Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

Over the course of the last two years, the European Union has been working on simultaneously addressing the separate challenges of migration management, integrated border management of the EU’s external borders and the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime. Effective information exchange amongst Member States, and between Member States and the relevant EU agencies, is essential to providing a robust response to those challenges and to building an effective and genuine Security Union.

The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the most successful tool for the effective cooperation of immigration, police, customs and judicial authorities in the EU and the Schengen associated countries. Competent authorities in the Member States such as police, border guards and customs officers need to have access to high quality information about the persons or objects they are checking, with clear instructions about what needs to be done in each case. This large-scale information system is at the very heart of Schengen cooperation and plays a crucial role in facilitating the free movement of people within the Schengen area. It enables competent authorities to enter and consult data on wanted persons, persons who may not have the right to enter or stay in the EU, missing persons – in particular children – and objects that may have been stolen, misappropriated or lost. SIS not only contains information about a particular person or object but also clear instructions for the competent authorities on what to do with that person or object once found.

In 2016, the Commission carried out a comprehensive evaluation\(^1\) of SIS, three years after the entry into operation of its second generation. This evaluation showed that SIS has been a genuine operational success. In 2015, national competent authorities checked persons and objects against data held in SIS on nearly 2.9 billion occasions and exchanged over 1.8 million pieces of supplementary information. Nonetheless, as announced in the Commission Work Programme 2017, building on this positive experience, the effectiveness and efficiency of the system should be further strengthened. To this end, the Commission is presenting a first set of three proposals to improve and extend the use of SIS as result of the evaluation while continuing its work to make existing and future law enforcement and border management systems more interoperable, following up on the ongoing work of the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability.

These proposals cover the use of the system (a) for border management, (b) for police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and (c) for the return of illegally staying third country nationals. The first two proposals together form the legal bases for the establishment, operation and use of the SIS. The proposal for the use of SIS for the return of illegally staying third country nationals supplements the proposal for border management and

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\(^1\) Report to the European Parliament and Council on the evaluation of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in accordance with Art. 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Art. 59 (3) and 66(5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA and an accompanying Staff Working Document. (OJ…).
complements the provisions contained therein. It establishes a new alert category and contributes to the implementation and monitoring of Directive 2008/115/EC².

Due to the variable geometry in Member States' participation in EU policies in the area of freedom, security and justice, it is necessary to adopt three separate legal instruments which will nonetheless work seamlessly together to enable the comprehensive operation and use of the system.

In parallel, with a view to enhancing and improving information management at EU level, in April 2016, the Commission began a process of reflection on "Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security".³ The overarching objective is to ensure that competent authorities systematically have the necessary information from different information systems at their disposal. In order to achieve this objective, the Commission has been reviewing the existing information architecture to identify information gaps and blind spots that result from shortcomings in the functionalities of existing systems, as well as from fragmentation in the EU’s overall architecture of data management. The Commission set up a High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to support this work, whose interim findings have also informed this first set of proposals as regards issues of data quality.⁴ President Juncker’s State of the Union address in September 2016 also referred to the importance of overcoming the current shortcomings in information management and of improving the interoperability and interconnection between existing information systems.

Following the findings of the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability, which will be presented in the first half of 2017, the Commission will consider a second set of proposals to further improve interoperability of SIS with other IT systems in mid-2017. The review of Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011⁵ concerning the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA) is an equally important element of this work and is likely to be the subject of separate Commission proposals also in 2017. Investing in swift, effective and qualitative information exchange and information management and ensuring the interoperability of EU databases and information systems is an important aspect of addressing current security challenges.

This proposal forms part of a first set of proposals⁶ to improve the functioning of SIS and its operation and use in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It implements:

(1) the Commission's announcement to improve the added value of the SIS for law enforcement purposes⁷ to respond to new threats;

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consolidation of the results of the work on the implementation of SIS carried out in the last three years entailing technical amendments to the Central SIS in order to extend some of the existing alert categories and provide new functionalities;

recommendations for technical and procedural changes resulting from a comprehensive evaluation of the SIS;

requests from SIS end-users for technical improvements; and

the interim findings of the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability as regards data quality.

In light of the fact that this proposal is intrinsically linked to the Commission proposal for a Regulation on the establishment, operation and use of the SIS in the field of border checks, a number of provisions are common to both texts. These include measures covering the end-to-end use of SIS, including not only the operation of the central and national systems, but also end-user needs; strengthened measures for business continuity; measures addressing data quality, data protection and data security, and provisions concerning monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements. Both proposals also extend the use of biometric information.

The current legal framework of the second generation of SIS – concerning its use for the purposes of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters – is based upon a former third pillar instrument: Council Decision 2007/533/JHA as well as a former first pillar instrument: Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006. This proposal consolidates the content of the existing instruments whilst adding new provisions so as to:

- better harmonise national procedures for the use of SIS, in particular with regard to terrorism related offences as well as children being at risk of parental abduction;
- extend the scope of SIS by introducing new elements of biometric identifiers to existing alerts;
- introduce technical changes to improve security and help reduce administrative burden by providing for compulsory national copies and common technical standards for implementation;
- address the complete end-to-end use of SIS, covering not only the central and national systems, but also ensuring that end-users receive all necessary data to perform their tasks and they comply with all security rules when they process SIS data.

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10 Please see Section 5 'Other elements' for detailed explanation of the changes included in this proposal.


• Consistency with other Union policies as well as with existing and future legal instruments

This proposal is closely linked with and complements other Union policies, namely:

(1) **Internal security** as underlined in the European Agenda on Security\(^{13}\) and the Commission’s work towards an effective and genuine Security Union\(^{14}\) to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist offences and other serious crimes by enabling law enforcement authorities to process personal data of persons suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism or serious crimes.

(2) **Data protection** insofar as this proposal ensures the protection of fundamental rights of individuals whose personal data is processed in SIS.

This proposal is also closely linked with and complements existing Union legislation, namely:

(3) **European Border and Coast Guard** as regards their access to SIS for the purposes of the proposed European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)\(^{15}\), as well as for providing a technical interface for SIS access to European Border and Coast Guard Teams, teams of staff involved in return-related tasks and members of the migration management support team to, within their mandate, have the right to access and search data entered in SIS.

(4) **Europol** insofar as this proposal grants Europol additional rights to access and search of data, within its mandate, that have been entered in SIS.

(5) **Prüm** insofar as the developments in this proposal to enable the identification of individuals on the basis of fingerprints (as well as facial images and DNA profiles) complements the existing Prüm provisions\(^{16}\) on mutual cross-border online access to designated national DNA databases and automated fingerprint identification systems.

This proposal is also closely linked with and complements future Union legislation, namely:

(6) **Management of the external borders.** The proposal complements the envisaged new principle in the Schengen Borders Code of the systematic checks against relevant databases of all travellers, including the EU citizens, upon entry and exit to the Schengen area, as established in response to the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters.

(7) **Entry/Exit System.** The proposal seeks to reflect the proposed use of a combination of fingerprint and facial image as biometric identifiers for the operation of the Entry/Exit System (EES).

(8) **ETIAS.** The proposal takes into account the proposed ETIAS which provides for a thorough security assessment, including a check in SIS, of third country nationals who intend to travel in the EU.

\(^{13}\) COM(2015) 185 final.


\(^{15}\) COM(2016) 731 final.

2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

• Legal basis

This proposal uses Articles 82(1)(d), 85(1), 87(2)(a) and 88(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as the legal bases for provisions concerning police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

• Variable geometry

This proposal builds upon the provisions of the Schengen acquis related to police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Therefore the following consequences in relation to the various protocols and agreements with associated countries have to be considered:

Denmark: According to Article 4 of Protocol 22 on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaties, Denmark shall decide, within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Regulation, whether it will implement this proposal, which builds upon the Schengen acquis, in its national law.

The United Kingdom: In accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 8(2) of Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000, concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, the United Kingdom is bound by this Regulation.

Ireland: In accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 6(2) of Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, Ireland is bound by this Regulation.

Bulgaria and Romania: This Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis, within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession. This Regulation has to be read in conjunction with Council Decision 2010/365/EU of 29 June 2010 which rendered applicable, subject to some restrictions, the provisions of the Schengen acquis related to the Schengen Information System in Bulgaria and Romania.

Cyprus and Croatia: This Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within, respectively, the meaning of Article 3(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession and Article 4(2) of the 2011 Act of Accession.

Associated Countries: On the basis of the respective agreements associating those countries with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein are to be bound by the Regulation proposed.

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17 OJ L 131, 1.6.2000, p. 43.
• **Subsidiarity**

This proposal will develop and build upon the existing SIS, which has been operational since 1995. The original intergovernmental framework was replaced by Union instruments on 9 April 2013 (Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA). A full subsidiarity analysis has been carried out in previous occasions; this initiative aims at further refining the existing provisions, addressing identified gaps and improving operational procedures.

The considerable level of information exchange between Member States through SIS cannot be achieved via decentralised solutions. By reason of the scale, effects and impacts of the action, this proposal can be better achieved at Union level.

The objectives of this proposal encompass, inter alia, technical improvements to enhance the efficiency of SIS, as well as efforts to harmonise the use of the system across all participating Member States. Due to the transnational nature of these aims and of the challenges in ensuring effective information exchange to counter ever diversifying threats, the EU is well placed to propose solutions to these issues, which cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States alone.

If existing limitations to SIS are not addressed, there is a risk that numerous opportunities for maximised efficiency and EU added value are missed and that there are blind spots impeding the work of competent authorities. As an example, the lack of harmonised rules on the deletion of redundant alerts within the system can lead to the hindrance of free movement of persons as a fundamental principle of the Union.

• **Proportionality**

Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union states that action by the Union shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives set out in the Treaty. The form chosen for this EU action must enable the proposal to achieve its objective and be implemented as effectively as possible. The proposed initiative constitutes a revision of SIS in relation to police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

The proposal is driven by the *privacy by design* principles. In terms of the right to protection of personal data, this proposal is proportionate as it provides for specific alert deletion rules and does not require the collection and storage of data for longer than is absolutely necessary to allow the system to function and meet its objectives. Based on consideration of the operational requirements, this proposal reduces the retention period for object alerts and brings them into line with person related alerts (as they are many times related to personal data, such as a personal identification documents or number plates). Policing experience show that stolen property can be recovered within a relatively short period of time which makes a 10 year expiry date for object alerts unnecessarily long.

SIS alerts contain only the data which is required to identify and locate a person or an object and to enable appropriate operational action. All other additional details are provided via the SIRENE Bureaux enabling the exchange of supplementary information.

In addition, the proposal provides for the implementation of all necessary safeguards and mechanisms required for the effective protection of the fundamental rights of the data subjects; particularly the protection of their private life and personal data. It also includes provisions designed specifically to strengthen the security of individuals' personal data held in SIS.
No further processes or harmonisation will be necessary at EU level to make the system work. The envisaged measure is proportionate in that it does not go beyond what is necessary in terms of action at EU level to meet the defined objectives.

- **Choice of the instrument**

The proposed revision will take the form of a Regulation and will replace Council Decision 2007/533/JHA whilst retaining much of the content of that Decision. Decision 2007/533/JHA was adopted as a so-called 'third pillar instrument' under the former Treaty on the European Union. Such 'third pillar' instruments were adopted by the Council without the European Parliament as co-legislator. The legal basis of this proposal is in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) since the pillar structure ceased to exist with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. The legal basis commands the use of the ordinary legislative procedure. The form of a Regulation (of the European Parliament and of the Council) has to be chosen because the provisions are to be binding and directly applicable in all Member States.

The proposal will build on and enhance an existing centralised system through which Member States cooperate with each other, something which requires a common architecture and binding operating rules. Moreover, it lays down mandatory rules on access to the system including for the purpose of law enforcement which are uniform for all Member States as well as the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA). Since 9 May 2013, eu-LISA is responsible for the operational management Central SIS, which consists of all tasks necessary to ensure the full operation of Central SIS 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This proposal builds on the responsibilities of eu-LISA in relation to SIS.

Furthermore, the proposal provides for directly applicable rules enabling data subjects' access to their own data and remedies without requiring further implementing measures in this respect.

As a consequence, only a Regulation can be chosen as a legal instrument.

3. **RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS**

- **Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation**

In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, three years after its entry into operation, the Commission carried out an overall evaluation of Central SIS II as well as of the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member States.

The results of the evaluation highlighted the need for changes to the SIS legal basis in order to provide a better response to new security and migration challenges. This includes for example a proposal to address the end-to-end perspective of SIS by regulating its use by the end-users and setting out data security standards applicable also to end-user applications, to reinforce the system for counter-terrorism purposes by providing a new action to be taken, clarify the situation of children who are under threat to be abducted by their parents as well as to expand the biometric identifiers available in the system.

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The evaluation results also showed the need for legal amendments in order to improve the technical functioning of the system and to streamline national processes. These measures will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of SIS by facilitating its use and reducing unnecessary burden. Further measures are designed to enhance the data quality and transparency of the system by more clearly describing the specific reporting tasks of Member States and eu-LISA.

The results of the comprehensive evaluation (the evaluation report and the related Staff Working Document were adopted on 21 December 2016\(^{21}\)) have formed the basis of the measures contained within this proposal.

- **Stakeholder consultations**

During the Commission's evaluation of SIS, feedback and suggestions were sought from relevant stakeholders, including delegates to the SISVIS Committee under the procedure established in Article 67 of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. This Committee includes the Member States’ representatives on both operational SIRENE matters (cross-border cooperation in relation to SIS) and technical matters in the development and maintenance of SIS and the related SIRENE application.

Delegates responded to detailed questionnaires as part of the evaluation process. Where further clarification was necessary or the subject needed to be further developed this was achieved through email exchange or targeted interview. This iterative process allowed issues to be raised in a comprehensive and transparent way. Throughout 2015 and 2016, delegates to the SISVIS Committee discussed these issues in dedicated meetings and workshops.

The Commission also consulted specifically with Member State national data protection authorities and members of the SIS II Supervision Coordination Group in the field of data protection. Member States shared their experiences on subject access requests and the work of national data protection authorities by responding to a dedicated questionnaire. The responses to this questionnaire from June 2015 have informed the development of this proposal.

Internally, the Commission set up an Inter-service Steering Group including the Secretariat-General and the Directorates-General for Migration and Home Affairs, Justice and Consumers, Human Resources and Security, and Informatics. This steering group monitored the evaluation process and provided guidance as needed.

The evaluation's findings also took into account evidence collected during on-site evaluation visits to Member States examining in detail how SIS is used in practice. This includes discussions and interviews with practitioners, SIRENE Bureau staff and national competent authorities.

In light of this feedback, this proposal makes provision for measures to improve the technical and operational efficiency and effectiveness of the system.

- **Collection and use of expertise**

In addition to the stakeholder consultations, the Commission also sought external expertise via three studies, the findings of which have been incorporated in the developments of this proposal:

• SIS Technical Assessment (Kurt Salmon)\textsuperscript{22}

This assessment identified the key issues in the functioning of SIS and future needs that should be addressed, primarily identifying concerns with regards to maximising business continuity and ensuring that the overall architecture can adapt to increasing capacity requirements.

• ICT Impact Assessment of Possible Improvements to the SIS II Architecture (Kurt Salmon)\textsuperscript{23}

This study assessed the current cost of operating SIS at national level and evaluated two possible technical scenarios for the improvement of the system. Both scenarios include a set of technical proposals focusing on improvements to the central system and overall architecture;

• "ICT Impact Assessment of the technical improvements to the SIS II architecture – Final Report", 10 November 2016, (Wavestone)\textsuperscript{24}

This study assessed the cost impacts on Member States of the implementation of a national copy by analysing three scenarios (a fully centralised system, a standardised N.SIS implementation developed and provided by eu-LISA to Member States and a distinct N.SIS implementation with common technical standards).

• Impact assessment

The Commission did not carry out an impact assessment.

The three independent assessments mentioned above (in "Collection and use of expertise") formed the basis of consideration for the impacts of changes to the system from a technical perspective. In addition, the Commission has concluded two reviews of the SIRENE Manual since 2013, i.e. since SIS II entered into operation on 9 April 2013 and Decision 2007/533/JHA became applicable. This includes a mid-term review assessment which resulted in the launch of a new SIRENE Manual\textsuperscript{25} on 29 January 2015. The Commission also adopted a Catalogue of Best Practices and Recommendations\textsuperscript{26}. Moreover, eu-LISA and the Member States carry out regular, iterative technical improvements to the system. It is considered that these options have now been exhausted, requiring more wholesale amendment to the legal basis. Clarity in areas such as application of end-user systems as well as detailed rules on alert deletion cannot be achieved through improved implementation and enforcement alone.

Furthermore, the Commission has carried out a comprehensive evaluation of SIS as required by Articles 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Art. 59 (3) and 66(5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA and published an accompanying Staff Working

\textsuperscript{22} European Commission FINAL REPORT — SIS II technical assessment.

\textsuperscript{23} European Commission FINAL REPORT — ICT Impact Assessment of Possible Improvements to the SIS II Architecture 2016.

\textsuperscript{24} European Commission FINAL REPORT — ICT Impact Assessment of the technical improvements to the SIS II architecture – Final Report", 10 November 2016, (Wavestone).


\textsuperscript{26} Commission recommendation establishing a catalogue of recommendations and best practices for the correct application of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the exchange of supplementary information by the competent authorities of the Member States implementing and using SIS II (C(2015)9169/1).
Document. The results of the comprehensive evaluation (the evaluation report and the related Staff Working Document were adopted on 21 December 2016) have formed the basis of the measures contained within this proposal.

The Schengen evaluation mechanism, laid down in Regulation (EU) No. 1053/2013\(^{27}\) allows the periodic legal and operational assessment of the functioning of SIS in the Member States. The evaluations are jointly carried out by the Commission and Member States. Through this mechanism, the Council makes recommendations to individual Member States, based on the evaluations carried out as part of multi-annual and annual programmes. As a result of their individual nature, these recommendations cannot replace legally binding rules which are applicable at the same time to all Member States using SIS.

The SISVIS Committee regularly discusses practical operational and technical issues. Although these meetings are instrumental in the cooperation between the Commission and the Member States, the outcome of these discussions (absent legislative changes) cannot remedy issues emerging due to diverging national practices, for example.

The changes proposed in this Regulation do not present a significant economic or environmental impact. However, these changes are expected to have a significantly positive social impact as they provide for increased security by allowing better identification of persons using false identities, criminals whose identity remains unknown after having committed a serious crime as well as missing minors. The impact of these changes on fundamental rights and data protection has been considered and set out in more detail in the next section (“Fundamental rights”).

The proposal has been drawn up making use of the substantial body of evidence collected to inform the overall evaluation of the second generation of SIS, which explored the functioning of the system and possible areas for improvement. In addition, a cost impact assessment study was carried out, to ensure that the national architecture chosen was the most appropriate and proportionate.

- **Fundamental rights and data protection**

This proposal develops and improves an existing system, rather than establishing a new one, and hence builds upon important and effective safeguards that have already been put in place. Nevertheless, as the system continues to process personal data, and will process further categories of sensitive biometric data, there are potential impacts on an individual's fundamental rights. These have been thoroughly considered, and additional safeguards have been put in place to limit the collection and further processing of data to what is strictly necessary and operationally required, and restricting access to that data to those who have an operational need to process it. Clear data retention timeframes have been set out in this proposal, including reduced retention periods for object alerts. There is explicit recognition of and provision for individuals' rights to access and rectify data relating to them, and to request erasure in line with their fundamental rights (see section on data protection and security).

In addition, the proposal strengthens measures to protect fundamental rights, as it sets out in legislation the requirements for an alert to be deleted and introduces a proportionality assessment if an alert is being extended. More reliable identification of individuals will be

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\(^{27}\) Regulation (EU) No. 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen (OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p.27).
possible through the use of biometric data for missing persons who need protection, ensuring personal data is accurate and protected appropriately. The proposal defines extensive and robust safeguards for the use of biometric identifiers to avoid innocent persons being inconvenienced.

The proposal also requires the end-to-end security of the system, ensuring greater protection for the data stored within it. With the introduction of a clear incident management procedure, as well as improved business continuity for the SIS, this proposal fully complies with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as regards the right to the protection of personal data. The development and continued effectiveness of SIS will contribute to the security of persons within society.

The proposal envisages significant changes concerning biometric identifiers. In addition to fingerprints, palm prints should also be collected and stored if the legal requirements are met. Fingerprint logs are attached to alphanumeric SIS alerts as provided for in Articles 26, 32, 34 and 36. It should be possible in the future to search these dactylographic data (fingerprints and palm prints) with fingerprints found at a scene of crime provided that the offence qualifies as serious crime or terrorism and that it can be stated to a high degree of probability that they belong to the perpetrator. Moreover, the proposal envisages the storage of fingerprints for so-called “unknown wanted persons” (the conditions are described in details in Section 5, Subsection "Photographs, facial images, dactylographic data and DNA profiles"). In case of uncertainty concerning a person’s identity based upon his documents, the competent authorities should carry out a fingerprint search against the fingerprints stored in the SIS database.

The proposal requires the collection and storage of additional data (such as details of the personal identification documents) that facilitates the work of the officers on the ground to establish the identity of a person.

The proposal guarantees the data subject’s right to effective remedies available to challenge any decisions, which shall in any case include an effective remedy before a court or tribunal in line with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

SIS constitutes one single information system. Consequently, the expenditure foreseen in two of the proposals (the current one and the Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks) should not be considered as two separate amounts but as a single one. The budgetary implications of the changes required for the implementation of both proposals are included in one legislative financial statement.

Due to the complementary nature of the third proposal (concerning the return of illegally staying third country nationals) the budgetary implications are dealt with separately and in an independent financial statement addressing only the establishment of this specific alert category.

On the basis of an assessment of the various aspects of the work required in relation to the network, the Central SIS by eu-LISA and the national developments in the Member States, the two proposals for Regulations will require a global amount of EUR 64.3 million for the period 2018-2020.

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This covers an increase of the TESTA-NG bandwidth due to the fact that in accordance with the two proposals, the network will transmit fingerprint files and facial images requiring higher throughput and capacity (EUR 9.9 million). It also covers eu-LISA’s costs in relation to staff and operational expenditure (EUR 17.6 million). eu-LISA informed the Commission that the recruitment of 3 new contract agents is planned to take place in January 2018 to start the development phase in due time to ensure entry into operations of the updated functionalities of SIS in 2020. The present proposal entails technical amendments to the Central SIS in order to extend some of the existing alert categories and provide new functionalities. The financial statement attached to this proposal reflects these changes.

Furthermore, the Commission carried out a cost impact assessment study to assess the costs of the national developments necessitated by this proposal. The estimated cost is EUR 36.8 million which should be distributed via a lump sum to the Member States. Hence, each Member State will receive the amount of EUR 1.2 million to upgrade its national system in accordance with the requirements set out in this proposal, including for setting up a partial national copy where this is not yet the case or for a back-up system.

A re-programming of the remainder of the Smart Borders envelope of the Internal Security Fund is planned in order to carry out the upgrades and implement the functionalities foreseen in the two proposals. The ISF Borders Regulation is the financial instrument where the budget for the implementation of the Smart Borders package has been included. Article 5 of the Regulation provides that EUR 791 million shall be implemented through a programme for setting up IT systems supporting the management of migration flows across the external border under the conditions laid down in Article 15. Out of the above-mentioned EUR 791 million, EUR 480 million is reserved for the development of the Entry-Exit System and EUR 210 million for the development of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS). The remainder will be partly used to cover the costs of the changes foreseen in the two proposals concerning SIS.

5. OTHER ELEMENTS

• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

The Commission, Member States and eu-LISA will regularly review and monitor the use of SIS, to ensure that it continues to function effectively and efficiently. The Commission will be assisted by the SISVIS Committee to implement technical and operational measures as described in the proposal.

In addition, this proposed Regulation includes provisions in Article 71(7) and (8) for a formal, regular review and evaluation process.

Every two years, eu-LISA is required to report to the European Parliament and the Council on the technical functioning – including security – of SIS, the communication infrastructure supporting it, and the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member States.


Furthermore, every four years, the Commission is required to conduct, and share with the Parliament and the Council, an overall evaluation of SIS and the exchange of information between Member States. This will:

- examine results achieved against objectives;
- assess whether the underlying rationale for the system remains valid;
- examine how the Regulation is being applied to the central system;
- evaluate the security of the central system;
- explore implications for the future functioning of the system.

eu-LISA is also now charged with providing daily, monthly and annual statistics on the use of SIS, ensuring continuous monitoring of the system and its functioning against objectives.

- **Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal**

**Provisions that are common to this proposal and the proposal for a Regulation on the establishment, operation and use of the SIS in the field of border checks**

- General Provisions (Articles 1 – 3)
- Technical architecture and ways of operating SIS (Articles 4 – 14)
- Responsibilities of eu-LISA (Articles 15 – 18)
- Right to access and retention of alerts (Articles 43, 46, 48, 50 and 51)
- General data processing and data protection rules (Articles 53 – 70)
- Monitoring and statistics (Article 71)

**End-to-end use of SIS**

With over 2 million end-users in the competent authorities across Europe, SIS is an extremely widely used and effective tool for information exchange. These proposals include rules covering the complete end-to-end operation of the system, including Central SIS operated by eu-LISA, the national systems and the end-user applications. It addresses not only the central and national systems, but also the end-users' technical and operational needs.

Article 9(2) specifies that end-users must receive the data required to perform their tasks (in particular all data required for the identification of the data subject and to take the required action). It also provides for a common blueprint for Member State implementation of SIS, ensuring harmonisation across all national systems. Article 6 stipulates that each Member State must ensure uninterrupted availability of SIS data to end-users, in order to maximise the operational benefits by reducing the possibility of downtime.

Article 10(3) ensures that the security of data processing also includes the data processing activities of the end-user. Article 14 obliges Member States to ensure that staff with access to SIS receive regular and ongoing training about data security and data protection rules.

As a result of the inclusion of these measures, this proposal more comprehensively covers the full end-to-end functioning of SIS, with rules and obligations concerning the millions of end-users across Europe. In order to use SIS to its full effectiveness Member States should ensure that each time their end-users are entitled to carry out a search in a national police or immigration database, they also search SIS in parallel. This way SIS can fulfil its objective as the main compensatory measure in the area without internal border controls and Member States can better address the cross-border dimension of criminality and the mobility of
criminals. This parallel search must remain in compliance with Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/680.

**Business continuity**

The proposals strengthen provisions regarding business continuity, both at national level and for eu-LISA (Articles 4, 6, 7 and 15). These ensure that SIS will continue to remain functional and accessible to staff on the ground, even if there are issues that affect the system.

**Data quality**

The proposal maintains the principle that the Member State, which is the data owner, is also responsible for the accuracy of the data entered in SIS (Article 56). It is, however, necessary to provide for a central mechanism managed by eu-LISA which allows Member States to regularly review those alerts in which the mandatory data fields may raise quality concerns. Therefore Article 15 of the proposal empowers eu-LISA to produce data quality reports to Member States at regular intervals. This activity may be facilitated by a data repository for producing statistical and data quality reports (Article 71). These improvements reflect the interim findings of the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability.

**Photographs, facial images, dactylographic data and DNA profiles**

The possibility to search with fingerprints with a view to identify a person is already set out in Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. The proposals make this search mandatory if the identity of the person cannot be ascertained in any other way. Furthermore, changes to Article 22 and new Articles 40, 41 and 42 will allow the use of facial images, palm prints and DNA profiles to identify a person, in addition to the use of fingerprints. Currently, facial images can only be used to confirm a person's identity following an alphanumeric search, rather than serving as the basis for a search. Dactylography refers to the scientific study of fingerprints as a method of identification. Experts in dactylography recognise that palm prints have the characteristic of uniqueness and that they contain reference points that enable accurate and conclusive comparisons just as do fingerprints. Palm prints can be used to establish a person's identity in the same way that fingerprints can be used. The taking of palm prints along with the ten rolled and ten flat prints of a person has been police practice for many decades. There are two main uses of palm prints:

i) Identification purposes when the subject has intentionally or unintentionally damaged the tips of their fingers. This can be through an attempt to avoid being identified or fingerprinted or through damage caused by accident or heavy manual work. In the course of the discussion on the technical rules of SIS AFIS Italy reported considerable success in the identification of irregular migrants who had intentionally damaged their fingertips in an attempt to avoid identification. The taking of palm prints by the Italian authorities allowed subsequent identification.

ii) Latent prints from crime scenes. Often, the suspect leaves traces at a crime scene and these transpire to be from the palm of the hand. It is only through the routine taking of palm prints, when a person is lawfully fingerprinted, that the suspect can be identified. The palm print also usually contains detail from the base of the fingers.

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31 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p.89).
which is often missing from the rolled and flat prints taken, as the latter tend to concentrate on the finger tips and upper joints.

The use of facial images for identification will ensure greater consistency between SIS and the proposed EU Entry Exit System, electronic gates and self-service kiosks. This functionality will be limited to the regular border crossings.

In cases where fingerprints or palm prints are not available, Article 22(1)(b) allows for the use of DNA profiles for missing persons who need to be placed under protection, especially children. This functionality will be used only in the absence of fingerprints and will be accessible only to authorised users. This provision therefore allows for the use of the DNA profiles via the missing person/child's parents or siblings to enable national authorities to identify and locate the individual in question. Member States already exchange this information with each other at an operational level, through the exchange of supplementary information. This proposal forms a regulatory framework around this practice, by inserting it into the substantive legislative basis for the operation and use of SIS and by implementing clear processes around the circumstances in which such profiles may be used.

The proposed changes will also allow SIS alerts to be issued for unknown persons wanted in connection with a crime, based on fingerprints or palm prints (Articles 40 - 42). These alerts may be created where for example latent fingerprints or palm prints are discovered at the scene of a serious crime and where there are strong reasons to suspect that the fingerprints belong to the perpetrator of that crime. For example when fingerprints are found on a weapon used in the commission of the crime or on any other object used by the perpetrator at the time when he committed the crime. This new alert category complements the Prüm provisions that enable interconnectivity of national criminal fingerprint identification systems. Via the Prüm mechanism, a Member State can launch a request to ascertain if the perpetrator of a crime whose fingerprints have been found is known in any other Member State (usually for investigative purposes). A person can be identified via the Prüm mechanism only if he or she has been fingerprinted in another Member State for criminal purposes. Hence, first time offenders cannot be identified. The developments in this proposal, i.e. the storage of fingerprints of unknown wanted persons, will enable the fingerprints of an unknown perpetrator to be uploaded into SIS so that he or she can be identified as wanted if encountered in another Member State. The use of this functionality presupposes that the Member States conducted a prior consultation of all available national and international sources but could not ascertain the identity of the person concerned. Sufficient safeguards are included in the proposal to ensure that under this category, SIS only stores the fingerprints of persons who are strongly suspected to have committed a serious crime or terrorist offence. Accordingly, the use of this new alert category can only be allowed in cases where the unknown perpetrator poses a major risk to public security which justifies the comparison of those prints with the fingerprints of travellers, for example to avoid that the person leave the area without internal border controls.

This provision does not allow end-users to insert fingerprints under this category where their connection to the perpetrator cannot be established. A further condition will be that the identity of the person cannot be established by using any other national, European or international databases storing fingerprints. Once such fingerprint is stored in SIS it will be used to identify persons whose identity cannot be ascertained in other ways. Should this check lead to a potential match, the Member State should carry out further checks with their fingerprints, possibly with the involvement of fingerprint experts to establish whether he or she is the owner of the prints stored in SIS, and should establish the identity of the person. The procedures are subject of national law. An identification as the owner of an "unknown wanted person" in SIS possibly leads to an arrest.
Access to SIS

This sub-section describes the new elements in terms of access rights to SIS with regard to competent national authorities as well as EU Agencies (institutional users).

National authorities - immigration authorities

In order to ensure the most effective use of SIS, the proposal grants access to SIS to national authorities responsible for examining conditions and taking decisions relating to entry, stay and return of third-country nationals on the territory of Member States. This addition enables the consultation of SIS in relation to irregular migrants who have not been checked at regular border controls. This proposal ensures the same treatment of third country nationals who are crossing the external borders at regular border crossing points (and are thus subject of checks applicable with regard to third country nationals) and of third country nationals who are arriving irregularly to the Schengen area.

Furthermore, this proposal ensures that registration authorities for vehicles (Article 44), boats and aircraft will have limited access to the system to carry out their tasks, provided that they are governmental services. This will help to avoid the registration of the mentioned conveyances if they are stolen and searched in another Member States. The initiative is not new concerning the vehicle registration services as their access to SIS was already provided by Article 102a of the Schengen Convention and by Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006. Following the same logic the proposal foresees the access of boat and aircraft registration authorities to SIS alerts related to boats and aircrafts.

Institutional users

Europol (Article 46), Eurojust (Article 47) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency – as well as its teams, teams of staff involved in return-related tasks, and members of the migration management support team – (Articles 48 and 49) have the access to SIS and SIS data that they need. Appropriate safeguards are put in place to ensure that the data in the system is properly protected (including also the provisions in Article 50 requiring that these bodies may only access the data they need to carry out their tasks).

These changes extend access to SIS for Europol to missing person alerts, ensuring that it can make best use of the system as it carries out its duties, and add new provisions that ensure that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency as well as its teams can access the system while carrying out the different operations under their mandate assisting Member States. In the context of the work of the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability and with a view to further strengthening information sharing on terrorism, the Commission will assess if Europol should automatically receive a notification from SIS when an alert on terrorism-related activity is created.

Furthermore under Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) the ETIAS Central Unit of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will perform searches in SIS via ETIAS in order to ascertain if the third country national applying for a

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travel authorisation is subject of a SIS alert. To this end the ETIAS Central Unit will also have full access to SIS.

**Specific changes to alerts**

Article 26 provides for Member States to temporarily suspend alerts for arrest (in case of an ongoing police operation or investigation), making them visible only to SIRENE Bureaux but not to the officers on the ground for a limited period of time. This provision helps to avoid that a confidential police operation to arrest a highly wanted offender is jeopardised by a police officer who is not involved in the matter.

Articles 32 and 33 provide for alerts on missing persons. Changes to these allow preventive alerts to be issued in cases where parental abduction is deemed a high risk, and provide for more finely tuned categorization of missing persons alerts. Parental abductions often take place in highly planned circumstances, with the intention of rapidly leaving the Member State where the custody arrangements were agreed. These changes address a potential gap in the current legislation whereby alerts for children can only be issued once they are missing. It will allow authorities in Member States to indicate children at particular risk. These changes will mean that, where there is a high risk of imminent parental abduction, border guards and law enforcement officials are made aware of the risk and will be able to examine more closely the circumstances where an at-risk child is travelling, taking the child into protective custody if required. Supplementary information, including on the decision of the competent judicial authority that requested the alert, will be provided via the SIRENE Bureaux. The SIRENE Manual will be reviewed accordingly. This alert will require an appropriate decision of the judicial authorities granting custody only to one of the parents. A further condition will be that there is an imminent risk of abduction. The status of alerts on missing child will automatically update to reflect them reaching adulthood, when applicable.

Article 34 allows data on vehicles to be added to the alert if there is a clear indication that these are connected with the person being sought.

Article 37 introduces a new form of check, the 'inquiry check'. This is, in particular, intended to support measures to counter terrorism and serious crime. It allows authorities to stop and question the person concerned. It is more in-depth than the existing discreet check, but does not involve searching the person and does not amount to arresting him or her. It may, however, provide sufficient information to decide on further action to be taken. Article 36 is also amended to reflect this additional type of check.

This proposal makes provision for SIS alerts to cover blank official documents and issued identity papers (Articles 36) and vehicles, including boats and aircraft (Articles 32, 34) where these are connected with alerts for people issued under these articles. Article 37 is amended to provide for action to be taken on the basis of these alerts. The objective is purely investigative as it will enable authorities to tackle situations where several persons are using authentic but look alike documents while they are not the lawful holders.

Article 38 sets out an expanded list of objects for which alerts can be issued, adding falsified documents, vehicles regardless of propulsion system (i.e. electric as well as petrol/diesel, etc.), falsified banknotes, IT equipment, and identifiable component parts of vehicles and industrial equipment. It does not contain any longer alerts on means of payment as the efficiency of those alerts remained very low and they have hardly produced any hits.

To clarify the process to be followed once an object that is subject to an alert has been found, Article 39 is amended to state that objects must be seized, in accordance with national law, in addition to contacting the authority which issued the alert.
Data protection and security

This proposal clarifies responsibility for preventing, reporting and responding to incidents that might affect the security or integrity of SIS infrastructure, SIS data or supplementary information (Articles 10, 16 and 57).

Article 12 contains provisions on keeping and searching logs of the history of alerts.

Article 12 also includes provisions relating to automated scanned searches of the number plates of motor vehicles, using Automatic Number Plate Recognition systems, obliging Member States to maintain a log of these searches in accordance with national law.

Article 15(3) maintains Article 15(3) of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA and provides that the Commission remains responsible for the contractual management of the communication infrastructure, including tasks relating to the implementation of the budget and the acquisition and renewal. These tasks will be transferred to eu-LISA in the second suite of SIS proposals in June 2017.

Article 21 extends the requirement to consider whether a case is sufficiently adequate, relevant and important to apply to decisions on whether the validity period of an alert should be extended. As a novelty this Article also requires member States to create an alert under Articles 34, 36 and 38 (as appropriate) in all circumstances, on those persons or their related objects whose activity falls under Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism.

Categories of data and data processing

This proposal expands the types of information (Article 20) that can be held about people for whom an alert has been issued, to also include:

- whether the person is involved any activity falling under Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA;
- other person-related remarks; the reason for the alert;
- details of the person's national registration number and place of registration;
- categorisation of the type of missing person case (alerts under Article 32 only);
- details of a person's identity or travel document;
- colour copy of the person's identity or travel document;
- DNA profiles (only if fingerprints suitable for identification are not available).

Article 59 expands the list of personal data that may be entered and processed in SIS for the purpose of dealing with misused identities. These data can only be entered upon the consent of the victim of misused identity. This will now also include:

- facial images;
- palm-prints;
- details of identity documents;
- the victim's address;
- the names of the victim's father and mother.

Article 20 provides for more detailed information in the alerts. It includes details of the personal identification documents of the data subjects and allowing the possibility to categorise missing children according to their disappearance, such as unaccompanied minors,
parental abduction, run-aways, etc. This is essential for the end-users to take the required measures without any delay for the protection of those children. The enhanced information allows better identification of the person concerned, and on the other hand for a more informed decision to be taken by the end-users. For the protection of the end-users carrying out the checks, SIS will also show if the person in relation to whom an alert was issued, falls under any of the categories provided in Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism.

The proposal makes clear that Member States must not copy data entered by another Member State into other national data files (Article 53).

**Retention**

The maximum retention period for alert on persons will be extended to five years, except for alerts for discreet, inquiry or specific checks where the retention period remains one year. Member States can always set shorter expiry periods. The extended maximum length of the expiry date follows the national practices of extending the expiry date if an alert has not yet fulfilled its purpose while the person concerned remains wanted. Moreover, it was necessary to align SIS with the retention period provided under other instruments, such as the Return Directive and Eurodac. For the sake of transparency and clarity it is necessary to provide for the same retention period for alerts on persons, except alerts created for discreet, inquiry or specific checks. The extension of the retention period does not jeopardise the interest of the data subjects as an alert cannot be kept longer than what is necessary for its purpose. Alert deletion rules have been explicitly set out in Article 52. Article 51 sets out the timeframe for reviewing alerts and includes, in particular, the reduced retention period for alerts on objects. In the absence of any operational need to retain the longer period for objects, it has now been reduced to five years to bring it in line with the retention period for person-related alerts. The expiry date for issued and blank documents, however, remains 10 years as the period of validity of documents is 10 years.

**Deletion**

Article 52 sets out the circumstances under which alerts must be deleted, bringing greater harmonisation to national practices in this area. Article 51 sets out particular provisions for SIRENE Bureau staff to delete alerts proactively that are no longer required if no reply is received from the competent authorities.

**Rights for data subjects to access data, rectify inaccurate data and erase unlawfully stored data**

The detailed rules on the data subject's rights remained unchanged as the existing rules already ensure a high level of protection and are in line with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2016/680. In addition to that Article 63 sets out the circumstances under which Member States may decide not to communicate information to data subjects. This must be for

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36 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p.89).
one of the reasons listed in this Article, and it must be a proportionate and necessary measure, in line with national law.

Sharing data on lost, stolen, invalidated and misappropriated documents with Interpol

Article 63 fully maintains Article 55 of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA as the better interoperability between the document section of SIS and the Interpol Stolen and Lost Document Database will be addressed by the Communication of the High Level Expert Group and in the second set of SIS proposals in June 2017.

Statistics

In order to maintain an overview of how remedies are working in practice, Article 66 sets out provision for a standard statistical system providing annual reports on numbers of:

- data subjects' access requests;
- requests for rectification of inaccurate data and erasure of unlawfully stored data;
- cases before the courts;
- cases where the court ruled in favour of the applicant; and
- observations on cases of mutual recognition of final decisions handed down by the courts or authorities of other Member States on alerts created by the alert-issuing State.

Monitoring and statistics

Article 71 sets out the arrangements that must be put in place to ensure the proper monitoring of SIS and its functioning against its objectives. To do this, eu-LISA is charged with providing daily, monthly and annual statistics on how the system is being used.

Article 71(5) requires eu-LISA to provide the Member States, the Commission, Europol, Eurojust and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency with statistical reports that it produces and allows the Commission to request additional statistical and data quality reports relating to SIS and SIRENE communication.

Article 71(6) provides for the creation and hosting of a central repository of data, as part of eu-LISA's work on monitoring the functioning of SIS. This will enable authorised staff of Member States, the Commission, Europol, Eurojust and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency to access the data listed in Article 71(3) in order to produce the statistics required.
Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL


THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 82(1) second subparagraph point (d), 85(1), 87(2)(a) and 88(2)(a) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) The Schengen information system (SIS) constitutes an essential tool for the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis as integrated into the framework of the European Union. SIS is one of the major compensatory measures contributing to maintaining a high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the European Union by supporting operational cooperation between border guards, police, customs and other law enforcement and judicial authorities in criminal matters.

(2) SIS was set up pursuant to the provisions of Title IV of the Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (the Schengen Convention). The development of the second generation of SIS (SIS II) was entrusted to the Commission pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 2424/2001 and Council Decision 2001/886/JHA and it was established by Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 as well as by Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. SIS II replaced SIS as created pursuant to the Schengen Convention.

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Three years after SIS II was brought into operation, the Commission carried out an evaluation of the system in accordance with Articles 24(5), 43(5) and 50(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Articles 59 and 65(5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA. The evaluation report and the related Staff Working Document were adopted on 21 December 2016. The recommendations set out in those documents should be reflected, as appropriate, in this Regulation.

This Regulation constitutes the necessary legislative basis for governing SIS in respect of matters falling within the scope of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. Regulation (EU) 2018/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks constitutes the necessary legislative basis for governing SIS in respect of matters falling within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union.

The fact that the legislative basis necessary for governing SIS consists of separate instruments does not affect the principle that SIS constitutes one single information system that should operate as such. Certain provisions of these instruments should therefore be identical.

It is necessary to specify the objectives of SIS, its technical architecture and its financing, to lay down rules concerning its end-to-end operation and use and to define responsibilities, the categories of data to be entered into the system, the purposes for which the data are to be entered, the criteria for their entry, the authorities authorised to access the data, the use of biometric identifiers and further rules on data processing.

SIS includes a central system (Central SIS) and national systems with a full or partial copy of the SIS database. Considering that SIS is the most important information exchange instrument in Europe, it is necessary to ensure its uninterrupted operation at central as well as at national level. Therefore each Member State should establish a partial or full copy of the SIS database and should set up its backup system.

It is necessary to maintain a manual setting out the detailed rules for the exchange of certain supplementary information concerning the action called for by alerts. National authorities in each Member State (the SIRENE Bureaux), should ensure the exchange of this information.

In order to maintain the efficient exchange of supplementary information concerning the action to be taken specified in the alerts, it is appropriate to reinforce the functioning of the SIRENE Bureaux by specifying the requirements concerning the available resources, user training and the response time to the inquiries received from other SIRENE Bureaux.

The operational management of the central components of SIS are exercised by the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the...

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42 Report to the European Parliament and Council on the evaluation of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) in accordance with Art. 24 (5), 43 (3) and 50 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Art. 59 (3) and 66(5) of Decision 2007/533/JHA and an accompanying Staff Working Document. (OJ...).
43 Regulation (EU) 2018/…
area of freedom, security and justice\(^\text{44}\) (the Agency). In order to enable the Agency to dedicate the necessary financial and personal resources covering all aspects of the operational management of Central SIS, this Regulation should set out its tasks in detail, in particular with regard to the technical aspects of the exchange of supplementary information.

(11) Without prejudice to the responsibility of Member States for the accuracy of data entered into SIS, the Agency should become responsible for reinforcing data quality by introducing a central data quality monitoring tool, and for providing reports at regular intervals to Member States.

(12) In order to allow better monitoring of the use of SIS to analyse trends concerning criminal offences, the Agency should be able to develop a state-of-the-art capability for statistical reporting to the Member States, the Commission, Europol and the European Border and Cost Guard Agency without jeopardising data integrity. Therefore, a central statistical repository should be established. Any statistic produced should not contain personal data.

(13) SIS should contain further data categories to allow end-users to take informed decisions based upon an alert without losing time. Therefore, in order to facilitate the identification of persons and to detect multiple identities, data categories relating to persons should include a reference to the personal identification document or number and a copy of such document where available.

(14) SIS should not store any data used for search with the exception of keeping logs to verify if the search is lawful, for monitoring the lawfulness of data processing, for self-monitoring and for ensuring the proper functioning of N.SIS, as well as for data integrity and security.

(15) SIS should permit the processing of biometric data in order to assist in the reliable identification of the individuals concerned. In the same perspective, SIS should also allow for the processing of data concerning individuals whose identity has been misused (in order to avoid inconveniences caused by their misidentification), subject to suitable safeguards; in particular with the consent of the individual concerned and a strict limitation of the purposes for which such data can be lawfully processed.

(16) Member States should make the necessary technical arrangement so that each time the end-users are entitled to carry out a search in a national police or immigration database they also search SIS in parallel in accordance with Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council\(^\text{45}\). This should ensure that SIS functions as the main compensatory measure in the area without internal border controls and better address the cross-border dimension of criminality and the mobility of criminals.

(17) This Regulation should set out the conditions for use of dactylographic data and facial images for identification purposes. The use of facial images for identification purposes


in SIS should also help to ensure consistency in border control procedures where the identification and the verification of identity are required by the use of fingerprints and facial images. Searching with dactylographic data should be mandatory if there is any doubt concerning the identity of a person. Facial images for identification purposes should only be used in the context of regular border controls in self-service kiosks and electronic gates.

(18) The introduction of an automated fingerprint identification service within SIS complements the existing Prüm mechanism on mutual cross-border online access to designated national DNA databases and automated fingerprint identification systems\(^{46}\). The Prüm mechanism enables interconnectivity of national fingerprint identification systems whereby a Member State can launch a request to ascertain if the perpetrator of a crime whose fingerprints have been found, is known in any other Member State. The Prüm mechanism verifies if the owner of the fingerprints are known in one point in time therefore if the perpetrator becomes known in any of the Member States later on he or she will not necessarily be captured. The SIS fingerprint search allows an active search of the perpetrator. Therefore, it should be possible to upload the fingerprints of an unknown perpetrator into SIS, provided that the owner of the fingerprints can be identified to a high degree of probability as the perpetrator of a serious crime or act of terrorism. This is in particular the case if fingerprints are found on the weapon or on any object used for the offence. The mere presence of the fingerprints at the crime scene should not be considered as indicating a high degree of probability that the fingerprints are those of the perpetrator. A further precondition for the creation of such alert should be that the identity of the perpetrator cannot be established via any other national, European or international databases. Should such fingerprint search lead to a potential match the Member State should carry out further checks with their fingerprints, possibly with the involvement of fingerprint experts to establish whether he or she is the owner of the prints stored in SIS, and should establish the identity of the person. The procedures should be subject of national law. An identification as the owner of an "unknown wanted person" in SIS may substantially contribute to the investigation and it may lead to an arrest provided that all conditions for an arrest are met.

(19) Fingerprints found at a crime scene should be allowed to be checked against the fingerprints stored in SIS if it can be established to a high degree of probability that they belong to the perpetrator of the serious crime or terrorist offence. Serious crime should be the offences listed in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA\(^{47}\) and ‘terrorist offence’ should be offences under national law referred to in Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA\(^{48}\).

(20) It should be possible to add a DNA profile in cases where dactylographic data are not available, and which should only be accessible to authorised users. DNA profiles should facilitate the identification of missing persons in need of protection and


particular missing children, including by allowing the use of DNA profiles of parents or siblings to enable identification. DNA data should not contain reference to racial origin.

(21) SIS should contain alerts on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes and wanted for arrest for extradition purposes. In addition to alerts, it is appropriate to provide for the exchange of supplementary information which is necessary for the surrender and extradition procedures. In particular, data referred to in Article 8 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States should be processed in SIS. Due to operational reasons, it is appropriate for the issuing Member State to make an existing alert for arrest temporary unavailable upon the authorisation of the judicial authorities when a person subject of a European Arrest Warrant is intensively and actively searched and end-users not involved in the concrete search operation may jeopardise the successful outcome. The temporary unavailability of such alerts should not exceed 48 hours.

(22) It should be possible to add to SIS a translation of the additional data entered for the purpose of surrender under the European Arrest Warrant and for the purpose of extradition.

(23) SIS should contain alerts on missing persons to ensure their protection or to prevent threats to public security. Issuing an alert in SIS for children at risk of abduction (i.e. in order to prevent a future harm that has not yet taken place as in the case of children who are at risk of parental abduction) should be limited, therefore it is appropriate to provide for strict and appropriate safeguards. In cases of children, these alerts and the corresponding procedures should serve the best interests of the child having regard to Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.

(24) A new action should be included for cases of suspected terrorism and serious crime, allowing for a person who is suspected to have committed a serious crime or where there is a reason to believe that he or she will commit a serious crime, to be stopped and questioned in order to supply the most detailed information to the issuing Member State. This new action should not amount either to searching the person or to his or her arrest. It should supply, however, sufficient information to decide about further actions. Serious crime should be the offences listed in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.

(25) SIS should contain new categories of objects of high value, such as electronic and technical equipment which can be identified and searched with a unique number.

(26) It should be possible for a Member State to add an indication, called a flag, to an alert, to the effect that the action to be taken on the basis of the alert will not be taken on its territory. When alerts are issued for arrest for surrender purposes, nothing in this Decision should be construed so as to derogate from or prevent the application of the provisions contained in the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. The decision to add a flag to an alert should be based only on the grounds for refusal contained in that Framework Decision.

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When a flag has been added and the whereabouts of the person wanted for arrest for surrender becomes known, the whereabouts should always be communicated to the issuing judicial authority, which may decide to transmit a European Arrest Warrant to the competent judicial authority in accordance with the provisions of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.

It should be possible for Member States to establish links between alerts in SIS. The establishment by a Member State of links between two or more alerts should have no impact on the action to be taken, their retention period or the access rights to the alerts.

Alerts should not be kept in SIS longer than the time required to fulfil the purposes for which they were issued. In order to reduce the administrative burden on the different authorities involved in processing data on individuals for different purposes, it is appropriate to align the retention period of alerts on persons with the retention periods envisaged for return and illegal stay purposes. Moreover, Member States regularly extend the expiry date of alerts on persons if the required action could not be taken within the original time period. Therefore, the retention period for alerts on persons should be a maximum of five years. As a general principle, alerts on persons should be automatically deleted from SIS after a period of five years, except for alerts issued for the purposes of discreet, specific and inquiry checks. These should be deleted after one year. Alerts on objects entered for discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks should be automatically deleted from the SIS after a period of one year, as they are always related to persons. Alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings should be automatically deleted from SIS after a period of five years, as after such a period the likelihood of finding them is very low and their economic value is significantly diminished. Alerts on issued and blank identification documents should be kept for 10 years, as the validity period of documents is 10 years at the time of issuance. Decisions to keep alerts on persons should be based on a comprehensive individual assessment. Member States should review alerts on persons within the defined period and keep statistics about the number of alerts on persons for which the retention period has been extended.

Entering and extending the expiry date of a SIS alert should be subject to the necessary proportionality requirement, examining whether a concrete case is adequate, relevant and important enough to insert an alert in SIS. Offences pursuant to Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism constitute a very serious threat to public security and integrity of life of individuals and to society, and these offences are extremely difficult to prevent, detect and investigate in an area without internal border controls where potential offenders circulate freely. Where a person or object is sought in relation to these offences, it is always necessary to create the corresponding alert in SIS on persons sought for a criminal judicial procedure, on persons or objects subject to a discreet, inquiry and specific check as well as on objects for seizure, as no other means would be as effective in relation to that purpose.

It is necessary to provide clarity concerning the deletion of alerts. An alert should be kept only for the time required to achieve the purpose for which it was entered. Considering the diverging practices of Member States concerning the definition of the

point in time when an alert fulfils its purpose, it is appropriate to set out detailed criteria for each alert category to determine when it should be deleted from SIS.

(32) The integrity of SIS data is of primary importance. Therefore, appropriate safeguards should be provided to process SIS data at central as well as at national level to ensure the end-to-end security of data. The authorities involved in data processing should be bound by the security requirements of this Regulation and be subject to a uniform incident reporting procedure.

(33) Data processed in SIS in application of this Regulation should not be transferred or made available to third countries or to international organisations. However, it is appropriate to strengthen cooperation between the European Union and Interpol by promoting an efficient exchange of passport data. Where personal data is transferred from SIS to Interpol, these personal data should be subject to an adequate level of protection, guaranteed by an agreement, providing strict safeguards and conditions.

(34) It is appropriate to grant access to SIS to authorities responsible for registering vehicles, boats and aircraft in order to allow them to verify whether the conveyance is already searched for in a Member State for seizure or for check. Direct access should be provided to authorities which are governmental services. This access should be limited to alerts concerning the respective conveyances and their registration document or number plate. Accordingly, the provisions of Regulation (EC) 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council\(^{51}\) should be included into this Regulation and that Regulation should be repealed.

(35) For processing of data by competent national authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection of serious crime or terrorist offences, or prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties including the safeguarding against the prevention of threat to public security, national provisions transposing Directive (EU) 2016/680 should apply. The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council\(^{52}\) and Directive (EU) 2016/680 should be further specified in this Regulation where necessary.

(36) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 should apply to the processing of personal data under this Regulation by national authorities when Directive (EU) 2016/680 does not apply. Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council\(^{53}\) should apply to the processing of personal data by the institutions and bodies of the Union when carrying out their responsibilities under this Regulation.


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European Union Agency for Law Enforcement cooperation (Europol Regulation)\(^{54}\) applies.

(38) The provisions of Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002\(^{55}\) setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime concerning data protection apply to the processing of SIS data by Eurojust, including the powers of the Joint Supervisory Body, set up under that Decision, to monitor the activities of Eurojust and liability for any unlawful processing of personal data by Eurojust. In cases when searches carried out by Eurojust in SIS reveal the existence of an alert issued by a Member State, Eurojust cannot take the required action. Therefore it should inform the Member State concerned allowing it to follow up the case.

(39) In so far as confidentiality is concerned, the relevant provisions of the Staff Regulations of officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European Union should apply to officials or other servants employed and working in connection with SIS.

(40) Both the Member States and the Agency should maintain security plans in order to facilitate the implementation of security obligations and should cooperate with each other in order to address security issues from a common perspective.

(41) The national independent supervisory authorities should monitor the lawfulness of the processing of personal data by the Member States in relation to this Regulation. The rights of data subjects for access, rectification and erasure of their personal data stored in SIS, and subsequent remedies before national courts as well as the mutual recognition of judgments should be set out. Therefore, it is appropriate to require annual statistics from Member States.

(42) The supervisory authorities should ensure that an audit of the data processing operations in its N.SIS is carried out in accordance with international auditing standards at least every four years. The audit should either be carried out by the supervisory authorities, or the national supervisory authorities should directly order the audit from an independent data protection auditor. The independent auditor should remain under the control and responsibility of the national supervisory authority or authorities which therefore should order the audit itself and provide a clearly defined purpose, scope and methodology of the audit as well as guidance and supervision concerning the audit and its final results.

(43) Regulation (EU) 2016/794 (Europol Regulation) provides that Europol supports and strengthens actions carried out by the competent authorities of Member States and their cooperation in combating terrorism and serious crime and provides analysis and threat assessments. The extension of Europol's access rights to the SIS alerts on missing persons should further improve Europol's capacity to provide national law enforcement authorities with comprehensive operational and analytical products concerning trafficking in human beings and child sexual exploitation, including online. This would contribute to better prevention of these criminal offences, the protection of potential victims and to the investigation of perpetrators. Europol's European


Cybercrime Centre would also benefit from new Europol access to SIS alerts on missing persons, including in cases of travelling sex offenders and child sexual abuse online, where perpetrators often claim that they have access to children or can get access to children who might have been registered as missing. Furthermore, since Europol's European Migrant Smuggling Centre plays a major strategic role in countering the facilitation of irregular migration, it should obtain access to alerts on persons who are refused entry or stay within the territory of a Member State either on criminal grounds or because of non-compliance with visa and stay conditions.

In order to bridge the gap in information sharing on terrorism, in particular on foreign terrorist fighters – where monitoring of their movement is crucial – Member States should share information on terrorism-related activity with Europol in parallel to introducing an alert in SIS, as well as hits and related information. This should allow Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre to verify if there is any additional contextual information available in Europol's databases and to deliver high quality analysis contributing to disrupting terrorism networks and, where possible, preventing their attacks.

It is also necessary to set out clear rules for Europol on the processing and downloading of SIS data to allow the most comprehensive use of SIS provided that data protection standards are respected as provided in this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2016/794. In cases where searches carried out by Europol in SIS reveal the existence of an alert issued by a Member State, Europol cannot take the required action. Therefore it should inform the Member State concerned allowing it to follow up the case.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council provides for the purpose of this Regulation, that the host Member State is to authorise the members of the European Border and Coast Guard teams or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks, deployed by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, to consult European databases, where this consultation is necessary for fulfilling operational aims specified in the operational plan on border checks, border surveillance and return. Other relevant Union agencies, in particular the European Asylum Support Office and Europol, may also deploy experts as part of migration management support teams, who are not members of the staff of those Union agencies. The objective of the deployment of the European Border and Coast Guard teams, teams of staff involved in return-related tasks and the migration management support team is to provide for technical and operational reinforcement to the requesting Member States, especially to those facing disproportionate migratory challenges. Fulfilling the tasks assigned to the European Border and Coast Guard teams, teams of staff involved in return-related tasks and the migration management support team necessitates access to SIS via a technical interface of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency connecting to Central SIS. In cases where searches carried out by the team or the teams of staff in SIS reveal the existence of an alert issued by a Member State, the member of the team or the staff cannot take the required action unless

authorised to do so by the host Member State. Therefore it should inform the Member States concerned allowing for follow up of the case.

(47) In accordance with Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)\(^{57}\) the ETIAS Central Unit of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will perform verifications in SIS via ETIAS in order to perform the assessment of the applications for travel authorisation which require, inter alia, to ascertain if the third country national applying for a travel authorisation is subject of a SIS alert. To this end the ETIAS Central Unit within the European Border and Coast Guard Agency should also have access to SIS to the extent necessary to carry out its mandate, namely to all alert categories on persons and alerts on blank and issued personal identification documents.

(48) Owing to their technical nature, level of detail and need for regular updating, certain aspects of SIS cannot be covered exhaustively by the provisions of this Regulation. These include, for example, technical rules on entering data, updating, deleting and searching data, data quality and search rules related to biometric identifiers, rules on compatibility and priority of alerts, the adding of flags, links between alerts, specifying new object categories within the technical and electronic equipment category, setting the expiry date of alerts within the maximum time limit and the exchange of supplementary information. Implementing powers in respect of those aspects should therefore be conferred to the Commission. Technical rules on searching alerts should take into account the smooth operation of national applications.

(49) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011\(^{58}\). The procedure for adopting implementing measures under this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2018/xxx (border checks) should be the same.

(50) In order to ensure transparency, a report on the technical functioning of Central SIS and the communication infrastructure, including its security, and on the exchange of supplementary information should be produced every two years by the Agency. An overall evaluation should be issued by the Commission every four years.

(51) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely the establishment and regulation of a joint information system and the exchange of related supplementary information, cannot, by its very nature, be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty of the European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(52) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular, this Regulation seeks to ensure a safe environment for all persons residing on the territory of the European Union and special protection for children who could

\(^{57}\) COM (2016)731 final.

be victim of trafficking or parental abduction while fully respecting the protection of personal data.

(53) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Regulation builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark shall, in accordance with Article 4 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Regulation whether it will implement it in its national law.

(54) The United Kingdom is taking part in this Regulation in accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 8(2) of Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis.

(55) Ireland is taking part in this Regulation in accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 6(2) of Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis.

(56) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point G of Council Decision 1999/437/EC on certain arrangements for the application of that Agreement.

(57) As regards Switzerland, this Regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement signed between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning the association of the Swiss Confederation with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point G, of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 4(1) of Council Decisions 2004/849/EC and 2004/860/EC.

59 OJ L 131, 1.6.2000, p. 43.
61 OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p.36.
64 Council Decision 2004/860/EC of 25 October 2004 on the signing, on behalf of the European Community, and on the provisional application of certain provisions of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation, concerning the Swiss
As regards Liechtenstein, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point G, of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/349/EU and Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU.

As regards Bulgaria and Romania, this Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession and should be read in conjunction with Council Decision 2010/365/EU on the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania.

Concerning Cyprus and Croatia this Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within, respectively, the meaning of Article 3(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession and Article 4(2) of the 2011 Act of Accession.

This Regulation should apply to Ireland on dates determined in accordance with the procedures set out in the relevant instruments concerning the application of the Schengen acquis to this State.

The estimated costs of the upgrade of the SIS national systems and of the implementation of the new functionalities, envisaged in this Regulation are lower than the remaining amount in the budget line for Smart Borders in Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council. Therefore, this Regulation should re-allocate the amount, attributed for developing IT systems supporting the management of migration flows across the external borders, in accordance with Article 5(5)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014.

Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 370, 17.12.2004, p. 78).

Council Decision 2011/349/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, relating in particular to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 1).

Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 19).

OJ L 166, 1.7.2010, p. 17.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1
General purpose of SIS

The purpose of SIS shall be to ensure a high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the Union including the maintenance of public security and public policy and the safeguarding of security in the territories of the Member States, and to apply the provisions of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union relating to the movement of persons on their territories, using information communicated via this system.

Article 2
Scope

1. This Regulation establishes the conditions and procedures for the entry and processing in SIS of alerts on persons and objects, the exchange of supplementary information and additional data for the purpose of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

2. This Regulation also lays down provisions on the technical architecture of SIS, the responsibilities of the Member States and of the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, general data processing, the rights of the persons concerned and liability.

Article 3
Definitions

1. For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

   (a) ‘alert’ means a set of data, including biometric identifiers as referred to in Article 22 and in Article 40, entered in SIS allowing the competent authorities to identify a person or an object with a view to taking specific action;

   (b) ‘supplementary information’ means information not forming part of the alert data stored in SIS, but connected to SIS alerts, which is to be exchanged:

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(1) in order to allow Member States to consult or inform each other when entering an alert;
(2) following a hit in order to allow the appropriate action to be taken;
(3) when the required action cannot be taken;
(4) when dealing with the quality of SIS data;
(5) when dealing with the compatibility and priority of alerts;
(6) when dealing with rights of access;

(c) ‘additional data’ means the data stored in SIS and connected with SIS alerts which are to be immediately available to the competent authorities where a person in respect of whom data has been entered in SIS is located as a result of searches made therein;

(d) ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’);

(e) ‘an identifiable natural person’ is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;

(f) ‘processing of personal data’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, logging, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction;

(g) a ‘hit’ in SIS means:
   (1) a search is conducted by a user;
   (2) the search reveals an alert entered by another Member State in SIS;
   (3) data concerning the alert in SIS match the search data; and
   (4) further actions are requested.

(h) ‘flag’ means a suspension of validity of an alert at the national level that may be added to alerts for arrest, alerts for missing persons and alerts for discreet, inquiry and specific checks, where a Member State considers that to give effect to an alert is incompatible with its national law, its international obligations or essential national interests. Where the alert is flagged, the requested action on the basis of the alert shall not be taken on the territory of this Member State.

(i) ‘issuing Member State’ means the Member State which entered the alert in SIS;

(j) ‘executing Member State’ means the Member State which takes or has taken the required actions following a hit;

(k) ‘end-users’ mean competent authorities directly searching CS-SIS, N.SIS or a technical copy thereof;
‘dactylographic data’ means data on fingerprints and palm prints which due to their unique character and the reference points contained therein enable accurate and conclusive comparisons on a person’s identity;

‘serious crime’ means offences listed in Article 2(1) and (2) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 200271;

‘terrorist offences’ means offences under national law referred to in Articles 1-4 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 200272.

Article 4

Technical architecture and ways of operating SIS

1. SIS shall be composed of:

(a) a central system (Central SIS) composed of:
   – a technical support function (‘CS-SIS’) containing a database, the ‘SIS database’;
   – a uniform national interface (NI-SIS);

(b) a national system (N.SIS) in each of the Member States, consisting of the national data systems which communicate with Central SIS. An N.SIS shall contain a data file (a ‘national copy’), containing a complete or partial copy of the SIS database as well as a backup N.SIS. The N.SIS and its backup may be used simultaneously to ensure uninterrupted availability to end-users;

(c) a communication infrastructure between CS-SIS and NI-SIS (the Communication Infrastructure) that provides an encrypted virtual network dedicated to SIS data and the exchange of data between SIRENE Bureaux as referred to in Article 7(2).

2. SIS data shall be entered, updated, deleted and searched via the various N.SIS. A partial or a full national copy shall be available for the purpose of carrying out automated searches in the territory of each of the Member States using such a copy. The partial national copy shall contain at least the data listed in Article 20 (2) concerning objects and the data listed in Article 20(3) (a) to (v) of this Regulation concerning alerts on persons. It shall not be possible to search the data files of other Member States' N.SIS.

3. CS-SIS shall perform technical supervision and administration functions and have a backup CS-SIS, capable of ensuring all functionalities of the principal CS-SIS in the event of failure of this system. CS-SIS and the backup CS-SIS shall be located in the two technical sites of the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale information systems in the area of freedom, security and justice established by Regulation (EU) No 1077/201173 (‘the Agency’). CS-SIS or backup CS-SIS may contain an additional copy of the SIS database and may be used simultaneously in

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active operation provided that each of them is capable to process all transactions related to SIS alerts.

4. CS-SIS shall provide the services necessary for the entry and processing of SIS data, including searches in the SIS database. CS-SIS shall:
   (a) provide online update of the national copies;
   (b) ensure synchronisation of and consistency between the national copies and the SIS database;
   (c) provide the operation for initialisation and restoration of the national copies;
   (d) provide uninterrupted availability.

Article 5
Costs

1. The costs of operating, maintaining and further developing Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure shall be borne by the general budget of the European Union.

2. These costs shall include work done with respect to CS-SIS that ensures the provision of the services referred to in Article 4(4).

3. The costs of setting up, operating, maintaining and further developing each N.SIS shall be borne by the Member State concerned.

CHAPTER II

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES

Article 6
National systems

Each Member State shall be responsible for setting up, operating, maintaining and further developing its N.SIS and connecting its N.SIS to NI-SIS.

Each Member State shall be responsible for ensuring the continuous operation of the N.SIS, its connection to NI-SIS and the uninterrupted availability of SIS data to the end-users.

Article 7
N.SIS Office and SIRENE Bureau

1. Each Member State shall designate an authority (the N.SIS Office), which shall have central responsibility for its N.SIS.

   That authority shall be responsible for the smooth operation and security of the N.SIS, shall ensure the access of the competent authorities to the SIS and shall take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Regulation. It shall be responsible for ensuring that all functionalities of SIS are appropriately made available to the end users.

   Each Member State shall transmit its alerts via its N.SIS Office.
2. Each Member State shall designate the authority which shall ensure the exchange and availability of all supplementary information (the SIRENE Bureau) in accordance with the provisions of the SIRENE Manual, as referred to in Article 8. Those Bureaux shall also coordinate the verification of the quality of the information entered in SIS. For those purposes they shall have access to data processed in SIS.

3. The Member States shall inform the Agency of their N.SIS II office and of their SIRENE Bureau. The Agency shall publish the list of them together with the list referred to in Article 53(8).

Article 8
Exchange of supplementary information

1. Supplementary information shall be exchanged in accordance with the provisions of the SIRENE Manual and using the Communication Infrastructure. Member States shall provide the necessary technical and personal resources to ensure the continuous availability and exchange of supplementary information. In the event that the Communication Infrastructure is unavailable, Member States may use other adequately secured technical means to exchange supplementary information.

2. Supplementary information shall be used only for the purpose for which it was transmitted in accordance with Article 61 unless prior consent is obtained from the issuing Member State.

3. The SIRENE Bureaux shall carry out their task in a quick and efficient manner, in particular by replying to a request as soon as possible but not later than 12 hours after the receipt of the request.

4. Detailed rules for the exchange of supplementary information shall be adopted by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2) in the form of a manual called the ‘SIRENE Manual’.

Article 9
Technical and functional compliance

1. When setting up its N.SIS, each Member State shall comply with common standards, protocols and technical procedures established to ensure the compatibility of its N-SIS with CS-SIS for the prompt and effective transmission of data. Those common standards, protocols and technical procedures shall be adopted by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

2. Member States shall ensure, by means of the services provided by CS-SIS, that data stored in the national copy are, by means of automatic updates referred to in Article 4(4), identical to and consistent with the SIS database, and that a search in its national copy produces a result equivalent to that of a search in the SIS database. End-users shall receive the data required to perform their tasks, in particular all data required for the identification of the data subject and to take the required action.
Article 10
Security – Member States

1. Each Member State shall, in relation to its N.SIS, adopt the necessary measures, including a security plan, a business continuity plan and a disaster recovery plan in order to:

(a) physically protect data, including by making contingency plans for the protection of critical infrastructure;
(b) deny unauthorised persons access to data-processing facilities used for processing personal data (facilities access control);
(c) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or removal of data media (data media control);
(d) prevent the unauthorised input of data and the unauthorised inspection, modification or deletion of stored personal data (storage control);
(e) prevent the use of automated data-processing systems by unauthorised persons using data communication equipment (user control);
(f) ensure that persons authorised to use an automated data-processing system have access only to the data covered by their access authorisation, by means of individual and unique user identities and confidential access modes only (data access control);
(g) ensure that all authorities with a right of access to SIS or to the data processing facilities create profiles describing the functions and responsibilities of persons who are authorised to access, enter, update, delete and search the data and make these profiles available to the national supervisory authorities referred to in Article 66 without delay upon their request (personnel profiles);
(h) ensure that it is possible to verify and establish to which bodies personal data may be transmitted using data communication equipment (communication control);
(i) ensure that it is subsequently possible to verify and establish which personal data have been input into automated data-processing systems, when, by whom and for what purpose the data were input (input control);
(j) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or deletion of personal data during transfers of personal data or during transportation of data media, in particular by means of appropriate encryption techniques (transport control);
(k) monitor the effectiveness of the security measures referred to in this paragraph and take the necessary organisational measures related to internal monitoring (self-auditing).

2. Member States shall take measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1 as regards security in respect of the processing and exchange of supplementary information, including securing the premises of the SIRENE Bureau.

3. Member States shall take measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1 as regards security in respect of the processing of SIS data by the authorities referred to in Article 43.
**Article 11**  
**Confidentiality – Member States**

Each Member State shall apply its rules of professional secrecy or other equivalent duties of confidentiality to all persons and bodies required to work with SIS data and supplementary information, in accordance with its national law. That obligation shall also apply after those persons leave office or employment or after the termination of the activities of those bodies.

**Article 12**  
**Keeping of logs at national level**

1. Member States shall ensure that every access to and all exchanges of personal data within CS-SIS are logged in their N.SIS for the purposes of checking whether or not the search is lawful, monitoring the lawfulness of data processing, self-monitoring and ensuring the proper functioning of N.SIS, data integrity and security.

2. The records shall show, in particular, the history of the alert, the date and time of the data processing activity, the data used to perform a search, a reference to the data transmitted and the names of both the competent authority and the person responsible for processing the data.

3. If the search is carried out with dactylographic data or facial image in accordance with Articles 40, 41 and 42 the logs shall show, in particular, the type of data used to perform a search, a reference to the type of data transmitted and the names of both the competent authority and the person responsible for processing the data.

4. The logs may be used only for the purpose referred to in paragraph 1 and shall be deleted at the earliest one year, and at the latest three years, after their creation.

5. Logs may be kept longer if they are required for monitoring procedures that are already under way.

6. The competent national authorities in charge of checking whether or not searches are lawful, monitoring the lawfulness of data processing, self-monitoring and ensuring the proper functioning of the N.SIS, data integrity and security, shall have access, within the limits of their competence and at their request, to these logs for the purpose of fulfilling their duties.

7. Where Member States carry out automated scanned searches of the number plates of motor vehicles, using Automatic Number Plate Recognition systems, Member States shall maintain a log of the search in accordance with national law. The content of this log shall be established by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2). Where a positive match is achieved against data stored in SIS, or a national or technical copy of SIS data, a full search shall be carried out in SIS in order to verify that a match has indeed been achieved. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 6 of this Article shall apply to this full search.

**Article 13**  
**Self-monitoring**

Member States shall ensure that each authority entitled to access SIS data takes the measures necessary to comply with this Regulation and cooperates, where necessary, with the national supervisory authority.
Article 14
Staff training

Before being authorised to process data stored in SIS and periodically after access to SIS data has been granted, the staff of the authorities having a right to access SIS shall receive appropriate training about data security, data protection rules and the procedures on data processing as set out in the SIRENE Manual. The staff shall be informed of any relevant criminal offences and penalties.

CHAPTER III

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AGENCY

Article 15
Operational management

1. The Agency shall be responsible for the operational management of Central SIS. The Agency shall, in cooperation with the Member States, ensure that at all times the best available technology, using a cost-benefit analysis, is used for Central SIS.

2. The Agency shall also be responsible for the following tasks relating to the Communication Infrastructure.
   (a) supervision;
   (b) security;
   (c) the coordination of relations between the Member States and the provider;

3. The Commission shall be responsible for all other tasks relating to the Communication Infrastructure, in particular:
   (a) tasks relating to implementation of the budget;
   (b) acquisition and renewal;
   (c) contractual matters.

4. The Agency shall be responsible for the following tasks relating to the SIRENE Bureaux and communication between the SIRENE Bureaux:
   (a) the coordination and management of testing;
   (b) the maintenance and update of technical specifications for the exchange of supplementary information between SIRENE Bureaux and the Communication Infrastructure and managing the impact of technical changes where it affects both SIS and the exchange of supplementary information between SIRENE Bureaux.

5. The Agency shall develop and maintain a mechanism and procedures for carrying out quality checks on the data in CS-SIS and shall provide regular reports to the Member States. The Agency shall provide a regular report to the Commission covering the issues encountered and the Member States concerned. This mechanism, procedures and the interpretation of data quality compliance shall be established by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).
6. Operational management of Central SIS shall consist of all the tasks necessary to keep Central SIS functioning 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in particular the maintenance work and technical developments necessary for the smooth running of the system. Those tasks also include testing activities ensuring that Central SIS and the national systems operate in accordance with the technical and functional requirements in accordance with Article 9 of this Regulation.

Article 16
Security

1. The Agency shall adopt the necessary measures, including of a security plan, a business continuity plan and a disaster recovery plan for Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure in order to:

(a) physically protect data, including by making contingency plans for the protection of critical infrastructure;

(b) deny unauthorised persons access to data-processing facilities used for processing personal data (facilities access control);

(c) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or removal of data media (data media control);

(d) prevent the unauthorised input of data and the unauthorised inspection, modification or deletion of stored personal data (storage control);

(e) prevent the use of automated data-processing systems by unauthorised persons using data communication equipment (user control);

(f) ensure that persons authorised to use an automated data-processing system have access only to the data covered by their access authorisation by means of individual and unique user identities and confidential access modes only (data access control);

(g) create profiles describing the functions and responsibilities for persons who are authorised to access the data or the data processing facilities and make these profiles available to the European Data Protection Supervisor referred to in Article 64 without delay upon its request (personnel profiles);

(h) ensure that it is possible to verify and establish to which bodies personal data may be transmitted using data communication equipment (communication control);

(i) ensure that it is subsequently possible to verify and establish which personal data have been input into automated data-processing systems, when and by whom the data were input (input control);

(j) prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or deletion of personal data during transfers of personal data or during transportation of data media in particular by means of appropriate encryption techniques (transport control);

(k) monitor the effectiveness of the security measures referred to in this paragraph and take the necessary organisational measures related to internal monitoring to ensure compliance with this Regulation (self-auditing).

2. The Agency shall take measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1 as regards security in respect of the processing and exchange of supplementary information through the Communication Infrastructure.
**Article 17**  
*Confidentiality – The Agency*

1. Without prejudice to Article 17 of the Staff Regulations of officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European Union, the Agency shall apply appropriate rules of professional secrecy or other equivalent duties of confidentiality of comparable standards to those laid down in Article 11 of this Regulation to all its staff required to work with SIS data. This obligation shall also apply after those persons leave office or employment or after the termination of their activities.

2. The Agency shall take measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1 as regards confidentiality in respect of the exchange of supplementary information through the communication infrastructure.

**Article 18**  
*Keeping of logs at central level*

1. The Agency shall ensure that every access to and all exchanges of personal data within CS-SIS are logged for the purposes mentioned in Article 12(1).

2. The logs shall show, in particular, the history of the alerts, the date and time of the data transmitted, the type of data used to perform searches, the reference to the type of data transmitted and the name of the competent authority responsible for processing the data.

3. If the search is carried out with dactylographic data or facial image in accordance with Articles 40, 41 and 42 the logs shall show, in particular, the type of data used to perform the search, a reference to the type data transmitted and the names of both the competent authority and the person responsible for processing the data.

4. The logs may only be used for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 and shall be deleted at the earliest one year, and at the latest three years, after their creation. The logs which include the history of alerts shall be erased after one to three years after deletion of the alerts.

5. Logs may be kept longer if they are required for monitoring procedures that are already underway.

6. The competent authorities in charge of checking whether or not a search is lawful, monitoring the lawfulness of data processing, self-monitoring and ensuring the proper functioning of CS-SIS, data integrity and security, shall have access, within the limits of their competence and at their request, to those logs for the purpose of fulfilling their tasks.
CHAPTER IV

INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC

Article 19
SIS information campaigns

The Commission, in cooperation with the national supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor, shall regularly carry out campaigns informing the public about the objectives of SIS, the data stored, the authorities having access to SIS and the rights of data subjects. Member States shall, in cooperation with their national supervisory authorities, devise and implement the necessary policies to inform their citizens about SIS generally.

CHAPTER V

CATEGORIES OF DATA AND FLAGGING

Article 20
Categories of data

1. Without prejudice to Article 8(1) or the provisions of this Regulation providing for the storage of additional data, SIS shall contain only those categories of data which are supplied by each of the Member States, as required for the purposes laid down in Articles 26, 32, 34, 36 and 38.

2. The categories of data shall be as follows:
   (a) information on persons in relation to whom an alert has been issued;
   (b) information on objects referred to in Articles 32, 36 and 38.

3. The information on persons in relation to whom an alert has been issued shall only contain the following data:
   (a) surname(s)
   (b) forename(s),
   (c) name(s) at birth
   (d) previously used names and aliases;
   (e) any specific, objective, physical characteristics not subject to change;
   (f) place of birth
   (g) date of birth;
   (h) sex;
   (i) nationality/nationalities;
   (j) whether the person concerned is armed, violent, has escaped or is involved in an activity as referred to in Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism;
   (k) reason for the alert;
(l) authority issuing the alert;
(m) a reference to the decision giving rise to the alert;
(n) action to be taken;
(o) link(s) to other alerts issued in SIS pursuant to Article 53;
(p) the type of offence for which the alert was issued;
(q) the person’s registration number in a national register
(r) a categorisation of the type of missing person case (only for alerts referred to in Article 32);
(s) the category of the person’s identification document;
(t) the country of issue of the person’s identification document;
(u) the number(s) of the person’s identification document;
(v) the date of issue of the person’s identification document;
(w) photographs and facial images;
(x) relevant DNA profiles subject to Article 22(1)(b) of this Regulation;
(y) dactylographic data;
(z) a colour copy of the identification document.

4. The technical rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching the data referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be laid down and developed by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

5. The technical rules necessary for searching data referred to in paragraph 3 shall be laid down and developed in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2). These technical rules shall be similar for searches in CS-SIS, in national copies and in technical copies, as referred to in Article 53(2) and they shall be based upon common standards laid down developed by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

Article 21
Proportionality

1. Before issuing an alert and when extending the validity period of an alert, Member States shall determine whether the case is adequate, relevant and important enough to warrant the entry of an alert in SIS.

2. Where a person or an object is sought by a Member State in relation to an offence that falls under Articles 1 to 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, the Member State shall, in all circumstances, create the corresponding alert under either Article 34, 36 or 38 as appropriate.

Article 22
Specific rules for entering photographs, facial images, dactylographic data and DNA profiles

1. The entering into SIS of data referred to in Article 20(3)(w), (x) and (y) shall be subject to the following provisions:
(a) Photographs, facial images, dactylographic data and DNA profiles shall only be entered following a quality check to ascertain the fulfilment of a minimum data quality standard.

(b) A DNA profile may only be added to alerts provided for in Article 32(2)(a) and (c) and only where photographs, facial images or dactylographic data suitable for identification are not available. The DNA profiles of persons who are direct ascendants, descendants or siblings of the alert subject may be added to the alert provided that those persons concerned gives explicit consent. The racial origin of the person shall not be included in the DNA profile.

2. Quality standards shall be established for the storage of the data referred to under paragraph 1(a) of this Article and Article 40. The specification of these standards shall be laid down by means of implementing measures and updated in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

**Article 23**

*Requirement for an alert to be entered*

1. An alert on a person may not be entered without the data referred to in Article 20(3)(a), (g), (k), (m), (n) as well as, where applicable, (p), except for in the situations referred to in Article 40.

2. Where available, all other data listed in Article 20(3) shall also be entered.

**Article 24**

*General provisions on flagging*

1. Where a Member State considers that to give effect to an alert entered in accordance with Articles 26, 32 and 36 is incompatible with its national law, its international obligations or essential national interests, it may subsequently require that a flag be added to the alert to the effect that the action to be taken on the basis of the alert will not be taken in its territory. The flag shall be added by the SIRENE Bureau of the issuing Member State.

2. In order to enable Member States to require that a flag be added to an alert issued in accordance with Article 26, all Member States shall be notified automatically about any new alert of that category by the exchange of supplementary information.

3. If in particularly urgent and serious cases, an issuing Member State requests the execution of the action, the Member State executing the alert shall examine whether it is able to allow the flag added at its behest to be withdrawn. If the executing Member State is able to do so, it shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the action to be taken can be carried out immediately.

**Article 25**

*Flagging related to alerts for arrest for surrender purposes*

1. Where Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA applies, a flag preventing arrest shall only be added to an alert for arrest for surrender purposes where the competent judicial authority under national law for the execution of a European Arrest Warrant has refused its execution on the basis of a ground for non-execution and where the addition of the flag has been required.
2. However, at the behest of a competent judicial authority under national law, either on the basis of a general instruction or in a specific case, a flag may also be required to be added to an alert for arrest for surrender purposes if it is obvious that the execution of the European Arrest Warrant will have to be refused.

CHAPTER VI

ALERTS IN RESPECT OF PERSONS WANTED FOR ARREST FOR SURRENDER OR EXTRADITION PURPOSES

Article 26

Objectives and conditions for issuing alerts

1. Data on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant or wanted for arrest for extradition purposes shall be entered at the request of the judicial authority of the issuing Member State.

2. Data on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes shall also be entered on the basis of arrest warrants issued in accordance with Agreements concluded between the Union and third countries on the basis of Article 37 of the Treaty on the European Union for the purpose of surrender of persons on the basis of an arrest warrant, which provide for the transmission of such an arrest warrant via the SIS.

3. Any reference in this Regulation to provisions of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA shall be construed as including the corresponding provisions of Agreements concluded between the European Union and third countries on the basis of Article 37 the Treaty on the European Union for the purpose of surrender of persons on the basis of an arrest warrant which provide for the transmission of such an arrest warrant via SIS.

4. The issuing Member State may, in the case of an ongoing search operation and following the authorisation of the relevant judicial authority of the issuing Member State, temporarily make an existing alert for arrest issued under Article 26 of this Regulation unavailable for searching to the effect that the alert shall not be searchable by the end-user and will only be accessible to the SIRENE Bureaux. This functionality shall be used for a period not exceeding 48 hours. If operationally necessary, however, it may be extended by further periods of 48 hours. Member States shall keep statistics about the number of alerts where this functionality has been used.

Article 27

Additional data on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes

1. Where a person is wanted for arrest for surrender purposes on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant the issuing Member State shall enter in SIS a copy of the original of the European Arrest Warrant.

2. The issuing Member State may enter a copy of a translation of the European Arrest Warrant in one or more other official languages of the institutions of the European Union.
Article 28
   Supplementary information on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes

The Member State which entered the alert in SIS for arrest for surrender purposes shall communicate the information referred to in Article 8(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA to the other Member States through the exchange of supplementary information.

Article 29
   Supplementary information on persons wanted for arrest for extradition purposes

1. The Member State which entered the alert into SIS for extradition purposes shall communicate the following data to the other Member States through the exchange of supplementary information to all Member States:

   (a) the authority which issued the request for arrest;
   (b) whether there is an arrest warrant or a document having the same legal effect, or an enforceable judgment;
   (c) the nature and legal classification of the offence;
   (d) a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, place and the degree of participation in the offence by the person for whom the alert has been issued;
   (e) in so far as possible, the consequences of the offence;
   (f) any other information useful or necessary for the execution of the alert.

2. The data listed in paragraph 1 shall not be communicated where the data referred to in Articles 27 or 28 have already been provided and are considered sufficient for the execution of the alert by the Member State concerned.

Article 30
   Conversion of alerts on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes or extradition purposes

Where an arrest cannot be made, either because a requested Member State refuses to do so, in accordance with the procedures on flagging set out in Articles 24 or 25, or because, in the case of an alert for arrest for extradition purposes, an investigation has not been completed, the requested Member State shall consider the alert as being an alert for the purposes of communicating the whereabouts of the person concerned.

Article 31
   Execution of action based on an alert on a person wanted for arrest with a view to surrender or extradition

1. An alert entered in SIS in accordance with Article 26 together with the additional data referred to in Article 27, shall constitute and have the same effect as a European Arrest Warrant issued in accordance with Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA where this Framework Decision applies.

2. Where Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA does not apply, an alert entered in SIS in accordance with Articles 26 and 29 shall have the same legal force as a request for

CHAPTER VII

ALERTS ON MISSING PERSONS

Article 32
Objectives and conditions for issuing alerts

1. Data on missing persons or other persons who need to be placed under protection or whose whereabouts need to be ascertained shall be entered in SIS at the request of the competent authority of the Member State issuing the alert.

2. The following categories of missing persons may be entered:
   (a) missing persons who need to be placed under protection
       (i) for their own protection;
       (ii) in order to prevent threats;
   (b) missing persons who do not need to be placed under protection;
   (c) children at risk of abduction in accordance with paragraph 4.

3. Paragraph 2(a) shall apply in particular to children and to persons who have to be interned following a decision by a competent authority.

4. An alert on a child referred to in paragraph 2(c) shall be entered at the request of the competent judicial authority of the Member State that has jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility in accordance with Council Regulation No 2201/2003 where a concrete and apparent risk exists that the child may be unlawfully and imminently removed from the Member State where that competent judicial authority is situated. In Member States which are party to the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children and where Council Regulation No 2201/2003 does not apply, the provisions of the Hague Convention are applicable.

5. Member States shall ensure that the data entered in SIS indicate which of the categories referred to in paragraph 2 the missing person falls into. Further, Member States shall also ensure that the data entered in SIS indicate which type of missing or vulnerable person case is involved. The rules on the categorisation of the types of cases and the entering of such data shall be laid down and developed by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

6. Four months before a child who is the subject of an alert under this Article reaches adulthood, CS-SIS shall automatically notify the issuing Member State that the

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reason for request and the action to be taken have to be updated or the alert has to be deleted.

7. Where there is a clear indication that vehicles, boats or aircraft are connected with a person who is the subject of an alert pursuant to paragraph 2, alerts on those vehicles, boats and aircraft may be issued in order to locate the person. In those cases the alert on the missing person and the alert on the object shall be linked in accordance with Article 60. The technical rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching the data referred to in this paragraph shall be laid down and developed by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

**Article 33**  
*Execution of action based on an alert*

1. Where a person as referred to in Article 32 is located, the competent authorities shall, subject to paragraph 2, communicate his or her whereabouts to the Member State issuing the alert. In the case of missing children or children who need to be placed under protection the executing Member State shall consult immediately the issuing Member State in order to agree without delay on the measures to be taken in order to safeguard the best interest of the child. The competent authorities may, in the cases referred to in Article 32(2)(a) and (c), move the person to a safe place in order to prevent him or her from continuing his journey, if so authorised by national law.

2. The communication, other than between the competent authorities, of data on a missing person who has been located and who is of age shall be subject to that person's consent. The competent authorities may, however, communicate the fact that the alert has been erased because the missing person has been located to the person who reported the person missing.

**CHAPTER VIII**

**ALERTS ON PERSONS SOUGHT TO ASSIST WITH A JUDICIAL PROCEDURE**

**Article 34**  
*Objectives and conditions for issuing alerts*

1. For the purposes of communicating the place of residence or domicile of persons, Member States shall, at the request of a competent authority, enter in SIS data on:
   
   (a) witnesses;

   (b) persons summoned or persons sought to be summoned to appear before the judicial authorities in connection with criminal proceedings in order to account for acts for which they are being prosecuted;

   (c) persons who are to be served with a criminal judgment or other documents in connection with criminal proceedings in order to account for acts for which they are being prosecuted;

   (d) persons who are to be served with a summons to report in order to serve a penalty involving deprivation of liberty.
2. Where there is a clear indication that vehicles, boat or aircraft are connected with a person subject of an alert pursuant to paragraph 1, alerts on those vehicles, boats and aircraft may be issued in order to locate the person. In such cases the alerts on the person and the alert on the object shall be linked in accordance with Article 60. The technical rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching the data referred to in this paragraph shall be laid down and developed by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

Article 35

Execution of the action based on an alert

Requested information shall be communicated to the requesting Member State through the exchange of supplementary information.

CHAPTER IX

ALERTS ON PERSONS AND OBJECTS FOR DISCREET CHECKS, INQUIRY CHECKS OR SPECIFIC CHECKS

Article 36

Objectives and conditions for issuing alerts

1. Data on persons or vehicles, boats, aircraft and containers shall be entered in accordance with the national law of the Member State issuing the alert, for the purposes of discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks in accordance with Article 37(4).

2. The alert may be issued for the purposes of prosecuting criminal offences, executing a criminal sentence and for the prevention of threats to public security:
   (a) where there is a clear indication that a person intends to commit or is committing a serious crime, in particular the offences referred to in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA;
   (b) where the information referred to in Article 37(1) is necessary for the execution of a criminal sentence of a person convicted of a serious crime, in particular the offences referred to in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA; or
   (c) where an overall assessment of a person, in particular on the basis of past criminal offences, gives reason to believe that that person may also commit serious crimes in the future, in particular the offences referred to in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.

3. In addition, an alert may be issued in accordance with national law, at the request of the authorities responsible for national security, where there is a concrete indication that the information referred to in Article 37(1) is necessary in order to prevent a serious threat by the person concerned or other serious threats to internal or external national security. The Member State issuing the alert pursuant to this paragraph shall inform the other Member States thereof. Each Member State shall determine to which authorities this information shall be transmitted.
4. Where there is a clear indication that vehicles, boats, aircraft and containers are connected with the serious crimes referred to in paragraph 2 or the serious threats referred to in paragraph 3, alerts on those vehicles, boats, aircraft and containers may be issued.

5. Where there is a clear indication that blank official documents or issued identity documents are connected with the serious crimes referred to in paragraph 2 or the serious threats referred to in paragraph 3, alerts on those documents, regardless of the identity of the original holder of the identity document, if any, may be issued. The technical rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching the data referred to in this paragraph shall be laid down and developed by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

**Article 37**

*Execution of the action based on an alert*

1. For the purposes of discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks, all or some of the following information shall be collected and communicated to the authority issuing the alert when border control checks, police and customs checks or other law enforcement activities are carried out within a Member State:

   (a) the fact that the person for whom, or the vehicle, boat, aircraft, container, blank official document or issued identity paper for which an alert has been issued, has been located;

   (b) the place, time and reason for the check;

   (c) the route of the journey and destination;

   (d) the persons accompanying the person concerned or the occupants of the vehicle, boat or aircraft or accompanying the holder of the blank official document or issued identity document who can reasonably be expected to be associated with the persons concerned;

   (e) the identity revealed and personal description of the person using the blank official document or issued identity paper subject of the alert;

   (f) the vehicle, boat, aircraft or container used;

   (g) objects carried, including travel documents;

   (h) the circumstances under which the person or the vehicle, boat, aircraft, container, blank official document or issued identity paper was located.

2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be communicated through the exchange of supplementary information.

3. Depending on the operational circumstances and in accordance with national law, a discreet check shall comprise a routine check of a person or object with a view to collecting as much of the information described in paragraph 1 as possible without jeopardising the discreet nature of the check.

4. Depending on the operational circumstances and in accordance with national law, an inquiry check shall comprise a more in-depth check and a questioning of the person. Where inquiry checks are not authorised by the law of a Member State, they shall be replaced by discreet checks in that Member State.
5. During specific checks, persons, vehicles, boats, aircraft, containers and objects carried, may be searched in accordance with national law for the purposes referred to in Article 36. Searches shall be carried out in accordance with national law. Where specific checks are not authorised by the law of a Member State, they shall be replaced by inquiry checks in that Member State.

CHAPTER X

ALERTS ON OBJECTS FOR SEIZURE OR USE AS EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

Article 38

Objectives and conditions for issuing alerts

1. Data on objects sought for the purposes of seizure for law enforcement purposes or use as evidence in criminal proceedings shall be entered in SIS.

2. The following categories of readily identifiable objects shall be entered:
   (a) motor vehicles, as defined by national law, regardless of the propulsion system;
   (b) trailers with an unladen weight exceeding 750 kg;
   (c) caravans;
   (d) industrial equipment;
   (e) boats;
   (f) boat engines;
   (g) containers;
   (h) aircraft;
   (i) firearms;
   (j) blank official documents which have been stolen, misappropriated or lost;
   (k) issued identity documents such as passports, identity cards, driving licenses, residence permits and travel documents which have been stolen, misappropriated, lost or, invalidated or purport to be such a document but are falsified;
   (l) vehicle registration certificates and vehicle number plates which have been stolen, misappropriated, lost, or invalidated or purport to be such a document or plate but are falsified;
   (m) banknotes (registered notes) and falsified banknotes;
   (n) technical equipment, information technology items and other high-value readily identifiable objects;
   (o) identifiable component parts of motor vehicles;
   (p) identifiable component parts of industrial equipment.

3. The definition of new sub-categories of object under paragraph 2(n) and the technical rules necessary for entering, updating, deleting and searching the data referred to in paragraph 2 shall be laid down and developed by means of implementing measures in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).
Article 39
Execution of the action based on an alert

1. Where a search brings to light an alert for an object which has been located, the authority which matched the two items of data shall in accordance with national law seize the object and contact the authority which issued the alert in order to agree on the measures to be taken. For this purpose, personal data may also be communicated in accordance with this Regulation.

2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be communicated through the exchange of supplementary information.

3. The Member State which located the object shall take the requested measures in accordance with national law.

CHAPTER XI

ALERTS ON UNKNOWN WANTED PERSONS FOR IDENTIFICATION ACCORDING TO NATIONAL LAW AND SEARCH WITH BIOMETRIC DATA

Article 40
Alerts on unknown wanted person for apprehension under national law

Dactylographic data may be entered in SIS, not related to persons who are subject of the alerts. These dactylographic data shall be either complete or incomplete sets of fingerprints or palm prints discovered at the scenes of crimes under investigation, of serious crime and terrorist offence and where it can be established to a high degree of probability that they belong to the perpetrator of the offence. The dactylographic data in this category shall be stored as “unknown suspect or wanted person” provided that the competent authorities cannot establish the identity of the person by using any other national, European or international database.

Article 41
Execution of the action based on an alert

In the event of a hit or a potential match with the data stored pursuant to Article 40, the identity of the person shall be established in accordance with national law, together with verification that the dactylographic data stored in SIS belong to the person. Member States shall communicate by using supplementary information in order to facilitate timely investigation of the case.

Article 42
Specific rules for verification or search with photographs, facial images, dactylographic data and DNA profiles

1. Photographs, facial images, dactylographic data and DNA profiles shall be retrieved from SIS to verify the identity of a person who has been located as a result of an alphanumeric search made in SIS.

2. Dactylographic data may also be used to identify a person. Dactylographic data stored in SIS shall be searched for identification purposes if the identity of the person cannot be ascertained by other means.
3. Dactylographic data stored in SIS in relation to alerts issued pursuant to Articles 26, 34(1) b) and d) and Article 36 may also be searched by using complete or incomplete sets of fingerprints or palm prints discovered at the scenes of crimes under investigation, and where it can be established to a high degree of probability that they belong to the perpetrator of the offence provided that the competent authorities are unable to establish the identity of the person by using any other national, European or international database.

4. As soon as this becomes technically possible, and while ensuring a high degree of reliability of identification, photographs and facial images may be used to identify a person. Identification based on photographs or facial images shall only be used at regular border crossing points where self-service systems and automated border control systems are in use.

CHAPTER XII

RIGHT TO ACCESS AND RETENTION OF ALERTS

Article 43

Authorities having a right to access alerts

1. Access to data entered in SIS and the right to search such data directly or in a copy of SIS data shall be reserved to the authorities responsible for:

(a) border control, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code);

(b) police and customs checks carried out within the Member State concerned, and the coordination of such checks by designated authorities;

(c) other law enforcement activities carried out for the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences within the Member State concerned;

(d) examining the conditions and taking decisions related to the entry and stay of third-country nationals on the territory of the Member States, including on residence permits and long-stay visas, and to the return of third-country nationals.

2. The right to access data entered in SIS and the right to search such data directly may also be exercised by national judicial authorities, including those responsible for the initiation of public prosecutions in criminal proceedings and for judicial inquiries prior to charge, in the performance of their tasks, as provided for in national law, and by their coordinating authorities.

3. The right to access data entered in SIS and to search such data directly may be exercised by the authorities competent to carry out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1(c) in the performance of these tasks. The access by these authorities shall be governed by the law of each Member State.

4. The authorities referred to in this Article shall be included in the list referred to in Article 53(8).
Article 44
Vehicle registration authorities

1. The services in the Member States responsible for issuing registration certificates for vehicles, as referred to in Council Directive 1999/37/EC, shall have access to the following data entered into SIS in accordance with Article 38(2)(a), (b), (c) and (l) of this Regulation for the sole purpose of checking whether vehicles presented to them for registration have been stolen, misappropriated or lost or are sought as evidence in criminal proceedings:

(a) data on motor vehicles, as defined by national law, regardless of the propulsion system;
(b) data on trailers with an unladen weight exceeding 750 kg and caravans;
(c) data concerning vehicle registration certificates and vehicle number plates which have been stolen, misappropriated, lost or invalidated.

Access to those data by the services responsible for issuing registration certificates for vehicles shall be governed by the national law of that Member State.

2. Services as referred to in paragraph 1 that are government services shall have the right to access directly the data entered in SIS.

3. Services as referred to in paragraph 1 that are non-government services shall have access to data entered in SIS only through the intermediary of an authority as referred to in Article 43 of this Regulation. That authority shall have the right to access those data directly and to pass them on to the service concerned. The Member State concerned shall ensure that the service in question and its employees are required to respect any limitations on the permissible use of data passed on to them by the authority.

4. Article 39 of this Regulation shall not apply to access gained in accordance with this Article. The communication to the police or judicial authorities by services as referred to in paragraph 1 of any information brought to light by access to SIS which gives rise to suspicion of the commission of a criminal offence shall be governed by national law.

Article 45
Registration authorities for boats and aircraft

1. The services in the Member States responsible for issuing registration certificates or ensuring traffic management for boats, including boat engines and aircraft shall have access to the following data entered into SIS in accordance with Article 38(2) of this Regulation for the sole purpose of checking whether boats, including boat engines; aircraft or containers presented to them for registration or subject of traffic management have been stolen, misappropriated or lost or are sought as evidence in criminal proceedings:

(a) data on boats;
(b) data on boat engines;

Subject to paragraph 2, the law of each Member State shall govern access to those data by those services in that Member State. Access to the data listed (a) to (c) above shall be limited to the specific competence of the services concerned.

2. Services as referred to in paragraph 1 that are government services shall have the right to access directly the data entered in SIS.

3. Services referred to in paragraph 1 that are non-government services shall have access to data entered in SIS only through the intermediary of an authority as referred to in Article 43 of this Regulation. That authority shall have the right to access the data directly and to pass those data on to the service concerned. The Member State concerned shall ensure that the service in question and its employees are required to respect any limitations on the permissible use of data conveyed to them by the authority.

4. Article 39 of this Regulation shall not apply to access gained in accordance with this Article. The communication to the police or judicial authorities by services as referred to in paragraph 1 of any information brought to light by access to SIS which gives rise to suspicion of a criminal offence shall be governed by national law.

Article 46
Access to SIS data by Europol

1. The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) shall have, within its mandate, the right to access and search data entered into SIS.

2. Where a search by Europol reveals the existence of an alert in SIS, Europol shall inform the issuing Member State via the channels defined by Regulation (EU) 2016/794.

3. The use of information obtained from a search in the SIS is subject to the consent of the Member State concerned. If the Member State allows the use of such information, the handling thereof by Europol shall be governed by Regulation (EU) 2016/794. Europol may only communicate such information to third countries and third bodies with the consent of the Member State concerned.

4. Europol may request further information from the Member State concerned in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/794.

5. Europol shall:
   (a) without prejudice to paragraphs 3, 4 and 6, not connect parts of SIS nor transfer the data contained therein to which it has access to any computer system for data collection and processing operated by or at Europol nor download or otherwise copy any part of SIS;
   (b) limit access to data entered in SIS to specifically authorised staff of Europol;
   (c) adopt and apply measures provided for in Articles 10 and 11;
   (d) allow the European Data Protection Supervisor to review the activities of Europol in the exercise of its right to access and search data entered in SIS.

6. Data may only be copied for technical purposes, provided that such copying is necessary in order for duly authorised Europol staff to carry out a direct search. The
provisions of this Regulation shall apply to such copies. The technical copy shall be used for the purpose of storing SIS data whilst those data are searched. Once the data have been searched they shall be deleted. Such uses shall not be construed to be an unlawful downloading or copying of SIS data. Europol shall not copy alert data or additional data issued by Member States or from CS-SIS into other Europol systems.

7. Any copies, as referred to in paragraph 6, which lead to off-line databases may be retained for a period not exceeding 48 hours. That period may be extended in an emergency until the emergency comes to an end. Europol shall report any such extensions to the European Data Protection Supervisor.

8. Europol may receive and process supplementary information on corresponding SIS alerts provided that the data processing rules referred to in paragraphs 2 to 7 are applied as appropriate.

9. For the purpose of verifying the lawfulness of data processing, self-monitoring and ensuring proper data security and integrity Europol should keep log of every access to and search in SIS. Such logs and documentation shall not be considered to be the unlawful downloading or copying of any part of SIS.

Article 47
Access to SIS data by Eurojust

1. The national members of Eurojust and their assistants shall, within their mandate, have the right to access and search data entered in SIS within their mandate, in accordance with Articles 26, 32, 34 38 and 40.

2. Where a search by a national member of Eurojust reveals the existence of an alert in SIS, he or she shall inform the issuing Member State.

3. Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as affecting the provisions of Decision 2002/187/JHA concerning data protection and the liability for any unauthorised or incorrect processing of such data by national members of Eurojust or their assistants, or as affecting the powers of the Joint Supervisory Body set up pursuant to that Decision.

4. Every access and search made by a national member of Eurojust or an assistant shall be logged in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 and every use made by them of data accessed by them shall be logged.

5. No parts of SIS shall be connected to any computer system for data collection and processing operated by or at Eurojust nor shall the data contained in SIS to which the national members or their assistants have access be transferred to such a computer system. No part of SIS shall be downloaded. The logging of access and searches shall not be construed to be an unlawful download or copying of SIS data.

6. Access to data entered in SIS shall be limited to the national members and their assistants and shall not be extended to Eurojust staff.

7. Measures to ensure security and confidentiality as provided for in Articles 10 and 11 shall be adopted and applied.
Article 48
Access to SIS data by the European Border and Coast Guard teams, teams of staff involved in return-related tasks, and members of the migration management support team

1. In accordance with Article 40(8) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, the members of the European Border and Coast Guard teams or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks as well as the members of the migration management support teams shall, within their mandate, have the right to access and search data entered in SIS within their mandate.

2. Members of the European Border and Coast Guard teams or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks as well as the members of the migration management support teams shall access and search data entered in SIS in accordance with paragraph 1 via the technical interface set up and maintained by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency as referred to in Article 49(1).

3. Where a search by a member of the European Border and Coast Guard teams or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks or by a member of the migration management support team reveals the existence of an alert in SIS, the issuing Member State shall be informed thereof. In accordance with Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, members of the teams may only act in response to an alert in SIS under instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards or staff involved in return-related tasks of the host Member State in which they are operating. The host Member State may authorise members of the teams to act on its behalf.

4. Every instance of access and every search made by a member of the European Border and Coast Guard teams or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks or by a member of the migration management support team shall be logged in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 and every use made by them of data accessed by them shall be logged.

5. Access to data entered in SIS shall be limited to a member of the European Border and Coast Guard teams or teams of staff involved in return-related tasks or by a member of the migration management support team and shall not be extended to any other team members.

6. Measures to ensure security and confidentiality as provided for in Articles 10 and 11 shall be adopted and applied.

Article 49
Access to SIS data by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency

1. For the purposes of Article 48(1) and paragraph 2 of this Article the European Border and Coast Guard Agency shall set up and maintain a technical interface which allows a direct connection to Central SIS.

2. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency shall, for the purpose of performing its tasks conferred on it by the Regulation establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), have the right to access and search data entered in SIS, in accordance with Articles 26, 32, 34, 36 and 38(2) (j) and (k).

3. Where a verification by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency reveals the existence of an alert in SIS the procedure set out in Article 22 of Regulation
establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) applies.

4. Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as affecting the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 concerning data protection and the liability for any unauthorised or incorrect processing of such data by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.

5. Every instance of access and every search made by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency shall be logged in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 and each use made of data accessed by them shall be registered.

6. Except where necessary to perform the tasks for the purposes of the Regulation establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), no parts of SIS shall be connected to any computer system for data collection and processing operated by or at the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, nor shall the data contained in SIS to which the European Border and Coast Guard Agency has access be transferred to such a system. No part of SIS shall be downloaded. The logging of access and searches shall not be construed to be the downloading or copying of SIS data.

7. Measures to ensure security and confidentiality as provided for in Articles 10 and 11 shall be adopted and applied by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.

**Article 50**

**Scope of access**

End-users, including Europol, the national members of Eurojust and their assistants as well as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency may only access data which they require for the performance of their tasks.

**Article 51**

**Retention period of alerts**

1. Alerts entered in SIS pursuant to this Regulation shall be kept only for the time required to achieve the purposes for which they were entered.

2. A Member State issuing an alert shall, within five years of its entry into SIS, review the need to retain it. Alerts issued for the purposes of Article 36 of this Regulation shall be kept for a maximum period of one year.

3. Alerts on blank official documents and issued identity documents entered in accordance with Article 38 shall be kept for a maximum of 10 years. Shorter retention periods for categories of object alerts may be established by means of implementing measures adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

4. Each Member State shall, where appropriate, set shorter review periods in accordance with its national law.

5. In cases where it becomes clear to staff in the SIRENE Bureau, who are responsible for coordinating and verifying of data quality, that an alert on a person has achieved its purpose and should be deleted from SIS, the staff shall notify the authority which created the alert to bring this issue to the attention of the authority. The authority shall have 30 calendar days from the receipt of this notification to indicate that the alert has been or shall be deleted or shall state reasons for the retention of the alert. If
the 30-day period expires without such a reply the alert shall be deleted by the staff of the SIRENE Bureau. SIRENE Bureaux shall report any recurring issues in this area to their national supervisory authority.

6. Within the review period, the Member State issuing the alert may, following a comprehensive individual assessment, which shall be logged, decide to keep the alert longer, should this prove necessary for the purposes for which the alert was issued. In such a case paragraph 2 shall apply also to the extension. Any extension of an alert shall be communicated to CS-SIS.

7. Alerts shall automatically be erased after the review period referred to in paragraph 2 except where the Member State issuing the alert has informed CS-SIS about the extension of the alert pursuant to paragraph 6. CS-SIS shall automatically inform the Member States of the scheduled deletion of data from the system four months in advance.

8. Member States shall keep statistics about the number of alerts for which the retention period has been extended in accordance with paragraph 6.

CHAPTER XIII
DELETION OF ALERTS

Article 52
Deletion of alerts

1. Alerts for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes pursuant to Article 26 shall be deleted once the person has been surrendered or extradited to the competent authorities of the issuing Member State. They may also be deleted where the judicial decision on which the alert was based has been revoked by the competent judicial authority according to national law.

2. Alerts for missing persons shall be deleted in accordance with the following rules:
   (a) Concerning missing children, pursuant to Article 32, an alert shall be deleted upon:
       – the resolution of the case, such as when the child has been repatriated or the competent authorities in the executing Member State have taken a decision on the care of the child;
       – the expiry of the alert in accordance with Article 51;
       – a decision by the competent authority of the issuing Member State; or
       – the location of the child.
   (b) Concerning missing adults pursuant to Article 32, where no protective measures are requested, an alert shall be deleted upon:
       – the execution of the action to be taken (whereabouts ascertained by the executing Member State);
       – the expiry of the alert in accordance with Article 51; or
Concerning missing adults where protective measures are requested, pursuant to Article 32, an alert shall be deleted upon:

- the carrying out of the action to be taken (person placed under protection);
- the expiry of the alert in accordance with Article 51; or
- a decision by the competent authority of the issuing Member State.

Subject to national law, where a person has been interned following a decision by a competent authority an alert may be retained until that person has been repatriated.

3. Alerts on persons sought for a judicial procedure shall be deleted in accordance with the following rules:

Concerning alerts on persons sought for a judicial procedure pursuant to Article 34 an alert shall be deleted upon:

(a) the communication of the whereabouts of the person to the competent authority of the issuing Member State. Where the information forwarded cannot be acted upon the SIRENE Bureau of the issuing Member State shall inform the SIRENE Bureau of the executing Member State in order to resolve the problem;
(b) the expiry of the alert in accordance with Article 51; or
(c) a decision by the competent authority of the issuing Member State.

Where a hit has been achieved in a Member State and the address details were forwarded to the issuing Member State and a subsequent hit in that Member State reveals the same address details the hit shall be logged in the executing Member State but neither the address details nor supplementary shall be resent to the issuing Member State. In such cases the executing Member State shall inform the issuing Member State of the repeated hits and the issuing Member State shall consider the need to maintain the alert.

4. Alerts on discreet, inquiry and specific checks shall be deleted in accordance with the following rules:

Concerning alerts on discreet, inquiry and specific checks, pursuant to Article 36, an alert shall be deleted upon:

(a) the expiry of the alert in accordance with Article 51;
(b) a decision to delete by the competent authority of the issuing Member State.

5. Alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence shall be deleted in accordance with the following rules:

Concerning deletion of alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings pursuant to Article 38 an alert shall be deleted upon:

(a) the seizure of the object or equivalent measure once the necessary follow-up exchange of supplementary information has taken place between SIRENE Bureaux or the object becomes subject of another judicial or administrative procedure;
(b) the expiry of the alert; or
(c) a decision to delete by the competent authority of the issuing Member State.

6. Alerts on unknown wanted persons pursuant to Article 40 shall be deleted in accordance with the following rules:

7. (a) the identification of the person; or
8. (b) the expiry of the alert.

CHAPTER XIV

GENERAL DATA PROCESSING RULES

Article 53
Processing of SIS data

1. The Member States may process the data referred to in Article 20 only for the purposes laid down for each category of alert referred to in Articles 26, 32, 34, 36, 38 and 40.

2. Data may only be copied for technical purposes, provided that such copying is necessary in order for the authorities referred to in Article 43 to carry out a direct search. The provisions of this Regulation shall apply to such copies. A Member State shall not copy alert data or additional data entered by another Member State from its N.SIS or from the CS-SIS into other national data files.

3. Technical copies, as referred to in paragraph 2, which lead to off-line databases may be retained for a period not exceeding 48 hours. That period may be extended in the event of an emergency until the emergency comes to an end.

4. Member States shall keep an up-to-date inventory of those copies, make that inventory available to their national supervisory authority, and ensure that the provisions of this Regulation, in particular those of Article 10, are applied in respect of those copies.

5. Access to data shall only be authorised within the limits of the competence of the national authorities referred to in Article 43 and to duly authorised staff.

6. With regard to the alerts laid down in Articles 26, 32, 34, 36, 38 and 40 of this Regulation, any processing of information contained therein for purposes other than those for which it was entered in SIS has to be linked with a specific case and justified by the need to prevent an imminent serious threat to public policy and public security, on serious grounds of national security or for the purposes of preventing a serious crime. Prior authorisation from the Member State issuing the alert shall be obtained for this purpose.

7. Any use of data which does not comply with paragraphs 1 to 6 shall be considered as misuse under the national law of each Member State.

8. Each Member State shall send, to the Agency, a list of its competent authorities which are authorised to search directly the data contained in SIS pursuant to this Regulation, as well as any changes to the list. The list shall specify, for each
authority, which data it may search and for what purposes. The Agency shall ensure the annual publication of the list in the Official Journal of the European Union.

9. In so far as Union law does not lay down specific provisions, the law of each Member State shall apply to data entered in its N.SIS.

Article 54
SIS data and national files

1. Article 53(2) shall not prejudice the right of a Member State to keep in its national files SIS data in connection with which action has been taken on its territory. Such data shall be kept in national files for a maximum period of three years, except if specific provisions in national law provide for a longer retention period.

2. Article 53(2) shall not prejudice the right of a Member State to keep in its national files data contained in a particular alert issued in SIS by that Member State.

Article 55
Information in case of non-execution of alert

If a requested action cannot be performed, the requested Member State shall immediately inform the Member State issuing the alert.

Article 56
Quality of the data processed in SIS

1. A Member State issuing an alert shall be responsible for ensuring that the data are accurate, up-to-date and entered in SIS lawfully.

2. Only the Member State issuing an alert shall be authorised to modify, add to, correct, update or delete data which it has entered.

3. Where a Member State other than that which issued an alert has evidence suggesting that an item of data is factually incorrect or has been unlawfully stored, it shall, through the exchange of supplementary information, inform the issuing Member State at the earliest opportunity and not later than 10 days after the said evidence has come to its attention. The issuing Member State shall check the communication and, if necessary, correct or delete the item in question without delay.

4. Where the Member States are unable to reach agreement within two months of the time when the evidence first came to light, as described in paragraph 3, the Member State which did not issue the alert shall submit the matter to the national supervisory authorities concerned for a decision.

5. The Member States shall exchange supplementary information where a person complains that he or she is not the person wanted by an alert. Where the outcome of the check shows that there are in fact two different persons the complainant shall be informed of the measures laid down in Article 59.

6. Where a person is already the subject of an alert in SIS, a Member State which enters a further alert shall reach agreement on the entry of the alert with the Member State which entered the first alert. The agreement shall be reached on the basis of the exchange of supplementary information.
**Article 57**

*Security incidents*

1. Any event that has or may have an impact on the security of SIS and may cause damage or loss to SIS data shall be considered to be a security incident, especially where access to data may have occurred or where the availability, integrity and confidentiality of data has or may have been compromised.

2. Security incidents shall be managed to ensure a quick, effective and proper response.

3. Member States shall notify the Commission, the Agency and the national supervisory authority of security incidents. The Agency shall notify the Commission and the European data Protection Supervisor of security incidents.

4. Information regarding a security incident that has or may have an impact on the operation of SIS in a Member State or within the Agency or on the availability, integrity and confidentiality of the data entered or sent by other Member States shall be given to the Member States and reported in compliance with the incident management plan provided by the Agency.

**Article 58**

*Distinguishing between persons with similar characteristics*

Where it becomes apparent, when a new alert is entered, that there is already a person in SIS with the same identity description element, the following procedure shall apply:

(a) the SIRENE Bureau shall contact the requesting authority to clarify whether or not the alert is on the same person;

(b) where the cross-check reveals that the subject of the new alert and the person already in SIS are indeed one and the same, the SIRENE Bureau shall apply the procedure for entering multiple alerts as referred to in Article 56(6). Where the outcome of the check is that there are in fact two different persons, the SIRENE Bureau shall approve the request for entering the second alert by adding the necessary elements to avoid any misidentifications.

**Article 59**

*Additional data for the purpose of dealing with misused identities*

1. Where confusion may arise between the person actually intended as the subject of an alert and a person whose identity has been misused, the issuing Member State shall, subject to that person's explicit consent, add data relating to the latter to the alert in order to avoid the negative consequences of misidentification.

2. Data relating to a person whose identity has been misused shall be used only for the following purposes:

   (a) to allow the competent authority to distinguish the person whose identity has been misused from the person actually intended as the subject of the alert;

   (b) to allow the person whose identity has been misused to prove his or her identity and to establish that his or her identity has been misused.

3. For the purpose of this Article, only the following personal data may be entered and further processed in SIS:
(a) surname(s)
(b) forename(s),
(c) name(s) at birth
(d) previously used names and any aliases possibly entered separately;
(e) any specific objective and physical characteristic not subject to change;
(f) place of birth
(g) date of birth;
(h) sex;
(i) photographs and facial images;
(j) fingerprints;
(k) nationality(ies);
(l) the category of the person’s identity document
(m) the country of issue of the person’s identity document
(n) the number(s) of the person’s identity document
(o) the date of issue of a person’s identity document
(p) address of the victim;
(q) victim's father’s name;
(r) victim's mother’s name

4. The technical rules necessary for entering and further processing the data referred to in paragraph 3 shall be established by means of implementing measures laid down and developed in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

5. The data referred to in paragraph 3 shall be deleted at the same time as the corresponding alert or earlier where the person so requests.

6. Only the authorities having a right of access to the corresponding alert may access the data referred to in paragraph 3. They may do so for the sole purpose of avoiding misidentification.

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**Article 60**

*Links between alerts*

1. A Member State may create a link between alerts it enters in SIS. The effect of such a link shall be to establish a relationship between two or more alerts.

2. The creation of a link shall not affect the specific action to be taken on the basis of each linked alert or the retention period of each of the linked alerts.

3. The creation of a link shall not affect the rights of access provided for in this Regulation. Authorities with no right of access to certain categories of alerts shall not be able to see the link to an alert to which they do not have access.

4. A Member State shall create a link between alerts when there is an operational need.
5. Where a Member State considers that the creation by another Member State of a link between alerts is incompatible with its national law or international obligations, it may take the necessary measures to ensure that there can be no access to the link from its national territory or by its authorities located outside its territory.

6. The technical rules for linking alerts shall be laid down and developed in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

**Article 61**  
Purpose and retention period of supplementary information

1. Member States shall keep a reference to the decisions giving rise to an alert at the SIRENE Bureau in order to support the exchange of supplementary information.

2. Personal data held in files by the SIRENE Bureau as a result of information exchanged shall be kept only for such time as may be required to achieve the purposes for which they were supplied. They shall in any event be deleted at the latest one year after the related alert has been deleted from SIS.

3. Paragraph 2 shall not prejudice the right of a Member State to keep in national files data relating to a particular alert which that Member State has issued or to an alert in connection with which action has been taken on its territory. The period for which such data may be held in such files shall be governed by national law.

**Article 62**  
Transfer of personal data to third parties

Data processed in SIS and the related supplementary information pursuant to this Regulation shall not be transferred or made available to third countries or to international organisations.

**Article 63**  
Exchange of data on stolen, misappropriated, lost or invalidated passports with Interpol

1. By way of derogation from Article 62, the passport number, country of issuance and the document type of stolen, misappropriated, lost or invalidated passports entered in SIS may be exchanged with members of Interpol by establishing a connection between SIS and the Interpol database on stolen or missing travel documents, subject to the conclusion of an Agreement between Interpol and the European Union. The Agreement shall provide that the transmission of data entered by a Member State shall be subject to the consent of that Member State.

2. The Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall foresee that the data shared shall only be accessible to members of Interpol from countries that ensure an adequate level of protection of personal data. Before concluding this Agreement, the Council shall seek the opinion of the Commission on the adequacy of the level of protection of personal data and respect of fundamental rights and liberties regarding the automatic processing of personal data by Interpol and by countries which have delegated members to Interpol.

3. The Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 may also provide for access through SIS for the Member States to data from the Interpol database on stolen or missing travel documents, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Decision governing alerts on stolen, misappropriated, lost and invalidated passports entered in SIS.
CHAPTER XV

DATA PROTECTION

Article 64

Applicable legislation

1. Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 shall apply to the processing of personal data by the Agency under this Regulation.

2. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 shall apply to the processing of personal data provided that national provisions transposing Directive (EU) 2016/680 do not apply.

3. For processing of data by competent national authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences of the execution of criminal penalties including the safeguarding against the prevention of threat to public security national provisions transposing Directive (EU) 2016/680 shall apply.

Article 65

Right of access, rectification of inaccurate data and erasure of unlawfully stored data

1. The right of data subjects to have access to data relating to them entered in SIS and to have such data rectified or erasure shall be exercised in accordance with the law of the Member State before which they invoke that right.

2. If national law so provides, the national supervisory authority shall decide whether information is to be communicated and by what means.

3. A Member State other than that which has issued an alert may communicate information concerning such data only if it first gives the Member State issuing the alert an opportunity to state its position. This shall be done through the exchange of supplementary information.

4. A Member State shall take a decision not to communicate information to the data subject, in whole or in part, in accordance with national law, to the extent that, and for as long as such a partial or complete restriction constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society with due regard for the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of the natural person concerned, in order to:

   (a) avoid obstructing official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures;
   (b) avoid prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties;
   (c) protect public security;
   (d) protect national security;
   (e) protect the rights and freedoms of others.

5. Any person has the right to have factually inaccurate data relating to him rectified or unlawfully stored data relating to him erased.
6. The person concerned shall be informed as soon as possible and in any event not later than 60 days from the date on which he applies for access or sooner if national law so provides.

7. The person concerned shall be informed about the follow-up given to the exercise of his rights of rectification and erasure as soon as possible and in any event not later than three months from the date on which he applies for rectification or erasure or sooner if national law so provides.

Article 66
Remedies

1. Any person may bring an action before the courts or the authority competent under the law of any Member State to access, rectify, erase or obtain information or to obtain compensation in connection with an alert relating to him.

2. The Member States undertake mutually to enforce final decisions handed down by the courts or authorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 70.

3. In order to gain a consistent overview of the functioning of remedies the national authorities shall develop a standard statistical system for reporting annually on:

   (a) the number of subject access requests submitted to the data controller and the number of cases where access to the data was granted;

   (b) the number of subject access requests submitted to the national supervisory authority and the number of cases where access to the data was granted;

   (c) the number of requests for the rectification of inaccurate data and the erasure of unlawfully stored data to the data controller and the number of cases where the data were rectified or erased;

   (d) the number of requests for the rectification of inaccurate data and the erasure of unlawfully stored data submitted to the national supervisory authority;

   (e) the number of cases which are heard before the courts;

   (f) the number of cases where the court ruled in favour of the applicant in any aspect of the case;

   (g) any observations on cases of mutual recognition of final decisions handed down by the courts or authorities of other Member States on alerts created by the alert-issuing Member State.

The reports from the national supervisory authorities shall be forwarded to the cooperation mechanism set out in Article 69.

Article 67
Supervision of N.SIS

1. Each Member State shall ensure that the national supervisory authority(ies) designated in each Member State and endowed with the powers referred to in Chapter VI of Directive (EU) 2016/680 or Chapter VI of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 monitor independently the lawfulness of the processing of SIS personal data on their territory and its transmission from their territory, and the exchange and further processing of supplementary information.
2. The national supervisory authority shall ensure that an audit of the data processing operations in its N.SIS is carried out in accordance with international auditing standards at least every four years. The audit shall either be carried out by the national supervisory authority, or the national supervisory authority(ies) shall directly order the audit from an independent data protection auditor. The national supervisory authority shall at all times retain control over and undertake the responsibilities of the independent auditor.

3. Member States shall ensure that their national supervisory authority has sufficient resources to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it under this Regulation.

**Article 68**

*Supervision of the Agency*

1. The European Data Protection Supervisor shall ensure that the personal data processing activities of the Agency are carried out in accordance with this Regulation. The duties and powers referred to in Articles 46 and 47 of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 shall apply accordingly.

2. The European Data Protection Supervisor shall ensure that an audit of the Agency's personal data processing activities is carried out in accordance with international auditing standards at least every four years. A report on that audit shall be sent to the European Parliament, the Council, the Agency, the Commission and the National Supervisory Authorities. The Agency shall be given an opportunity to make comments before the report is adopted.

**Article 69**

*Cooperation between national supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor*

1. The national supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor, each acting within the scope of its respective competences, shall actively cooperate within the framework of their responsibilities and shall ensure coordinated supervision of SIS.

2. They shall, each acting within the scope of its respective competences, exchange relevant information, assist each other in carrying out audits and inspections, examine difficulties in the interpretation or application of this Regulation and other applicable legal acts of the Union, study problems that are revealed through the exercise of independent supervision or through the exercise of the rights of data subjects, draw up harmonised proposals for joint solutions to any problems and promote awareness of data protection rights, as necessary.

3. For the purposes laid down in paragraph 2, the national supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor shall meet at least twice a year as part of the European Data Protection Board established by Regulation (EU) 2016/679. The costs and servicing of these meetings shall be borne by the Board established by Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Rules of procedure shall be adopted at the first meeting. Further working methods shall be developed jointly as necessary.

4. A joint report of activities as regards coordinated supervision shall be sent by the Board established by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 to the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission every two years.
CHAPTER XVI

LIABILITY

Article 70
Liability

1. Each Member State shall be liable for any damage caused to a person through the use of N.SIS. This shall also apply to damage caused by the issuing Member State, where the latter entered factually inaccurate data or stored data unlawfully.

2. Where the Member State against which an action is brought is not the Member State issuing the alert, the latter shall be required to reimburse, on request, the sums paid out as compensation unless the use of data by the Member State requesting reimbursement infringes this Regulation.

3. Where any failure by a Member State to comply with its obligations under this Regulation causes damage to SIS, that Member State shall be held liable for the damage, unless and in so far as the Agency or another Member States participating in SIS failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the damage from occurring or to minimise its impact.

CHAPTER XVII

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 71
Monitoring and statistics

1. The Agency shall ensure that procedures are in place to monitor the functioning of SIS against objectives, relating to output, cost-effectiveness, security and quality of service.

2. For the purposes of technical maintenance, reporting and statistics, the Agency shall have access to the necessary information relating to the processing operations performed in Central SIS.

3. The Agency shall produce, daily, monthly and annual statistics showing the number of records per category of alert, the annual number of hits per category of alert, how many times SIS was searched and how many times SIS was accessed for the purpose of entering, updating or deleting an alert in total and for each Member State. The statistics produced shall not contain any personal data. The annual statistical report shall be published. The Agency shall also provide annual statistics on the use of the functionality on making an alert issued under pursuant to Article 26 of this Regulation temporarily non-searchable, in total and for each Member State, including any extensions to the retention period of 48 hours.

4. Member States as well as Europol, Eurojust and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency shall provide the Agency and the Commission with the information
necessary to draft the reports referred to in paragraphs 3, 7 and 8. This information shall include separate statistics on the number of searches carried out by, or on behalf of, by the services in the Member States responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates and the services in the Member States responsible for issuing registration certificates or ensuring traffic management for boats, including boat engines; aircraft and containers. The statistics shall also show the number of hits per category of alert.

5. The Agency shall provide the Member States, the Commission, Europol, Eurojust and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency with any statistical reports that it produces. In order to monitor the implementation of legal acts of the Union, the Commission shall be able to request the Agency to provide additional specific statistical reports, either regular or ad hoc, on the performance or use of SIS and SIRENE communication.

6. For the purpose of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article and of Article 15(5), the Agency shall establish, implement and host a central repository in its technical sites containing the data referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article and in Article 15(5) which shall not allow for the identification of individuals and shall allow the Commission and the agencies referred to in paragraph 5 to obtain bespoke reports and statistics. The Agency shall grant access to Member States, the Commission, Europol, Eurojust and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency to the central repository by means of secured access through the Communication Infrastructure with control of access and specific user profiles solely for the purpose of reporting and statistics.

Detailed rules on the operation of the central repository and the data protection and security rules applicable to the repository shall be adopted by means of implementing measures adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 72(2).

7. Two years after SIS is brought into operation and every two years thereafter, the Agency shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the technical functioning of Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure, including the security thereof, and the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member States.

8. Three years after SIS is brought into operation and every four years thereafter, the Commission shall produce an overall evaluation of Central SIS and the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member States. That overall evaluation shall include an examination of results achieved against objectives, and an assessment of the continuing validity of the underlying rationale, the application of this Regulation in respect of Central SIS, the security of Central SIS and any implications for future operations. The Commission shall transmit the evaluation to the European Parliament and the Council.

Article 72
Committee procedure

1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.
Article 73
Amendments to Regulation (EU) 515/2014

Regulation (EU) 515/2014\(^76\) is amended as follows:

In Article 6, the following paragraph 6 is inserted:

“6. During the development phase Member States shall receive an additional allocation of 36.8 million EUR to be distributed via a lump sum to their basic allocation and shall entirely devote this funding to SIS national systems to ensure their quick and effective upgrading in line with the implementation of Central SIS as required in Regulation (EU) 2018/…\(^*\) and in Regulation (EU) 2018/…\(^*\)

*"Regulation on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police and judicial cooperation for criminal matters and in Regulation (OJ.....

**"Regulation (EU 2018/...on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks and in Regulation (OJ ...)”.

Article 74
Repeal

Upon the date of application of this Regulation the following legal acts are repealed:


Council Decision 533/2007/JHA of 12 July 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SISII);


Article 75
Entry into force and applicability

1. This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

2. It shall apply from the date fixed by the Commission after:

(a) the necessary implementing measures have been adopted;

(b) Member States have notified the Commission about that they have made the necessary technical and legal arrangements to process SIS data and exchange supplementary information pursuant to this Regulation;


(c) The Agency has notified the Commission about the completion of all testing activities with regard CS-SIS and the interaction between CS-SIS and N.SIS.

3. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable to Member States in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament
The President

For the Council
The President
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
   1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative
   1.2. Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB structure
   1.3. Nature of the proposal/initiative
   1.4. Objective(s)
   1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative
   1.6. Duration and financial impact
   1.7. Management mode(s) planned

2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES
   2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules
   2.2. Management and control system
   2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities

3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
   3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected
   3.2. Estimated impact on expenditure
      3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on expenditure
      3.2.2. Estimated impact on operational appropriations
      3.2.3. Estimated impact on appropriations of an administrative nature
      3.2.4. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework
      3.2.5. Third-party contributions
   3.3. Estimated impact on revenue
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative


1.2. Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB structure

Policy area: Migration and Home Affairs (Title 18)

1.3. Nature of the proposal/initiative

☐ The proposal/initiative relates to a new action

☐ The proposal/initiative relates to a new action following a pilot project/preparatory action

☑ The proposal/initiative relates to the extension of an existing action

☐ The proposal/initiative relates to an action redirected towards a new action

1.4. Objective(s)

1.4.1. The Commission's multiannual strategic objective(s) targeted by the proposal/initiative

Objective – "Disrupt organised crime"
Objective – "A strong EU response to tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation"

The necessity to review the legal basis of SIS in order to address new security and migration challenges has been emphasised by the Commission on a number of occasions. For example, in the "European Agenda on Security" the Commission announced its intention to evaluate SIS in 2015-2016 and assess whether there are new operational needs requiring legislative changes. Moreover, the security agenda emphasised that SIS lies at the heart of police information exchange and should be further strengthened. More recently, in its Communication "Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security," the Commission stated that additional functionalities of the system will be considered on the basis of the overall evaluation report with a view to present proposals to revise the legal basis of SIS. Finally, on 20 April 2016, in its Communication "Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective

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78 ABM: activity-based management; ABB: activity-based budgeting.
79 As referred to in Article 54(2)(a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.
and genuine Security Union,” the Commission proposed a number of changes to SIS in order to improve its added value for law enforcement purposes.

The overall evaluation, conducted by the Commission confirmed that SIS is an operational success. However, despite its many successes, the evaluation also made a number of recommendations, with the goal of enhancing the technical and operational effectiveness and efficiency of the system.

On the basis of the recommendations in the overall evaluation report and fully in line with the Commission’s objectives stated in the above-mentioned communications and the Strategic Plan 2016-2020 of DG Migration and Home Affairs, this proposal aims to implement:

- The Commission’s announcement to improve the added value of SIS for law enforcement purposes to respond to new threats;
- Recommendations for technical and procedural changes resulting from a comprehensive evaluation of SIS;
- Requests from end-users for technical improvements;
- The interim findings of the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability as regards data quality.

1.4.2. Specific objective(s) and ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific objective No</th>
<th>DG Migration and Home Affairs Management Plan 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific objective 2.1 – A strong EU response to tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific objective 2.2 – Disrupt serious and organised cross-border crime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned

Chapter 18 02 – Internal Security

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1.4.3. Expected result(s) and impact
Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.

The primary goal of the proposed legal and technical changes in SIS is to make the system more operationally effective. The overall evaluation of SIS, carried out by DG HOME in 2015-2016, recommended technical enhancements of the system and harmonisation of national procedures in the field of law enforcement cooperation.

The new proposal introduces measures which address end-users' operational and technical needs. In particular, new data fields for existing alerts will enable police officers to have all the necessary information to perform their tasks effectively. Furthermore, the proposal specifically emphasises the importance of uninterrupted availability of SIS, as downtimes can significantly impact upon the work of law enforcement officers. Moreover, the present proposal provides technical changes that will make the system more efficient and simpler.

Once adopted and implemented, these proposals will also increase business continuity – Member States will be obliged to have a full or partial national copy and a back-up of this. This will enable the system to remain fully functional and operational for officers on the ground.

The proposal introduces new biometric identifiers – palm prints, facial images and DNA profiles in specific and limited cases. This, coupled with the envisaged changes to Articles 32 and 33 (missing persons alerts) to allow the entry of preventive alerts and the categorisation of missing persons cases, will, firstly, significantly strengthen the protection of unaccompanied minors and, secondly, enable their identification on the basis of their DNA profile or that of their parents and/or siblings (with consent).

Member States' authorities will also be able to issue alerts in relation to unknown individuals wanted in relation to a crime, solely on the basis of latent or crime scene fingerprints or palm prints. This is not possible under the current legal and technical framework and, hence, represents an important development.

1.4.4. Indicators of results and impact
Specify the indicators for monitoring implementation of the proposal/initiative.

During the upgrading of the system:

After the approval of the proposal and the adoption of the technical specifications, SIS will be upgraded in order to better harmonise national procedures for the use of the system, extend the scope of the system by introducing new elements to existing alert categories, and introduce technical changes to improve security and help reduce administrative burdens. eu-LISA will coordinate the project management of upgrading the system. eu-LISA will establish a project management structure and provide a detailed timeline with milestones for implementing the proposed changes which will allow the Commission to closely monitor the implementation of the proposal.

Specific objective – Entry into operations of the updated functionalities of SIS in 2020

Indicator – successful completion of comprehensive pre-launch testing of the revised system.

Once the system is operational:
Once the system is operational, eu-LISA will ensure that procedures are in place to monitor the functioning of the Schengen Information System against objectives, relating to output, cost-effectiveness, security and quality of service. Two years after SIS was brought into operational and every two years thereafter, eu-LISA is obliged to submit to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the technical functioning of Central SIS and the Communication Infrastructure, including the security thereof, and the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member States. Furthermore, eu-LISA produces daily, monthly and annual statistics showing the number of records per category of alert, the annual number of hits achieved per category of alert, how many times SIS was searched and how many times the system was accessed for the purpose of entering, updating or deleting an alert in total and for each Member State. In addition to that, the Agency will also provide annual statistics on the use of the functionality on making an alert issued under Article 26 of this Regulation temporarily non-searchable, in total and for each Member State, including any extensions to the retention period of 48 hours.

Three years after SIS is brought into operation and every four years thereafter, the Commission produces an overall evaluation of Central SIS and the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member States. This overall evaluation includes an examination of results achieved against objectives, and an assessment of the continuing validity of the underlying rationale, the application of this Regulation in respect of Central SIS, the security of Central SIS and any implications for future operations. The Commission will send the evaluation to the European Parliament and the Council.

Specific objective 1 – Disrupt organised crime.

Indicator – Use of EU information exchange mechanisms. This can be measured through an increase in the number of hits in SIS. Indicators are the statistical reports, issued by eu-LISA and the Member States. They will enable the Commission to assess how are the new functionalities of the system being used.

Specific objective 2 – A strong EU response to tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation.

Indicator – Increase in the number of alerts and hits, particularly in relation to Article 36 (3) of the proposal for alerts on persons and objects for discreet checks, inquiry checks or specific checks.

1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative

1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term

1. To contribute to the maintenance of a high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the EU;

2. To better harmonise national procedures for the use of SIS;

3. To broaden the list of institutional users with access to SIS data by providing full access to the system to Europol and the new European Border and Coast Guard.

4. To provide new elements to SIS alerts and new functionalities in order to extend the scope of the system, enable it to address the current security environment, enhance cooperation between the Member States' law enforcement and security authorities and reduce the administrative burden;
5. To address the complete end-to-end use of SIS, covering not only the central and national systems, but also ensuring that end-users receive all necessary data to perform their tasks;

6. To reinforce business continuity and ensure the uninterrupted operation of SIS at central and national level;

7. To enhance the fight against international criminality, terrorism and cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong cross-border dimension.

1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement

SIS is the main security database in Europe. In the absence of internal border controls, the effective combatting of crime and terrorism gained a European dimension. The objectives of the proposal pertain to technical improvements to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the system and to harmonise its use across participating Member States. The transnational nature of these aims, along with the challenges in ensuring effective information exchange to counter ever diversifying threats, mean that the EU is in the best position to propose solutions to these problems. The objectives of enhancing the efficiency and harmonised use of SIS, namely, the increase in the volume, the quality and the speed of the information exchange via a centralised large-scale information system managed by a regulatory agency (eu-LISA) cannot be achieved by Member States alone and require intervention at the EU level. If the present issues are not addressed, SIS will continue to operate in line with the rules applicable at present, thereby missing opportunities for maximising efficiency and EU added value identified through evaluation of SIS and its use by Member States.

In 2015 alone, the competent authorities of the Member States accessed the system nearly 2.9 billion times, a clear demonstration of the system's vital contribution to law enforcement cooperation within the Schengen area. This high level of information exchange between Member States would not have been reached through decentralised national solutions, and it would have been impossible to achieve these results at the Member State level. Furthermore, SIS has proved to be the most effective information exchange tool for counter-terrorism purposes and it provides EU added value as it allows the national security services to cooperate in a rapid, confidential and efficient manner. The new proposals will further facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation between the EU Member States. Moreover, within their competences, Europol and the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency will be granted full access to the system as a clear sign of the added value of EU involvement.

1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past

1. The development phase should commence only after the business needs and end-user requirements are fully defined. Development can only take place once the underlying legal instruments, setting out its purpose, scope, functions and technical details have been definitively adopted.

2. The Commission conducted (and continues to conduct) continuous consultations with the relevant stakeholders, including delegates to the SISVIS Committee under the Comitology procedure. This Committee includes the Member States’ representatives on both operational SIRENE matters (cross-border cooperation in relation to SIS) and technical matters in the development and maintenance of SIS and the related SIRENE application. The changes, proposed by this Regulation, have
been discussed in a highly transparent and comprehensive way in dedicated meetings and workshops. Internally, the Commission set up an Inter-service Steering Group encompassing the Secretariat-General and the Directorates-General for Migration and Home Affairs, Justice and Consumers, Human Resources and Security, and Informatics. This steering group monitored the evaluation process and provided guidance as needed.

3. The Commission also sought external expertise via two studies, the findings of which have been incorporated in the developments of this proposal:

- SIS Technical Assessment – the assessment identified key issues pertaining to SIS and future needs that should be considered; it identified concerns with regards to maximising business continuity and ensuring that the overall architecture can adapt to increasing capacity requirements;

- ICT Impact Assessment of Possible Improvements to the SIS II Architecture – the study assessed the current costs of operating SIS at national level and evaluated three possible technical scenarios for the improvement of the system. All scenarios include a set of technical proposals focusing on improvements to the central system and overall architecture.

1.5.4. **Compatibility and possible synergy with other appropriate instruments**

This proposal should be seen as the implementation of the actions contained in the Communication of 6 April 2016 on "Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security"\(^{84}\) which highlights the need for the EU to strengthen and improve its IT systems, data architecture and information exchange in the area of law enforcement, counter-terrorism and border management.

Furthermore, this proposal is closely linked and complements other Union policies, namely:

a) Internal security as underlined in the European Agenda on Security\(^ {85}\), to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute serious crimes and terrorism offences by enabling law enforcement authorities to process personal data of persons suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism or serious crimes;

b) Data protection insofar as this proposal must ensure the protection of fundamental rights to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data is processed in SIS.

The proposal is also compatible with existing European Union legislation, namely:

a) European Border and Coast Guard\(^ {86}\) as regards, firstly, the possibility for the Agency staff to conduct risk analyses and secondly, their access to SIS for the purposes of the proposed ETIAS. The proposal also aims to provide a technical interface for SIS access to European Border and Coast Guard Teams, teams of staff

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\(^{84}\) COM(2016) 205 final.


involved in return-related tasks and members of the migration management support team to, within their mandate, have the right to access and search data entered in SIS;

b) Europol insofar as this proposal grants Europol additional rights to access and search of data entered in SIS within its mandate;

c) Prüm insofar as the developments in this proposal to enable the identification of individuals on the basis of fingerprints (as well as facial images and DNA profiles) complements the existing Prüm provisions on mutual cross-border online access to designated national DNA databases and automated fingerprint identification systems.

The proposal is also compatible with future European Union legislation, namely:

a) Management of the external borders. The proposal complements the envisaged new principle in the Schengen Borders Code of conducting systematic checks against relevant databases of all travellers, including EU nationals, upon entry and exit to the Schengen area, as established in response to the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters;

b) Entry/Exit System (EES) insofar as this proposal seeks to reflect the proposed use of a combination of fingerprint and facial image as biometric identifiers for the operation of the EES

c) ETIAS insofar as this proposal takes into consideration the proposed ETIAS which provides for a thorough security assessment, including a check in SIS, of third country nationals who intend to travel in the European Union.

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1.6. **Duration and financial impact**

- Proposal/initiative of **limited duration**
  - Proposal/initiative in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY
  - Financial impact from YYYY to YYYY
- Proposal/initiative of **unlimited duration**
  - Preparatory period 2017
  - Implementation with a start-up period from 2018 to 2020,
  - followed by full-scale operation.

1.7. **Management mode(s) planned**

- Direct management by the Commission
  - by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
  - by the executive agencies
- Shared management with the Member States
- Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:
  - third countries or the bodies they have designated;
  - international organisations and their agencies (to be specified);
  - the EIB and the European Investment Fund;
  - bodies referred to in Articles 208 and 209 of the Financial Regulation;
  - public law bodies;
  - bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they provide adequate financial guarantees;
  - bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that provide adequate financial guarantees;
  - persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the CFSP pursuant to Title V of the TEU, and identified in the relevant basic act.

- If more than one management mode is indicated, please provide details in the ‘Comments’ section.

**Comments**

The Commission will be responsible for the overall management of the policy and eu-LISA will be responsible for the development, operation and maintenance of the system.

SIS constitutes one single information system. Consequently, the expenses provided in two of the proposals (the current one and the Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks) should not be considered as two separate amounts but as a single one. The budgetary implications of the changes required for the implementation of both proposals are included in a single legislative financial statement.

89 Details of management modes and references to the Financial Regulation may be found on the BudgWeb site: http://www.cc.cec/budg/man/budgmanag/budgmanag_en.html
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES

2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules

*Specify frequency and conditions.*

The Commission, Member States and the Agency will regularly review and monitor the use of SIS, to ensure that it continues to function effectively and efficiently. The Commission will be assisted by the Committee to implement technical and operational measures as described in this proposal.

In addition, this proposed Regulation makes provisions (Articles 71(7) and (8)) for a formal, regular review and evaluation process.

Every two years, eu-LISA is required to report to the European Parliament and the Council on the technical functioning – including security – of SIS, the communication infrastructure supporting it, and the bilateral and multilateral exchange of supplementary information between Member States.

Furthermore, every four years, the Commission is required to carry out, and share with the Parliament and the Council, an overall evaluation of SIS and the exchange of information between Member States. This will:

a) examine results achieved against objectives;

b) assess whether the underlying rationale for the system remains valid;

c) examine how the Regulation is being applied to the central system;

d) evaluate the security of the central system;

e) explore the implications for the future functioning of the system.

Furthermore, eu-LISA is also now required to provide daily, monthly and annual statistics on the use of SIS, ensuring continuous monitoring of the system and its functioning against objectives.

2.2. Management and control system

2.2.1. *Risk(s) identified*

The following risks are identified:

1. Potential difficulties for eu-LISA in managing the developments presented in the current proposal in parallel with other ongoing developments (e.g. the implementation of AFIS in SIS) and future developments (e.g. the Entry-Exit system, ETIAS and the upgrade of Eurodac). This risk could be mitigated by ensuring eu-LISA has sufficient staff and resources to carry out these tasks and the ongoing management of the Maintenance in Working Order (MWO) contractor.

2. Difficulties for the Member States:

2.1 These difficulties are primarily of a financial nature. For example, the legislative proposals include the mandatory development of a partial national copy in each N.SIS II. Member States which have not developed one already will have to make the investment. Similarly, national implementation of the Interface Control Document should be a complete implementation. Those Member States that have not yet done this will have to make provision for this in the budgets of the relevant Ministries. This risk could be mitigated through the provision of EU funding for Member States, e.g. from the Borders component of the Internal Security Fund (ISF).
2.2 The national systems have to be aligned with central requirements and discussions with Member States on this may introduce delays in the development. This risk could be mitigated through early engagement with Member States on this issue to ensure action can be taken at the appropriate time.

2.2.2. *Information concerning the internal control system set up*

The responsibilities for the central components of SIS are exercised by eu-LISA. In order to enable better monitoring of the use of SIS, to analyse trends concerning migratory pressure, border management and criminal offences, eu-LISA should be able to develop a state-of-the-art capability for statistical reporting to the Member States and the Commission.

eu-LISA's accounts will be submitted for the approval of the Court of Auditors and subject to the discharge procedure. The Commission's Internal Audit Service will carry out audits in cooperation with eu-LISA's internal auditor.

2.2.3. *Estimate of the costs and benefits of the controls and assessment of the expected level of risk of error*

N/A

2.3. *Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities*

Specify existing or envisaged prevention and protection measures.

The measures foreseen to combat fraud are laid down in Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 1077/2011 which provides as follows:

1. In order to combat fraud, corruption and other unlawful activities, Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 shall apply.

2. The Agency shall accede to the Interinstitutional Agreement concerning internal investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and shall issue, without delay, the appropriate provisions applicable to all the employees of the Agency.

3. The decisions concerning funding and the implementing agreements and instruments resulting from them shall explicitly stipulate that the Court of Auditors and OLAF may carry out, if necessary, on-the-spot checks among the recipients of the Agency's funding and the agents responsible for allocating it.

In accordance with this provision, the decision of the Management Board of the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice concerning the terms and conditions for internal investigations in relation to the prevention of fraud, corruption and any illegal activity detrimental to the Union's interests was adopted on 28 June 2012.

DG HOME's fraud prevention and detection strategy will apply.
3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected

- Existing budget lines

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading of multiannual financial framework</th>
<th>Budget line</th>
<th>Type of expenditure</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heading 3 – Security and Citizenship</td>
<td>Diff./Non-diff.(^{90}) from EFTA countries (^{91}) from candidate countries (^{92}) from third countries within the meaning of Article 21(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18.0208 – Schengen Information System</td>
<td>Diff NO NO YES NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.020101 – Support of border management and a common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel</td>
<td>Diff NO NO YES NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18.0207 – European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA)</td>
<td>Diff NO NO YES NO</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{90}\) Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations.

\(^{91}\) EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

\(^{92}\) Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidate countries from the Western Balkans.
### 3.2. Estimated impact on expenditure

#### 3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading of multiannual financial framework</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Security and Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DG HOME</th>
<th>Year 2018</th>
<th>Year 2019</th>
<th>Year 2020</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Operational appropriations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18.0208 Schengen Information System</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Commitments</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>6,234</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>9,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>6,234</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>9,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.020101 (Borders and Visa)</td>
<td>18,405</td>
<td>18,405</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>18,405</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>18,405</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL appropriations for DG HOME</td>
<td>6,234</td>
<td>20,259</td>
<td>20,259</td>
<td>46,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments</td>
<td>=1+1a+3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments</td>
<td>=2+2a+3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,234</td>
<td>20,259</td>
<td>20,259</td>
<td>46,752</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Heading of multiannual financial framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>.eu-LISA.</th>
<th>Year 2018</th>
<th>Year 2019</th>
<th>Year 2020</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security and Citizenship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>• Operational appropriations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title 1: Staff Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>Commitments (1)</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payments (2)</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title 2: Infrastructure and operating expenditure</strong></td>
<td>Commitments (1a)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payments (2a)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title 3: Operational expenditure</strong></td>
<td>Commitments (1a)</td>
<td>12,893</td>
<td>2,051</td>
<td>1,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payments (2a)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>7,893</td>
<td>4,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL appropriations for.eu-LISA</strong></td>
<td>Commitments =1+1a +3</td>
<td>13,103</td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>2,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payments =2+2a +3</td>
<td>2,710</td>
<td>8,103</td>
<td>4,861</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.2.2. Estimated impact on operational appropriations

| • TOTAL operational appropriations | Commitments (4) | | | |
| | Payments (5) | | | |
| • TOTAL appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope for specific programmes | (6) | | | |
| **TOTAL appropriations** | Commitments =4+ 6 | | | |


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading of multiannual financial framework</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>‘Administrative expenditure’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year N</th>
<th>Year N+1</th>
<th>Year N+2</th>
<th>Year N+3</th>
<th>Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DG: &lt;……&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other administrative expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL DG &lt;……&gt;</td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TOTAL appropriations under HEADING 5
of the multiannual financial framework

(Total commitments = Total payments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year N</th>
<th>Year N+1</th>
<th>Year N+2</th>
<th>Year N+3</th>
<th>Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### TOTAL appropriations under HEADINGS 1 to 5
of the multiannual financial framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Payments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

93 Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts.
3.2.3.1. Estimated impact on DG HOME appropriations

- ☐ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
- ☑ The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicate objectives and outputs</th>
<th>Year 2018</th>
<th>Year 2019</th>
<th>Year 2020</th>
<th>Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development National System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17,184</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17,184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL COST</td>
<td>18,405</td>
<td>18,405</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

94 Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.: number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.).

95 As described in point 1.4.2. ‘Specific objective(s)…’.
3.2.3.2. Estimated impact on EU-LISA’s operational appropriations

- ☐ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
- ☑ The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below:

**Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)**

| Indicate objectives and outputs | Type\(^{96}\) | Average cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | No | Cost | TOTAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jahr 2018</td>
<td>Jahr 2019</td>
<td>Jahr 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 1**
Development Central System

- Contractor | 1 | 5,013
- Software   | 1 | 4,050
- Hardware   | 1 | 3,692

Subtotal for specific objective No 1 | 12,755

**SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 2**
Maintenance Central System

- Contractor | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0,365 | 1 | 0,365 | 0,730
- Software   | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0,810 | 1 | 0,810 | 1,620
- Hardware   | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0,738 | 1 | 0,738 | 1,476

Subtotal for specific objective No 2 | 1,913 | 1,913 | 3,826

\(^{96}\) Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.: number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.).

\(^{97}\) As described in point 1.4.2, ‘Specific objective(s)…’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 3</th>
<th>Meetings/Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal for specific objective No 3</td>
<td>0,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL COST</td>
<td>12,893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.3.3. Estimated impact on eu-LISA’s human resources

Summary

- ☐ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature
- ☑ The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below:

EUR million (to three decimal places)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 2018</th>
<th>Year 2019</th>
<th>Year 2020</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officials (AD Grades)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials (AST Grades)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract staff</td>
<td>0,210</td>
<td>0,210</td>
<td>0,210</td>
<td>0,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seconded National Experts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>0,210</td>
<td>0,210</td>
<td>0,210</td>
<td>0,630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recruitment is planned for January 2018. All staff must be available as of early 2018 in order to allow starting the development in due time with a view of ensuring an entry into operations of SIS II Recast in 2020. The 3 new Contractual Agents (CAs) are needed to cover needs both for the project implementation as well as for operational support and maintenance after deployment to production. These resources will be used to:

- Support the project implementation as project team members, including activities as: the definition of requirements and technical specifications, cooperation and support to Member States during the implementation, updates of the Interface Control Document (ICD), the follow-up of the contractual deliveries, documentation delivery and updates, etc.
- Support transition activities for putting the system into operations in cooperation with the contractor (releases follow-up, operational process updates, trainings (including Member States training activities), etc.
- Support the longer-term activities, definition of specifications, contractual preparations in case there is reengineering of the system (e.g. due to image recognition) or in case the new SIS II Maintenance in Working Order (MWO) contract will need to be amended to cover additional changes (from technical and budgetary perspective)
- Enforce the second level support following Entry into Operation (EiO), during continuous maintenance and operations

It has to be noted that the three new resources (FTE CA) will act on top of the internal teams resources which will be as well dedicated to the project/contractual and financial follow-up/operational activities. The use of CAs will provide adequate duration and continuity of the contracts to ensure business continuity and use of the same specialised people for operational support activities after the project conclusion. On top of that, the operational support activities require accesses to Production environment that cannot be assigned to contractors or external staff.
### 3.2.3.4. Estimated requirements of human resources

- ☐ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources.
- ☐ The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below:

#### Estimate to be expressed in full time equivalent units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year N</th>
<th>Year N+1</th>
<th>Year N+2</th>
<th>Year N+3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XX 01 01 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s Representation Offices)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX 01 01 02 (Delegations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX 01 05 01 (Indirect research)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 01 05 01 (Direct research)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)

- XX 01 01 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s Representation Offices)
- XX 01 01 02 (Delegations)
- XX 01 05 01 (Indirect research)
- 10 01 05 01 (Direct research)

#### External staff (in Full Time Equivalent unit: FTE)\(^8\)

- XX 01 02 01 (AC, END, INT from the ‘global envelope’)
- XX 01 02 02 (AC, AL, END, INT and JED in the delegations)
- XX 01 04 yy \(^9\) - at Headquarters
- XX 01 04 yy \(^9\) - in Delegations
- XX 01 05 02 (AC, END, INT - Indirect research)
- 10 01 05 02 (AC, END, INT - Direct research)
- Other budget lines (specify)

**TOTAL**

\(XX\) is the policy area or budget title concerned.

The human resources required will be met by staff from the DG who are already assigned to management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together if necessary with any additional allocation which may be granted to the managing DG under the annual allocation procedure and in the light of budgetary constraints.

#### Description of tasks to be carried out:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officials and temporary staff</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) AC= Contract Staff; AL = Local Staff; END= Seconded National Expert; INT = agency staff; JED= Junior Experts in Delegations.

\(^9\) Sub-ceiling for external staff covered by operational appropriations (former ‘BA’ lines).
3.2.4. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework

- ☐ The proposal/initiative is compatible the current multiannual financial framework.
- ☑ The proposal/initiative will entail reprogramming of the relevant heading in the multiannual financial framework.

A re-programming of the remainder of the Smart Borders envelope of the Internal Security Fund is planned in order to implement the functionalities and changes foreseen in the two proposals. The ISF Borders Regulation is the financial instrument where the budget for the implementation of the Smart Borders package has been included. It provides in Article 5 that EUR 791 million shall be implemented through a programme for setting up IT systems supporting the management of migration flows across the external border under the conditions laid down in Article 15. Out of the above-mentioned EUR 791 million, EUR 480 million is reserved for the development of the Entry-Exit System and EUR 210 million for the development of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS). The remainder, EUR 100.828 million will be partly used to cover the costs for the changes related to the upgrade of the SIS II functionalities, envisaged in the two proposals.

- ☐ The proposal/initiative requires application of the flexibility instrument or revision of the multiannual financial framework.

Explain what is required, specifying the headings and budget lines concerned and the corresponding amounts.

3.2.5. Third-party contributions

- ☑ The proposal/initiative does not provide for co-financing by third parties.
- The proposal/initiative provides for the co-financing estimated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specify the co-financing body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL appropriations co-financed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EN 97

EN
3.3. **Estimated impact on revenue**

- ☐ The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.
- ☑️ The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:
  - ☐ on own resources
  - ☑️ on miscellaneous revenue

**EUR million (to three decimal places)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget revenue line:</th>
<th>Appropriation available for the current financial year</th>
<th>Impact of the proposal/initiative(^{100})</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 6313 – contribution Schengen Associated Countries (CH, NO, LI, IS).</td>
<td>p.m</td>
<td>p.m</td>
<td>p.m</td>
<td>p.m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For miscellaneous ‘assigned’ revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected.

18.02.08 (Schengen Information System), 18.02.07 (eu-LISA)

Specify the method for calculating the impact on revenue.

The budget shall include a contribution from countries associated with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis.

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\(^{100}\) As regards traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be net amounts, i.e. gross amounts after deduction of 25 % for collection costs.