
Facts and Trends

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politically motivated crime</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremism</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing extremism</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamism/Islamist terrorism</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(excluding Islamism)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espionage and other intelligence activities</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Scientology Organisation (SO)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Politically motivated crime

In 2014, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered 32,700 offences in the category of politically motivated crime, an increase of 3.3% over the previous year (2013: 31,645). This figure includes 12,543 propaganda offences (38.4%; 2013: 13,105, 41.4%). The total number of politically motivated crimes includes violent offences, the number of which rose from 2,848 to 3,368, for an increase of 18.3%. Offences involving bodily injury again accounted for the largest share of violent offences (2,285). Of the total, 23,909 offences (73.1%) were found to have an extremist background (2013: 22,129, 69.9%); of these, 912 (2013: 537) could not be assigned to any specific category.

Two aspects should be noted:

- a rise in the number of violent offences motivated by right-wing extremism (the largest number since 2008) and xenophobia (highest level since the current definition of politically motivated crime was introduced in 2001); and
- an enormous increase in the number of crimes and violent offences in the category of politically motivated crime by foreigners.

More specifically:

In the area of right-wing politically motivated crime, 16,559 criminal offences were classified as having an extremist background (2013: 16,557). In 2014, there were 990 violent crimes motivated by right-wing extremism (2013: 801), an increase of 23.6% over the previous year and the largest number since 2008 (1,042). Here it should be noted that most of this increase can be traced to violent rioting during a rally initiated by hooligans to protest Salafists in Cologne on 26 October 2014 (176 offences recorded). At 512, the number of violent crimes directed at foreigners (2013: 473) was the largest since the current definition of politically motivated crime was introduced in 2001. By contrast, the number of violent crimes against actual or supposed left-wing extremists (139; 2013: 146) and other political opponents (60; 2013: 52) remained about the same. In 2014, there was one attempted homicide motivated by right-wing extremism (2013: four).

The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).
In 2014, 4,424 criminal offences were classified as left-wing politically motivated crimes with an extremist background (2013: 4,491), of which 995 were violent crimes (2013: 1,110). The number of left-wing extremist motivated violent offences against police and security authorities remained large and virtually unchanged at 623 (2013: 632), while the number of violent offences against actual or supposed right-wing extremists dropped significantly to 367 (2013: 566), as did the number related to protests against privatisation and gentrification: 60 in 2014 compared to 151 in 2013. In 2014, there were seven attempted homicides motivated by left-wing extremism (2013: three).

In the area of politically motivated crime by foreigners, 2,014 offences with an extremist background were recorded (2013: 544), including 259 violent offences (2013: 76). The number of criminal offences in this area thus increased by 270%, and that of violent crimes by 240%. One reason for this increase is the large number of protests against the advance of the terrorist militia Islamic State (IS) in Syria and northern Iraq and its attacks on Kurds and Yazidis. In line with this trend, in 2014 there were six attempted homicides in the area of extremist crime by foreigners (2013: zero).
Right-wing extremism

By the end of 2014, the number of right-wing extremist sympathisers had fallen slightly, as in previous years, to 21,000, after subtracting multiple memberships (2013: 21,700). More than one-quarter of all right-wing extremists are neo-Nazis. The number of neo-Nazi sympathisers fell slightly again in 2014, to about 5,600 persons (2013: 5,800). The number of subculture-oriented right-wing extremists fell slightly in 2014 to 7,200 (2013: 7,400). But subculture-oriented right-wing extremists continue to make up the largest share of right-wing extremist sympathisers, at around 30%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right-wing extremist following ¹</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subculture-oriented right-wing extremists</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Nazis</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party membership</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIE RECHTE (The Right)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bürgerbewegung pro NRW (pro NRW, Civic Movement for North Rhine-Westphalia)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der III. Weg (The Third Way; added in 2014)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other right-wing extremist organisations</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22,700</td>
<td>22,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after subtracting multiple memberships</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which right-wing extremists willing to use violence</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which violence-oriented right-wing extremists ²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.
² Up to 2013, only the number of right-wing extremists willing to use violence was given. Starting in 2014, the number of violence-oriented right-wing extremists has been given, which includes the subset of right-wing extremists willing to use violence.
Militancy and the level of violence remain high among right-wing extremists, as shown by the large number of violent crimes motivated by right-wing extremism and by the fact that half of all right-wing extremists can be considered violence-oriented.

Even though their use of violence is typically spontaneous and situation-dependent, it has the overall effect of strategic violence. It serves to intimidate opponents and can be understood as a “communications strategy”. Even though right-wing extremist publications no longer give priority to promoting it, establishing „nationally liberated zones“ remains a goal.

Strategic violence is sometimes defined as „self-defence“. For example, right-wing extremists see Germany as being threatened by „race extinction“, which they believe only a self-appointed elite can prevent. Their rhetoric is correspondingly dramatic when it comes to what they consider excessive foreign influence. Individuals and small groups draw on this rhetoric to justify their actions: „Deeds not words“, as described by the right-wing terrorist organisation Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground, NSU). In any case, fantasies of violence against foreigners can be found on the Internet in large quantities.

Foreigners in particular remain the focus of right-wing extremist violence. More than 50% of all right-wing extremist violent offences committed are motivated by xenophobia. The number of right-wing extremist offences directed at housing for asylum seekers (mainly property damage and propaganda offences) more than tripled over the previous year to 170 (2013: 55).

Another focus of right-wing extremist violence is attacks on left-wing extremists and other political and ideological opponents, whom they consider „enemies of the people“ and of an ethnically homogeneous Volksgemeinschaft, the National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics. The language used to prepare, justify and carry out acts of violence is similarly militant.

Despite government measures and a high level of socio-political isolation, violence-oriented right-wing extremists remain a serious threat. This applies to their routine violence against foreigners and those with
other political views. It also applies to the danger of escalating protests against asylum seekers and the creation of clandestine organisations. Ultimately, the underlying ideology is fixated on the idea of saving the Volk from imminent destruction – an idea that virtually demands militant, ruthless action.

Racism, dehumanisation of foreigners and rejection of political opponents, all of whom are considered traitors and agents of foreign powers, provide the ideology to justify their unrestrained violence.

The security authorities keep a careful watch on developments, from radicalisation to the creation of organisational structures to training in the use of weapons. Self-radicalisation of individuals or small groups constitutes a potential risk that should not be underestimated.

Music and the Internet continue to be significant factors in radicalisation and recruitment to right-wing extremism.

But right-wing extremists have lately been unable to attract large numbers of followers to their demonstrations and concerts. To counter this weakness, right-wing extremists have been trying to stir up popular dissatisfaction with asylum policy. Right-wing extremist parties specifically target public demonstrations, seeking to exploit them for their own ends and to portray themselves as carrying out the public will.

The Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) continues to be in trouble: The party leadership is divided and unable to pursue a coherent strategy; election results have been disastrous; the party was voted out of the Saxony state parliament and is now facing a possible ban, all of which has further weakened the party. The neo-Nazi elements of the party view the new party chairman, Frank Franz, elected in early November 2014, with a great deal of scepticism, even though he adheres to the party’s fundamental, anti-constitutional positions.

The NPD nonetheless remains the most influential right-wing extremist party, with its 5,200 members. It is also firmly anchored in certain regions where it is also seen as a “normal” party, with considerable influence on local politics. The party cannot yet be written off entirely: As already seen in the past, the NPD may be able to take advantage of future developments.
Association bans are an important security policy instrument to fight right-wing extremist organisations. The neo-Nazi scene increasingly uses the political party as a model of organisation to make it more difficult to ban. Possible entitlement to state funding provides further incentive. DIE RECHTE (The Right) and Der III. Weg (The Third Way) are two relatively new right-wing extremist party groupings that are increasingly used by neo-Nazis as platforms for their activities.

In DIE RECHTE, the neo-Nazi regional organisation in North Rhine-Westphalia (the only regional organisation with activities worth mentioning) was able to consolidate its influence on the overall party. The party uses provocative activities („law and order“ campaigns in Dortmund and Wuppertal) and recruiting targeted at football fans and hooligans to find violence-oriented supporters and build up a potential threat to use against the police and political opponents.

The significant influence of neo-Nazis in the party Der III. Weg is apparent from its many leading activists who used to belong to the Freies Netz Süd (FNS, Free Network South), which was banned in July 2014. The party, which is now the most influential neo-Nazi force in Bavaria, is currently focused on protests against asylum seekers.

Both of these very small parties offer an ideological home for neo-Nazis whose organisations have been banned; the parties’ influence is limited to a few regions. Although no structured process of party formation was apparent in 2014, they allow regional groupings of neo-Nazis to act under cover of party privilege. This could serve as a model for other neo-Nazis and encourage additional attempts at this kind of organisation.

Despite their occasional participation in elections, neither party is oriented in the slightest towards working within a parliamentary system. Instead, their aims are acquiring funding, using structures that cannot be banned to continue their neo-Nazi activities, and above all promoting a climate of fear and intimidation with their aggressive behaviour.

Again in 2014, the Bürgerbewegung pro NRW (pro NRW, Civic Movement for North Rhine-Westphalia) failed to have an impact in elections. Its programme for the elections to the European Parliament was full of disparaging statements about Islam, asylum seekers, Sinti and Roma and the European Union.
Although some of its key statements occasionally receive high levels of approval in opinion polls, right-wing extremism is clearly not accepted by mainstream society and remains politically isolated. For this reason, right-wing extremists try to participate in the discussion of current issues without revealing their fundamental ideology. They address international crises that have an effect on Germany’s internal security and are thus the subject of popular debate. Current issues are in particular the growing number of asylum seekers and the threat of Islamist terrorist attack in connection with the civil war in Syria and the growth of the Islamic State (IS). Right-wing extremists tried to gain broader support for their position, which is fundamentally anti-Semitic, anti-American and opposed to the West, with their political agitation on the conflicts between Israel and Hamas and between Russia and Ukraine.

Political agitation against asylum seekers was a priority for the entire right-wing extremist scene in 2014, which used xenophobic activities to stir up resentment and gain new followers. They held rallies in the immediate vicinity of planned or existing refugee housing. Right-wing extremists are trying to find a certain acceptance for their views in the asylum debate. They often participate in neighbourhood demonstrations against asylum housing, often without objections from the organisers. They also portray themselves as the ones who take the public’s fears seriously, and they try to steer protests in the direction of a fundamental critique of the existing political order.

Right-wing extremists tried to take advantage of “Monday marches” and peace marches held on a regular basis in various German cities for their own purposes. With their anti-Western, anti-Semitic and anti-Islam attitudes and conspiracy theories, these events offer an opening to blatantly right-wing extremist positions.
Left-wing extremism

At the end of 2014, the number of active left-wing extremists totalled 27,200 (after subtracting multiple memberships) and thus remained virtually unchanged compared to 2013 (27,700).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left-wing extremist following</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomists</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>6,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchists</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist–Leninists and other left-wing extremists</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>21,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after subtracting multiple memberships</td>
<td>27,700</td>
<td>27,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which left-wing extremists willing to use violence</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which violence-oriented left-wing extremists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,600&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off.
2 Up to 2013, only the number of left-wing extremists classed as “willing to use violence” were accounted for in this table. As from 2014, the number of “violence-oriented” left-wing extremists will be quoted, which includes the subset of left-wing extremists willing to use violence.

As was the case in previous years, there was a slight drop in the membership of Marxist–Leninist and other legalist left-wing extremist groups (21,100 in 2014 compared to 21,600 in 2013). The number of violence-oriented left-wing extremists totalled 7,600 at the end of 2014, of whom 6,100 were autonomists.

While the number of left-wing extremist acts of violence varies from year to year, the level and acceptability of that violence has risen in recent years. In particular, it is apparent that the threshold for harming police officers has lowered over the years. Not only is serious bodily harm tacitly accepted, but also the possible death of other people. In 2014, the police recorded seven attempted homicides (2013: three), six of which were directed against police officers.

Attacks are also carried out against police property. Since it opened in February 2014, the police station in the Connewitz district of Leipzig in
Saxony, for instance, has been the target of 16 attacks. The most serious one took place in the evening of 7 January 2015, when around 50 people attacked the station with cobble stones, paint bombs and fireworks and attempted to trespass into the building. In a letter claiming responsibility the attackers wrote: „Cop, your tolerated status has been revoked.“

Attacks against police officers and against actual (or alleged) right-wing extremists, which usually occur on the fringes of demonstrations, are widely accepted in the violence-oriented scene. Endorsing violence is more of a strategic than an ideological issue in left-wing extremism.

A distinction still needs to be drawn between “mass militancy” and property-related and person-related violence in left-wing extremism.

Confrontational violence is regarded as the categorical demarcation between left-wing extremists and „the system“. In addition, that violence is to make an impact in the media. Music which breeds violence and videos which are used to mobilise followers, for example, are both disseminated via the Internet in order to generate the right atmosphere among those taking part in demonstrations.

The policy of mass militancy which is applied in the autonomist scene, that is rioting in the streets in the context of demonstrations or other big events, generally needs an environment which is conducive to inciting others to perpetrate violence. Small, flexible groups, known as „Black Blocks“, of masked activists wearing uniform „riot gear“ are formed during demonstrations. Activists use their provocative manner to make their confrontational attitude to the police and their will to escalate the situation clear, and they stoke up the atmosphere among other demonstrators.

Besides confrontational violence on the streets, violence-oriented left-wing extremists also carry out serious, targeted attacks. These carefully planned acts of violence are intended to send a clear signal. Along with eliciting a media response, their purpose is to force the facilities or businesses which are attacked to change their behaviour. The attacks are to cause financial losses and practical disruption. Self-incriminatory letters, which are often posted on the Internet, are used to provide the ideological justification for these acts. To protect themselves against criminal prosecution, the perpetrators keep changing the names of their actions or use no names at all (known as „no name militancy“).
Left-wing extremists continue in their attempts to exploit social conflicts to benefit their own revolutionary objectives. They intervene in diverse social fields of action and try to popularise their radical positions. The ideological basis of their activities remains their rejection of the „capitalist system“, which is held responsible for social hardship and war, for racism, environmental disasters and the destruction of living spaces. In the left-wing extremist discourse, capitalism is more than just an economic system, it is the foundation of „bourgeois rule“. Overthrowing that bourgeois rule goes hand in hand with the establishment of a new social and political system – in combination with the abolition of our parliamentary democracy.

However, more than a few protagonists in the left-wing extremist scene feel that not only is the „capitalist system“ in crisis, but left-wing extremism itself: They claim that the movement has not yet managed to turn the changes occurring at global level and within social structures to political advantage. Nor have German left-wing extremists been able to profit from the European financial and economic crisis.

The lack of social relevance and the failure to establish their own positions has led violence-oriented left-wing extremists to launch a strategy debate, in consequence of which they are undergoing a process of restructuring. Alongside „classic“ autonomists, who are sticking to their thematic and strategic premises (social and individual autonomy, violence as a means to subjective liberation), increasing numbers of post-autonomists are emerging who want to cooperate with groups which have different ideologies (policy of alliances).

Left-wing extremists are using this restructuring process in an attempt to increase their capacity for discursive and agitating action. Their aim is to use the Internet and social media to establish nationwide structures so as to stop the fragmentation in the scene. This process developed a very specific dynamic in 2014.

The question of whether to form a structured organisation, like that as to the use of violence and militancy, is a recurring theme for autonomists. Given that they are in principle opposed to organisational structures and hierarchies, they tend to prefer more structure-less, informal forms of
cooperation. For years, they have also been discussing whether organisational structures could promote both political responsibility and effectiveness. This debate is chiefly being led by people who now tend to describe themselves as post-autonomists. They are in favour of retaining militant strategies, but they are also eager to get their message across („No militancy for militancy’s sake“) and call for a policy which reaches beyond their own scene. They are also calling for supraregional organisational structures and cooperation with other left-wing extremist movements, as well as, on a case-by-case thematic basis, with other groups.

In October 2014, for instance, the Interventionistische Linke (Interventionist Left, IL) presented an „Interim Status Paper“, the outcome of a debate which had been ongoing for several years among the more than 20 predominantly post-autonomist groups in the network. Their motto is „We are the stone throwers and the appeasers all in one“. The network is currently in a process of transition towards establishing an organisational structure and aims to attract „all those who want to engage with passion and earnest in a collective, organising and radical process to overcome the marginalisation and powerlessness of the left.“ The organisation wants to prepare the „step towards a supraregional, locally based organisation“ in order to „represent the radical left in social struggles“.

The Antifaschistische Linke Berlin (Antifascist Left Berlin, ALB) disbanded in September 2014. For years, it had been one of the largest groups of autonomists in Berlin and had been able to mobilise most of its members. Some of its members joined the IL.

The aim in forming a post-autonomous organisation is to be able to dovetail various types of activities – not least to increase the strength of the movement, the precondition for being able to engage in (mass) militancy in the first place. However, it cannot be ignored that the post-autonomists’ opening up to forces outside of their own movement does not mean they have sworn off militancy and violence. Even though violence is rejected as an „empty ritual“, „proactive resistance“ is still being propagated.

„Classic“ autonomists have not yet been involved in this process of organising the scene. Nevertheless, they may possibly step up their clandes-
tine violent activities in order to reinforce their own strategy as part of this process. In addition to a renunciation of „autonomist“ convictions, the opposite development has also been registered: The alternative response to the failure of „mass militancy“ at large-scale events has been the forming of very small groups of autonomists which engage in clandestine violent activities.

One example is a group called Gruppo Informale, which has been active in Berlin and which was responsible for a total of 13 arson attacks and offences of causing damage to property between 9 May and 29 July 2014. The target of those attacks included vehicles belonging to the police, security firms and Deutsche Bahn, as well as bank branches and public administration buildings. The Gruppo Informale has not engaged in any further activities since 29 July 2014.

Besides autonomists and post-autonomists, Marxists, Leninists and anti-imperialists in the violence-oriented left-wing extremist scene are also attempting to form alliances.

They include, for example, the [3A]*Revolutionäre Bündnis ([3A]*Revolutionary Alliance), which comprises five member organisations. As early as 2014, the Alliance had begun to mobilise followers against the G7 Summit in Elmau in Bavaria in June 2015, and called for an „assault on the summit“. In „analogy with the successful protests against the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm in 2007“, „mass protests in Germany and Europe“ were to be organised.

Further, the Antifaschistische Revolutionäre Aktion Berlin (Anti-Fascist Revolutionary Action Berlin, ARAB), whose credo is „we will not allow the Civil Code to dictate what type of resistance we engage in“ and which had been one of the most active groups in the violence-oriented left-wing extremist spectrum in Berlin since 2007, joined the national Trotskyist network Neue antikapitalistische Organisation (New Anti-Capitalist Organisation, NaO) in October 2014.

Internationalist-oriented anti-imperialist groups are primarily opposed to NATO’s and the EU’s „imperial projects“ and the policies of the United States and Germany. Against the backdrop of the rise of the Islamist-terrorist Islamic State (IS), solidarity with and support for the banned terror-
ist organisation Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which had been hardly perceptible over a long period, again came to the fore, among other things in the form of demonstrations and calls to reverse the ban on the PKK, above all, though, on account of the fundraising campaign „Solidarity with Rojava – Weapons for the YPG/YPJ“.

As regards the conflict between Ukraine/the West and Russia, many left-wing extremists, especially orthodox Communists and anti-imperialists, are backing the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, claiming that it is the imperialist West which is the warmonger.
Islamism/Islamist terrorism

There was a slight rise in the Islamist following in Germany to 43,890 (2013: 43,190). This was due to the increase in the number of members/followers of the Salafist movement in Germany in particular.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamist following¹</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core al-Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)</td>
<td>no hard numbers</td>
<td>no hard numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State (IS)</td>
<td>not listed</td>
<td>no hard numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN)</td>
<td>not listed</td>
<td>no hard numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salafist Movements</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (HAMAS)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus Separatist Movement (NKSB – Nordkaukasische Separatistenbewegung)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Hezbollah (TH)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood (MB)/Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V. (IGD)</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tablighi Jama’at (TJ)</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e.V. (IZH)</td>
<td>no hard numbers</td>
<td>no hard numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millî Görüş movement and affiliated associations (IGMG)</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>31,000³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other⁴</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>2,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43,190</td>
<td>43,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The various forms of Islamism differ both in their claims (regional or global) and their means (legalistic, violence-oriented or terrorist). What all of them have in common is the abuse of religion to political ends.

Europe continues to be the target of **Islamist terrorism**. The fact that the terrorist threat remains high is demonstrated by the attacks in Brussels (Belgium, May 2014), Paris (France, January 2015) and Copenhagen (Denmark, February 2015). One of the Paris attackers as well as the attacker of Copenhagen claimed allegiance to the terrorist organisation Islamic State (IS).

Even though security agencies are not aware of IS structures in Germany at present, criminal proceedings were instituted against a number of IS followers or supporters in 2014.

On 12 September 2014 the Federal Minister of the Interior banned the activities of the terrorist organisation IS in Germany. The ban includes the use of IS signs in particular as well as of logos used by media outlets associated with IS. The order cannot be appealed since October 2014.

The military success of IS and the proclamation of its „caliphate“ have taken the terrorist threat to a new level.

Failed states have been a safe haven for terrorist groups for some years already. The so-called Islamic State has been trying to give the impression that it is a „normal“ state which also has a functioning administration. Thus, IS has gone beyond being a mere terrorist organisation. Its proclamation of the „caliphate“ and its military success have led to euphoria among jihadists also in Europe, regardless of the atrocities committed by jihadist militias and the terror spread by them. This has resulted in a constantly increasing number of individuals travelling to conflict areas to support IS.
If IS succeeded in establishing itself in a larger area in the longer run, transnational jihad would once more have a sanctuary and a training ground for its fighters, even more so than in Afghanistan in the past. It would then have a logistical centre which would enable them to coordinate complex attacks. IS pursues a global agenda. This became sufficiently clear after the US and their allies had begun launching air strikes in order to defend ethnic and religious minorities, with IS using the air strikes as a reason to call for attacks to be carried out in the West as well.

The success of IS has also changed the power structures within jihadism. The sympathies of the international jihad scene increasingly seem to lie with IS. It is to be feared that al-Qaeda will try to make up for its loss of reputation by carrying out new spectacular terrorist attacks.

The complexity of Islamist terrorist structures is expected to remain high. Jihadism, which is both globalised and individualised, appears in different forms: from regional groups associated with the terrorist organisations IS or al-Qaeda, to diverse networks which are affiliated with these organisations, to lone actors or micro-groups who/which have often been radicalised by Internet publications and who make it hard for security agencies to take counter-measures at an early stage because they prepare attacks autonomously and independently of any organisations. Both al-Qaeda and IS promote the modus operandi of „individual jihad“. For them, it is a form of combat which enables them to cause great terror using comparatively few resources.

Jihadists use modern communications technology to spread their ideology but above all to report on their terrorist activities. In earlier years IS had already shown a remarkable degree of professionalism in producing and spreading its propaganda, but now the organisation has succeeded in making it even more professional, especially as regards the use of social media. From the combat zones jihadists stay in touch with their „brothers and sisters in faith“ in Europe and across the globe. They do so not just via video messages but also via social-media-accounts, which enable them to engage in dialogue with one another.

As of early 2015 more than 600 German or German-based Islamists who had departed for Syria or Iraq to join fightings or to support Islamist
groups in any other way were known to the security agencies. This repre-
sents an increase of more than 100% within one year (early 2014: 270 de-
partures). Meanwhile, IS has become the most important port of call for
jihad volunteers from Germany. Jihadists willing to fight are given the
opportunity to learn about various terrorist techniques and to test them
in practice in training camps. These individuals increasingly show signs
of having become desensitised, brutalised and inured to violence. Several
jihadists from Germany have committed suicide attacks in Iraq and Syria,
allegedly at the behest of IS. Returnees who underwent terrorist training
or who took actively part in fightings pose a considerable security risk.

Salafism continued to be the most dynamic Islamist movement in Ger-
many in 2014 with 7,000 adherents (compared to 5,500 in the previous
year). The Salafist scene represents a very important recruitment ground
for jihad. The Salafist movement rests upon an ideology which claims to
be exclusively based on the principles of the Koran, the example of the
Prophet Muhammad and of the first three generations of Muslims. It al-
so rests upon an affinity for violence. Almost all individuals with links to
Germany who have joined jihad had before been in contact with Salafist
structures. In 2014 Salafists continued their efforts to attract public at-
tention with events and provocations, for instance with the LIES!
(READ!) campaign and the Shariah Police. The Salafist association Die
Wahre Religion (DWR, The True Religion) went on with its LIES! cam-
paign with unabated intensity. Started in autumn 2011, this is a cam-
paign to distribute copies of the Koran. Throughout Germany DWR
members have been handing out copies of the Koran at information
stands and/or when deliberately approaching people in pedestrian
zones. By December 2014 more than 1.7 million copies of the LIES! Ko-
ran, which has been published in several languages, had been printed
and almost all of them distributed, mainly in Germany, according to
DWR. In August and September 2014 Salafists, wearing high-visibility
vests with the inscription „Shariah Police“, patrolled the city centre of
Wuppertal (North Rhine-Westphalia) and handed out flyers which read
„Shariah Controlled Zone“ – a method of agitation which has been
known from the UK since 2010. They called on young people in front of
gambling halls and discos to respect Islamic laws (no smoking and no gambling) and shop owners of Turkish origin not to sell alcohol.

Anti-Semitism is an integral part of the Islamist ideology. The hated state of Israel is especially linked with classic anti-Semitic stereotypes: from Jewish financial power to a global Jewish conspiracy.

During the demonstrations against the war in Gaza in summer 2014, partly organised by HAMAS (which was not easily perceived by the outside world), anti-Semitism was openly displayed. The slogans used at events and online, which were partly aggressively anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli, but above all the assaults on Jews and pro-Israel demonstrators and the attack on the synagogue in Wuppertal have been evidence of the undiminished potential for aggression.

The attack in the Jewish Museum of Brussels – perpetrated by a Syria returnee – and the attack on a Jewish supermarket in Paris have highlighted the fact that the threat to Jews and Jewish facilities remains high.

As a result of the IS terror against ethnic and religious minorities, violent clashes between Salafists and Yazidis and/or Kurds took place also in Germany in August and October 2014: in Herford (North Rhine-Westphalia), Celle (Lower Saxony) and Hamburg. The principle of action-reaction between the extremist antipodes continue to pose a considerable threat to internal security: attacks committed by jihadists enable right-wing extremist groups to justify their anti-Islamic agitation and even their violence; Salafists, for their part, make use of this to vindicate their own violence.

By exerting political and social influence, legalistic groups try to impose a social order that is in conformity with Islamic rules, as they see it. The most important tendency within this spectrum is the Millî Görüş movement. Both in Turkey and in Germany, the Millî Görüş movement consists of several components, which are held together by a common ideological religious orientation and ideological links with Necmettin Erbakan. Even though all associations act autonomously and independently of one another, the Millî Görüş ideology is the element that ties them together, albeit to a greater or a lesser degree. The Islamische
**Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e.V. (IGMG)** is also affiliated with the Millî Görüş movement. Information available to security agencies proves that the IGMG still has links with some parts of the Millî Görüş movement. At the same time, it was established that the IGMG’s ties with extremism are becoming weaker throughout Germany, although this varies in intensity.
Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security (excluding Islamism)

With 29,330 individuals, the following from the field of non-Islamist organisations of foreigners posing a threat to security resp. extremist organisations of foreigners in Germany slightly increased as against the previous year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Following of extremist organisations of foreigners</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing extremists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Communist Party / Marxists-Leninists (TKP/ML)</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP)</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,810</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,330</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policy and strategy of the secular extremist organisations of foreigners in Germany as well as their agitation and level of militancy are crucially influenced by the developments and events in the respective countries of origin (and the locally based central organisational units). Their activities are aimed at a radical change of the political conditions in their home

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1 Figures refer to Germany; they are partly estimated and rounded.
2 Figures also include members / sympathisers of the groups which have been banned.
countries – often also by using force and terrorism. Besides, they may pose a threat to the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany and, partly, they also violate the idea of international understanding. The majority of these groupings consider Germany a safe haven, from where they can support the organisations in their home countries by propagandist and, above all, by material and financial means. The Germany-based adherents usually are the addressees of politico-strategic guidelines, and – depending on their individual susceptibility – they are prepared to consistently implement them.

Beyond the calendar year, especially the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), due to its maintenance of a terrorist option, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party – Front (DHKP-C), due to its overt commitment to armed struggle, as well as the Ülkücü movement, due to its denial of the principle of equality, continue to be of particular importance to Germany’s internal security.

In 2014, the activities of the 14,000 PKK adherents in Germany were mainly influenced by two events:

- the stagnating peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish government, and
- the fight of the Kurds in Syria and Iraq against the Islamist-terrorist Islamic State (IS) attracting worldwide attention.

The PKK, whose central claim is the extended cultural and political autonomy of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and the neighbouring Kurdish settlement areas, was in a position to mobilise individuals in a way reaching far beyond its closer circle of members and adherents.

It particularly succeeded in considerably improving its reputation. By the Kurds’ fight against IS which it propagandistically remodelled into a fight of the PKK against jihadists, it managed to push its own claim to absoluteness as well as its own terrorist option into the background. In Europe, the PKK has attempted to exploit this development by calling for its organisation to be deleted from the EU terrorist list and for the ban imposed on its activities in Germany since 1993 to be lifted.
The situation in Syria and Iraq made it easier for the PKK to carry out its recruitment activities for the guerrilla. In Germany, intense efforts could be determined among young people of mainly Kurdish origin. In an overt and well-targeted attempt, young people were recruited for participation in armed combat activities through the PKK’s media apparatus as well as on the Internet. The number of the recruits having left Germany for the combat zones rise significantly in the period under review, ranging somewhere in the medium two-digit region.

With the aggravation of the situation in the combat zones, the young PPK adherents’ action behaviour also changed.

Since the summer of 2014, PKK adherents used the advance of the IS in Northern Iraq and Syria – especially towards the Northern Syrian city of Kobanê – as an opportunity to carry out numerous protest actions. While many events passed off peacefully, cases of material damage and violent clashes with the police and with Islamists occurred in the framework of several events in early August and early October, even resulting in offences of grievous bodily harm and attempted homicide.

The PKK remains the most powerful extremist organisation of foreigners in Germany. It is in a position to mobilise individuals far beyond the closer circle of its following. Besides, its cadre structures allow a quick implementation of new strategic and tactical guidelines, also in what refers to its possibly carrying out militant forms of action. Even though the PKK continues to attach priority to peaceful events to be staged in Europe, violence remains one option of its ideology. This is clearly illustrated not least by the recruitment of individuals for the guerrilla.

Although the acts of violence committed in Turkey in 2014 did not reach the previous years’ level, the DHKP-C has continued to propagate the need of using terrorist violence. In its „armed propaganda“, the Marxist-Leninist organisation is focusing on the Turkish state and „US imperialism“. The DHKP-C is an isolated, conspiratorial organisation which openly propagates violence. In a similarly uncompromising manner, it also asserts its claim to an avant-garde role towards competing revolutionary groups. Solely the armed fight under the DHKP-C’s lead is considered promising.
The series of major terrorist attacks committed by DHKP-C members in Turkey in 2012 and 2013 continued in the spring of 2015, after – in the course of 2014 – militant attacks had been directed against facilities of Turkey’s ruling party AKP as well as against premises and members of the police.

In Germany, the DHKP-C mainly operates via its cover organisation Anatolian Federation, especially regarding prisoners’ care and the political field of „anti-racism“. Although the DHKP-C considers Germany a safe haven, its death cult events, staged in commemoration of the so-called martyrs, show that also in Germany its organisational units support the party line, including the terrorist option.

The nationalist and racist Ülkücü ideology based on an idealisation of Turkey and Turkishness by simultaneously denigrating other ethnic groups is mainly represented in Germany by the umbrella organisation Föderation der Türkisch-Demokratischen Idealistenvereine in Deutschland e.V. (Federation of Associations of Turkish Democratic Idealists in Germany regd. assoc.) and its mostly non-organised young followers. While the organised activists try to gain influence on a local level in political bodies and parties, the young adherents, who are mainly networked via the Internet, propagate racism in an offensive manner and incite to violence – not only through verbally radical appeals but sometimes also through calls upon others to carry out acts of violence directed against other ethnic groups.

The threat potential of the right-wing extremist Ülkücü movement is multidimensional: it concerns the normative level of the value system as well as the field of internal security through the conflict-prone confrontation with political opponents.

The deliberate denigration of other ethnic groups does not only fundamentally violate the principle of human dignity, but it also impedes these groups’ integration into German society. It has to be taken into account that the different parts of the movement adopt some kind of dual-strategy approach.

The organised part of the Ülkücü movement explicitly calls upon its members to exercise their democratic rights in Germany and to engage
in politics and society in order to exert influence. The Ülkücü movement’s having managed to gain ground on a local level in political bodies and parties may not be interpreted as recognition of the free democratic basic order but as exerting deliberate political influence in line with a nationalist ideology.

However, the non-organised part of Ülkücü – mainly networked via the Internet – with 3,000 mostly young individuals regarded as belonging to this movement, openly avows itself to racism. In its agitation, it especially focuses on Kurds, who are generally called PKK adherents and subjected to verbal attacks and slander, which sometimes culminate in extermination threats. Agitation against Jews implies an anti-Semitism of a similarly eliminating character.

Actually, the Ülkücü ideology encourages the development of a nationalist and racist youth movement. Conflicts in Turkey, particularly regarding the Kurds’ issue, will continue in Germany, with a potential threat of violent clashes emanating from the Ülkücü movement’s young followers.
Espionage and other intelligence activities

Foreign intelligence services continue to invest a great deal of organisational effort and expense in espionage against Germany. The use of cyberspace for espionage purposes has increased the intensity of that espionage many times over.

Germany is of interest in its role as a geopolitical actor, as a member of NATO and the EU and, finally, on account of its economic strength and innovative businesses. Oppositional groups from foreign intelligence services’ home countries are another target of espionage activities.

Most foreign intelligence activity against Germany is carried out by the services of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Their governments’ political agendas dictate the priority areas of their intelligence services’ activities.

In 2014 it became clearer than ever just how important the intelligence services are within Russia’s security architecture. Russian espionage is currently essentially influenced by the conflict between the West and Russia in regard to Ukraine. Russia is primarily interested in gathering information at an early stage about the Federal Government’s position, as well as that of political parties and institutions, as regards how they plan to handle the crisis and their future policy towards Russia. Not least, the Russian services are also attempting to present their point of view to the public and to use their contacts to exert influence.

These attempts not only to pre-empt policy decisions but also to influence politics and the general public show how much importance the Russian services continue to attach to German politics. It is not expected that there will be any let-up in Russian espionage activities in the foreseeable future. Rather, it is to be expected that these activities will be stepped up in the context of the crisis in Ukraine, at least, though, that Russia will continue to react variably and flexibly to current events.

However, this should not disguise the fact that the Russian intelligence services’ interests go beyond the current crisis – politically, militarily, economically, as well as technically.
The Russian intelligence services chiefly employ members of legal residences for espionage activities. These bases in Germany have particularly high staff levels compared to those in other European countries.

The intelligence services play an important role in China’s authoritarian and repressive political system. They have wide-ranging powers, which they use to keep the Communist Party in power and to provide extensive support to the policy of territorial integrity dictated by the Chinese leadership. The same goes as regards establishing geopolitical and military positions of power, as well as the modernisation of the national economy. In consequence, the intelligence services’ work abroad focuses on separatist/democratic opposition to the system, political decision-making processes and technological expertise, for instance in the fields of arms, aerospace, and mechanical and plant engineering.

China’s geopolitical situation and its political and economic ambitions mean there will in all probability be no lessening of the country’s espionage activities. The regime continues to exercise wide-ranging control over its own population: Economic liberalisation has led to no democratic opening up. Likewise, the strategic competition with the United States and Japan, which the country is engaged in, does not leave any room for hope that there will be any sustained détente. In economic terms, China is developing from being the world’s subcontractor into a country with high-tech production techniques – a goal which it will no doubt be able to achieve more quickly and cost-effectively with the help of illegal expertise and technology transfers.

Although the Chinese intelligence services concentrate on fighting the opposition in exile in Germany, key shifts in focus have become apparent in recent years: In the past the services almost exclusively recruited only ethnic Chinese as agents for classic espionage activities (politics and military, science and technology). Now, though, they are also making attempts to solicit people from countries in the West as informers or agents. In addition, intelligence officers from China travel to Germany and its neighbouring countries to carry out their activities. There are signs that a combination of strategies is being applied in the field of industrial espionage, that is both human sources and „electronic attacks” are being used in a targeted fashion.
The *Iranian intelligence services* are one of the political leadership’s key instruments for securing its claim to power. Consequently, the intelligence services will continue to focus their activities on the Iranian opposition.

The regime has so far not been able to rebut claims that it is seeking to build nuclear weapons. Despite official avowals to the contrary, Iranian agencies are extremely interested in pursuing their illegal attempts to procure proliferation-relevant material in Germany. In particular, they are interested in items which can be used in the field of nuclear technology. Iran sees itself as a regional power which is intent on shaping politics beyond its own borders, including with a pronounced anti-Western and anti-Zionist thrust. At the same time, there are clear indications of a quite dramatic collapse in the country’s economic performance on account of sanctions imposed against its nuclear programme. Given this situation, the regime is interested both in gathering (insider) information about the West’s future policy – for example Germany’s foreign and security policy – and in securing illegal transfer routes, in order to possibly circumvent sanctions.

The BfV has verified that Iran is attempting to procure goods illegally in Germany and that these efforts have been steadily increasing in recent years. Even in an international comparison they are currently at a quantitatively high level. In particular, goods are being sought which can be employed in the field of nuclear technology.

In 2014, the BfV established that Iran was making increased attempts to procure goods which could be useful in its ambitious missile technology programme, which could also serve the deployment of nuclear weapons. Preventing Iran’s nuclear armament programme is a common objective of the international community. In addition to the negotiations which are ongoing in this area, it is essential that illegal proliferation-relevant procurement activities be prevented – a task which requires close cooperation between international and national security authorities. Given the continued lack of clarity as to the overall situation, Germany anticipates that Iran will continue its intensive procurement efforts in Germany (especially via covert structures).
Modern information and communication technologies have also changed foreign intelligence services’ modi operandi. Information which in the past only agents were able to obtain by conventional means can now be obtained by digital means and on a much larger scale. Also, there is much less risk of discovery. The use of cyberspace for espionage purposes has increased such espionage several-fold.

Nevertheless, „electronic attacks“ are not only used for espionage purposes. They can also be combined with the manipulation of data and the destruction or disruption of functionality, possibly together with causing targeted, major damage (i.e. sabotage), to which critical infrastructures in particular are vulnerable.

The increasing effectiveness of digital espionage has not, though, led to any loss in the importance of human sources. The potential targets of espionage activities therefore need to continue to safeguard their protected property both against attempted attacks from outside and against their own employees („insider attacks“) who are recruited or blackmailed to this end.

The German economy is one of the most knowledge-intensive in the world; its factors for success are its wealth of ideas, technical innovation, and forward-looking research and development. Against this backdrop, industrial espionage against German businesses has been a well-known phenomenon for many years. Following the publication of alleged espionage activities by Western services, the impression has arisen in the media and industry that the scale of industrial espionage in Germany has considerably increased.

However, the BfV has not established that this is the case – and reports from the business sector have also provided no evidence whatsoever to this effect. The cases which the BfV has been involved in have almost exclusively been related to the People’s Republic of China or the Russian Federation.

The Federal Government attaches great importance to protecting the economy and securing Germany’s expertise as a competitive advantage. Protecting the economy means that the State, associations and businesses need to work together. A milestone in this cooperation was
reached in August 2013, when the Federal Minister of the Interior, the Presidents of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI, German Association of German Industry) and of the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK, Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce) signed a declaration entitled „Economic Security in Germany 2015 – Trust, Information, Prevention“, which is part of the National Economic Security Strategy. This strategy is being pursued with vigour: Various groups of experts have already begun elaborating concrete recommendations for effective action to strengthen national economic security.

An awareness-raising campaign called „Prevention through Information“, which the BfV launched several years ago, aims at giving businesses specific information about how to safeguard their expertise.

In the age of globalisation, it is important that businesses’ awareness is heightened for effective economic security at national level. Intensive cooperation between the State and the business sector, and the closer and more trustful exchange of information at international level between Western intelligence services regarding their strategies for protecting the economy are just as crucial.
The Scientology Organisation (SO)

The activities and attractiveness of the Scientology Organisation continue to wane. Its attempts since 2004 to expand its German subsidiaries and wield greater political influence failed to have an effect again in 2014: Its branches in Berlin and Hamburg still have only the status of an „ideal org“.

The SO adheres to its fundamental ideological orientation and strategy and to its familiar priorities. It continues to be guided by the writings of its founder L. Ron Hubbard. These writings make clear that a society based on Scientology teachings would not guarantee significant fundamental and human rights.

Again in 2014, one priority was aggressive agitation against psychiatry and psychotherapy, which the SO considers harmful for patients and a means of repression. In this context, the SO-affiliated Kommission für Verstöße der Psychiatrie gegen Menschenrechte e.V. (KVPM, committee for human rights violations by psychiatrists) mounted an exhibition in Munich in spring 2014 („Psychiatry: Death, not help“) accompanied by a demonstration in protest of „forced psychiatry“ on 1 March 2014.
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