38	42	44	26	136	-41	1.9
Others	462	271	529	515	487	247	-8.9	-49	18
Total Sea Border	1 746	2 256	2 229	2 401	2 214	1 343	-40	-39	



#### Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Total	2011 Q4 - Reasons for refusal of entry (see description below)										
	Refused <sup>-</sup> Persons	Α	В	С	D	E	F	G	н	ı	n.a.	Reasons
Top Ten Nat	tionalities											
Ukraine	3 788	9	33	1 045	7	1 769	186	462	219	26	39	3 795
Albania	2 261	34	251	57	5	405	82	551	1 294	66	87	2 832
Russia	1 839	129	5	1 164	21	202	21	185	90	80	33	1 930
Serbia	1 555	61	11	227	18	106	415	191	518	27	11	1 585
Belarus	1 106	33	0	519	1	91	5	384	50	32	5	1 120
Morocco	1 058	448	45	113	23	153	3	22	235	26	7	1 075
Croatia	1 032	280	0	8	0	33	283	45	144	225	25	1 043
Brazil	1 012	1	6	117	1	377	46	76	105	9	276	1 014
Turkey	578	46	19	300	13	130	19	36	31	9	26	629
Georgia	567	1	8	456	0	50	0	6	54	1	2	578
Others	9 839	749	535	1 975	285	2 792	419	554	613	261	2 029	10 212
Total	24 635	1 791	913	5 981	374	6 108	1 479	2 512	3 353	762	2 540	25 813

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A has no valid travel document(s);
  B has a false/counterfeit/forged tra

- has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
  has no valid visa or residence permit;
  has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
  has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
  has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
  has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;

- does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit; is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register; is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union.

Annex Table 7A. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reasons for refusal and border type

						2012 Q1						
	2010		20	11			% cha	ange on	per cent	112 - barata - baran		
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total	Highest share		
All Borders										Nationality		
E) No justification	6 276	6 130	6 584	6 331	6 888	6 108	-0.4	-11	24	Ukraine (29%)		
C) No valid visa	8 538	5 934	7 147	8 982	7 803	5 981	0.8	-23	23	Russia (19%)		
H) Alert issued	3 490	6 455	5 338	4 480	3 970	3 353	-48	-16	13	Albania (39%)		
Reason not available	3 499	3 183	3 296	3 344	3 038	2 540	-20	-16	9.8	United States (15%)		
G) No subsistence	2 314	2 686	3 174	2 799	2 965	2 512	-6.5	-15	9.7	Albania (22%)		
A) No valid document	1 289	1 544	2 172	2 186	1 908	1 791	16	-6.1	6.9	Morocco (25%)		
F) Over 3 month stay	1 247	1 556	1 256	1 333	1 337	1 479	-4.9	11	5.7	Serbia (28%)		
B) False document	720	696	676	675	752	913	31	21	3.5	Albania (27%)		
I) Threat	725	709	707	581	838	762	7.5	-9.1	3.0	Croatia (30%)		
D) False visa	459	490	398	403	527	374	-24	-29	1.4	Congo (Dem. Rep.) (8.3%)		
Total All Borders	28 557	29 383	30 748	31 114	30 026	25 813	-12	-14				
Land Borders										Nationality		
C) No valid visa	5 333	3 450	4 411	5 874	4 760	3 689	6.9	-23	29	Ukraine (27%)		
E) No justification	2 468	2 331	2 454	2 452	2 192	2 184	-6.3	-0.4	17	Ukraine (74%)		
H) Alert issued	2 358	4 318	3 921	3 005	2 523	2 168	-50	-14	17	Albania (34%)		
G) No subsistence	1 378	1 753	2 098	1 867	1 977	1 730	-1.3	-12	14	Ukraine (26%)		
F) Over 3 month stay	1 019	1 239	1 064	1 137	1 137	1 221	-1.5	7.4	9.6	Serbia (33%)		
A) No valid document	392	689	1 039	1 037	749	913	33	22	7.2	Morocco (48%)		
I) Threat	429	521	540	428	606	475	-8.8	-22	3.7	Croatia (47%)		
B) False document	59	104	60	138	80	310	198	288	2.4	Albania (79%)		
D) False visa	103	104	81	141	179	75	-28	-58	0.6	Congo (Dem. Rep.) (29%)		
Reason not available	0	1	0	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.				
Total Land Border	13 539	14 510	15 668	16 079	14 203	12 765	-12	-10				



# Annex Table 7B. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reasons for refusal and border type

						2012 Q1					
	2010		20	11			% cha	ange on	per cent	Highest share	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total	Highest share	
Air Borders										Nationality	
E) No justification	3 787	3 690	3 983	3 732	4 475	3 815	3.4	-15	33	Brazil (9.9%)	
Reason not available	3 385	3 071	3 152	3 200	2 939	2 466	-20	-16	21	United States (15%)	
C) No valid visa	2 330	2 092	2 250	2 386	2 456	1 991	-4.8	-19	17	Russia (9.0%)	
G) No subsistence	887	818	963	829	872	731	-11	-16	6.2	Brazil (10%)	
H) Alert issued	807	1 000	804	747	803	721	-28	-10	6.2	Albania (27%)	
A) No valid document	584	498	526	627	673	600	20	-11	5.1	Unknown (36%)	
B) False document	624	575	575	519	642	568	-1.2	-12	4.9	Unknown (20%)	
D) False visa	347	367	246	246	331	277	-25	-16	2.4	China (8.7%)	
I) Threat	294	186	158	145	220	276	48	25	2.4	Suriname (11%)	
F) Over 3 month stay	221	312	180	193	194	257	-18	32	2.2	Brazil (17%)	
Total Air Border	13 266	12 609	12 837	12 624	13 605	11 702	-7.2	-14			
Sea Borders										Nationality	
H) Alert issued	325	1 137	613	728	644	464	-59	-28	34	Albania (77%)	
C) No valid visa	875	392	486	722	587	301	-23	-49	22	Philippines (40%)	
A) No valid document	313	357	607	522	486	278	-22	-43	21	Russia (36%)	
E) No justification	21	109	147	147	221	109	0	-51	8.1	Morocco (48%)	
Reason not available	114	111	144	144	99	74	-33	-25	5,5	United States (6.8%)	
G) No subsistence	49	115	113	103	116	51	-56	-56	3,8	Albania (73%)	
B) False document	37	17	41	18	30	35	106	17	2.6	Unknown (60%)	
D) False visa	9	19	71	16	17	22	16	29	1.6	Morocco (50%)	
I) Threat	2	2	9	8	12	11	450	-8.3	0.8	Albania (64%)	
F) Over 3 month stay	7	5	12	3	6	1	-80	-83	0.1	Turkey (100%)	
Total Sea Border	1 752	2 264	2 243	2 411	2 218	1 346	-41	-39			

Annex Table 8. **Applications for asylum** 

Applications for international protection by top ten nationalities

							2 Q1		
	2010		20	)11			% char	ige on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Top Ten Nationa	alities								
Afghanistan	5 949	6 427	7 067	8 552	7 626	6 306	-1.9	-17	12
Serbia	8 396	4 425	2 814	2 832	6 937	4 259	-3.8	-39	7.8
Pakistan	2 045	2 123	2 530	3 778	3 904	3 126	47	-20	5.8
Somalia	3 565	2 559	3 705	3 288	3 714	2 820	10	-24	5.2
Russia	3 571	2 830	2 733	3 643	3 730	2 697	-4.7	-28	5.0
Iraq	3 926	3 757	3 380	4 159	3 503	2 660	-29	-24	4.9
Iran	2 937	2 599	2 376	3 012	3 276	2 488	-4.3	-24	4.6
Syria	1 260	1 358	1 517	2 750	2 555	2 447	80	-4.2	4.5
Eritrea	1 665	1 909	3 040	2 191	2 053	2 129	12	3.7	3.9
Nigeria	1 419	1 738	3 431	3 867	2 838	1 772	2.0	-38	3.3
Others	23 221	23 468	28 981	29 341	31 738	23 636	0.7	-26	43
Total	57 954	53 193	61 574	67 413	71 874	54 340	2.2	-24	



#### Annex Table 9. **Document fraud**

Fraudulent documents detected at BCPs by border type and top ten nationalities

							2 Q1		
	2010		20	L1*			% chan	ge on*	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Border Type									
Air	1 563	1 182	1 099	1 103	1 196	1 762	4.1	2.8	68
Land	261	402	469	584	511	696	73	36	27
Sea	227	104	151	257	233	119	2.9	-54	4.6
Top Ten Nationali	ties Clain	ned							
Albania	29	38	50	59	85	355	818	311	14
Unknown	209	106	146	117	149	314	-29	-50	12
Morocco	133	163	134	254	218	202	21	-10	7.8
Ukraine	137	163	174	249	150	151	-7.4	0.7	5.9
Nigeria	89	81	58	74	65	114	27	58	4.4
Iran	69	69	41	121	90	83	8.7	-17	3.2
Sri Lanka	115	57	45	70	106	79	35	-27	3.1
Congo (Dem. Rep.)	44	45	63	95	101	74	58	-30	2.9
Pakistan	23	41	45	37	37	72	56	73	2.8
Afghanistan	63	41	43	38	28	61	29	89	2.4
Others	1 140	884	920	830	911	1 072	-7.5	-10	42
Total	2 051	1 688	1 719	1 944	1 940	2 577	20	4.8	100

 $<sup>^{\</sup>circ}$  The quarterly data for 2011 (and related percentage changes) exclude data for some Member States where this breakdown is not available

Annex Table 10. **Document fraud**Fraudulent documents detected at BCPs by type of document and type of fraud

							2012	2 Q1	
	2010		201	1			% chan	ge on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago p	orevious Qtr	of total
DOCUMENT TYPE									
Passports	750	670	665	791	767	705	5.2	-8.1	
Forged	337	341	316	363	391	265	-22	-32	38
Authentic	200	178	173	216	233	193	8.4	-17	27
False-no more details	73	58	61	68	55	133	129	142	19
Counterfeit	114	71	93	131	80	99	39	24	14
Stolen blank	25	19	17	12	8	15	-21	88	2
Pseudo	1	3	5	1	0	0	-100	n.a.	0
ID Cards	298	213	258	305	282	235	10	-17	
Counterfeit	117	90	122	116	119	130	44	9.2	55
Authentic	85	56	49	93	84	71	27	-15	30
Stolen blank	11	8	10	13	15	12	50	-20	5
False-no more details	9	7	11	14	8	12	71	50	5
Forged	76	47	64	68	56	9	-81	-84	4
Pseudo	0	5	2	1	0	1	-80	n.a.	0.4
Visa	220	194	193	180	184	171	-12	-7.1	
Counterfeit	69	104	120	125	118	108	3.8	-8.5	63
Forged	53	58	35	26	36	26	-55	-28	15
False-no more details	69	22	25	12	20	17	-23	-15	10
Stolen blank	25	7	4	9	7	11	57	57	6
Authentic	4	3	9	8	3	8	167	167	5
Pseudo	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	6
Residence Permits	258	276	295	317	403	336	22	- 17	
Counterfeit	85	110	138	157	191	164	49	-14	49
Authentic	51	67	69	59	88	71	6	-19	21
Stolen blank	56	56	56	70	74	58	3.6	-22	17
Forged	50	27	22	25	33	27	0	-18	8
False-no more details	16	16	10	5	16	16	0	0	5
Pseudo	0	0	0	1	1	0	n.a.	-100	
Stamps	128	179	247	279	225	552	208	145	
Counterfeit	34	140	174	195	160	478	241	199	87
False-no more details	94	39	71	73	57	74	90	30	13
Forged	0	0	2	11	8	0	n.a.	-100	
Other	130	156	61	72	79	34	-78	-57	
Counterfeit	104	57	38	31	52	16	-72	-69	47
Authentic	12	6	4	6	9	9	50	0	26
Stolen blank	1	4	4	1	5	5	25	0	15
Forged	4	87	13	32	12	2	-98	-83	6
Pseudo	0	1	2	2	0	2	100	n.a.	6
False-no more details	9	1	0	0	1	0	-100	-100	

Note: Data for France not included

1 784

1 688

1 719

1 944

1 940

2 033

20

4.8

Total



#### Annex Table 11. Return decisions issued

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

			2012 Q1					
			% char	nge on	e on per cent			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Top Ten Nationa	lities							
Afghanistan	4 400	6 423	7 243	9 208	6 421	46	-30	9.2
Pakistan	3 580	5 382	8 569	9 073	5 854	64	-35	8.4
Morocco	2 413	2 914	2 392	3 465	4 214	75	22	6
Algeria	2 180	2 916	2 667	4 573	3 696	70	-19	5.3
Albania	2 153	2 411	1 506	2 140	3 568	66	67	5.1
Bangladesh	1 470	2 074	1 924	2 427	3 495	138	44	5
Tunisia	787	1 260	1 475	1 638	3 103	294	89	4.4
India	2 151	1 996	2 091	2 579	3 088	44	20	4.4
Serbia	1 898	1 599	1 332	1 585	2 559	35	61	3.7
Nigeria	2 103	1 743	1 610	1 901	2 455	17	29	3.5
Others	27 835	26 998	26 580	28 721	31 451	13	9.5	45
Total	50 970	55 716	57 389	67 310	69 904	37	3.9	

### Annex Table 12. **Effective returns**

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

						2012 Q1			
		)11		% change on		per cent			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total	
Top Ten Nation	nalities								
Albania	2 829	2 887	3 386	3 597	3 028	7	-16	7.6	
Serbia	1 784	2 145	1 951	2 037	2 503	40	23	6.2	
India	1 866	1 604	1 926	2 271	2 422	30	6.6	6	
Pakistan	1 216	1 297	1 547	2 193	2 381	96	8.6	5.9	
Morocco	1 774	1 712	1 582	1 837	2 086	18	14	5.2	
Russia	1 478	1 583	1 605	1 555	1 764	19	13	4.4	
China	1 557	903	1 241	1 444	1 755	13	22	4.4	
Tunisia	416	2 452	2 579	3 176	1 637	294	-48	4.1	
Ukraine	1 202	1 474	1 861	1 963	1 555	29	-21	3.9	
Brazil	1 703	1 378	1 300	1 683	1 372	-19	-18	3.4	
Others	18 920	17 641	18 661	19 829	19 600	3.6	-1.2	49	
Total	34 745	35 076	37 639	41 585	40 103	15	-3.6		

Annex Table 13. **Effective returns** 

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

		20	11			% change on		per cent
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Type of Return								
Forced	17 692	19 462	20 203	23 452	19 623	11	-16	49
Enforced by Member State	14 932	16 844	17 464	20 742	17 077	14	-18	43
Not specified	2 508	2 370	2 383	2 266	2 209	-12	-2.5	5.5
Enforced by Joint Operation	252	248	356	444	337	34	-24	0.8
Voluntary	14 075	12 501	14 936	15 658	17 584	25	12	44
Others	8 196	6 643	8 494	8 807	10 171	24	15	25
IOM Assisted	3 133	3 269	3 531	3 975	4 181	33	5.2	10
Not specified	2 746	2 589	2 911	2 876	3 232	18	12	8.1
Not specified	2 978	3 113	2 500	2 475	2 896	-2.8	17	7.2
Total	34 745	35 076	37 639	41 585	40 103	15	-3.6	
Top Ten Nationalities								
Forced								
Albania	2 740	2 791	3 265	3 436	2 871	4.8	-16	7.2
Pakistan	575	901	968	1 494	1 574	174	5.4	3.9
Tunisia	341	2 088	2 067	2 783	1 277	274	-54	3.2
Serbia	925	1 039	983	1 213	1 046	13	-14	2.6
Afghanistan	777	647	703	1 053	891	15	-15	2.2
Morocco	691	656	649	856	869	26	1.5	2.2
India	649	755	696	766	843	30	10	2.1
China	606	431	545	618	670	11	8.4	1.7
Bangladesh	349	390	392	650	669	92	2.9	1.7
Algeria	489	422	552	609	624	28	2.5	1.6
Others	9 550	9 342	9 383	9 974	8 289	-13	-17	21
Voluntary								
India	1 208	832	1 223	1 500	1 570	30	4.7	3.9
Serbia	853	1 100	967	822	1 453	70	77	3.6
Russia	1 192	1 250	1 278	1 224	1 426	20	17	3.6
Ukraine	829	1 005	1 380	1 502	1 206	45	-20	3.0
China	918	449	685	798	1 059	15	33	2.6
Pakistan	626	384	561	659	785	25	19	2.0
Brazil	904	657	637	979	759	-16	-22	1.9
Iraq	465	594	522	625	717	54	15	1.8
Turkey	460	456	451	377	607	32	61	1.5
Nigeria	609	347	466	534	441	-28	-17	1.1
Others	6 011	5 427	6 766	6 638	7 561	26	14	19



#### **Notes on Sources and Methods**

For the data concerning detections at the external borders of the EU, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece, these detections are included in the data for indicator 1A Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border

type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra- EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs



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