

# Cryptome

31 August 2014

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html>

## **A Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA**

By Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, Michael Sontheimer and Holger Stark

### **NSA and GCHQ Turkey Documents**

The following NSA and GCHQ documents pertain to intelligence relations with Turkey or spying operations against the country. SPIEGEL has redacted them to obscure the most sensitive information.

**Collaboration in Overdrive: A CNE Success (NSA)**

**Turkey and the PKK (NSA)**

**NCRs with Foreign Relations Missions Become 'SUSLAs' (NSA)**

**SINIO Seminar: Turkish Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (NSA)**

**NSA Intelligence Relationship with Turkey - Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish Intelligence Directorate (SIB) (NSA)**

**NSAs Oldest Third Party Partnership (NSA)**

**Agenda 14-15 May 2013: Brigadier general XXXXXXXX YYYY - Turkish Signal Intelligence Chief (NSA)**

**SINIO Series of Strategic Intelligence Issue Seminars Begins with Tough Times for Turkey (NSA)**

**JORDAN-BELGIUM (GCHQ)**

**Load Sharing Carriers R.O.W. (via UK) in IRAQ plus RLEs (GCHQ)**

**Turkey at the G20 Pre-Meeting in London September 2-5 2009 (GCHQ)**

**MHS/GCHQ Projects - Turkey Energy Company Development (GCHQ)**

**Kurdistan Regional Government (GCHQ)**

**SINIO Seminar: Turkey and the Kurds (NSA)**

**(S//SI//REL) Collaboration in  
Overdrive: A CNE Success**

FROM: multiple authors in  
International Security Issues (S2C)  
Unknown  
Run Date: 11/13/2006

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*(TS//SI//REL) First-ever Computer  
Network Exploitation success against  
Turkish leadership is achieved.*

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(TS//SI//REL) Two heads are better than one, right? Well SIGINT development (SIGDEV) is living proof that collaboration really is efficient! SIGDEV analysts and target office elements (TOPI) within International Security Issues (ISI), with lots of help from their friends in SIGINT Strategy and Governance (SSG) and the Tailored Access Office (TAO), did something they'd never accomplished before; they achieved their first-ever computer network exploitation success against Turkish leadership! This successful process will serve as the prototype for future SIGINT target development efforts in ISI.

(S//SI//REL) The process of target development seems obvious enough, but this group added extreme collaboration to [target templating](#) and ended up with a winning combination. The ISI SIGDEV/TOPI effort focused development by identifying a 90-day surge team comprising SIGDEV, TOPI, SSG analysts (templating) and TAO. The team then employed target templating methodology to create a strategic action plan. This methodology served to focus exploitation efforts, research, analysis and collection planning. The data-visualization tool, ██████████ facilitated collaboration across organizations and was used to

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NSA/CSSM 1-52,  
DATED 08 JAN  
2007 DECLASSIFY  
ON: 20320108

document the team's analytic efforts, target information, and foster an environment of analytic exchange and data sharing.

(TS//SI//REL) See the [Turkish Surge Project Plan](#).

(C//SI//REL) The result was success in collecting communications-of-interest within 180 days from the implementation of the action plan to actual collection of the intended target and reporting of intelligence information! Because of the detailed nature of the documentation produced through this methodology, all pertinent players were able to carry out their role efficiently and to great effect.

(U//FOUO) Authors:

[REDACTED] ISI Operations Staff  
[REDACTED] Europe, Strategic Partnerships & Energy SIGINT Development (S2C13)  
[REDACTED] (S2C13)

(U) Turkey and the PKK

FROM: [REDACTED]  
FAD's Central/Eastern Europe Office (DP13)  
Run Date: 12/20/2005

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(TS//SI) The U.S. fears that Turkey may undertake cross-border raids into Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish PKK terrorists... NSA provides Turkey with SIGINT about the group.

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(S//SI) NSA's robust SIGINT exchange with our two Turkish partners on indigenous terrorism targets is primarily focused on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)\*, and the PKK has been a sensitive topic of recent high-level US-Turkish discussions. The Turkish Government and general population strongly believe that the US should be doing more against PKK insurgents operating from northern Iraq to conduct terrorist operations inside Turkey.

(S//SI) The US condemns the PKK as a terrorist group and accepts that the coalition and the Iraqi Transitional Government and Turkey need to work together to do more against this threat. The US

views Turkey as a valuable partner in NATO and in the global war on terrorism (the 1 March 2003 Parliamentary vote that prevented the Coalition from using Turkey for Operation Iraqi Freedom notwithstanding) but is all too aware that the Kurds per se in northern Iraq are friendly forces, and cross-border operations are an Iraqi sovereignty issue.

(U) The specter of 30 million Kurds coalescing into an autonomous Kurdistan is a long-standing political problem for Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The Kurds are Turkey's largest non-Turkish ethnic group and the only minority that can pose a threat to Turkish national unity. The PKK, arguably the best known and most radical of the Kurdish movements, seeks to establish an independent Marxist state in predominantly Kurdish southeastern Turkey.

(U) Since 1984, the PKK has conducted a violent terrorist insurgency against the Government of Turkey, highlighted by attacks on Turkish security forces, bombings of tourist sites inside Turkey, and attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European cities. Turkey has responded by deploying army units and elite police forces to violently suppress the insurgents. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Kurds established a de facto state in northern Iraq and allowed the PKK to set up semi-permanent bases there. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, in an August 2005 Wall Street Journal piece, noted that Iraq should not be allowed to remain a training ground for terrorists, whether al Qaeda or the PKK, and asserted that the PKK has already killed more than 30,000 Turkish citizens.

(S//SI) The US Government is concerned that Turkey might lose patience and conduct cross-border operations inside Iraq while in hot pursuit of PKK insurgents. US National Security Adviser Hadley and SACEUR\*\* General █████ met separately in September 2005 with senior Turkish officials to discuss the PKK. EUCOM, CENTCOM and State Department all have irons in this fire and the value of NSA's SIGINT support to our Turkish partners has been consistently highlighted by both the Charge' and the Office of Defense Cooperation in the US Embassy in [Ankara](#).

(TS//SI) NCRTURK\*\*\*\*, in [Ankara](#), works closely with two Turkish SIGINT partners, GES (military) and ETI (civilian)\*\*\*\*. NSA's collection efforts against the PKK, a third tier terrorist organization, are generally limited to operations in northern Iraq, in southeastern Turkey, and in Turkish tourist areas where bombings have occurred. We share SIGINT product, technical collection and analytic support, and unique US collection with both Turkish partners. NSA normally provides GES with a report every six hours locating a defined number of PKK handsets active within Turkey; no data is provided to the Turks concerning PKK handsets active in northern Iraq. NSA also provides data on insurgent handsets to ETI in support of Turkey's Law Enforcement Access program.

(TS//SI) In an effort to support Turkey by doing more against the PKK, NCRTURK, CT/S2I3, and GEO, in October 2005, provided GES with hourly reports on the locations of handsets used by the PKK operating inside Turkey. This initiative was restricted by resource constraints to a two-week period in support of specific Turkish military operations. Feedback from the Turks on the effectiveness of this enhanced SIGINT support is pending at this time.

(S//SI) NSA, through the SINIO for Europe, is also actively participating in US Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement efforts to track financial support links for the PKK in Western Europe. NSA's very few expert "follow-the-money" analysts are generally deployed against tier zero and other very high priority targets so we can only support a very focused effort against PKK finances, one that targets individuals and organizations for which lead information is available. Any lead information will most likely come from the Turkish partners and that angle is being worked by NCRTURK.

(S//SI) As US political and military strategists grapple with the thorny issue of how to better assist the Government of Turkey in combating the PKK, NSA and our Turkish SIGINT partners are already fully engaged in this important subset of the global war on terrorism.

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(U) Notes: \* (S//SI) This terrorist group changes names like a chameleon changes colors. Currently calling itself the People's Congress of Kurdistan (KGK, or Kongra-Gel), it has in the past been known as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK), and it originated and is still referred to by most Turks as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). NSA also targets and shares SIGINT with Turkey on the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C).

\*\* (U) SACEUR = Supreme Allied Commander, Europe - commander of NATO's military forces

\*\*\*\* (S//SI) The two Turkish SIGINT partners are the General Electronic Service (GES), a military command under the J2 of the Turkish General Staff; and the civilian Electronic and Technical Intelligence (ETI) Directorate of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO).

(U//FOUO) This article is reprinted from the Foreign Affairs Digest, December edition.

Information Owner: 



DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS  
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

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- [Web search](#)
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- [SIDtoday Article](#)
- [Letter to the Editor](#)
- [SIGINT-y Social Media Page](#)

**(U//FOUO) NCRs with Foreign Relations Missions Become 'SUSLAs'**

FROM: [REDACTED]

Foreign Affairs Directorate Staff (DP09)

Run Date: 08/30/2006

(U//FOUO) Over the years the term "NSA/CSS Representative" (NCR) has grown to include Agency representatives at a variety of places: Commands, other US Government agencies, US embassies in support of Third Party agreements, etc.

(S//SI) Recently, we created another title specifically for our representatives to major Third Parties: "**Special US Liaison Advisor**" (**SUSLAs**), who are the senior representatives of the DIRNSA/CHCSS to a specific **Third Party**. The first SUSLA named was Special US Liaison Advisor, Italy, and Special US Liaison Advisor, Germany, followed shortly thereafter.

(U//FOUO) Until recently, a few of the NCRs have been performing SUSLA duties but were still called NCRs. This led to some measure of confusion in a variety of administrative matters, mostly within headquarters. By changing the titles of these NCRs to SUSLAs we have eliminated this confusion and provided a more rational approach to titles by re-designating those positions that are primarily foreign affairs-related as SUSLAs, > reserving the title NCR to those senior representatives with primarily Command and other US Government Agency representation.

(U//FOUO) Note that this change applies to the title only - not to mission, function, authorities, duties, or reporting chain. There is also no change in relationships and existing oversight authorities arranged between these positions, NSA/CSS Europe or NSA/CSS Pacific, and the Foreign Affairs Directorate.

(S//SI) The following NCRs' titles have changed:


- NCR Turkey is now Special US Liaison Advisor, Turkey (**SUSLAT**)
- NCR Thai is now Special US Liaison Advisor, Thailand (**SUSLAB**)
- NCRJ is now Special US Liaison Advisor, Japan (**SUSLAJ**)
- NCR KOR is already dual-titled as Special US Liaison Advisor, Korea; the use of the NCR KOR title is being phased out (**SUSLAK**)

FYI, The Special US Liaison Advisor refers to the chief of the site, while Special US Liaison Activity refers to the site itself. Either way, it's "SUSLA"!

(U//FOUO) Note that our Special US Liaison Officers located in Second Party nations are SUSLOs, and are all designated with the name of the partner's capital city (e.g., SUSLOL = Special US Liaison Officer, London). Those titles have not been changed.

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**(U//FOUO) SINIO Seminar: Turkish Presidential and Parliamentary  
Elections**

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Chief, Strategic Intelligence Issues (S17)  
Run Date: 08/13/2007

**What:** SINIO Seminar  
**When:** 22 August 2007, from 1030 to 1200

**Where:** Ops 1, room 2N044

Advance registration is required. See below for instructions.

(U//FOUO) The SINIO Council and the National Cryptologic School are pleased to present the 16th in a series of Strategic Intelligence Issue Seminars for 2007. "*Turkish Presidential and Parliamentary Elections: Dynamics, Regional Impact, and Relations with the United States*" will be presented by [REDACTED] SINIO for Russia/Europe/Eurasia.

**Course Overview:**

(U) The likely presidential candidacy of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan is a redline for the Turkish military because they distrust his commitment to secularism. Concerns about Kurdish terrorism, the potential for an independent Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government, Turkey's EU candidacy, and the pending U.S. congressional resolution on the Armenian genocide issue will also be issues of concern--with anti-American overtones.


(U//FOUO) **To register**, and for further info on this series of seminars, please consult the [SINIO Events Website](#). Any questions or concerns regarding registration should be directed to the National Cryptologic School.

(U//FOUO) POCs:

[REDACTED] SINIO for Russia/Europe/Eurasia [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Executive to the SINIO Council [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] National Cryptologic School [REDACTED]

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National Security Agency/Central  
Security Service

15 APR 2013


**Information Paper**

**Subject: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA Intelligence Relationship with Turkey –  
Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish  
SIGINT Intelligence Directorate (SIB)**

**(U) Introduction**

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's 50-plus year SIGINT relationship with the Government of Turkey (GOT) includes cooperation with the civilian SIGINT service within the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish military SIGINT Intelligence Directorate (SIB). Of note, the GOT decided in 2011 that the military SIB would be made subordinate to the civilian MIT. SIGINT collaboration with MIT and SIB provides NSA access to military targets of interest in [REDACTED] Russia and Georgia, as well as counter-terrorism (CT) targets such as the Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongra Gel, aka KGK, formerly PKK), the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) and radical Islamic terrorist elements. Also, NSA's Information Assurance (INFOSEC) Directorate has a relationship with the Turkish General Staff/J6 as well as with the Turkish National Research of Electronics and Cryptology (UEKAE).

**(U) Key Issues**



(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Counter Terrorism (CT) SIGINT exchange with Turkey was expanded by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in July 2002 to include actionable intelligence. In May 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) modified the guidance to include actionable intelligence against KGK leadership in Northern Iraq. Additional CT targets worked with the GOT include the DHKP/C and radical Islamic terrorist elements such as al-Qa'ida (AQ) and its affiliated groups.

(S//SI//REL TO USA, TUR) A Memorandum of Agreement between the National Security Agency and the Republic of Turkey, represented by the Turkish General Staff Electronic Systems Command (now SIGINT Intelligence Directorate - SIB) was signed 04 April 1995. The purpose of this agreement was to ensure mutual exchange and cooperation for enhancing, supporting, and developing the SIGINT capabilities of the Turkish Military

**Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52**  
**Dated: 20070108**  
**Declassify On: 20320108**

SIGINT organization with GES (now SIB) and NSA in order that we may more effectively carry out their missions against mutually agreed upon targets. This agreement between NSA and MIT/SIB updates and further implements the U.S.-Turkish SIGINT arrangements entered into in 1980. NSA will propose a review of the 1995 agreement during a Strategic Planning Conference at NSA Washington in May 2013.

(S//SI//NF) NSA is working to re-establish cooperation with the MIT on Project SEA SENTRY II, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] for U.S. customers in exchange for geographical access and regional monitoring capabilities for the Turks.

### (U) Discussion

[REDACTED]

### (U) What NSA Provides to the Partner

- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA provides equipment, technology, training, and U.S. SIGINT requirements and reporting to the Turkish partner to better assist NSA in fulfilling U.S. intelligence requirements.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) In terms of equipment and technology NSA provides both collection and cryptographic equipment. A Cryptographic Modernization program is under way with both partners to upgrade encryption on all shared and some non-shared communications links. A High Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF) collection site is

[REDACTED] NSA also provides decryption of DHKP/C internet traffic the Turks collect.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) U.S. SIGINT requirements and reporting cover military and paramilitary targets in [REDACTED] and the KGK. This reporting is a mixture of near-real time and product "Tear Line" reports and analysis.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA provides daily interaction and actionable intelligence on foreign fighter Sunni extremists, against both Turkish and non-Turkish individuals. NSA provides regional Tactical [REDACTED] reporting in two hour increments.

### (U) What the Partner Provides to NSA

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The partner provides near real time reporting on military air, naval, ground, and paramilitary targets in Russia, [REDACTED] Georgia, Ukraine, and on KGK

targets, as well as daily summary reporting of Black Sea and CIS Naval and Air activity and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA enjoys joint operational access to the HFDF site in [REDACTED] which, in turn, functions as a node on NSA's world-wide CROSSHAIR HFDF geolocation service. The U.S. and 2<sup>nd</sup> Parties receive approximately 400,000 fixes yearly utilizing Lines-of-Bearing from the [REDACTED] site while the Turks receive approximately 5000 fixes yearly from its regional usage of CROSSHAIR, an 80 to 1 ratio in FVEY's favor.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA receives Turkish transcripts of KGK voice collection. Cooperation on the KGK target by the U.S. Intelligence Community in Ankara has increased across the board since the May 2007 DNI Memorandum encouraged all to do so.

#### **(U) Success Stories**

#### **(U) Problems/Challenges with the Partner**

(S//SI//NF) Turkey is both a SIGINT partner and an intelligence target. This dynamic between partner and target surfaces when conducting risk-benefit analysis to determine what technologies can be shared with the Turkish partners.

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) MIT/SIB continues to be a cooperative partner working with NSA to fulfill joint intelligence requirements and has the potential to become a significantly more productive partner if Turkish-U.S. relations were to improve. Turkey's unique geographic access offers collection potential to fill additional SIGINT requirements.

**TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN**

(TS//SI//NF) U.S. intelligence reporting in recent years indicates possible Iranian connections with Dr. [REDACTED], the head of the MIT/SIB. The possible impact of these connections to the U.S. SIGINT relationships is unknown at this time.

(U//FOUO) Prepared by: [REDACTED]

**TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN**

(U) NSA's Oldest Third Party SIGINT Partnership

FROM: (S//SI) [REDACTED]

Country Desk Officer (CDO) Turkey

Run Date: 10/07/2005 (S//SI) Our "oldest" Third Party partner is Turkey, with whom we've had a SIGINT relationship since 1949. That begs a question, since NSA wasn't created until November 1952. This article answers that question and sketches the relationship between NSA and our two Turkish SIGINT partners.

(S//SI) The NSA/CSS Representative, Turkey (NCR TURK), located in beautiful [Ankara](#) with a staff of about 40 NSAers, is responsible for providing SIGINT technical assistance, engineering advice, maintenance support, equipment, and training to both of the Turkish SIGINT organizations:

- the General Electronic Service (GES), a military SIGINT command under the J2 Intelligence Directorate of the Turkish General Staff (TGS); and
- the Electronic and Technical Intelligence (ETI) Directorate, the SIGINT element of the civilian Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO). (S//SI) Our SIGINT exchange with these partners includes information on a variety of regional military targets and a significant amount of data on terrorism targets, to include international groups and indigenous terrorist organizations such as the Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongra Gel / KGK, formerly known as the PKK). In return, GES provides information on Russian military forces, regional activity in the Caucasus, and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] GES also identifies shipping traffic in the Dardanelles and collects radar signatures under the SEA SENTRY program. GES and ETI provide language assistance on KGK/PKK traffic; and

ETI and NSA have a dedicated circuit for CT [Counterterrorism] analytic exchanges.

(S//SI) Throughout the Cold War, Turkey's location on the Black Sea afforded the US with unique access to the underbelly of the Soviet beast. Turkey is now a committed US/Coalition partner both in the Global War on Terrorism and in NATO peacekeeping and stabilization operations throughout the region. Turkey's borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria have obvious geopolitical significance for US military planners and political strategists. In addition, ongoing joint signals surveys between NSA and GES have the potential to provide unique access to emerging targets of interest.

(TS//SI) In answer to the question begged above, the US/Turkey SIGINT relationship did begin in 1949, but it was based on a verbal agreement between CIA and ETI, with CIA offering funding and equipment to ETI in exchange for raw COMINT traffic. In 1979, the program of support for ETI was assumed by NSA and incorporated into the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). The legal basis for the US SIGINT relationship with GES stems from a June 1954 Joint Military Facilities Agreement that was further amplified in a 1962 MOU that committed the US to provide SIGINT information, training, equipment, and assistance in the development of a SIGINT capability for GES.

(TS//SI) NSA entered into this 1962 agreement with the TGS in exchange for Turkish permission to operate US SIGINT sites on Turkish soil. NSA's overt SIGINT operations in Turkey ceased with the closing of Sinop in September 1993. SCS continues to conduct covert SIGINT collection from sites in Istanbul and [Ankara](#).



(U) Adana Mosque, on the Seyhan River in Adana, Turkey

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(U//FOUO) This article is reprinted from the Foreign Affairs Digest, September edition.

Information Owner:   







# AGENDA

**As of: 30 April 2013**

**PROTOCOL REP:**



**VISIT MANAGER:**

**DATE/TIME OF VISIT:** (U) 14-15 May 2013//0900-1600

**VISITOR:** (U//FOUO) **BRIGADIER GENERAL**  
(Phonetic: [REDACTED])

**TITLE:** (U//FOUO) Turkish Signal Intelligence Chief  
(TNIO/SIB)

**COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** (U//FOUO) Turkey/Signal Intelligence Directorate  
(SIB - Sinyal Istihbarat Baskanligi), Turkish National  
Intelligence Organization  
(MIT, Milli Istihbarat Teskilati) *Note: MIT is also  
known as TNIO*

**EQUIVALENCY:** (U//FOUO) Director, NSA

**ACCOMPANIED BY:** (U//FOUO) **MR.** [REDACTED]  
(Phonetic: [REDACTED])  
Deputy Director of SIGINT Directorate  
**MR.** [REDACTED]  
(Phonetic: [REDACTED])  
SIB/Department Chief  
**MR.** [REDACTED]  
(Phonetic: [REDACTED])  
SIB/Middle East Countries-Expert  
**MR.** [REDACTED]  
(Phonetic: [REDACTED])  
SIB/RF-Expert  
**MS.** [REDACTED]  
Translator  
**MR.** [REDACTED]  
SLO Ankara  
**MS.** [REDACTED]  
D/SLO Ankara

**INTERPRETER:** (U) Yes.

**PREVIOUS VISITS:** (U) No.

**CLEARANCES:** (U//FOUO) S//SI

**ACCOMPANYING NSA SENIOR:** (U) MR. [REDACTED]  
Director, Foreign Affairs (DIRFA)

**PHOTOGRAPHER:** (U) No.

**MEMENTO PRESENTED:** (U) No.

**UNIFORM OF THE DAY:** (U) Guests: Business Attire.

**PURPOSE OF VISIT:** (S//SI) [REDACTED] and delegation will be attending the Strategic Planning conference 14-15 May 2013 and also a ELINT demonstration at the Naval Research Laboratory, Chesapeake Beach, MD on 16 May 2013. It is anticipated that [REDACTED] may request additional NSA support to ongoing projects such as: PHANTOMNOVA, SEA SENTRY II, future projects Signal Surveys, COMINT/ELINT analysis training, and operations. Operational Issues to include [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] reporting, to include information sharing and capability development towards mutual targets. [REDACTED] will addresss TNIO's expectation from the SIGINT cooperation with NSA.  
**NOTE:** [REDACTED] has requested that Human Language Technology (HLT) discussion and SIGINT support to Kongra/ Gel PKK/KGK be removed from the agenda.

**JUSTIFICATION FOR DIRECTORATE INVOLVEMENT:** (S//SI//NOFORN) [REDACTED] support to NSA's request to stage SIGINT collection equipment in Turkey for [REDACTED] SOCHI Olympics support, and the SEA SENTRY II choke-point collection program justify Directorate participation.

**EXPECTED OUTCOME:** (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) An opportunity for NSA to engage the Turkish SIGINT Director to evaluate the future potential of the NSA- MIT partnership.

DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS  
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL

**(C) SINIO Summer 2003 Series of Strategic Intelligence Issue Seminars  
Begins with *Tough Times for Turkey***

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Deputy Chief, Strategic Intelligence Issues  
Run Date: 06/10/2003

(C) On Thursday, the SINIO Council and the National Cryptologic School are pleased to present the first in a series of Strategic Intelligence Issue Seminars for

Summer 2003. "Tough Times for Turkey" will be presented by the Deputy SINIO for Europe, [REDACTED] on **Thursday, 12 June from 10:30 to 12:30 in Room 2B4118-6**. Advance registration is required; click [HERE](#) for instructions.

**Course Overview:**

(C) The fallout from the Iraqi campaign has been largely negative for Turkey, and the full impact of this very bitter episode in U.S.- Turkish relations is still unknown. The pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Turkish General Staff (TGS), guardian of Turkey's secular democracy, view each other with mutual suspicion. The strategic relationship with the U.S. is seriously weakened, so the U.S. is unlikely to champion Turkey's cause in Europe or with the IMF/World Bank as fervently. In addition, Turkey's regional influence, particularly in northern Iraq, has been significantly diminished. The presentation will examine the impact that major differences in expectations, perceptions, threat definition, decisionmaking, and communication had on the strategic relationship and assess the likely long-term impact.

(U//FOUO) Please consult the SINIO Website ("go sinio") for information on future events in this series.

POCs:



SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE

8BBAC  
JORDAN-BELGIUM

Report No: 44 Date: 01/12/2008

Case Notation: 8BBAC  
Polarity/Freq: 8BL [REDACTED] Mhz

Summary:

This informal report has been issued to highlight a link of potential interest for tasking.

The physical gateways are JORDAN-BELGIUM, however BELGIUM is providing a logical gateway to the ROW.

The link is a fairly standard E1 employing Timeslots 30 and 31 to relay C7, which in turn provides the dialling for this link. Compression is achieved by utilising DTX-360B DCME equipment.

Traffic summaries indicate that both terminals are relaying transit data.

Results:

TS 30 (HOST)  
OPC 4-032-5 (Jordan, FAST Link GSM) DPC 2-014-7 (Belgium, Brussels F Belgacom)  
Link activity as follows:

4-032-5 to 2-012-2 CIC 0066-0097, 0155-0191

Transit calls to:

Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Greece, Belgium, France, Spain, Cyprus, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Norway, Poland, Germany, Malaysia, Australia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, [Turkey](#), India, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Qatar, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan

4-032-5 to 2-012-1 CIC 0065-0096, 0145-0192

Transit calls in addition to above include:

Mauritius, Finland, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Sweden, Syria, Iran

TS 31 (HOST)

OPC 4-032-0 (Jordan, FAST Link) DPC 2-013-1 (Belgium, Brussels F Belgacom)

Link activity as follows:

4-032-0 to 2-012-2 CIC 0065-0096, 0145-0183

Transit calls to:

Morocco, Algeria, Libya, France, Spain, Cyprus, Finland, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, Malaysia, Australia, South Korea, China, [Turkey](#), India, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Bhutan

4-032-0 to 2-012-1 CIC 0066-0097, 0146-0183

Transit calls in addition to above include:

South Africa, Greece, Andorra, Switzerland, Singapore

Mapping:

8BBAC was input to Depthgauge for mapping.

Although the resultant map was not fully conclusive, it supports the previously listed mapping as follows:

C7 in BS30 controls trunks 2,3,4,5  
C7 in BS31 controls trunks 0,1,6,7  
40320-20122 TR0 CIC'S 0065-0087 TS 01-23 LIN  
40320-20122 TR1 CIC'S 0098-0126 TS 02-30 ALTE  
40325-20122 TR2 CIC'S 0066-0085 TS 02-21 LIN  
40325-20122 TR3 CIC'S 0098-0126 TS 02-30 ALTE  
40325-20121 TR4 CIC'S 0065-0094 TS 01-30 LIN  
40325-20121 TR5 CIC'S 0098-0126 TS 02-30 ALTE  
40320-20121 TR6 CIC'S 0066-0093 TS 02-29 LIN  
40320-20121 TR7 CIC'S 0098-0118 TS 02-22 ALTE  
\*\*\* LAST MAP 02037 \*\*\*

Further signalling is being carried by these C7 channels, which has not yet been mapped.

Possibly controls voice on another bearer:

BS30 40325-20121 CIC 0151-0192 and 40325-20122 CIC 0155-0191

BS31 40320-20121 CIC 0146-0183 and 40320-20122 CIC 0145-0183

The RLE to this link is believed to be 8BBNH. Currently in view at Sounder.

ANALYSIS: -

8BBAC was sampled for DNR activity for approximately 94 hours over the period 26/11/2008-01/12/2008 on Drumkit.

Originating Countries Calls Percentage Destination Countries Calls Percentage

Results – TS30

TS30: - Scored 607 hits, which include both tasked and de-tasked numbers listed in Corinth. Of the 607 hits, 86 were scored against 26 currently tasked numbers.

Results – TS31


TS31: - Scored 349 hits, which include both tasked and de-tasked numbers listed in Corinth. Of the 349 hits, 40 were scored against 14 currently tasked numbers.

Hits can be viewed in Drumroll under the following filenames:

TS 30 = 8BBAC0030


TS 31 = 8BBAC0031

TASKED HITS NOTED FOR TS30:




TURKISH MFA


SELECTION OF NON-TASKED HITS FOR TS30: (priority 1 hits highlighted in red)



KURDISH LEADERSHIP



TASKED HITS NOTED FOR TS31:



SELECTION OF NON-TASKED HITS FOR TS31: (priority 1 hits highlighted in red)





[KURDISH](#) LEADERSHIP

[KURDISH](#) LEADERSHIP

Technical Details: Link = 8BBAC  
Modulation – 8PSK.

Symbol rate = 780.19 Kbps  
Data rate = 2048bps.  
Fec rate = 7/8.  
Fec Type = TPC.  
Overhead = None.  
Reed Solomon = None  
Absolute encoding.  
This link can be tasked on the system

Contact Details

OPA-BUDE -

1 of 7

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on 01242 221491 x30306 (non-sec) or email [infoleg@gchq](mailto:infoleg@gchq)  
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE

DTX 600 Load Sharing Carriers R.O.W (via UK) to IRAQ plus RLEs  
Report No: 35 Date: 15/10/08 Case Notations: G2BCR (UK – IRAQ)  
G2BBU (UK – IRAQ)  
G2BCS (IRAQ – UK)  
G2BBV (IRAQ – UK) Polarity/Freq: G2H [REDACTED] MHz  
G2H [REDACTED] MHz  
G2H [REDACTED] MHz  
G2H [REDACTED] MHz

Summary:

This informal report has been issued to highlight IRAQ/UK load sharing DTX600 carriers plus their corresponding return link ends.

The physical gateways are UK – IRAQ / IRAQ - UK, however, the UK is providing a logical gateway for the R.O.W (mainly [Turkey](#), Syria, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt & UK) to/from Iraq.

C7 analysis confirms that G2BCR & G2BBU are load-sharing traffic between R.O.W and IRAQ, and G2BCS & G2BBV are load-sharing traffic between IRAQ and R.O.W.

Hits noted from numbers in Iraq (964), Iran (98), Syria (963), [Turkey](#) (90) & UK (44)

Results:

JSS7 Hits noted as follows:

G2BCR

Called Number, [REDACTED]  
Called Number, [REDACTED]  
Called Number, [REDACTED]  
Calling Number [REDACTED]

G2BCS

Called Number, [REDACTED]  
hits)  
Called Number, [REDACTED]  
Calling Number [REDACTED]  
Calling Number [REDACTED]  
Calling Number [REDACTED]

G2BBU

Calling Number, [REDACTED], NON OP [KURDISH](#) EXTREMISM  
Called Number, [REDACTED] LEADERSHIP [REDACTED]  
Calling Number, [REDACTED]  
Called Number, [REDACTED]

G2BBV

Called Number, [REDACTED]  
Calling Number [REDACTED]  
Called Number, [REDACTED]  
Called Number, [REDACTED]  
Calling Number [REDACTED]

Analysis:

G2BCR UK – IRAQ (paired with G2BCS)

C7 OPC 2-153-1 (Nokia DX220 ABS) UK, DPC 4-036-4 (Unid Exch) IRAQ  
DTX600 contains 11 active trunks of g729 voice activity, plus one WC1A channel.  
Device Name: ABS-LINK1-LOCAL  
Protocols: CISCO/IPV4/ICMP/TCP/UDP/GRE/ESP/PPTP (Engineering related)  
Location of C7 following Swordfish decompression = 3rd Trunk BS19

G2BCS IRAQ – UK (paired with G2BCR)

C7 OPC 4-036-4 (Unid Exch) IRAQ, DPC 2-153-1 (Nokia DX220 ABS) UK  
DTX600 contains 11 active trunks of g729 voice activity, plus one WC1A channel.  
Device Name: ABS-LINK1-REMOTE  
Protocols: CISCO/IPV4/ICMP/TCP/UDP/GRE/ESP/PPTP (Engineering related)  
Engineering traffic noted within GRE sample, which indicated “Location Information” as BSC  
DPC =0x00000F5 (KRK) – (probably relating to Kirkuk).  
Location of C7 following Swordfish decompression = 3rd Trunk BS19

G2BBU UK – IRAQ (paired with G2BBV)

C7 OPC 2-153-1 (Nokia DX220 ABS) UK, DPC 4-036-4 (Unid Exch) IRAQ  
DTX600 contains 11 active trunks of g729 voice activity, plus one clear PCM voice channel.  
Location of C7 following Swordfish decompression = 3rd Trunk BS19

G2BBV IRAQ – UK (paired with G2BBU)

C7 OPC 4-036-4 (Unid Exch) IRAQ, DPC 2-153-1 (Nokia DX220 ABS) UK  
DTX600 contains 11 active trunks of g729 voice activity, plus one clear PCM voice channel.  
Location of C7 following Swordfish decompression = 3rd Trunk BS19

Technical Details: Polarity: G2 (Intelsat 902) Lin Horizontal

Freq: G2BCR [REDACTED] MHz

Freq: G2BBU [REDACTED] MHz

Freq: G2BCS [REDACTED] MHz

Freq: G2BBV [REDACTED] MHz

Modulation: QPSK

Symbol Rate: [REDACTED]

FEC Rate: [REDACTED]

FEC RASIN: TPC2D78R005

Data Rate: 2048k

Randomiser: A12

Can this carrier be tasked on the Collection System? Due to limited patching there is currently no spare tasking availability on Lopers.

Contact Details [REDACTED] OPA-BUDE - ([REDACTED])

SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE

1 of 3

[REDACTED]

SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE

Turkey at the G20 pre-meeting in London September 2-5 2009

### Contents

- 1 G20 pre-meeting in London <#G20\_pre-meeting\_in\_London>
- 2 Objective <#Objective>
- 3 Reporting requirements <#Reporting\_requirements>
- 4 Targets <#Targets>

Duration: 2-5 September (Weds-Sat morning)

Attended by Finance Ministers. Heads of State will meet in Pittsburgh later in the month, 24-25 September

to measure progress against the aims set out at the London summit in April 2009, which were to:

- restore confidence, growth and jobs
- repair the financial system to restore lending
- strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust
- fund and reform international financial institutions
- promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism
- build inclusive, green and sustainable recovery

Turkish attitudes to:

- the above list of aims/objectives
- progress (or not) on increased regulation and reform
- willingness (or not) to cooperate with the rest of the G-20 nations

## Targets

- Mehmet Simsek - Finance Minister

MSISDN - [REDACTED]

IMSI - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@gmail.com

possibles:

- Ali Babacan - Treasury Minister
- [REDACTED] - Treasury rep at Embassy
- [REDACTED] - Senior Specialist, Central Bank of Turkey [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Turkey [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] [Turkish](#) Treasury - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - Governor, Central Bank of Turkey - Dumus. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - Treasury official
- [REDACTED] - G20 Sherpa/Treasury undersecretary - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - Treasury official - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] Treasury official - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - Treasury official - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - Treasury official - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - Treasury official - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - Treasury official - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] Treasury official - [REDACTED]

MHS/GCHQ Projects - (TS//SI) Turkey Energy Company Development

- Requirement - The Energy Security Team within GCHQ's OPI-TSI require any indication of where the traffic for the following companies is going and ideas for improving access and collection. They are especially interested in MENR and the balance of power they have established.
- Key organisations: Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR), Deputy Directorate for Energy, Water and the Environment (MFA), BOTAS ([Turkish](#) Energy Company), TPAO ([Turkish](#) Petroleum Corporation), Calik Enerji.
- Key personalities: Hilmi Guler (Energy Minister), [REDACTED]
- GCHQ Customer - OPI-TSI [REDACTED]
- MHS POC - [REDACTED]
- Start Date - 29 Oct 08
- Estimated End Date - 2 Mar 09
- Project Status - Assigned

Assigned analysts: [REDACTED]

- Project Notes
- 29 Oct 08 - Analysts assigned
- 29 Oct 08 - Analysts to target company buildings, identify satellite comms and other technologies being used. Links from comms to be surveyed by NMDC and results in Roadbed analysed.
- 07 Jan 09 - Following attempts to acquire imagery from MHS sources for MENR, BOTAS and TPAO buildings in Ankara, requested TOPI submit a task through JARIC for building rooftop imagery.

## Kurdistan Regional Government

### The Kurds

Those individuals who collectively could be called the **Kurdish** People <[https://wikipedia.gchq/index.php/Kurdish\\_People](https://wikipedia.gchq/index.php/Kurdish_People)> are split across a series of countries. Ethnic **Kurdish** populations exist in varying numbers in **Turkey**, Iran, Iraq </index.php/Iraq> and Syria. The overall size of this group is estimated to number somewhere between 20-25 million. The largest grouping resides in south-eastern **Turkey**, where the estimated **Kurdish** population is around 15 million. In Iran, there are another four to six million Kurds and, in Iraq, three to four million. However, it is only in Iraq where the ethnic Kurds currently have any significant degree of autonomy. The **Kurdish** military forces known as peshmerga played a key role in the overthrow of the former Iraqi government.

### Kurdistan

The current as well as historical strength of the nationalist impulse amongst the Kurds, generally, and those in Iraq specifically, should not be underestimated. The dream of a wider **Kurdish** nation has been an aspiration of ethnic Kurds for generations. A geographical area called Kurdistan was first noted in the 13th Century, but the Kurds have never really formed a coherent and unified state, having lived independently as tribes. Over their history, numerous foreign powers (up to and including Saddam) have used the Kurds for their own devices. This has led two ideas to become entrenched in the **Kurdish** psyche - the continual disunity arising from tribalism and a perception of perpetual foreign betrayal of **Kurdish** aspirations. These are still relevant even today when considering **Kurdish** aspirations towards statehood.

### Status of the

#### KRG

The Iraqi constitution declares that the Republic of Iraq has a federal system made up of a decentralised capital, regions and governorates, and local administrations. The status of the



"Kurdistan Regional Government" (KRG) as an autonomous region is already defined in the document (and provides a possible model for Iraq's future). The region has its own flag and national anthem. Under the constitution, certain powers remain the exclusive preserve of the federal government; foreign policy and negotiation, national defence policy, financial and customs policies, standards, naturalization, the radio spectrum, and the mail. Various other powers and 'competences' are shared between the federal government and both the regional and provincial authorities. These include: the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields; formulating the "necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people"; organising customs; and formulating policy on health, the environment, and education. The two main [Kurdish](#) parties, the [Kurdish](#) Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have united to form an alliance with several smaller parties, and the [Kurdish](#) alliance has 53 deputies in the new Baghdad parliament, while the [Kurdish](#) Islamic Union has 5. PUK-leader Jalal Talabani has been elected President of the new Iraqi administration, while KDP leader Massoud Barzani is President of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

#### Article 140

and the Disputed Areas

In January 2008 the UN Special Representative to Iraq, Steffan de Mistura, persuaded the Kurds to agree to extend the deadline for the Article 140 referendum to June 2008. As the new deadline approaches and prospects for a referendum remain highly unlikely, de Mistura reportedly announced in April in Arbil a three-stage plan for an alternative solution to the Kirkuk and disputed areas issue. This involves settling the status of less contested disputed areas by district level consensus. The outcome will be used as a model for dealing with the more contentious Kirkuk status, without having to stage a referendum.

#### Problems of

Regionalism

The constitutional privileging of regional legislation makes it more difficult for Baghdad to impose its will on regions. In the absence of a nationally-agreed hydrocarbons law, local authorities have the opportunity to strengthen de facto control. The KRG is already using its autonomous status to further its interests, passing its own Oil and Gas Law on 6 August 2007 which will enable the KRG to opt out of any future national oil contract and revenue-sharing agreements. In the absence of robust national hydrocarbons legislation, a new oil-rich region in the south could gain substantial control over its natural resources at the expense of the centre (and, therefore, provinces or regions which lack these resources). The constitution's specificity with regards to "oil and gas extracted from current fields" could also create problems over the exploration and exploitation of fields which have either not been discovered yet, or which do not yet produce oil or gas.

[Kurdish](#) leaders are keen supporters of federalism; whilst they will not be directly affected by the law on region formation, they are mindful of the indirect effects. The KRG currently stands alone as an autonomous region. By promoting regionalism in Arab areas of Iraq the Kurds hope to end the KRG's exceptional status, thereby cementing and even strengthening its autonomy. This, in turn, could be useful in gaining greater control over northern Iraq's oil wealth.

However, the regionalisation of predominantly Sunni provinces in central and western Iraq will depend on developing political and tribal dynamics, economic pressures, and the outcome of Article 140 and other territorial disputes. It is unclear at present how Article 140 and the region formation law will affect these disputed northern areas. Provincial boundaries may be redrawn, either formally or de facto, to take different regional solutions into account. If areas of Ninawah and Tamim

(including Kirkuk) are formally incorporated into the KRG we assume that provincial boundaries would have to be changed or some other solution devised to prevent populations regionalised within the KRG from obstructing the regionalisation of the remainder of these provinces. Provincial elections could play an important role, especially if aligned Sunni tribal movements perform well in neighbouring provinces.

**(C) SINIO Seminar: Turkey and the Kurds**

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Chief, Strategic Intelligence Issues (S17)  
Run Date: 05/18/2006

**What:** SINIO Summer Seminar  
**When:** Thursday 25 May, 1100-1300  
**Where:** OPS1, Room 2N044

(U//FOUO) Advance registration is required; see below for instructions.

(C) The SINIO Council and the National Cryptologic School are pleased to present the 3rd in a series of Strategic Intelligence Issue Seminars for the Summer of 2006. "*Turkish Cross-Border Operations and Kurdish Intifada: Rhetoric or Reality?*" will be presented jointly by the Assistant SINIO for Europe, [REDACTED] and the SINIO for Europe, [REDACTED]

**(U) Course Overview:**

(C) "Turkish Cross-Border Operations and Kurdish Intifada: Rhetoric or Reality?"

Increasing threats and attacks by the terrorist group Kongra Gel (former PKK) in Turkish urban areas and tourist locations, mounting Turkish pressure for action against Kongra Gel camps and leadership in northern Iraq, and prolonged unrest in mostly Kurdish southeastern Turkey this spring have the attention of senior U.S. policymakers. Chronic Turkish government failure to address the underlying grievances of its Kurdish population provides an environment that supports Kongra Gel's ability to constitute a serious security threat for Turkey and pose a serious challenge for U.S. policymakers as unilateral Turkish military action in northern Iraq is a hotbutton (nightmare) issue for the United States. Is Turkish cross-border action likely? Can Kongra Gel make good on its threats of wider attacks? Who are the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks? Why did the social unrest and riots in March occur? Will they persist? What role does Kongra Gel play? How does the Intelligence Community assess these issues? What role does SIGINT play?

**(U) Registration:**

(U//FOUO) To register, please contact [REDACTED]

POCs:

[REDACTED] Strategic Intelligence Issues [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] for National Cryptologic School [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Executive to the SINIO Council [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Assistant SINIO for Europe [REDACTED] for information