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OPERATIONS DIVISION
Joint Operations Unit
SEA BORDERS SECTOR

Annexes of the Operational Plan

EPN CONCEPT
Joint Operation EPN HERA 2014
2014/SBS/03



European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States
of the European Union

www.frontex.europa.eu
Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland
Tel. +48 22 205 95 00
Fax +48 22 205 95 01

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ANNEX 1 - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1.1. General

The JO Hera 2013 was implemented from 1 August to 31 October 2013.

During the JO EPN Hera 2013, a total of 128 irregular migrants reached [REDACTED] whilst during 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008 and 2007, a total of 85, 340, 204, 2 284, 9 254 and 12 473 irregular migrants respectively arrived on [REDACTED]

Commented [A1]: The blanked out parts contain indications of the operational area. Disclosing the operational area would expose law enforcement officials' patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Indicator	2010	2011	JO Hera 2012	JO Hera 2013
Incidents	27	27	23	11
Incidents with migrants	n.a.	20	7	7
Migrants	204	340	84	128
Facilitators	12+22	1+3	6	5
Empty boats	n.a.	7	15	2

The implementation of the previous phases of the JO Hera, together with the enforcement of the bilateral agreements between the Spanish authorities and their counterparts in the African countries of Mauritania and Senegal, undoubtedly contributed to stabilising the trend of arrivals. The results of the operation indicate a need for developing closer cooperation with third countries of departure in Africa, in particular with Morocco, which can currently be considered just about the only country of departure.

In 2013, during the 3 months of the JO, the number of migration related incidents remained stable, compared to 2012 and also remained at a very low level; at the same time the number of apprehended migrants increased by 50% (128 in 2013 and 84 in 2012).

In August 2013, 4 incidents were reported (1 smuggling case, 1 pollution incident and 2 other incidents related to empty boats).

During the implementation of the JO Hera 2013, 5 persons (4 Moroccan and 1 Malian) were identified and prosecuted for facilitating illegal migration, and 2 persons (1 Moroccan and 1 Spanish) were arrested for drug smuggling.

The distribution of migration related incidents with respect to disembarkation locations was as follows: [REDACTED] (2 inland, 2 at sea with 78 irregular migrants), [REDACTED] 2 (both at sea with 24 irregular migrants) [REDACTED] - 1 (at sea with 26 irregular migrants). In addition, 1 smuggling case was reported on [REDACTED] and an oil spill was reported near Senegal. An empty boat was detected on [REDACTED]. As regards facilitators, 4 were apprehended [REDACTED].

Commented [A2]: The blanked out parts contain indications of the operational area. Disclosing the operational area would expose law enforcement officials' patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

Between 1 August and 31 October 2013, 128 irregular migrants (59 Moroccans, 26 Gambians, 21 unknown, 17 Malians, 3 Ivoirians, 1 Mauritanian and 1 Guinean (GNQ) were apprehended, while 4 Moroccans and 1 Malian were arrested for human smuggling.

Seven boats (4 “*pateras*”, 2 “*cayucos*” and 1 rubber boat) were involved in the respective migration incidents. The “*cayucos*” were 12 and 16 metres in length, whereas the length of the “*pateras*” ranged from 5 to 8 metres, which is a typical size.

According to FRAN data, from 1 January to 31 March 2014, 39 irregular migrants landed on [redacted] (24 Moroccans, 7 Malians, 5 Guinean (GNQ), 1 Burkinabe, 1 Guinean (GNB), 1 Congolese.

1.2. Risks and threats, *modus operandi* and trends identified

In general terms, the level of the irregular migration flow towards the [redacted] in 2013 was low. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

In line with the intelligence gathered during previous Hera joint operations, the main types of vessels used by migrants in 2013 were identical to those previously used.

When examining the figures in relation to the number of boat arrivals and the number of apprehended irregular migrants, a similar downward trend is apparent for both from 2006 onwards. However, the *ratio* of migrants per boat is far from being constant. Actually overall, it indicates a sharp drop since 2008.

From 2006 to 2008 the average number of migrants aboard each boat was 53-56, as the relatively large “*cayucos*” (which were mainly used by Senegalese and Mauritanian nationals) could hold that number of persons. On the other hand, during the same period, Moroccans used “*pateras*” or rubber boats which are smaller than the “*cayucos*” and therefore the average number of migrants per boat was lower. Another aspect of arrivals is their seasonality. It can be observed that from 2007 to 2009 in terms of the number of detected migrants, September was the month with the highest activity levels, with a secondary peak in November, whereas from December through to April the number of irregular migrants detected was relatively low.

From 2010 through to 2013, when the detections mainly comprised Moroccan nationals, the pattern was the same, with arrivals peaking in September. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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Commented [A4]: The marked parts contain detailed information on the analytical findings, risk assessment and recommendations. Their disclosure would be tantamount to releasing pieces of intelligence gathered by law enforcement officials and thus harm the course of future operations and facilitate irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]

Currently, there is a degree of uncertainty regarding developments in the Sahel region, in particular in relation to the internal displacement of African migrants fleeing from conflict areas. Therefore, the geopolitical situation in this region needs continuous monitoring in order to assess the need for an appropriate operational response, should the situation require it.

1.3. Brief notes about the geopolitical situation in source and transit countries

Morocco and Western Sahara

In September 2013, Morocco adopted a new legal package (set of three laws) to deal with the question of migration. Since then and for the first time in this country's history, 580 asylum seekers (mostly Syrians and people from Cote d'Ivoire) have been given refugee status. They received refugee identity cards and residency papers allowing them to work and access some social services. In addition, 25 000 irregular migrants are expected to benefit from an "exceptional" grant of residency papers in 2014.

As for the Western Sahara, the United Nations Security Council extended, on 29 April 2014, the term of the UN peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara for another year, leaving its mandate to monitor the 1991 ceasefire between Morocco and the national liberation movement the Sahrawi Polisario Front unchanged.

Mauritania

Mauritania started to crack down on terrorist sympathisers and stepped up its border patrols after the January 2013 military intervention in Mali. More [REDACTED]

The government of Mauritania is also actively promoting enhanced regional border management and, in this regard, hosted an African Union ministerial conference on security cooperation in the Sahel-Sahara region on 17 March 2013. In August 2013, Niger and Mauritania also signed a military cooperation agreement, aimed at containing the spread of terrorism in the region.

Senegal

According to AFIC reporting, 2 attempts of departure from the shores of Senegal (Saint-Louis) were prevented in the period October - December 2013 and 5 people were arrested, whereas 3 attempted were halted in Dakar and Thiès in the period January - March 2014 and 23 people were arrested.

[REDACTED]

Commented [A5]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding law-enforcement operations. Its disclosure would expose the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

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Mali

After 18 months of instability that began with a Tuareg rebellion in January 2012, which was the primary catalyst for an army coup in March 2012, Mali is entering into a period of stability, helped by the international community as a whole.

Since its inception on 1 July 2013, the 12 600-strong UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilisation of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap. The main focus is on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons.

Complementing the UN's efforts, the EU has allocated funds to the region under the 10th European Development Fund (2007-2013). In the framework of its Sahel strategy, the EU has further mobilised additional financial resources for development and security-related projects.

In the framework of the Strategy, the EU also launched a civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission 'EUCAP SAHEL' in July 2012 in order to contribute to the fight against crime and terrorism in Niger, Mali and in the whole region. The mission was launched at the request of Niger's government in the summer of 2012. Liaison Officers were deployed to Nouakchott (Mauritania) and Bamako (Mali).

In February 2013, the EU decided to launch the EU military Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) for a 15-month mandate. On 15 April 2014 the above mentioned mission was extended until 18 May 2016. In addition, the EU provided immediate financial support to early recovery, restoration of state authority and basic services in Mali already in February 2013.

According to the UN, the situation in the northern part of Mali is not yet conducive for sustainable returns, however, spontaneous returns from Niger (facilitated by the UNHCR) have picked up pace during 2014. With almost 7 000 persons returned, returns are already at levels recorded during the whole of 2013. The vast majority of returnees are Tuareg. The increasing number of returns comes as Mali, Niger and the UNHCR signed an agreement that provides a legal framework to support spontaneous returns. This represents another sign that fragile stability is returning to Northern Mali and with it a greater level of institutional presence in this unstable part of Mali.

1.4. Forecast

Looking at annual migratory trends, it might be assumed that, despite the increase reported in the number of irregular migrants landed on the ██████████ in 2013 (283) compared to 2012 (174), 2014 will not be different from the previous years in terms of arrivals and incidents, although the peak in figures can be expected during the summer time, particularly in August and September, provided that patrolling activities in Senegal and Mauritania continue and the level of cooperation between Morocco and Spain remains high as in 2013. In addition, the level of migration of Moroccan nationals to the ██████████ is low and is not expected to increase sharply.

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	2011	2012	2013	2014*
ESP-Sea-█ (total)	340	174	283	39
Moroccans	321	104	104	24

*up to 31 March 2014 (FRAN data)

Ultimately, several factors lead to consider that migrants from sub-Saharan countries will predominantly use the West African route during 2014 towards Morocco and Libya with the purpose of entering Spain (southern coast and the enclaves) and Italy.

In this respect, it is worth making reference to:

- The free movement of nationals belonging to the area of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under which they can move freely within the region. Signs that fragile stability is returning or is being maintained in certain areas (Mali - Western Sahara), although, in this respect, the current situation in *Casamance* and the presence of terrorist cells in West African countries might pose an additional threat to the stability of the area, along with famine and poverty.
- *Libya's* continued political instability and the continuous volatility in security, favour facilitation networks and the arrival of sub-Saharan migrants in Libya. In fact increasing numbers of Moroccan, Senegalese, Malian, Mauritanian, Gambian nationals (commonly some of the top nationalities in the JO Hera) were reported in 2013 and are being reported 2014 in the JO Hermes.
- The current increasing irregular migratory pressure in Ceuta and Melilla.

1.5. Recommendations

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ANNEX 2 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS

Objectives	Indicators
Enhance border security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective border control at external borders maintaining preventive effects including detection and prevention of cross border crime • Support to the national authorities of HM in disclosing cases of smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and other cross border crime
Enhance efficiency of border security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detection of all suspicious vessels enabling to intercept persons, to prevent unauthorized border crossings, to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally as well as to report the other illegal activities detected to competent authorities
Enhance operational cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level of MS participation in operational activities • Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations • Enhanced cooperation between national authorities of host MS as well as on international level • Supporting Third countries in Border management activities • Multi-character operational concept to be applied
Enhance exchange of information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collection of operational information from all actors involved and persons debriefed in order to obtain intelligence, thus improving the risk assessments that underpin the operational activities • Distribution of operational information to all involved actors through authorized channels
Enhance efficiency of the exchange of information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of fully automated online reporting system • Seeking standardized format and quality of the reports and interviews • Use of the “Guidelines for JORA Incident Template” giving detailed information on definitions and establishing a sets of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes • Swift information exchange amongst all actors as close to real time as possible
Identify possible risks and threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Debriefing activities to support migration management and obtaining intelligence • Monitoring political, economic and social situation in the countries of origin and transit
Establish and exchange best practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fostering practical cooperation between the authorities involved in prevention and tackling irregular migration as well as cross-border crime • Delivering workshops, meetings, operational briefings, other networking events to participants
Support establishment of permanent structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving and fostering cooperation/information exchange between MS NCC/ICC/RCC
Support provision of trainings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of targeted specific training activities

ANNEX 3 - DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO GUEST OFFICERS AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT)

General

Executive powers

The national border guards of Spain have the leading role in the implementation the joint operation in Operational Area P1.

Guest officers¹ have the capacity to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border surveillance in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code and other applicable EU and international law.

Guest officers may only perform tasks and exercise powers under instructions from and, as a general rule, in presence of the Spanish officers.

In Operational Area P2, the CO of the deployed assets have the leading role in the implementation of the JO.

Uniform and armbands

Guest officers shall wear their national uniform and a blue armband with the insignia of the European Union and Frontex on their uniforms while performing their tasks and exercising their powers.

For the reasons explained in the relevant chapter of the Handbook to OPIAN on Joint Maritime Operations, the request to wear uniform and armbands is not applicable to Screening and Debriefing experts.

Accreditation document

Guest officers shall carry visibly at all times an accreditation document for the purposes of identification. This document shall be presented on request.

Other participants shall carry an accreditation or participation card, in accordance with their status.

Use of Force

When using force, GOs shall not exceed the minimum degree that is absolutely necessary, proportional and reasonable in the circumstances. The use of force or coercive measures is possible for the performance of a duty or in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. The use of force or coercive measures shall never be arbitrary or abusive.

All use of force shall be in strict accordance with the applicable laws and practices of the EU MS/SAC conducting the boarding and with applicable international law.

The Host and participating MSs shall avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety of their vessels (units), and where participants are obstructed in the execution of their duties.

Boarding and search teams of participating units have the inherent right to use all available means to apply that force reasonably necessary to defend themselves or others from physical harm.

Any use of force shall be immediately and promptly reported with all necessary details to ICC/NCC and Frontex.

¹ For the purpose of this document, the expression "guest officer(GO)", includes seconded guest officers(SGO)

National rules on the use of Force

The search onboard a vessel suspected of being involved in a trafficking of migrants should be conducted in a secure way, regarding both the boarding team and the crew, as well as the migrants. Pay attention to every urgent request of the migrants (water, medical assistance, etc). If is necessary the use of force, to repel a violence or defeat a physical opposition, the intensity, the duration and the extent of the reaction shall be proportional to the intensity, to the proximity and to the reality of the threat.

Use of weapons

The use of weapons, as it may affect the life or health of persons, is the last resource of the actions and should only be envisaged as a last resort. It must be strictly proportionate and may only be used in case of legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence of other persons. If the use of a firearm is inevitable the National Officer/GOs shall ensure that it will be done in such a way that causes the less possible injuries and minimizes the damages.

Any use of force shall be immediately and promptly reported with all necessary details to ICC/NCC and Frontex.

Conditions to use weapons (*warnings, targets, etc*)

In international waters, the use of weapons in under the responsibility of the flag state law. In the territorial waters, any use of weapons, by the participating MS assets is generally prohibited. Any urgency shall be immediately communicated to the ICC for proper actions.

The above mentioned guidelines of use of force shall not limit the use of force or use of weapons in self-defence.

Immediate measures to be taken following the use of force and/or weapons

After the use of force or weapons, the GO and/or crew members will immediately contact, if not present at the moment, the Spanish officer referent, in order to manage all the related procedures foreseen by the National law.

Any use of force shall be immediately and promptly reported with all necessary details to ICC/NCC and Frontex.

1. Border surveillance

In accordance with the operational concept, the joint operation consists of border surveillance at the territorial waters of Senegal.

The maritime and aerial participating units, performing border surveillance at the operational area should monitor intensively specific maritime areas on the basis of information provided by the Spanish authorities. The scope of these patrols is to prevent unauthorised border crossings and to tackle cross border crime, in particular smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons and to prevent loss of life at sea.

While implementing the operational concept the participants, and in particular the GOs must:

- ✓ bear in mind that the prevention of loss of lives has overall priority in all operational actions;

- ✓ promote and respect the fundamental rights consigned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or other relevant international law, including the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees;
- ✓ take due account of the safety and security of the vessel, its crew and its cargo;
- ✓ not prejudice the national, commercial or legal interests of the Flag State;
- ✓ ensure within available means, that any measure taken with regard to a particular vessel is environmentally sound under the circumstances;

The following operational concept for the assets has to be applied:

- ✓ - Fixed wings airplane, helicopter and OPV: Surveillance / detection / tracking / identification
- ✓ - OPV and CPV: Detections / tracking / identification / interceptions
- ✓ - CPB: Tracking / interceptions

Flexibility in the patrolling schedule is a key element for the success of the JO. Participating units can be requested by the ICC to reschedule patrolling activities according to operational needs.

Naval bases [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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During border surveillance activities, the following specific instructions must be observed:

Detection

Upon detection, the participating unit shall approach a vessel suspected of carrying persons presumably intending to circumvent checks at border crossing points or of being engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea in order to observe its identity and nationality and, pending further measures, shall survey that vessel at a prudent distance taking all due precautions. The [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Commented [A10]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

And where possible, information about the situation of persons on board, in particular whether there is an imminent risk to their lives or whether there are persons in urgent need of medical assistance. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Interception

Interception in the territorial sea

██████████ and in accordance with the authorization contained in the Bilateral Agreement the participating unit may take one or more of the following measures where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel may be carrying persons intending to circumvent checks at border crossing points or is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea:

- (a) request information and documentation on ownership, registration and elements relating to the voyage of the vessel, and on the identity, nationality and other relevant data on persons on board, including whether there are persons in urgent need of medical assistance, and making persons on board aware that they may not be authorized to cross the sea border of a Member State;
- (b) stop, board and search the vessel, its cargo and persons on board, and question the persons on board.

If evidence confirming that suspicion is found, the content of the Bilateral Agreement authorises the participating unit to take one or more of the following measures:

- (a) seizing the vessel and apprehending persons on board;
- (b) ordering the vessel to alter its course outside of or towards a destination other than the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of a Member State, including escorting the vessel or steaming nearby until it is confirmed that the vessel is keeping to that given course;
- (c) conducting the vessel or persons on board to Senegalese territory.

Any measure taken in accordance with the previous paragraphs shall be proportionate and shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve its objectives.

For the purposes of adopting the aforementioned measures, Spain shall instruct the participating unit appropriately through the ICC.

The participating unit shall inform Spain, through the ICC, whenever the master of the vessel requests that a diplomatic agent or a consular officer of the flag State be notified.

Where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a stateless vessel is carrying persons intending to circumvent the checks at border crossing points or is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, the content of the Bilateral Agreement authorizes one or more of the measures mentioned above. Spain shall instruct the participating unit through the ICC.

Interception in the contiguous zone

██████████ the measures laid down for the Interception in territorial sea may be adopted by the participating units under the conditions mentioned above.

Any authorisation referred to in the previous paragraphs may only be given for measures that are necessary to prevent the infringement of relevant laws and regulations of Senegal.

Where a stateless vessel is transiting the contiguous zone, the participating unit may board and search the vessel with a view to verifying its statelessness. If evidence confirming that suspicion is found, the participating unit shall inform the ICC and may take further appropriate measures as laid down above in accordance with national and international law.

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Interception on the High Seas

On the high seas, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, the participating units shall take one or more of the following measures, subject to the authorisation of the flag State, in accordance with the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, and where relevant, national and international law:

(a) request information and documentation on ownership, registration and elements relating to the voyage of the vessel, and on the identity, nationality and other relevant data on persons on board, including whether there are persons in urgent need of medical assistance;

(b) stop, board and search the vessel, its cargo and persons on board, and question persons on board and inform them that persons directing the vessel may face penalties for facilitating the voyage.

If evidence confirming that suspicion is found, the participating units may take one or more of the following measures, subject to the authorisation of the flag State, in accordance with the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, and where relevant, national and international law:

(a) seize the vessel and apprehending persons on board;

(b) warn and order the vessel not to enter the territorial sea or the contiguous zone, and, where necessary, request the vessel to alter its course towards a destination other than the territorial sea or the contiguous zone;

(c) conduct the vessel or persons on board to the Senegalese territory;

(d) conduct the vessel or persons on board to Spanish territory.

Any measure taken in accordance with the above paragraphs shall be proportionate and shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve its objectives.

For the purposes of adopting the aforementioned measures, Spain shall instruct the participating unit appropriately through the ICC.

- Where the vessel is flying the flag or displays the marks of registry of Spain or Iceland (participating MS), the former or the latter, after confirming the nationality of the vessel, authorise one or more of the aforementioned measures.

Spain shall then instruct the participating unit appropriately through the ICC.

- Where the vessel is flying the flag or displays the marks of registry of a Member State that is not participating in the sea operation or of a third country, Spain or Iceland (participating Member State), depending on whose participating unit has intercepted that vessel, shall notify the flag State, shall request confirmation of registry and, if nationality is confirmed, shall request that the flag State take action to suppress the use of its vessel for smuggling of migrants. If the flag State is unwilling or unable to do so either directly or with the assistance of the Member State to whom the participating unit belongs, that Member State shall request authorisation from the flag State to take any of the aforementioned measures. Spain or Iceland (the participating Member State) shall inform the ICC of any communication with the flag State and of the intended actions or measures authorised by the flag State. Spain shall then instruct the participating unit appropriately through the ICC.
- Where, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is, in reality, of the same nationality as a participating unit, that participating

unit shall verify the vessel's right to fly its flag. To that end, it may approach the suspect vessel. If suspicion remains, it shall proceed to a further examination on board the vessel.

- Where, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is, in reality, of Spanish nationality or any other (participating Member State), the participating unit shall verify the vessel's right to fly its flag.
- Where, in the cases referred to in the two previous paragraphs, the suspicions regarding the nationality of the vessel prove to be founded, Spain or any other (participating Member State) may authorise one or more of the measures laid down above. Spain shall then instruct the participating unit appropriately through the ICC.

Pending or in the absence of authorisation of the flag State, the vessel shall be surveyed at a prudent distance. No other measures shall be taken without the express authorisation of the flag State, except those necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or those measures which derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements.

Where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a stateless vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, the participating unit may board and search the vessel with a view to verifying its statelessness. If evidence confirming that suspicion is found, the participating unit shall inform Spain which may take, directly or with the assistance of the Member State to whom the participating unit belongs, further appropriate measures as referred above in accordance with national and international law.

A Member State whose participating unit has taken any measure shall promptly inform the flag State of the outcome of that measure.

The national official representing Spain or any other participating Member State at the ICC shall be responsible for facilitating communications with the relevant authorities in seeking authorisation to verify the right of a vessel to fly its flag or to take any of the measures aforementioned.

Where the grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants on the high seas prove to be unfounded or where the participating unit does not have jurisdiction to act, but there remains a reasonable suspicion that the vessel is carrying persons intending to reach the border of a Member State and to circumvent checks at border crossing points, that vessel shall continue to be monitored. The ICC shall communicate information about that vessel to the National Coordination Centre of the Member State towards which it is directed.

Search and rescue situations

Member States participating in the JO shall observe their obligation to render assistance to any vessel or person in distress at sea and, during the operation, they shall ensure that their participating units comply with that obligation, in accordance with international law and in respect of fundamental rights. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.

For the purpose of dealing with search and rescue situations that may occur during the operation, the following provisions shall be observed:

(a) When, in the course of the operation, the participating units have reason to believe that they are facing a phase of uncertainty, alert or distress as regards a vessel or any person on board, they shall promptly transmit all available information to the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) responsible for the search and rescue region in which the situation occurs and they shall place themselves at the disposal of that RCC.

(b) The participating units shall inform the ICC as soon as possible of any contact with the RCC and of the course of action taken by them.

(c) A vessel or the persons on board shall be considered to be in a phase of uncertainty in particular:

- (i) when a person has been reported as missing or a vessel is overdue; or

- (ii) when a person or a vessel has failed to make an expected position or safety report.
- (d) A vessel or the persons on board shall be considered to be in a phase of alert in particular:
 - (i) when, following a phase of uncertainty, attempts to establish contact with a person or a vessel have failed and inquiries addressed to other appropriate sources have been unsuccessful; or
 - (ii) when information has been received indicating that the operating efficiency of a vessel is impaired, but not to the extent that a distress situation is likely.
- (e) A vessel or the persons on board shall be considered to be in a phase of distress in particular:
 - (i) when positive information is received that a person or a vessel is in danger and in need of immediate assistance; or
 - (ii) when, following a phase of alert, further unsuccessful attempts to establish contact with a person or a vessel and more widespread unsuccessful inquiries point to the probability that a distress situation exists; or
 - (iii) when information is received which indicates that the operating efficiency of a vessel has been impaired to the extent that a distress situation is likely.
- (f) Participating units shall, for the purpose of considering whether the vessel is in a phase of uncertainty, alert or distress, take into account and transmit all relevant information and observations to the responsible RCC including on:
 - (i) the existence of a request for assistance, although such a request shall not be the sole factor for determining the existence of a distress situation;
 - (ii) the seaworthiness of the vessel and the likelihood that the vessel will not reach its final destination;
 - (iii) the number of persons on board in relation to the type and condition of the vessel;
 - (iv) the availability of necessary supplies such as fuel, water and food to reach a shore;
 - (v) the presence of qualified crew and command of the vessel;
 - (vi) the availability and capability of safety, navigation and communication equipment;
 - (vii) the presence of persons on board in urgent need of medical assistance;
 - (viii) the presence of deceased persons on board;
 - (ix) the presence of pregnant women or of children on board;
 - (x) the weather and sea conditions, including weather and marine forecasts.
- (g) While awaiting instructions from the RCC, participating units shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety of the persons concerned.
- (h) Where a vessel is considered to be in a situation of uncertainty, alert or distress but the persons on board refuse to accept assistance, the participating unit shall inform the responsible RCC and follow its instructions. The participating unit shall continue to fulfil a duty of care by surveying the vessel and by taking any measure necessary for the safety of the persons concerned, while avoiding taking any action that might aggravate the situation or increase the chances of injury or loss of life.

Where the RCC of a third country responsible for the search and rescue region does not respond to the information transmitted by the participating unit, the latter shall contact the RCC of Spain unless that participating unit considers that another internationally recognised RCC is better able to assume coordination of the search and rescue situation.

Where the search and rescue situation has been concluded, the participating unit shall, in consultation with the ICC, resume the operation.

Boarding

Aiming at the enforcement of international law, in particular relating to immigration, the participating unit may board the suspicious vessel.

Pre-boarding activity

Before boarding a particular vessel, the participating unit must take in consideration at least the following elements:

(a) Right of approach. The CO of the participating vessel must be aware that under international law, a war vessel, military aircraft, or other duly authorized vessel may approach in international waters any vessel, other than a war vessel or government vessel on non-commercial service, to verify its nationality.

(b) Authority and jurisdiction: The CO of the participating vessel must ascertain whether their authority and jurisdiction exist prior to conducting a boarding and/or taking follow-up law enforcement action. Additionally, they are required to comply with internal practice guidance that may limit the exercise of authority and jurisdiction without first obtaining a statement of no objection from ICC.

(c) Risk/benefit assessment and safeguards. Given the limited number of enforcement resources, the maritime units cannot board all vessels encountered, and therefore, operational cost/benefit decisions should be made by the CO.

While all possible contingencies cannot be addressed, the following factors figure prominently in deciding whether to initiate a boarding:

- Safety of personnel and property.
- Probability of detecting unlawful conduct.
- Impact on maritime commerce and boating public.

Boarding procedures

Detailed guidance and explicit boarding procedures and tactics have to be developed by each participating MS to ensure that boarding is conducted safely and effectively.

Boarding teams

COs are responsible for ensuring their law enforcement personnel are properly trained and equipped to carry out their duties. At the discretion of the CO, non-qualified Coast Guard personnel (e.g., break-in boarding personnel, cadets, and engineering personnel) may support the boarding team in the progress of their action.

- ✓ Boarding officer: The boarding officer, under the CO's supervision, is in charge of the boarding team and is responsible for the proper conduct of the boarding.
- ✓ Qualified boarding team members: Law enforcement team members may consist of qualified personnel from different MS.
- ✓ Other law enforcement agencies: When multinational boarding team is used, they agree in advance to follow the boarding officer's direction and comply with customary policy governing the use of force. Special circumstances may dictate deviation from this policy with the agreement of the ICC.
- ✓ Boarding team qualifications: Boarding officers are required to meet the national criteria related to the boarding.
- ✓ Boarding team size: Boarding teams are comprised of at least two qualified personnel, at least one of which is a qualified boarding officer. Boarding team size beyond this minimum requirement is determined on a case-by-case basis.

Factors to be taken into consideration when making these determinations include:

[REDACTED]

Commented [A12]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

[REDACTED]

Detention and release of persons and property

Vessels, the persons aboard, and property associated with either may be detained at sea, by the participating unit, for the time reasonably necessary to:

- (a) ensure the safety of persons and property;
- (b) complete an assessment of a possible violation of law (including interviewing persons on board). Information about the aim of the ongoing procedure must be provided;
- (c) effect other law enforcement action (e.g., seizing the boat, detain a facilitator); and
- (d) carry out the enforcement of a judicial decision where the vessel, person or property is subject to such order (e.g., vessel subject to forfeiture or person subject to arrest).

No person shall, in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, be forced to enter, conducted to or otherwise handed over to the authorities of a country where, inter alia, there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion or from which there is a serious risk of an expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

Based on the information collected by the Host MS² and the General Assessment of the Host MS, Spain, Iceland and Frontex agree that apprehended persons may be conducted to or be handed over to the Senegalese authorities, and that apprehended and rescued persons may be disembarked in Senegal.

² In accordance with the clarification requested, the Host Member State collected information from the following sources: diplomatic missions of Spain in Senegal, internal reports of the Directors of Interior in Senegal, progress reports from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) and enquiry of data from international organizations (Ref: SGRIE/24.06.2014 - "20140624 ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN SENEGAL"), annexed and constituting an integral part of the current operational plan.

PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

The participating units shall, without prejudice to the primacy of the safety of the persons intercepted or rescued and the safety of the participating units or that of third parties, use all means to identify the intercepted or rescued persons, assess their personal circumstances, inform them of their destination in a way that those persons understand or may reasonably be presumed to understand and give them an opportunity to express any reasons for believing that disembarkation in the proposed place would be in violation of the principle of *non-refoulement*.

For those purposes, Spain and Senegal ensure the availability of shore-based in Dakar of medical staff, interpreters, legal advisers and other relevant experts that shall provide support for the screening and personal assessment of the persons apprehended or rescued at the designated points of disembarkation in Senegal.

Each participating unit appoints an Officer responsible for the final decision on the personal assessment referred to above that shall collect all information mentioned above and forward it regularly to the ICC and to Frontex.

Rules for security body searches and evidence collection on the spot

All the activities shall be implemented with regards to the National law and the eventual necessity to ask the authorization, through the Spanish police officers involved in the operational activities, to the Judicial Authority.

Disembarkation

No person shall, in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, be disembarked in a country where, *inter alia*, there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or from which there is a serious risk of an expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.

Disembarkation of people apprehended subsequently to interception

The participating units are authorized by Senegal to disembark in its territory the persons intercepted and apprehended in its territorial sea as well as in the operational area beyond its territorial sea.

Disembarkation of people rescued

The main applicable principle to be observed is that the responsibility to provide a place of safety, or to ensure that a place of safety is provided, falls on the State responsible for the SAR region in which the survivors were recovered, as set forth in relevant applicable international legal instruments.

It shall be ensured that coordination and cooperation with the relevant SAR authorities is carried out in such a way that the persons rescued can be delivered to a place of safety.

Spain and Iceland (participating Member State) shall cooperate with the responsible RCC to identify a place of safety and, when it will be designated such a place of safety, they shall ensure that disembarkation of the rescued persons is carried out rapidly and effectively.

If it is not possible to arrange for the participating unit to be released of its obligation to render assistance as soon as reasonably practicable, taking into account the safety of the rescued persons and that of the participating unit itself, it shall be authorised to disembark the rescued persons in Spain.

The participating units shall inform the ICC of the presence of any persons in need of international protection and vulnerable persons, and the ICC shall transmit that information to the competent national authorities of the country where disembarkation takes place.

The aforementioned paragraphs on GENERAL AND PERSONAL ASSESSMENT apply to the disembarkation of rescued persons.

Follow-up measures

Provision of basic human needs

Each participating unit shall include at least one person with basic first aid training. Furthermore, upon disembarkation, Senegal shall, prior to any other action, render the basic human needs of the apprehended and rescued persons such as food, shelter and medical assistance.

Special measures applicable to persons in need of international protection

Senegal, with the support of Spain shall address the special needs of persons in need of international protection.

COs and national EU officers shall refer to the national Senegalese officer with whom they work when a person expressed, in any way, a fear of suffering serious harm if (s)he is returned to his/her country of origin or former habitual residence, or if he/she asks or claims for asylum or any other form of international protection.

The Senegalese officer shall hand over those persons referred by the COs and national EU officers to the competent authority - Senegalese National Police - for an examination of their status.

Special measures applicable to vulnerable persons

Senegal, Spain and any other participating MS shall address the special needs of children, including unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons in need of urgent medical assistance, disabled persons, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, persons with mental disorders and persons who could have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation.

COs and GOs shall refer without delay to the national Senegalese officer with whom they work other vulnerable persons as described above. The national Senegalese officer shall hand over to the competent national authority.

The responsible authority of Senegal for ensuring the Follow up measures is:

- Senegalese National Police

[REDACTED] AREA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A13]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the operational area. Their disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

ANNEX 5 - INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES

MS	Authority	Human and technical resources	Deployment dates	OMNTE / Additional TE/GO/SGO
Spain	Guardia Civil	CPV	01/08/2014 31/10/2014	OMNTE
Spain	Guardia Civil	OPV Rio Tajo	01/08/2014 31/10/2014	OMNTE
Spain	Guardia Civil	FWA	20/09/2014 10/10/2014	
Iceland	Coast Guard	FWA	11/10/2014 31/10/2014	
Spain	Guardia Civil	ICC Coordinator	01/08/2014 31/10/2014	
Spain	Guardia Civil	1 ICC Staff	01/08/2014 31/10/2014	
Spain	CNP	1 IO	01/08/2014 31/10/2014	
Spain	Guardia Civil	RCC Coordinator	01/08/2014 31/10/2014	
Spain	Guardia Civil	RCC Staff	01/08/2014 31/10/2014	
Spain	Guardia Civil	LCC Coordinator	01/08/2014 31/10/2014	
Spain	Guardia Civil	Technical Staff	TBD	

REMARK:

Any changes related to deployments of the resources in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated Deployment Overview will be available upon request during implementation phase. The final list of deployed resources will be available in Frontex Evaluation Report (FER).

ANNEX 6 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING

1. Operational briefing

During the first days of deployment all participants taking part in the joint operation will receive the Operational Briefing delivered by Frontex and national authorities of the host MS.

1.1 General briefing delivered by Frontex

The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex.

1.1.1. National Officials, Officers of host MS, Observers and Debriefing Experts from home MS (if deployed)

- All participants listed above will be briefed by FOC at the beginning of their deployment in a centralized way in the ICC Madrid;
- Briefing on JORA will be delivered by FOC with the support of FSC;
- In exceptional cases, if respective participants are not available for the centralized Operational briefing in the ICC, the briefing will be delivered on the spot, if possible.

1.1.2. Crew members

- Crew members will be briefed by Operational Team in the operational areas at the beginning of deployment. In case the briefing cannot be delivered on spot, the NO in the ICC is responsible for transferring the information received by him in the ICC to the crew members.

1.2 National briefing delivered by host MS

The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host MS based on the deployment overviews provided by Joint Operations Unit (JOU).

The National briefers are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by TRU.

The National briefers nominated by Spanish authorities will deliver the National briefing to the experts, NOS and officers of host MS during the first day of deployment in a centralized way in the ICC Madrid and in the course of the JO in the Operational area upon arrival. In exceptional cases, if respective participants are not available for the centralized Operational briefing in the ICC, the briefing will be delivered on the spot.

The National briefers nominated by Spanish authorities will deliver the National briefing to the crew members in the operational areas during the first day of deployment for the first round of deployments and on the spot for the subsequent deployments. If the briefing on the spot shouldn't be possible the ICC shall brief the crew members through the NO.

National briefer shall:

- Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews
- Report to the project manager (TRU) any irregularities regarding briefings carried out;

- Support the development process of training courses, tools and materials, including the implementation process of such activities;
- Prepare Report of National Briefer after each activity and submit it to the project manager (TRU);
- Assist in preparing assessments and evaluations of the operational activities.

In case the Spanish authorities have not nominated National briefers in the location where resources will be deployed, LCC Coordinator is responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. In this case the LCC Coordinators will prepare the report of National Briefers after each activity and submit to the project manager (TRU).

2. Operational debriefing

- The Operational debriefing for all participants will be performed by Operational Team members in close cooperation with local authorities in the operational areas during the last days of deployment;
- In case the Operational debriefing cannot be organized for each deployed asset, it can be limited to NO within the ICC;
- The Report from Participants is considered to be as part of Operational debriefing.

Standard plan for operational briefing and debriefing is available in Handbook.

ANNEX 7 - COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

1. Third Country Observers

The Observers from Third Countries participate in the operation pursuant to Article 14(6) of Frontex Regulation and, when signed, the existing working arrangements between Frontex and the competent authorities of the participating Third Country. They have no executive powers to carry out border control tasks, and are not authorized to take any measures against any person. They may only advice and exchange/obtain practical experience.

In particular, the Observers from Third Countries can:

- Intermediate between the national authorities of the host MS and their national authorities on border related incidents and information sharing;
- Support the officers of national authorities of host MS during the examination of travel documents;
- Assist with special language and/or professional skills;
- Participate in combined patrols at the maritime borders with the local officers;
- Exchange intelligence information regarding the modus operandi, routes and criminal networks operating in the area of concern detected during and in the framework of the operation, in accordance with their respective legislation;
- Participate in JCB meetings, when appropriate and after consultation with the FOC.

Further tasks and duties can be executed according to the national legislation of the home/host country.

2. Relation with Third Countries within the geographical area of the Operation - Fundamental Rights and Data protection

According to the assessment of the situation in third countries that are in the geographical area of the Operation (considered transit countries or countries of origin of mixed flows of migrants detected during the Joint Operation), migrants and eventual asylum seekers might be disembarked in those third countries only if the assessment of the situation concludes that the country complies with "principle of non-refoulement".

Exchange of personal data with third countries regarding intercepted or rescued persons obtained during a sea operation, shall be strictly limited to what is absolutely necessary and shall be carried out in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and the relevant national provisions on data protection.

If according to the assessment done on the situation there is a serious risk of contravention of the "principle of non-refoulement" in a certain third country, exchange of personal data is forbidden regarding intercepted or rescued persons originated from that third country.

ANNEX 8 - COOPERATION WITH OTHER UNION AGENCIES AND BODIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

1. Cooperation with Europol

Frontex and Europol cooperate during the JO through exchange of information and intelligence. In particular, Frontex shall instruct debriefing experts that any personal data gathered during debriefing on facilitators or persons suspected of being involved in the facilitation of irregular immigration, terrorism or other crimes shall be passed to the hosting authorities.

It is recommended that the hosting authorities provide to Europol, via the Europol National Unit of host MS the personal data referred to above.

2. Cooperation with EFCA

Cooperation with EFCA, within the framework of the Joint Operation will be based on information exchange channels and structures established by Host MS.

Typically cooperation should focus on the exchange of information, namely sightings, as regards fisheries control within JO operational area. EFCA dedicated contact point will receive, via the competent national authority, the whole collated or collected information (pictures and/or videos) related to possible illegal fishing cases that might be detected by participating assets during patrolling activities. EFCA's template with the minimum requirements for sighting information to be collected in case of detection of a fishing boat will be used by participants. EFCA's contact point will provide the ICC with the list of vessels of interest from fisheries perspective as well as inform on position of detected boats during EFCA's campaign which could be of possible interest for Frontex. Also EFCA will deliver to the crew-members from participating MS airborne and seaborne assets a tailored briefing package on fisheries control.

Also ad-hoc cooperation on case by case basis can take place.

3. Cooperation with UNHCR

The Sahel region continues to be plagued by political upheaval, especially in Mali, neighbouring country to Senegal. Frontex signed a Working Arrangement with UNHCR on 13 June 2008 and their presence in Senegal could serve to support the work of the national authorities in enhancing their capacity to tackle the needs and protection concerns of refugees and asylum seekers in the area

4. Cooperation with EMSA

Cooperation with EMSA will be carried on based on information exchange channels and structures established by Host MS.

5. Cooperation with MAOC

The cooperation between MAOC, host and participating MS and Frontex will be carried out as agreed during the tri-lateral meeting (host MS, EU Agencies and Frontex) held in Madrid on May 13, 2014; MAOC will make available to the ICC (through the Centre of Intelligence against Organized Crime - CICO) its updated "Vessel of Interest" list (VOI) to be used by the deployed assets during their patrolling activities. CICO will report the mentioned list to the ICC and the relevant Spanish Authorities following national procedures.

In case a participating asset detects a VOI and/or has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in illicit traffic, the following actions should be undertaken:

Immediate report via established communication channels to the ICC of all relevant information (position, route, track, speed, identification, etc.) allowing the Spanish authorities' prompt reaction and predisposition of tailored countermeasures.

ICC has to send this information to MAOC via CICO.

MAOC will provide the case-owner requirements regarding the VOI to the ICC via CICO. The feedback related to the VOI from ICC to MAOC should also be channelled through CICO.

Furthermore, when possible, MAOC will provide to the ICC with other relevant information regarding drug trafficking in the operational area via CICO.

However, all law enforcement actions (e.g. boarding, search and seizing of the vessel) may only be taken by Member State Security Forces based on their respective competences.


In addition to that ICC might instruct:

- the sighting (naval and air) assets to support in stopping, pursuit the VOI, in accordance to the relevant International law of the sea;
- the sighting (naval) assets to support in search the VOI, in case clear evidences of dealing with illicit traffics are discovered. The support does not involve the competence to actively be engaged in the search.

MS/SAC assets' CO should document (by taking photos and/or videos) all actions (detection and interception) and to submit all materials to ICC and Frontex ASAP.

6. Cooperation with Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) can support Frontex in the mainstreaming of fundamental rights in all Frontex activities. Upon request, FRA can provide guidance on how to implement fundamental rights in Frontex operations. Frontex and FRA also cooperate in the planning and implementation of research at the external EU borders. FRA chairs the Frontex Consultative Forum and works in close cooperation with the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer. Staff deployed by Frontex are encouraged to use materials published by FRA available at www.fra.europa.eu, in particular the [Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration](#) as well as the [Handbook on European data protection law](#).

ANNEX 9 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME**Commented [A14]:**

The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the command & control scheme of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials engaged in the operation and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

ANNEX 10 - JORA

1. JORA Actors

Role	Name	FX/MS	Entity	E-mail	Phone
JORA Administrator / Service Management	[REDACTED]	FX	FSC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	FX	FSC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	FX	SBS	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Delegated Frontex Access Manager	[REDACTED]	FX	SBS	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Template Creator	[REDACTED]	FX	RAU	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
National Access Manager 1	[REDACTED]	Spain	Guardia Civil	[REDACTED]	
National Access Manager 2	[REDACTED]	Spain	Guardia Civil	[REDACTED]	
National Access Manager 3					


Commented [A15]:

The blanked out parts also contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

The blanked out parts also contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.


NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different actors are described in the JORA Policy and Process business documentation

2. JORA Incidents Reporting Structure



Commented [A16]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the reporting mechanisms of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would expose law enforcement officials engaged in the operation and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

3. JORA Reporting Timeline



Commented [A17]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the reporting mechanisms of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials engaged in the operation and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

4. JORA Incident Template Attributes' List

General information

No	Name of attribute	Mandatory ³	Remarks
1	Primary Incident type	mandatory	
2	Secondary Incident Type		
3	Incident number	(automatic)	
4	Date of reporting	(automatic)	
5	Operational Area	mandatory	
6	Reference to Operational Area	mandatory	
7	Detection date		
8	Coordinates Detection		
9	Type/Subtype Detected by		
10	Interception Date		
11	Coordinates Interception		
12	Type/Subtype Intercepted by		
13	Search and Rescue		
14	Eurosur Border Section	mandatory	
15	Incident Impact Level	mandatory	

Persons Information

16	Country/Place of Departure	mandatory	
17	Place of Disembarkation		
18	Migrants Prevented from Departure		
19	Victims of Trafficking		
20	Death Cases		
21	Number of People		

³ Please mark the respective cells under „Mandatory“ if you deem that the relevant field should be mandatorily filled by the Incident Reporter. By doing so, the Incident Reporter will be compelled to enter the mandatory data to submit the Incident Report to the next validation level.

22	Age		
23	Is Adult		
24	Nationality Claimed		
25	Nationality Presumed		
26	Nationality Confirmed		
27	Gender		
28	Accompanied		
29	By Relative		
30	Primary Role of Person	mandatory	
31	Secondary Role of Person		
32	Reasons for Refusal		
33	Document Information		

Additional Information

34	Documents Alerts information		
35	Attachments		
36	Number of transport Means		
37	Transport Type		
38	Boat destroyed by		
39	Comments	mandatory	
40	Primary Smuggling of		
41	Secondary Smuggling of		
42	Quantity of Smuggled Goods 1		
43	Quantity of Smuggled Goods 2		
44	Additional Vessel Information		

ANNEX 11 - CONTACT DETAILS

1. General

Authority	Address	Contact
Frontex (HQ)	Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland	frontex@frontex.europa.eu
NCC Madrid	Calle Guzmán el Bueno, 110 Madrid CP 28003 Spain	

2. Frontex

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address
Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Manager	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Team	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Operational Analyst	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
FX Situation Centre (FSC)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Spokesperson	Izabella Cooper	+48 22 205 95 35 +48 667 667 292	press@frontex.europa.eu
Press Officer	Ewa Moncure	+48 22 205 9635 +48 785 001 374	press@frontex.europa.eu

Commented [A18]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, thus facilitating irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The blanked out parts also contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

3. Host MS - Spain

3.1. Guardia Civil

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address	Location
Head Of NCC	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [A19]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

The blanked out parts also contain the names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In this regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

NCC Operational room				
Operations Department				
Risk Analysis Unit				
ICC Room :				
CRCC Canarias				

3.2. Cuerpo Nacional de Policía

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address	Location
General Commissariat for Aliens and Borders				

4. Other

Role	Name	Phone number	Email address	Location

REMARK:

Any changes related to the contact details of the participants in the course of the joint operation do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan. The updated contact details will be available and shared with the participants during implementation phase on a need basis.

ANNEX 12 - ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND LOGISTICS

1. Recommended accommodation

Location	Name	Phone number/ e-mail	Fixed price for FX in EUR	Walking distance to LCC Yes/NO	Internet included Yes/NO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		■	■
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		■	■
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]				
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]				

Commented [A20]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the accommodation of law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the safety of officials involved in future and ongoing operations in the same area, thus harming the course of these operations and facilitating irregular migration. In light of the above the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.

2. Firearms and ammunitions transportation

The aim of this practical note is to draw your attention to a sensitive issue of transporting weapons and ammunition. The guidelines are given in general and are still subject to more restrictive policy applied by the sending Member State, airlines used for the particular legs of the journey and even the airport security authorities of both the departure and transfer airports.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [A21]: The blanked-out parts contain detailed operational information regarding the transportation of service weapons and ammunition. These security rules are addressed to law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would pose a risk to the general safety and for this reason the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.



Photo of a firearm properly packed.



Photo of a firearm and ammunition improperly packaged.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]