



Council of the
European Union

Brussels, 28 July 2017
(OR. en)

11562/17

LIMITE

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COVER NOTE

From: European External Action Service (EEAS)
date of receipt: 27 July 2017
To: Political and Security Committee (PSC)
Subject: Options paper for CSDP support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force

Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2017) 933.

Encl.: EEAS(2017) 933

EEAS(2017)933
Limited

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



CMPD

Working document of the European External Action Service

of 27/07/2017

EEAS Reference	EEAS(2017) 933
Distribution marking	<i>Limited</i>
To [and/or GSC distribution acronyms]	CFSP/PESC CSDP/PSDC COPS
Title / Subject	Options paper for CSDP support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force
[Ref. prev. doc.]	

**OPTIONS PAPER FOR CSDP SUPPORT TO
THE G5 SAHEL JOINT FORCE****I. CONTEXT**

1. A stable Sahel region is a key priority for Europe. Within the framework of the EU Strategy for Sahel and its Regional Action Plan, substantial support is provided to the Sahel through traditional EDF-funding, IcSP, and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, Humanitarian Aid, and CSDP missions. In December 2014 five countries in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) decided to create the G5 Sahel, to strengthen cooperation on development and security in the Sahel region. Since then, the EU has mobilised a wide range of instruments to provide direct support to the G5 Sahel, including CSDP Missions, the Regionalisation concept as well as the EU Trust Fund project “Supporting G5 for security in the Sahel (*Appui au G5 pour la Sécurité au Sahel*)”.
2. In January 2017, three of the G5 Sahel countries (Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) decided to create a force to secure the “Three borders” areas called Liptako Gourma. It was later confirmed by the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel countries who decided to create a full G5 Joint Force operating on three sectors in Sahel (West, Centre, and East). The aim of this G5 Joint Force is to tackle the common security challenges such as expansion of terrorist threat and activities of jihadist armed groups, organised crime, and traffic of arms, drugs and human beings and develop a regional response to these different threats.
3. The G5 Sahel Joint Force is a follow up to the cross-border operations already carried out by the G5 countries with the support of Operation BARKHANE since summer 2014 in the framework of the PMCT (*Partenariat Militaire de Coopération Transfrontalières*). The Joint Force is supposed to incorporate the G5 countries' battalions already mobilised in these borders areas and allow for permanent operations.
4. The process of creation of this Joint Force has so far been very swift: on 8 March, the Concept of Operations of the Joint Force was approved by the G5 Defence and Security Committee (DSC) and then endorsed by the AU on 11 April 2017. During a subsequent meeting of the DSC in mid-May 2017, the annexes of the CONOPS were finalized. On 21 June, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2359 welcoming the deployment of the G5 Sahel Force, brought political support to the Group of Five (G5) Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, and encouraged bilateral and multilateral partners to support the Joint Force and to expeditiously convene a planning conference to ensure coordination of donor assistance.
5. As G5 Sahel defence and security cooperation is moving quickly ahead, the EU is ready to provide support through an integrated approach in which the support from the CSDP missions,

via training and advisory activities, goes hand in hand support provided under other existing EU financial instruments (EDF, EUTF for Africa, IcSP, African Peace Facility, etc.). The support to setting up of this Force should take place in full coordination with the G5 countries themselves, but also our partners in-place, bilateral and international efforts such as the French Operation BARKHANE and MINUSMA.

6. On 1st and 13th June, the Member States were briefed in PSC on the evolution of the setting up of this Joint Force, on the range of support that EU could provide to the G5 and they invited the EEAS to provide a paper with options to enhance support to the G5 by CSDP missions.
7. The aim of this paper is to present the concept of G5 Sahel Force Joint Force, its potential role in the regional security framework as well as to propose options for enhanced support through the CSDP missions in the region (EUTM Mali, EUCAP SAHEL Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger) and provide recommendations on the possible way forward.

II. G5 JOINT FORCE SITUATION/ STATE OF PLAY (cf ANNEX C, D, E, F)

8. **The mandate** given to the G5 Sahel Joint Force by the AU Peace and Security Council is to:
 - Fight against terrorism, drug and human trafficking;
 - Contribute to the re-establishment of state authority and to the return of displaced persons and refugees;
 - Facilitate humanitarian operations;
 - Contribute to the implementation of development actions.
9. **The area of operations** of the Joint Force will cover three zones of the G5 Sahel, three borders sectors (also called “fuseau”):
 - Sector West, which will cover the border between Mauritania and Mali,
 - Sector Centre, in the “Three borders area”, in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso,
 - Sector East, covering the border between Niger and Chad.
10. In each sector, the area of operation will cover an area of 50 kilometres on each side of the border. Each contingent of the Force intervenes on its own territory, in Joint Operations and, in coordination with the other contingent, can cross the border when necessary.
11. Sector Centre is currently attracting much attention, due to the increasingly deteriorating situation in central Mali and in the northern areas of Burkina-Faso. But it has to be underlined that this Joint Force remains the G5 Force and not a G3 Force.
12. At this stage of planning, **the Sahel Joint Force** will be composed of 5000 servicemen, including 91 gendarmes and police officers (the figure of 10.000 has been considered, without confirmation so far).

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13. The force will be divided into 7 battalions of 650 servicemen each:

- Two battalions, one Malian, one Mauritanian, will be deployed in the sector West;
- Three, one Malian, one Burkinabe, one Nigerien, will be deployed in the sector Centre,
- Two, one Nigerien, one Chadian, in the sector East.

14. **Command structure**, it has been decided that it will be composed of:

- A General Headquarters to be located in Mali, firstly deployed in Bamako and, as soon as possible, in Mopti-Sévaré; and
- Three Operative Headquarters (also called Sector HQ), one for each sector. Only the Operative Headquarters for the Sector Centre has been identified. It will be located in Niamey. The other two Operative HQs (for sector West and East) have not yet been identified.

15. **A Police component** is foreseen in the Joint Force CONOPS. To date, there is still a lack of clarity on the scope and mandate of this Police component. For the time being, only the establishment of small units of 15 police personnel in each battalion is foreseen.

16. Even if not clearly indicated in the CONOPS at this stage, the G5 chiefs of staff want these units to be composed of 2-3 military police (Prévôté) and 12-13 criminal investigators in order to accompany military units and take the lead as first responders for investigation and/or crime scene management (i.e. information collection and management, criminal investigation in the field of anti-terrorism and organised crime). The full prosecution process shall be carried out by specialised units at national level. This police component should contribute to ensuring civilian control over the penal chain.

III. ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN SUPPORT OF THE G5 FORCE

17. Since the announcement to create the Force, most of the international actors engaged in the region have acknowledged the necessity to support the initiative.

18. On June 21st, the UN Security Council welcomed the deployment of the Joint Force by the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2359. This is a very important step towards stabilisation of the Sahel and for the common work to strengthen security and to fight terrorism and transnational organised crime – including smuggling and trafficking of human beings, drugs and firearms – while ensuring respect for human rights.

a) Financial support by African Peace Facility (APF)

19. During the G5/EU Ministerial meeting of 5 June 2017 in Bamako, the HRVP announced €50M support to the Joint Force which will be delivered through the African Peace Facility (APF) until end of December 2018.
20. The G5 Sahel request was endorsed by the African Union on 15 June 2017 and received by the EU the same day. The request includes support for the rehabilitation and the functioning of the Force's headquarters and its three command posts, the setting up of a communication network linking the units deployed with their respective command post and the Force headquarters, support to the stationing and protection of battalions deployed in the area of operation, emergency medical evacuation and support to ground mobility in the area of operation and the counter-IED equipment.
21. Moreover, the African Union Commission requested the EU to manage the support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, in view of the urgency required to address the rapid deterioration of the security situation in the targeted area. The EU in turn will call upon the services of an entity specialised in the management of security related projects including procurement of military equipment, which will require an amendment of the APF 2017-2018 Action Programme at COREPER's level.
22. The formal consultation process with Member States for the mobilisation of this APF support was launched early July with a first joint COAFR/ACP WG meeting.

b) EU Trust Fund (EUTF)

23. In the framework of the EU Trust Fund Sahel and Lake Chad window, and coupling on-going efforts under other financial instruments, the EUTF for Africa is putting in place a comprehensive and integrated approach, either at national or sub-regional level, which builds on three main pillars: i) supporting internal security forces of partner countries so as they help ensure better State presence and control of their territories and accompany the return to the rule of law; ii) increasing the resilience of local population and contributing to their social and economic stability by better addressing their needs in terms for instance of provision and access to basic health and social services, and increase of alternative economic and employment opportunities; and iii) encouraging dialogue and reconciliation activities both within and between local communities as well as between the latter and local internal security forces as a first step to help build confidence and address the distance and sense of injustice often felt by local populations towards the security apparatus.
24. Programmes in the security-border management domains complement the establishment of the Joint Force, deployed in similar areas, but with different objectives. Close cooperation with operators in charge of the implementation of these EU TF projects will be therefore crucial.

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1) *National programmes:*

25. **PARSEC**, in Mali (Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et de Gao), supports the Malian government in re-establishing adequate security conditions in the centre and along the borders with Niger and Burkina Faso, including via strengthening the capacities of its internal security forces and providing them with (non-lethal) equipment.
- **ProGEF**, in Burkina Faso (Programme Gestion Intégrée des Espaces Frontaliers au Burkina Faso) supports the national Border Management Strategy as well its operational implementation by enhancing national legal frameworks for a more effective border management; strengthening the capacities of relevant actors (internal security forces, etc.); increasing State presence and encouraging the socio-economic development of the communities living in border areas.
 - **AJUSEN**, in Niger (Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger) supports Niger in developing and implementing robust policies in the field of security, justice, migration and border management, with special attention to sound financial management and to the strengthening of the capacities of relevant actors along the whole penal chain (law enforcement actors, including those dealing with border management, the judiciary, etc.).
 - **ECI**, in Niger (Equipes Conjointes d'Investigation). This project supports the establishment of a joint investigation team composed of French, Spanish and Nigerien officials in Niger, through constant peer-to-peer dialogue, training and mentoring.

2) *Regional programmes:*

- **GAR-SI Sahel**: Groupes d'Action Rapide-Surveillance et Intervention. The programme supports the establishment of law enforcement flexible, mobile and multi-tasking units (100 men) in the G5 Sahel countries and Senegal (training, mentoring, equipment) to ensure better control of national territories and borders and therefore tackle the threats posed by traffickers and terrorist groups.
- **WAPIS** (West African Police Information System), which supports the strengthening of the collection, management and dissemination of police-related information in West Africa (ECOWAS + G5 Sahel interested member countries).
- **Appui au G5 pour la Sécurité au Sahel**: this project aims at strengthening the G5 Permanent Secretariat capacities and those of its Member States in the field of security and border management and to support the G5 Sahel Presidency in its daily work as well as in its cooperation with other financial and technical partners. Thanks to a technical assistance permanently deployed in Nouakchott and Bamako, the project the EU aim at supporting the development of the emerging Security structures of the G5, such as the “Plateforme de Coopération en Matière de Sécurité” (PCMS), and the “Collège Sahélien de Sécurité”, which is about to be settled soon in Bamako.

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26. All of these EU actions have to be implemented in close coordination with this recent initiative of the G5 countries, and may require adaptation of their scope to enhance synergies with the G5 Joint Force.

c) CSDP Missions

27. **EUTM Mali** was launched in February 2013 by the EU to provide military and training advice to the Malian Armed Forces in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity. After the last Strategic Review of EUTM Mali, the Mission has been given the new objective to support the G5 Sahel process, by contributing to enhancing coordination and interoperability within the G5 Sahel national armed forces, and has consequently already organised, in Mali, three training courses for G5 Sahel liaison officers.

28. EUTM Mali is also, within its core mandate, advising the Malian Armed Forces to develop this G5 Sahel Joint Force, Mali being in the lead for this initiative as Presidency of the G5 Sahel. And EUTM Mali already supported the G5 Sahel firstly in developing the CONOPS for the Joint Force, secondly writing the statement of requirements for APF support and finally providing military expertise.

29. To date the two civilian CSDP Missions, EUCAP Mali and EUCAP Niger have not been directly involved in support to the planning process for the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

d) Bilateral support

30. France will continue direct military support through its Barkhane Operation, mainly in the framework of the joint cross-border operations, especially through the deployment of “combined detachments for military operational support” in the three Sector Centre countries.

31. France also proposes a bridging support. The objective is to help the Sector Centre in reaching an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in the autumn, waiting that European tools and missions take over. This bridging support is threefold:

- To support the setting up of operational commitment preparation centres ;
- To provide logistical package (computers, furniture) for Niamey Operative HQ ;
- To provide tactical equipment (see below).

32. In the framework of a common initiative, France and Germany announced their intention to bring substantial support to the G5 Joint Force with a focus on supporting the battalions of the G5 Joint Force. This could be achieved through the provision of light equipment (troop support, protection, armament, helmets, communication assets and ammunitions) and should also contribute to improving the mobility of the armed forces (vehicles).

33. To meet the operational needs of Niger, France would reinforce its airmobile capabilities, providing helicopters. At the same time, Germany could finance renovation projects for airport

structures (on Niamey Air base) and will invest in the refurbishment of the runway at Gao (Mali). France will continue to punctually provide logistic package (fuel, combat rations pack...) and medical assets.

34. Germany and France have considered the possibility to provide significant support in operational commitment and training. France decided to facilitate operational commitment for G5 battalions by supporting the creation of operational commitment preparation centres in Mali, Niger and Burkina-Faso. Germany is planning to finance the equipment of the G5 Defence College, in Nouakchott (Mauretania) and is considering financing trainings for the G5 Liaison Officers in the framework of the Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali). Finally, these two Member States offered to play a role in the needed coordination of international efforts. They co-chaired a first meeting in Paris in mid-June 2017 and are planning to organise the next one in Berlin on October 10th 2017.

e) **MINUSMA**

35. Support brought by the EU to the G5 Joint Force has to be considered and carried out in complementarity with other actors such as the UN Mission, which has been active in the field for four years. The MINUSMA military force is already operating in close cooperation with the Malian Armed Forces in the north and in the centre of the country. The Joint Force should be perceived as contributing to creating an enabling environment for MINUSMA to fulfil its mandate, in particular in Central Mali region where MINUSMA is already present, and about to settle: building of an UN “Supercamp” in Mopti is on-going, to gather different MINUSMA units in adequate security conditions.
36. On the 29th of June 2017, Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2364 (2017), extending the mandate of MINUSMA for one year. This resolution mirrors the language contained in resolution 2359 (2017), in which the Security Council urges the G5 Sahel Joint Force, MINUSMA and the French forces to ensure adequate coordination and exchange of information regarding their operations, within their respective mandates, in particular through the relevant intelligence and liaison officers from the G5 Sahel Member States to MINUSMA.

Conclusion: The unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of the Resolution 2359 provides a strong political signal of international support to the G5 Sahel and a solid platform for mobilising resources in support of the Joint Force. The G5 is already benefitting from EU support (APF, EUTF, CSDP, Bilateral) complemented by efforts of the International Community. France is already involved in the G5 building up process through the BARKHANE Operation and will provide extra support for the operationalisation of the G5 Force including at Joint Force General Headquarters and Niamey Operative HQ. Germany is providing infrastructure and equipment bilateral support to Niger and to the G5 Defence College in Nouakchott (Mauretania). MINUSMA's mandate was revised enabling exchange of intelligence and liaison officers.

IV. EU GAP ANALYSIS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF THE JOINT FORCE

37. The development of the Joint Force will be sequenced: first establishment of the G5 Force and then its operationalisation. Considering all actions conducted by other international contributors potentially involved, the identified possible gaps and the needs, where the EU could provide assistance, are estimated as follows:

4.1 Identified needs during the G5 Joint Force establishment phase:

a) Support to the Command and Control (C2) structure with advisory, training and provision of equipment for the establishment.

- Advice in defining the G5 Joint Force C2 structure, with the nucleus located in Bamako before deployment in Mopti-Sevare;
- Support to the improvement of the infrastructure for the General Headquarters in Mopti-Sevare and the three sector Operative Headquarters (only Niamey is identified for the time being as the location of the Centre Operative HQ);
- training of G5 Sahel countries staff personnel before deployment to the different Headquarters;
- Enhance G5 capacities to command and conduct operations by equipping the different Headquarters with vehicles, communication and information system materiel..., financed through APF support, or with other international contribution.

b) Support to the national contingents of the G5 Sahel countries with advisory, training and equipment, enabling them to coordinate and operate together.

- Advise and support each G5 Sahel country in preparing and sustaining their national contributions to the G5 Sahel Joint Force;
- Train the leaders of each national detachment part of the G5 Force and some specific or specialist re-training, enabling to increase the interoperability between the national detachments;
- Equip national detachments on a case by case basis, financed through APF support, or with other international contributions.

c) Support to the Police Component with advice, training and provision of equipment, which needs to be compatible with the military components (synchronisation of equipment of military and police units).

- Better define missions, roles, tasks and interactions of the Police components with local ISF authorities and ensure a consistent follow-up by the penal chain at national levels;
- Provide advice at the levels of the future General HQ and other HQ levels as well as to the G5 presidency on the establishment of Police components and coordination and cooperation areas with the military components;

- Ensure that relevant training is delivered to the Police units prior to deployment in theatre.

4.2 Identified needs during the implementation of the G5 Joint Force mandate:

38. Once the G5 Joint Force is established advice and support in its operationalisation will be undertaken and based on interoperability and the capacity to implement its mandate in the four defined objectives given by the Joint Force mandate (cf paragraph 8). As in the previous phase, activities should concentrate in the following areas:

a) Support to the command and control (C2) structure with advice, training and equipment:

- Advise and support through the deployment of advisors, temporary or permanently embedded, in the General Headquarter (Mopti-Sevare) and Operative headquarter (Niger only identified at the time of writing the document).
- Provide necessary training to maintain the required level of capability, considering the HQ personnel turn-over, or ensure pre-assignment staff training before each rotation, if any;
- Contribute to the sustainment of the different Headquarters with logistical and medical support.
- As appropriate, provide support to the agency implementing the projects on EU support to G5 Joint Force financed through the APF.

b) Support of the national contingents (with advice, training and equipment):

- Advise each G5 Sahel country for their commitments in the G5 Sahel Joint Force.
- Train the leaders of the national detachments and some basic or specialist re-training allowing the detachments to conduct joint operations.
- Contribute to the equipment of national detachments on a case by case basis and to their sustainment with logistical and medical support.
- As appropriate, provide support to the agency implementing the projects on EU support to G5 Joint Force financed through the APF.

c) Support to the Police Component

- Provide advice to the future General Main HQ and other HQ levels on the Police component.
- Assuming that there will be a regular turn-over of units, training shall be provided on a regular basis to maintain an adequate level of capability in the units.

d) Coordination of international support

39. In addition to the provision of advice, technical support and training, a centralised focal point/hub could collect, collate and disseminate the available information concerning the

support provided by all the various partners (EU Member States and others) to the G5 Joint Force in order to facilitate planning and avoid duplications.

Conclusion: Identification of the needs demonstrates that support should be provided in different ways, but that priority must be given to the capacities enabling the establishment of the Joint Force and to have a successful first Joint Operation. In order to do so, the support to the deployment of the Command and Control structures is identified as a priority: the General HQ immediately in Bamako, then in Mopti-Sévaré, as well as the Centre sector Operative Headquarter in Niamey.

V. POSSIBLE CSDP SUPPORT WITHIN THE CURRENT MANDATES

40. Given the composition of the G5 force and its initial phase of operationalisation, most of the activities that could be conducted through CSDP in support of the Force would be of military nature. These activities could be conducted in Mali. In addition, on the civilian side, EUCAP Mali experts could provide advice to the G5 Sahel Presidency in Bamako on a better definition of the status, roles and required strength of the Police component to fulfil the presumed tasks. Both EUCAP missions could provide tailor made support once the role of the Police component is better defined.

5.1 Actions in support of the G5 military component

a) Support to the command and control (C2) structure:

Mali assumes the Presidency of the G5 Sahel and the MAF has received the lead to develop the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

41. Advising G5 Joint Force HQ staff:

➤ Within its current mandate, EUTM Mali can support the G5 Sahel process, concurrently with its support to the MAF, contributing to the enhancement of coordination and interoperability among the G5 Sahel national armed forces.

EUTM Mali envisages the creation of a bespoke cell within the Advisory Task Force (ATF) to support the MAF and also the G5 Sahel Joint Force. This new cell within the ATF would operate in both Bamako and, on a non-permanent basis, in Mopti-Sévaré (as part of the Combined Mobile Advisory Training Team (CMATT), see below). Two following options on how this new cell could operate have been identified:

- Support the G5 Sahel Joint Force within current means and capabilities (no need for additional personnel). This will require current outputs of the ATF to be re-prioritised (pending the level of support requested). For example, ATF could stop supporting Malian National Guard and Gendarmerie;

- Support the G5 Sahel Joint Force through specialist reinforcement with EU Member States National Voluntary Contributions (NVC)¹. Two to seven² French speaking officers are required depending on the area where advice is needed.
- EUTM Mali intends also to deploy dedicated CMATT to Mopti-Sévaré to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force: this will require limited deployment for short term to support the establishment of the General Headquarters, complemented by regular visits of a short duration for some specialists. At this stage, three CMATT of four weeks each in Mopti-Sévaré are envisaged.
- The deployment of people in Mopti-Sévaré will need additional support and financial resources and support:
 - Medical support in addition to what is currently foreseen by EUTM Mali to conduct its decentralized activities in support of Malian Armed Forces. Indeed, the deployment of dedicated CMATT will require additional medical support³ beyond what is originally envisaged under the current Deployed Medical Surgical Support Services (DMSSS) and Fixed Wings Medevac contract. This additional requirement can be covered by capabilities provided by Member States or by extension to the existing contracts, which need additional funding to be provided by ATHENA;
 - In addition the continuing failure of force generation to deliver a Protected Transport Platoon capability will require the purchase of up to four armoured vehicles for mobility in the Mopti-Sévaré area⁴. This support will be submitted to the ATHENA Special Committee in mid-July to allow EUTM Mali to conduct its decentralised activities in support of the MAF. The same armoured vehicles could be used to conduct the dedicated CMATT to Mopti-Sévaré to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force, without additional personnel.
 - Additional budget to cover the costs of the dedicated CMATT (renting accommodations...)

42. Training of G5 Sahel Joint Force HQ staff :

- EUTM Mali was already transforming its successful G5 Sahel Liaison Officers' course into a dedicated planning course to benefit the G5 Sahel countries Staff officers to be deployed in the G5 Sahel Joint Force Headquarters. Three G5 Sahel Staff courses are envisaged; the first will take place in Bamako and the subsequent two in Mopti-Sévaré. Additional funding will be

¹ National Voluntary Contributions won't need a revision of the SOR and no additional budget from ATHENA.

² Exact number will depend on discussion with MAF and G5S FC GHQ to define in which domain they need advising (J2 – J3 – J4 – J5 – J6 – J8). + One cell leader

³ The current assessment of available medical facilities in the MOPTI – SEVARE area indicates that they do not meet EU standards and therefore the Mission Commander would need to accept a greater level of risk than is currently foreseen in the Mission Plan or deploy the DMSSS and FW Medevac.

⁴ The costs of the first CMATT in MOPTI-SEVARE would be up to €M1,5 (if 4 armoured vehicles not yet bought) with the two following CMATT costing up to €700k

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needed to conduct these courses (daily allowance and flight tickets for the trainees, lodging arrangements with a budget estimation for each course around 50.000 €). The funding for these courses has not yet been identified (a solution could be explored with the G5 Sahel Permanent Secretariat through the possible involvement of the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité, both on the financial side and in a coordination role).

- The deployment of EUTM Mali temporary training teams to provide advice in specialist areas such as CIS could also be considered to support the General Headquarters from initial operational capability (Bamako) to full operational capability (Sevare). This would also rely on temporary contributions from MS (with NVC; exact number pending on the request), allowing EUTM Mali to keep current support to the MAF.

b) Support to the G5 national contingents:

- EUTM Mali could provide training to the G5 Sahel Joint Force Malian manoeuvre forces at Koulikouro Training Camp (Mali) both at company level and in specialist areas but this will also require that Malian training needs be re-prioritised. Another option could be the reinforcement of the EUTM Education and Training Task Force with temporary NVC from MS or a partnership with other partners (like with "Coopération Française"), which would enhance the size of the potential training audience.
- For G5 non-Malian units, this training will probably focus on the leadership, by incorporating them in the training for Malian units or to organize "train the trainers" courses on specific subject allowing the G5 Sahel countries to improve their interoperability. All these activities will always be on Malian invitations and thus would remain within the EUTM Mali mandate. As for any training to be performed by EUTM for non-Malian units, additional funding will probably be needed (daily allowance and flight tickets for the trainees; budget pending the duration and number of trainees).
- The G5 Sahel Joint Force also offers secondary opportunities to support the Signals School (CIT) at KATI and the staff school at KOULIKORO (EEM – Ecole d'Etat-Major) which sit firmly within the scope of the current mandate and would offer much needed focus on these two key areas. Indeed, with MAF agreement, EUTM Mali could help the development in these two schools specific modules to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force. This would allow G5 Sahel to be sustainable for G5 Sahel LNO/staff course in the EEM and CIS module in the Signals School.

5.2 Actions in support of the G5 Joint Force Police component

43. Within the framework of their current mandates, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali can cover the needs for advice and training of the G5 Joint Force Police component, each in its specific area of expertise. However, these advising and training activities can only be conducted

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in Niger by EUCAP Sahel Niger, and in Mali by EUCAP Sahel Mali, as their mandates do not allow them to work outside their area of deployment.

44. Advising:

- Advice to the G5 Presidency on the definition of the status, roles and strength of the Police component of the Force;
- Support to the definition of equipment requirements in order to ensure interoperability and compatibility of materials with the military units;
- Advice to the Ministries of Security in Niger and Mali on matters related to the G5 JF police component;
- Advice and support to the Main HQ in Mopti-Sevaré;
- Raising awareness of relevant civilian and military authorities on "judicialisation", anti-terrorism and organised crime;
- Advice on information collection and management;
- Advice on transborder criminal investigation cooperation.

All advising activities can be performed by one or both of the Missions, depending on the issues, within their current mandates, means and capabilities.

45. Training:

- Based on current assumptions (only 15 personnel in each battalion), EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger, without mandate change, and without additional staff, can provide training to the units of the Police component of the Force, but only if the training activities take place in Mali or Niger. Training can be foreseen in the areas of:
 - Information collection and management (trafficking, counter-terrorism and organised crime);
 - Criminal Police with a specific focus on trans-border issues;
 - "Judicialisation" of the action of the Armed forces (EUCAP Sahel Niger, topic already included in mandate);
 - Human rights, International Humanitarian Law and gender, in synergies with EUTM;
 - Training can take the form of:
 - Training individual Police units of each battalion either in Mali or Niger or both;
 - Joint training EUCAP– EUTM Mali for Police units together with the military units;

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- Dedicated training on the relevant equipment.

Conclusion: With regards to EUTM, direct support to the building up and the operationalisation of the G5 Joint Force and HQs can already be provided. Nevertheless, some of this support would require extra personnel to be generated either through the CJSOR or with National Voluntary Contribution. At the same time extra equipment and budget support would be required for EUTM. Training for non-Malian units can only be performed in Mali, so the funding requirement implies that either EU MS contribute to these activities or another solution has to be identified (CSS).

For the Police component of the G5 Joint Force, EUCAP Sahel Mali can provide advice to the G5 Sahel Presidency on refining the definition of the tasks and missions of the Police Component. Both EUCAP Missions can also give training and advice to the Police units deployed within the Joint Force, providing that those training and advising activities take place either in Mali or in Niger. Both Missions can as well directly support the General Headquarters in Mopti-Sévaré (Mali) and the Sector Centre Operative Headquarters in Niamey (Niger) respectively.

VI. POSSIBLE CSDP SUPPORT REQUIRING MANDATE ADJUSTMENT

46. In order to address the identified gaps in the building up and operationalisation of the G5 force, it could be considered to have the mandate of the Sahel CSDP missions revised. This could be done in the medium term and along the following proposals.

6.1 Actions in support of the G5 military component

a) EUTM Advice and support role at the G5 GHQ in Mopti/Sevare only

47. This enabling capacity should be considered on a permanent basis. Having permanent staff deployed will guarantee the continuity of the advisory function to the GHQ. However, the deployment of these few advisors will be very demanding in term of enabling support (medical, force protection ...) and thus also in term of budget. This could be conducted through a revision of the EUTM SOR, providing EUTM Mali additional personal, allowing keeping the current support to the MAF. The permanent deployment of EUTM Mali officers, with an advice and support role, in the General HQ of the G5 Sahel Joint Force in Mopti-Sévaré would require a revision of the Mandate and of the MPLAN. This permanent deployment of EUTM Mali expertise in support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force would also need a revision of the budget and support (Force Protection, Medical and Logistical Support...). This permanent deployment would probably require additional support from MINUSMA, the deployment to Mopti-Sévaré of which is foreseen soon.

b) EUTM Advice and support role at the G5 GHQ in Mopti/Sevare and sector headquarters

48. Permanent embedding of advisory and liaison team with the GHQ Sévaré and sector Headquarters (Niamey for Sector centre; and to be defined for Sectors West and East) could be

considered to enhance interoperability. But the deployment of EUTM Mali experts in the three sector Headquarters, as well as the potential deployment in support of each of the G5 Sahel country would need EUTM mandate to be revised (Mission area, tasks, security). Considering the phasing and the building up of these HQs, this should be defined in the next EUTM Strategic Review due by the end of 2017 and implemented by mid-May 2018.

c) Pre-deployment training to G5 national contingents

49. EUTM Mali could provide training to the Malian units to be deployed in their area of operation. A further step could be the training of units from all G5 Sahel countries. However this would require an extension of the mandate in terms of Mission Area and target audience, making the mission 'EUTM Sahel' rather than 'EUTM Mali'. This possibility has to be further explored and assessed as the conditions for such a support are not met and could be designed once the G5 force has started to implement its mandate and capitalised on its lessons learned. It will then be possible to have a clear view of the real needs for Joint Force.

6.2 Actions in support of the G5 Joint Force Police component

50. Should the G5 decide to give more importance to the role of the Police Component and/or revert back to initial plans which foresaw a large Police component of 600, it would then be necessary to consider more robust support through civilian CSDP Missions. Indeed, in this case, it may be relevant to have temporary or permanent experts from EUCAP Niger or EUCAP Mali deployed in other G5 Sahel countries to advise or train the G5 Force, notably the Police part of the future Sector HQs, not located yet (for sector West and sector East). This reinforced support would require amendment to the mandates of existing civilian CSDP Missions as well as additional staff. The development of the GARSIS concept should also be taken into account and used to the benefit of the building up of a dedicated police component for the G5, as relevant.

51. Until there is a decision, if any, on increasing the scope and/or size of the Police Component, there is no need to amend existing EUCAP Missions' mandates.

6.3 Support to the G5 force benefiting from the CSDP Regionalisation

52. With regard to the Regionalisation of the CSDP action, phase 1 "Creating a CSDP security and defence network in the Sahel region and conducting a needs assessment leading to the development of a CSDP regional implementation plan" is ongoing.

53. The Regional Coordination Cell and its network of Internal Security and Defence Experts can play a facilitating role in the implementation of training at regional level (in particular to the benefit of the G5 Joint Force). In this respect, the role and function of the "Collège Sahélien de Sécurité" should also be considered as actions of mutual interest in support of the G5 should be fostered and developed in complementarity and efficiency.

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54. Potentially, the Internal Security and Defence experts to be deployed in the Delegations could, through their role as adviser to the heads of Delegation, provide advice to the future HQs of the G5 Sahel Joint Force in Sector West and East (when identified), but also liaise with the national military and police HQs of the G5 Sahel countries (to identify the needs/gaps; enabling the coordination of the participation at G5 Sahel courses provided by CSDP missions).
55. Moreover, the accomplishment of phase 1 will be assessed in the Regionalisation Strategic Review conducted in second half of 2018 and then the MS will decide on the follow-up phase.
56. It is proposed that this new phase does not only focus on the CSDP Regional Implementation plan, but also addresses the expanding CSDP presence in the Sahel region, when required and feasible. If relevant, and pending an overall needs analysis and assessment, phase 2 of the Regionalisation could already look into the opportunity to deploy extra staff in support of the G5 to structure the Regional cooperation in Sahel.

Conclusion: Once the G5 force is operational and starts implementing its mandate, an increased footprint for Sahel CSDP Missions would be necessary. This would entail greater sustainment costs and require force protection and medical provision to be considered for EUTM and possibly extra staff for both EUCAP Missions. Considering the tempo for the building up and operationalisation of the G5 force, most of the proposed scenarios should be further analysed during the next EUTM strategic review in 2017. A comprehensive assessment of EU action in the Sahel, benefiting from the Regionalisation Implementation Plan, would be presented to EU MS during the Regionalisation Strategic Review before end of 2018. This review could already propose to further expand CSDP presence in the G5 countries. Other options could possibly be considered in the framework of a “holistic” Strategic Review of the three CSDP Missions in Sahel, including Regionalisation, at the end of 2018.

VII. INFORMATION HUB

57. In order to maximise the efforts of the International Community to support the establishment, operationalisation and sustainment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5 SJF), consideration should be given to the activation of an information-hub. A G5 SJF Information-Hub (G5 S JF IH) would collate information from the EU Institutions and partners (MS and Third Countries, as appropriate) and, in turn, provide a regularly updated consolidated picture of the planned, ongoing and completed support actions in favour of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Meetings with Member States and other possible partners would be organised as required to facilitate the sharing of information and possible announcement of contributions. An overall understanding of who is doing what and for what purpose would facilitate a more effective and tailored planning of support actions, a coordinated approach, as well as minimise duplication of efforts. The information-hub could be established within the EEAS and build on the experience and

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procedures of the OPCW and OSCE Info-Hubs.⁵ The Regional Coordination Cell could contribute, via its experts, to the information gathering at local levels

58. This Information-Hub could be activated in 8-10 working days, once missions and tasks are clearly articulated. EUMS could initially manage it for a few weeks, with recourse to double or triple-hatting available personnel. However, given the enduring MPCC logistics and medical vacant positions, MS will be asked to provide temporary personnel augmentation to man the Info-Hub (initially one person on a rotational basis). The role of EUTM Mali within this framework would be constrained by the limited information available in Bamako.

Conclusion: An EU Information-hub could be established in Brussels within the EEAS (EUMS-MPCC) with strong connections in the field, through EUTM Mali and Regionalisation Coordination Cell (RCC) in Bamako and, in order to facilitate a more effective and tailored planning of support actions, a coordinated approach, as well as minimise duplication of efforts. Nevertheless, this would require temporary augmentation of one person in MPCC.

VIII. PROPOSED WAY FORWARD:

59. As described above, the building up of the G5 force will be gradual and as a consequence, the EU support will commensurately follow a phased approach.

60. The possible actions described in this note would either be: 1) iso-mandate within current means and capacities, or 2) require extra financial resources, personnel and equipment, or 3-4) require a revised mandate to follow-up the operationalisation of the G5 force. Finally, a clearing house and/or coordination platform should be developed.

61. The following phased approach is recommended and presented options would need EU MS's approval:

1) Within the current mandates and within mean and capabilities, than can already be implemented.

a) EUTM Mali can provide military expertise to the Malian presidency of G5 Sahel in building-up the Joint Force.

b) EUTM Mali can provide advice to the G5 JF C2 structure, initially the nucleus in Bamako (*EUTM would re-prioritise its activities*)

⁵ Chemical Weapons Information Hub (CWIH) in support of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for the removal of the chemical weapons from Syria Ukraine Information Hub (UAIH)) in support of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

- c) EUTM Mali provide training to G5 countries future Staff officers to be deployed in the G5 JF Headquarters (*same problem of funding as for G5 LNO Courses*)
- d) EUTM Mali can provide training for the Malian contingent to be deployed for the G5 JF (*EUTM Mali would just re-prioritise its activities*)
- e) EUTM Mali provide training to G5 countries officers who will command the G5 countries contingents deployed in the G5 JF (*same problem of funding as for G5 LNO Courses*)
- f) EUTM Mali could provide support to the agency implementing the projects on EU support to G5 Joint Force financed through the APF, as appropriate.
- g) EUCAP Mali can provide police expertise to the Malian presidency of G5 Sahel regarding the status, role and strength of the Police component of the G5 Joint Force. EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger can provide advice and support to the G5 Force HQs in Mali and Niger respectively.
- h) EUCAP Mali and Niger can provide dedicated training to the Police Component of the G5 JF in their area of expertise, including to the benefit of other G5 countries but only on invitation of Malian and Nigerien authorities.
- i) Establishment of an Information Hub, within EEAS in Brussels and on the ground, in order to collate information from the EU Institutions, EU Member States and international donors as appropriate regarding the support they would provide, in order to avoid duplications of efforts.

<p>Recommendation: All proposals are preserving EUTM and EUCAP core mandates and it is recommended that EU MS agree to their implementation. These proposals can be implemented immediately following MS authorisation. However, some extra funds for the training of G5 Liaison officers would be needed (by EU MS support, or in the framework of the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité pending the agreement of the G5 Sahel Permanent Secretariat).</p>
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2) Within current mandate but with extra staff and extra cost: to be implemented by end of 2017.

- j) EUTM would create a bespoke cell within its Advisory Task Force but would maintain the same level of activities for the MAF. This would require between two to seven additional functions/ experienced staff officers and a revision of SOR (except if MS agree to provide through National Voluntary Contributions)
- k) Non-permanent deployment of EUTM Mali actions in support of the G5 Sahel FC in Mopti/Sévaré through 3 or 4 dedicated CMATT. This would require a revision of the budget

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(to provide additional medical support and armoured vehicle; and to cover the running costs of these short non-permanent deployments). This activity would require the same level of additional staff as above (j).

Recommendation: The above proposed activities would require up to 8 personnel and would require budget to up of for 4 CMATT: €700k, within EUTM current structure (to be evaluated in the subsequent operational planning). MPCC have also to asses if any National voluntary Contribution could fill these requests. Support to the HQ in Mopti-Sévaré could be achieved by extra equipment and budget in support of this new task for EUTM Mali (CMATT).

3) Requiring the revision of the Mandate (and of the MPLAN and OPLANS) Timeline: end of 2017.

- l) Permanent deployment of EUTM Mali officers in the General HQ of the G5 Sahel Joint Force would require a revision of the Mandate and of the MPLAN.
- m) If a larger or more substantial Police Component was chosen by the G5, EUCAP Mali and Niger could provide more robust advice and training, including outside Mali and Niger, but this would require a change in the mandates as well as extra staff.

Recommendation: Option j (EUTM expert permanent deployment to the G5 Joint Force General HQ in Mopti-Sévaré) has to be balanced with option k (extra dedicated CMATT). Based on the costs, duration and impacts of such activities, it would be recommended in any case starting by extra CMATT end of 2017, and then assess the opportunity of a permanent presence in General HQ in Mopti-Sévaré.

4) Requiring the revision of mandate during the next strategic review process:

- n) The deployment of EUTM Mali experts in the three Sectors Headquarters, as well as the deployment in support of the national contingents of the G5 Sahel countries, could be envisaged in the next EUTM Mali Strategic review due by the end of 2017 and implemented by mid-May 2018. **Timeline: May 2018**
- o) The Strategic Review of Regionalisation is planned for the second half of 2018 and would be an opportunity to align these different parallel processes into one unified action, if conditions enable so. **Timeline: Second half of 2018**
- p) It could possibly be considered in the framework of a “Holistic” Strategic Review of the three CSDP Missions in Sahel including Regionalisation, **to be tabled at the end of 2018.**

Recommendation: A comprehensive assessment of EU action in the Sahel, benefiting from the Regionalisation Implementation Plan, would be presented to EU MS during the Regionalisation Strategic Review before end of 2018. This review could already propose to further expand CSDP presence in the G5 countries, foreseen in phase 3 of this concept.

IX Recommendations

62. It is proposed that EU Member States:

1. Agree with all proposals that can already be implemented within the current mandates and within means and capabilities, including extra funds for the training of G5 Liaison officers (EU MS support or possible agreement with the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité, if approved by the G5 Sahel Permanent Secretariat), and one extra personnel at MPCC level (G5 Sahel Information Hub).
2. Agree with all proposals that can be implemented by the end of 2017, within current mandate, but with extra staff and extra cost, which would require up to 8 military personnel within EUTM and €700k for 4 extra CMATT dedicated to the G5 Joint Force General HQ in Mopti-Sévaré.
3. Consider the revision of the Mandate (and of the MPLAN and OPLANS) for (i) EUCAP Missions to advise and train, including outside Mali and Niger, (ii) EUTM, based on the lessons learned from the CMATT process, decide on the opportunity for a permanent presence in General HQ in Mopti-Sévaré.
4. Consider the revision of the Mandates of the Sahel CSDP Missions, during the next sequenced Strategic Review process: Deployment of EUTM Mali experts in the three PC Sector Headquarters, timeline: May 2018 (option n), Strategic Review of Regionalisation Second half of 2018 (option o) or “holistic” Strategic Review of CSDP action in Sahel end of 2018 (option p).