

Annual Risk Analysis 2014





Annual Risk Analysis 2014



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1
00-124 Warsaw, Poland
T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01
frontex@frontex.europa.eu
www.frontex.europa.eu

Warsaw, May 2014
Risk Analysis Unit
Frontex reference number: 5119/2014

Printed version:
OPOCE Catalogue number: TT-AC-14-001-EN-C
ISBN 978-92-95033-81-8
ISSN 1977-446X
DOI 10.2819/33366

PDF:
TT-AC-14-001-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-95033-80-1
ISSN 1977-4451
DOI 10.2819/33026

Cover photo © Guardia Costiera, 2013. All rights reserved.

DISCLAIMERS

This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used on the maps. The contents of open-source boxes are unverified and presented only to give context and media representation of irregular-migration phenomena.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2014 has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

Table of contents

Executive summary	#6
1. Introduction	#10
2. Methodology	#11
3. Situation at the external borders	#15
3.1. Before the border	#15
3.2. At the border	#20
3.3. After the border	#48
4. Environmental scan	#55
5. Outlook	#63
6. Statistical annex	#69



List of abbreviations used

ARA	Annual Risk Analysis
BCP	border-crossing point
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
CETI	<i>Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes</i> [Spanish Temporary Stay Centre for Immigrants]
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
CIREFI	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EAW	European Arrest Warrant
EBF	External Borders Fund
EB-RAN	Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EES	Entry/Exit System
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EPN	European Patrols Network
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
Eurodac	European Dactyloscopy
Europol	European Police Office
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
FRTD	Facilitated Rail Transit Document
FTD	Facilitated Transit Document
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GPS	Global Positioning System
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICSR	International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
ID	identity document
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	Internal Security Fund
JO	Joint Operation
JORA	Frontex Joint Operations Reporting Application
LBTA	local border traffic agreement
NGO	non-government organisation
OCG	organised crime groups
OLAF	European Anti-Fraud Office
PNR	Passenger Name Record

Q/Qtr	quarter of the year
RTP	Registered Traveller Programme
SAC	Schengen Associated Country
SCIFA	Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum
SIS II	Schengen Information System
THB	trafficking in human beings
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USD	United States dollar
VIN	Vehicle Identification Number
VIS	Visa Information System
VSN	visa sticker number



Executive summary

Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2014 presents a European summary of trends and developments along the external borders of the Member States of the EU. It focuses on describing current challenges that are likely to impact on operations coordinated along the external borders. It presents the latest update regarding the situation before the border, at the border and after the border.

Before the border

Data on visa issuance are not yet available for 2013, but the European Commission has released the data for 2012. In 2012, a total of 14 250 595 short-term uniform visas were issued, representing an increase of 13% compared to 2011, and a 51% increase compared to 2009, when 9 420 896 short-term uniform visas were issued. Most of the visas (59%) were issued in just three countries: the Russian Federation, which alone accounted for 42% of all visas issued in 2012, with nearly 6 million visas, as well as Ukraine (1.3 million, 9%) and China (1.25 million, 8%).

At the border

Passengers

Passenger flow is an indicator of the volume of checks that border guards have to perform. However, at European level, there is no systematic reporting on passenger flows by BCP, border section or as a total for the EU external borders. At the air border, data from Eurostat on extra-EU arrivals are the best approximation of the flow of passengers. At the air border, Eurostat data showed that intra-EU arrivals (460 million) were approximately four times larger than extra-EU arrivals (125 million) at main EU airports in 2012. Extra-EU

arrivals in 2012 showed a steady trend of +2% compared to 2011. The UK and Germany are the two Member States reporting the largest number of extra-EU arrivals, each reporting more than 20 million. The main two airports with the largest number of departures to the EU in 2012 were the Turkish airports of Istanbul Atatürk (IST) and Antalya Airport (AYT), which reached around 6 million passengers during the year.

At the land border, although data are limited, it can be assessed that between 2009 and 2013, passenger flows increased more rapidly at the land border than at the air border in the wake of visa liberalisation for the Western Balkan countries and the implementation of local border traffic agreements. It is now assumed that there are more passengers crossing at the land border than at the air border.

Refusals of entry and document fraud

According to the Schengen Borders Code, third countries nationals arriving at the external borders may be refused entry into the EU if not fulfilling all the entry conditions. Refusals of entry rose by 11% between 2012 and 2013, to 128 902. While most refusals of entry are reported from the land and air borders, in line with the distribution of passenger flows, the long-term trend is an increase at the land border due to increasing passenger flow. At the EU level, Russians ranked first for refusals of entry, followed by Ukrainians and Albanians.

The Eastern land border saw a large increase in refusals of entry issued to Russians of Chechen origin at the Polish-Belarusian land border between March and August 2013.



© Fotolia, 2014

The migrants showed up without visas and then applied for asylum. Later on, they also applied for asylum in Germany.

In the Western Balkans, visa liberalisation granted to citizens of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania increased both the passenger flow and the number of refusals of entry. Refusals of entry issued to nationals of the Western Balkan countries accounted for 18% of all refusals in the EU in 2013, while this share was only 9% back in 2010, i.e. before visa liberalisation. Thus, visa liberalisation resulted in more passengers checked at the borders. At the same time, passengers no longer requesting a visa were no longer screened by consulate authorities, thus increasing the responsibilities of the border-control authorities, which are now the only authorities to identify travellers who do not meet the criteria for travelling in the EU for a period of three months within a six-month period, as laid down in the legislation.

In 2013, there were around 9 800 detections of migrants using document fraud to illegally enter the EU or Schengen area. The use of fraudulently obtained (rather than forged) documents is becoming an increasingly common *modus operandi* at the border. This is because modern documents are getting more and more difficult to forge or reproduce. Indeed, detections of fraudulently obtained passports doubled in 2013 in comparison to 2012.

Illegal border-crossing

Detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU's external borders sharply increased between 2012 and 2013, from approximately 72 500 to 107 000, which represents an annual increase of 48%. While the annual increase is significant, the 2013 level is comparable to the totals reported by Member States in 2009 and 2010 (104 600 and 104 000, respectively), and is still lower than the total reported during the Arab Spring in 2011 (141 000). Apart from this rising trend, 2013 was characterised by three phenomena: a large increase in illegal border-crossings by Syrians, subsequently applying for asylum, on the Eastern Mediterranean route and in the Central Mediterranean; a steady flow of migrants departing from North Africa (Libya and Egypt) putting their life at risk to cross the Mediterranean Sea; and a sharp increase, mostly in January-June, in detections reported by Hungary at its land border with Serbia.

Most detections of illegal border-crossing were of Syrians, Eritreans, Afghans and Albanians, who together accounted for 52% of total detections (or 55 400). Syrians alone (25 500) represented almost a quarter of the total. Their detections at the EU border tripled between 2012 and 2013, reflecting the dire situation in Syria and the desperate plight of Syrian refugees. Syrians were by far the most common nationality to request international protection with 50 096 applications reported to the Frontex by Member States. This is nearly twice as much as the already very high number of applications submitted



by Syrians in 2012 and represented a significant increase in numbers for the EU.

In the Central Mediterranean area detections were low in the first quarter of 2013, but gradually increased starting from the second quarter to reach a peak in the third. By the end of the year, the annual total was 40 304 detections of illegal border-crossings. Most boats departed from Libya, where facilitators take advantage of weak government controls. Many migrants also departed from Egypt.

On the Eastern Mediterranean route, detections (24 800 in 2013) were at the lowest level reported since 2009, but this route still ranked second and accounted for nearly a quarter of all detections of illegal border-crossing to the EU. Compared to 2011 and 2012, the areas of detections also considerably changed and detections in the Eastern Aegean Sea were the largest, followed by detections along the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey.

Detections of illegal border-crossing strongly increased on the Western Balkan route, from about 6 400 in 2012 to 19 500 in 2013. Most of the detections were reported in February-July 2013 at the Hungarian-Serbian land border. Migrants detected in that period for illegal-border crossing immediately applied for asylum and subsequently absconded to continue their journey to other Member States.

In the Western Mediterranean area and on the Western African route, detections of illegal border-crossing remained fairly stable in 2013, with 6 800 and nearly 300 detections respectively. In the Western Mediterranean, nearly two-thirds of the detections were reported at the land border in Ceuta and Melilla. This is associated with more effective prevention of departures at sea by the Moroccan authorities and enhanced prevention

measures in the Mediterranean Sea, including the EPN JO Indalo. Several times in 2013, the Spanish authorities warned of the permanent threat of migration to Melilla.

At the eastern land border, detections of illegal border-crossing remained at a low level, at 1 300, or 1.2% of the EU total.

After the border

In 2013, there were about 345 000 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which represented a generally stable trend compared to the previous year. This is consistent with a stable, if slightly declining long-term trend over the past five years.

Based on the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) data for 2013, the number of asylum applications submitted in the EU continued to increase. Preliminary data indicate an overall increase of about 28%, totalling 353 991 applications in 2013. Syrians were by far the most common nationality to request international protection, nearly double the already very high number of applications submitted in 2012. More than two-thirds of all Syrian applications were submitted in Sweden, Germany and Bulgaria.

Between 2012 and 2013, detections of facilitators decreased by 11%, totalling about 6 900 in 2013. This decrease may be in part due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and using document fraud to enter the EU, which allows facilitators to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompany migrants.

In 2013, there was a steady trend of about 159 000 third-country nationals effectively returned to third countries. This total does not include readmissions between Member States. As in 2012, the UK and Greece were the Member States conducting the largest number of returns.

Conclusions – Outlook

The best forecasts – those likely to materialise and have a direct bearing on the situation at the external border – spell an increased workload for border-control authorities as of October 2014, when all Schengen Member States will be required to be able to carry out VIS fingerprint verifications at all border-crossing points (BCPs) and also to issue VIS visas with biometrics at the border when necessary. This additional mandatory task will come in addition to increased passengers flows, in particular at the land border, due to visa liberalisation and a general increase in people's mobility worldwide. Increased workload and responsibilities for border-control authorities come at a time of budget constraints.

Looking ahead, everything points to a heightened likelihood of large numbers of illegal border-crossings into the EU and an increased number of migrants in need of assistance from search and rescue operations but also in terms of provision of international protection, in particular in the southern section of

the external border, on the Eastern Mediterranean route and the Central Mediterranean route. Many migrants who crossed illegally are expected to continue making secondary movements within the EU.

Most risks associated with document fraud were assessed as high. Indeed, document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU. These risks are common to nearly all Member States, as they are associated with passenger flows and border checks, which are a specific expertise of border-control authorities. Most cases of fraud are expected to involve EU travel documents and there are indications of a shift away from the use of passports towards less sophisticated documents such as ID cards and residence permits.

The risks associated with the abuse of legal channels are often assessed as high as they are common and widespread phenomena. Although no reliable measurements exist in this respect, such abuse probably represents the easiest and most common *modus operandi* used by persons staying illegally in the EU.



1. Introduction

The Frontex Annual Risk Analysis (ARA) 2014 presents a European summary of trends and developments along the external borders of the Member States of the EU. This analysis is based on information provided to Frontex by the EU Member States and Schengen Associated countries throughout 2013, as well as information collected during Frontex Joint Operations and from open sources.

The analysis starts with an overview of the situation before the border based on data for Schengen uniform visas. It then looks at the situation along the external border, based on trends in regular passenger flows, detections of illegal border-crossing, clandestine entries and refusals of entry. Finally, the report provides an update on the situation regarding persons staying illegally in the EU and third-country nationals returned.

Frontex operational activities aim at strengthening border security by ensuring the coordination of Member States' actions in the implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the external borders. The coordination of operational ac-

tivities also contributes to better allocation of Member States' resources and protection of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The ARA 2014 concentrates on the current scope of Frontex operational activities, which focus on irregular migration at the external borders of EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. In line with the concept of integrated border management (IBM), border management should not be limited to controlling illegal migration but also cover threats to the EU internal security. Thus a full section is dedicated to the analysis of cross-border crime.

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) would like to express its gratitude to all members of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) in Member States for their efforts in providing data and information, as well as to Europol, European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Commission, which have contributed to the ARA 2014, and to all Frontex colleagues involved in the preparation of this report.



© Frontex, 2012

2. Methodology

Data exchange

A coherent and full analysis of the risks affecting security at the external borders requires, above all, the adoption of common indicators. Consistent monitoring of these indicators will then allow effective measures to be taken on the ground. The analysis will need to identify the risks that arise at the external borders themselves and those that arise in third countries.

The backbone of the ARA 2014 is the monthly statistics exchanged between Member States within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). This regular data-exchange exercise was launched in September 2007 and then refined in 2008. Thanks to the FRAN members' efforts, a much larger statistical coverage was achieved in 2011, focusing on seven key indicators: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing, (2) refusals of entry, (3) detections of illegal stay, (4) asylum applications, (5) detections of facilitators, (6) detections of forged documents and (7) return decisions and effective returns.

Following the closing of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI) working group in April 2010, most of its mandate, in particular the aspects concerning the exchange of data, were transferred to the FRAN. Most indicators

monitored by CIREFI had already been part of the monthly data exchange among FRAN members and only the statistics on returns had to be added as the seventh indicator of the regular data exchange as of January 2011.

In 2011, the original FRAN indicator on forged documents was updated to enable the analysis of complex *modi operandi*. Following a successful pilot study, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed in early 2012 to oversee the exchange of a much more comprehensive and detailed indicator on document fraud, including the abuse of genuine documents.

Member States were not requested to answer specific questions in support of this analysis. Rather, bi-monthly analytical reports and incident reports of Member States routinely collected within the FRAN and Member States' contributions to several Tailored Risk Analyses produced in 2013 were used as important sources of information, especially as regards the analysis of routes and *modi operandi*.

Open-source information was also effectively exploited, especially in identifying the main push and pull factors for irregular migration to the EU. Among others, these sources included



reports issued by government agencies, international and non-governmental organisations, as well as official EU reports, such as the European Commission's reports on third countries, and mainstream news agencies.

In addition, Frontex organised an Annual Analytical Review to consolidate the risk analyses presented in the FRAN Quarterlies for 2013 and also to gather knowledge on likely risks of irregular migration at the EU's external borders. Participants of the FRAN were invited in January 2014 to review and comment on the risks identified at the external borders during a one-day exercise.

The data exchange was overseen by Frontex involving national border-control authorities. Data were categorised by border type (land, air and sea) and those on land borders were additionally categorised by border section with neighbouring third countries.

The data exchanged within the FRAN are compiled and analysed on a quarterly basis. Priority is given to the use of data for management purposes and to its fast sharing among Member State border-control authorities. Member States' data processed by Frontex are not treated as official statistics and thus may occasionally vary from those officially published by national authorities.

Throughout 2013, some FRAN members performed backdated updates of their 2012 statistics. These updates have been accounted for in this document and so some data presented herein may differ from the data presented a year ago in the Annual Risk Analysis 2013.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders, if any, between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the

Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders, if any, between the Schengen Member States and Member States not yet part of the Schengen area (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Cyprus) or Member States that have opted-out from Schengen (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals per airport.

Quality of available data

Consistent with other law-enforcement indicators, variations in administrative data related to border control depend on several factors. In this case, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry are both functions of the amount of effort spent detecting irregular migrants and the actual flow of irregular migrants to the EU. For example, increased detections of illegal border-crossing might be due to a real increase in the flow of irregular migrants or may in fact be an outcome of more resources made available to detect them. In exceptional cases, increased resources may produce a rise in reported detections while effectively masking an actual decrease in the flow of migrants, resulting from a strong deterrent effect.

Conservative estimates of the number of irregular migrants within the EU vary between 3 and 6 million, according to the results of Clandestino, an EU-sponsored project implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Other estimates put the figure of irregular

migrants at 8 million, of which 80% are staying inside the Schengen area, half of them having originally entered it legally. However, there is currently no estimate of the annual flow of persons entering and staying illegally in the EU.

Information on national-level resources for border-control authorities and their allocation is currently only partially known. These data are provided by Member States themselves either within the Schengen evaluation mechanism or within the External Borders Fund (EBF) reporting. Without systematic and reliable information on resources allocated to border control and without estimates of irregular migration flows, it is not possible to assess the performance and impact of the border controls put in place and the analyses of the situation at the EU's external borders are limited to descriptive statistics of the administrative data provided by Member States.

As highlighted in the Schengen Catalogue, variation in regular passenger flow is an important factor to be taken into account in the allocation of border-control resources. However, regular flows of passengers across the EU's external borders are currently not recorded systematically. Some approximations have been arrived at by using availa-

ble Eurostat data on passenger flows at the air borders and relying on publicly available data on passenger flows across the land borders received from national border-control authorities.

Data on the number of EU visas issued and their places of issue would improve the characterisation of third-country passenger flows. However, this information, which is collected within the Council's Visa Working Party and published by the European Commission, is not yet available for 2013. For the purpose of the ARA, data from 2008 to 2012 are discussed as an introduction to the general situation at the borders.

Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)

A key development in the CIRAM 2.0 update released in 2011 was the adoption of a management approach to risk analysis that defines risk as a function of the threat, vulnerability and impact. Such an approach endeavours to reflect the spirit of the Schengen Borders Code and the Frontex Regulation, both of which emphasise risk analysis as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources within the constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of equipment.



Table 1. Summary of FRAN indicators

FRAN indicator	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% change on prev. year
Illegal entries between BCPs	104 599	104 060	141 051	72 437	107 365	48
Clandestine entries at BCPs	296	242	282	599	599	0
Facilitators	9 171	8 629	6 957	7 720	6 902	-11
Illegal stay	412 125	353 077	350 948	344 928	344 888	0
Refusals of entry ¹	113 029	108 651	118 277	116 202	128 902	11
Applications for asylum ²	219 814	203 880	254 054	276 308	353 991	28
Persons using fraudulent documents ³	:	:	5 289	7 882	9 804	24
Return decisions issued ⁴	:	:	231 385	269 949	224 305	17
Effective returns	:	:	149 045	158 955	160 699	1.0
Other indicators						
Issued visas (source: European Commission)	11 203 043	10 241 000	11 842 761	13 510 250	:	n.a.
Passenger flow ⁴	660 000 000	675 000 000	701 000 000	:	:	n.a.

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 10 February 2014

¹ In addition, Spain reported refusals of entry in Ceuta and Melilla, which totalled: 492 742 in 2008; 374 845 in 2009; 280 625 in 2010; and 215 021 in 2011.

² For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications.

³ Decisions not available for France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden

⁴ Data for France are not available for 2011 and 2012.

⁴ Figures provided by Member States to the European Commission in the framework of the EU External Borders Fund".

:

n.a. not applicable



© Frontex, 2012

3. Situation at the external borders

3.1. Before the border

Issuance of Schengen visas

Visa policy acts as a form of pre-entry procedure to ensure that third-country nationals comply with entry requirements, which helps to prevent irregular migration. In this respect, particularly important in preventing subsequent illegal stay is the role of consular offices in third countries determining whether a third-country national should be granted a visa or not. Member States have introduced a variety of specific measures in their visa-issuing procedures to tackle irregular migration, which includes the assessment of the willingness to return, the training of personnel at embassies and consulates, and cooperation and information exchange with other entities and Member States. Other preventive measures include the use of biometric data in the visa application process and the identification of specific categories of migrants who might misuse their visa and raising the awareness in third countries about the consequences of making fraudulent applications.

The Community Code on Visas, which entered into force in April 2010, sets out the common requirements for issuing transit and short-term visas to enter the territory of Member States. There are currently over 100 nationalities that require a visa to enter the EU, covering more than 80% of non-EU

population of the world. Nevertheless, about 1 billion nationals from approximately 40 third countries do not require an EU visa. These include Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the USA. The list of countries whose nationals require a visa to travel to the UK or Ireland differs slightly from other EU Member States. As indicated in the Visa Code, statistical data are an important means of monitoring migratory movements and can serve as an efficient management tool.

Recent changes to Schengen regulations have seen a simplification of the visa regime. Schengen Member States now issue only three types of visa: (1) airport transit visa (A) – valid only for airport transit, does not entitle the holder to leave the transit zone of the airport; (2) short-stay visa (C) – valid for stays of no more than 90 days per period of 180 days; (3) national long-stay visas (D) and residence permits. The data include visas issued by the Schengen Associated Countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), but do not include those issued by Croatia, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria*, which have not yet joined the Schengen area, nor visas issued by the UK and Ireland, which are not part of the Schengen area.


Data on visa issuance by Member States and third countries of issuance are not yet available for 2013, but the European Commission, through its Directorate-General Home Affairs, has released the data for 2012. Visa

* Data on visa issued by Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria were reported by the Commission until 2011, but stopped to be reported as of 2012.



Figure 1. **Over the past few years, the largest share of short-term uniform visas (mostly multiple-entry) have been issued to Russians**

Short-term uniform visas issued in 2007–2012, by nationality



Source: *Overview of Schengen Visa Statistics 2009–2012*, European Commission Directorate-General Home Affairs, 2013

Information System (VIS) data are collected on the basis of the place of application rather than the citizenship of the visa applicant. Thus, for instance, applications made in the Russian Federation do not necessarily represent only Russian nationals. However, for the purpose of the following overview, the country where the visas were delivered was used as the most suitable approximation of the visas issued to citizens of that country. Visas broken down by nationalities are available at the national level, where they can be used for operational purposes.

In 2012, a total of 14 250 595 short-term uniform visas were issued, representing an increase of 13% compared to 2011 and a 51% increase compared to 2009, when 9 420 896 short-term uniform visas were issued. This increase is even more remarkable taking into account that in 2010 and 2011, five Western Balkan countries (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina) saw their visa requirements to enter the EU lifted, leading to a landslide decrease in the number of visas issued in these five countries from 688 531 in 2009 to only 13 893 in 2012.

In fact, most of the visas (59%) were issued in just three countries: the Russian Federation, which alone accounted for 42% of all visas issued in 2012, with nearly 6 million visas, as well as Ukraine (1.3 million, 9%) and China (1.25 million, 8%). There are, however, important differences between these three countries in the purpose of travel and frequency of trips. Multiple-entry visas accounted for 49% of all visas issued in the Russian Federation but only for 13% of those issued in China. Indeed, many Chinese applied for short-term visas as part of their tourist package in the EU. According to the World Tourism Organization, China is now the leading nation in terms of tourism expenditure worldwide and this trend will further consolidate.

Consistent with the countries where visas were most issued, seven out of ten Schengen states' consulates receiving most short-term visas applications in 2012 were in the Russian Federation, and the remaining three in Ukraine, China and Belarus. These ten consulates received 31% of all Schengen visa applications.

In 2012, the Schengen Member States reporting the issuance of most short-term visas were France (2.1 million worldwide), Germany

Table 2. **The number of visas issued in the Russian Federation increased significantly for many Member States between 2011 and 2012**

Number of visas issued by Member States and third countries of issuance (top ten)

Visa for EU/Schengen country	Third country	2011	2012	% change	% share in 2012
Finland	Russian Federation	1 182 876	1 313 864	11%	9.2%
Spain	Russian Federation	699 815	920 490	32%	6.5%
Greece	Russian Federation	513 223	655 887	28%	4.6%
Italy	Russian Federation	579 492	631 120	8.9%	4.4%
Poland	Ukraine	369 893	447 813	21%	3.1%
Germany	Russian Federation	375 103	397 271	5.9%	2.8%
France	Russian Federation	339 253	394 784	16%	2.8%
Czech Republic	Russian Federation	339 083	383 441	13%	2.7%
Poland	Belarus	244 037	291 822	20%	2.0%
France	China	237 679	277 099	17%	1.9%
Other		8 629 796	8 537 004	-1.1%	60%
Grand Total		13 510 250	14 250 595	5.5%	100%

Source: *Overview Of Schengen Visa Statistics 2009-2012*, European Commission Directorate-General Home Affairs, 2013

(1.7 million), Spain (1.6 million), Italy (1.6 million) and Finland (1.4 million, mainly in the Russian Federation). These five Member States issued 60% of all uniform short-term visas.

Also in 2012, 138 144 short-term visas were issued at BCPs. The BCPs with most visas issued were the seaports of Rotterdam, Barcelona and Antwerp.

Table 2 shows the number of visas issued by the top ten Member States in specific third countries. The table clearly illustrates a large increase in the number of visas issued in the Russian Federation by several Member States.

Visa refusals

The consulate in charge of dealing with visa applications assesses the applicant's compliance with entry conditions, the risk of irregular immigration, the applicant's intention to leave the territory of the Member State before the expiry of the visa and the risk the applicant presenting a risk to the security or public health of the Member State.

As a result, some visa applications are refused. There are no data on the reasons for refusal of visa applications, but the overall visa refusal rate may be determined per third country where visas are issued. Combined with additional information and tailored to operational needs, the rate of visa refusals in consulates may be used by border-control authorities to determine the countries of origin presenting the highest risk of irregular migration.


On average, 4.8% of C visa applications were refused in 2012 (down from 5.5% in 2011). There are, however, important differences between Member States (Belgium refuses 16% of applications, while Lithuania and Latvia refuse around 1% each) and between third countries (while in Algeria 27% and in Iran 18% of applications are refused, the refusal rate in the Russian Federation, Belarus and South Africa is below 1%).

Regarding the risk of clandestine entry, with no reliable measurements in place, the extent of the phenomenon is probably underestimated.



Figure 2. **The highest rate of visa refusals in 2013 was recorded for nationals from Maghreb countries and Iran**

Visa refusal rate for top 20 countries where visas were issued in 2013



Source: *Overview of Schengen Visa Statistics 2009–2012*, European Commission Directorate-General Home Affairs, 2013

At the borders, border controls consist of border checks and border surveillance. 'Border checks' means the checks carried out at border crossing points, to ensure that persons, including their means of transport and the objects in their possession, may be authorised to enter the territory of the Member States or authorised to leave it. EU nationals are subject to minimal checks, while third-country nationals, whether they require a visa or not, are subject to thorough checks. Border checks represent a significant part of the work of border control authorities and are directly linked to the flow of passengers.

It is during border checks that a decision, based on a procedure set in the Schengen Borders Code, may be taken by border control authorities to refuse entry to third-country nationals. It is also during border checks that document fraud is detected. These two aspects, trends in refusals of entry and document frauds, are analysed based on data sent by Member States to the FRAN.

'Border surveillance' means the surveillance of borders between border crossing points and the surveillance of border crossing points

outside the fixed opening hours, in order to prevent persons from circumventing border checks. It is during surveillance that border control authorities detected illegal border-crossings. These detections are the most visible part of border controls and the ones that are often reported by the media.


Detections of migrants trying to avoid border checks by hiding in vehicles is assimilated as a particular attempt to circumvent border checks and referred to as clandestine entries.

As a corollary to strengthened surveillance and checks along the external borders, border-control authorities are confronted with the detection of cross-border crimes such as trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking and the smuggling of excise goods, as well as with detections of cross-border crime committed on exit, like the smuggling of stolen assets, in particular vehicles. Thus, the analysis of cross-border crime forms an integral part of the description of the situation along the external borders.

Finally, the analysis of asylum applications for international protection is also impor-

Figure 3. As most passengers enter the EU through main land BCPs, passenger flow through air BCPs currently accounts for less than half of total passenger traffic to the EU

Main land and air border-crossing points at the external border





tant for border-control authorities because they are often the first authorities asylum seekers meet, before being referred to asylum authorities.

3.2. At the border

3.2.1. Regular passenger flow

Passenger flow is an indicator of the volume of checks that border guards have to perform, relative to the number of border guards. Citizens enjoying free movement are subject to minimum checks, while third-country nationals, whether they require visas or not, are subject to more thorough checks, as defined by the Schengen Borders Code. Hence, the nature and volume of passenger flow determine to a large extent the planning and allocation of resources for border checks.

Passenger flow data also prove useful in analysing indicators of irregular migration, in particular refusals of entry and detections of document fraud. Indeed, differences in the rates of refusals of entry to overall passenger flow may help identify best practices and eventually ensure that checks are per-

formed in a harmonised way across the BCPs of the EU. Similarly, detections of document fraud are most effectively analysed in connection with passenger flows and detection rates, rather than the sheer number of detections, and provide the most useful tool for assessing border checks and flows of document fraudsters.

At European level there is no systematic reporting on passenger flows by BCP, border section or as a total for the EU's external border. Member States reported data on passenger flow in the framework of the European Border Fund (EBF), showing a total of 701 million crossings (entries and exits) in 2011, excluding the UK and Ireland, which do not participate in the EBF, and including crossings between non-Schengen and Schengen Member States (France-UK, Belgium-UK, Romania-Hungary). This total consists of 384 million passengers crossing at the air border, 233 million at the land border and 84 million at the sea border. However, the total for the air border represents all passenger flows, including passengers from EU countries. Eurostat provides data on air passenger flows (EU nationals and third-country nationals) coming only from third countries, which totalled 125 million in 2011, including the UK and Ireland. The EBF total for sea border-crossing appears very large, but probably also includes crossings between Member States. Given these uncertainties, it is difficult to estimate the EU total passenger flow from third countries that could usefully be analysed against the number of refusals of entry and detections of fraudulent documents.

As traveller numbers continue to rise, it can be expected that the current infrastructure at BCPs will have greater difficulties in dealing with increased throughput. The dual objective of facilitating travel and maintaining security requires the introduction of new approaches and innovative solutions to border management.

Table 3. Arrivals from third countries at EU air borders (arrival airports)

Arrivals reported by main EU arrival airports on flights departing from third countries

Airport	2011	2012	% change 2012 vs. 2011
London Heathrow (LHR)	19 134 909	18 960 639	-0.9%
Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG)	13 166 320	13 637 115	3.6%
Frankfurt am Main (FRA)	11 948 604	12 391 125	3.7%
Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS)	8 888 934	8 817 924	-0.8%
Madrid Barajas (MAD)	5 360 402	5 173 811	-3.5%
Munich (MUC)	4 495 110	4 657 121	3.6%
Zurich (ZRH)	3 436 247	3 687 037	7.3%
London Gatwick (LGW)	3 130 434	3 334 359	6.5%
Rome Fiumicino (FCO)	3 903 380	2 964 920	-24%
Brussels (BRU)	2 187 111	2 578 640	18%
Others	38 318 765	39 093 675	2.0%
Total	113 970 216	115 296 366	1.2%

Source: Eurostat avia_par dataset as of 7 January 2014

Table 4. **Arrivals from third countries at EU air borders (departure airports)**

Arrivals by main third-country departure airports on flights from third countries to the EU

Departure airport	2011	2012	Share in total	Top EU destinations
Istanbul Atatürk (IST)	5 107 868	6 065 289	5.3%	Heathrow 7% Frankfurt am Main 7%
Antalya Civ-Mil (AYT)	6 014 437	5 728 800	5.0%	Duesseldorf 8% Schiphol 6%
Dubai International (DXB)	4 962 073	5 461 719	4.7%	Heathrow 19% Charles de Gaulle 8%
New York John F. Kennedy International (JFK)	5 206 849	5 177 789	4.5%	Heathrow 28% Charles de Gaulle 14%
Tel-Aviv Ben Gurion Airport (TLV)	3 438 250	3 275 706	2.8%	Charles de Gaulle 11% Heathrow 9%
Moscow Sheremetyevo (SVO)	3 057 744	3 247 421	2.8%	Charles de Gaulle 12% Schiphol 6%
Newark Liberty International (EWR)	2 967 770	2 817 646	2.4%	Heathrow 21% Frankfurt am Main 8%
Moscow Domodedovo (DME)	2 301 468	2 590 872	2.2%	Heathrow 10% München 10%
Singapore Changi (SIN)	2 073 009	2 250 750	2.0%	Heathrow 38% Frankfurt am Main 21%
Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD)	2 185 108	2 094 876	1.8%	Heathrow 28% Frankfurt am Main 16%
Other	76 655 640	76 585 498	66%	
Total	113 970 216	115 296 366	100%	

Source: Eurostat avia_par dataset as of 7 January 2014

Air borders

At the air border, Member State border-control authorities do not collect data on passengers going through border checks in a systematic way. Some Member States have systems in place that record the number and nationality of the passengers in detail, but most Member States do not directly collect detailed statistics but rely on information provided by air carriers. One of the main difficulties in estimating the flow of passengers through the external borders at the air border is that passengers coming from third countries and passengers coming from non-Schengen Member States go through the same booths and so there is no way to distinguish the two flows.

At the air border, data from Eurostat on extra-EU arrivals are the best approximation of the flow of passengers, but this flow does not

correspond to the total flow of passengers going through border checks as it does not take into account the flow between Schengen and non-Schengen Member States.

Eurostat data showed that intra-EU arrivals (460 million) were approximately four times larger than extra-EU arrivals (125 million) at main EU airports in 2012. Extra-EU arrivals in 2012 showed a steady trend of +2% compared to 2011. The UK and Germany are the two Member States reporting the largest number of extra-EU arrivals, each reporting more than 20 million. France follows with 18 million extra-EU arrivals. Together, the UK, Germany and France account for 61% of all extra-EU arrivals.

In 2012, the largest numbers of extra-EU arrivals were reported from London Heathrow (LHR) with more than 18 million passengers, followed by Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG)

Table 5. **Arrivals from third countries at EU air borders (most increasing departure airports)**

Arrivals by main increases for the combination of EU and third-country partner airports

Departure country	Arrival country	Departure airport	Arrival airport	2011	2012	% Total	% Change
Ukraine	Italy	Kyiv	Treviso	9 973	37 841	0.03%	279%
Russian Fed.	Italy	Vnukovo	Federico Fellini	9 338	22 231	0.02%	138%
UAE	Denmark	Dubai	Copenhagen	44 279	102 632	0.09%	132%
Belarus	Bulgaria	Minsk	Burgas	11 737	25 511	0.02%	117%
Russian Fed.	Estonia	Sheremetyevo	Tallinn	21 528	46 080	0.04%	114%
Total				113 970 216	115 296 366		

Source: Eurostat avia_par dataset as of 7 January 2013

airport (13 million) and Frankfurt am Main (FRA) airport (12 million).

Extra-EU arrivals by air demonstrate a clear seasonal pattern with many more passengers arriving in the summer holiday period. In the light of the total 2012 data for 27 EU Member States, during the first months of the year the passenger air flow is around 11 million passengers per month, followed by a steady increase in the number of passengers during the months of June and July, reaching a peak in August, with approximately 17 million passengers. After this time, the number of passengers starts to gradually fall off over the subsequent months, reaching its low in November and December, at around 10 million passengers. There is thus an increase of nearly 70% between the month with the smallest flow and the month with the largest flow.

Third-country airports of departure to the EU

The main two airports with the largest number of departures to the EU in 2012 were the Turkish airports of Istanbul Atatürk (IST) and Antalya Airport (AYT), which reached around 6 million passengers during the year. Dubai International Airport (DXB), with an increasing trend since 2009, and New York John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) also ranked top reaching more than 5 million


passengers in 2012. Other airports located in countries such as the Russian Federation, Israel and the USA accounted for a significant volume of passengers in 2012. The flights departing from the Turkish airports and from the USA had the airports of Düsseldorf (DUS) and London Heathrow (LHR) as main destinations.

The main increases in regular air passenger flow between 2011 and 2012

The route with the highest increase from 2011 to 2012 on extra-EU flights runs from Ukraine to Italy, with a sharp increase of passengers on the route between the Ukrainian airport in Kyiv (KBP) and the Italian airport of Treviso (TSF), in the north of Italy (+279%). There was also a large increase on the route connecting Moscow Vnukovo (VKO) and the Italian airport of Federico Fellini International Airport (RMI) in Rimini (+138%). Although the total number of passengers is relatively low, the development of new air routes is important to follow because it requires border-control authorities to get acquainted with new passenger profiles, including in some cases updating their knowledge on travel documents that were not commonly encountered before the development of these new routes. Cooperation with other EU airports with similar third-country departure airports speeds up the learning process.

Figure 4. Arrivals from third countries are higher during the summer holiday period (June to September) reaching the peak in August with 17 million passengers coming to the EU from a third country

Passengers arriving to the EU from third countries in 2012



Source: Eurostat

Since 2009, the route from Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport (SVO) to Lennart Meri Airport in Tallinn (TLL) has also shown a continuous growth, with around 46 000 passengers in 2012, resulting in a 114% increase from 2011 to 2012.

Dubai International Airport (DXB) also ranked top among the airports with the highest increase in passengers on flights coming to the EU. From 2011 to 2012 there were almost three times more passengers flying from Dubai to Copenhagen Airport (CPH) in Denmark. To a lesser extent, the number of passengers flying from Dubai to Geneva (GVA) also showed a strong increase of 89% in 2012.

Land borders

Information available on passenger traffic at the external land borders of the EU is scarce. Although it appears fundamental to risk analysis, policy making and resource allocation, not all Member States count every traveller crossing land borders and the practices for counting travellers and vehicles vary considerably among Member States.

The only reliable comparative data available come from the SCIFA data collection exercise

conducted for one week, from 31 August to 6 September 2009, which offers some evidence of the importance of cross-border flows at land borders.* Land BCPs follow air borders closely in terms of the total volume of entries and exits. However, between 2009 and 2013, passenger flows increased more rapidly at the land border than at the air border in the wake of visa liberalisation for Western Balkan countries and the implementation of local border traffic agreements. It is now assumed that there are more passengers crossing at the land border than at the air border.


The SCIFA data collection exercise also revealed, at least in 2009, a different composition of passenger flow at the land and at the air border, with a larger proportion of third-country nationals requiring thorough checks on entry, in line with the Schengen Borders Code, at the land border (53% of the flow) than at the air border (40%). This variation is likely larger in 2013, representing a significant load on the external land borders.

Importantly, the proportion of border-crossings by third-country nationals to the total number of entries/exits varies widely among Member States. For example, in 2010 in Poland this ratio was almost three times greater

* Best Practices in border checks at EU land Border Crossing Points, Frontex, June 2013

Figure 5. **LBTAs contributed to an increase in the total number of passengers crossing the external border**

Local border traffic agreements between eastern border Member States and neighbouring countries



than in Hungary, while the estimated volume of total traffic in these two countries was comparable (see Tab. 6).

The SCIFA exercise also concluded that road BCPs account for a much larger proportion of traveller traffic (around 95% of all border-crossings) than rail BCPs. It is reasonable to assume that there are significant seasonal differences in the flows at land BCPs across the EU, considering, for example, much larger flows during the summer holiday period.

Land BCP check practices and land BCPs themselves vary widely. This sets them apart from air borders, as airports constitute a controlled environment where practices can be

more easily standardised. Moreover, the rate at which traffic flows across land BCPs are determined not only by Member States but also by the practices of neighbouring third countries. Bilateral cooperation is thus fundamental to facilitating transit. Unlike at the air border, early warnings at land BCPs are rarely available, which limits the ability of border management authorities to allocate resources in advance. Finally, land borders can be subject to massive or emergency flows, for which contingency planning is necessary.

Local border traffic agreements

A local border traffic agreement (LBTA) provides for the issuance of permits entitling border residents to cross an external land border under the local border traffic regime. This must be done in compliance with the relevant provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals.

In general, LBTA permits do not include other biometric identifiers besides the photograph of the holder, although some Member States (e.g. Poland and Slovakia) appear to be considering the option of adding supplementary biometrics in the future. In light of the mandatory introduction of fingerprint checks in the VIS at land borders from October 2014, a number of questions arise. Assuming that visa policy remains the same and the citizens of a number of neighbouring countries continue to be visa-required, it remains uncertain whether LBTA card holders will be exempt from the requirement to provide their fingerprints. If so, then it is likely that LBTA cards might become more popular, but also more targeted by organised criminal groups as a way of avoiding the fingerprint check. If no, then all Member States' national LBTA card issuance systems will have to be reorganised to include fingerprints on the card.


3.2.2. Refusals of entry

According to the Schengen Borders Code, third countries nationals arriving at the external borders may be refused entry into the EU if not fulfilling all the entry conditions. There are nine reasons to refuse entry and they are all listed in the Schengen Borders Code. The Schengen Borders Code also describes the standard refusal form to be issued to each person refused entry into the EU.

Refusals of entry rose by 11% between 2012 and 2013, to 128 902. While most refusals of entry are reported from the land and air borders, in line with the distribution of passenger flows, the long-term trend is an increase at the land border due to increasing passenger flow. At the EU level, Russians ranked first for refusals of entry, followed by Ukrainians and Albanians.

At the land borders, most refusals of entry (more than 50 000) were reported at the eastern land borders, in particular at the land border between Poland and Belarus. Most of these refusals concerned citizens of the

Figure 6. In line with growing passenger flow, refusals of entry increased most at the land border




Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014

Russian Federation of Chechen origin who applied for asylum after being refused entry due to lack of visa. Soon afterwards they continued towards Germany, where they applied for asylum again. Neither Germany nor Poland granted them asylum and therefore most stayed illegally within the EU. This *modus operandi* was mostly reported between March and April 2013. However, even after

Figure 7. Russians increased most due to a large number of refusals of entry issued at the land border between Poland and Belarus, where they also applied for asylum. Most were of Chechen origin

Top increases and decreases in refusals of entry between 2012 and 2013, by nationality




Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014



Figure 8. **Refusals of entry to nationals from Western Balkan countries with visa-free status increased most at the land border**

Refusals of entry issued to nationals from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in 2009–2013, by border type



Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014

April 2013, the monthly number of refusals of entry to Russians at the Polish-Belarusian land border remained larger than in the corresponding months of 2012. The reasons behind this sudden and large increase are not fully understood. There was no particular security or political incidents in Chechnya immediately before or during that period, and the economic situation, while relatively poor, did not change drastically either. This sudden flow could have been triggered by rumours spreading in Chechnya about Germany granting asylum to Russians of Chechen origin.

In the Western Balkans, visa liberalisation granted to citizens of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania increased both passenger flow and refusals of entry. In terms of volume, the increase was much stronger at the land border, from 7 146 in 2009 to 19 275 in 2013, than at the air border, from 1 109 to 4 431, reflecting the preferred choice of transport for most Western Balkan nationals travelling to the EU. Refusals of entry to Western Balkan country nationals with the visa-free status accounted for 20% of all refusals in the EU in 2013, while this proportion was only of 13% in 2010, i.e. before visa liberalisation. This highlights the increased workload of border-control authorities.

3.2.3. Document fraud

Document fraud involving either authentic or false documents is an important challenge for border control and internal security, as it allows migrants in irregular or unlawful situations not only to enter the territory of a Member State, but then also to move freely within the Schengen area and to non-Schengen EU Member States.

It is generally recognised that document fraud poses significant risks: Individuals assuming a bogus identity and operating in the black market seriously affect internal security and undermine international criminal investigations, as well as national social systems and the ability of any state to effectively manage and protect its legitimate communities. Document fraud also creates strong links to organised crime groups (OCGs) and generates their proceeds, because modern documents require more sophisticated and expensive techniques to produce quality forgeries.

Document fraud can involve the use of both authentic and false documents and can be classified in the following four categories:

False documents:

- forgeries – previously authentic documents that have been tampered with or ‘falsified’;
- counterfeits – entirely manufactured documents made to resemble originals

Authentic documents:

- fraudulently obtained documents – documents that were issued based on fraudulent applications or supporting documents;
- impostors – documents being used by an unauthorised user (look-alikes).

The abuse of EU passports is of particular concern because migrants using them may be subject to less rigorous checks at the external border, and because documents may

also be used to access social systems or be subsequently reused by other migrants attempting illegal entry. Another major issue relates to fraudulently obtained visas, which raise particular challenges for first-line officers to detect, especially given linguistic differences and the fact that migrants are not required to cross the external border of the Member State that issued the visa. Some of these issues will be addressed by the Visa Information System (VIS), which will conclude its staggered roll-out by the end of 2014.

Modern, sophisticated documents are more difficult to falsify or reproduce than documents issued some years ago. As a result there has been a consistent move towards the abuse of genuine documents (which do not require forgery techniques) either by using someone else's document, i.e. acting as impostors or by obtaining genuine documents based on fraudulent applications. Many experts suggest that a strengthening of registration and issuing procedures, coupled with more sophisticated and standardised breeder documents are needed to overcome the growing threat of the abuse of genuine documents.

The European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network

To address the need for standardised information exchange in the field of detected fraudulent documents, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed in early 2012 to serve as a platform for information exchange among Member States. Overseen by Frontex, during 2013 some 29 Member States/Schengen Associated Countries met to exchange information on several occasions and maintained and developed the detailed and complex monthly data-exchange covering all detections of document fraud at the external border and on all international flights. Depersonalised data on document



© Frontex, 2012


Figure 9. **Modern documents are ever more sophisticated and thus more difficult to falsify and reproduce yet fraudulently obtained visas may be particularly hard to detect by first-line officers**

fraudsters were exchanged detailing type of document and routes taken.

According to EDF-RAN data, in 2013 there were nearly 10 000 detections of migrants using fraudulent documents to attempt illegal entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which is an increase of 24% compared to the previous year (Fig. 10). Some of this increase was due to more countries par-

Figure 10. **Reported detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries increased by 24% between 2012 and 2013**

Detections of document fraudsters detected on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, by border type in 2009–2013. Data for France are only available for 2013




Source: EDF-RAN data as of 10 February 2014



Figure 11. **The proportion of passport fraud that involved authentic passports at the external border increased between 2012 and 2013 (Impostors = green, Fraudulently obtained = blue)**

Pie charts showing the proportion of different types of passport fraud detected in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Data restricted to entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries; authentic documents containing fraudulent documents were excluded; data from France were only available for 2013



Source: EDF-RAN data as of 10 February 2014

participating in the EDF in 2013 and also probably because of steadily more consistent and well-defined reporting within the framework of the EDF-RAN. However, there was also evidence of a significant increase in detections of document fraud across the EU, particularly in terms of authentic documents.

In 2013, nearly three-quarters of detections of document fraud were at the external air, rather than sea or land borders.

Detections were clumped among a small number of airports which detected very high numbers of fraudulent documents. For example, the top five airports (Paris Charles de Gaulle, Rome Fiumicino, Madrid, Lisbon and London Heathrow) reported nearly half of all detections at the external air border. At the land border, BCPs between Greece and Albania, between Bulgaria and Turkey and between Ukraine and both Poland and Hungary were all significant in terms of detections of document fraud.

Modi operandi

Recent years have seen increased detections of impostors using genuine documents. This is

widely believed to be in response to modern sophisticated documents being more difficult to falsify or reproduce. In 2013 document experts and border guards raised concerns that more authentic documents were also being fraudulently obtained as another alternative to producing expensive falsifications.

Because more countries participated in the EDF-RAN in 2013, the total number of detections of authentic documents would also be expected to increase, even in the absence of any change in relative detections of different *modi operandi*. To assess the degree to which authentic documents are becoming more commonly used as a *modus operandi*, it is necessary to look at the proportion of overall detections of document fraud that involved authentic documents. Analyses were repeated excluding countries that joined the EDF-RAN in 2013, with no difference to the results.

EDF-RAN data confirm that authentic passports were detected proportionally more frequently in 2013 than in previous years (Fig. 11), suggesting that abuse of authentic documents is an increasing *modus operandi* to illegally enter the EU/Schengen area. For example, in 2012 impostors and fraudulently ob-

tained documents represented 23% and 4% of overall passport fraud, respectively, whereas in 2013 these proportions increased to 28% and 6%, indicating that this type of abuse is becoming more common at the expense of other *modi operandi*.

Trends

Back in 2012 the most commonly detected type of document fraud was the use of counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay in the Schengen area. This type of fraud was associated with Ukrainian nationals detected at their land border with Poland and Ukraine and was indicative of circular migration patterns. However, the majority of migrants abusing border-crossing stamps in 2012 were from Albania most frequently detected at their land border with Greece. Albanians were not only detected here but were also very frequently detected attempting to enter the UK from the Schengen area, often using counterfeit Italian ID cards. The combination of these two phenomena rendered Albanians the nationality most associated with document fraud in 2012.

In 2013, detections of Albanians fell by half but they were still ranked second at the EU level. Albanians were mostly detected at the Greek and, to a lesser extent, the Croatian land border but also at the Spanish air border. Counterfeit Greek border-crossing stamps were still the most commonly detected fraudulent document at the EU level in 2013.

In 2013, following a threefold increase compared to the year before, Syrian irregular migrants were by far the most commonly detected document fraudsters in the EU. They were most commonly detected at the German, Italian, Portuguese and Austrian air borders, as well as at Kapitan Andreevo, a Bulgarian land BCP with Turkey. Some EU airports tend to distrust claimed nationalities and so report very large volumes of de-

tections of unknown nationalities. However, a comparative analysis suggests that many of these unknown nationalities are actually Syrians, which would mean that the figures presented here are an underestimation of the actual numbers of Syrians arriving in the EU/Schengen area with fraudulent documents.

Another key hotspot for detections of document fraud of a single nationality was visible in detections of Moroccans at the Spanish sea border. In this case detections were exclusively reported from the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, where Moroccans were detected using a broad suite of authentic documents as impostors. These document included Spanish ID cards and residence permits, and Moroccan passports presumably with valid visas contained within.

3.2.4. Illegal border-crossing

Detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU's external borders sharply increased between 2012 and 2013, from 72 437 to 107 365, which represented an annual increase of 48%. Although significant, the 2013 level is comparable to the totals reported by Member States in 2009 and 2010 (104 599 and 104 060, respectively) and is still lower than the total reported during the Arab Spring in 2011 (141 051). Apart from this rising trend, the year 2013 was characterised by three phenomena: a large increase in illegal border-crossings by Syrians (subsequently applying for asylum) on the Eastern Mediterranean route and in the Central Mediterranean; a steady flow of migrants departing from North Africa (Libya and Egypt) putting their life at risk to cross the Mediterranean Sea; and a sharp increase, mostly in January-June, in detections reported on the Western Balkan route.

In 2013, there was also a sharp contrast between the beginning of the year, which started with the lowest quarterly total re-



corded since 2009 (9 717 in Q1 2013), and the third quarter, which reported one of the highest quarterly totals (42 789 detections in Q3 2013). This swift fluctuation in less than six months shows the rapidly evolving situation at the external border and the difficulty in forecasting flows that appear to be driven as much by local circumstances as by development outside the EU.

In terms of nationalities, Syrians, Eritreans, Afghans and Albanians together accounted for 52% of total detections (or 55 359). Syrians alone (25 546) represented almost a quarter of the total. Their detections at the EU border tripled between 2012 and 2013. Unlike in previous years when the top nationality tended to be reported from only a few border areas, suggesting that the flows were controlled by a limited number of facilitators, Syrians were reported as the top nationality detected illegally crossing in most border areas. They were also the top nationality for other indicators, in particular asylum applications, reflecting the dire situation in Syria and the desperate plight of Syrian asylum seekers. Border-control authorities, often the first authorities they encountered, received their requests for asylum and referred them to asylum authorities.

Eritreans ranked second in 2013, with 11 298 detections, or 11% of the total. This represented one of the most significant increases (fourfold), as their detections in 2012 totalled 2 604. The vast majority of Eritreans were detected on the Central Mediterranean route (9 926, or nearly 90%), after departing from Libya. Following a similar route, Somalis were also detected in large numbers in 2013 (5 624), which level is comparable to 2012 (5 038). Altogether, detections of Eritreans and Somalis totalled 16 922, or 16% of all detections. This relatively large share shows the importance of the migration flow from the Horn of Africa to the EU, a flow that is often perilous as migrants have to cross the Sahara, transit

through Libya, where they are often ostracised, and then cross the Mediterranean Sea.

Detections of Afghans sharply decreased to about 9 500 in 2013, down from 13 169 detections in 2012 and nearly 26 000 in 2010. In nearly all indicators, Afghans were at their lowest level since 2009, suggesting a pause in their movements to the EU in 2013.

The number of detected Albanians was similar to that of Afghans, with 9 021 detections, mostly reported from the land border between Greece and Albania. This was an increase of 60% and came after two years of relatively low detections, with about 5 000 detections in 2011 and 2012.

Although they do not appear among the top nationalities, detections of Nigerians (3 386), Malians (2 887), Senegalese (1 643) and Gambians (2 817) all quadrupled or more compared to 2012. Together they totalled 10 733 detections (10% of all), and were mostly reported from the Central Mediterranean.

Routes

In the annual total for 2013, detections of illegal border-crossing on the Central Mediterranean route accounted for the largest percentage of all detections (40 304, or 38% of the total). This represented a fourfold increase in detections compared to 2012, but the 2013 total remained below the detections reported in 2011, i.e. the year of the Arab Spring. Closely related are also the detections in the area of Apulia and Calabria, mostly linked to departures from the Eastern Mediterranean, totalling nearly 5 000 detections.

Detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route continued to drop, from a peak of 57 025 in 2011 to 37 214 in 2012 and 24 799 in 2013. Detections were roughly equally distributed between the Eastern Aegean Sea and the land borders with Turkey. Detec-

Table 6. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections of illegal border-crossing in 2009–2013 reported by route and top three nationalities at the external borders

Routes	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Central Mediterranean route (Italy and Malta)*	10 236	1 662	59 002	10 379	40 304	38	288
Eritrea	1 084	55	641	1 889	9 926	25	425
Syria	18	0	92	109	9 591	24	8 699
Somalia	3 143	82	1 400	3 394	4 497	11	32
Eastern Mediterranean route (Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus)	39 975	55 688	57 025	37 224	24 799	23	-33
Land	11 127	49 513	55 558	32 854	12 968	52	-61
Syria	354	495	1 216	6 216	7 366	57	19
Afghanistan	639	21 389	19 308	7 973	2 049	16	-74
Algeria	211	6 335	3 393	2 316	493	3.8	-79
Sea	28 848	6 175	1 467	4 370	11 831	48	171
Syria	184	139	76	906	5 361	45	492
Afghanistan	11 758	1 373	310	1 593	4 080	34	156
Eritrea	1 093	445	11	50	552	4.7	1 004
Western Balkan route	3 089	2 371	4 658	6 391	19 951	19	212
Kosovo*	705	372	498	942	6 303	32	569
Pakistan	10	39	604	861	3 072	15	257
Afghanistan	700	469	983	1 665	2 174	11	31
Circular route from Albania to Greece	40 250	35 297	5 269	5 502	8 728	8.1	59
Albania	38 017	32 451	5 022	5 398	8 592	98	59
Kosovo*	34	21	37	34	45	0.5	32
Georgia	12	16	21	7	23	0.3	229
Western Mediterranean route	6 642	5 003	8 448	6 397	6 838	6.4	6.9
Land	1 639	1 567	3 345	2 839	4 229	62	49
Not specified	503	1 108	2 610	1 728	3 329	79	93
Algeria	464	459	735	967	900	21	-6.9
Morocco	672	0	0	144	0	0	-100
Sea	5 003	3 436	5 103	3 558	2 609	38	-27
Algeria	3 190	1 242	1 037	1 048	536	21	-49
Mali	3	20	87	194	467	18	141
Morocco	254	300	775	364	282	11	-23
Apulia and Calabria (Italy)	807	2 788	5 259	4 772	4 994	4.7	4.7
Syria	22	191	191	472	1 912	38	305
Pakistan	1	53	992	1 156	956	19	-17
Egypt	0	168	962	424	746	15	76
Eastern border route	1 335	1 052	1 049	1 597	1 316	1.2	-18
Georgia	173	144	209	328	235	18	-28
Vietnam	31	39	23	158	149	11	-5.7
Afghanistan	163	132	105	200	149	11	-26
Western African route	2 244	196	340	174	283	0.3	63
Morocco	176	179	321	104	104	37	0
Mali	555	1	2	5	54	19	980
Burkina Faso	84	0	0	0	51	18	n.a.
Black Sea route	1	0	0	1	148	0.1	14 700
Syria	0	0	0	0	80	54	n.a.
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	62	42	n.a.
Turkey	0	0	0	0	6	4.1	n.a.
Other	20	3	1	0	4	0	n.a.
Egypt	1	0	0	0	2	50	n.a.
Guinea	0	0	0	0	2	50	n.a.
Ukraine	16	0	0	0	0	0	n.a.
Total	104 599	104 060	141 051	72 437	107 365	100	48

* excluding Apulia and Calabria


** This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013



Figure 12. **At EU level, Syrians and Eritreans were the fastest growing nationalities detected for illegal border-crossing between 2012 and 2013**

Top increases and decreases by nationality for detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs between 2012 and 2013, by nationality



Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014

tions reported from the land border between Greece and Turkey remained low throughout the year. The decrease compared to previous years followed the strengthening of border surveillance on the Greek side, including the completion of a fence along the 12-kilometre land connection with Turkey, and deployment of additional staff to patrol the area of the River Evros marking the land border between Turkey and Greece. Greece also took a series of measures inland (i.e. changes in the asylum policy and return measures), which resulted in curbing illegal immigration.

Detections on the Western Balkan route rose sharply to a record level of 19 951 detections. In July, the number of detections started to fall, but stayed above the level of 2012.

Circular migration between Albania and Greece increased markedly between 2012 and 2013 (8 729, +59%), but the 2013 total remains below the number of detections in 2009 (40 250) and 2010 (35 297), corresponding to the period before visa liberalisation for Albanians.

The situation remained relatively stable in the Western Mediterranean (6 838, compared to 6 397 in 2012) and along the eastern land border (1 316, compared to 1 597 in 2012).


■ Central Mediterranean route

In the Central Mediterranean area, the large and sudden increase in detections in 2011, following the turmoil in Tunisia and Libya, had been significantly reduced by the end of 2011, but resumed in 2012. In 2013, the number of detections was low in the first quarter, but gradually increased from the second quarter to reach a peak in the third. Out of the annual total of 40 304 detections, 75% were reported in only four months, i.e. between July and October 2013, with a peak in September, a pattern also observed in 2012.

Tragically, this period of an intense flow of migrants between North Africa and the EU saw several major incidents of boats capsizing in the region resulting in a massive loss of life, including women and children. These events were widely reported in the media and attracted a lot of political attention to

Figure 13. In 2013, most detections of illegal border-crossing were reported on the Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean routes

Detections of illegal border-crossing in 2013 with percentage change on 2012 by route and top nationality detected



the issue of irregular migration in the Mediterranean in general, including several statements released by the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs.


Since then, detections of migrants have dropped considerably from nearly 8 000 detections in October to 1 297 in November 2013, but this decrease also coincided with the traditional winter low period when rough

sea conditions render sailing hazardous. A closer analysis of the data showed that, compared to previous years, detections in December 2013 (2 476) were the largest for a month of December since 2008, when systematic data monitoring started. This indicates the determination of migrants stranded in Libya, mostly sub-Saharan and Syrians, to sail to the EU despite the difficult winter conditions.



Figure 14. **In the Central Mediterranean, only Tunisians were detected in significantly lower numbers in 2013 than in 2012, while Syrians and Eritreans showed the largest increases**

Top increases and decreases in detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPS on the Central Mediterranean route between 2012 and 2013, by nationality



Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014

An increased use of rubber boats has also been reported, mostly by sub-Saharanans. Compared to fishing boats, rubber boats put migrants' lives at a greater risk, but offer the cheapest sailing option. On the other hand, when fishing boats or larger boats are used, they tend to be overcrowded, which also increases the risk of them capsizing. To prevent this, search and rescue operations are undertaken ever closer to the Libyan coast. However, the awareness of these measures among facilitators and migrants decreases their overall perception of risk taken when embarking on what remains a perilous journey.

Nationalities

Together, nationals from the Horn of Africa, in this case Eritreans (9 926) and Somalis (4 497), represented the largest proportion of detections on the Central Mediterranean route, totalling 14 423, or 36%. During interviews conducted in the framework of the JO Hermes, most Eritreans and Somalis indicated that they had left their countries due to security and economic concerns. Somalis

and Eritreans reported using the same route through Ethiopia and Sudan.


Syrian migrants ranked second in the annual total for 2013, with 9 591 detections, representing nearly a quarter of the total. Many departed from Libya's coastal area near Zuwarah, but the largest proportion departed from Egypt. They often travelled in family units.

Overall, three main flows can be distinguished departing from Libya: (1) Syrians, often arriving from Egypt and departing on wooden boats from Zuwarah on the western Libyan coast, which offers the shortest connection to the EU's southern external border; (2) nationals from the Horn of Africa; and (3) nationals from West Africa.

Egyptian migrants were also reported on the Central Mediterranean route, with 1 982 detections in 2013.

Figure 15. **On the Eastern Mediterranean route, detections at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey increased until November 2013**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs on the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2012–2013



Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014

■ Eastern Mediterranean route

Since data collection began in early 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained its status as a hotspot of irregular migration. However, following the implementation of a set of Greek operations in August 2012 as well as the continued implementation of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations (Poseidon Sea and Land), detections significantly dropped at the Greek-Turkish land border. In 2013, the figure was the lowest reported on this route since 2009, but the route still ranked second and accounted for nearly a quarter of all detections for illegal border-crossing to the EU.

Compared to 2011 and 2012, the areas of detections also considerably changed, and detections in the Eastern Aegean Sea were the largest, followed by detections along the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey.

Syrians represented more than half of all detections on this route (12 727, or 51%) and although they were mostly reported at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey and in the Eastern Aegean Sea, they were also the single most detected nationality at the land border between Greece and Turkey,

and in Cyprus. Most of them were travelling in family groups. Many applied for asylum in Bulgaria immediately after their detection, as well as in other Member States, but very few applied for asylum in Greece.

Afghans ranked second (6 129), mostly detected in the Eastern Aegean Sea, but their detections were considerably reduced after the peak of 2011 (19 618). Similarly, as compared to 2011, detections of illegally staying Afghans also decreased, from 25 296 in 2011 to 16 836 in 2013, as did the number of Afghans applying for asylum (FRAN data), from 29 672 in 2011 to 24 060 in 2013. These concurrent decreases occur at a time of growing uncertainties for many Afghans living in Afghanistan or as refugees in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.

Detections of Africans has also considerably decreased on the Eastern Mediterranean route, from 8 479 in 2012 to 3 460 in 2013.


Bulgarian land border

In this border area, detections considerably increased between August 2012 and October 2013, after which they fell sharply. This decrease coincided with a strengthening of



Figure 16. **On the Eastern Mediterranean route, only the number of Syrians increased significantly between 2012 and 2013**

Top increases and decreases of detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs on the Eastern Mediterranean route between 2012 and 2013, by nationality



Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014

surveillance efforts at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey and the deployment of additional staff (police and border police officers).

Most migrants crossed the land border with the help of local residents from the area of Edirne who were either working for the facilitation networks based in Istanbul or were operating independently.

Most detections in this area concerned Syrians. After detections, most Syrians applied for asylum. Their number is still small compared with more than 2 million who have sought shelter elsewhere according to data available at the end of 2013, but has placed serious strain on Bulgarian resources. While some Syrians opted to stay in Bulgaria, others, mostly those with relatives or acquaintances in other Member States, preferred to continue mostly to Germany or Sweden.

Greek land border

In 2013, at the land border between Greece and Turkey, detections remained very low.

As at other border sections of the Eastern Mediterranean route Syrians ranked first. The low number of detections followed the strengthening of border surveillance on the Greek side in 2012, including the completion of a fence along the 12-kilometre land connection with Turkey, and deployment of additional staff to patrol the area of the River Evros marking the land border between Turkey and Greece.

Information reported by the Turkish authorities also suggest a continued presence of migrants on the Turkish side of the border. While most will eventually opt to cross by sea or across the neighbouring land border to Bulgaria, it is important to highlight that the pressure of illegal migration on the Greek-Turkish land border section remains higher than the data on detections for illegal border-crossing may suggest.

Eastern Aegean Sea

In the Aegean Sea, most of migrants targeted the islands of Lesbos and Samos. However, detections were reported also elsewhere

in the Eastern Aegean Sea, covering a large area from Samothrace Island in the north (reporting its first detections) to Megisti Island in the south.

Nearly 70% of the migrants who had entered illegally through the Eastern Aegean Sea were detected on the islands after their crossing. Detections also occurred in the Ionian Sea while migrants were trying to reach Italy.

At the beginning of 2013, most migrants crossing the Eastern Aegean Sea were Afghans, but gradually Syrians have become the main nationality reported for illegal border-crossing.

■ **Western Balkan route**

Detections of illegal border-crossing strongly increased on the Western Balkan route, from 6 391 in 2012 to 19 951 in 2013, reaching a record high since data collection began in 2008. Most of the detections were reported between January and June 2013 at the land border between Hungary and Serbia. During that period, migrants detected crossing the border illegally immediately applied for asylum and soon absconded to continue their journey to other Member States. In July, coinciding



© Frontex, 2014

Figure 17. **Most irregular migrants crossed the land border between Turkey and Bulgaria with the help of local residents**


with an amendment in the Hungarian asylum policy, the number of detections started to decrease, but nevertheless remained higher than in previous years.

Kosovo* citizens were the main nationality detected for illegal border-crossing, repre-

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Figure 18. **In the Western Balkans, detections were much larger in 2013 than in previous years, with a peak in June 2013**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs on the Western Balkan route in 2009–2013




Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014



* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Figure 19. **In the Western Balkans, detections of Kosovo* citizens increased most between 2012 and 2013**

Top increases and decreases of detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs on the Western Balkan route between 2012 and 2013, by nationality



Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014

senting 32% of all detections on this route. However, their detections were concentrated between April and July 2013 (81% of their 2013 total), and dropped to a negligible level after July 2013. This drop followed return flights from Hungary to Pristina that were accompanied by a media campaign in Kosovo* to prevent illegal migration.

Detections of other nationalities, notably from Pakistan and Afghanistan, also dropped after July 2013, but remained higher than in the previous year. African and Asian migrants detected at the land border between Hungary and Serbia had originally crossed illegally the external border on the Eastern Mediterranean route and then transited through the Western Balkans mostly via the border between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and increasingly via the Bulgarian-Serbian border.

The accession of Croatia to the EU on 1 July 2013 did not affect the movements of migrants across the Western Balkans. The border section between Hungary and Serbia remained the main border section for most

migrants to attempt illegal entry to the EU. In addition, this border section also recorded a large increase in the traffic flow after 2011, in the wake of the visa liberalisation process, resulting in a surge in refusals of entry. Border-control authorities, at a time of budgetary constraints, have thus had to face new challenges simultaneously on the green border and at BCPs.

■ Circular route between Albania and Greece

In 2013, Greece reported 8 728 detections of illegal border-crossing at its land border with Albania and with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of which 8 592 were associated with Albanians. This represented a 59% rise in relation to a year previously.

This substantial increase broke the stable situation in place since 2011, when visa liberalisation was granted to Albanians. Prior to visa liberalisation, detections had ranged between 38 000 and 30 000 a year. However, since 2011, annual detections of illegal border-crossing have been around 5 000.

The introduction of visa liberalisation went together with a small increase in refusals of entry as more Albanians crossed the border at BCPs.

■ Western Mediterranean route

In 2013 there were 6 838 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast and the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla. This total is comparable to the total of 6 397 reported in 2012.

In 2013, nearly two-thirds of the detections were reported at the land border in Ceuta and Melilla. This is probably associated with more effective prevention of departures at sea by the Moroccan authorities and enhanced prevention measures in the Mediterranean Sea, including the EPN JO Indalo. This assumption is supported by the fact that the improvement of weather conditions in the summer did not result in a significant increase in detections at the sea border in this region.

Several times in 2013, the Spanish authorities warned of the permanent threat of migration to Melilla. Indeed, there were several violent incidents of migrants attempting to cross the fence in large groups (more than a hundred persons), sometimes resulting in casualties. Once in Melilla, migrants are turned over to Spanish Police Headquarters for identification, and many are transferred to the Temporary Centre for Immigrants (CETI – *Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes*). However this centre only has a limited capacity and some migrants had to be transferred to mainland Spain.

The analysis of nationality is problematic as most of the detections reported by Spain are of unknown nationalities; however, most are assumed to be sub-Saharan. There is a reluctance of the vast majority of migrants to cooperate with the authorities.

■ Apulia and Calabria

In Apulia and Calabria in southern Italy, detections tend to be associated with different movements of irregular migration. Most of the detections in the area of Apulia are linked to secondary movements from Greece to Italy, while most of the detections in Calabria are associated with migrants who departed from Turkey or Egypt and sailed across the Aegean Sea towards Italy.

In 2013, detections were stable with a total of 4 994 compared to 4 772 in 2012. As in previous years, most migrants were nationals from Asian and Middle East countries. Syrians, ranking first, represented 38% of all the detections on this route.

Syrian migrants, acting on family advice, tend to refuse to be fingerprinted and travel to Catania and Syracuse, where a large number of Syrians have successfully landed over the past few months. Many continue their journey to Sweden or Germany where the new migrants apply for asylum.

As on the Central Mediterranean area, detections started to increase in spring and peaked in November 2013. The sharpest increases were of Syrians and Eritreans, together with large numbers of arriving Egyptians. Most of these migrants are thought to have departed from North Africa, specifically Egypt. In contrast to these increasing trends, the number of Pakistanis and Afghans, declined compared to 2012.

Detections in Calabria were mostly associated with departures from Turkey and Egypt, and the main nationality detected there were Syrians. Many migrants reported transshipment in high seas from large fishing boats to smaller wooden boats to reach the shores (mother boat *modus operandi*).



■ Black Sea route

Detections of illegal border-crossing on the Black Sea are extremely rare, but in 2013 Bulgaria reported one attempt of clandestine entry at Varna seaport in June and Romania reported four incidents involving the detection of 118 migrants often aided by Turkish facilitators attempting to reach the Romanian coast. The migrants were mostly Syrians or Afghans.

These incidents still constitute isolated cases, and are possibly linked to the increased surveillance on the Eastern Mediterranean route and the increasing number of migrants waiting in Turkey to reach the EU illegally. However, while these four cases should be taken extremely seriously, they are not yet a signal of larger shifts towards Romania.

■ Eastern land border route

The eastern land border route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Despite the total length of all the border sections, detections on this route tend to be lower than on other routes, possibly due to the long distances from many countries of origin. Also, according to several reports shared during 2013, visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps tend to predominate on this route, as opposed to detections of illegal border-crossing.

Detections of illegal border-crossing remained stable between 2012 and 2013, with 1 316 detections (compared to 1 597 in 2012). Similarly to previous years, most of the detections were reported from the land border between Slovakia and Ukraine. Estonia reported an increase, but a large proportion of these detections were connected with the smuggling of goods rather than irregular migration.

In terms of nationalities, Georgians ranked first, mostly detected at the land border between Lithuania and Belarus, followed by Afghans, mostly detected at the land border between Slovakia and Ukraine.

Detections of illegal border-crossing are also kept at low levels along the eastern land border thanks to the surveillance efforts of neighbouring third countries, in particular the Russian Federation and Belarus. Most part of the border with Belarus is fenced on the Belarusian side. In 2013, a new fence has been constructed on the green border between Norway and the Russian Federation. This fence will enable the Russian authorities to re-deploy human resources to other parts of the Russian border.

While the threat of illegal border-crossing between BCPs along the eastern land border seems to be lower than at other sections of the external land border of the EU, this border section is faced with increasing passenger and lorry traffic, which requires additional efforts from border-control authorities.

Also, the issue of migrants refused entry and then applying for asylum and absconding from reception centres is the most serious along the eastern land borders. In 2013, it is estimated, based on data for refusals of entry to Poland and asylum applications in Poland and Germany, that about 15 000 Russians of Chechen origin used this *modus operandi* and subsequently stayed illegally in the EU. For comparison, this is twice the number of detections of illegal border-crossing reported on the Western Mediterranean route (6 838), half of those reported on the Eastern Mediterranean route (24 799), or 4% of all detections of persons staying illegally in the EU in 2013. The use of this *modus operandi* at the eastern border appears to be a significant entry channel of illegal migration to the EU. It exploits legal loopholes while still absorbing an important part of the resources at the border.



© Frontex, 2013



© Frontex, 2013

Figure 20. **The low number of detections probably underestimates the actual scale of clandestine entry of migrants hiding in lorries or private cars**

3.2.5. Clandestine entries

Detections of clandestine entry in vehicles should be analysed in connection with the type and number of vehicles crossing through BCPs. However, as for passenger flow, data on regular traffic of vehicles are rather limited. Car traffic is particularly significant in Slovenia, while Romania and Hungary both manage large numbers of lorries at their borders. This is important, as lorry traffic is known to have a disproportionately negative effect on crossing times.

It is difficult to analyse this indicator because some Member States do not report any detections. Thus, the low number points to difficulties in reporting rather than to the low use of this *modus operandi* along the external EU borders.

Detections of illegal border-crossing at (rather than between) BCPs are restricted to the external land and sea borders of the EU and to detections that are confirmed clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport). Their volume is extremely low for the whole of the EU, with 599 detections in 2013, especially compared with other indicators, such as detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs (107 360).

Clandestine entry requires migrants to stay in confinement for long periods of time, and

is known to put migrants' lives at risk of suffocation and dehydration. Therefore, most of the migrants detected hiding in vehicles at BCPs are single young males, rather than more vulnerable family groups.

According to information provided by Western Balkan countries and several EU Member States, there is considerable variation in the *modus operandi* considering the points of departure (either straight from Greece or in several legs through the Western Balkans) and types of vehicles used (cars, buses, cargo/passenger trains). In some reported cases irregular migrants were hidden in railway carriages of international trains departing from Greece.

In view of the very low number of detections reported at the external borders compared to the large volume of vehicle (particularly lorry) crossings, it is reasonable to assume that detections underestimate the actual number of clandestine entries. While checking all vehicles would introduce undue waiting time for many bona fide travellers, targeted checks on some vehicles meeting specific risk criteria would make it possible to determine with more precision the extent of the phenomenon and better prevent it. Operational risk analysis techniques, similar to those used by customs or for checking lorries at the border between Schengen Member States and the UK, could be adapted to the specificities of the external borders.



3.2.3. Cross-border crime

Frontex promotes and coordinates European border management with a special focus on migration flows. In application of the concept of Integrated Border Management, it additionally supports Member States in combating organised crime at the external borders, including the smuggling of goods and trafficking in human beings.

However, due to the legal and institutional national characteristics, border guard authorities along the external borders of the EU have different types and degrees of responsibilities in the fight against transnational crimes. The nature and extent of inter-agency cooperation at the external borders thus differs greatly between EU Member States. Regarding the prevention of smuggling of illicit goods, border-control authorities of one Member State play only an assisting role, while border-control authorities in another Member State share their tasks with Customs or are able to conduct their own investigations. Because of these differences, cross-border crime data reported by some national border guard institutions are partial and sometimes do not include data collected by customs.

On the other hand, identifying cross-border movements of persons involved in criminal activities or victims thereof is a crucial task of border-control authorities. Either in the case of human trafficking or the travel of voluntary fighters with a jihadist background, border agencies are confronted with new challenges particularly in the field of international and inter-agency cooperation, profiling, identification, and assistance to victims.

Smuggling of illicit drugs

Cannabis from North Africa and the Western Balkans

The EU is destination for several main routes for various narcotic drugs, coming from different regions of the world. According to the EMCDDA/Europol *EU Drug Markets Report*^{*}, cannabis resin had been the most seized drug in Europe for many years. The main provider of cannabis resin to Europe is Morocco, although its production capacities are in decline while those in Afghanistan are re-emerging. Amounts seized in Spain, the country reporting the largest detections, exceeded the domestic demand by around 15%. Large amounts of cannabis resin are then forwarded to the Netherlands and particularly Belgium.

In 2010, seizures of herbal cannabis exceeded resin seizures for the first time in Europe. The shift towards herbal cannabis was predominantly caused by an increase of domestic production in many European countries. This means that trafficking across the EU external borders has decreased, with the domestic production increasingly satisfying national demand. An exception seems to be trafficking activities in southeast Europe, where mainly Albanian cannabis supplies customer demands of countries including Greece, Italy, Slovenia, and Hungary.

By August 2013, the Italian Guardia di Finanza concluded a major aerial surveillance operation to determine the amount of cannabis which is produced by Albanian criminals. After an examination of 12.5% of the Albanian territory, experts could identify the existence of 500 plantations, which according to Italian estimates produce an annual 1 000 tonnes of herbal cannabis worth around EUR 4.5 billion. More than 300 hectares were identified around the Albanian town of Lazarat near the Greek border, which is essentially under control of the local producers.

* Figures in this paragraph are published in EMCDDA/Europol (2013), *EU Drug Markets Report: a strategic analysis*.

Cocaine from South America

According to EMCDDA/Europol calculations based on seizure data^{*}, cocaine shows to be the third most intensively smuggled drug in Europe after cannabis resin and herb. The seizure numbers increased between the mid-nineties and 2007, but have been declining since 2009.

Between 2001 and 2011, Spain accounted for around 50% of all cocaine seizures in the EU. Large shipments travelled by sea from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela to Spain and Portugal. A large share of the substance arrived from South America via the African route. Since 2004, countries like Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia and Senegal have been developing into a region for transit and redistribution^{**}, with absolute turnovers by the criminal organisations often exceeding national security budgets of West African countries.

Drug traffickers preferred to transport the cocaine by aircraft, speedboats, maritime vessels and with couriers on commercial flights to the EU, and tried to avoid the exposure of risky overland transfers. Nevertheless, according to UNODC and various other public sources, South American cocaine is going to be increasingly transported across the Sahara and North Africa to Europe, thereby affecting stability in countries such as Mali and Libya.^{***}

A diversification of trafficking routes away from the very dominant routes to the Iberian Peninsula drew a larger share of cocaine to the ports of the Balkans and the Black Sea. Between 2009 and 2011, four tonnes of cocaine have been seized in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey, accounting for 2% of the overall number of seizures reported in Europe.^{****} Although appearing comparably low, the share of these four countries has grown threefold since 2001. Moreover, the EU Drug Markets Report 2013 published by



© Guardia di Finanza, 2013

Figure 21. **In 2013, the Italian Guardia di Finanza's aerial surveillance operation identified over 500 cannabis plantations in the Albanian territory, mostly near the Greek border**

EMCDDA and Europol highlights the Eastern Baltic Sea area as potentially the next emerging cocaine entry point.

Heroin from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan

Seizure and treatment numbers suggest that heroin use in Europe has been decreasing during the last decade, while consumers often replaced the substance with other, mostly synthetic drugs. However, seizures show that heroin is still smuggled along the traditional routes to the EU and remains a considerable source of income for internationally operating Organised Crime Groups. Most of the heroin consumed in the EU is produced in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, in Iran and Pakistan. It is transported along two major routes to Europe: the Balkan route, which runs through Turkey and the Balkan countries, and the Northern or Silk route, which heads through Central Asia and the Russian Federation.

As regards the heroin smuggled along the Balkan route, Turkey plays a central role due to its multiple trade and road connections to

* EMCDDA/Europol (2013), *EU Drug Markets Report: a strategic analysis*, p. 38ff.

** UNODC (2013), *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, p. 16.

*** UN Security Council Meeting 18 December 2013 ('Peace and security in Africa'), press release SC/11224.

**** EMCDDA/Europol (2013), *EU Drug Markets Report: a strategic analysis*, p. 46.



Asia and Europe. Between 2001 and 2009, seizures in Turkey increased three to fourfold to 16 tonnes annually, contrasting the steady decline that was registered in the rest of Europe, where only half of this amount could be seized in 2009. In the years 2010 and 2011, however, numbers of incidents and quantities of heroin seized appeared to be in steady decline, both in the EU and Turkey.

From Turkey, smuggled heroin usually enters the EU through the land borders of Greece and Bulgaria. In a particularly significant incident on 1 August 2013, Turkish border authorities detected 717 kg of heroin at the BCP Hamzabeyli on a Croatian-registered lorry driven by a Croatian citizen. The officers found the 1 400 packages of heroin worth around EUR 13.5 million between dishwashers, washing machines, and LCD TVs. The lorry that was loaded in Istanbul was on the way to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a layover before further continuing its journey to the EU. Similar but smaller seizures were also made in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo* and Serbia.

New psychoactive substances from China and India

New psychoactive substances comprise a wide range of drugs that are not yet under control of national or international drug legislation. In 2012, the Early Warning System of the EMCDDA and Europol listed a total of 73 synthetic substances. Although new psychoactive substances represent only a small share of the illicit drugs market, they are particularly dangerous because limited information about their effects on the human body is available. These substances often come in the form of more openly sold 'Legal Highs', thereby giving the false impression of legality and lower consumer exposure to physical and mental health risks. They are believed to be largely used by producers as replacements for more traditional drugs in short supply, as has been the case with MDMA, better known as Ecstasy.

The challenges for law-enforcement authorities at air and other external borders of the EU lie within the development of widely established capacities to identify a diversity of quickly emerging trends. Drug control legislative measures within the EU also need a more coherent approach to prevent the exploitation of differences and gaps between national jurisdictions.

Trafficking in human beings (THB)

The detection of persons trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labour or other purposes represents a major challenge for border authorities, as victims themselves are often not aware about their fate when they arrive in the transit or destination countries. Border agencies in the EU and in third countries developed measures in various fields to achieve better results in the detection of incoming victims:

- At air borders, some EU authorities widened the time window for identification of potential cases of THB by monitoring areas between the boarding gate and the airport arrival area. Moreover, flight crews were trained to identify potential victims and traffickers already in the plane.
- Some authorities took stronger measures to investigate the circumstances of the travel of unaccompanied children.
- Measures were improved to identify fraudulent travel and supporting documents.
- An example from a third country is the development of a proactive screening programme at Taiwanese airports, which encourages immigrant workers to complete an online questionnaire on the circumstances of their employment. Immediate assistance is offered when certain indicators become visible.

As of February 2014, 20 countries have notified of a full transposition of the Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims. The Directive defines the minimum common rules for identifying and sanctioning offences of trafficking in human beings.

In 2013, Eurostat presented its first report and statistics on THB at the EU level, including data on the years 2008 to 2010. Within three years, the number of identified victims, male and female, registered by police, NGOs and other agencies in the EU Member States increased from 3 691 (2008) to 4 198 (2009) and 5 535 (2010).⁶ As Eurostat points out, more reported cases are not necessarily related to a higher number of actual victims. The upward tendency may also be caused by an improved reporting rate of the phenomenon.

Data disaggregated by types of exploitation during the three reference years show that a majority of 62% of the victims were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation and 25% for labour exploitation. Others were trafficked for forced begging, criminal activities, removal of organs and other purposes. Important for border guards at the external borders is the fact that the share of victims from non-EU countries increased from 12% to 37% for male and from 18% to 39% for female victims between 2008 and 2010.

According to Eurostat, the main third countries of origin in 2010 were Nigeria, China, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, the Russian Federation, Brazil, Vietnam, Namibia and Algeria. Two patterns are visible within the three reference years. First, the number of victims from Latin America increased strongly while the number of victims from the EU's immediate neighbourhood decreased. This shift indicates an increased use of air borders as entry gates for trafficking to the EU. Second, victims from Nigeria and China are consistently strongly represented throughout the reference period and beyond, thus adding to the nec-

essary experience for the establishment of more detailed profiles.

European foreign fighters in Syria

According to law-enforcement authorities and experts, the number of Europeans with a jihadist agenda fighting in the conflict in Syria has significantly increased during 2013. According to an estimate made by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation in December^{**}, between 396 and 1 937 fighters from Western Europe are presently taking part in the Syrian armed conflict. Since the previous estimate of April 2013, the numbers, which are based on Member State estimates and open sources, have risen threefold. Official figures from France and Denmark on that phenomenon have tripled and authorities in Belgium, Germany and the UK have even quadrupled their numbers. In January 2014, the French government stated that around a dozen of the French nationals in Syria or willing to go there are minors, being as young as 15 years of age.

In light of this development, national governments and EU representatives are increasingly discussing ways to monitor and prevent the movements of young people to Syria. Terrorism experts and law-enforcement officials fear that some of these fighters may return to Europe ideologically and militarily trained, thus posing a terrorist threat to societies.

Smuggling of weapons

In a scheme revealed in December 2013, French police has disrupted a particularly large smuggling ring that trafficked several hundreds of guns, pistols, Kalashnikovs, ammunition and spare parts mainly from the Western Balkans to France.

According to media reports published in November 2013, the Hellenic Coast Guard intercepted a cargo ship near the Aegean island

^{**} ICSR Insight: Up to 11 000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among Western Europeans, 17/12/2013.

* It should be noted that 2008 data come from 22 EU Member States, whereas 2009 and 2010 data include figures from 25 EU countries.



of Syri with 20 000 AK-47 assault rifles and explosives onboard. The crew of three Turkish and three Indian nationals was arrested. The North Africa and Middle East representative for the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime recently warned that the instability and armed conflict in the Middle East led to massive arms smuggling in the region.

Exit of stolen motor vehicles

According to Eurostat, the total number of vehicles including cars, motorcycles, buses, lorries, construction and agricultural vehicles stolen in the EU has been steadily falling from 1.85 million in 1998 to 0.88 million in 2010. Among the reasons were the advanced technical protection measures developed by the producers and intensified international law-enforcement cooperation.

Only a small share of the vehicles stolen in the EU is detected at its external borders, often in the context of Frontex Joint Operations. In contrast to the overall theft statistics, detections at the borders reported to Frontex showed a slight increase from 498 in 2012 to 519 in 2013. The increase may have been caused by increased awareness and relevant expertise of Frontex Guest Officers and regular border guards.

Most car thefts were detected by querying SIS II, the Interpol and national theft data with the Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) specified on the engine, frame and major parts of most motor vehicles. Car thieves applied various *modi operandi* to cloud the identity of their stolen vehicles at the external borders. Reports indicated frequent manipulation of the VIN, or departure from the EU with rental or very recently stolen cars before authorities are notified of the theft. In other cases, vehicles were disassembled into parts to obscure identification or powers of attorney containing an authorisation to travel abroad were counterfeited.

Modi operandi as mentioned above were regularly reported at the EU eastern borders, where detections of stolen motor vehicles on exit increased from 289 in 2012 to 313 in 2013. The vehicle brand preferences did not change during the last years, as almost 40% of the cars detected were produced by Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz and BMW. A majority of the persons driving the stolen vehicles had the nationality of the country to which they intended to leave the EU. For example, 131 of the 192 persons attempting to transfer their stolen vehicle to Ukraine were of Ukrainian nationality, only 35 were EU citizens.

Smuggling of excise goods

Tobacco

According to estimates of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the smuggling and domestic illicit production of cigarettes caused an annual financial damage of over EUR 10 billion in the budgets of the EU and its Member States. In effect of the financial and euro crisis of the last years, many governments increased the taxes on excise goods to reduce their budget deficits. Between July 2012 and 2013, at least ten EU Member States increased their duties on cigarettes, in average by EUR 0.33 per pack of the 'Most popular price category', as defined by the European Commission.^{*}


Currently, a customer would pay for an average pack of cigarettes EUR 5 in Finland, whereas across the Russian border, the same good would cost him only around EUR 1.5. Not only individual consumers and small scale smugglers from economically weak border regions try to make use of existing price differences. Large scale criminal businesses illicitly import cigarettes from as far away as Asia to Western European markets.

In June 2013, the European Commission presented a new strategy to step up fight against illicit tobacco trade, which stipulates the in-

* Excise duty tables: Part III
Manufactured Tobacco,
European Commission,
Directorate-General,
Taxation and Customs
Union, Ref. 1038 rev. 1,
July 2013.

Figure 22. **In 2013, most stolen cars continued to leave the EU in Poland heading for Ukraine**

Main routes of stolen vehicles crossing the external border and main brands stolen in 2013



involvement of producers and countries of origin and the improvement of international and inter-agency cooperation. It moreover provides strengthened sanctions and harmonised definitions of customs infringements.

In order to address the problem of contraband cigarettes and to prevent the oversupply of third-country markets, the EU has already signed legally binding agreements

with the four largest tobacco manufacturers, which cover 80% of the world market. Through these agreements the companies committed themselves to sell to legitimate clients only and to implement a tracking system that assists law-enforcement authorities in determining if cigarettes are traded illegally. The smuggling of the main brands produced by these four large companies has decreased substantially over the past years.



However, smaller companies outside the EU still sell large quantities to third-country markets where only an insignificant share of these cigarettes can be absorbed by the local demand. Much of the rest is then smuggled out to EU countries. In particular seizures of 'cheap white brands' have been showing a strong upward tendency over the past years. An example is the Jin Ling cigarette brand produced in Kaliningrad, which grew so popular among western consumers that this brand itself became being counterfeited.

Although cigarette prices were recently also increased in the eastern neighbourhood of the EU, the smuggling of cigarettes from Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine remained highly profitable and fuelled the growth of transnational organised crime groups active in that business.

Petroleum products

The contraband of fuel was mainly reported at the eastern European borders with Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Western Balkan countries. This illegal activity was caused by the price difference between EU Member States and their third-country neighbours. In many cases, the smugglers crossed the border several times a week to fill up the large or illegally extended petrol tanks of their private vehicles. This kind of ant smuggling did not only cause fiscal losses, but also increased the workload of border guards significantly. Large shares of the border queues at the eastern European borders were regularly caused by fuel smugglers. Member States such as Estonia, Poland and Slovakia are currently taking measures to prevent individuals from crossing the borders on a regular basis to import fuel for other than private use. Travellers arriving in Estonia by motor vehicle, for example, may now bring fuel exempt from excise duty in the quantity of one regular fuel tank only at the first entry within a calendar month.

3.3. After the border

3.3.1. Asylum applications

Analysing trends in asylum applications is important for border-control authorities because they are often the first authorities prospective applicants meet, before being referred to asylum authorities. For border-control authorities, they thus represent an important workload. Border-control authorities also play a role in the implementation of the Dublin system. As mentioned in recital 3 of the Eurodac Regulation (and in recital 4 of the recast Eurodac Regulation), for the purposes of applying the Dublin Regulation, it is necessary to establish the identity of applicants for asylum and of persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders. Finally, unfounded applications for international protection inevitably delay the examination and subsequent provision of protection for those third-country nationals with genuine claims. When applications are made further to an attempt to illegally enter the territory (illegal border-crossing, document fraud, refusal of entry, clandestine entry), it overloads border-control authorities and dilutes allocated resources.

In line with EU Regulation (EC) 862/2007, complete data on asylum applications for 2013 are due at the end of February 2014 and are usually available from Eurostat at the beginning of March 2014. The following analysis is based on FRAN data, which are preliminary data made available by border-control authorities and for France and the Netherlands only they include applications made at the border.

The number of asylum claims submitted to the FRAN increased very significantly. In 2013 the number of applications rose to a record high since the FRAN was established in 2008, at 353 991 applications following the previous record year of 2012 (276 308 applications).

The main countries of citizenship were Syria, the Russian Federation and Afghanistan, while applications from citizens of Western Balkan countries continued to be significant despite being overwhelmingly judged to be unfounded by Member States.

Syrians were by far the most common nationality to request international protection with 50 096 applications. This is nearly twice as much as the already very high number of applications submitted by Syrians in 2012 and represented a significant increase in numbers for the EU, but remained a tiny proportion of the overall number of asylum seekers which, according to UNHCR surpassed 2.3 million to-date (February 2014). In the EU, more than two-thirds of all Syrian applications were submitted in Sweden (16 125), Germany (12 402) and Bulgaria (4 511). By contrast, very few applied for asylum were submitted in Greece which, like Bulgaria, neighbours Turkey from where many Syrians arrived in the EU. Indeed, although Greece allows Syrians to stay in the country for six months, many do not consider applying for asylum there because they receive little support and prefer to apply in other Member States.

While many Syrians crossed illegally the external border before applying for asylum, the total number of asylum applications of Syrians was twice as high as the number of detections of illegal border-crossing (25 546). This difference may be linked to a combination of factors, including possibly significant numbers of Syrians who:

- crossed the border illegally and have not been detected;
- had been already legally or illegally staying in the EU and who claimed asylum as it became clear that the prospect of return to Syria was impossible;
- entered the EU with valid travel documents and applied for asylum (e.g. people who obtained a visa for the purpose of family reunification and applied for asylum once in the country).

Legitimacy of asylum claims

There is no legal definition of a 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate' claim at this stage. However, the recast Asylum Procedures Directive includes the concepts of inadmissible/admissible-unfounded/admissible-manifestly unfounded applications, which may be the basis for a future classification. Until Member States transpose the recast Asylum Procedures Directive into their national legislation and an appropriate reporting is put in place, it will be difficult to address the question of international protection claim legitimacy.

A few Member States also allowed entry and residence to Syrians through other channels. On the basis of a temporary humanitarian admission programme (*temporäres humanitäres Aufnahmeprogramm*) of 30 May 2013, Germany selected, jointly with UNHCR, about 5 000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The extension of this programme of 23 December 2013 includes further 5 000 Syrians from Syria, the neighbouring countries (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) and Egypt. Persons qualified for the programme receive a preliminary residence permit for two years. They are supposed to travel on their own and are then distributed among German federal states. Those with a criminal record in Germany or any connections to criminal or terrorist organisations are excluded from this programme.

In the first half of 2013, Hungary reported a large increase in asylum applications, from 1 854 in the second semester of 2012 to 12 185 in the first semester of 2013, one of the most spectacular increases recorded in the FRAN. This increase was due to the January 2013 change in legislation in the Hungary asylum policy to bring it in line with EU standards. The news of this change quickly spread among migrants from Kosovo* (many of whom are able to transit Serbia easily, having passports or other official documentation) creating a pull factor that resulted in an increase

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

** EASO, *Asylum Applications from the Western Balkans: comparative analysis of trends, push-pull factors and responses*, 2013.

in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Hungary and Serbia, followed by concurrent asylum applications. Hungary quickly reacted with media campaigns and returns organised to Kosovo^{*}, the main origin of asylum applicants, as well as further change in the asylum policy.

Much of the increase between 2012 and 2013 was also due to more asylum applications submitted by citizens of the Russian Federation of Chechen origin in Poland and then again in Germany. Most of these applications are most likely of the same individuals who first applied in Poland and then in Germany.

In Bulgaria, the number of asylum applications also rose sharply, although from a low base. Bulgaria reported 7 144 asylum applications in 2013 which is a massive increase compared to a year previously (1 376). The increase was mostly due to Syrians whose applications accounted for nearly two-thirds of all applications in Bulgaria for the year. Syrians mostly travelled in family units. There is some evidence that many had already received protection in Turkey, but Bulgaria offers comparatively cheaper living conditions while being relatively close to Syria. The Bulgarian reception system was quickly overloaded and Bulgaria is still opening new centres and trying to improve conditions in the reception centres.

Syrians who had crossed the border illegally to Italy and Greece instead did not generally apply for asylum there but continued on to other EU Member States.

Western Balkan nationals, mostly from Serbia, continued to apply in large number for asylum. Considering together the five Western Balkan countries with visa-free regime (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), they represent the largest proportion of asylum applicants in the EU (re-

maintaining at a steady level of 25 802 in 2012 and 25 600 in 2013). In 2013, they went mostly to Germany (16 092). With regard to this flow, concerned Member States undertook measures intended to reduce or mitigate both push factors in the countries of origin and pull factors in destination countries.

According to an ad hoc report produced by EASO on this flow^{**}, specific measures concerning pull factors included prioritisation of asylum applications from the relevant countries of origin, engaging additional staff (or staff normally in charge of other tasks) to manage specific caseloads, shortening of processing times, applying accelerated procedures, reduction or change in format of benefits provided during the process (in particular by reducing cash benefits) and strengthened voluntary or forced return programmes. Lists of safe countries of origin remain an important tool in managing certain caseloads, whereby applications submitted by applicants from such a country of origin are typically being processed in an accelerated manner, for Member States who use those types of procedures.


Measures concerning push factors included high level visits and initiatives to develop migration partnership aiming at a more comprehensive approach to migration; local visits and information campaigns aimed at clarifying the misconceptions of potential applicants regarding the intended destination country.

EASO highlighted in its report that the combination of short processing time and lowered cash benefits seemed to bring most change in terms of lowering the number of applications filed in a Member States.

The topic of multiple applications in various Member States falls directly under the Dublin procedures and related statistics collected by Eurostat. Unfortunately, statistics are not very informative since they are not disag-

Figure 23. While the total number of detections of illegal stay was relatively stable at the EU level between 2012 and 2013, significant differences can be seen among Member States with large increases both in the volume and in percentage change in Germany and Bulgaria and large decreases in Greece and Italy

Detections of illegal stay in 2013 with percentage change on 2012



gregated by citizenship. The lack of cohort statistics on international protection also means that decision figures and asylum applications cannot be compared. Indeed, the delay for examining a claim and issuing a de-

cision are significant and vary widely among EU States. As a consequence, the decisions issued throughout 2013 do not systematically relate to claims lodged in 2013 and both indicators need to be interpreted with caution.



3.3.2. Detections of illegal stay

Through Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN), Member States also report on the number of third-country nationals who have been detected by Member State authorities while not fulfilling, or no longer fulfilling, the conditions for stay or residence, whether they were detected inland or while trying to exit the territory.

The number of detections of illegal stay includes third-country nationals who are not in the possession of a valid visa, residence permit, travel document etc., or being in breach of a decision to leave the country. It also includes third-country nationals who initially entered legally but overstayed their permission to stay.

In 2013, there were 344 888 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which represents a generally stable trend compared to the year before and the recent reporting periods. This is consistent with a stable but slightly declining long-term trend over the past five years. In 2008, there were 441 237 detections of illegal stay, or 28% more than in 2013.

In the following analysis of detections of illegal stay, it has to be kept in mind that the Netherlands, for 2012 and 2013, due to technical reasons, only reported detections on exit and not detections made inland, which in 2011 amounted to about 6 000. Also in Sweden, for administrative reasons, many asylum applicants were also reported as illegal stayers, raising the total number of detections of illegal stay in Sweden. Finally, detections for Croatia (1 397) corresponded to detections between July and December 2013, after the country joined the EU.

The overall stable trends masked large difference between Member States. Germany continued to rank first and also reported the highest absolute increase. Most of the in-

crease was due to increase in detections of Russians and Syrians. The second largest increase in volume was reported by Bulgaria, mostly of Syrians. This increase coincided with an increase in detections of illegal border-crossing and asylum applications.

But several Member States also reported very large decreases, notably Greece where detections dropped by 41% between 2012 and 2013. The decrease was also significant in Italy, where detections dropped by 22% between 2012 and 2013.

The vast majority of illegal stayers were detected inland (290 978 detections, or 84% of the total) and so are presumed to be long-term over stayers as they were making no attempt to leave at the time of detection. The next most common location for detections of illegal stayers was those exiting at the air (30 883 detections or 9% of the total) followed by the land borders (17 677 detections, or 5%) whereby illegally staying migrants were leaving the EU or the Schengen area.

In terms of nationalities, the large number of Syrians detected staying illegally is artificially inflated by detections in Sweden which includes people not meeting requirements for staying in Sweden before they apply for asylum. Looking at detections in the past few years, Moroccans stand out as one of the main nationalities detected staying illegally (above 20 000 annual detections between 2009 and 2013), although their detections at the external borders remain much lower. This tends to indicate that Moroccans tend to cross legally the external borders, but then overstay their legal period of stay within the EU. The same applies to Algerians, although in lower number (above 10 000 annual detections for illegal stay between 2009 and 2013). Afghans also stand out as among the top nationalities since 2009, but are showing a decreasing trend, with 38 637 detections in 2009 and 16 836 detections in 2013. The decreasing trend in de-

tections for staying illegally coincides with a decreasing trend in detections at the border, as well as a decrease in applications for asylum.

3.3.3. Returns

In terms of data on return of third-country nationals in third-countries, the first set refers to Member States decisions to return third-country nationals and the second set concerns effectively carried out returns. The number of decisions to return has traditionally been much lower than that of effective returns due to a number of factors, such as the fact that a number of decisions in some Member States are issued to persons who are not staying legally but then apply for asylum, and are thus not returned.

Data on returns focus on return to third-countries, and exclude readmissions of third-country nationals carried out between Member States.


Decisions to return

In 2013, there were 224 305 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which was a 17% decrease compared to 2012. The absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from, inter alia, France and the Netherlands, while Sweden, which is assumed to have issued high numbers of decisions, only reported effective returns.

Much of the change between 2012 and 2013 was due to a decrease in return decisions by Greece (-49 % between 2012 and 2013). This decrease is in line with decreases reported by Greece in detections of illegal border-crossing (-46%) and of illegally staying persons (-40%). By contrast, return decisions significantly increased in the UK, which ranked first in 2013, as well as in Austria.

Figure 24. **In 2013, 40% of the effective returns were voluntary**

Effective returns in 2013, by type



Source: FRAN data as of 10 February 2014

Effective returns

In 2013, there was a steady trend of 160 699 third-country nationals effectively returned to outside the EU. The UK was the Member State conducting the highest number of returns, with steady trends of returned Indians and Pakistanis. Greece reported an increase in effective returns, mostly of Albanians following their increased detections for illegal border-crossing in 2013. Effective returns nearly doubled in Bulgaria, in the wake of the increased detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border with Turkey.

Type of effective return

It is difficult to evaluate the overall cost-effectiveness of return measures in comparison with other practical measures taken to reduce irregular migration. However, forced returns are recognised as being more costly than voluntary returns, although Member States highlight the importance of return flights (including those co-ordinated by Frontex) in ensuring an effective return, as well as having a deterrent effect for future irregular migrants.*

* European Migration Network Synthesis Report, *Practical Measures to Reduce Irregular Migration*, 2012



Within the number of effective returns to third countries, 40% were reported to be on a voluntary basis and 54% were forced returns. The UK and Poland reported the largest number of voluntary returns, and Greece, the UK and France accounted for nearly half of the forced returns. As in 2012, most of the forced returns in 2013 concerned Albanians returned by Greece, followed by Pakistanis.

3.3.4. Detections of facilitators

Overall detections of facilitators fell by 10% between 2012 and 2013, from 7 720 to 6 902. This decrease is consistent with a more general long-term decreasing trend in detections of facilitators of irregular migration. In 2008 and 2009, there were more than 9 000 such detections.

According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to gain entry to the EU, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossing.

Member States tend to detect more domestic facilitators than any other nationality; in 2013, all of the top three reporting countries for this indicator reported their own citizens as facilitators more frequently than any other single nationality. Among the countries reporting the most facilitators this propensity was strongest in Italy and Spain, where about a third of all detected facilitators were of their own nationality. In France, domestic facilitators accounted for about a fifth of all detections.

Facilitation of illegal immigration consists of three aspects or sub-phenomena: (1) facilitation of irregular migrants' entry to the EU via the EU external borders; (2) facilitation of irregular migrants' secondary movements within the EU (within the Schengen area or between Schengen and the EU); and (3) facilitation of migration status transition of irregular migrants within the EU, i.e. the legalisation of their residence status. Organised crime groups can be involved in any of the three areas.



© Frontex, 2012

4. Environmental scan

1. European Commission's priorities in 2014

a) Fight against trafficking in human beings

In the context of the implementation of the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings and the implementation of the Joint Statement of the Head of the EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies, the European Commission reflects on the following issues regarding trafficking in human beings:

- Early identification of victims is of primary importance in the EU legal and political framework. In September 2013, the European Commission published a *Reference Document on Guidelines on the Identification of Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings* addressed especially to border guards and consular services. This Reference Document was based on *Frontex Anti-trafficking Training for Border Guards – Trainer's Manual* and the *Handbook for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel on how to Assist and Protect Victims of Human Trafficking* (produced by the Council of the Baltic Sea States – CBSS).
- The European Commission has also funded a project that will develop guidelines for better identification of victims, taking into account the EC/ILO 2009 lists of indicators on trafficking of human beings, in order

to facilitate a more harmonised approach and to improve identification.

The first evaluation report of the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings will be published by the European Commission in mid-2014.

b) Improving the knowledge regarding irregular secondary movements of third-country nationals within the EU

The Council has identified strategic priority areas where efforts need to be stepped up and monitored in relation to irregular immigration. Under one of those strategic priority areas, a number of goals are listed, including 'Strengthening identification of illegal immigration routes inside the Schengen area'. Member States generally agree that there is a need for better data collection and analysis, that the Commission should play a role in this and that existing structures should be used to the greatest extent possible.

Three groups of third-country nationals involved in secondary movements within the Schengen area could be distinguished: (a) migrants who have entered illegally; (b) migrants who have entered legally but are no longer entitled to stay in the Schengen area (overstayers); and (c) asylum seekers (who have moved to another Member State from the one where they have initially submitted their application).



Following more than a year of preparatory work, the Frontex Risk Analysis Network agreed in December 2013 on indicators of these movements to be regularly collected as of January 2014. The knowledge gathered through the regular data collection and the analytical follow up, should feed into the assessment of the functioning of the Schengen area and to the strategic level discussion on possible measures aimed at countering unauthorised secondary movements of third-country nationals within the EU.

2. Implementation of Objective 4 of the Internal Security Strategy

a) The second generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II)

The focus for the Commission in 2014/2015 will be to monitor correct implementation by Member States of all SIS II functionalities (new data categories, linking between alert, European Arrest Warrant (EAW), photographs). Also, the European Commission will present a report on the use of fingerprints in SIS II in accordance with Article 22(c) of the legal basis. Finally, the Commission will follow up the integration of possible new Member States and Europol.

b) The roll-out and impact of Visa Information System (VIS)

The VIS will be rolled out, region by region, until all Schengen states' consulates worldwide are connected. The global roll-out will take at least until spring 2015. So far, the VIS has started operations in North Africa in October 2011, in the Near East in May 2012, in the Gulf region, in October 2012, in West and Central Africa in March 2013, in East and Southern Africa in June 2013, in South America in September 2013 and in Central and South East Asia and in the occupied Palestinian Territory in November 2013.

The following tentative dates have so far been agreed for the roll-out in 2014:

- 15 May 2014: Central America, North America, the Caribbean, Australasia
- 25 September 2014: Western Balkans and Turkey, the Eastern neighbouring countries

However a few Member States consider they might need more time for the roll-out in countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. The roll-out for the remaining regions will not take place before 2015.

State of play of entry/exit system and registered traveller programme

The Smart Borders Package will re-examine and test both a detailed design of the technical architecture and the underlying operational processes. Its objective will be to ensure that the best possible choices are made both from a technical and cost-benefit point of view, taking into account the need for a high level of data protection.

c) EUROSUR Regulation

On 2 December 2013 the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) became operational. EUROSUR will be operational in 30 countries in total. In this first phase, it will become operational in 19 countries, the 18 EU Member States at the southern and eastern external borders and the Schengen Associated Country Norway. As of 1 December 2014, another eight EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries will join EUROSUR. Ireland and the UK do not take part in the Schengen cooperation and therefore also not involved in EUROSUR.

The backbone of EUROSUR is formed by 'national coordination centres', via which all national authorities with a responsibility for border surveillance (e.g. border guard, police, coast guard, navy) are required to cooperate and to coordinate their activities.

Information on incidents occurring at the external land and sea borders, the status and position of patrols as well as analytical reports and intelligence are being shared via 'national situational pictures' among these national authorities.

This cooperation and information exchange allows the concerned Member State to react much faster to any incidents concerning irregular migration and cross-border crime or relating to a risk to the lives of migrants.

Frontex plays an important role in bringing together and analysing in the 'European situational picture' information collected by Member States, thereby detecting changing routes or new methods used by criminal networks. This European situational picture also contains information collected during Frontex joint operations and on the pre-frontier area. Furthermore, Frontex cooperates with other EU agencies, such as the European Maritime Safety Agency and the EU Satellite Centre.

3. The new Internal Security Fund and financing in the area of Home Affairs for the period 2014–2020

The final text of the ISF Borders was agreed between the three institutions in December 2013. Despite important cuts in the initial budget, the main features of this instrument proposed by the Commission have remained in the final text. The global resources for the implementation between 2014 and 2020 (seven years) will be EUR 2 760 million, of which 1 551 shall be allocated to the Member States. The main features of the funds are described below:

- support and reinforce the national capabilities in the area of border control and visa policy and thus expressing financial solidarity with the tasks entrusted to individual Member States at external bor-

ders and in consulates in the interest of the border-free area as a public service provided to the Union;

- finance the development of the smart border package, i.e. the setting up of an EU Entry/Exit System (EES) and an EU Registered Traveller Programme (RTP);
- finance the introduction and operation of the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR, notably through the purchase of equipment, infrastructure and systems in Member States;
- reinforce the Schengen governance and the evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis by (a) funding the operation of that mechanism under direct management; (b) introducing conditionalities based on compliance with the Schengen acquis for the disbursement of operating support to Member States and (c) requiring Member States to (re)allocate resources received for programmes under this instrument with priority to remedy weaknesses if these have been identified under the mechanism;
- boost the operational potential of the Frontex Agency by inviting Member States to earmark additional resources under their programmes for specialised equipment which can be put at the disposal of the Agency for its Joint Operations;
- support the development and implementation of the relevant Union policies in the EU, in and with third countries under 'Union actions', thus improving the overall management of migration flows to the Union (projects managed either directly, such as studies or pilot projects to reinforce co-operation with third countries, or indirectly, in accordance with the Financial Regulation);



- have readily available adequate resources to provide emergency assistance in case of situations of urgent or exceptional migratory pressure;
- continue support for the functioning of the Specific Transit Scheme for Lithuania, in accordance with the obligations of the EU, providing support to compensate for foregone fees from transit visas and additional costs incurred by Lithuania in implementing the Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) and Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) scheme, such as replacing and upgrading equipment, IT systems, training and operational costs.

4. The Schengen Governance legislative package

Already in mid-September 2011, the Commission presented a communication entitled 'Schengen Governance – strengthening the area without internal border control'. The package contained two legislative proposals, a regulation on the establishment of an evalua-

tion and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis (10597/13) and one an amendment to the Schengen Borders Code as regards the rules for the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances (PE-CO S 30/13). The package that aims to be the EU's response to potential derogations and restrictions to liberty of circulation was finally adopted in October 2013.

a) Schengen evaluation mechanism

The revision of the Schengen evaluation mechanism is quite extensive. Increased importance of the Commission and significantly enhanced follow-up procedures regarding how identified deficiencies in any Member State should be remedied are two most striking changes.

Also, Schengen evaluations now cover all aspects of the Schengen acquis, including the absence of border controls at internal borders and can also be conducted as unannounced on-site visits. Importantly, recommendations from Frontex annual risk analysis will be taken into account by the Commission when drafting annual evaluation programmes and deciding on unannounced on-site visits.

b) Reintroduction of border control at internal borders

Schengen states reserve their severing right to unilaterally reintroduce internal border controls. The main novelties are linked to duration, geographic scope and procedure to be followed when a Member State wishes to reintroduce internal border controls.

Namely, the amendments stipulate that reintroduction of border control is also possible for specific parts of internal border and not just the entire border section in question. This solution reflects the reality of the situation since border controls are often only



Procedure for reintroducing border control at internal borders

[Member] States which want to reinstate border control must provide details of the situation to the Commission and its partners and, if required, convince them of the necessity of such measures through joint meetings. This 'explanation process' carries three major consequences. Firstly, the new measures strongly restrict Member States' discretionary powers. Or, from a different angle, the Member States' 'safeguard clause' is subject to a powerful instance of 'communitisation'. Further, the amendment gives the Commission and the Member States the opportunity to appeal to the Court of Justice when, for instance, a state reintroduces border control without having convinced its partners of the necessity and proportionality.

Source: Yves Pascouau, European Policy Centre, December 2013



necessary at a certain section of the internal border in question.

They also clarify the maximum duration for which border control may be reintroduced, whether it is for foreseeable events (up to six months) or in an emergency (up to two months). Importantly, an obligation for Member States to provide more specific reasoning behind the reintroduction of internal borders is also a novelty worth mentioning (see box for details).

Probably the most important change is linked to specific measures in the case of serious deficiencies relating to the external border controls. Namely, if evaluation report under the Schengen evaluation mechanism concludes that a Member State has been seriously neglecting its obligations, the Council may on the basis of a Commission proposal recommend that one or more specific Member States reintroduce border controls at all or specific parts of the internal borders. In such extreme case, the Council's initiative (recommendation and not obligation) is considered as a last resort.

5. Schengen visa policy developments

In the first half of 2014 it is expected that the visa-free regime will be applicable with Moldova, after the country is transferred to the visa-free list of Regulation 539/2001. If the visa-free regime would lead to abuses, then the new suspension mechanism could be triggered.

An additional 19 countries (16 Pacific and Caribbean island nations, the United Arab Emirates, Peru and Colombia) will probably be transferred to the visa-free list of Regulation 539/2001 in April 2014, but visa-free travel will need to wait until the negotiation and entry into force of visa waiver agreements with each of these countries – which means prob-

ably until 2015 at least. Moreover, the negotiations for the visa waiver agreements with Peru and Colombia will only start after the Commission presents a positive assessment of the risks involved, particularly in terms of irregular migration and security. It is unlikely that the move to grant visa-free status to the 16 Caribbean and Pacific island nations and to the UAE will bring any additional risks in terms of migration and security.

Towards the end of the year 2014, the Commission may propose a new revision of the lists of countries of Regulation 539/2001, using a new methodology that will take into account not only the traditional security and irregular immigration criteria but also economic and human rights considerations.

'Touring visa'

In March 2014, the European Commission will present a proposal recasting and amending the Visa Code and a proposal to establish a new 'touring visa', allowing to circulate in the Schengen area for more than 90 days per 180 days without staying longer than 90 days in one Schengen state. Due to upcoming European elections, this proposal will be adopted by the co-legislators not before 2015.

6. Possible evocation of the so-called 'Visa safeguard clause' by Member States already in 2014

The visa suspension mechanism has been available to Member States since 9 January 2014. Member States can now request the Commission to temporarily suspend the visa-free regime with a third country when at least one of the criteria listed in Regulation 1289/2013 is met (see box).

The European Commission is aware of the still worrying numbers of unfounded asylum applications from citizens of some Western



Balkan countries in some Member States, in particular in Germany.

7. Revised Dublin Regulation

On 29 June 2013, the EC Regulation 343/2003, known as Dublin II, was recast. The new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, known as Dublin III, was jointly adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council. This new regulation, applicable as of 1 January 2014, intends to harmonise practices already

in place in the Member States and improve the asylum system efficiency.

The new regulation establishes more concrete criteria and clarifies which Member State is responsible for examining an application for international protection.

It also contains more provisions to protect the applicants as a new right to information for asylum applicants and the compulsory obligation to a personal interview. New clauses concerning children's rights and family reunification were also introduced, in order to guarantee the minors best interests and better ensure family reunification.

There was also a strong emphasis concerning the fundamental rights covered by this new regulation. In this regard, it contains a new provision on judicial remedies for asylum seekers to challenge the Dublin decisions where transfers would not be in compliance with their fundamental rights and there was the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.

According to the European Commission, the new regulation will have no or no significant impacts on the distribution of the asylum applications. The principles of the system remain the same in the recast, and, most importantly, the main criteria for establishing the Member State responsible remain unchanged.

According to UNHCR, the recast statutes, which will require extensive transposition at the national level in 2014, strengthen protection standards. However, discrepancies in implementation persist, leading to protection gaps in some countries and posing challenges to the functioning of the Common European Asylum System. These include challenges in the application of the Dublin III Regulation, which determines which Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application.



Criteria from Regulation 1289/2013

Article 1a

A Member State may notify the Commission if it is confronted, over a six-month period, in comparison with the same period in the previous year or with the last six months prior to the implementation of the exemption from the visa requirement for nationals of a third country listed in Annex II, with one or more of the following circumstances leading to an emergency situation which it is unable to remedy on its own, namely a substantial and sudden increase in the number of:

- (a) nationals of that third country found to be staying in the Member State's territory without a right thereto;
- (b) asylum applications from the nationals of that third country for which the recognition rate is low, where such an increase is leading to specific pressures on the Member State's asylum system;
- (c) rejected readmission applications submitted by the Member State to that third country for its own nationals.

The comparison with the six-month period prior to the implementation of the exemption from the visa requirement as referred to in the first subparagraph shall only be applicable during a period of seven years from the date of implementation of the exemption from the visa requirement for nationals of that third country.



Eurodac changes

Until recently the Eurodac database could only be used for asylum purposes. However, the European Commission's proposal to recast the Eurodac Regulation (603/2013) includes an extension to the scope of the Regulation in order to allow law-enforcement authorities in Member States as well as Europol to compare latent fingerprints from crime scenes with Eurodac fingerprint data for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating serious crimes and terrorism.

According to the legislation there are several restrictions to use the information stored in the Eurodac system*:

- Limited searches only to the most serious crimes, such as murder and terrorism;
- Law-enforcement authorities must undertake a comparison of fingerprints against the Visa Information System (where permitted);
- Law-enforcement checks may not be made in a systematic way, but only as a last resort when all the conditions for access are fulfilled;
- No data received from Eurodac may be shared with third countries.

Entry into force and impact on distribution of asylum applications

The recast Eurodac Regulation will be applicable from 20 July 2015. According to the European Commission, it will have no impact on the changes on distribution of asylum applications or secondary movements, but there is a change concerning persons who have been granted international protection. Until now, if someone applies for asylum, it has not been possible to check whether they were previously granted protection in another Member State. From the mentioned date onwards, it will be possible for a Member State to see if the person already has a status elsewhere and, if so, it should be possible to return that

person to the Member State that granted protection.

8. EU Readmission Agreements – state of play regarding new agreements

According to the information provided by the European Commission, the Readmission Agreement with Turkey was signed on 16 December 2013 and will enter into force once the European Parliament gives its consent and the Turkish Parliament ratifies it.

A Readmission Agreement with Azerbaijan was initialled in July 2013. Preparations for the signature are being made, after which entry into force is expected to follow without delay.

Negotiation of the Readmission Agreement with Morocco is expected to be re-launched soon. The parallel negotiation of a Visa Facilitation Agreement, as part of the EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership, should break the current deadlock. A similar process is foreseen for Tunisia, although negotiating directives for a Readmission Agreement have not yet been recommended to the Council.

Readmission negotiations with Belarus were officially launched on 29 January 2014, following an initial invitation to open negotiations in 2011. A first round of technical negotiations is expected to be held in March 2014. The course and length of negotiations is, according to the European Commission, difficult to predict, though the parallel negotiation of Visa Facilitation Agreement is expected to facilitate the process. For comparison, the agreement with Armenia, which is the most recent to enter into force, required a period of around 20 months from the start of negotiations until entry into force.

* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-of-applicants/index_en.htm



Analysis of Eurodac 'hits' data for 2012

The Eurodac statistics are based on records of (1) fingerprints from all individuals aged 14 years or over who have made applications for asylum in the Member States ('category 1'), (2) fingerprints of persons who were apprehended when crossing a Member State's external border irregularly ('category 2'), or (3) persons who were found illegally present on the territory of a Member State (in case the competent authorities consider it necessary to check a potential prior asylum application) ('category 3').

In 2012, a total of 34.4% of all multiple applications were local hits* (down from 38.6% in 2011). In a number of Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK) this figure even exceeds 50%. In the case of Belgium, local hits accounted for 10 037 of the 14 883 applications (67.4%) and in Cyprus local hits accounted for 139 of the 148 applications (93.9%).

Foreign hits** give an indication of the secondary movements of asylum seekers in the EU. As in previous years, the statistics confirm that the secondary movements witnessed do not necessarily follow the 'logical' routes between neighbouring Member States. For instance, France continued to receive the highest number of foreign hits from asylum seekers who previously lodged an application in Poland (2 498). Germany and Switzerland received a high number of asylum seekers who had previously lodged an application in Sweden (2 567 and 1 050, respectively). The statistics show, as in previous years, that foreign hits are not a one-way street from the countries with an external land border or those bordering the Mediterranean to the more northerly Member States.

When comparing 2012 with 2011 an increase from 21% to 65.3% can be observed in the number of cases of persons apprehended in connection with an irregular border-crossing who later decide to lodge an asylum claim. This reflects an increase in absolute terms from 7 384 in 2011 to 17 319 in 2012.

The majority of those who entered the EU illegally via Italy and moved on, travelled to Switzerland (2 978), Germany (1 359) or Sweden (881). Those who moved on after having entered illegally via Greece mainly went to Germany (2 168), Sweden (1 612) or Austria (1 216). Of those entering via Spain, most moved on to either France (410), Germany (284), Belgium (259) or Switzerland (242), while those who moved on after having had their fingerprints taken in Hungary mainly moved on to the neighbouring countries of Germany (61) or Austria (59).

* 'Local hits' are cases where a person making an asylum application in a Member State is discovered to have previously applied for asylum in the same Member State.

** 'Foreign hits' are cases where a person making an asylum application in a Member State is discovered to have previously applied for asylum or detected for illegal border-crossing in another Member State.



© Frontex, 2012

5. Outlook

This chapter reviews the possible evolution of the situation along the external border of the EU in the coming years. While some developments are likely to materialise, others seem possible, based on current knowledge. Finally, past experiences demonstrate that there are a large number of unforeseeable events and factors that can have a profound and unpredictable impact on the situation at the border.

5.1. The likely

The best forecasts – those likely to materialise and have a direct bearing on the situation at the external borders – are the continued use of the Mediterranean area as the main crossing points for irregular migration, and the growing workload of border-control authorities due to growth of passengers flows and the introduction in October 2014 of compulsory biometric check on VIS Schengen visa holders. At the same time, border-control authorities are increasingly expected to be engaged in search and rescue operations covering vast areas of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as being the first interlocutors for a growing number of persons presenting themselves at the EU borders in search of international protection. Budget environment is expected to remain tight over the next few years.

5.1.1. Illegal border-crossing expected to remain concentrated in southern and south-eastern borders of the EU

Based on the location of the main countries of origin for irregular migration to the EU for the past five years, the border areas that are most likely to deal with illegal border-crossing remain the Southern Mediterranean coast, and the borders with Turkey. Migrants living in or having relatively easy/facilitated access to Turkey and/or North Africa will continue to be overrepresented in the flow of irregular migrants to the EU. In particular, departures of sub-Saharan migrants from Libya across the Central Mediterranean to reach Italy and arrivals of Syrians crossing the border illegally to apply for asylum in the EU – two phenomena already present in 2013 – are likely to continue in the near future.

Southern Mediterranean area

On the Eastern Mediterranean route, enhanced surveillance along the Greek land border with Turkey has resulted in a displacement to the Eastern Aegean Sea and the Bulgarian land border with Turkey. Displacement to the Eastern Aegean Sea is expected to put pressure on the limited local reception facilities for undocumented migrants and increase the allocation of resources for search and rescue operations, as well as increase the possibility of migrants continuing undetected their journey to Western European Member States.



The Bulgarian authorities will carry on building and renovating reception facilities but resources are being stretched and migrants will continue to consider crossing illegally the land border between Turkey and Greece as an option to reach their final destinations in the EU. Among those migrants, Syrians are the most vulnerable and the likelihood of humanitarian crisis at the EU border will remain significant until the situation in Syria improves. The ability to provide consistent and timely measures and actions will be crucial for coping with security and humanitarian risks.

In addition, an increasing number of migrants from North Africa and the Middle East are expected to transit to Turkey via the air border, before attempting to cross illegally the border to the EU, including through the use of forged document. Istanbul airport (IST) is an important hub for irregular migrants travelling by air route to several Member States, with continuous increase in passenger flows for the past few years and airline carriers' expansion towards Africa and the Middle East. Turkish airports are thus likely to remain common embarking points for irregular migrants arriving in the EU.

Central Mediterranean area

In the Central Mediterranean, many areas on the North African coasts may be used as departure points for illegal border-crossing to the EU. At the end of 2013, departures from Libya were increasing, but Egypt and Tunisia also offer crossing options for potential migrants. North African countries may be used as transit countries for migrants from more southern African countries to sail across the Mediterranean. They may be used as transit by migrants from many different origins, which complicate further predictions in terms of volume.

The increasing detections of illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean, along

with the increasing complexity of irregular arrivals are expected to absorb a significant proportion of resources. The broadening of the surveillance area results in border assets being increasingly mobilised in support of search and rescue activities.

5.1.2. Increased workload at the border

Regular passenger flows across the external border will increase significantly in the coming years due to rising global mobility. Visa liberalisation processes and local border traffic agreements are placing also increasing responsibilities on border-control authorities.

Air travel environment is becoming more complex with the growth of low-cost carriers. Also the advances in travel complexity and growing sophistication of criminal activities generate increasing workloads for border-control officers and difficulties in developing risk assessments of planes and passengers.


In addition, the EU continues to receive a high number of asylum seekers. A substantial number of economic migrants appear to use the asylum procedure to try entering or staying on the territory of the EU. Their first interlocutors are often border-control authorities.

5.1.3. VIS implemented at BCPs in October 2014

The Visa Information System (VIS) is a system for the exchange of information on short-stay visas between Member States. The VIS was established via Council Decision 2004/512/EC of 8 June 2004. The main objectives of the VIS are to facilitate visa application procedures and checks at the external borders and to enhance security. The VIS facilitates the exchange of data between Schengen states on visa applications in order to ease procedures, prevent 'visa shopping' and assist in the fight against fraud.

Figure 25. VIS was rolled-out in eleven regions in 2011–2013. The roll-out will continue with the remaining twelve regions adopting VIS during 2014 and 2015, although no dates have yet been agreed on

Roll-out status of the Visa Information System by world region



The VIS became operational on 11 October 2011. The start of the VIS operations has had major consequences for the EU's border authorities. By the end of the transitional period, three years after VIS began, i.e. in October 2014, all Schengen Member States will be required to be able to carry out VIS fingerprint verifications at all BCPs and also be able to issue VIS visas with biometrics at the border when necessary.

The obligation for consulates to exchange visa data follows a roll-out calendar established for 23 regions of the world (see Fig. 25). At the end of 2013, consulates in 11 regions were already using the VIS. Data on visas issued in 2013 is not yet available, but together these 11 regions represented 23% of all visas issued

in 2012. The roll-out will continue throughout 2014, but definite dates have not yet been determined by the Council. Member States are still debating on the most practical way to roll-out the VIS in regions representing the bulk of short-term visa application and issuance, in particular the Russian Federation (Region 18), alone representing 42% of all visas issued in 2012.

The VIS Regulation (Article 18) provides the border guards carrying out border checks at the external borders with access to consult the VIS data. This access is for the sole purpose of verifying the identity of the visa holder, the authenticity of the visa and/or whether the conditions for entry to the territory of the Member States are fulfilled.



During the initial period, between October 2011 and October 2014, this verification can either be accomplished with the visa sticker number (VSN) or with the VSN in combination with the fingerprints of the holder. After October 2014, the verification will be accomplished with the visa sticker number (VSN) in combination with the fingerprints of the holder, unless exceptional circumstances (for instance due to the intensity of traffic) mean that in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code the visa holder is exempted from fingerprinting.

Thus, as of October 2014, the workload for border-control authorities will increase significantly. Based on available statistics on Schengen visas issued in 2012, and assuming that VIS roll-out took place in Regions 12 to 17, it can be estimated that about 500 000 VIS Schengen visas will be issued and will thus have to be checked by border control. This estimate does not take into account passengers travelling on multiple entry visas, who can cross the border several times within a six-month period.

Eventually, in 2015, assuming that the VIS roll-out takes place in Regions 18 to 23, including in the Russian Federation, China and Turkey, the number of VIS visas issued every month can be estimated at about 1.2 million.

While there were some discussions in 2013 about granting visa-free travel for Russian citizens, an option that would have considerably changed the impact of the VIS rollout, at an extraordinary meeting on 6 March 2014, the European Council (EU heads of state or government) decided to suspend bilateral talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters. This means that, at the time of writing, visa-free travel for Russian citizens has been postponed indefinitely.

The Schengen Borders Code does not currently impose mandatory consultation of the

VIS on exit. However, a thorough check on exit comprises, among other things, a verification that the person is in possession of a valid visa, if required, and it may include consultation with the VIS in accordance with Article 18 of the VIS Regulation.

It is important to stress that VIS is a tool for border guards, but the VIS result alone is not sufficient to refuse entry. When an issue is spotted during first-line check, passengers must still be sent to second-line checks for additional verification and final decision.

5.1.4. Budget cuts

The economic crisis led to reductions in public funding in many Member States and at the EU level. These reductions have already impacted several border-control agencies and significant annual savings are to be expected over future budgets, which has an impact on the capability and capacity to respond to challenges faced at the border.

5.2. The possible

5.2.1. Continued involvement of organised crime groups

It is possible that organised crime groups (OCGs) will get increasingly involved in the facilitation of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings across the EU. There are growing reports that facilitators not only provide assistance to cross the border illegally, but also facilitate the stay of irregular migrants in Member States by providing fraudulent documents.

However, there remain large uncertainties as to the level of organisation that can range from very structured enterprises to opportunistic groups. Little is also known about the extent of the connection between the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings. While by definition irregular mi-

gration is linked to international movements, there remain many unknowns as to the international dimension of the OCGs involved in these activities. Some information point to the fact that leader of the OCGs are most often of the nationality of the smuggled persons, while other indicate the involvement of many opportunistic groups not necessarily specialising in the smuggling of migrants from a single nationality.

5.2.2. Document fraud

Given the increasing level of security features in modern travel documents and stricter migration policies across Member States, the misuse of genuine travel documents (which includes impersonation and fraudulently obtained documents) is likely to be an entry method which will steadily rise.

Some of these issues will be addressed by the Visa Information System (VIS), which is operational among issuing authorities across 11 regions as of November 2013, and VIS will be rolled-out to additional regions in 2014 and 2015.

The systematic check on arrivals of VIS visas is likely to result in increased abuse of fraudulent breeder documents required to obtain genuine VIS, as well as EU passports which do not require systematic biometric controls at the border. In addition, the use of specific fraudulent techniques to deceive biometric checks, like spoofed fingerprints, is also likely to increase.

5.3. The unknown

5.3.1. Time and composition of irregular migration flows

Illegal-migration flows are expected to follow known routes from North Africa and the Middle East to the EU, mostly by sea and through the south-eastern land border via

Turkey. The main uncertainties concern the timing, as well as the size and composition of the flows. The composition and/or the size of the flow will vary in response to the developing situation in North Africa and in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and neighbouring countries.

Swift diversification of *modi operandi*, possible displacement between routes or border types, and escalating attempts to evade detection or identification are all likely to occur in response to enhanced surveillance.

5.3.2. Sudden political and economic changes

Political evolutions are hard to predict. There is no assurance that another sharp economic downturn or social unrest in neighbouring countries would not spur irregular migration. Though economic and social duress had long been present in North Africa, the rapidity and extent of the changes brought about by the Arab Spring that began in December 2010 were largely unexpected.

Similarly, another sharp economic downturn in the EU, or on the contrary, a strong rebound in economic growth and demand for labour in the EU, may not be excluded and may have considerable influence on irregular migration to the EU.

5.3.3. Migrants staying illegally in the EU

There is an intelligence gap on the profile of persons staying illegally in Member States, which prevents border-control authorities from effectively assessing entry criteria, in particular the assessment for lacking appropriate justification for the purpose of stay. Indeed, the indicator on detections of persons staying illegally is strongly influenced by the national resources devoted to their detections. As past experience of regularisation programmes has shown, the total number of



detections may under-represent some categories of migrants staying illegally but rather inconspicuous, like for example Ukrainians employed as domestic workers or providing care to the elderly.

5.3.4. Threat of terrorists' movements

Overall, there is an underlying threat of terrorism-related travel movements especially due to the appeal of the Syrian conflict to both idealist and radicalised youths. The conflict in Syria has attracted hundreds of foreign fighters, including EU citizens, dual-nationality holders and other third-country nationals. Turkey has become the preferred country where foreign fighters enter or exit Syria primarily because of its geographical location plus the availability of legal and cheap travel options.

Irrespective of whether avoided or promoted by terrorist structures, it is possible that irregular migration routes and/or facilitation networks could be utilised especially if the associated risks and costs are perceived to be low in comparison to other legal travel options.

Frontex is not in a position to identify, nor does it have any information that suggests, any nexus between terrorist travel and irregular migration routings and/or facilitation networks. Nonetheless, the following possibilities cannot be excluded: changes in the travelling *modi operandi* for EU-based fighters after administrative and/or legal measures upon their return; and the reluctance of third-country national fighters to return home in fear of reprisal, which may lead them to resettle elsewhere.

6. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 10 February 2014, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
All Borders						
Syria	861	1 616	7 903	25 546	24	223
Eritrea	1 439	1 572	2 604	11 298	11	334
Afghanistan	25 918	22 994	13 169	9 494	8.8	-28
Albania	33 260	5 138	5 651	9 021	8.4	60
Kosovo*	393	540	990	6 357	5.9	542
Somalia	4 619	3 011	5 038	5 624	5.2	12
Pakistan	3 878	15 375	4 877	5 047	4.7	3.5
Not specified	1 592	11 900	2 113	3 570	3.3	69
Nigeria	559	6 893	826	3 386	3.2	310
Algeria	8 763	6 157	5 479	3 299	3.1	-40
Others	22 778	65 855	23 787	24 723	23	3.9
Total All Borders	104 060	141 051	72 437	107 365	100	48
Land Border						
Albania	32 592	5 076	5 460	8 833	19	62
Syria	530	1 254	6 416	8 601	18	34
Kosovo*	393	540	990	6 350	13	541
Afghanistan	22 844	20 396	9 838	4 392	9.3	-55
Not specified	1 304	2 747	1 817	3 469	7.4	91
Pakistan	3 675	13 781	3 344	3 211	6.8	-4.0
Algeria	6 961	4 671	4 081	2 500	5.3	-39
Palestine	2 661	652	1 195	723	1.5	-39
Morocco	1 319	2 236	1 422	693	1.5	-51
Bangladesh	1 506	3 575	4 751	687	1.5	-86
Others	16 015	14 951	9 869	7 733	16	-22
Total Land Borders	89 800	69 879	49 183	47 192	100	-4.0
Sea Border						
Syria	331	362	1 487	16 945	28	1 040
Eritrea	507	680	1 942	10 953	18	464
Afghanistan	3 074	2 598	3 331	5 102	8.5	53
Somalia	517	1 513	3 480	5 054	8.4	45
Nigeria	196	6 380	575	2 870	4.8	399
Egypt	713	1 948	1 283	2 749	4.6	114
Gambia	125	511	514	2 722	4.5	430
Mali	23	2 484	422	2 236	3.7	430
Pakistan	203	1 594	1 533	1 836	3.1	20
Senegal	10	453	145	1 391	2.3	859
Others	8 561	52 649	8 542	8 315	14	-2.7
Total Sea Borders	14 260	71 172	23 254	60 173	100	159

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 2. Clandestine entries at BCPs

Detections reported by top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type						
Land	168	159	484	558	93	15
Sea	74	123	115	41	6.8	-64
Top Ten Nationalities						
Syria	3	6	42	181	30	331
Afghanistan	8	58	190	128	21	-33
Algeria	35	55	61	48	8.0	-21
Morocco	14	15	24	33	5.5	38
Kosovo*	1	0	12	30	5.0	150
Pakistan	12	10	24	30	5.0	25
Turkey	93	24	42	21	3.5	-50
Israel	0	0	0	20	3.3	n.a.
Ghana	0	0	5	14	2.3	180
Iraq	7	14	14	12	2.0	-14
Others	69	100	185	82	14	-56
Total	242	282	599	599	100	0

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 3. Facilitators

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type						
Inland	5 918	5 146	5 186	4 712	68	-9.1
Land	1 171	625	887	725	11	-18
Land Intra-EU	616	365	498	558	8.1	12
Sea	503	324	471	396	5.7	-16
Air	300	367	358	271	3.9	-24
Not specified	121	130	320	240	3.5	-25
Top Ten Nationalities						
Not specified	261	255	479	644	9.3	34
Italy	1 367	568	543	559	8.1	2.9
China	554	375	316	350	5.1	11
Morocco	413	390	461	347	5.0	-25
Egypt	160	173	199	304	4.4	53
Albania	430	221	243	285	4.1	17
France	365	404	352	271	3.9	-23
Spain	285	320	498	241	3.5	-52
Bulgaria	287	178	159	219	3.2	38
Romania	398	268	364	217	3.1	-40
Others	4 109	3 805	4 106	3 465	50	-16
Total	8 629	6 957	7 720	6 902	100	-11

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Place of Detection						
Inland	295 274	283 308	278 438	290 978	84	4.5
Air	29 322	33 126	35 410	31 009	9.0	-12
Land	7 011	17 640	19 883	17 677	5.1	-11
Land Intra-EU	12 996	9 230	5 832	3 216	0.9	-45
Sea	7 232	6 593	4 585	1 396	0.4	-70
Between BCP	1 233	1 049	724	574	0.2	-21
Not specified	9	2	56	38		-32
Top Ten Nationalities						
Syria	3 160	3 746	11 967	26 355	7.6	120
Morocco	22 183	21 887	21 268	26 250	7.6	23
Not specified	7 862	7 155	9 207	20 704	6.0	125
Afghanistan	21 104	25 296	24 395	16 836	4.9	-31
Albania	20 862	10 207	13 264	16 166	4.7	22
Russian Federation	9 471	10 314	11 486	14 722	4.3	28
Algeria	14 261	15 398	15 776	14 474	4.2	-8.3
Pakistan	10 508	12 621	18 334	14 205	4.1	-23
Ukraine	8 835	12 847	13 081	12 467	3.6	-4.7
Tunisia	8 350	22 864	15 211	10 637	3.1	-30
Others	226 481	208 613	190 939	172 072	50	-9.9
Total	353 077	350 948	344 928	344 888	100	0

Annex Table 5. Refusals of entry

Refusals by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
All Borders						
Russian Federation	9 171	9 225	10 113	22 697	18	124
Ukraine	18 744	15 811	18 108	16 376	13	-9.6
Albania	2 324	15 983	12 060	11 564	9.0	-4.1
Serbia	6 543	6 672	5 652	8 181	6.3	45
Georgia	3 328	2 801	8 846	8 100	6.3	-8.4
Morocco	2 349	4 168	3 934	5 049	3.9	28
Belarus	5 662	5 983	5 035	4 572	3.5	-9.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	895	1 762	1 693	3 523	2.7	108
Turkey	3 663	3 353	3 086	2 999	2.3	-2.8
Brazil	6 178	4 777	3 042	2 524	2.0	-17
Others	49 794	47 742	44 633	43 317	34	-2.9
Total All Borders	108 651	118 277	116 202	128 902	100	11
Land Border						
Russian Federation	6 389	5 913	7 306	20 236	26	177
Ukraine	17 658	14 697	17 007	15 375	20	-9.6
Georgia	3 098	2 571	8 535	7 742	9.9	-9.3
Serbia	5 518	5 550	4 810	7 405	9.5	54
Albania	1 263	8 978	7 378	6 504	8.3	-12
Belarus	5 555	5 840	4 912	4 430	5.7	-9.8
Morocco	940	2 827	2 416	3 615	4.6	50
Bosnia and Herzegovina	799	1 519	1 532	3 363	4.3	120
Croatia	4 067	3 528	3 634	1 989	2.5	-45
FYR Macedonia	3 307	2 648	1 781	1 758	2.2	-1.3
Others	5 321	5 521	5 472	5 866	7.5	7.2
Total Land Borders	53 915	59 592	64 783	78 283	100	21
Air Border						
Albania	624	3 303	2 689	3 159	7.1	17
Brazil	6 072	4 697	2 980	2 481	5.5	-17
USA	2 338	2 219	1 966	2 305	5.1	17
Algeria	685	1 191	1 330	2 001	4.5	50
Not specified	1 434	1 530	1 958	1 916	4.3	-2.1
Russian Federation	1 369	1 459	1 650	1 812	4.0	9.8
Nigeria	1 719	1 544	1 709	1 647	3.7	-3.6
Turkey	1 606	1 303	1 422	1 257	2.8	-12
China	1 613	1 124	1 195	1 186	2.6	-0.8
Morocco	1 080	1 007	997	963	2.2	-3.4
Others	30 823	30 042	26 167	26 055	58	-0.4
Total Air Borders	49 363	49 419	44 063	44 782	100	1.6
Sea Border						
Albania	437	3 702	1 993	1 901	33	-4.6
Philippines	589	739	1 073	743	13	-31
Russian Federation	1 413	1 853	1 157	649	11	-44
Morocco	329	334	521	471	8.1	-9.6
Turkey	303	271	185	228	3.9	23
Not specified	82	150	251	165	2.8	-34
India	227	135	258	151	2.6	-41
Tunisia	108	126	128	139	2.4	8.6
Kiribati		7	156	136	2.3	-13
Syria	55	102	129	123	2.1	-4.7
Others	1 830	1 847	1 505	1 131	19	-25
Total Sea Borders	5 373	9 266	7 356	5 837	100	-21



Annex Table 6. **Reasons for refusals of entry**

Reasons for refusals of entry reported at the external borders

	Total Refusals	Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Russian Federation	22 697	496	24	19 292	283	1 528	226	707	183	493	167	23 399
Ukraine	16 376	389	143	6 637	36	6 660	749	939	580	107	182	16 422
Albania	11 564	391	194	384	31	2 603	401	2 141	4 674	268	648	11 735
Serbia	8 181	153	48	499	13	1 746	1 500	2 274	1 758	156	122	8 269
Georgia	8 100	4	19	7 761	22	219	3	39	63	9	19	8 158
Morocco	5 049	2 589	154	769	94	517	45	220	719	370	46	5 523
Belarus	4 572	88	26	2 614	6	1 018	121	457	186	169	30	4 715
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3 523	718	3	167	2	782	310	1 129	366	117	290	3 884
Turkey	2 999	283	67	1 590	45	395	218	120	155	87	101	3 061
Brazil	2 524	10	20	226	1	782	124	165	304	41	969	2 642
Others	43 317	3 880	1 949	10 115	1 027	10 338	1 348	2 939	1 829	1 260	9 879	44 564
Total	128 902	9 001	2 647	50 054	1 560	26 588	5 045	11 130	10 817	3 077	12 453	132 372

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

Annex Table 7. Reasons for refusals of entry

Reasons for refusals of entry reported by Member State at the external borders

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year	Highest share
All Borders							Nationality
C) No valid visa	31 241	29 930	35 966	50 054	38	39	Russian Federation (39%)
E) No justification	25 987	25 947	25 309	26 588	20	5.1	Ukraine (25%)
Reason not available	14 798	12 861	11 127	12 453	9.4	12	USA (16%)
G) No subsistence	8 576	11 633	11 029	11 130	8.4	0.9	Serbia (20%)
H) Alert issued	12 627	20 255	15 712	10 817	8.2	-31	Albania (43%)
A) No valid document	4 767	7 851	7 866	9 001	6.8	14	Morocco (29%)
F) Over 3 month stay	5 589	5 490	5 367	5 045	3.8	-6.0	Serbia (30%)
I) Threat	2 561	2 835	3 271	3 077	2.3	-5.9	Russian Federation (16%)
B) False document	2 908	2 801	3 767	2 647	2.0	-30	Unknown (13%)
D) False visa	1 715	1 824	1 842	1 560	1.2	-15	Russian Federation (18%)
Total All Borders	110 769	121 427	121 256	132 372	100	9.2	
Land Border							Nationality
C) No valid visa	19 668	18 495	25 054	40 163	50	60	Russian Federation (45%)
E) No justification	11 523	9 429	11 849	12 724	16	7.4	Ukraine (50%)
G) No subsistence	5 298	7 695	7 486	7 517	9.4	0.4	Serbia (27%)
H) Alert issued	8 901	13 767	11 258	7 289	9.1	-35	Albania (39%)
A) No valid document	1 747	3 514	3 498	5 071	6.3	45	Morocco (49%)
F) Over 3 month stay	4 633	4 577	4 518	4 018	5.0	-11	Serbia (36%)
I) Threat	1 752	2 095	2 073	1 803	2.3	-13	Croatia (23%)
Reason not available	3	1		595	0.7	n.a.	Bosnia and Herzegovina (45%)
B) False document	420	382	1 407	498	0.6	-65	Albania (31%)
D) False visa	410	505	640	434	0.5	-32	Russian Federation (58%)
Total Land Borders	54 355	60 460	67 783	80 112	100	18	
Air Border							Nationality
E) No justification	14 352	15 880	12 807	12 943	28	1.1	Albania (9.7%)
Reason not available	14 127	12 362	10 713	11 373	25	6.2	USA (18%)
C) No valid visa	8 854	9 184	8 651	8 386	18	-3.1	Russian Federation (11%)
G) No subsistence	3 190	3 482	3 297	3 334	7.2	1.1	Albania (9.9%)
A) No valid document	2 175	2 324	2 612	2 648	5.7	1.4	Unknown (41%)
H) Alert issued	2 973	3 354	2 697	2 340	5.1	-13	Albania (40%)
B) False document	2 373	2 311	2 239	2 015	4.4	-10	Unknown (15%)
I) Threat	790	709	1 121	1 149	2.5	2.5	Suriname (14%)
D) False visa	1 266	1 190	1 126	1 046	2.3	-7.1	Venezuela (7.1%)
F) Over 3 month stay	917	879	834	949	2.1	14	Brazil (12%)
Total Air Borders	51 017	51 675	46 097	46 183	100	0.2	
Sea Border							Nationality
C) No valid visa	2 719	2 251	2 261	1 486	25	-34	Philippines (40%)
A) No valid document	845	2 013	1 756	1 278	22	-27	Russian Federation (33%)
H) Alert issued	753	3 134	1 757	1 162	20	-34	Albania (78%)
E) No justification	112	638	653	857	15	31	Albania (67%)
Reason not available	668	498	414	482	8.2	16	Albania (11%)
G) No subsistence	88	456	246	279	4.7	13	Albania (85%)
I) Threat	19	31	77	125	2.1	62	Albania (79%)
F) Over 3 month stay	39	34	15	78	1.3	420	Morocco (37%)
D) False visa	39	129	76	75	1.3	-1.3	Morocco (63%)
B) False document	115	108	121	64	1.1	-47	Morocco (28%)
Total Sea Borders	5 397	9 292	7 376	5 886	100	-20	



Annex Table 8. **Applications for asylum**

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities						
Syria	4 488	8 180	22 739	50 096	14	120
Russian Federation	13 059	12 936	16 764	35 285	10	110
Afghanistan	21 552	29 672	28 182	24 060	6.8	-15
Eritrea	6 897	9 193	10 504	18 162	5.1	73
Somalia	15 348	13 266	14 785	17 379	4.9	18
Not specified	6 906	8 962	14 843	17 238	4.9	16
Pakistan	7 129	12 335	15 412	16 212	4.6	5.2
Serbia	15 460	12 416	15 940	14 971	4.2	-6.1
Kosovo*	5 271	4 592	4 620	14 294	4.0	209
Iran	9 691	11 263	12 619	11 436	3.2	-9.4
Others	98 079	131 239	119 900	134 858	38	12
Total	203 880	254 054	276 308	353 991	100	28

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 9. **Persons using fraudulent documents**

Detections on entry from third countries to EU or Schengen area by border type or nationality

	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type					
Air	3 652	4 401	7 068	72	61
Land	1 281	3 072	2 110	22	-31
Sea	356	405	615	6.3	52
Not specified	0	4	11	0.1	175
Top Ten Nationalities					
Syria	83	486	1 281	13	164
Unknown	370	191	1 219	12	538
Albania	155	2 110	1 044	11	-51
Morocco	496	397	619	6.3	56
Nigeria	244	277	482	4.9	74
Ukraine	437	284	347	3.5	22
Iran	199	243	334	3.4	37
Senegal	72	81	220	2.2	172
Afghanistan	90	202	211	2.2	4.5
Turkey	228	199	204	2.1	2.5
Others	2 915	3 412	3 843	39	13
Total	5 289	7 882	9 804	100	24

Annex Table 10. Fraudulent documents

Detections of fraudulent documents on entry from third countries to EU or Schengen area by country of issuance and type of documents

	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year	Highest share
Top Ten Countries of Issuance						Document Type
Greece	276	2 137	1 418	13	414	Stamps (54%)
France	586	688	1 270	11	117	Passports (40%)
Italy	812	982	1 114	9.8	37	ID cards (28%)
Spain	614	487	763	6.7	24	Residence permits (35%)
Germany	352	434	588	5.2	67	Residence permits (31%)
Turkey	203	247	461	4.1	127	Passports (82%)
Belgium	307	249	458	4	49	Passports (28%)
Sweden	95	143	390	3.4	311	Passports (78%)
Bulgaria	148	125	262	2.3	77	ID cards (46%)
Poland	462	233	243	2.1	-47	Stamps (50%)
Others	3 130	3 464	4 357	38	39.0	Passports (77%)
Document Type						Fraud Type
Passports	2 743	3 171	5 251	46	91	Forged (40%)
Residence permits	1 234	1 370	1 768	16	43	Counterfeit (37%)
Stamps	927	2 675	1 438	13	55	Counterfeit (86%)
ID cards	994	944	1 338	12	35.0	Counterfeit (43%)
Visa	736	762	1 280	11	74	Counterfeit (56%)
Other	351	267	249	2.2	-29	Counterfeit (57%)
Total	6 985	9 189	11 324	100	62	

Annex Table 11. Return decisions issued

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities						
Albania	:	8 210	15 356	17 983	8.0	17
Pakistan	:	26 604	24 707	16 567	7.4	-33
Syria	:	2 672	8 129	12 599	5.6	55
Morocco	:	11 184	15 436	12 486	5.6	-19
India	:	8 817	10 628	10 193	4.5	-4.1
Russian Federation	:	7 063	7 650	9 976	4.4	30
Afghanistan	:	27 274	23 147	9 301	4.1	-60
Ukraine	:	8 453	9 255	9 242	4.1	-0.1
Algeria	:	12 336	13 771	8 732	3.9	-37
Nigeria	:	7 357	9 345	8 549	3.8	-8.5
Others	:	111 415	132 525	108 677	48	-18
Total	80 679	231 385	269 949	224 305	100	-17

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 12. **Effective returns**

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities						
Albania	:	12 699	13 149	20 543	13	56
Pakistan	:	6 253	10 488	12 126	7.5	16
India	:	7 667	8 946	8 958	5.6	0.1
Russian Federation	:	6 221	6 894	8 431	5.2	22
Ukraine	:	6 500	7 645	7 810	4.9	2.2
Morocco	:	6 905	7 667	6 758	4.2	-12
Serbia	:	4 948	7 520	6 512	4.1	-13
Nigeria	:	5 327	4 658	5 235	3.3	12
China	:	5 145	5 254	4 837	3.0	-7.9
Bangladesh	:	2 900	4 637	4 767	3.0	2.8
Others	:	84 480	82 097	74 722	46	-9.0
Total		69 242	149 045	160 699	100	1

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 13. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	2013	Share of total	% change on prev. year
TYPE OF RETURN						
Forced	:	80 809	82 061	87 359	54	6.5
Enforced by Member State	23 091	69 982	71 568	75 968	87	6.1
Not specified	10 213	9 527	8 759	9 832	11	12
Enforced by Joint Operation	10 213	1 300	1 734	1 559	1.8	-10
Voluntary	:	57 170	65 596	64 975	40	-0.9
Others	22 426	32 140	36 433	34 377	53	-5.6
IOM-assisted	6 408	13 908	15 417	16 660	26	8.1
Not specified	9 882	11 122	13 746	13 938	21	1.4
Not specified	:	11 066	11 298	8 365	5.2	-26
Total	:	149 045	158 955	160 699	100	1.1
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES						
Forced						
Albania	:	12 232	11 944	19 295	22	62
Pakistan	:	3 938	7 178	8 368	9.6	17
Serbia	:	2 668	2 943	3 353	3.8	14
Tunisia	:	7 279	5 137	3 123	3.6	-39
Morocco	:	2 852	3 275	2 943	3.4	-10
India	:	2 866	3 427	2 898	3.3	-15
Bangladesh	:	1 781	3 169	2 878	3.3	-9.2
Nigeria	:	3 112	2 714	2 707	3.1	-0.3
Algeria	:	2 072	2 521	2 617	3.0	3.8
Afghanistan	:	3 180	3 378	2 396	2.7	-29
Others	:	38 829	36 375	36 781	42	1.1
Total Forced Returns	:	80 809	82 061	87 359	54	6.5
Voluntary						
Russian Federation	:	4 944	5 532	6 988	11	26
Ukraine	:	4 716	6 079	6 291	9.7	3.5
India	:	4 763	5 462	6 032	9.3	10
Pakistan	:	2 230	3 076	3 663	5.6	19
Serbia	:	2 265	4 552	3 126	4.8	-31
China	:	2 850	2 702	2 797	4.3	3.5
Nigeria	:	1 956	1 642	2 322	3.6	41
Kosovo*	:	1 477	1 593	2 271	3.5	43
Bangladesh	:	1 110	1 427	1 874	2.9	31
Iraq	:	2 206	2 071	1 495	2.3	-28
Others	:	28 653	31 460	28 116	43	-11
Total Voluntary Returns	:	57 170	65 596	64 975	40	-0.9

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence



Notes on FRAN data sources and methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece (these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A). Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

The data on return decisions issued (FRAN indicator 7A) are not available for Ireland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The data on effective returns (FRAN indicator 7B) are not available for Ireland. In addition, the data of effective returns are not disaggregated by return operation (voluntary and forced) for Spain. The data on voluntary effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (IOM-assisted and others) for Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands. The data on forced effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (enforced by Member States and by Joint Operations) for Belgium, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands.



European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1
00-124 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01

frontex@frontex.europa.eu
www.frontex.europa.eu



For Public Release

Risk Analysis Unit

Frontex reference number: 5119/2014

Printed version:
TT-AC-14-001-EN-C
ISBN 978-92-95033-81-8
ISSN 1977-446X
DOI 10.2819/33366

PDF:
TT-AC-14-001-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-95033-80-1
ISSN 1977-4451
DOI 10.2819/33026

Warsaw, May 2014