

FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 1 • JANUARY–MARCH 2013

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4





FRAN Quarterly

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List of abbreviations used

BCP	border-crossing point
CIRCA	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
CIREFI	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
fYROM	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IBSS	Integrated Border Surveillance System
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICONet	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
ID	identity document
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
JO	Joint Operation
MS	Member State
OCG	organised crime group
RAU	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
SAC	Schengen Associated Country
SIS	Schengen Information System
UK	United Kingdom
WB-RAN	Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

Note

As some Member States do not distinguish between the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) and Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) in their reporting, 'Congo' and 'Congolese' are used as collective terms for these two countries throughout this report unless otherwise indicated.

Executive summary

In Q1 2013 all indicators of irregular migration and asylum exchanged under the FRAN and EDF-RAN were reduced in comparison with the final months of 2012. In most cases these declines were interpreted as consistent with the cycle of seasonal variation, whereby the first few months of each year are usually associated with reduced pressure at the border compared to other times of the year. This was especially true of asylum applications that have declined by 12–24% at the beginning of each year since data collection began in 2008. Detections of document fraud also showed signs of seasonal decrease, both in terms of entry at the external border and on intra-Schengen flights.

There were, however, two indicators that in Q1 2013 showed signs of reductions in excess of what would normally be expected based on seasonal trends. Firstly, detections of migrants illegally staying in the EU were reduced, but this indicator has been in steady decline from over 100 000 per quarter in the beginning of 2009 to the lowest ever level of 77 000 in the current reporting period. Secondly, detections of illegal border-crossing were much reduced following, among other things, increased operational activity at the external border, particularly in Greece.

The Greek operation Aspida, carried out at the Greek-Turkish border, has had dramatic and pervasive impact on both local and more general irregular migration trends.

In the area of the operation, detections of irregular migrants decreased to a minimum. Although some of this decline was due to seasonal variation, the operation is considered by many sources to have effectively closed this border section for irregular migrants. Other factors that contributed to reducing detec-

tions in the area include the completion of a border fence and the threat of longer detention times for detected migrants.

The operation has also forced the growing number of migrants arriving in Turkey to redirect to alternative routes, where normally they would cross the land border to Greece. Reports and data suggest that these migrants, most of whom began to congregate in Istanbul, were offered three alternative *modi operandi* to enter the EU:

1. Leaving the west coast of Turkey in small boats to illegally cross the Eastern Aegean Sea to the Greek Islands: Syrians and Afghans were both detected at similar frequencies of around 500 each over the three-month period.
2. Illegally crossing the green border into Bulgaria: detections of illegal border-crossing at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey began to increase almost immediately after the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida. In response, the Bulgarian Border Guard Authority deployed a specialised police operation and enhanced air surveillance at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, and they implemented an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS) along the most affected part of the border. Syrians were the most commonly detected migrants at this border section, with 279 detections.
3. Purchasing fraudulent documents and boarding flights from Istanbul to the EU: since the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida, there has been an increase in the number of migrants detected arriving on flights from Turkey using fraudulent documents, particularly Syrians as well as other nationalities usually associated with illegal border-crossing to Greece from Turkey.



The Greek operation Aspida has also changed the extent and nature of document fraud used at the external border and within the Schengen area. Before the operation, large numbers of migrants entered Greece from Turkey and then used fraudulent documents to make secondary movements on intra-Schengen flights from Athens to final destination Member States. This flow was probably also underestimated because of the lack of systematic checks and absence of border control on these intra-Schengen flights. Since the operation Aspida prevented large numbers of migrants from reaching Athens, detections of document fraudsters arriving in the Schengen area on flights from Athens has dropped by 50%. Consistent with the theory that migrants were congregating in Istanbul, detections on flights from Istanbul more than doubled over the same period. However, immediately subsequent to the reporting period there have been reports of many migrants avoiding Istanbul and instead heading straight to Izmir for immediate departure towards the Greek Islands.

The Western Balkans land route is another way in which migrants who originally entered the Schengen area in Greece make secondary movements to their final destination countries. Hence, given the pervasive effects of the Greek operation Aspida, it would not have been unreasonable to have foreseen a reduction in pressure across the region, particularly in terms of 'long-distance' nationalities normally associated with irregular migration into Greece, such as Afghans, Pakistanis, Syrians and Algerians. However, according to data exchanged by the FRAN and the WB-RAN, in Q1 2013 detections of illegal border-crossing actually increased by 29% (to 8 500) compared with the same period in 2012, with around two-thirds of detections being migrants assumed to have first entered the Schengen area in Greece. One potential explanation for the continued existence of this flow is that these migrants may have entered Greece before the operation Aspida started in

August 2012; hence indicating that the journey takes on average at least eight months. An alternative explanation is that these migrants were already illegally staying in Greece, and left under increased pressure from the Greek authorities, who have also been targeting migrant communities in Athens and other urban areas.

The border section which reported most increases of irregular migration during the first three months of 2013 was the Hungarian land border with Serbia. In this location there was a threefold increase in detections of illegal border-crossing in Q1 2013 compared to the same period in 2012. Most detections were secondary movements of long-distance migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Algeria who originally entered the Schengen area in Greece. However, the biggest increase was a threefold rise in the number of detected Kosovo* citizens, and a corresponding eightfold increase in their asylum applications in Hungary as a whole.

Also in Greece, but unrelated to the operation Aspida, Albanians continued to feature highly in several indicators of irregular migration. For example, with more than 1 000 detections they were the most commonly detected migrants illegally crossing the external land border, almost exclusively to Greece but with a steady trend compared to previous reporting periods. They were also commonly detected as illegal stayers and they were refused entry to Greece in significant but stable numbers. Albanians were the second most common nationality detected for document fraud on entry at the external border from a third country. In this case they were using counterfeit Greek border-crossing stamps at their land border with Greece in order to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay. Albanians were also detected using forged and counterfeit Greek or Italian ID cards in significant and increasing numbers to attempt entry to the UK from the Schengen area, sometimes via Ireland.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular-migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at the EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first, to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second, to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated among sections to serve as context.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore some of the more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities undertaken by Member State border-control authorities to secure different border sections and widespread variation in reporting and data-collection practices.

FRAN Members and Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and actively encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of RAU and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors will occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines, and the growing volume and complexity of data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.



2. Methodology

The present 19th issue of the FRAN Quarterly is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between January and March 2012, and exchanged between 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and so are not repeated here.

During the June 2010 FRAN Meeting, a proposal for a harmonised definition of the return indicator was outlined and several questions were presented in order to motivate discussion among FRAN Members in view of establishing the regular collection of monthly return data by Frontex. Subsequently, an online survey of FRAN Members was conducted to gather information and further motivate discussion to fine-tune the proposal for the indicator. The 11th FRAN report (Q1 2011) was the first to include analysis of Indicators 7A and 7B, and the definitions of these indicators are included in an annex to that report. Data collection commenced in January 2011.

The FRAN data-exchange has been in place since September 2007. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an interest group of the European Commission's

CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a country template prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 25th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end of year data which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 19th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 15 April 2013. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with comprehensive analysis.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, of particular relevance, the exchange of data were transferred to the FRAN. Fortunately, most CIREFI indicators already overlapped with the monthly data exchange of FRAN members. The exception was the indicator on returns, which was added as part of the regular data exchange within the FRAN at the beginning of 2011.

In January 2012 the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud to illegally cross the external borders, and on all international flights. Data were backdated and joined with those exchanged under a pilot Tailored Risk Analysis released in 2011.*

The EDF-RAN data are checked for inconsistencies, and corrections are made to reported totals to bring them in line with reported breakdowns. Corrections are also made to any three-letter nationality codes not present in the reference ISO list of nationality codes.**

* *The Nature and Extent of Document Fraud to Enter the European Union 2009–2010*, Ref. Ro63/2011

** <http://www.iso.org>

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active for at least a proportion of Q1 2013. Namely, for sea borders they were JO Poseidon Sea 2012 and JO Hermes 2012, for land borders – JO Poseidon Land 2012 and 2013 and JO Focal Points Land 2012; for the air border – JO Focal Points Air 2012 and 2013.

Monthly data on the following indicators were exchanged among the FRAN community:

1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs

1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs

2 detections of suspected facilitators

3 detections of illegal stay

4 refusals of entry

5 asylum applications

6 document fraud (EDF-RAN)

7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals

7B effective returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

FRAN and EDF-RAN data used in the tables and charts are as of 21 May 2013

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation), were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.

Acknowledgements

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express thanks to all FRAN and EDF-RAN Members and their associates in Member State statistical, migration and document fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, and the analysts who compile the bi-monthly analytical reports on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.

We are also grateful to Member State representatives who responded to requests for additional information on key topics and emerging trends (e.g. Hungary).



3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1. **Summary of FRAN indicators**

Detections or cases as reported by Member States


FRAN indicator	2011		2012				2013 Q1	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on	
							prev. year	prev. qtr
1A Illegal entries between BCPs	28 325	13 636	23 095	22 093	13 613	9 717	-29	-29
1B Clandestine entries at BCPs	84	103	126	167	203	130	26	-36
2 Facilitators	1 614	2 105	1 785	1 712	2 118	1 622	-23	-23
3 Illegal stay	93 834	88 461	84 891	86 759	84 817	77 127	-13	-9.1
4 Refusals of entry	29 011	24 826	28 237	31 993	31 036	27 911	12	-10
5 Applications for asylum	71 874	56 857	59 591	72 314	83 446	69 812	23	-16
7A Return decisions issued	67 310	69 904	67 891	71 129	61 025	55 285	-21	-9.4
7B Effective returns	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 258	42 157	38 221	-1.1	-9.3

Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2013

Figure 1. **Evolution of FRAN indicators**

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between fourth and first quarters



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2013



4. Situational picture in Q1 2013

- Overall irregular migration was at a reduced level during the first three months of 2013, mostly following increased operational activity at the external border combined with some foreseen seasonal declines.
- During Q1 2013 all FRAN and EDF-RAN indicators decreased compared to the previous reporting period.
- There were fewer detections of illegal stay than ever before, which is consistent with long-term declines in reports of this indicator.
- There were fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than ever before, with just 9 717 detections. The drop was limited mostly to sea borders.
- At the external land border, detections of illegal border-crossing actually increased compared with the previous quarter.
- Most of the major routes of irregular migration reported low levels of detections, but there were increased detections on the Western Balkans route.
- Following a threefold increase compared to Q4 2012, in Q1 2013 the land border between Hungary and Serbia reported more detections of illegal border-crossing than any other border section.
- Overall, migrants from Syria were the nationality most commonly detected illegally crossing the external border.
- Migrants from Mali, the Gambia, Kosovo*, and Syria were increasingly detected illegally crossing the external border.
- Albanians detected illegally crossing their land border into Greece was the largest single phenomenon in Q1 2013, followed by Kosovo* citizens at the Hungarian land border with Serbia.
- There was increased operational activity across the Eastern Mediterranean region, including:
 1. The Greek operation Aspida at the land border with Turkey;
 2. Frontex JOs Poseidon Land and Sea at the borders with Turkey;
 3. Bulgarian specialised police operation at their land border with Turkey.
- At the Greek land border with Turkey, which was the undisputed hotspot during the first half of 2012, detections of illegal border-crossing were at almost negligible levels.
- Weak displacement effects from Greek land border with Turkey were reported as increased detections of:
 1. illegal border-crossing at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey, where migrants and facilitators were increasingly detected;
 2. migrants leaving the west coast of Turkey to illegally cross the Eastern Aegean Sea towards the Greek Islands. This border section ranked second at the EU level in terms of detections;
 3. document fraudsters on flights from Turkey to Schengen airports, often using authentic Swedish passports.
- Secondary movements of many nationalities were still detected across the Western Balkans in substantial numbers.
- Hungary reported huge increases in the number of asylum applications submitted by Afghans, Kosovo* citizens, Pakistanis and Algerians.
- In Greece, Albanians continued to be reported at high levels among several different indicators in terms of document fraud, illegal border-crossing, illegal stay and refusals of entry.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

- Albanians were also the nationality most associated with document fraud both on entry at their land border with Greece (counterfeit stamps) and while attempting entry to the UK from the Schengen area, sometimes via Ireland (ID cards).
- In Q1 2013 Slovenia began to refuse entry to the Schengen area to large numbers of Croatians for a wide range of reasons not directly linked to irregular migration, including lack of valid documents.

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing

Overall in Q1 2013 there were 9 717 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which was by far the lowest figure since data collection began in early 2008. In comparative terms, this figure represents a decrease of 26% compared to the previous quarter, but a reduction of two-thirds since the same quarter in 2012.

The low number of detections compared to other quarters was almost exclusively due to vastly increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where in recent years the majority of migrants were detected (operation Aspida, see next section).

The following is a list of top reporting border sections with an indication of the most commonly reported nationalities:

1. Land border between Hungary and Serbia, where a wide range of nationalities were increasingly detected such as Kosovo* citizens, Afghans, and Pakistanis;
2. The Greek Aegean Sea to where Afghans and Syrians were increasingly displaced from the Greek land border with Turkey;
3. The Greek land border with Albania with a significant trend of Albanian circular migrants;
4. The Bulgarian land border with Turkey, where Palestinians and Syrians, and

more recently Malians were increasingly detected;

5. The Spanish land border with Morocco, where there was a steady trend of unknown nationalities (probably sub-Saharan) and Algerians.

4.1.1. Operational activity in Eastern Mediterranean region

During the reporting period in the Eastern Mediterranean region there were three significant sources of operational activity which produced several knock-on effects in other regions. The operational activities were as follows:

1. The Greek land border with Turkey has been a major hotspot for irregular migration for several years. However, in August 2012 the Greek authorities launched the operation Aspida, deploying additional manpower, assets and equipment to the Evros region in order to curb the flow of illegal border-crossing.

The enhanced surveillance and patrolling activities resulted in a drastic drop in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing in at the Greek land border with Turkey. In addition to the operation Aspida, the operation Xenios Zeus focused on detecting migrants inland in urban areas around Athens.

2. Immediately after the deployment of the operation Aspida detections of illegal border-crossing at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey began to increase, indicating a weak displacement from the operational area. As a response to the increasing migration pressure, the Bulgarian Border Guard Authority deployed additional officers, patrol cars and service dogs along the Bulgarian-Turkish border.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



* The system consists of stationary posts with long-range 360-degree cameras triggered by movement-detection sensors. It is currently operative along a 58-kilometre stretch of the BGR-TUR border plus a short section of the GRC-BGR border. It is planned to cover the whole BGR-TUR border by mid-2015.

A specialised police operation in some areas of the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, and enhanced air surveillance have been ongoing since 1 October 2012. In addition, since 1 July 2012, the Bulgarian authorities have implemented an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS)* at the border. It covers the most affected section of the Bulgarian-Turkish land border. Regular bilateral joint meetings for preventing and resolving border incidents take place under the Agreement signed between Bulgaria and Turkey.

3. The JO Poseidon Land 2012 was active during Q1 2013. The JO Poseidon Sea 2012 was also active during the reporting period in order to tackle the flow of irregular migrants penetrating the external EU sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

4.1.2. EU Summaries

While useful for summary purposes, EU-level figures conceal considerable variation within and among Member States, nationalities and the major irregular-migration routes. For example, in contrast to the overall decline and the fact that in Q1 2013 there were fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than in any previous quarter since data collection began, at a wide range of border sections detections of illegal border-crossing actually increased. This was particularly the case for the Hungarian land border with Serbia. Hence, the overall decrease compared to a year previously was driven almost entirely by far fewer (-67%) detections at the Greek land border with Turkey.

Despite this huge decrease, in Q1 2013 Greece still reported more detections of illegal border-crossing than any other Member State, with just over half reported from the Eastern Aegean Sea and a third from

the Greek land border with Albania. Hungary ranked second among Member States for the first time data collection began in 2008 following a threefold increase compared to the same period in 2012, in Q1 2013. Italy ranked third and continued to report a significant but steady trend of detections compared to a year previously.


Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FRAN Indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing, and the proportion of detections between the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. The first quarter of each year is usually influenced by weather conditions less favourable for both approaching and illegally crossing the external border of the EU. Correspondingly, poor conditions for illegal border-crossing also render it more difficult to detect such attempts. The combination of these two effects means that the first quarter of each year has usually been associated with fewer detections than during the summer months.

There were barely more than 6 000 detections at the external land border which is nearly a 50% reduction compared to a year previously, but is actually a small increase compared to the previous quarter (Fig. 2). Increased detections at the external land border were due to more Asian, North African and Western Balkan nationals attempting to illegally crossing the land border into Hungary from Serbia. As a result of this increase, in Q1 2013 the land border between Hungary and Serbia was the border section that reported the most detections of illegal border-crossing.

In Q1 2013, detections were particularly low when compared both with the final quarter of 2012 and the first quarters of previous years. The former comparison is explained by the Greek operation Aspida reducing detections at the Greek land

Figure 2. In Q1 2013 there were fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than during any other quarter since data collection began in 2008. Nevertheless, detections at the land border actually increased compared to the previous quarter

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections and the land and sea borders



border with Turkey, while the longer-term decline has more to do with the absence in early 2013 of two disparate but overlapping phenomena:

- I. The flow of Albanian circular migrants to Greece was reduced by ~85% in 2011 and 2012, since Albanians were granted visa-free access to the Schengen area in late 2010;
- II. In 2011 there was a temporary surge of illegal border-crossing in response to the Arab Spring uprising in several North African countries.

Migrants from Syria (1 248) were the most commonly detected migrants attempting to illegally cross the external border. Detections of migrants from Syria increased throughout 2012, but there was a steady decline between the final quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013. This is the first time since the Arab Spring that migrants from Afghanistan were not the most commonly detected migrants. In fact, in Q1 2013 migrants from Afghanistan ranked third at the EU level with half the number of detections compared to the same period in 2012 (1 082 compared with 2 543).

The migrants that were detected in the most increased frequencies compared to the same period in 2012 were from Kosovo* (+190% to 588), Mali (+1 316% to 354) and the Gambia (+721% to 279).

The 9 717 detections of illegal border-crossing in Q1 2013 were the result of combined detections in 14 Member States, many of which experienced differing trends. Figure 3 (overleaf) illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing among ten Member States during the first quarters of both 2011 and 2012 (size of circles), and also the degree of change between the two reporting periods (slopes). Despite a decrease of two-thirds, Greece still reported the most detections of illegal border-crossing, but several Member States reported very significant increases (e.g. Estonia, Bulgaria and Hungary).

In contrast to increases in most Member States, Romania reported significantly fewer detections than a year previously and the previous quarter. In Q1 2012 there was a temporary surge of Algerian migrants detected at the Romanian land border with

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Figure 3. In Q1 2013 despite dramatic increases in many Member States particularly Hungary, there were far fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than in Q1 2012, driven entirely by fewer detections in Greece following increased operational activity at their land border with Turkey

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q1 2012 and Q1 2013 for the top ten Member States shown by size of circles; gradient of the lines indicate the percentage change





Figure 4. In Q1 2013 there were decreased detections compared to a year previously of nationalities normally associated with the Greek border with Turkey, contrasting against increased detections of Malians, Gambians, Kosovo* citizens and Syrians

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q1 2012 and Q1 2013 for the top ten nationalities in Q1 2013 shown by size of circles; gradient of the lines indicate the percentage change



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Serbia, which explains the decrease compared to a year previously (Fig. 3). The decrease compared to the previous quarter was due to nearly a complete absence of migrants from Pakistan, Algeria, and Bangladesh at the land border with Serbia, and migrants from Ukraine and Moldova at the land border with Moldova.

Apart from analysing the changes in terms of Member State distributions, it is also informative to consider these trends by nationality of migrants. Figure 4 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing of the top ten nationalities during the first quarters of 2012 and 2013 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes).

A large number of nationalities were detected in smaller numbers in Q1 2013 than a year previously in Q1 2012, mostly because of increased operational activity in Greece that resulted in fewer detections at the Greek land border with Turkey. These nationalities, some of which are illustrated in Figure 4, included Afghans, Bangladeshis, Algerians, Pakistanis and Somalis.

In contrast to these widespread declines, some migrants were detected in much higher numbers in Q1 2013 than in Q1 2012 (Fig. 4). Most notably Syrians, were increasingly detected at the Greek sea border with Turkey (Eastern Aegean Sea) and the Bulgarian land border with Turkey, while Kosovo* citizens were increasingly detected at the Hungarian land border with Serbia.

To a lesser degree, but still significant at the EU level were increased detections of Malians at a range of border sections including the Bulgarian land border with Turkey and also the Hungarian land border with Serbia and the Spanish sea border at Cadiz. Gambians were also increasingly detected compared to same period in 2012, in this case

they were almost exclusively detected in the Italian Pelagic Islands.

Data received within FRAN show the extent of the displacement effects from the Greek land border with Turkey following operational activity in the area. For example, in the East Aegean Sea migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Palestine were all increasingly detected compared to the same period in 2012, well before the Greek operation Aspida. Also the Bulgarian land border with Turkey has reported increased detections, but in this case of Syrians, Malians and Palestinians.

Also apparent from FRAN figures is the way in which the Hungarian land border with Serbia became increasingly important compared to the first quarter of 2013. The nationalities detected at this border section are comparable to those associated with the Eastern Mediterranean region and so are probably migrants that were making secondary movements across the Western Balkans. The exception was Kosovo* citizens, now the third most detected nationality at the external land border. According to some reports they are exploiting a change of asylum legislation in Hungary (see Section 4.7. Asylum claims).

4.2. Routes

For more detailed analyses detections of illegal border-crossing are frequently classified into major irregular migration routes, relating to regions of detection rather than linear routes taken. As illustrated in Figure 5, during the first quarter of 2013 detections of illegal border-crossing on the main irregular migration routes converged to very similar levels with less than 2 000 detections separating the top five routes.


In the Eastern Mediterranean, detections tend to be characterised by Asian and some

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Figure 5. **At the beginning of 2013, detections of illegal border-crossing on the main irregular migration routes converged to a much lower level and narrower range of detections than in previous reporting periods**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration route



North African migrants illegally crossing the border from Turkey into Greece. In the second half of 2012 detections were much reduced following increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where most detections were previously reported (see Section 4.1.1.). In response, detections increased elsewhere in the region yet to a much lesser extent, resulting in a sustained low level of detections between the final quarter of 2012 and the first three months of 2013 (Fig. 5).

On the main Central Mediterranean route, which includes the Italian Pelagic Islands (Linnosa, Lampione and Lampedusa) and Malta, most detections tend to be of migrants arriving on boats from North Africa. During the previous quarter there were fewer detections of North African nationalities such as Tunisians and Egyptians but there was a surge of migrants from sub-Saharan countries such as Eritrea, the Gambia and Mali, all of which were detected in much higher numbers during the last three months of 2012 compared with Q3 2012. In the current reporting period, the number of detected Somalis decreased, resulting in the top three nationalities – Somalis, Gambians and Egyptians

– being detected at similarly low levels of around 200–250 each over the three-month period (Fig. 5).

In contrast to the overall decline, detections on the Western Balkans route increased from less than 1 500 in Q4 2012 to more than 2 500 in Q1 2013. This was because of a wide range of nationalities that were detected increasingly attempting to enter Hungary from Serbia, with Kosovo* citizens now ranked top among all nationalities.

4.2.1. Eastern Mediterranean route


Since data collection began in early 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained its status as a major hotspot of irregular migration into the Schengen area, mostly associated with illegal border-crossing from Turkey. However, since early August 2012 detections on this route have been at much lower levels following the deployment of the Greek operation Aspida at the Greek land border with Turkey (see Section 4.1.1.).

In Q1 2013 there were 2 734 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Med-

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Figure 6. **Following the August 2012 launch of the Greek operation Aspida at the Greek land border with Turkey, detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route fell to unprecedentedly low levels, but with a weak displacement effect to the Eastern Aegean Sea**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs at the Greek land and sea border with Turkey



iterranean route, which was a decrease of 66% compared to the same period in 2012 but nevertheless still constituting nearly 30% of all detections at the EU level. In effect, this route remained the major entry point to the Schengen area.

With nearly 1 000 detections in Q1 2013, Syrians were by far the most detected nationality on this route. More than half of these detections were in the Eastern Aegean Sea region, with significant numbers also at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey.

For much of the last few years migrants from Afghanistan have been detected in very high numbers on the Eastern Mediterranean route; in Q1 2013 just 500 were detected although they were still the second most commonly detected nationality on this route. Migrants from Sri Lanka (173) and Mali (120) were detected in much higher numbers than ever before on this route.

Greek land border with Turkey

During the first half of 2012, the Greek land border with Turkey was the undisputed

hotspot for illegal border-crossing into the Schengen area. However, in Q1 2013 detections at the Greek land border with Turkey were much reduced following the August 2012 launch of the Greek operation Aspida. Syrians were the most commonly detected nationality of migrants along this border section.

During much of February 2013 the water level in and around the Evros River was also extremely high, which made many areas almost impassable. As a result detections of illegal border-crossing were even lower than expected.

Displacement effects

Although the Greek land border with Turkey is viewed by many as having been effectively closed by the Greek operation Aspida, there is no evidence to suggest that fewer migrants arrive in the region hoping to cross the external border of the EU. Once in Turkey instead of heading to the Greek land border, many migrants are thought to be offered three main choices of how to proceed to the external border of the EU:



1. To cross the Bulgarian land border with Turkey on foot
2. Small boats departing from the East Aegean Sea
3. Flights from Istanbul to the EU with fraudulent documents

1. Bulgarian land border with Turkey

Detections at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey began to increase almost immediately after the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida. Syrians were also the most commonly detected migrants at this border section, although some of them may be other nationalities claiming to be Syrian to increase their chances of being granted international protection.

The interviews carried out with migrants apprehended in the Bulgarian operational area lead to the conclusion that most crossed the land border with the help of local residents from the area of Edirne who were either working for the facilitation networks based in Istanbul or were just working on their own.

Migrants tended to arrive in Edirne using either public transport or means of transport provided by facilitators, and then they were handed over to the local smugglers with experience in facilitating the border-crossing. Many were instructed to claim false nationalities in order to inhibit accurate data entry into EURODAC. Nevertheless, their fingerprints were recorded electronically and sent to the EURODAC database.

2. East Aegean Sea

This border section ranked second at the EU level in Q1 2013. The most frequently detected migrants were Syrians and Afghans, followed by Sri Lankans, whose number has recently increased.

The JO Poseidon Sea 2012 was operational throughout the reporting period, focusing on tackling the flow of irregular migrants penetrating the external EU sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

Syrians have been the most commonly detected migrants during the operation so far in 2013. Most were men travelling alone but here were some family units, and all were heading for Sweden or Germany to claim asylum. Once they entered Turkey, those intending to enter the EU travelled to Istanbul in order to make contact with facilitation networks. They stayed in Istanbul for between 1–12 weeks before being taken by van to the west coast of Turkey to depart towards the Greek eastern Aegean Islands.


Afghans were also detected in this region. Most were previously resident in Iran and had decided to travel to the EU due to deteriorating employment conditions. The Afghan community in Iran can easily find criminal networks that can facilitate them to Turkey and then to Greece. Once in Turkey, the Afghan migrants were transported by public transport to Istanbul and from there mainly by private transportation directly to departure area on the western coast of Turkey, where they boarded rubber boats destined for the Greek eastern Aegean Islands.

3. Flights from Turkey

Since the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida, there has been an increase in the number of migrants detected arriving on flights from Turkey using fraudulent documents, particularly Syrians as well as other nationalities usually associated with illegal border-crossing into Greece from Turkey. These included Iranians, Afghans, Iraqis and Algerians, all of whom were detected more frequently than ever before on flights from

Figure 7. **There has been increased detections of migrants, particularly Syrians, using fraudulent documents on flights from Turkey since the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida in August 2012**

Number of travellers detected using fraudulent documents on flights arriving from Turkey, by quarter since the beginning of 2011



Turkey, either during the final quarter of 2012 or during the current reporting period.

Figure 7 shows the number of detections of document fraudsters arriving in all Member States/Schengen Associated Countries during each quarter since the beginning of 2011, according to data exchanged under the EDF-RAN. Clearly the number of detections nearly doubled between the third and fourth quarters of 2012, coinciding exactly with the launch of the Greek operation Aspida (see Section 4.1.1).

4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean increased massively back in 2011, largely due to the political and civil unrest across North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Libya. Since the end of that year, irregular migration in the region has been more stable, especially following reinstated cooperation between Italian and Tunisian authorities concerning the return of Tunisian nationals.

According to FRAN data, in Q1 2013 there were just 1 124 reported detections of illegal border-crossing on the main Central Mediterranean route (Italian Pelagic Islands, Sicily and Malta), which was about 30% of the detections during the previous quarter but a slight increase compared to a year previously in Q1 2012 (928). However, this figure concealed seasonal decreases for some commonly detected nationalities and significant increases for others, and across the region it is widely accepted that detections are likely to increase with the onset of less inclement weather.

Since early 2011 migrants from Tunisia have been among the most commonly detected migrants arriving in the Central Mediterranean region but during the first three months of 2013 only 75 Tunisians were detected. In fact nearly all of the top 10 nationalities in Q1 2013 were detected in much lower numbers than during the final quarter of 2012.



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Fewer Migrants to the Canaries

[In February 2013] Spanish Minister Jorge Fernández said that the government has classified traffic to the islands from Africa as virtually non-existent due to the sharp decline in the number of boats and migrants in recent years. Last year saw just 173 Africans land by boat in the Canaries, a fall of 50% compared to the previous year and a tiny fraction of the 31 000 who landed in 2006 at the height of the *cayuco* (wooden boat) crisis that stretched the emergency services and migrant holding centres to breaking point. Despite the positive news, experts say the authorities should not eliminate surveillance of the region's waters in order not to encourage the traffickers to focus their attention on the Canaries once again.

Source: www.islandconnections.eu,
10 February 2013



Migrants from Somalia ranked top in the region but were detected at their lowest level for over a year (271). However, subsequent to the reporting period there was some evidence to suggest that the Somalis had once again become the most detected nationality of migrants in the Central Mediterranean.

For example, on 9 May, the Italian authorities were informed by telephone that a migrant boat had departed from Libya towards Italy. A coastal patrol vessel from Lampedusa intercepted the boat and took all 98 migrants, most of whom were from Somalia or Eritrea, onboard.

A total of 233 migrants from the Gambia were detected in the Central Mediterranean during Q1 2013 which is the highest ever level for this nationality resulting in them ranking second in this region, followed by 216 Egyptians.

The JO Hermes 2012 was operational just for the first month of the reporting period. The operation was established to support the Italian authorities in tackling maritime illegal migration on the coasts of Sicily, Pantelleria and the Pelagic Islands (Lampedusa, Linosa, Lampione).

In January 2013, there was only one incident reported under JO Hermes whereby a total of 35 irregular migrants were detected, 32 of which were Syrian and three were Egyptian. No facilitators were arrested. The vessel with crew and some migrants had departed from Alexandria (Egypt) with a stopover near Crete, Greece, where some migrants disembarked, and others (in this case the Syrians) joined them to sail as far as Sicily. The disembarkation point was near Syracuse but this time the interception took place inland, implying that the facilitators (and probably some migrants) evaded detection.

The absence of boats from Tunisia and Libya may be due to the bad weather conditions throughout the Mediterranean area.

Although FRAN data suggest that detections of migrants from Syria were low in this region during the first three months of 2013 (85), there were some reports of boats arriving directly from Syria. They started they

journey from the coast of Syria, organised by Egyptian facilitators claimed to depart from the Turkish coast near the border with Syria (Iskenderun) onboard 8-metre Egyptian vessels. They often changed vessels out at sea (always coordinated by the Egyptian facilitators) before reaching the Italian coast after around 10 days. Some claimed to have been contacted by a Syrian facilitator part of a criminal organisation which organises and recruits people in Syria to reach Italy for EUR 5 000 each.

4.2.3. Western Mediterranean route

In Q1 2013 there were only around 1 000 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, where three-quarters of all detections were reported. At the end of 2012 we reported vastly increased detections of migrants from Chad, Cameroon, Mali and Guinea arriving in the region of Cadiz but this did not continue into the first few months of 2013.

Analysing the nationalities detected on this route is problematic as half were reported by the Spanish authorities as being of unknown nationality. However, open sources suggest that there have been increased reports of African migrants storming the border fence in Melilla.

4.2.4. Western African route

In the first quarter of 2013, there were just a few individual detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, which is the same level as during the same period in 2012. During the previous quarter there were 30 or so detections of both Gambians and Moroccans but neither of these nationalities were apparent in the data exchanged for the first three months of 2013. Hence irreg-

ular migration pressure on the Western African route is much reduced.

4.2.5. Eastern land borders route

The eastern land borders route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Despite the total length of all the border sections, detections tend to be lower than on other routes, possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and many countries of origin. Also according to several bi-monthly analytical reports shared throughout 2012 and during early 2013, visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps tend to predominate on this route, as opposed to detections of illegal border-crossing (see Section 4.8. Document fraud).

In Q1 2013, there were just 220 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which was lower than the previous quarter but stable compared to a year previously. However, this stable trend in total numbers conceals much variation between nationalities over the last year. For example, there was a sharp increase in detections of migrants from the Russian Federation, but fewer detections of nationalities from further afield such as Afghanistan and Bangladesh.

Estonia reported by far the most detections on this route mostly of Russians and Vietnamese migrants at the land border with the Russian Federation, but also with a significant proportion of unknown nationalities.

4.2.6. Western Balkans route

There were almost 8 500 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs (green borders) reported by Western Balkan countries and neighbouring Member States. Unsurprisingly, the number is one-fifth (21%)



* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

lower compared to the previous quarter and thus in line with the regular seasonal variation. There were, however, significant differences between trends reported by Member States and Western Balkan countries. Hungary, for example, reported a sharp 165% increase compared to the last quarter of 2012, while the number of cases reported by Serbia dropped by 41% in relation to the last three months of 2012.

When 8 500 detections are compared to the same period in 2012, a clear increasing trend emerges with almost a third more cases (29%). While the Hungary-Serbia border was once again first among regional border sections, relative increases were the highest in the case of the Serbia-Croatia (192%) and Croatia-Slovenia (192%) borders. The shift back to the Hungary-Serbia border is most likely linked to legislative changes in Hungary regarding detention of migrants (see box in Section 4.7. Asylum claims).

In terms of nationalities, roughly two-thirds of all detections (over 5 900) continued to be associated with migrants who had entered the Western Balkans en route from Greece (i.e. Afghans, Pakistanis, Syrians, Algerians, Somalis and Eritreans), although the detections of all these nationalities combined decreased in comparison with the previous quarter. For example, the trend of Syrian nationals constantly increasing during the past three quarters did not continue in the first quarter of 2013. Nevertheless, the number of detection was still quite substantial at 767 cases. Detections of Afghans also declined, both compared to the corresponding quarter in 2012 (-23%) and the previous three months (-33%).

On the other hand, detections of claimed Malian nationals increased to 258, or 231% more in comparison with the previous quarter. Most of these detections were made at the borders between the former Yugoslav Re-

public of Macedonia and Serbia, and Serbia and Hungary. However, it should be stressed that false claims of nationality (e.g. nationality swapping) may partly explain this trend.

Detections of Western Balkan nationals remained relatively stable, Albanians being the top detected nationality (1 475). However, detections of persons from the territory of Kosovo* continued to increase and were 58% higher compared to the last quarter of 2012. The detections were mostly made at the Hungary-Serbia border, where Kosovo* citizens became the single largest group of detected migrants (a 19% share of the total).

The above observations would indicate the existence of a time lag of at least six months between developments at the Greek-Turkish borders and secondary movements through the Western Balkans. More precisely, the Greek operations Xenios Zeus and Aspida, which resulted in a precipitous drop in the numbers of detections at the Greek-Turkish land border, have not yet had the expected corresponding impact on detections in the Western Balkans. However, there are some early signs of this knock-on effect taking place (e.g. decline in the number of Syrians and Afghans).

Hiding in vehicles

Detections of migrants hiding in vehicles increased markedly compared with the corresponding quarter of 2012 (+78%). More precisely, there were 708 migrants detected trying to illegally cross the border at BCPs, mostly reported by Serbia (a 33% share), followed by Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

However, trends within the region were mixed. The most notable change was a sharp increase of detections at the border section between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece. This border became

the top reporting section with a 19% share of the regional total.

This extraordinary increase of detections reported exclusively by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (no detections by Greek authorities) can be explained by enhanced efforts of border authorities to detect migrants, especially in trains. The rather impressive results of the increased activities probably had an impact on detections at other border sections along this route.

In any case, the flow of migrants travelling by train from Greece towards the Western Balkan countries is probably substantially larger than the current figures of detections indicate. This assumption may be further corroborated by other observations in the northern part of the region – for example Slovenia reporting a rising trend in the use of cargo trains in clandestine border crossings. There are cases where irregular migrants have hidden even among potentially dangerous cargo (e.g. metal waste).

Regardless of their declining numbers (similar to green borders), Afghans remained the top detected nationality with a 17% share (120) with Syrians coming second with a 12% share (83). As in the case of green borders, detections of West Africans, such as claimed Malian and Ivorian nationals, rose compared to the previous quarter (from 12 to 40 and from 3 to 28, respectively).

4.3. Clandestine entry

Restricting the FRAN indicator on detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (1B) to the external land and sea borders of the EU and to detections confirmed to be clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport), results in extremely low detections for the whole of the EU especially

compared with other indicators, such as detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs. For example, in Q1 2013 only 130 detections were reported from the whole FRAN community (but see Section 4.2.6. Western Balkans route). Despite steady increases in this indicator throughout 2012, this figure was actually a reduction compared to the previous quarter (203) and also to the first quarter of 2012 (103).

In the case of Slovenia, from where most detections were reported in each quarter for the last year, most detections were of Afghan migrants increasingly detected at the border with Croatia. Nearly all of these Afghan migrants were making secondary movements after initially entering the Schengen area in Greece (see Section 4.2.6. Western Balkans route). In Bulgaria the increased detections of clandestine entries at BCPs were due to more migrants from Syria, who were increasingly detected at the land border with Turkey – probably as a displacement effect from the Greek land border with Turkey.

In contrast to the low number of detections of clandestine entry at the external border, there were more detections within the EU/Schengen area (405). Although higher than for the external border, this figure was a reduction of around 15% compared to the previous quarter. The geographical distribution of these 'internal' detections sheds important light on the direction of secondary movements and the final destination countries selected by each nationality. For example, the UK and Italy reported the greatest number of internally detected clandestine irregular migrants. The most significant trends were Albanians detected attempting entry to the UK (probably at the ferry connections and channel tunnel), and fewer Afghans arriving in Ancona, Italy, hidden on ferries from Greece.




Figure 8. **In Q1 2013 France detected the most facilitators of irregular migration, but detections in Bulgaria increased more than any other Member State**

Detections of facilitators in Q1 2013 and percentage change from Q1 2012

4.4. Detections of facilitators

Notwithstanding an increase during the first few months of 2011, detections of facilitators of irregular migration have been falling steadily for the last two years. According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossing.

Consistent with this long-term decline, in Q1 2013, there were 1 622 detections of facilitators of irregular migration, which is almost the lowest level since data collection began in 2008 (Fig. 1). Nearly all the top five reporting Member States detected fewer facilitators of irregular migrants in Q1 2013 than in any time during the previous year. As has been the case over recent reporting periods, France, Italy and Spain detected the most facilitators with two-thirds of all detections at the EU level.

The biggest increase in detections was in Bulgaria, where detections almost doubled from Q1 2012 to Q1 2013, although from a rather low base. Most of these detections were of Bulgarian nationals and were associated with illegal border-crossing from Turkey, which increased in the second half of 2012 as a weak displacement from the Greek border.

Member States tend to detect more domestic facilitators than any other nationality; very often most of the top reporting countries for this indicator tend to report their own citizens as facilitators more frequently than any other single nationality. In line with this tendency, the top three nationalities of facilitators detected in specific Member States were Italians detected in Italy, French detected in France, and Spanish detected in Spain. In addition there were increased detections of Algerian facilitators in France and Somalis detected in Italy.

4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q1 2013, there were over 77 000 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is a reduction of around 10% compared to both the previous quarter and the same quarter in 2012. However, this figure was also the lowest ever reported for this indicator*, and is consistent with the previously reported stable but slightly declining long-term trend over the last two years (Fig. 1). However, this long-term decline masks much variation among Member States.

The vast majority of migrants staying illegally were detected inland (64 071) and so are presumed to be long-term illegal stayers as, at the time of detection, they were making no attempt to leave. The next most common location for detections of illegal stayers was those exiting at the air (7 779) followed by the land borders (4 117), whereby illegally staying

migrants were leaving the EU or Schengen area and may have included those that were over staying by short periods.

The phenomenon that decreased the most compared to the previous quarter was detections on exit from France towards the UK. However, the reduction was not of a specific nationality, rather all the top nationalities were reported in much lower numbers such as Afghans, Albanians and Iranians.

Germany continued to report by far the most detections of migrants illegally staying, followed by France and Spain. In Germany detections of illegal stayers also decline consistent with the overall trend, but detections of Russian and Turkish nationals increased to their highest ever levels to rank first and second in Germany. A few Member States reported increased detections compared to the previous quarter, thus going against the overall trend. However, these increases were small and generally in line with previous reported figures. Detections even fell in Greece, where there has been markedly increased operational activity aimed at detecting illegal stayers in Athens and other urban areas.

The nationalities that were most commonly detected as illegal stayers in the EU remained generally unchanged compared to the previous quarter but in the longer term Syrians have been detected in increasing numbers since half way through 2012. However, even detections of Syrians fell during the first three months of 2013 compared with the end of 2012.

Also increasing were numbers of unknown nationalities which constituted more than 3 500 detections in Q1 2013 or more than 5% of the total. If these detections tended to be associated with one or a few nationalities then they could seriously bias analyses of illegal stay at the EU level.

* Some of this decline was due to changes in reporting practices in the Netherlands




Figure 9. **Poland continued to refuse entry to the most migrants in Q1 2013, but some of the biggest increases were reported by Slovenia, now ranked second among Member States**

Refusals of entry in Q1 2013 and percentage change from Q1 2012

Of the exchanged data that were suitable for analysis (Swedish data included asylum seekers and all inland detections in Switzerland were of unknown nationalities), the most significant phenomena relating to illegal stay were Moroccans detected inland in Spain, Algerians detected in Belgium and Albanians and Pakistanis detected in Greece. It is noteworthy that, despite reporting the most illegally staying migrants, Germany does not appear high up in the list of phenomena (linked to single nationalities) – this is because in Q1 2013 (as in most previous reporting periods), Germany detected over 150 different nationalities of illegally staying migrants at slightly

lower frequencies, whereas some other reporting countries tend to have single nationalities that are reported in very high numbers, for example Moroccans in Spain.

4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q1 2013 there were nearly 28 000 refusals of entry at the external border, with about 55% refused from the land border and most of the remainder being refused from the air border. In the context of recent years this figure is broadly in line with other recent quarters, although it is slightly lower than the second half of 2012 when

there were more than 30 000 refusals of entry during each quarter.

As has been the case for most other reporting periods, in Q1 2013 Poland refused the most migrants (Fig. 9), mainly Ukrainian nationals refused entry at their land border (up by 8% compared to the same period in 2012). Overall more than two-thirds of all refused Ukrainian nationals were refused entry to Poland but the percentage was even higher for Georgians, nearly 90% of whom were refused entry to Poland.

After Ukrainians refused entry to Poland, the second most common phenomenon was Georgians refused entry to Poland at the border with Belarus. Refusals of Georgian was increased compared to the same period in 2012 but was at the lowest level for the last 12 months.

Although from rather low bases, there were three trends that increased notably during Q1 2013. The first was Serbians refused entry at the Hungarian land border with Serbia, the second was Albanians refused entry at the Greek land border with Albania, and the third was Croatians refused at the Slovenian land border with Croatia.

Following recent increases in the number of refusals of entry, in Q1 2013 Slovenia ranked second among Member States (Fig. 9). The most commonly refused nationality in Slovenia was Croatian for very wide variety of reasons but mostly reasons A (No valid document) and I (Threat).

4.7. Asylum claims

The number of claims of asylum in the EU increased steadily throughout 2012 from just over 55 000 in Q1 to a staggering 83 446 applications in the final quarter of the year – the highest every reported since data collection began for this indicator in 2008 (FRAN data



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“ EU Urges Greece To Up Asylum

The European Union has called on Greece to review its asylum policies, especially for Syrians fleeing 'atrocities' in their country. Greece grants asylum to as few as 1 in 100 000 applicants and the government has been acting to purge the country of those in the country unlawfully.

European Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmstroem told a news conference after talks with Greek leaders that the number of people gaining asylum in Greece 'continues to be very low, and I am particularly worried about this situation, especially about the Syrians.' 'Every day we hear atrocities about their country,' she added.

Greece has complained it has received little support from the EU to deal with waves of immigrants from Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe and has been left to fend almost by itself. Malmstroem, who came to Greece to review the situation, said Syrian asylum seekers were '100 percent' protected in other European countries, while protection was 'close to zero percent' in Greece.

Source: greece.greekreporter.com, 14 May 2013



do not include asylum applications submitted inland in France or the Netherlands).

Much of this increase resulted from many more applications submitted by Syrian and, to a lesser extent, Serbian and Russian nationals

Without question, the most significant trend in asylum applications throughout 2012 was increased applications submitted by Syrian nationals, which in Q4 2012 increased to nearly 9 000 applications and 11% of the EU total, amounting to more applications submitted by a single nationality in any given quarter since data collection began for this indicator. This continued into the first three months of 2013. Indeed the second and third most populous categories of nationalities submitting applications in single Member States were Syrians submitting applications in Germany and Syrians submitting applications in Sweden. Two thirds of all applications submitted by Syrians in Q1 2013 were in Germany or Sweden. Given that Syrians are still highly detected illegally crossing the border of the EU and as document fraudsters, and that the civil war shows no signs of abating, this flow of asylum seekers is likely to continue.

Hungary reported a fivefold increase in asylum applications over the last year. This increase was due to more applications submitted by a range of nationalities such as Kosovo* citizens, Pakistanis and Algerians. Some reports suggest that there is a pull factor in terms of a change of asylum legislation which prohibits the immediate return of asylum seekers to Serbia (see box).

4.8. Document fraud

In Q1 2013 there were nearly 2 000 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries. The most commonly detected migrants using document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from a third country were from Albania and Syria.

Also important were detections of document fraud between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States. As is normally the case, many of these were reported by the UK, which is a common destination coun-



Dublin transfers to Hungary of people who have transited through Serbia

1. In April 2012 UNHCR issued a report entitled *Hungary as a country of asylum: observations on the situation of asylum-seekers and refugees in Hungary*, which reviewed access to asylum procedures, standards of reception conditions, quality of asylum decision-making, detention practice, treatment of persons with special needs, and other issues.
2. As a result of this report in October 2012 UNHCR urged countries to refrain from returning asylum-seekers to Hungary under the Dublin II Regulation, where they had transited through Serbia prior to their arrival in Hungary.
3. In November 2012, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a comprehensive package of legal amendments which came into force in January 2013 aimed at ensuring that asylum-seekers whose asylum claims have not yet been decided, may remain in the territory of Hungary pending an in-merit examination, and will not be subject to detention or return.
4. UNHCR now observes that Hungary no longer denies an examination on the merits of asylum claims where asylum-seekers transit via Serbia or Ukraine prior to their arrival in Hungary. Such asylum-seekers are no longer returned to Serbia or Ukraine.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence



“ Sham wedding fixers ‘offer groom’ for GBP 3 500

An undercover reporter posed as a would-be bride from India who wants to stay in Wales but with her work visa due to run out. She was offered a Czech husband by sham wedding fixers in Cardiff [UK] for GBP 3 500. She was also advised how to convince the UK Border Agency she had been with her new partner for more than a year.

The undercover team filmed a group of sham wedding fixers as they organised a photo shoot around Cardiff aimed at conning officials into thinking the reporter and her ‘partner’ had been a couple since 2011, when in fact they had only met for a few hours. The reporter was given lessons in how to lie about where they met and told to write down and learn a list of information about her fake fiancé in case she was questioned at the register office or after the wedding by the UKBA.

Source: www.bbc.co.uk,
26 February 2013



try for irregular migrants travelling from the Schengen area.

On intra-Schengen flights there were also many detections of document fraud in Q1 2013, but the lowest level since reliable data collection began at the beginning of 2012. The decrease is widely recognised to be associated with the Greek operation Aspida at the Greek land border with Turkey, which during the reporting period, prevented many migrants from entering Greece and then boarding intra-Schengen flights in Athens. Overall document fraud was most associated with migrants from:

1. Albania with 20% of all detections, and
2. Syria with 13% of all detections

4.8.1. Migrants from Albania

In Q1 2013 some 830 Albanians were detected using a total of 880 fraudulent documents, which is an increase of nearly a third compared to the same period in 2012. Without question Albanians represent the biggest proportion of document fraud at the EU level.

Albanians were mostly detected on entry to the Schengen area from a third country but also travelling between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States. The latter flow was almost exclusively between the Schengen area and the UK, sometimes via Ireland.

Greece detected more Albanians than any other Member State, mostly on entry at the Greek BCPs Kakavia and Kristalopigi but at a reduced rate compared to Q1 2012. In this context they were using counterfeit Greek border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay. This phenomenon was the most apparent form of document fraud in 2012, which may be following a somewhat seasonal variation or may be in decline; data exchanged in Q2 2013 should go some way to answering this question.

Albanians were also detected on exit from Athens either on intra-Schengen flights or on flights to the UK or Ireland.

4.8.2. Migrants from Syria

Syrians, on the other hand, were detected on entry to the Schengen area on flights from Turkey and on intra-Schengen flights from Greece.

Throughout 2012 migrants from Syria were increasingly detected as document fraudsters across Member States, such that there

was an overall sixfold increase since the beginning of the year (all travel types combined). During the first half of the year most were detected on intra-Schengen flights from Greece, presumably individuals who had previously crossed the land border with Turkey. In the final quarter of 2012 and during the first few months of 2013 the most common embarkation point for Syrian document fraudsters was Istanbul.

4.9. Returns

4.9.1. Return decisions

In Q1 2013 there were 55 285 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which is a decrease of 21% compared to during the same period in 2012. The UK reached more decisions to leave than any other member State, but there were more Pakistanis that were subject to a decision to leave in Greece than any other single nationality in any Member State.

Most of the overall decrease was due to 50% fewer decisions being made in Greece, where throughout 2012, more decisions to leave were reached than in any other Member State. Most of these decisions to leave were handed to migrants after they were detected illegally crossing the land border between Greece and Turkey. During the first half of 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing in this region were very significant at the EU level, but have subsequently fallen to very low levels (see Section 4.1.1.); correspondingly the number of return decisions reached in Greece also fell down affecting figures for the EU as a whole.

Note that the absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on

decisions were unavailable from, inter alia, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, where it is assumed that high numbers of decisions were reached.

Notwithstanding return decisions reached in Greece, there was very little change in the number of decisions made by other Member States. The UK for instance reported little change in the number of return decisions reached, and while some other Member States reported changes of between -20 and +20%, these changes were within the range of previous reporting periods.


The exception was Bulgaria, where the number of return decisions more than doubled in Q1 2013 as compared to Q1 2012. This increase was due to more Syrians, Algerians, Palestinians and Malians being subject to return decisions and almost certainly related to increased detections of illegal border-crossing since the beginning of Greek operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey (see Section 4.1.1.).

More Pakistanis were subject to decisions to leave than any other nationality (4 723), followed by Albanians (3 838), Moroccans (3 439) and Indians (2 901). Pakistanis were mostly issued decision to leave in Greece, while Albanians were subject to decisions to leave in similar numbers in both Greece and Italy. All these nationalities were subject to similar numbers of decisions as a year previously in Q1 2012.

At the Member State level there is often a discrepancy between the number of return decisions reached and the number of effective returns carried out. Some of the differences may be due to time lags between judicial decisions and physical returns, while other differences may be due to the disappearance of migrants once a decision has been reached.

Figure 11. **The most commonly returned migrants were from Albania, Pakistan and India**

Return decisions issued and effective returns (voluntary or forced) to third countries of the top nationalities in Q1 2013



4.9.2. Effective returns

In Q1 2013, there continued to be little changes in the total number of third-country nationals effectively returned to countries outside the EU compared to most quarters in 2012. The total number of 38 221 was however a 9% decrease compared to the previous quarter but was within the normal range of variation. As has been the case during every quarter of data exchange so far for this indicator, the UK conducted the largest number of returns, in this case up by 7% compared to the previous quarter, which is the most effective returns performed by any Member State during any quarter since data collection began, and nearly twice that of the Member State that ranked second, which was Greece.

The most returned nationalities were Albanians (mostly returned by Greece), Pakistanis (returned by Greece and the UK) and Indians (mostly returned by the UK). Unfortunately, the number of migrants of unspecified nationalities that were effectively returned increased massively from just few hundred in Q1 2012 to nearly 2 000 in Q1 2013, which renders other estimates of nationalities less effective. This gap in the data results from local

reporting issues. Nearly all of these unspecified nationalities were reported by France, where some 60% of all returned migrants were reported as being of unknown nationalities.

Among the top 20 cases of return from the EU/Schengen area classified as the nationality of the migrant and the returning Member State, ranked first and second at the EU level with consistent numbers were Albanians returned by Greece and Indians returned by the UK. Pakistanis were returned in significant numbers by both Greece and the UK.

The number of returns from Greece increased significantly in October 2012, following the launch of operation Xenios Zeus, which has been underway since 2 August 2012 targeting illegal stayers mostly in Athens but also in some other urban areas. Much of the increase was due to more migrants from Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Bangladesh being forcibly returned in much higher numbers during the fourth quarter of 2012, almost certainly as a result of the operation Xenios Zeus.

These widely-publicised activities will also probably be contributing to the preventive effect of operation Aspida at the Greek land

border with Turkey, as migrants will be aware that even if they successfully cross the border they are still likely to be picked up by the authorities inland. In fact, some open sources claim that Greek police reports have come to the same conclusion.

4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

Criminal groups that operate across the EU external borders pose a significant challenge to European law-enforcement authorities. They affect the overall management of the external borders insofar as the prevention of cross-border crime demands substantial personal and financial resources of European border agencies. The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit works with Member States to collect information with the purpose to adapt operational activities to the dynamics of cross-border crime activities.

Risks, that shaped the crime picture along the borders in the first quarter of 2013, were influenced by seasonal fluctuations, vulnerabilities along the borders, and changing operational schemes of transnational organised crime groups. In Q1 2013, particularly significant in terms of impact on the security of borders and EU citizens were the following trends:

- At the eastern borders, the continuation of frequent organised, large-scale and individual tobacco smuggling cases from particularly Ukraine and Belarus, and a slight decrease in the detection of stolen vehicles smuggled in the opposite direction.
- Along the Balkans route, an increase in the smuggling of cannabis from Albania, influenced by vulnerable borders in the Western Balkans.
- At the Western Mediterranean and Western African routes, well-organised and

large-scale cases of cocaine smuggling were concealed among a large volume of legitimate international commercial trade and increasingly sophisticated methods to hide the substance.

Due to the winter season and the absence of Frontex Joint Operations in the Mediterranean Sea in the first quarter of 2013, the emphasis of this chapter is placed on the eastern borders of the EU and the Balkans route.

4.10.1. Eastern borders

Smuggling of tobacco products

The excise good most smuggled across the eastern external borders into the EU are tobacco products. Most prominent among them are cigarettes, but also hand rolling tobacco is found by the authorities. The characteristics of this illegal trade have changed over the last decade. The illicit import of counterfeit tobacco products and cigarettes of less common brands have replaced the large-scale smuggling of well-known products. This trend is partly caused by Cooperation Agreements that were signed between the European Commission and the world's largest tobacco manufacturers through which the companies oblige themselves to sell their products only to registered customers and prevent their products from falling into the hands of criminals. This cooperation gave a larger share of the black market to 'cheap whites' exclusively produced for the purpose of smuggling and other cigarettes of inferior quality. A major part of these products are smuggled across the EU eastern borders.

Independent from the different short-term trends at individual border sections that are often influenced seasonally, all Member States across the eastern border rank the smuggling of tobacco high among the risks threatening the integrity of their long land



borders. The Member States located along the eastern border to the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine experienced different trends regarding this crime during the first two months of the year. Slovakia and Latvia reported a clear decrease in the smuggling of excise goods.

Lithuania, which neighbours both the Russian and Belarusian territory reported a growing share of cigarettes smuggled from Belarus, while the illicit imports from the Russian Federation substantially decreased during the last years. This seems to be confirmed by Frontex JO Focal Points Land, which reported only five incidents of cigarette smuggling from the Russian Federation between January and March 2013. The Lithuanian State Border Guard Service continued to identify illicit activities on its railway connections with Belarus. The Minsk to Vilnius train connection received particular attention. Smuggled cigarettes with Belarusian excise labels are detected on a regular basis, as, for example, on 14 January 2013, when Lithuanian authorities found more than 30 000 cigarettes of the Belarusian brands 'Minsk', 'Fest' and 'Alliance' that were placed in bags under passenger seats. Only few days before, Lithuanian border guards discovered a similar amount of smuggled tobacco products in corners and cavities of a freight train engine coming from Belarus.

Romanian reports show that cigarette smuggling activities across the Ukrainian and Moldovan border between January and February 2013 remained rather stable compared to the previous winter season. On the other hand, Estonia registered a strong increase in smuggled cigarettes in relation to the previous reporting period.

On 25 February, the Polish Border Guard succeeded in the disruption of a large smuggling operation with the seizure of a lorry in proximity of the Slovakian border. The trailer contained 4.5 million cigarettes of the Mayfair

brand, which presumably were on their way from an unknown Western Balkan country to the UK. The Polish driver and another passenger of the lorry with Polish number plates were arrested.

The Polish authorities moreover discovered numerous smuggling cases on passenger and freight trains from Belarus and Ukraine. The incidents ranged from individuals transporting smaller amounts of up to 5 000 pieces to large-scale and organised undertakings. In February, a joint action between border guards, customs officers and railway security that involved the use of a dog specialised on tobacco products revealed the smuggling of near to 300 000 cigarettes that were hidden under floors, seats and above ceilings of a train from Ukraine. Three individuals from Ukraine, one of them an employee from the Ukrainian railway company pleaded guilty to have committed the offense. In two other cases that were uncovered in January, together 480 000 cigarettes were discovered under train wagons transporting logs.

The intensity of smuggling activities strongly depends on their acceptance by the general public. The Lithuanian Free Market Institute recently published a study*, which shows that 62% of Lithuanians, 51% of Latvians and 31% of Estonians, justify or rather justify the smuggling and consumption of smuggled excise goods such as cigarettes, alcohol products and fuel. A large share of the population in the Baltic countries thinks that the illicit import of these goods has increased in 2012. A majority of these countries' citizens moreover believes that a combination of increasing product prices, decreasing incomes, and weakening opportunities to afford legal goods are the main causes for smuggling. The survey represents only three countries, but certainly mirrors a widely established opinion in larger parts of the EU population.

* *Population attitude survey towards smuggling and consumption of illegal goods 2013*, Lithuanian Free Market Institute, http://files.lrinka.lt/Tyrimas_kontrabanda/Report.pdf



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 12. **Large seizure of cigarettes coming from the Western Balkans**

Frequent detections of cigarette smuggling along the eastern external borders of the EU should not obscure the fact that numerous illicitly imported tobacco products are destined for Western European countries. The attractiveness of this criminal business is naturally proportional to the price difference between source and destination country of the smuggled goods. As no regular customs controls exist within the EU on the route westwards to Member States with high tobacco taxes, the risk of shipping cigarettes there increases at a lower pace once the EU external borders are crossed. According to open sources, alone in February and March, 21 million illicit cigarettes were discovered in the Netherlands. A continuation of this rate of detections would mean a substantial increase for 2014, after 62 and 210 million were seized, respectively, in 2012 and 2011.

Apart from coming on land from Eastern Europe, many of the illegally smuggled cigarettes are also shipped on vessels from the Russian Federation and Ukraine via Dutch harbours, where they are repacked for transport to the UK and Ireland.

Smuggling of fuel

According to the abovementioned study on the population attitude towards smuggling, 60% of the Lithuanian population believes



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 13. **Seizure of systematically hidden cigarettes in a train compartment**

that the smuggling of fuel has increased during the last year. 29% admitted that they or one of their family members has bought smuggled fuel. The study points out that at the end of August 2012, one litre of Diesel costs EUR 1.36 in Lithuania, whereas a customer has to pay only half the price in the Russian Federation. The amount of fuel smuggled across the EU border is hard to assess, because in most cases the amounts are limited and difficult to detect. Private cars with a regular fuel tank capacity of up to 100 litres are frequently used to import fuel that is then resold with large profit within the EU.

Regarding commercial road freight, Poland has introduced a restriction that allows drivers to enter the EU at its BCPs with a maximum of 600 litres only. However, as this limit does not exist in Lithuania, it would be easy for drivers of commercial vehicles with extended tanks to simply enter the EU through Lithuania instead. The example shows the difficulty to curb the deliberate and systematic illicit import of fuel without international coordination. In mid-March, the Lithuanian authorities discovered one case of this profitable trade in the town of Silutes. A Lithuanian and a Russian citizen used the internal tank of a lorry to repeatedly transfer cheap fuel from the Russian Federation to Lithuania, where it was pumped into separate containers and sold.



Exit of stolen vehicles at the eastern borders

Both reports of international and national bodies show a clear reduction in the numbers of stolen motor vehicles in Europe within the last ten years. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime claims that the rate of stolen land vehicles, including cars, motorcycles, buses, lorries, construction and agricultural vehicles, decreased by 44% between 2003 and 2010. Europol and national figures of Member States confirm this general downward tendency. On a European level, the existing figures indicate to a certain degree a correlation between the gross domestic product of a country and its level of vehicle thefts. However, also in those countries with a high GDP, thefts decreased substantially. Norway in 2012 registered a 75% decrease of stolen vehicles within the last ten years. While Germany counted 63 240 vehicle misappropriations in 2003, the number was reduced to 41 057 in 2011. The regional distribution of the thefts in Germany shows a concentration of vehicle theft towards the country's east, which is in accordance with the main direction of the later movement of the stolen vehicles, which primarily points towards Eastern Europe. Poland and Lithuania play a particular role as transit countries. After crossing the EU external borders there, only a certain part of these vehicles are being sold in Ukraine and Belarus, while Central Asian States show to be key markets for the remaining share.

Frontex Joint Operations at the EU external borders to Eastern Europe in the first quarter 2013 reported 41 stolen vehicle detections, which is on the level of the same period of 2012. Compared to the last quarter of 2012 however, the number was reduced by 50%. As in 2012, the detection rates were highest at the Polish BCPs of Medyka to Ukraine and Terespol to Belarus, where, respectively, 15

Figure 14. The distribution of detections of stolen vehicles on exit among border sections in Q1 2013, compared with Q1 2012 and Q4 2012






Figure 15. Polish BCPs at the border with Ukraine and Belarus registered the highest number of stolen vehicles on exit from the EU in Q1 2013

and 16 stolen cars were stopped from leaving the EU.

With 22% in Q1 2013, vans and transporters had a remarkably high share among the stolen vehicles detected through Joint Operations at the eastern external borders. In Norway, this category occupied the top three places in the list of the most stolen models in 2012. The fact that transporters in many cases possess less sophisticated protective mechanisms partly explains this trend. Another reason is that the market demand in

the destination countries is relatively high for these vehicles. Furthermore, a number of stolen vans were also detected with other stolen goods inside, thereby increasing their criminal value.

Numbers from Frontex Joint Operations suggest that BMW, Mercedes, and Volkswagen were the most detected stolen vehicle brands on exit from the EU. Among all brands, SUVs were particularly popular among car thieves, or they may just be subject to increased scrutiny by border guards.



Analyses of this crime suggest a high degree of specialisation and technical expertise with the criminal groups active in this field. As costly technical devices (such as radio jammers) are used to break electronic locks and disable tracking devices many luxury cars are equipped with, this criminal activity requires substantial financial investments. The different steps from the actual theft to the transport and sale in the destination countries are divided between different groups, and their individual members are rarely informed on the entire process.

Hazardous goods

Many Member State authorities possess Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) at the external EU land borders and container ports (see Fig. 16). They are designed to detect traces of radiation emanating from a vehicle passing through the device. At smaller BCPs, authorities are also using mobile appliances for this purpose. The monitors are built to identify gamma radiation, and sometimes include neutron detectors for the interception of nuclear threats. At European and Asian borders, RPMs were increasingly deployed in the 1990s to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials from the territory of the former Soviet Republics. The USA installed many of these devices particularly at container ports after the September 2001 terrorist attacks to detect the smuggling of Radiological Dispersal Devices, broadly known as 'dirty bombs'.

In most cases, however, alarm procedures are triggered by commercial goods emitting radiation, including fertilisers and building materials such as ceramic, tiles, porcelain, granite and other clay- or rock-based products, which naturally contain radioactive sources. On 18 January 2013, the Lithuanian authorities detected a sudden rise in the number of alerts at the Klaipeda Container Terminal. They were triggered by a larger delivery of porcelain bricks from


China, destined for Belarus, which showed to emit a radiation of around 0.3 microsievert (mSv), thereby exceeding the legal limit of 0.2 mSv. The national authority responsible for radiation safety allowed the three shipments to pass through EU territory after an inspection, as they did not show to pose a threat to public health. In Lithuania alone, 74 cases of increased radiation at the country's borders triggered an alarm in 2012 and represented a good example of inter-agency cooperation.

4.10.2. Western Balkans

Smuggling of drugs

The Western Balkans route, which connects the heroin trade from mainly Afghanistan to Europe, is subject to strong scrutiny of law-enforcement and border-control authorities. The extent of opium cultivation in Afghanistan and treatment statistics in the EU stand in contrast to the seizures conducted in the Western Balkan countries, through which a large share of the heroin trade flows. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that 60 tonnes of heroin are smuggled annually from Afghanistan along the Balkan route, and that at least 10 tonnes of the substance flows through Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, according to the country's seizure statistics, only 10 kg of heroin were seized by the country's law-enforcement authorities in 2012. Although the total seizures in the region by far do not reflect the dimension of this illicit trade, some countries could demonstrate effective disruptions of that business in the first quarter of 2013.

On 24 January 2013, a joint activity of the Serbian police and customs administration led to the seizure of 21 kg of heroin in a spare wheel of the jeep of a Turkish citizen coming from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and passing through the Presevo BCP. The driver used to work and live in Germany. The



© State Border Guard Service of Lithuania

Figure 16. **Radiation Portal Monitor at the Lithuanian border**

illicit substance was detected through a mobile scanner, which showed that the wheel was filled with a large number of small parcels. The shipment had an estimated value of around EUR 500 000.

In the beginning of February, law-enforcement authorities at the border-crossing point of the Bulgarian Svilengrad railway station detected 30 000 bottles of fake perfumes (Boss, Chanel, D&G, Givenchy, and Armani) behind pellets of glass jars in a train. The freight was officially destined for the Netherlands, with the likely purpose to satisfy heightened customer demand ahead of the St. Valentine's Day. The particularity about this case was that 8 kg of heroin were filled into some of the flacons, worth more than EUR 500 000. The final destination for the shipment was a city in Germany.

During the last years, the significance of the Balkan and Black Sea region for the import of cocaine to the EU has been growing steadily. According to a study published by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol*, the cocaine seizures in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey represent only a small proportion of 2% of the total number of seizures in Europe, but their share has tripled since 2001. Based on the result of their risk analysis, Bulgarian customs officers on 7 January 2013 searched a freight container from St. Lucia. Hidden in two jet skis, they found 12 packages containing more than 3 kg of cocaine worth around EUR 1.8 million. The freight was addressed to a resident of Plovdiv.

Balkan nationals have increasingly been seen involved in the cocaine trade beyond the Balkans recently. According to the EMCDDA and Europol, OCGs from the Western Balkans

* *EU Drug Markets Report*, EMCDDA and Europol 2013, <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/drug-markets>



© FYROM Customs Administration



Figure 17. Cannabis from Albania was hidden in mattresses

have achieved a more important position in that criminal activity. On 22 March 2013, for example, Spanish authorities arrested a Bulgarian and a Serbian national, both 30 years old, when entering the Spanish marina of Sotogrande in a private vessel with 590 kg of cocaine onboard.

A 175% increase in marijuana seizures in Albania between 2011 and 2012 both represents a result of intensified law-enforcement activity, but also of expanded marijuana production. In Q1 2013, large amounts of the drug, mostly produced in Albania, were seized on their way to EU countries. On 7 January, the authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stopped and searched a lorry transporting mattresses at the Medzitlija border-crossing point to Greece. The inspection of the trailer led to the detection of 342 kg of marijuana, concealed in the inner part of the mattresses. The substance was bought from Albania and was destined for resale in the Netherlands.

On 3 March 2013, the Hellenic Coast guard detected in the port of Patras 327 packages of cannabis in a cavity under the cargo of a lorry driven by a Slovak citizen. The destination of the lorry was Italy. Also on his way to Italy two weeks later, a Greek national was stopped by border guards before attempting to embark the ferry to Italy in Igoumenitsa



Figure 18. 327 packages of cannabis seized by the Hellenic Coast Guard during a search of a lorry belonging to a Slovak who was trying to depart to Italy

with more than 391 kg of cannabis behind the cargo of his lorry.

Other shipments from the region were detected on a route through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia. On 10 January, Serbian officers found 908 kg of Marijuana in a lorry attempting to leave Serbia to Croatia through the BCP of Batrovci. The drugs were meant to be sold in Switzerland.

Officers deployed through Frontex JO Focal Points Land contributed to the disruption of the cannabis trade by detecting five cases of cannabis smuggling, seizing 38 kg of the substance at the BCP of Roszke between Serbia and Hungary.

Weapons

According to an article published in Sarajevo's daily newspaper Dnevni Avaz in March 2013, a high official from the NATO HQ in Sarajevo warned about 13 000 to 18 000 tonnes of surplus arms and ammunition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are not centrally registered. According to the official, the risk of abuse is high and the country should be considered to be a place from which weapons and explosives are being smuggled. In March 2013, a wire-guided

anti-tank missile of the 'Fagot' model went missing from the Bosnian army barracks 'Kula 2' in Mrkonjićgrad and was not found since then. Moreover, gaps apparently exist in the procedure related to the storage of cleared mines, which is under the responsibility of the Federation's Civil Protection Administration. According to experts, the inventory of stored mines includes data on their numbers, but does not register their weight, which would enable the undetected removal of explosives from the thousands of the still existing devices.

On 9 March 2013, the Hellenic Coast Guard arrested two Bulgarian and one Italian national at the port of Igoumenitsa for attempting to smuggle weapons and drugs to Italy. Four assault rifles, five magazines, five silencers, 46 cartridges and 1.4 kg of cannabis were found in the van belonging to the suspects. According to Greek media sources, in a prior case in January 2013, the Greek authorities detected large amounts of weapons and ammunition loaded on the vessel 'Alexandretta' coming from Turkey. The ship, which was registered as a cement bulk cargo ship, was forced by the police to dock at the port of Volos for further investigations. The destination of the illicit freight could not be established.

4.10.3. Central Mediterranean route

Although the Central Mediterranean route is rather associated with irregular migration, Malta recently registered more attempts to smuggle diesel from North Africa. On 28 March 2013, the Libyan coastguard stopped an Egyptian boat smuggling contraband diesel to Malta. The 13 persons on-board included also one Maltese national. According to documents discovered on-board, the vessel made already three trips to Malta during the same month. According to Maltese media sources, the smuggling of fuel has become a lucrative business since



Figure 19. **Weapons and cannabis seized in Igoumenitsa by Hellenic Coast Guard; two Bulgarians and one Italian citizen were arrested**

the beginning of the Arab Spring. Most of the smuggled fuel is sold in open waters to Maltese fishermen or to criminals, who further transport it to the Maltese coast.

4.10.4. Western Mediterranean and West African routes

Routes from the African continent to Europe, especially to the Iberian Peninsula, were again in Q1 2013 heavily used by criminal organisations for the trafficking of cocaine and marijuana. Seizures affected both regular smuggling attempts by individual travellers boarding ferries and planes to the EU and large-scale and highly organised shipments of mainly cocaine originating from Latin America. Although the overall amounts seized in Spain and Portugal clearly decreased after peaking at 80 tonnes in 2006, falling retail prices in the region on the other hand may point to an increasing availability.

According to the EU Drug Markets Report published by the EMCDDA and Europol in January 2013, the cocaine market has been subject to increased liberalisation, with Colombian groups becoming less important and



* *EU Drug Markets Report*, EMCDDA and Europol 2013, <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/drug-markets>

more fragmented. Bolivia and Peru have increased their role as production countries. West Africa plays an increasing role as a way-point for the supply of drugs from Latin America. Law-enforcement authorities should give particular attention to the growing involvement of Mexican cartels and their role in the supply chain between producer and destination countries*.

On 1 February 2013, a criminal group imported six containers of leather from Columbia through the port of Algeciras to Spain and delivered it to a factory in the city of Elche. Spanish law-enforcement agencies, triggered by a previously detected indicator, searched the cargo during the Operation Pluto, and indeed discovered the largest amount of cocaine since 2001: 3 732 packs of the drug contained each around 1.1 kg, amounting to a total of 4.1 tonnes. The police arrested 16 suspects and as a result of searches conducted at their residences and properties, weapons, computers, and luxury vehicles were seized.

In another operation conducted on 15 March, British, Portuguese, and Spanish authorities raided a ship in the Atlantic Ocean being on the way to Portugal. Involved officers seized the two tons of cocaine located onboard and arrested the crew consisting of four Brazilians and one Korean. The alleged organisers, including the Venezuelan head of the group were arrested in Porto, Portugal, on the next day. Within the reference period, at least four more seizures of between 240 and 670 kg of cocaine smuggled into the EU were conducted by the Spanish police at the ports of Algeciras, Barcelona and Sotogrande. The incidents reported in Q1 2013 indicate at least a temporary accumulation of large scale seizures and at the same time confirm the assumption of a fragmentation of the cocaine trade in terms of nationalities and countries involved.

Spain and Portugal are the most significant entry gates of cannabis resin to Europe. According to the EMCDDA and Europol, Spain accounted for 70% of all seizures in Europe in 2011, but reached its lowest level since 1997. On average, Spain intercepts 2 kg of the substance per seizure, but amounts exceeding a ton are detected on a regular basis, such as on 1 March 2013, when Spanish police seized 2.65 tonnes of hashish arriving in the port of Algeciras. The illicit substance brought into the Iberian Peninsula is produced in Morocco and further transported into France, from where it is sold locally or transported to other EU countries to the east and north. The Netherlands and Belgium are used as distribution and storage centres. Italy plays a minor role as a European entry point for the cannabis resin.

4.10.5. Trafficking in human beings

Q1 2013 shows a number of substantial disruptions of criminal groups involved in trafficking of human beings. Spanish authorities in February 2013 dismantled an organisation that ran six brothels in the region of Andalucía. The perpetrators, who continuously convinced victims from Latin America under false pretence to come to Spain, used a large network of licit companies in order to launder their proceeds of crime. Payment terminals for the brothels' clients were connected to these companies in order to disguise the origin of the profits. 52 suspects were arrested and besides the offense of human trafficking, they were accused of money laundering, bribery, and labour exploitation.

At the same time, the French police has dismantled an organisation trafficking Nigerian women for sexual exploitation. Seven persons, who operated the illicit business across France, have been arrested. The proceeds of the exploitation scheme amounted to around EUR 90 000 per month.

7. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 21 May 2013, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries



Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2013 Q1			per cent of total
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
Member State									
Syria	614	715	2 024	3 923	1 241	1 248	75	0.6	13
Albania	1 554	1 177	1 797	1 254	1 423	1 199	1.9	-16	12
Afghanistan	7 301	2 153	4 529	4 518	1 969	1 082	-50	-45	11
Pakistan	5 874	1 045	1 650	1 491	691	755	-28	9.3	7.8
Not specified	808	321	525	771	496	655	104	32	6.7
Algeria	2 570	1 275	2 000	1 494	710	622	-51	-12	6.4
Kosovo*	119	203	199	272	316	588	190	86	6.1
Somalia	799	1 017	1 673	1 283	1 065	481	-53	-55	5.0
Mali	87	25	110	143	379	354	1 316	-6.6	3.6
Gambia	43	34	49	160	310	279	721	-10	2.9
Others	8 556	5 671	8 539	6 784	5 013	2 454	-57	-51	25
Total All Borders	28 325	13 636	23 095	22 093	13 613	9 717	-29	-29	100
Land Borders									
Albania	1 539	1 176	1 736	1 214	1 334	1 158	-1.5	-13	19
Not specified	737	307	463	554	493	643	109	30	11
Syria	578	676	1 918	3 321	501	591	-13	18	9.8
Kosovo*	119	203	199	272	316	588	190	86	9.8
Algeria	2 164	1 227	1 481	878	495	505	-59	2.0	8.4
Afghanistan	6 711	1 775	3 963	3 584	516	473	-73	-8.3	7.9
Pakistan	5 548	915	1 189	1 006	234	403	-56	72	6.7
Mali	40	21	88	43	83	204	871	146	3.4
Morocco	748	425	570	227	200	150	-65	-25	2.5
Palestine	285	267	363	309	256	121	-55	-53	2.0
Others	5 995	4 211	5 835	3 153	1 186	1 180	-72	-0.5	20
Total Land Border	24 464	11 203	17 805	14 561	5 614	6 016	-46	7.2	100
Sea Borders									
Syria	36	39	106	602	740	657	1 585	-11	18
Afghanistan	590	378	566	934	1 453	609	61	-58	16
Somalia	113	553	1 106	862	959	364	-34	-62	9.8
Pakistan	326	130	461	485	457	352	171	-23	9.5
Gambia	26	21	36	153	304	251	1 095	-17	6.8
Egypt	544	186	533	422	142	226	22	59	6.1
Sri Lanka	12	0	0	0	0	171	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	4.6
Mali	47	4	22	100	296	150	3 650	-49	4.1
Palestine	59	19	13	94	322	119	526	-63	3.2
Algeria	406	48	519	616	215	117	144	-46	3.2
Others	1 702	1 055	1 928	3 264	3 111	685	-35	-78	19
Total Sea Border	3 861	2 433	5 290	7 532	7 999	3 701	52	-54	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011	2012				2013 Q1		per cent of total	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
Border Type									
Land	63	67	106	151	160	117	75	-27	90
Sea	21	36	20	16	43	13	-64	-70	10
Top Ten Nationalities									
Afghanistan	30	50	52	47	41	33	-34	-20	25
Syria	5	1	4	9	28	24	2 300	-14	18
Algeria	6	8	10	15	28	12	50	-57	9.2
Morocco	4	3	10	7	4	8	167	100	6.2
Kosovo*	0	4	6	2	0	7	75	<i>n.a.</i>	5.4
Tunisia	2	1	0	0	10	5	400	-50	3.8
Turkey	1	5	1	23	13	5	0	-62	3.8
Ghana	0	0	1	0	4	5	<i>n.a.</i>	25	3.8
Croatia	4	0	1	8	2	4	<i>n.a.</i>	100	3.1
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	1	4	<i>n.a.</i>	300	3.1
Others	32	31	41	56	72	23	-26	-68	18
Total	84	103	126	167	203	130	26	-36	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2011	2012				2013 Q1			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 114	1 489	1 254	1 019	1 424	1 142	-23	-20	70
Land	159	215	177	272	223	186	-13	-17	11
Sea	93	129	116	117	109	98	-24	-10	6.0
Land Intra EU	94	138	122	96	142	93	-33	-35	5.7
Air	108	81	70	97	110	80	-1.2	-27	4.9
Not specified	46	53	46	111	110	23	-57	-79	1.4
Top Ten Nationalities									
Not specified	88	88	77	146	168	156	77	-7.1	9.6
Italy	134	202	94	98	149	112	-45	-25	6.9
France	64	95	99	70	88	81	-15	-8	5.0
Morocco	91	90	95	91	185	77	-14	-58	4.7
Spain	111	140	144	77	137	70	-50	-49	4.3
Albania	59	73	37	65	68	60	-18	-12	3.7
China	105	88	101	61	66	59	-33	-11	3.6
Serbia	43	40	33	68	44	55	38	25	3.4
Romania	58	136	55	79	94	50	-63	-47	3.1
Pakistan	38	59	82	62	83	48	-19	-42	3.0
Others	823	1 094	968	895	1 036	854	-22	-18	53
Total	1 614	2 105	1 785	1 712	2 118	1 622	-23	-23	100

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2011	2012				2013 Q1			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Place of Detection									
Inland	76 512	72 520	68 906	68 696	68 316	64 071	-12	-6.2	83
Air	8 985	8 693	8 493	9 752	8 472	7 779	-11	-8.2	10
Land	5 214	4 731	4 766	5 632	4 754	4 117	-13	-13	5.3
Sea	1 325	1 040	1 084	1 090	1 371	380	-63	-72	0.5
Land Intra EU	1 639	1 347	1 427	1 393	1 665	377	-72	-77	0.5
Not specified	0	0	3	9	44	237	<i>n.a.</i>	439	0.3
Between BCPs	159	130	212	187	195	166	28	-15	0.2
Top Ten Nationalities									
Morocco	5 575	6 047	5 683	4 724	4 814	4 933	-18	2.5	6.4
Afghanistan	7 750	6 345	6 179	6 252	5 619	4 077	-36	-27	5.3
Not specified	2 308	1 159	1 253	2 653	4 142	3 985	244	-3.8	5.2
Syria	1 192	1 396	2 020	4 004	4 547	3 848	176	-15	5.0
Pakistan	3 587	3 752	5 088	4 989	4 505	3 779	0.7	-16	4.9
Algeria	4 010	4 247	4 077	3 747	3 705	3 445	-19	-7	4.5
Albania	3 085	3 167	3 627	2 856	3 614	3 388	7.0	-6.3	4.4
Russian Federation	2 427	2 363	2 419	3 531	3 173	3 189	35	0.5	4.1
Ukraine	3 737	3 202	3 036	3 655	3 188	2 867	-10	-10	3.7
Tunisia	6 360	4 705	4 442	3 239	2 825	2 818	-40	-0.2	3.7
Others	53 803	52 078	47 067	47 109	44 685	40 798	-22	-8.7	53
Total	93 834	88 461	84 891	86 759	84 817	77 127	-13	-9.1	100



Annex Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2013 Q1			per cent of total
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
Member State									
Ukraine	3 921	3 788	3 994	5 840	4 484	3 745	-1.1	-16	13
Albania	2 941	2 261	3 737	2 837	3 201	2 781	23	-13	10
Russian Federation	2 214	1 945	2 325	2 978	2 864	2 597	34	-9.3	9.3
Serbia	1 639	1 389	1 222	1 487	1 542	1 991	43	29	7.1
Georgia	1 136	568	1 692	3 282	3 304	1 578	178	-52	5.7
Morocco	1 014	1 058	1 081	708	1 087	1 290	22	19	4.6
Croatia	867	1 032	1 048	977	792	1 197	16	51	4.3
Belarus	1 615	1 106	1 116	1 386	1 425	1 105	-0.1	-22	4.0
Brazil	1 071	1 012	859	563	608	734	-27	21	2.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	405	381	388	426	497	647	70	30	2.3
Others	12 188	10 286	10 775	11 509	11 232	10 246	-0.4	-8.8	37
Total All Borders	29 011	24 826	28 237	31 993	31 036	27 911	12	-10	100
Land Borders									
Ukraine	3 608	3 503	3 723	5 500	4 281	3 535	0.9	-17	23
Russian Federation	1 510	1 290	1 620	2 185	2 211	1 953	51	-12	13
Serbia	1 358	1 200	1 034	1 265	1 311	1 769	47	35	11
Albania	1 161	1 192	2 587	1 684	1 915	1 576	32	-18	10
Georgia	1 065	493	1 620	3 214	3 208	1 498	204	-53	9.6
Croatia	815	979	1 002	925	728	1 142	17	57	7.3
Belarus	1 574	1 080	1 086	1 350	1 396	1 080	0	-23	6.9
Morocco	651	666	708	295	747	943	42	26	6.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	343	347	346	385	454	615	77	35	3.9
ŷROM	537	400	506	472	403	441	10	9.4	2.8
Others	1 136	920	1 021	2 024	1 507	1 046	14	-31	6.7
Total Land Border	13 758	12 070	15 253	19 299	18 161	15 598	29	-14	100
Air Borders									
Brazil	1 056	1 003	841	540	596	724	-28	21	6.7
Albania	944	617	638	581	853	724	17	-15	6.7
Not specified	508	435	458	453	612	512	18	-16	4.7
United States	557	461	484	534	487	492	6.7	1.0	4.6
Algeria	504	269	356	299	406	430	60	5.9	4.0
Russian Federation	348	373	389	510	378	401	7.5	6.1	3.7
Nigeria	388	374	435	477	423	340	-9.1	-20	3.1
Turkey	331	355	352	322	393	336	-5.4	-15	3.1
China	256	305	258	345	287	268	-12	-6.6	2.5
Morocco	288	254	259	245	239	248	-2.4	3.8	2.3
Others	7 859	6 777	6 395	6 335	6 660	6 326	-6.7	-5.0	59
Total Air Border	13 039	11 223	10 865	10 641	11 334	10 801	-3.8	-4.7	100
Sea Borders									
Albania	836	452	512	572	433	481	6.4	11	32
Philippines	230	208	371	241	252	251	21	-0.4	17
Russian Federation	356	282	316	283	275	243	-14	-12	16
Morocco	75	138	114	168	101	99	-28	-2.0	6.5
Kiribati	6	36	23	61	36	73	103	103	4.8
Tunisia	39	28	26	39	35	36	29	2.9	2.4
India	44	26	89	51	92	34	31	-63	2.2
Turkey	42	18	30	65	26	29	61	12	1.9
Not specified	29	40	117	43	51	29	-28	-43	1.9
Ghana	9	4	14	11	13	26	550	100	1.7
Others	548	301	507	519	227	211	-30	-7.0	14
Total Sea Border	2 214	1 533	2 119	2 053	1 541	1 512	-1.4	-1.9	100

Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2013 Q1 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Ukraine	3 745	18	19	1 206	7	1 718	95	433	192	21	38	3 747
Albania	2 781	120	72	81	13	498	134	304	1 353	133	109	2 817
Russian Federation	2 597	146	2	1 693	24	297	19	141	134	136	47	2 639
Serbia	1 991	17	17	128	9	305	362	596	466	94	16	2 010
Georgia	1 578	2	3	1 430	1	55	1	4	81	2	2	1 581
Morocco	1 290	579	34	141	22	131	6	42	273	65	11	1 304
Croatia	1 197	269	2	20	1	48	191	195	145	226	101	1 198
Belarus	1 105	3	1	552	0	232	9	202	89	28	8	1 124
Brazil	734	2	6	64	0	236	36	37	89	9	255	734
Bosnia and Herzegovina	647	20	0	62	2	83	114	126	157	67	16	647
Others	10 246	919	519	2 422	277	2 754	243	724	434	218	2 052	10 562
Total	27 911	2 095	675	7 799	356	6 357	1 210	2 804	3 413	999	2 655	28 363

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.



Annex Table 7. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and reasons for refusal

Member State	2011		2012			2013 Q1		per cent of total	Highest share	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago			prev. qtr
Member State									Nationality	
C) No valid visa	7 803	6 033	8 313	11 381	10 202	7 799	29	-24	27	Russian Fed. (22%)
E) No justification	6 888	6 109	5 704	6 728	6 765	6 357	4.1	-6.0	22	Ukraine (27%)
H) Alert issued	3 970	3 354	3 281	5 099	3 961	3 413	1.8	-14	12	Albania (40%)
G) No subsistence	2 965	2 507	3 400	2 651	2 457	2 804	12	14	9.9	Serbia (21%)
Reason not available	3 038	2 540	2 693	3 031	2 863	2 655	4.5	-7.3	9.4	United States (16%)
A) No valid document	1 908	1 863	1 998	2 021	1 961	2 095	12	6.8	7.4	Morocco (28%)
F) Over three-month stay	1 337	1 479	1 142	1 531	1 212	1 210	-18	-0.2	4.3	Serbia (30%)
I) Threat	838	762	816	886	806	999	31	24	3.5	Croatia (23%)
B) False document	752	913	1 004	798	1 049	675	-26	-36	2.4	Unknown (14%)
D) False visa	527	380	374	511	572	356	-6.3	-38	1.3	Syria (8.7%)
Total All Borders	30 026	25 940	28 725	34 637	31 848	28 363	9.3	-11	100	
Land Borders									Nationality	
C) No valid visa	4 760	3 646	5 521	8 389	7 498	5 474	50	-27	35	Russian Fed. (26%)
E) No justification	2 192	2 185	2 259	3 875	3 530	2 810	29	-20	18	Ukraine (58%)
H) Alert issued	2 523	2 167	2 183	3 996	2 912	2 439	13	-16	16	Albania (36%)
G) No subsistence	1 977	1 725	2 484	1 750	1 527	1 938	12	27	12	Serbia (28%)
A) No valid document	749	912	896	906	784	1 043	14	33	6.7	Morocco (54%)
F) Over three-month stay	1 137	1 221	925	1 336	1 036	975	-20	-5.9	6.2	Serbia (35%)
I) Threat	606	475	529	609	460	706	49	53	4.5	Croatia (32%)
Reason not available	0					101	n.a.	n.a.	0.6	Croatia (64%)
B) False document	80	310	464	328	305	100	-68	-67	0.6	Albania (56%)
D) False visa	179	81	110	192	257	81	0	-68	0.5	Syria (27%)
Total Land Border	14 203	12 722	15 371	21 381	18 309	15 667	23	-14	100	
Air Borders									Nationality	
E) No justification	4 475	3 815	3 317	2 590	3 085	3 352	-12	8.7	30	Albania (7.7%)
Reason not available	2 939	2 466	2 568	2 901	2 778	2 461	-0.2	-11	22	United States (17%)
C) No valid visa	2 456	1 991	2 050	2 389	2 221	1 913	-3.9	-14	17	Russian Fed. (9.7%)
G) No subsistence	872	731	822	852	892	807	10	-9.5	7.2	Albania (9.5%)
A) No valid document	673	600	589	629	794	708	18	-11	6.3	Unknown (45%)
H) Alert issued	803	721	644	634	698	638	-12	-8.6	5.7	Albania (37%)
B) False document	642	568	518	441	712	562	-1.1	-21	5.0	Unknown (15%)
I) Threat	220	276	267	259	319	260	-5.8	-18	2.3	Russian Fed. (15%)
D) False visa	331	277	246	295	308	259	-6.5	-16	2.3	Dominican Republic (7.3%)
F) Over three-month stay	194	257	213	191	173	223	-13	29	2.0	Brazil (14%)
Total Air Border	13 605	11 702	11 234	11 181	11 980	11 183	-4.4	-6.7	100	
Sea Borders									Nationality	
C) No valid visa	587	396	742	603	483	412	4.0	-15	27	Philippines (53%)
A) No valid document	486	351	513	486	383	344	-2.0	-10	23	Russian Fed. (41%)
H) Alert issued	644	466	454	469	351	336	-28	-4.3	22	Albania (74%)
E) No justification	221	109	128	263	150	195	79	30	13	Albania (69%)
Reason not available	99	74	125	130	85	93	26	9.4	6.1	India (14%)
G) No subsistence	116	51	94	49	38	59	16	55	3.9	Albania (86%)
I) Threat	12	11	20	18	27	33	200	22	2.2	Albania (85%)
D) False visa	17	22	18	24	7	16	-27	129	1.1	Tunisia (50%)
B) False document	30	35	22	29	32	13	-63	-59	0.9	Unknown (46%)
F) Over three-month stay	6	1	4	4	3	12	1 100	300	0.8	Albania (42%)
Total Sea Border	2 218	1 516	2 120	2 075	1 559	1 513	-0.2	-3.0	100	

Annex Table 8. Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2013 Q1		per cent of total	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	2 555	2 447	3 545	7 505	8 927	8 063	230	-9.7	12
Russian Federation	3 730	2 697	2 911	4 442	6 300	6 927	157	10	9.9
Afghanistan	7 626	6 306	6 736	7 151	7 437	5 594	-11	-25	8.0
Not specified	4 172	3 881	2 999	2 999	4 442	3 474	-10	-22	5.0
Pakistan	3 904	3 126	3 540	3 966	4 785	3 376	8.0	-29	4.8
Somalia	3 714	2 820	3 964	3 570	3 925	2 877	2.0	-27	4.1
Iran	3 276	2 488	2 669	3 271	3 657	2 816	13	-23	4.0
Serbia	5 771	3 352	1 691	4 576	6 321	2 430	-28	-62	3.5
Nigeria	2 838	1 773	1 916	2 008	2 196	2 413	36	9.9	3.5
Eritrea	2 053	2 129	2 288	2 880	2 967	2 266	6.4	-24	3.2
Others	32 235	25 838	27 332	29 946	32 489	29 576	14	-9.0	42
Total	71 874	56 857	59 591	72 314	83 446	69 812	23	-16	100

^a This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 9. **Document fraud**

False documents detected at BCPs reported by border type and top ten nationalities

Border Type	2011	2012				2013 Q1		per cent of total	Highest share	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago prev. qtr			
Air	1 196	1 240	1 207	1 223	1 822	1 163	-6.2	-36	73	Syria (19%)
Land	494	740	1 060	819	654	399	-46	-39	25	Albania (45%)
Sea	145	103	98	134	84	28	-73	-67	1.8	Morocco (50%)
Not specified	0	0	1	0	4	0	n.a.	-100	0	
Top Ten Nationalities Claimed										Nationality Document
Syria	33	31	60	92	412	267	761	-35	17	Germany (23%)
Albania	75	353	909	498	391	213	-40	-46	13	Greece (83%)
Unknown	151	78	58	33	76	102	31	34	6.4	France (12%)
Bangladesh	18	21	50	62	108	73	248	-32	4.6	Italy (59%)
Iran	84	79	68	80	64	69	-13	7.8	4.3	France (20%)
Morocco	211	197	82	56	115	51	-74	-56	3.2	Spain (27%)
Nigeria	63	108	75	58	74	51	-53	-31	3.2	Nigeria (22%)
Turkey	50	53	44	55	96	41	-23	-57	2.6	Turkey (37%)
Serbia	10	29	11	29	16	38	31	138	2.4	Slovenia (16%)
Ukraine	144	151	72	75	55	38	-75	-31	2.4	Poland (37%)
Others	996	983	937	1 138	1 157	647	-34	-44	41	Italy (10%)
Total	1 835	2 083	2 366	2 176	2 564	1 590	-24	-38	100	

Annex Table 10. Document fraud

False documents detected at BCPs reported by type of document and type of fraud

Document Type	2011	2012				2013 Q1			per cent of total	Highest share Nationality Document
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
PASSPORTS	721	705	647	769	1 050	675	-4.3	-36		Sweden (9.0%)
Forged	285	268	288	328	456	297	11	-35	44	Vietnam (6.4%)
Authentic	220	192	151	241	270	225	17	-17	33	Sweden (23%)
Counterfeit	74	98	99	74	179	87	-11	-51	13	Turkey (15%)
No more details	135	133	98	108	75	39	-71	-48	5.8	Germany (15%)
Stolen blank	7	14	11	18	69	24	71	-65	3.6	Denmark (42%)
Pseudo	0	0	0	0	1	3	n.a.	200	0.4	France (33%)
ID CARDS	257	238	247	217	242	137	-42	-43		Italy (21%)
Counterfeit	110	131	112	102	134	75	-43	-44	55	Italy (23%)
Authentic	77	71	47	52	47	27	-62	-43	20	France (19%)
Stolen blank	12	12	18	7	13	19	58	46	14	Germany (68%)
Forged	19	11	44	13	37	14	27	-62	10	Italy (50%)
No more details	39	12	25	42	11	1	-92	-91	0.7	Poland
Pseudo	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	n.a.	0.7	France (19%)
VISA	176	183	170	167	242	194	6.0	-20		Italy (21%)
Counterfeit	112	118	95	83	111	113	-4.2	1.8	58	Germany (26%)
Forged	18	28	22	41	79	51	82	-35	26	Italy (49%)
Authentic	3	8	10	13	13	14	75	7.7	7.2	Italy (64%)
Stolen blank	6	11	16	7	22	13	18	-41	6.7	Spain (46%)
No more details	37	17	27	23	17	3	-82	-82	1.5	Spain (67%)
Pseudo	0	1	0	0	0	0	-100	n.a.		
RESIDENCE PERMITS	384	345	308	330	387	243	-30	-37		Germany (26%)
Stolen blank	71	59	67	56	98	79	34	-19	33	Germany (53%)
Counterfeit	179	172	142	161	159	75	-56	-53	31	Italy (21%)
Authentic	85	71	49	67	66	47	-34	-29	19	Spain (34%)
Forged	24	27	34	25	50	34	26	-32	14	Greece (35%)
No more details	24	16	15	21	14	7	-56	-50	2.9	Germany (57%)
Pseudo	1	0	1	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.		Belgium
STAMPS	225	577	959	630	509	287	-50	-44		Greece (60%)
Counterfeit	160	502	931	583	470	257	-49	-45	90	Greece (67%)
Forged	8	0	27	42	35	29	n.a.	-17	10	Italy (28%)
No more details	57	75	1	5	4	1	-99	-75	0	Denmark
OTHER	72	35	35	63	134	54	54	-60		Italy (57%)
Counterfeit	52	16	17	47	101	27	69	-73	50	Italy (56%)
Authentic	8	9	9	12	23	23	156	0	43	Italy (65%)
Pseudo	0	2	3	0	3	2	0	-33	3.7	Unknown
Forged	5	2	5	3	7	2	0	-71	3.7	Italy (50%)
No more details	6	0	1	1	0	0	n.a.	n.a.		
Stolen blank	1	6	0	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.		
Total	1 835	2 083	2 366	2 176	2 564	1 590	-24	-38		



Annex Table 11A. Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2011	2012				2013 Q1			Highest share Nationality Claimed	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		per cent of total
PASSPORTS	721	705	647	769	1 050	675	-4.3	-36		Syria (22%)
SWE-Authentic	13	6	10	16	44	52	767	18	7.7	Syria (54%)
VNM-Forged	0	0	0	0	0	19	n.a.	n.a.	2.8	Vietnam
FRA-Authentic	26	20	13	27	33	17	-15	-48	2.5	Algeria (18%)
DZA-Forged	21	14	7	12	27	16	14	-41	2.4	Syria (50%)
BGD-Forged	4	6	11	16	34	13	117	-62	1.9	Bangladesh
TUR-Counterfeit	18	7	9	14	56	13	86	-77	1.9	Syria (69%)
SEN-Forged	4	5	4	0	10	13	160	30	1.9	Senegal (62%)
BGD-Authentic	3	3	3	0	2	13	333	550	1.9	Bangladesh
TUR-Forged	14	13	8	8	16	13	0	-19	1.9	Syria (38%)
GBR-Authentic	12	13	9	19	9	13	0	44	1.9	Nigeria (23%)
Others	606	618	573	657	819	493	-20	-40	73	Syria (20%)
ID CARDS	257	238	247	217	242	137	-42	-43		Syria (26%)
ITA-Counterfeit	27	42	46	19	21	17	-60	-19	12	Albania (65%)
TUR-Counterfeit	5	2	2	4	47	15	650	-68	11	Syria (73%)
DEU-Stolen blank	0	0	1	3	2	12	n.a.	500	8.8	Syria (92%)
GRC-Counterfeit	15	9	16	10	2	9	0	350	6.6	Albania (67%)
ITA-Forged	11	3	9	3	15	7	133	-53	5.1	Albania (57%)
BGR-Counterfeit	6	6	7	8	11	7	17	-36	5.1	Syria (29%)
ROU-Counterfeit	19	18	12	13	7	6	-67	-14	4.4	Romania (67%)
FRA-Authentic	9	5	4	10	6	5	0	-17	3.6	Algeria (60%)
BEL-Authentic	6	1	3	7	2	4	300	100	2.9	Congo (Dem. Rep.) (75%)
BEL-Counterfeit	2	6	5	14	4	4	-33	0	2.9	Belgium (25%)
Others	157	146	142	126	125	51	-65	-59	37	Syria (20%)
VISA	176	183	170	167	242	194	6.0	-20		Bangladesh (12%)
DEU-Counterfeit	20	17	14	22	27	29	71	7.4	15	Syria (38%)
ITA-Forged	2	7	10	23	46	25	257	-46	13	Bangladesh (64%)
FRA-Counterfeit	31	40	44	27	24	24	-40	0	12	Iran (33%)
ESP-Counterfeit	9	14	3	9	9	15	7.1	67	7.7	Syria (47%)
FRA-Forged	6	8	5	3	7	13	63	86	6.7	Algeria (31%)
ITA-Authentic	0	5	7	10	10	9	80	-10	4.6	Bangladesh (78%)
BEL-Counterfeit	0	1	0	1	12	7	600	-42	3.6	Morocco (29%)
ESP-Stolen blank	2	0	2	0	10	6	n.a.	-40	3.1	Dominican Republic
ITA-Counterfeit	5	19	9	5	8	5	-74	-38	2.6	Sri Lanka (60%)
AUT-Counterfeit	0	0	3	0	8	5	n.a.	-38	2.6	Nigeria
Others	101	72	73	67	81	56	-22	-31	29	Unknown (11%)

Total: see Table 11B

Annex Table 11B. Document fraud (cont.)

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2011					2012					2013 Q1			Highest share Nationality Claimed
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago prev. qtr		per cent of total					
RESIDENCE PERMITS	384	345	308	330	387	243	-30	-37					Syria (21%)	
DEU-Stolen blank	39	24	18	17	36	42	75	17	17				Syria (33%)	
GRC-Stolen blank	25	21	47	33	58	32	52	-45	13				Syria (66%)	
ITA-Counterfeit	33	47	63	46	29	16	-66	-45	6.6				Morocco (25%)	
ESP-Authentic	39	33	21	20	18	16	-52	-11	6.6				Morocco (25%)	
ITA-Authentic	24	17	4	6	11	12	-29	9.1	4.9				Ghana (17%)	
BEL-Counterfeit	78	21	20	23	25	12	-43	-52	4.9				Tunisia (25%)	
GRC-Forged	0	9	17	14	33	12	33	-64	4.9				Russian Federation (25%)	
FRA-Authentic	9	9	9	20	22	11	22	-50	4.5				Mali (27%)	
DEU-Forged	0	6	4	1	0	9	50	n.a.	3.7				Syria (67%)	
ESP-Counterfeit	20	27	14	9	14	9	-67	-36	3.7				Morocco (22%)	
Others	117	131	91	141	141	72	-45	-49	30				Nigeria (9.7%)	
STAMPS	225	577	959	630	509	287	-50	-44					Albania (60%)	
GRC-Counterfeit	1	254	646	405	352	171	-33	-51	60				Albania (98%)	
POL-Counterfeit	90	78	34	29	27	15	-81	-44	5.2				Ukraine (93%)	
DEU-Counterfeit	2	5	8	10	11	14	180	27	4.9				Syria (50%)	
HUN-Counterfeit	6	9	5	12	5	9	0	80	3.1				Serbia (44%)	
ITA-Forged	0	0	3	7	6	8	n.a.	33	2.8				Ukraine (63%)	
HUN-Forged	0	0	2	9	3	7	n.a.	133	2.4				Bosnia and Herzegovina (43%)	
ITA-Counterfeit	4	9	12	16	5	7	-22	40	2.4				Serbia (29%)	
FRA-Counterfeit	3	20	2	8	13	7	-65	-46	2.4				Congo (Dem. Rep.) (29%)	
ESP-Counterfeit	3	6	5	5	4	3	-50	-25	1.0				fYROM (33%)	
HRV-Counterfeit	0	0	0	3	0	3	n.a.	n.a.	1.0				Serbia	
Others	116	196	242	126	83	43	-78	-48	15				Serbia (21%)	
OTHER	72	35	35	63	134	54	54	-60					Bangladesh (35%)	
ITA-Counterfeit	13	2	7	12	78	15	650	-81	28				Bangladesh (40%)	
ITA-Authentic	2	5	5	7	19	15	200	-21	28				Bangladesh (87%)	
VCT-Authentic	0	0	0	0	0	5	n.a.	n.a.	9.3				Egypt	
BGR-Counterfeit	4	1	0	0	3	4	300	33	7.4				Romania (50%)	
UKR-Counterfeit	0	0	1	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.7				Ukraine	
UNK-Pseudo	0	1	0	0	2	2	100	0	3.7				Ukraine (50%)	
DNK-Authentic	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.9				Unknown	
FRA-Counterfeit	0	2	0	0	2	1	-50	-50	1.9				Albania	
POL-Counterfeit	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.9				Serbia	
GBR-Forged	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.9				Morocco	
Others	53	24	22	44	30	7	-71	-77	1.3				Serbia (29%)	
Total	1 835	2 083	2 366	2 176	2 564	1 590	-24	-38						



Annex Table 12. **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2013 Q1		per cent of total	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
Top Ten Nationalities									
Pakistan	9 073	5 854	5 782	7 097	5 974	4 723	-19	-21	8.5
Albania	2 140	3 568	4 149	3 615	4 024	3 838	7.6	-4.6	6.9
Morocco	3 465	4 214	4 022	3 744	3 456	3 439	-18	-0.5	6.2
India	2 579	3 088	2 467	2 360	2 713	2 901	-6.1	6.9	5.2
Algeria	4 573	3 696	3 955	3 269	2 851	2 480	-33	-13	4.5
Nigeria	1 901	2 455	2 251	2 327	2 312	2 320	-5.5	0.3	4.2
Afghanistan	9 208	6 421	7 198	6 321	3 207	2 253	-65	-30	4.1
Ukraine	2 460	2 163	2 160	2 445	2 487	2 203	1.8	-11	4.0
Russian Federation	1 577	1 812	1 684	2 125	2 029	2 126	17	4.8	3.8
Bangladesh	2 427	3 495	3 382	4 596	2 514	1 776	-49	-29	3.2
Others	27 907	33 138	30 841	33 230	29 458	27 226	-18	-7.6	49
Total	67 310	69 904	67 891	71 129	61 025	55 285	-21	-9.4	100

Annex Table 13. **Effective returns**

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2013 Q1		per cent of total	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
Top Ten Nationalities									
Albania	3 597	3 028	3 071	2 903	4 166	3 476	15	-17	9.1
Pakistan	2 193	2 366	2 490	1 831	3 805	3 123	32	-18	8.2
India	2 271	2 388	2 204	1 973	2 362	2 426	1.6	2.7	6.3
Not specified	203	132	157	170	676	1 914	1 350	183	5.0
Russian Federation	1 555	1 470	1 539	2 078	1 782	1 695	15	-4.9	4.4
Ukraine	1 963	1 473	1 906	2 106	2 145	1 624	10	-24	4.2
Serbia	1 209	1 683	1 881	1 989	1 941	1 544	-8.3	-20	4.0
Morocco	1 837	2 078	2 020	1 888	1 711	1 501	-28	-12	3.9
Bangladesh	951	1 078	1 090	806	1 674	1 285	19	-23	3.4
Nigeria	1 459	1 094	1 259	1 158	1 155	1 278	17	11	3.3
Others	24 347	21 854	22 814	21 356	20 740	18 355	-16	-11	48
Total	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 258	42 157	38 221	-1.1	-9.3	100

Annex Table 14. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

Type of Return	2011	2012				2013 Q1		per cent of total	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
Forced	23 452	19 625	21 273	18 892	22 840	19 536	-0.5	-14	51
Enforced by Member State	20 742	17 077	18 423	14 976	20 305	15 265	-11	-25	40
Not specified	2 266	2 211	2 241	3 471	2 192	3 924	77	79	10
Enforced by Joint Operation	444	337	609	445	343	347	3.0	1.2	0.9
Voluntary	15 658	16 123	16 572	15 755	17 112	16 517	2.4	-3.5	43
Others	8 807	8 586	9 577	8 464	9 767	9 419	9.7	-3.6	25
IOM assisted	3 975	4 254	3 984	3 423	3 761	3 697	-13	-1.7	9.7
Not specified	2 876	3 283	3 011	3 868	3 584	3 401	3.6	-5.1	8.9
Not specified	2 475	2 896	2 586	3 611	2 205	2 168	-25	-1.7	5.7
Total	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 258	42 157	38 221	-1.1	-9.3	100
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES									
Forced									
Albania	3 436	2 871	2 864	2 579	3 649	3 245	13	-11	8.5
Pakistan	1 494	1 574	1 759	997	2 862	2 270	44	-21	5.9
Unknown	54	43	46	34	381	1 270	2 853	233	3.3
Bangladesh	650	669	706	501	1 304	809	21	-38	2.1
Serbia	770	741	785	659	745	764	3.1	2.6	2.0
India	766	843	872	899	807	687	-19	-15	1.8
Afghanistan	1 053	891	950	606	946	684	-23	-28	1.8
Nigeria	874	586	774	707	658	627	7.0	-4.7	1.6
Algeria	609	624	615	580	716	575	-7.9	-20	1.5
Morocco	856	870	847	830	765	559	-36	-27	1.5
Others	12 890	9 913	11 055	10 500	10 007	8 046	-19	-20	21
Total Forced Returns	13 997	10 847	12 051	11 140	11 334	10 000	-7.8	-12	26
Voluntary									
India	1 500	1 536	1 328	1 038	1 547	1 728	13	12	4.5
Russian Federation	1 224	1 132	1 171	1 741	1 471	1 436	27	-2.4	3.8
Ukraine	1 502	1 124	1 483	1 707	1 754	1 330	18	-24	3.5
Pakistan	659	770	708	680	908	833	8.2	-8.3	2.2
China	798	903	759	563	476	826	-8.5	74	2.2
Serbia	437	938	1 093	1 322	1 186	773	-18	-35	2.0
Nigeria	534	429	433	336	441	608	42	38	1.6
Unknown	22	29	36	8	198	562	1 838	184	1.5
Brazil	979	758	989	414	536	520	-31	-3.0	1.4
Bangladesh	301	409	381	271	366	466	14	27	1.2
Others	7 702	8 095	8 191	7 675	8 229	7 435	-8.2	-9.6	19
Total Voluntary Returns	9 738	9 648	10 107	9 718	10 424	9 373	-2.9	-10	25



Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece, these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A. Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs



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