


Eastern Borders

Annual Overview 2012





Eastern Borders

Annual Overview 2012





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Table of contents

Executive summary #5

1. Background and methodology #7

1.1. Data collection and additional information #7

1.2. Quality of available data #8

1.3. Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) #9

2. Overview of irregular migration situation at the common borders #10

3. The context – factors impacting the regional migratory movements #13

4. Risk assessment #18

4.1. Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods #19

4.2. Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries #26

4.3. Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries #30

5. Outlook #34

6. Statistical annex #35



List of abbreviations used

BCP	border-crossing point
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EB	Eastern Borders
EBC	Eastern Borders Conference
EB-RAN	Eastern Border Risk Analysis Network
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EUR	euro
FMS	Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
FP	Focal Point
fyROM	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	gross domestic product
JO	Joint Operation
LBT	local border traffic
LBTA	local border traffic agreement
MS	Member State
OCG	organised crime group
RAU	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
RFI	request for information
SIS	Schengen Information System
THB	trafficking in human beings
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
UK	United Kingdom
USD	United States dollar
VIN	vehicle identification number

Executive summary

The overall situation at the common and regional borders* between the Eastern Border Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) members (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), the Russian Federation** and the neighbouring Member States (Poland, Slovakia, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, Hungary and Estonia) did not change significantly compared to 2010.

Analysis of the available statistical data, additional information provided by the EB-RAN countries and relevant Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations clearly indicate that the main challenges are linked to growing cross-border movements of regular travellers and illicit goods. Increasing passenger traffic is a derivative of several Local Border Traffic Agreements and relatively high demand for EU visas in the EB-RAN countries. The expanding flow of illicit goods, on the other hand, is caused predominately by price differentials between the two sides of the common borders for a wide range of products, in particular excise goods.

Price differentials and economic disparities in the border zones are the main drivers of smuggling activities. These remain the single largest threat to border security at the common borders between EU Member States, the Russian Federation and EB-RAN countries. Cigarettes and fuel continue to be smuggled mostly towards the EU, while smuggling of stolen vehicles, household goods (ranging from groceries to electronics) follows the opposite direction.

Available data indicate that the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine remain markets with significant purchasing power and high demand for second-hand vehicles such

as motorbikes, cars, heavy machines (agricultural and construction machines) and lorries. Due to these market needs the *modi operandi* of smugglers of vehicles are varied and change rapidly.

The threat of irregular migration is considered somewhat smaller in its magnitude when compared to the above mentioned border security threats. Analysis of EU Member States and EB-RAN members' statistical data clearly points to two main migratory systems affecting the common borders. The first one is linked to nationals beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)***, mostly Afghans and Somalis (non-CIS flow) trying to migrate to the EU using the EB-RAN countries as transit points. Detection figures from Ukraine suggest that these migrants usually arrive in Ukraine through legal travel channels (business, student or tourism visa) or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

The second, more traditional, migration system is linking nationals from CIS countries with the Russian Federation as their main destination and to lesser extent also with the EU.

During 2011 the Slovakian-Ukrainian border remained the most affected section of the common borders in terms of irregular migration. Almost 30% of the total detections of illegal border-crossing at the common borders took place there. This border section was followed by a migration route, observed already during 2010, linking Belarus to Lithuania (21% of the total detections of illegal border-crossing at the common borders). The two flows were different in composition, *modi operandi* and the required facilitation services (or lack thereof).

* Common and regional borders are outlined in the map in Figure 2 (page 11).

** The Russian Federation is not part of the EB-RAN information exchange.

*** Commonwealth of Independent States; for the purpose of this document, Georgian nationals are considered as CIS nationals regardless of the fact that Georgia formally ended its membership in CIS on 18 August 2009.



Ukraine remains the main transit country for both CIS and non-CIS irregular migrants aiming to reach the EU through its eastern borders. In addition, Ukraine is also the major route for migrants from the Caucasus region and Central Asian countries travelling towards (or from) the Russian Federation. It remains difficult to ascertain to what extent the two flows are linked.

Importantly, detections for illegal stay on exit from the EU towards the neighbouring EB-RAN countries more than doubled in 2011 (from around 3 300 to around 6 900). The most significant increases were reported by Poland and Hungary and were largely linked to Ukrainian nationals. This trend could be a further indication of worsening job oppor-

tunities within the traditional destination Member States for Ukrainian migrants, i.e. Italy, Germany and Spain.

Finally, Poland and Ukraine hosted the UEFA Football Championship in June and beginning of July 2012. Although the number of border security incidents related to the event was not foreseen to increase, traffic at the common land borders between Poland and its neighbours was expected to grow dramatically during the event. Both Poland and Ukraine planned joint activities to smoothly manage the traffic of supporters through the common borders, including simplification of border checks, which could have been exploited by networks organising irregular migration and engaging in smuggling activities.

1. Background and methodology

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) created the concept of the Eastern Borders Conference (EBC) in August 2008. The EBC was designed as a regular activity/forum where specific challenges related to irregular migration at the eastern borders of the EU could be addressed by representatives of FRAN (Frontex Risk Analysis Network) and the relevant neighbouring third countries.

By 2009 Frontex had signed cooperation arrangements with Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Moldova and Belarus. Subsequently, Frontex proposed to set up a permanent Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN), to be comprised of the competent Border Control Authorities from the mentioned four countries and the Risk Analysis Unit of Frontex.

Additional agreements were later signed allowing for the establishment of regular information exchange and joint analytical activities: with Moldova in March 2009 (Cooperation Plan), with Ukraine in November 2010 (Mechanism on information exchange for risk analysis cooperation) and with Belarus in November 2010 (Memorandum on regular exchange information and joint analytical activities). The Russian Federation opted to stay out of the EB-RAN information exchange.

1.1. Data collection and additional information

The core of the overview are the EB-RAN and monthly statistical data provided by neighbouring FRAN members: Poland, Slovakia, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, Hungary and Estonia (only common borders) covering the year 2011. There are six key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing, (2) detections of facilitators, (3) detections of illegal stay, (4) refusals of entry, (5) asylum applications, and (6) detections of false documents.


In addition, the 2012 Annual Overview introduces the notion of risk as defined by the updated Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM, see below). To reflect this novel approach, all EB-RAN countries were addressed, prior to the expert meeting of 15 March 2012, with a Request for Information (RFI) together with a voting matrix.

Other sources used included, in particular, bi-monthly analytical reports from Member States, FRAN Quarterlylies, several Tailored Risk Analyses produced in 2011 and Frontex reporting from different Joint Operations coordinated by Frontex.

Open sources of information were also effectively exploited. Among others, these sources included reports issued by government agencies, EU institutions and international or non-governmental organisations.



Figure 1. The Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)



1.2. Quality of available data

Consistent with other law-enforcement indicators, variation in administrative data related to border control depends on several factors. In this case, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry are both functions of the amount of effort spent detecting migrants and the flow of irregular migrants. For example, increased detections of illegal border-crossing might be due to an actual increase in the flow of irregular migrants, or they may in fact be an outcome of more resources made available to detect migrants. In exceptional cases, an influx of resources may produce an increase in reported detections while effectively masking the ac-

tual decrease in the flow of migrants, resulting from a strong deterrent effect.

Similar issues should be taken into account regarding the number of detections of cross-border crime at the borders. Higher numbers of detection at a particular border-crossing point might indicate a surge in criminality, but may also be the result of more efficient border controls and/or the presence of specialists whose expertise in a certain area (the identification of stolen vehicles, for instance) may lead to a higher number of detections.

1.3. Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)

A key development in the CIRAM update released in 2011 is the adoption of a management approach to risk analysis that defines risk as a function of threat, vulnerability and impact. Such an approach endeavours to emphasise risk analysis as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources within constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of equipment.

According to the model, a 'threat' is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood; 'vulnerability' is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the threat and 'impact' is determined as the potential consequences of the threat. In this way, the structured and systematic breakdown of risk is presented in the risk assessment and conclusions chapters. It should be noted, however, that the present report meant for public release does not discuss vulnerabilities.



2. Overview of irregular migration situation at the common borders

* For example EUBAM reports, FRAN bi-monthlies, national analytical reports and open sources

In light of the data collected within EB-RAN, as well as during Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations and from other sources*, the largest threats to border security at the common borders include the smuggling of excise goods, stolen vehicles, attempts to evade taxation and trafficking in human beings (THB).

In contrast to other sections of the external borders of the EU, this long border section has no hotspots of irregular migration. In fact, during 2011, less than 1% of all detections of illegal border-crossings in the EU occurred at the external EU borders with the Russian Federation, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

Statistical indication of the migration pressure is best represented through an analysis of several FRAN and EB-RAN indicators

(see Tab. 1). As mentioned earlier, less than 1% of all illegal border-crossings at external EU borders during 2011 were reported from the common borders. On the other hand, the importance of efforts to limit possible abuse of stay is best represented by the fact that more than one quarter (26%) of all refusals of entry in the EU during 2011 were issued by the authorities at the eastern land external borders. Detections of false travel documents amounted to 11% of all detected false documents within EU.

Importantly, detections of illegal stay on exit from the EU towards the neighbouring EB-RAN countries more than doubled in 2011 (from around 3 300 to around 6 900). The most significant increases were reported by Poland and Hungary and were largely linked

Table 1. Summary of FRAN, EB-RAN* and selected Member States^{†**} indicators for 2011

Indicator	EU Totals	EU MS (eastern land borders only)	% of EU total	EB-RAN
Illegal border-crossing between BCPs	140 980	990	1%	4 307
Clandestine entries	282	0	0%	14
Facilitators	6 957	76	1%	72
Illegal stay	350 944	6 883	2%	27 027
Refusals of entry	118 104	30 848	26%	27 282
Applications for asylum	254 054	24 042	9%	68
False travel documents	9 682	1 104	11%	285
Return decisions issued	231 276	36 973	16%	n.a.
Effective returns	148 853	20 461	14%	n.a.

* 2011 data from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

** Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

Source: EB-RAN and FRAN data as of 12 March 2012




Figure 2. General overview map of the EU's eastern border



Figure 3. **Border-crossing point in Korczowa (Poland-Ukraine). It handled more than 2 million travellers in 2010 and 1.1 million during the first six months of 2011**



Source: Polish Border Guard 2012

to Ukrainian nationals. This trend could be a further indication of worsening job opportunities within traditional destination Member States for Ukrainian migrants (Italy, Germany and Spain).

Increasing traffic of regular passengers was largely driven by different Local Border Traffic Agreements (LBTAs) between the EB-RAN countries and the neighbouring Member States. Likewise, the available data point to an increasing number of transported goods and imported cars at the common borders.

Goods flow through the Polish borders

Just one Customs Chamber in Przemyśl (Polish border with Ukraine) registered more than 38 500 used car declarations (33 480 in 2009). Surprisingly, most of the traffic of lorries was reported by Białystok (Polish-Belarusian border) with 432 900 lorries in both directions, while the Polish-Ukrainian border ranked second with 246 500 lorries registered by customs officers at the border-crossing points.

Source: GUS – Polish Central Statistical Office (http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_11951_PLK_HTML.htm)

3. The context – factors impacting the regional migratory movements

The available statistical data clearly point to the existence of two migratory systems, affecting both EB-RAN countries and the neighbouring Member States. The two systems are driven by economic realities, geography and important historical or linguistic ties. Importantly, the first one attracts migrants to the Russian Federation, while the other draws migrants to the EU.

Destination: the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation, after experiencing economic downturn in 2008 and 2009, came out of the crisis with a 4.3% GDP growth rate in 2011. In an attempt to further stimulate economic growth, the Russian Federation plans to modernise and privatise the main branches of its national economy. The growing economy is pulling in labour migrants from the whole CIS area. Moreover, during 2011 the unemployment rate in the Russian Federation fell to 7.8%, while the average salary increased by 3.4%.

Immigration laws in the Russian Federation are changing, which usually means the introduction of more restrictions. Nevertheless, during the first half of 2011, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) reported less than 16 000 expulsions from the total number of 500 000 persons. Namely, the most common procedure used by the FMS is to fine and later release migrants coming from CIS countries.

Further plans to change the Russian Federation's immigration policy are aimed at intro-

ducing entry bans for those who repeatedly violate immigration law, higher penalties for facilitators, biometric registration for all legal labour migrants and the possible introduction of language tests.

Regardless of these new restrictions, the mobility of persons and goods has been further enhanced after the Customs Union of the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Kazakhstan entered into force on 1 July 2011. Belarus and the Russian Federation abolished controls of goods on their common borders in April 2011 and, in July 2011 customs controls were also abolished at the Russian Federation-Kazakhstan border. Furthermore, additional steps have been taken by the Russian Federation to agree with Belarus and Kazakhstan on a common visa policy, most notably with regards to Georgian nationals.

During the first half of 2011 the Russian Federation started bilateral talks with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and offered also Ukraine to participate in the Customs Union. In February 2012 Kyrgyzstan submitted an official request to join in early 2013, while the date has not yet been set for Tajikistan. Three other Central Asian countries, i.e. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, were also invited to join the Customs Union, which the Russian authorities refer to as a future Eurasian Union (by 2015).

Destination: the European Union

This migratory system is driven by economic realities and seasonal demand for labour. The destination countries in the EU can be divided



into those in the immediate proximity (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) and those hosting significant diaspora communities from Ukraine and Moldova (Italy, Spain, the UK, Germany). This distinction is important in terms of intended duration of migration, with those preferring neighbouring Member States clearly engaged in a more circular migratory pattern.

Europe's economic crisis entered its third year in 2012 and a modest recovery is forecast for

2013. The economic slowdown is causing an additional tightening of immigration policies in some EU Member States.

On the contrary, Poland, Germany, Belgium and Austria reported lower unemployment rates in 2011.

Local border traffic agreements (LBTAs)

The local border traffic agreements are signed with an intent to increase mobility of peo-




Figure 4. The economy in the neighbourhood of the Russian Federation – the percentage of the remittances in countries' GDP (background colour, data for 2010), with indication of value of remittances sent by migrants to source countries (in millions of USD, in 2010) and comparison of GDP growth in 2011

ple living in the border areas. The Ukraine-Poland LBTA that entered into force on 1 July 2009 can serve as a good example. Namely, the Ukrainian zone under the LBTA (see Fig. 5) includes a total area of 24 000 square kilometres with over 1.2 million inhabitants. The agreement was intended to allow Ukrainian nationals living in the border areas to cross the border using a simplified procedure. In essence, the LBTA introduced a sort of visa-

free travel with elements of trusted traveller programmes given that LBT permits are issued by the Polish consular authorities for a limited period and after vetting the applicants. LBT permit has a clear geographical limitation allowing travellers from Ukraine to stay in the immediate border areas of Poland (30 kilometres inland).



Figure 5. LBTA between Poland and Ukraine



Specimens of Local Border Traffic Permits – planned Lithuanian and working Polish:



Source: Lithuanian and Polish Ministries of Internal Affairs

Unsurprisingly, the LBTA led to significant increases of the overall passenger flows at the Polish-Ukrainian border, in particular in 2010. While in 2009 roughly 3 million Ukrainian entries were recorded by Poland, the number rose by 40% to more than 4.2 million during 2010 and is expected at around 5 million in 2011 (+27%). Consequently, the share of Ukrainian entries recorded under the LBTA rose from slightly more than 30% during Q1 2010 to exactly 50% in the last quarter of

2010. This quarterly share has since stabilised at the level of around 50%.

Several new local border traffic agreements are expected to enter into force during 2012. Those include Poland-the Russian Federation (Kaliningrad Oblast), Norway-the Russian Federation and LBTA between Latvia and Belarus. The planned LBTA with Belarus are effectively put 'on-hold' after the most recent diplomatic dispute between the EU and Belarus.

Visa liberalisation process

The EU is currently engaged in visa dialogues with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Experience with other LBTAs in the past has shown that important changes in the level of border traffic intensity can be expected, should visa obligation be abolished for the three mentioned countries.

In addition, future improvements of road infrastructure have the capacity to significantly increase the share of travellers beyond the immediate common borders areas. Therefore, the regular passenger flow to the EU has significant potential for growth. In terms of absolute numbers, most of the growth will be limited to the common land borders.

Both Belarus and Ukraine plan to finalise bilateral agreements with Turkey on the introduction of visa-free regime during 2012.

UEFA Football Championship 2012

The tournament was held between 8 June and 1 July 2012, with the opening match in Poland and the final game played in Ukraine. The number of foreign spectators according to the pool of tickets and other factors (including rising prices of hotel and air ticket in Ukraine) was expected to reach between 200 000 and 400 000 spectators.

Only three non-EU countries qualified to the tournament (including hosting Ukraine) and two of them played the first round of the tournament in Poland, i.e. the Russian Federation and Croatia. Therefore, most of the traffic was expected to affect the Polish-Ukrainian land border, air borders in Poland and, to a lesser extent, the Slovenian and Hungarian borders with Croatia.

Both countries cooperated on traffic simplification including one-stop control (so called 'green lanes' or 'euro lanes') with Polish and Ukrainian border and customs services working together at one spot on the Polish side of the border. An agreement on a simplified visa regime for UEFA EURO 2012 supporters and participants was also concluded.

At the end of April 2012 Poland took the decision to temporarily introduce border controls at its borders with Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Germany from 4 June to 1 July 2012.

Frontex prepared a Tailored Risk Analysis of the UEFA Football Championship 2012 and launched Joint Operation EuroCup 2012 aimed at supporting the Polish Border Guard during the event. Although a lot of efforts were made by both Ukraine and Poland to prepare for the event, past experience had shown that the number of irregular migration incidents did not in fact increase during sports events. This was particularly applicable to this event, as the host countries, Poland and Ukraine held the majority of the tickets.



4. Risk assessment



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The following risk assessment is guided by the CIRAM working definition of risk as a function of three main components: threat, vulnerability and impact. A systematic examination of each component allows for classifying risks into categories of significance.

Establishing a general context in which border authorities from EB-RAN countries and the neighbouring Member States operated during 2011 is therefore important for identifying the main border (regional and common) security risks. In addition, the results from the voting matrix exercise were also used to identify the following main three risks (in order of importance):

1. Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods
2. Risk of increased irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries
3. Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries

Each identified risk is described in detail, broken down by its main components. As this report is meant for public release, vulnerabilities are not discussed here. A summary risk table at the beginning is added to offer a quick overview of the issues at stake.

4.1. Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods

Table 2. Summary risk table

Risk name	Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods
Threat	Smuggling of tobacco, oil products and other excise goods to the EU countries and trafficking of stolen vehicles on exit from Europe
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allocation of adequate equipment and personnel at the external eastern borders of the EU • Cooperation between border control authorities and customs services in Members States • Queues and safety measures at different BCPs
Mitigation	Regular cooperation of Member States with EB countries; joint operations of border control authorities, customs services, police and EB countries targeted on dismantling organised crime groups dealing with smuggling of cigarettes and stolen vehicles.

4.1.1. Description of the threat

Data collected within the EB-RAN, as well as information from Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations and various open sources, clearly indicate that cross-border criminality, mainly large- and small-scale smuggling of tobacco products, trafficking in stolen vehicles (cars and heavy machinery on exit from the EU) and, to a lesser extent, smuggling of drugs and petroleum products remain the most significant threat to border security at the common borders.

Smuggling of tobacco

Monitoring of the situation at the land borders during Frontex-coordinated Joint Operation Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011 shows that the common borders are one of the most important entry points for smuggled cigarettes to the EU, followed by the Eastern Balkans (border with Turkey) and the Western Balkans.


Tobacco smuggling continues to be lucrative due to price differences between the EU and third countries. Main destination countries for smuggled cigarettes are western European countries such as the UK, Ireland, France, Belgium, Germany and the Member States located along the eastern borders of the EU.

In the case of Romania and Lithuania, an estimated 60–70% of all smuggled cigarettes are sold there while the rest are smuggled to other European countries. Similar estimates are also valid for Poland.

Western European countries are destination markets for both cigarettes smuggled from third countries to Member States but also those illegally produced on the territory of the EU.

Intelligence collected during investigations by the Polish Border Guard shows that cig-

Figure 6. Detections of smuggled cigarettes among the EU external border sections during JO Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011 (accordingly left and right).



Source: JO Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011



Cigarette smuggling through Lithuania

In September 2011, the Polish Border Guard, while performing routine control of vehicles in border areas, discovered two lorries fully packed of smuggled cigarettes. According to international consignment documents, the two lorries were carrying industrial soot. The third lorry belonging to the same shipment was detected after investigation. In total, 170 000 cartons of cigarettes were detected.

All detained smugglers were Polish citizens. Five persons were accused of taking part in organised crime group (OCG), smuggling cigarettes from the Russian Federation. Lorries were professionally prepared for smuggling as each vehicle weight was according to declared content of the shipment.

Source: Polish Border Guard 2012



Source: Polish Border Guard, Podlaski Regional Unit

arettes for the western European market are also 'produced' by illegal factories on the territory of Poland. Those cigarettes are similar in quality to the genuine brands which are believed to be preferred by western consumers over those produced outside the EU.

As the cases detected by the Polish authorities show, some detections of smuggled cigarettes in 2011 also occurred inland (see box on the right).

During JO Focal Points Land 2011 a great majority of detections of smuggled cigarettes were reported at the land border between (in decreasing order) Ukraine and Poland, Romania and Moldova, Belarus and Poland, the Russian Federation and Lithuania, the Russian Federation and Poland, Ukraine and Hungary, and the Russian Federation and Finland. The highest number of smuggling incidents was reported at the eastern borders of Poland, followed by the eastern borders of Romania.

Although the number of cigarette smuggling cases decreased compared to previous year, the actual number of pieces seized soared by 96.5%. This means that smugglers attempted to traffic larger amount of cigarettes per shipment, which may be indicative of an increasing engagement of organised crime groups in cigarette smuggling.


Modi operandi of cigarette smugglers used at the land border remain quite diverse. Compared to 2010, no major changes were detected, apart from some minor novelties in regard to the use of rail and maritime shipments.

Smuggling ranges from operations carried out by individuals (so called 'ant smugglers') to large scale enterprises involving organised groups that use private cars, buses, lorries and trains. Minivans and lorries with custom-built hidden compartments (i.e. false floors, walls and double-walled fuel tanks) are especially popular.

As during previous years, smugglers were reported using off-road vehicles and tractors at different green borders as well as small boats along the River Nemunas or the River Bug.

According to available information from Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, the number of cigarette smuggling incidents fluctuates widely: in the autumn-winter season smuggling of cigarettes decreases when compared to the spring-summer period. This is mainly due to

Figure 7. Comparison of number of incidents and cigarettes seized during JO Focal Points Land 2011



Source: JO Focal Points 2011

cold and rainy weather and seasonally deteriorating condition of secondary roads along different regional green borders.

Detections of cigarettes smuggled through the Belarusian border hidden in rail freights was also reported in 2011. In particular, incidents during the third quarter included cartons of cigarettes hidden in the cargo of iron ore transported by rail and packed into cardboard boxes wrapped up with black foil.

Price difference

Price differential remains the most important driver for smuggling tobacco and petrol products through the common borders.

Similar to 2010, monitoring of cigarette prices in 2011 shows a significant price difference between Member States and EB-RAN countries (see Fig. 8). The greatest price divergence was observed in Ireland, the UK, Sweden, France, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

A stolen BMW detected at the Lithuanian-Russian border at Medininkai BCP

Thorough control of one car (see the photo) at the Lithuanian-Russian border revealed that the driver was not the owner of the car, the insurance of the car had expired and another international insurance certificate, bearing the VIN of the car, was found in the vehicle. The new insurance had been issued in the name of a third person, neither the owner nor the driver. As the documents and the identification elements on the vehicle were genuine, a query of databases was made about the driver. It was discovered that the driver had exited Lithuania with 8 different vehicles over the past 7 months.



Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012

tion of eastern European nationals working in the Western European countries. They are the main consumers of smuggled cigarettes and sometimes also engage in distribution of tobacco products.

Smuggling of vehicles

The EU borders in the east are increasingly important exit points for stolen vehicles from the EU (Fig. 10). Most stolen vehicles were reported at the Polish land border with Belarus and Ukraine, followed by the Hungarian border with Ukraine.

Vehicles were mainly stolen in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The most commonly used *modus operandi* was the transit of vehicles with falsified documents. This was followed by smuggling of vehicles dismantled into parts (see box overleaf), transportation of vehicles on a platform trailer or train, abuse of lease agreements and, less frequently, also altering vehicle identification numbers (VIN number).

In 2011, stolen heavy vehicles, machines, buses and trailers were increasingly reported at the common borders. The detected vehicles were mostly transported to Belarus and Ukraine. Stolen agricultural machines (tractors) and excavators were also reported.


These and similar types of heavy vehicles/ machinery are very attractive to smugglers,



Source: Polish Border Guard 2012

Figure 9. In August 2011 Polish Border Guards from Dorohusk BCP detained a Polish citizen who attempted to smuggle 1 600 cartons of cigarettes across the River Bug

Figure 10. Detections of stolen vehicles on exit from the EU (by border section) during JO Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011



Source: JO Focal Points Land 2010 and 2011



Case studies of stolen vehicles smuggled in parts during JO Focal Points Land 2011

In January 2011 a lorry loaded with used spare parts was submitted to second line control at Kukuryki BCP (border between Poland and Belarus). The checks revealed that the shipment contained complete parts of 13 luxury cars for which alerts had been issued in the SIS. The overall value of the vehicles was estimated at more than EUR 1 million. Cases of motor vehicle smuggling using a similar *modus operandi* have been detected at the Hungarian border with Ukraine in the area of FP Zahony.



In February 2011 eight motorbikes stolen in Italy (see photo) were found dismantled in a Mercedes Sprinter returning from Italy to Ukraine. The van was carrying parcels which were arranged like a wall in order to conceal the motorbikes. In March eight additional motorbikes stolen in Italy and then dismantled were being transported in a Mercedes Sprinter returning to Ukraine, also covered by parcels.

as they are of high value. The vehicles were predominantly transported from France and Germany via Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary to Ukraine, Belarus and further onwards to the Russian Federation, as well as Kazakhstan.

The detection of drugs and smuggled excise goods also requires a close cooperation between border control authorities and customs services.

4.1.2. Impact

Allocation of adequate equipment and personnel and cooperation between border control authorities and customs services

The flow of excise goods and smuggling of stolen vehicles on exit from the EU requires sufficient allocation of equipment and experienced border control officers to properly address this threat.

In 2011, the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) adopted amendments to the Ukrainian Customs Code. The new regulation was aiming at reducing the number of cases of confiscation of vehicles used for transporting contraband goods. In line with the changes, vehicles should be confiscated for smuggling of drugs, weapons and explosives. New regulation was expected to come into force on 1 January 2012, but has been delayed.

Queues and safety measures at BCPs

Depending on the infrastructure of the border checkpoint, smuggling of excise goods can create queues and affect the safety of the border-crossing point.

Queues created by fuel smugglers do have an impact on the management of the border by increasing waiting times but also present a safety hazard since fuel smugglers' vehicles are often modified and may potentially catch fire or even explode (see box on the right).

Table 3. Price of Euro-Super 95 fuel in 2011 in Member States and neighbouring third countries and respective price differences

Border	Price in EU country in EUR	Price in third country in EUR	Price difference gap in EUR
Finland-Russian Federation	1.56	0.67	0.89
Lithuania-Belarus	1.36	0.74	0.62
Estonia-Russian Federation	1.26	0.66	0.61
Poland-Russian Federation	1.25	0.66	0.59
Slovakia-Ukraine	1.41	0.84	0.57
Poland-Belarus	1.27	0.74	0.53
Hungary-Ukraine	1.33	0.84	0.49
Greece-Albania	1.67	1.23	0.44
Poland-Ukraine	1.33	0.96	0.38
Greece-fYROM	1.56	1.19	0.36
Romania-Ukraine	1.25	0.89	0.36
Romania-Moldova	1.24	0.92	0.33
Hungary-Serbia	1.37	1.31	0.07
Hungary-Croatia	1.37	1.31	0.07
Slovenia-Croatia	1.39	1.38	0.01
Romania-Serbia	1.22	1.28	-0.06
Bulgaria-fYROM	1.18	1.29	-0.11
Bulgaria-Serbia	1.18	1.31	-0.13
Greece-Turkey	1.53	1.68	-0.15
Bulgaria-Turkey	1.16	1.75	-0.60

Source: European Commission Oil Bulletin (average prices for 2011 - No. 1550, 1562, 1574, 1586), open source data for third countries

Car explosion at the Polish border with the Russian Federation (Gołdap-Gusiew checkpoint)

A car with Polish registration plates exploded at the Russian side of the Gołdap-Gusiew border checkpoint located at the border with Poland (April 2011). The explosion started a fire that reduced the car to its metal frame. In addition, the fire spread to the nearby building, which housed a duty-free shop, burning its roof. Illegal adaptation of the car for the purpose of petrol smuggling was indicated as the most probable cause of the accident.





4.2. Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries

Table 4. Summary risk table

Risk name	Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries
Threat	Use of false documents, abuse of visas, asylum policy, illegal border-crossing by migrants; establishing of new OCGs producing false documents, facilitating migration from CIS to EU and EB-RAN countries
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• More second-line checks• Staff redirected to surveillance• Abuse of social benefits system• Internal security
Mitigation	Focus on main identified <i>modi operandi</i> , cooperation with neighbouring countries and with destination countries on ongoing investigations against facilitators/OCGs

4.2.1. Description of the threat

Illegal border-crossings between BCPs

In 2011 the total number of detections of illegal border-crossing by non-CIS migrants increased by 20% compared to 2010. Similar to 2010, the Slovakian-Ukrainian border remained the most affected section of the common borders, accounting for 32% of the total non-CIS detections.

In contrast to 2010, the peak in detections of non-CIS nationals occurred in the fourth quarter of 2011. This could be linked to a very late change of weather given that heavy snowfall and winds only started in the middle of December 2011.

The migration flow of non-CIS nationals reflected in illegal border-crossing mainly consists of two nationalities – Afghans and Somalis (together accounting for almost 60%, or 460 of the total of 813 non-CIS migrants).

Yearly comparison shows that Afghan nationals remained the dominant group of non-CIS migrants with stable overall numbers (259 in 2010 and 267 in 2011), while Somalis increased their relative share (from 127 in 2010 to 193 in 2011).

Most of the Afghan nationals were reported at the Ukrainian borders with Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. In 2011, the number of Afghans reported at the Belarus-Lithuania border doubled. At the same time, Ukraine reported a decrease in detections of Afghan nationals at the border with the Russian Federation.

Afghans and Somalis are detected mostly during late night hours in small groups of two to five.

In Ukraine, the main nexus points of irregular migration are two cities – Uzhgorod and Mukachevo, where migrants are provided with accommodation before attempting the border-crossing. Uzhgorod is the main stop-over for non-CIS nationals travelling by public transport (trains) with the intention to cross into the EU. After reaching Uzhgorod migrants are often taken by private cars closer to the border with Slovakia.

Detection figures from Ukraine suggest three main ways that non-CIS migrants use to reach Ukraine: (a) direct arrival, using legal travel channels (business, student or tourist visa), (b) indirect arrival, transiting through the Russian Federation, and (c) via Ukraine's Black Sea ports.

Facilitation networks in Belarus and Lithuania

The Belarusian State Border Service informed in September 2011 of the investigation conducted at the Belarus-Lithuania border. The uncovered facilitation network was composed of nationals of Lithuania, Belarus and the Russian Federation. The Belarusians were professional drivers and Russian guides were ex-soldiers with specialised skills. The network recruited Afghan nationals already living in the Russian Federation. Migrants were coming to Minsk (Belarus) on regular buses. They were then taken by the Belarusian facilitators to the suburbs of Minsk and transported by car to the Lithuanian border (Grodno and Voronava regions). After the crossing, on the Lithuanian side another group of facilitators took them to Poland in minivans.



Source: Belarusian State Border Service, September 2011

Source of the photos: http://gpk.gov.by/press_center/news/interaction/10041/

The third nationality in 2011, following the same migration routes as Afghans and Somalis, were Vietnamese (42). However, the number of Vietnamese migrants decreased by 38% compared to 2010. Vietnamese migrants were reported at the Ukrainian border with the Russian Federation and Poland and Slovakia. In 2011, Vietnamese also were reported at the Estonian land border with the Russian Federation.

In conclusion, Ukraine (and to a much lesser extent Belarus) is the main transit country for non-CIS irregular migrants aiming to reach the EU through the common borders. However, when compared with other migration routes towards the EU, the flow through Ukraine can be considered modest at best.

The highest number of facilitators in 2011 was reported by Lithuania and Belarus (27), which is almost double the figure reported in 2010 (16). However, the majority of facilitators, according to information provided by



Source: Ukrainian State Border Service

Figure 11. One of the detected groups of Afghans near Novoselica



Example of false Belgian residence permit



Source: Estonian presentation, EB-RAN meeting in Warsaw 21 June 2011

both countries, were mainly detained after criminal investigations. Most of the facilitators were Lithuanians and Russians, but there were also individual cases of Polish, Kyrgyz, Belarusian, Afghan and Turkish nationals.

Use of false travel documents and impostors

A new *modus operandi* was reported in 2011 consisting in the use of false travel documents by nationals from the Central Africa (mainly the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon).

In 2010, the number of detections of false documents used by non-CIS countries nationals totalled 129. This number rose to 360 during 2011, with almost 50% reported by Latvia alone.

The new phenomenon in 2011 was concentrated mainly at the borders with the Russian Federation, although a small percentage of all detected African nationals were reported

at the Slovakian-Ukrainian and Hungarian-Ukrainian borders (16 persons).

The abuse was largely linked to Belgian documents (122), followed distantly by Italian (24), French (19) and Greek documents (16). As reported by Latvia, Estonia and Poland, migrants presented original passports with forged Belgian aliens' registration certificates or residence permits (see photo in box). Poland also reported the use of stolen blank documents.

The main route of entry for migrants originating from the Russian Federation is through land borders, using international train and bus connections. As observed by Latvia, most of the cases were detected on the international trains going through just one train BCP. After detection, migrants always claimed asylum in order to avoid readmission back to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, migrants from African countries were also reported at several air borders *en route* from the Russian Federation.

Migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville) and Cameroon were staying legally in the Russian Federation (short-term Russian visas), where they subsequently obtained false residence permits or other documents.

4.2.2. Impact

Geographical proximity to the Schengen area seems to be the main driver for non-CIS migrants towards the EU. Visa policy in EB-RAN countries could also be pointed out here, allowing specific groups of migrants easy access to the external land borders of the EU.

Most non-CIS migrants are undocumented, which complicates possible returns to their countries of origin.

Given the relatively low numbers, the impact of non-CIS migration remains fairly limited and is mainly linked to the allocation of resources and equipment.

Moldova case – clandestine entry

Moldova reported nine Turkish nationals trying to enter Romania hidden in a camper-van in mid-January 2011. The camper was driven by a German national, accompanied by Moldovan passengers. The clandestine Turkish nationals, discovered hiding in the van, had original travel documents with valid Moldovan visas.



Passports of irregular migrants from Turkey and the camper with German number plates

Source: Serviciul Grănicerii al Republicii Moldova



4.3. Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries

Table 5. Summary risk table

Risk name	Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries
Threat	Abuse of documents, illegal border-crossing
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Second-line checks• Staff redirected to surveillance• Internal security by extensive efforts to combat transborder or local OCGs
Mitigation	Cooperation with neighbouring countries and with destination countries, return

4.3.1. Description of the threat

CIS nationals attempting to illegally enter the Schengen area tend to use different *modi operandi* depending on the nationality. For example, Russians apply for asylum. Georgians frequently try to cross the border legally first and only claim asylum or try to illegally cross the green border to the EU when refused. Others, like Armenians, often use legal travel channels to enter the EU and subsequently claim asylum. Moldovans mainly attempt to illegally cross through different green borders, while Ukrainians often try to obtain genuine visas under false pretences.

Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

In 2011 the total number of detections of illegal border-crossing of CIS migrants reported at the common borders decreased by 13% compared to 2010. This trend was driven by developments at the Slovakian-Ukrainian border, where detections of illegal border-crossing dropped by an impressive 43%. At the same time, the Lithuanian-Belarusian border recorded a more than 100% increase (albeit from a low base).

With 415 CIS migrants, the Belarus-Lithuania border ranked first, followed by the Ukraine-Slovakia (326) and Ukraine-Poland borders (275). The shift from Ukraine to Belarus was mainly caused by Georgians using a direct flight connection from Tbilisi to Minsk, from

where they further travelled by train to the main rail BCPs on the Belarusian border with Lithuania.

The most affected regional borders were those between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (1 101), and between Ukraine and Moldova (1 019). However, at these border sectors and also at the Ukrainian-Belarusian border most cases of illegal border-crossing can be attributed to local inhabitants. According to information provided by Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, these cases are largely connected to smuggling activities, illegal logging and illegal fishing or hunting.

Ukrainian and Moldovan nationals remained the top two nationalities with the joint share of more than 65% of all illegal border-crossings made by CIS nationals (down from 3 648 in 2010 to almost 3 000 in 2011). However, as mentioned above, a large majority of illegal border-crossings at the regional borders are not linked to irregular migration.

Russian nationals are the third top nationality (13%; decreasing trend), followed by Georgians (12%; increasing trend). Amongst other CIS nationalities, Armenians ranked sixth with 55 migrants detected crossing the border illegally.

The characteristics of CIS migrants are very different from non-CIS nationals. They mainly cross the border in very small groups (of

2–3 persons), often individually. CIS migrants rarely use facilitation; they are prepared and equipped with maps, compasses, clothes to change and they are able to communicate in Russian, which is the main reason why they do not use facilitators' network.

Obtaining visas under false pretences

Obtaining visas under false pretences is one of the most often used *modi operandi* associated with CIS migrants. This method is also used by Ukrainians travelling with tourist or business visas.

According to available information, the Local Schengen Cooperation Meetings in Kiev have repeatedly addressed the issue of visa shopping. The so-called 'visa traders' engage with their clients on the Internet, via email or through leaflet offers to arrange Schengen visas.

There are also companies and individuals in EU Member States who, in exchange for money, provide Ukrainian visa applicants with the necessary documents or even fictitious invitation letters.

It is assessed that the majority of Member States are faced with such practices, which are fuelled by the differences in respective rejection rates and many obstacles to the prosecution of 'visa traders'. Member States' consular authorities in Ukraine seek to counter visa shopping with strengthening the capacity of their staff at consular sections and improving the technical equipment needed to detect false documents.

Transit abuse

Furthermore, statements received during second-line interviews of Ukrainians who were refused entry to Poland because they could not properly justify the purpose of their stay, corroborate the extent of the unlawful

transit issue problem. The interviewed migrants admitted that their real destinations – mainly Germany, Italy or Austria – were almost always different to the one claimed in their visa application.

Refusals of entry at the external border of the EU are therefore a very good indication of the extent of this type of abuse. Ukrainians are traditionally the most refused nationality at the external land borders of the EU.


Inland controls

Regional units of the Polish Border Guard, which performs checks on the main international road and railway routes leading from Germany, France, Italy and Austria, published on their websites summary results of their controls undertaken as compensatory measures. According to this information, all units 'bordering' with other Member States in the west and south of Poland detect a consistently high number of CIS countries' nationals travelling from EU countries. In most cases, they are transiting Ukrainians or Moldovans coming back from western EU countries where they work, yet they only hold visas allowing them to work or conduct business activities in Poland. According to information collected during interviews, they had originally applied for Polish visas with the intention to work in other EU countries.



Source: Polish Border Guard 2012

Source: Polish Border Guard, Silesian Regional Division
www.slaski.strazgraniczna.pl



Source: The European Commission, February 2012

Figure 12: **By and large, nationals of the Russian Federation were the largest group of visa receivers**

False documents

According to FRAN data, between 2010 and 2011 there was just a 1.4% increase in the number of individuals detected using false (forged or counterfeit) documents to enter the EU; this is a steady trend despite reports of a widespread shift away from false-document towards genuine-document abuse, which includes impersonation, fraudulently obtained documents and abuse of legal channels.

Nearly half of all detections of false-document users were of nationals from just five countries – Ukraine, Albania, Morocco, Iran and Nigeria; of the remaining nationalities, around 150 were detected at very low frequencies. Ukrainian nationals were mostly detected in Poland with Polish documents.

At the common borders almost 90% of all false documents were used by nationals from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

Multipersons*

Although this *modus operandi* is not commonly used, it mainly concerns nationals of CIS countries, who have the possibility to officially change names or surnames. In 2011 Poland regularly detected CIS migrants trying to enter presenting new passports issued with changed personal data. Biometric check often reveals that the new passport holder has an active entry ban to Poland.

False entry/exit stamps

False stamps confirming the fulfilment of the conditions of stay are mainly detected at the Polish, Hungarian and, to a lesser extent, also Slovakian border with Ukraine. The main reason for falsifying these stamps is to fabricate evidence that the migrant had not overstayed on his/her last visit when applying for a new visa.

However, many stamps were forged so as to appear that the migrants had left the EU (while in fact they had been overstaying), in an attempt to legalise their status by obtaining a visa for a fictitious 're-entry'.

Given the visa-free regime in the vast CIS area, migrants can have easy access to the external borders of the EU. Factors such as the geographical proximity, good public transport and the widespread use of the Russian language in the CIS area often result in only limited need for facilitation services, since migrants are normally able to travel without any assistance.

When it comes to fraudulently obtained visas, EU consular authorities report that it is relatively easy for migrants to get hold of fraudulent supporting documents.

4.3.2. Impact

The impact of CIS migration to the EU could be assessed based on the number of refusals issued to CIS nationals.

* *Modus operandi* involving 'change of identity' by using a new legally issued passport with altered personal data, such as changed names or alternative transliteration of names from the Cyrillic into Latin alphabet. By pretending to be a different person, migrants try to avoid an existing entry ban.



5. Outlook

Cross-border crime

Cross-border crime will remain the main challenge for the common borders. Available data from EB-RAN participants suggest that the same issue is also a primary concern in the case of regional borders.

Cross-border crime will continue to be driven mainly by small-scale smugglers of cigarettes, petrol and stolen vehicles. Local demand-supply circumstances such as price differential, changes in the legal framework and the amount of effort that can be put into detecting smuggling will continue to govern the extent of the phenomenon.

As the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus will remain important markets for stolen vehicles (ranging from spare parts, motorbikes, luxury cars, lorries to specialised vehicles), new methods of smuggling will certainly be developed.

Irregular migration

The common borders will likely remain impacted by mainly two routes: (1) traditional route from Ukraine to Slovakia, which is mainly used by migrants from Afghanistan, Somalia and, in smaller numbers, by Moldovans; and (2) new routes that emerged during 2010-2011 in Baltic countries. One example is the route from the Russian Federation through Latvia, where the *modus operandi* to enter the EU includes both abuse of documents (DR Congo and Cameroon) and illegal crossing through the green border after refusal of entry is issued (Georgian, Russian, and Armenian migrants).

Belarusian plans to introduce visa obligation for Georgian nationals have not yet been implemented; however, Belarus announced its intention to introduce visa-free travel for Turkish nationals. Ukraine has already signed such an agreement with Ankara, expected to enter into force before the June-July 2012 UEFA Football Championship.

The new wave of return migration, mostly involving Ukrainian nationals, is likely to continue, though at a more moderate pace. As reported mainly by Hungary and Poland, the number of overstayers detected on exit from the EU doubled in 2011 compared to a year before. This especially concerned those who had entered the EU between 2003 and 2007 using false entry/exit stamps.

The ongoing diplomatic dispute between the EU and Belarus could cause some unintended consequences. The transiting routes could shift, with non-CIS migrants increasingly entering Belarus before illegally crossing into the EU.

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported by top five border sections and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	% change on prev. year	per cent of total
Top Five Border Sections				
Ukraine-Russia	1 398	1 129	-19	20
Ukraine-Moldova	1 442	1 056	-27	18
Slovakia – Ukraine	877	669	-24	12
Lithuania – Belarus	272	494	82	8,6
Ukraine-Belarus	307	389	27	6,8
Others	1 904	1 976	3,8	35
Top Ten Nationalities				
Ukraine	2 068	1 980	-4,3	35
Moldova	1 933	1 368	-29	24
Russia	677	590	-13	10
Georgia	431	544	26	9,5
Afghanistan	259	268	3,5	4,7
Belarus	237	266	12	4,7
Somalia	127	201	58	3,5
Armenia	77	56	-27	1
Vietnam	58	42	-28	0,7
Lithuania	33	35	6,1	0,6
Others	300	363	21	6,4
Total	6 200	5 713	-7,9	

Annex Table 2. **Illegal border-crossing at BCPs**

Detections reported by top five border sections and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	% change on prev. year	per cent of total
Top Five Border Sections				
Ukraine-Belarus	680	919	35	30
Ukraine-Russia	757	713	-5.8	23
Romania – Moldova	195	346	77	11
Poland – Ukraine	202	288	43	9.4
Ukraine-Moldova	325	268	-18	8.7
Others	331	530	60	17
Top Ten Nationalities				
Ukraine	1 175	1 715	46	56
Moldova	580	649	12	21
Russia	187	149	-20	4.9
Tajikistan	118	99	-16	3.2
Kyrgyzstan	99	90	-9.1	2.9
Romania	42	77	83	2.5
Belarus	62	45	-27	1.5
Not Specified	48	32	-33	1.0
Turkey	12	29	142	0.9
Germany	9	17	89	0.6
Others	158	162	2.5	5.3
Total	2 490	3 064	23	

Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring Member States, place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	% change on prev. year	per cent of total
Place of Detection				
Land	248	160	-35	96
Air	13	6	-54	3.6
Sea	3	0	<i>n.a.</i>	
Top Ten Nationalities				
Ukraine	92	53	-42	32
Lithuania	10	20	100	12
Russia	24	17	-29	10
Romania	54	14	-74	8.4
Moldova	29	13	-55	7.8
Poland	16	10	-38	6.0
Turkey	1	6	500	3.6
Vietnam	1	5	400	3.0
Belarus	4	3	-25	1.8
Malaysia	0	2	<i>n.a.</i>	1.2
Others	33	23	-30	14
Total	264	166	-37	

Annex Table 4. Applications for asylum

Detections reported top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	% change on prev. year	per cent of total
Top Ten Nationalities				
Russia	6 019	5 076	-16	21
Somalia	2 127	2 776	31	11
Afghanistan	2 478	2 421	-2.3	10
Georgia	1 622	2 363	46	9.8
Eritrea	1 728	1 266	-27	5.2
Iraq	1 216	1 116	-8.2	4.6
Algeria	248	719	190	3
Serbia	1 309	709	-46	2.9
Iran	710	578	-19	2.4
Syria	229	523	128	2.2
Others	7 192	6 642	-7.6	27
Total	24 878	24 189	-2.8	

Note:

Applications for asylum from EU Member States include all applications received in the territory of the countries, not limited to those made at the eastern borders.

Annex Table 5. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	% change on prev. year	per cent of total
Place of Detection				
Land	18 238	20 448	12	60
Air	12 387	11 810	-4.7	34
Between BCP	1 055	878	-17	2.6
Inland	102	613	501	1.8
Sea	477	565	18	1.6
Top Ten Nationalities				
Ukraine	4 230	6 114	45	18
Russia	5 318	5 842	9.9	17
Georgia	6 110	4 977	-19	15
Moldova	3 556	2 539	-29	7.4
Uzbekistan	1 279	1 587	24	4.6
Armenia	1 312	1 480	13	4.3
Azerbaijan	1 371	1 388	1.2	4.0
Belarus	948	1 232	30	3.6
Lithuania	814	894	9.8	2.6
Turkey	711	777	9.3	2.3
Others	6 610	7 484	13	22
Total	32 259	34 314	6.4	

Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	% change on prev. year	per cent of total
Border Type				
Land	65 417	52 813	-19	90
Sea	3 297	3 140	-4.8	5.4
Air	2 840	2 657	-6.4	4.5
Not specified	9	0	n.a.	8,6
Top Ten Nationalities				
Ukraine	18 823	16 303	-13	28
Russia	7 652	7 506	-1.9	13
Belarus	5 736	5 947	3.7	10
Moldova	9 202	5 387	-41	9.2
Georgia	4 668	4 178	-10	7.1
Lithuania	2 472	3 942	59	6.7
Uzbekistan	6 272	1 903	-69	3.3
Poland	810	1 050	30	1.8
Armenia	1 667	1 014	-39	1.7
Kyrgyzstan	1 542	921	-40	1.6
Others	12 719	10 432	-18	18
Total	71 563	58 610	-18	

Annex Table 7. **Persons using false documents**

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring Member States, border type and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	% change on prev. year	per cent of total
Border Type				
Land	1 351	1 314	-2.7	90
Air	167	140	16	9.6
Sea	20	8	-60	0.5
Top Ten Nationalities				
Ukraine	1 092	757	-31	52
Congo (Democratic Republic)	2	159	7 850	11
Belarus	47	124	164	8.5
Moldova	130	71	-45	4.9
Cameroon	5	43	760	2.9
Georgia	30	43	43	2.9
Russia	77	41	-4.7	2.8
Turkey	21	24	14	1.6
Congo	4	19	375	1.3
Armenia	11	17	55	1.2
Others	119	164	38	11
Total	1 538	1 462	-4.9	



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