

University of Bradford

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**UPDATE:**

**BRITISH STATE COLLECTION, COLLATION & USE  
OF INFORMATION & INTELLIGENCE ON THE  
BRITISH PEACE MOVEMENT AND ITS MEMBERS.**

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## 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE UPDATE

In 1982, I was informed about the Ministry of Defence Police's attempt to interview Lois Cameron in Liverpool. At the time, in common with most members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, we were both only vaguely aware of the existence of that body. In response, I started to research material in order to write a short article about them.

It became apparent very rapidly that there was no central body of information about the (then) Special Constabulary and, perhaps worse for a writer, that at least some of the details were covered by the Official Secrets Act. The Ministry of Defence appeared unable to acknowledge, let alone answer, any letters of enquiry. The length of time being taken to compile information was rapidly becoming uneconomic in terms of any possible return from writing a short report. (Which is probably why there were no such articles from which to draw in the first place.)

However, I had sent out several other 'feelers', and accounts of the MDP's presence and activities were trickling in. At the same time, research had 'turned up' the twin body of the Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary. A year or so later, it had become clear that serious research into these bodies and their links to intelligence collection and use would be a full-time occupation.

At the beginning of 1984, proposals seemed to have crystallised. Discussion with Malcolm Dando led *inter alia* to considerations of the invasion of Human Rights and Civil Liberties. I went away to write what initially was going to be a short and simple submission.

That took nearly another year! - As I began to write the paper, and to follow-up small shreds of information from a large number of sources, it became clear that a central part was played by the Security Service and Special Branch. Thus the original submission, completed in December 1985 and of which Section 2 is a précis, concentrated on the rôles, activities and links between what were

then seen as the major 'policing' bodies of the Peace Movement. These notes are brought up to date in the next two sections.

In the 20 months or so since then, it has become clear both that other State agencies are almost certainly involved in these activities, and that government and the civil service, acting in consort or individually, resort regularly and intentionally to the use of secrecy and disinformation in such a way as to interfere seriously with campaigning by and membership of the Movement.

Hence and without apology, Section 5 of this update contains sets of information which appeared not at all, or were only briefly referred to in the original submission. I had suggested in the letter accompanying that document that somebody else should be researching them; they now appear central to this study.

Two charts are given in the appendices to indicate the various levels of interaction of the intelligence and security bodies, the first showing parts of the internal system and the second demonstrating ties with the United States counterparts.

Further appendices show the growth trends, sometimes quite alarming, of the overt agencies of policing and intelligence. There are (unsurprisingly) no figures available to show the probable corresponding growth of the Security Service.

There is little consideration or reference in this paper to the 'Wright Affair'. This is intentional. The full implications of Peter Wright's account are as yet unclear, particularly as regards the Peace Movement. In circumstances where a person fully trained in the niceties of intelligence, subversion and disinformation purports to tell the truth, it may pay to be wary.

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## 2. R&SUMÉ OF ORIGINAL SUBMISSION

### 2.1 PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS

The study will "investigate the collection, collation and use of intelligence and information on individuals, groups and organisations within the British Peace Movement by government and Crown agencies, with particular reference to implications for Human Rights and Civil Liberties".

Definitions:

Intelligence: data not normally available to the public.

Information: data published or otherwise legally obtainable.

Peace Movement: all groups and individuals opposed to general or specific acts of, or preparations for, warfare between nation-states.

Human Rights & Civil Liberties: as defined in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: and/or the National Council for Civil Liberties' Charter of Civil Rights and Liberties.

### 2.2 BACKGROUND

The State has detailed contingency plans which it intends to use in any run-up to an envisaged war or national emergency. These include the removal from society of "subversive or potentially subversive people". Such action cannot be taken without the present existence of continuously-updated national and/or regional records. The collection of such information on members of the Peace Movement directly contravenes the provisions of Article 8 of the United Nations Declaration by making incursion into personal privacy. Reliance cannot be placed by the State on the European Convention's exemption of national security, since no section of the Peace Movement has been shewn to fall within the definitions of subversion propounded by Lord Denning or by successive Home Secretaries. Article 8 is further contravened by the use of telephone and mail interception.

Sections of the Declaration and Convention relating to freedoms of thought, expression and assembly are similarly contravened by known and admitted State surveillance of public and private meetings.

Protocol 4 of the European Convention, guaranteeing freedom of movement to, from and within one's own country, has not been ratified by the United Kingdom. It has been and is contravened. A register of names is kept at all points of entry: vehicle numbers of peaceful protestors are regularly taken: and physical measures have been taken to prevent particular individuals or groups of people from moving freely about the nation.

Particular organisations identified as involved in these contraventions are:

The Security Service [MI5]:

The Police Forces, and in particular their Special Branches:

The Ministry of Defence and the Royal Air Force Police Forces:

The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary.

Other organisations which are or which may be linked to the above, and which share measures of secrecy, lack of accountability and [probable] informational links are:

The Intelligence Service [SIS or MI6]:

Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ]:

The Defence Intelligence Staff [DIS]:

Transport, Docks and Airport Police.

All organisations identified in the first of these sections have in common six or more of:

secrecy of operation:

definite, or necessary and postulated links:

complete or little-circumscribed autonomy:

lack of accountability to parliament:

a direct interest in the activities of the Peace Movement:

a known history of incursion into the field of Human Rights:

operation in the United Kingdom on behalf of the British government or its individual ministers.

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### 2.3 THE SECURITY SERVICE

The Security Service has no legal foundation. It was formed as MO5 in 1906 and redesignated MI5 in 1916. Despite an agreement between it and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch in 1931, its existence could not be admitted in parliament until quite recently. In 1963 the Denning Report publicly detailed its relationships and functions. It is concerned with "offences against the State" regarding spies and "subversive or terrorist organisations". Details of such individuals or organisations are passed to the Special Branch to facilitate searches and arrests, for which MI5 has no legal authority. Press and broadcasting publication of further details is circumscribed by D-notice 10.

Details of the funding of MI5 are known only to the Prime Minister, though the Service is theoretically responsible directly to the Home Secretary. Government ministers are informed of current activities strictly on a "need-to-know" basis.

Such administrative control as does exist appears to be via a series of linked and quasi-accountable bodies, enumerated as:

The Official Committee on Security [chaired by the Cabinet Secretary]:

The Co-ordinator of Intelligence and Security [theoretically independent]:

The Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC]:

The Overseas Economic Intelligence Committee [OEIC]:

The London Signals Intelligence Board [LSIB]:

The Official Committee on Security [OCS]:

The Permanent Secretaries' Committee on Intelligence Services [PSIS].

These bodies are also linked to [inter alia] the DIS, SIS and GCHQ.

It has been reported that MI5 keeps files on up to two million individuals. Although the Maxwell-Fife Directive of 1952 insists that the Service shall be kept "absolutely free from any political bias or influence", it is clear that the majority of its 'targets' would be classified as 'left-wing' and/or 'anti-nuclear'.

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## 2.4: THE POLICE SPECIAL BRANCHES

The Metropolitan Police Special Branch dates from 1883. Formed originally to deal with the Fenian bombings, -it soon branched out into other political areas. Provincial police forces commenced formation of their own Special Branches in 1958. Whilst the Security Service is constrained to deal with subversive and terrorist elements, no such limitation exists upon the Special Branch. As the rest of the Constabulary, its emphasis lies in the control of public order or "maintaining the Queen's peace". Thus it can admit its interest in such bodies as trades unions, the women's suffrage movement, the Communist Party and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

The Metropolitan Special Branch has access not only to the Police National Computer [PNC], but also to the 'C' Division machine. Access to the reported two million files on the latter is limited to members of the Branch (and presumably on request to members of Provincial Branches). Some files, including vehicle registration details, on the PNC are 'flagged' to alert the Branches.

In addition to detail derived from the other divisions of the Police Forces, Special Branches are known to have obtained information by means of:

Telephone taps (including 'blanket taps' on organisations):

Interception of mail:

Informal contact with managers of telephone exchanges:

Access to [Northern Ireland] computer-based military intelligence:

Briefings from the Security Service:

Attendance at public meetings (in person, or via the services of other plain-clothes police):

Posing as officials of other national or regional organisations:

Collecting names and addresses from letters to the press.



In theory, as part of the legally-based Constabulary, the Special Branch is subject to a greater degree of accountability than is the Security Service. Individual officers are responsible via line management to the Head of their Branch, thence to the Chief Constable. The Chief Constable is then answerable to the Local Police Committee or, in London, to the Home Secretary.

The little evidence available suggests that Chief Constables, however, are (as Ministers with the Security Service) kept informed only on a 'need to know' basis. In turn, the Chief Constable is not required to answer questions of the Police Committee relating to "operational matters". The government frequently declines to respond to questions concerning the Branches; staffing figures were given for the first time in 1978.

Although each Special Branch is stated to be autonomous, it seems probable that there is a degree of regional co-ordination.

Direct public accountability depends to a large extent on the Police Complaints Procedure as laid down in the Police & Criminal Evidence Act of 1984. The average length of time taken to investigate a complaint against the police is 20 weeks, and only approximately 0.6% of complaints result in disciplinary hearings or the laying of criminal charges. In view of the obvious difficulty in identifying Special Branch officers, the resultant 'success rate' is likely to be lower.

## 2.5 THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE POLICE

The Ministry of Defence Police Force (MDP) is a nationally organised body whose chief constable reports, via the second permanent under-secretary of state, to the Secretary of State for Defence. It is distinct from the 'civil' police force, having its own headquarters, CID, serious crimes squad, other specialist groups and training school. Current strength is around 4 000, and all members of the MDP have the full powers of a police constable\*. Staffing has been augmented in response to Peace Movement activities.

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\* At the time of writing the original paper, these powers were geographically circumscribed. This is no longer the case. [See Sec.4.1],

The MDP officer is theoretically appointed by, and responsible to, his base commander. In practice however appointments and deployment are centrally controlled by the Chief Constable, who prepares a classified annual report on the force. There are four Assistant Chief Constables, each in charge of an Area, and each Area is subdivided into approximately eight Groups. The MDP liaises closely with both the civil police and the Security Service. All officers are trained in the use of firearms, and some are regularly armed. All applicants to the force are positively vetted.

At Bramley, Burtonwood and Caerwent the MDP costs are paid by the United States Army. Liaison with US Forces' Intelligence is probable. The MDP are voluntarily subject to the 'normal' police complaints procedure.

The Royal Air Force has its own separate police force, which it uses for [armed] guarding of sensitive areas. The Royal Navy makes extensive use of service personnel for such activity. Both the RAF and the Navy also use the MDP, which holds the customs warrant at all naval bases.

The traditional rôle of the MDP has been control of entry to the armed forces' bases and headquarters. There is considerable evidence of a recent widening of responsibility.

## 2.6 THE UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY CONSTABULARY

Until 1954, the MDP were charged with the guarding of nuclear research and production sites. This responsibility was transferred to a new constabulary of the UKAEA by act of parliament in that year. Like the MDP, the force was centrally controlled, empowered to act within 15 miles of its establishments, and responsible via the second permanent under-secretary of state to its Minister [the Secretary of State for Energy]. Since 1976, specific legislation has permitted members of the ABAC to carry firearms and to operate in a wider geographical area.

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As with the MDP, the Chief Constable's annual report is a classified document; the force voluntarily adopts the 'civil' complaints procedure; and some members are regularly armed. It is probable that the chief officers of the two forces have regular formal contact.\* The AEAC does not seem to have direct access to the civil police computers, though it is charged with the detection and prevention of theft and of attacks by terrorist groups.

The members of the AEAC are deployed at sites owned by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, British Nuclear Fuels plc, and URENCO. It does not currently guard the sites of electricity board or other commercial 'nuclear' operators.

The strength of the AEAC is approximately 650; it investigates roughly 400 cases per year, most of which are internal crimes not specifically associated with nuclear materials.

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\* This now seems less likely. See page 22.

3. UPDATE: INTERNAL SURVEILLANCE ORGANISATIONS;  
-- The Security Service and Special Branches.

3.1 THE SECURITY SERVICE

Over the last two years, a great amount of detail concerning the operation and internal organisation of MI5 has been published. Some of this appears to have been with the active collusion and approval of government and security agencies [authors such as Chapman Pincher and Rupert Allason]. Other 'leaks' have been without such authority [Cathy Massiter] and have resulted in prompt court action [Peter Wright]. MI5 remains, however, a secret organisation. There is no public accountability, and such information as exists is not able to be checked for accuracy. The following, therefore, is an overview of some of the published information, repeated with such caveat.

According to Cathy Massiter<sup>1</sup>, a former chairperson of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was subject to a Security Service telephone tap on the grounds that he was a member of the Communist Party. Using this tap, MI5 were able to record all important information concerning the Campaign. Chapman Pincher<sup>2</sup> indicates that CND was classed as a "subversive organisation" for the three decades of the fifties to seventies, and that although "the label has been removed" some members remain so classed and subject to surveillance. Files previously collated have not been destroyed. It is interesting to note that membership of the Communist Party has been used as an excuse for instigation of surveillance, though the CPGB has not since 1951 been a "subversive organisation" as defined by the Home Secretary<sup>3</sup>.

Pincher's assessment of the situation was confirmed and extended by a private detective who claimed on an HTV programme of 27 June 1985 that he had been employed by MI5, and that the monitoring of CND sympathisers continued despite police denials.<sup>4</sup>

According to Nick Davies<sup>5</sup>, 'subversives' are kept under surveillance by department F2 of the Security Service. Subdivision

F2(R) is concerned solely with "education, pacifists and members of parliament". F2 is also said to maintain links with the Civil Contingencies Unit [see Section 5].

The revelation of the tapping of CND telephones led to an official complaint to the new tribunal [which was dismissed], to a High Court hearing [which, though not won by CND, led to a judicial statement on 26 July 1985 that the Campaign had "an arguable case" that the Home Secretary was abusing his powers] and to the preparation of a case for the European Commission of Human Rights.

Information obtained from the August 1983 telephone tap was passed to a new Ministry of Defence Secretariat, DS19, set up on the orders of the then Secretary of State Michael Heseltine. This Secretariat, and MI5's links with the Ministry of Defence Working Party on the Control of Anti-nuclear Demonstrations, are also considered in Section 5.1.2.

MI5 has since 1978 installed new mainframe computer equipment costing £20 million<sup>6</sup> and reportedly able to hold basic information on 20 million people<sup>7</sup>. There remains no way of checking the veracity of such personal information or of controlling its use.

### 3.2 THE SPECIAL BRANCHES

As has been noted, the Special Branches and Security Service are closely interlinked. Both are ultimately responsible to the Home Secretary. The Branches are briefed at regional level by MI5, which also provides training on targets and techniques.<sup>8</sup>

Surveillance of the Peace Movement has been regular and continuous. According to Bowes:

(In the early 1950s) "Peace organisations, like the ex-Servicemen's Movement for Peace and the British Peace Committee ... continued to be subjected to surveillance that only became common knowledge when the Special Branch did something 'newsworthy' -- as when it stopped foreign sympathisers from entering the country, or informed continental governments (eg prior to the August 1951 Berlin Youth Festival) of Britishers to be prevented from travelling freely."<sup>9</sup>

-- Bowes continues his survey of surveillance and interference with civil liberties up to and including the arrest and questioning of the 'Wethersfield Six'. According to the *Spectator* of 8 April 1960:

"From the beginning this ... organisation has been infiltrated ... One plain-clothes man, I understand, took part in the first rocket-site demonstration the Committee held and was much put out when he was thrown vigorously off the site! Other Special Branch or MIS agents attend their meetings, receive their confidential briefings and attend their private conferences. And their telephone is tapped, presumably without Mr Butler's knowledge."

As Bowes points out, not only is there a disregard for civil liberties, but certain of the Special Branch actions are designed to intimidate rather than to collect intelligence.<sup>10</sup>

These activities continue, and according to Peter Allen they have increased since 1981.<sup>11</sup> Telephone tapping, far from being strictly limited by the need of a Secretary of State's warrant, is said by the Post Office Engineer's Union to be "systematic and widespread".<sup>12</sup> Richelson<sup>13</sup> notes additional intelligence and information collection methods as:

- collation of press reports on named activists:
- collection of the names of all those signing petitions to parliament:
- noting the names of those appearing for those who "attend or help with the defence" in certain trials:
- the purchase and collection of papers, magazines and leaflets of political groups.

The decision of the Branches covertly to collect information or overtly to intimidate may be taken on a regional, cyclical, individual or random basis. There are indications for each:

*Regionally:* Karen Lewton, past CND National Council Member for Northumberland, regularly received damaged and obviously opened post.<sup>14</sup> The current National Council Member for Durham, soon after she decided to stand for election, was overtly watched and followed by uniformed and non-uniformed officers.<sup>15</sup> But no such intimidation has yet occurred in Derbyshire.

*Cyclically:* the Committee of 100 was directly intimidated by the use of prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act. Last year, William Peden, a CND Council Member and member of Polariswatch, was

arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and questioned by Special Branch under the Official Secrets Act.<sup>16</sup>

*Individually:* in 1982, Lois Cameron in Liverpool was visited by the MDP and questioned by a CID officer, following her writing of a letter to USAF Burtonwood. Other active members of Liverpool CND were 'ignored' despite visits and letters to Burtonwood.<sup>17</sup> Lois was not an officer of CND, but she was young and living alone. It has been suggested that Hilda Murrell was selected for attention because of her relationship to a naval officer who served in the Falklands Conflict.

*Randomly:* much overt policing, though not only of the Peace Movement, seems to have a random quality. The invasion of Chilwell ROF in 1984 was not prevented by the civilian constabulary, despite their presence and then current experience of the miners' strike. A later attempt [1986] was thwarted by 'herding' and 'penning' protestors. It could be argued that inconsistency is both endemic and intentional. A high degree of uncertainty may engender a respect bred of fear.

The "Home Office Guidelines on Work of a Special Branch" were published at about the same time as the original submission to which this is an update.<sup>18</sup> The following sections seem particularly pertinent:

¶1: "the responsibility of each Special Branch relates only to the area of the force of which it is a part" except that the Metropolitan Branch has a national responsibility for "Irish Republican extremism and terrorism";

¶5: "A special branch gathers information about threats to public order...to provide assessments of whether marches, meetings, demonstrations and pickets pose any threat to public order and help the chief officer to determine an appropriate level of policing."

¶6: "A Special Branch assists the Security Service in carrying out its tasks of defending the Realm...from the actions of persons and organisations...which *may be judged to be* subversive to the State."

¶10: "At airports and seaports, Special Branch officers...gather information relating to their other functions..."

¶16: "Data on individuals or organisations should not *under any circumstances* be collected or held solely on the basis that...a person or organisation supports *unpopular causes*..."

¶17: "It is also important to ensure that, *wherever possible*, information recorded about an individual is authenticated and does not give a false or misleading impression...Each Special Branch should...maintain an effective system for...destroying information which can no longer be clearly related to the discharge of its functions."

¶18: "Access to information held by Special Branch should be strictly limited to those who have a particular need to know. *Under no circumstances should information be passed to commercial firms or to employers' organisations.*"

¶20: "Subversive activities are those which threaten the safety or well-being of the State, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means."

[all emphases are mine]

-- ¶1 seems to be unnecessary unless some Branches had been co-operating without authorisation at a Regional level; or unless it was felt necessary publicly to deny the existence of such organisation. In 1961, there was a high-level meeting of Special Branch officers. Proposals included:

"...regionalisation of Special Branch...each region, though answerable to the 'appropriate chief constable', to be directly responsible to the Home Office."<sup>19</sup>

["region" in this press report appears to mean a single constabulary].

-- of the other sections, ¶5 implies that a Special Branch must operate clandestinely to collect information prior to all 'political' meetings and demonstrations: ¶6 allows a local Branch to set its own criteria on 'subversion', despite the edict of ¶20: ¶10 probably relates to the list of 'subversive' British nationals held at customs posts. So far as is known, the Devon & Cornwall Special Branch, when under John Alderson, is the only one to have had its files thoroughly 'weeded' as required by ¶17, and data then held is known to have gone beyond the dictates of ¶16, often having been based on unchecked hearsay evidence. Home Secretary Leon Brittan appeared to rebuke the Metropolitan Special Branch in relation to ¶16 when, in a parliamentary reply to a question requesting a report on their interviewing of a former CND magazine editor, he said:

"peaceful political campaigning [does not come] within the definition of subversion which is given in the guidelines."<sup>20</sup>

¶18 seems frequently to have been circumvented or ignored. The Economic League, an organisation which provides reports to employers on the political background of potential employees, seems to have access to otherwise unobtainable information. Individual employers have also reported receiving telephone calls from Special Branch officers warning them of left-wing activity.<sup>21</sup>

Overall, the Guidelines seem to have been prepared for public consumption as much as for the guidance of Special Branches.



An interesting, but chilling, note appears on page 132 of the same Home Affairs Committee Report. A submission by the National Council for Civil Liberties states:

"An important extension of Special Branch activities took place in the early sixties. The peace movement and protest movements of all kinds were active in many parts of the country. Chief Constables of provincial forces were, *therefore*, encouraged to set up their own security organisations. Most of them did so."

[my emphasis]

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REFERENCES; SECTION 3

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2. Chapman Pincher: The Secret Offensive: Sudgwick & Jackson, 1985, ISBN 0 283 99262 x: page 222.
3. With the acceptance of Harry Pollett's 1947 report to the CPGB executive, and the January 1951 launching of July 1950's The British Road to Socialism.
4. Judith Cook: Murrell Still Tick-tocks On: *New Statesman*, 5 July 1985.
5. Nick Davies: MI5's Surveillance Machine: *The Observer*, 10 March 1985.
6. Harry Cohen, MP: Interception of Communications Bill: Second Reading: *Hansard*, 3 December 1985, c247.
7. Richard Norton-Taylor: Why You Can't Always Tell Who is Listening: *The Guardian*, 1 August 1986.
8. Davies, Gifford & Richards: Political Policing in Wales: Welsh Council for Civil & Political Liberties [WCCPL], 1984.
9. Stuart Bowes: The Police and Civil Liberties: Lawrence & Wishart, 1966: page 155.
10. *ibid*, as in [p.166] raids on the homes of the 'Wethersfield 6'; and [p.144] photographing peaceful demonstrators.
11. Peter Allen: Big Sister is Watching You: in *Sanity*, August 1984.
12. Quoted by Allen in the same article.
13. Jeffrey T Richelson & Desmond Ball: The Ties that Bind: Allen & Unwin, 1985, ISBN 0 04 327092: page 287.
14. Gillian Reeve & Joan Smith: Offence of the Realm: CND Publications Ltd, 1986, ISBN 0 907321 36 4: page 19.
15. Direct information. A formal complaint has been made to the police.
16. Peden subsequently took court action against the police. His file was then sent for consideration to the Director of Public Prosecutions. See *The Guardian*, 3 and 6 September and 5 November, 1986.
17. Personal information, and quoted in Reeve & Smith, *op cit*.
18. in The Fourth Report of the Home Affairs Committee, 1984-85: Special Branch: House of Commons: HMSO, 17 April 1985, ISBN 0 10 207185 3: pages x - xiii.
19. *The Daily Telegraph*: 23 May 1961.

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- 20 *Hansard*: 11 March 1985, c28w. The Guidelines were originally issued to Special Branches on 19 December 1984.
- 21 Cited by the National Council for Civil Liberties in the Home Affairs Committee Report [*op cit*, page 26] for example is the case of Jan Martin, a potential BBC employee who was refused access to a Taylor Woodrow premises on the grounds of information they had received from Special Branch. The [false] record had been raised by a mistaken identification, but Ms Martin was only able to establish the cause of her banning through her retired father's contacts, he having been a detective chief superintendent at New Scotland Yard.

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#### 4. THE SPECIAL CONSTABULARIES.

##### 4.1 THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE POLICE

Between 1982 and 1986, there appears to have been a reorganisation or change of emphasis in the activities of the MDP. Overall organisation in four Areas remained unchanged, but the number of Groups was reduced from 33 to 24.<sup>1</sup> Some losses reflect obvious diminution in the bases' importance (RAF Quedgley); others, presumably, changes in emphasis in MDP activity (NIRU/REME N. Ireland). One change in the period - the 'removal' of Shoeburyness from Central to Southern Area - may indicate the beginnings of an alignment with civil defence and war planning organisations. A relocation is curious; the London Group appears to have moved to Feltham (though the HQ in Whitehall remains). Unusually, no address is given for the Feltham Group.

The 1987 Police & Constabulary Almanac shows one additional change; the creation of an RAF Molesworth Group, presumably in response to the imminent arrival of Cruise missiles, and to the ongoing protest at the base. Perhaps surprisingly, there remains no Group HQ at RAF Greenham Common.

The MDP have remained active as the 'behind the fence' protection against peace protestors, though often detention by them has resulted in release without charge.<sup>2</sup> When arrests and detentions have been made, there have been many mistakes. Photographs have been taken without the protestors' permission;<sup>3</sup> detainees have been searched against their will;<sup>4</sup> and public benches in magistrates' courts have been packed by MDP officers in an attempt to exclude the public.<sup>5</sup> For a legally constituted police force, the MDP seem to have either little training in the law or little respect for human rights. In the course of the legal process against Clive Ponting, the MDP officers' statements were changed between committal hearing and trial.<sup>6</sup>

The Ministry of Defence Police Orders for Aldermaston give several insights into the operations and organisation of the force.<sup>7</sup>

Nearly all force members at this location are permanently armed when on duty, and at night the establishment is patrolled by an armoured vehicle whose crew are equipped with sub-machine guns. Other specialised vehicles are used by a Special Escort Group, responsible for security of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in transit. The vehicles carry HF, VHF and multi-channel radios; the crews are again "fully armed"; and their operation is thought to be co-ordinated by the Royal Artillery. In addition to these two armed and mobile patrols, there is a third; a Special Response Group. For emergency use, the base has an exclusive line to the Thames Valley Police HQ.

This evidence further debases the parliamentary statement of Dr John Gilbert, who as Minister of State for Defence Procurement claimed in 1984 that the MDP were not normally armed.<sup>8</sup> It also raises again the question of communications with other agencies.

In evidence to the Defence Committee, the Assistant Chief Constable of the MDP Northern Area said that he had "no facilities" to check up on the [Faslane] peace campers' background or to make use of Strathclyde police files.<sup>9</sup> This appears to rule out the possibility that the MDP have any link at all into the civil police computers; and to eliminate the likelihood of the Defence Police maintaining their own database. Later in the same cross-examination at Clyde Submarine Base, Commodore David Morse responds to the pressing question of how information on "people who are involved in action at the base" is obtained. The Commodore's entire response is deleted from the record.<sup>10</sup>

On 27 January of this year, the Ministry of Defence Police Bill received its second reading<sup>11</sup> (Royal Assent was received on 5 March). The Bill, deriving from the Broadbent Report<sup>12</sup>, replaces the previous Acts relevant to the formation of the force and raises the status of the force from special to full constabulary. Notably, it removes the restriction limiting MDP operations and powers to within 15 miles of a military establishment. A Police Committee is formed, reporting as required to the Secretary of State for Defence and comprising *inter alia* the chief and Scottish equivalent of HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, and relevant civil Chief Constables. The size of the constabulary has now increased to ca 4 800 [see

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appendices]. The future of the MDP as regards to both the privatised Royal Ordnance factories and the Security and Intelligence Service headquarters is under review, but no resultant redundancies are envisaged. The constabulary's responsibilities are now able to be extended to the policing of private contractors carrying out official defence contracts.

The White Paper preceding the preparation of the Bill<sup>13</sup> gives some insights into, and confirmation (or otherwise) of suppositions concerning, the MDP. Hence:

"While the Defence Council has the formal responsibility ... the Second Permanent Under Secretary MOD is effectively the policy controller of the MDP, reporting to Ministers *as necessary*."

[Paragraph 18: my italics]

The previously-supposed liaison between the chiefs of the MDP and Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary through the Chief Police Officers' Association (CPOA) does not appear to exist. Para 23 indicates that the CPOA is an MoD organisation. Hence, the 'other' chief constable referred to in evidence to the Defence Committee (see original submission) is presumably that of the RAF Police.

"...MDP's subordinate organisation should be modified to have a senior representative such as an Assistant Chief Constable at CINCPNAVHOM, HQ UKLF, and RAF Support Command (covering also RAF Strike Command) and another, possibly also with a policy rôle, at MDPHQ covering the interests of the PEMB."

[Para 73c]\*

There was, according to Para 94, a "record throughput of 965 students, including 396 recruits" at the MDP Training School. Four members of the MDP attended courses at the civil police Bramshill Staff College.

It would appear that the force is not well-briefed in terms of impending or possible real threats to security. Recommendation (v), Para 112, suggests that "the MDP CID's activities should be predominantly related to petty crime on-base". It had been noted in Para 57 that:

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CINCPNAVHOM;	Commander-in-Chief, UK-based naval forces.
HQ UKLF;	Headquarters, United Kingdom Land Forces (ie Army)
PEMB;	Procurement Executive Management Board.

"CID work is a complex operation requiring expensive technical back-up facilities *which the MDP do not have*. Crime is increasingly complex with wide national and even international links. The civil CIDs alone have the requisite spread of background knowledge."

[my italics]

From the foregoing and a general reading of the White Paper, it would seem that the MDP is a relatively low-level organisation in respect of any threat to individual privacy and freedoms. Nevertheless, there remain aspects giving rise to serious concern:

- (a) The force is directly accountable only to a senior civil servant:
- (b) It would appear to be growing direct links with the Home Defence Forces, one of whose primary duties is to quell civil unrest in time of national emergency:
- (b) The new Ministry of Defence Police Committee is constituted under the Act *without* any indication or limitation as to its membership. The White Paper indicates (Paras 71-2) that there will be intentional overlap between this Committee and two new Defence Security Committees.\* The chain of command and responsibility is immediately blurred. (I am currently unaware of links between these Security Committees and other security and intelligence bodies).

Ch...:  
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#### THE UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY CONSTABULARY (UKAEAC)

Unlike the MDP, Special Branch and Security Service, the UKAEAC has kept or been kept out of the press and out of parliamentary debate. The committee report stage and second reading of the Atomic Energy Authority Bill raised no reference to the constabulary.<sup>14</sup> A short report in the *Guardian*<sup>15</sup> indicates that, there have been 'major changes' in the organisation over the last year. These include a force increase to 682 [see appendices]; an increase to 50 police dogs [previous number not given]; the authorisation of all 100 sergeants to carry firearms; and the attendance of some members on firearms courses held by the civil police at Wakefield.

\* Defence Security  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Ordinary} \\ \text{Co-Ordinary} \end{array} \right. \rightarrow \text{Career.}$

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The changes are reflected in the Police & Constabulary Almanacs.<sup>16</sup> The force has been split into two divisions, A and B, responsible respectively for Capenhurst, Dounreay, Springfields and Sellafield; and Harwell, Risley and Winfrith. The division is possibly geographical, though both Capenhurst and Risley are in Cheshire; or according to Organisation (all 'B' division are AEA plants, all 'A' except Dounreay are BNFL). The Headquarters similarly has been split between London and Risley, whilst Establishments at London and Chapelcross have been 'lost'.

The rationale for these changes is unknown. However, according to the new Chief Constable John Reddington, who has overseen them, "the greatest challenge faced...during 1986 was the number of anti-nuclear demonstrations at BNFL and UKAEA sites".<sup>17</sup> The reorganisation may owe its inception both to the changing status of the Atomic Energy Authority and to reaction to increased public questioning of the necessity for a nuclear weapons industry.<sup>18</sup>



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REFERENCES: SECTION 4

1. Police and Constabulary Almanacs, 1982 & 1986: R.Hazell & Co, Henley-on-Thames: ISSN 0477-2008.
2. See for example the *Guardian* report of 7 Feb 86 on the blockade of RAF Molesworth.
3. And to the annoyance of at least one magistrate: see Jane Dibblin: Magistrate Protests about 'Forced' Photos in *New Statesman*, 23 Aug 85.
4. See for example Molesworth: Fence Posted in *Peace News*, 8 Mar 85.
5. Moira Abdel Rahim, in a letter to *The Guardian*, 14 Mar 86.
6. Richard Norton-Taylor: The Ponting Affair: Cecil Woolf, 1985: page 69.
7. The Orders were removed by three Greenham women on 9 August 1985, and a report by Duncan Campbell and Patrick Forbes appeared in the *New Statesman* a week later, under the heading MoD Aldermaston outwitted by Greenham women.
8. *Hansard* 17 May 84, c533. Quoted in the original submission.
9. Second Report from the Defence Committee 1983-84: The Physical Security of Military Installations in the United Kingdom: HMSO 1984, ISBN 0 10 292784: Para 315.
10. *ibid*, Para 317.
11. *Hansard*, 27 Jan 87, cs275-309.
12. Report on the Ministry of Defence Police, chaired by Sir Ewen Broadbent: HMSO Cmnd 9853, 24 Jul 86.
13. Ministry of Defence: Report of the Ministry of Defence Police Review Committee: HMSO Cmnd 9853, Jul 86.
14. Atomic Energy Authority Bill (house of Lords): Second Reading; *Hansard* 21 Jan 86, cs215-40: Report; 11 Feb 86, cs 884-90. Royal Assent was received on 19 Feb 86. The purpose of the Act is to transfer the AEA to a trading fund basis.
15. Police Step up Training at Nuke Sites: Paul Brown, in *The Guardian*, 4 Aug 87.
16. *op cit* and (1987): ISBN 0 901718 39 4.
17. Paul Brown, 4 Aug 87, *op cit*.
18. As has already been noted, the AEA Constabulary is not, despite its name, responsible for the policing of (CEGB) atomic energy installations.

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## 5. ADDENDUM: LINKS, SECRECY & IMPLICATIONS.

### 5.1 INTERNAL SECURITY LINKS

#### 5.1.1. Government Communications Headquarters

There have been, over the past year or two, many references to a possible rôle played by Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the interception of internal communications. The Government seems intent on taking extreme steps against those who would reveal any information on the operations of this not-so-secret organisation'. Despite its title, Nigel West's recent publication<sup>2</sup> is concerned almost entirely with the period ending in 1945. Its only 'revelation' of current activity is that GCHQ Cheltenham has a Cray 3 computer. Government legal actions, stretching back to 1958, seem only tenuously linked with the current administration's perceived passion for secrecy and appear to indicate that GCHQ has indeed an internal rôle.

It is known that GCHQ's main interest is in the receipt and interpretation of radio signals. However, to be able to provide the security and intelligence services with 85% of their information as claimed by Laurie<sup>3</sup>, it would be necessary for the organisation to intercept telephone conversations. Campbell<sup>4</sup> indicates that there is a British Telecom microwave link running specifically to the organisation.

It could be claimed that the microwave link is installed for communications use in civil defence. However, it is known that GCHQ has 'listened in' to international telephone conversations. In the years 1967-71, the organisation constructed two satellite dishes near Bude, specifically to collect such INTELSAT-beamed 'traffic'.<sup>5</sup> Coincidentally in 1967, the White House authorised Operation Minaret, which "used GCHQ listening stations ... to relay information on communications of civil rights and anti-vietnam war activists" to the US National Security Agency (NSA).<sup>6</sup>

Given the importance attached to GCHQ Cheltenham in terms of information collection, given that it has a link to the main Telecom trunk system, and given that it has intercepted telephone traffic in the past, it is difficult not to draw the conclusion that it uses the microwave link. It also seems probable that, if voice or keyword recognition is used to filter intercepted telephone calls then, given Cheltenham's impressive computer power, it is done at this centre.<sup>7</sup>

The total worldwide staff of GCHQ is estimated at 20 000 (Compared with a combined Intelligence Services manpower of 10 000<sup>8</sup>). Collected information is fed-in to the Cabinet Office via the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)<sup>9</sup> under the chairmanship of Sir Colin Figures and containing the heads of MI5, MI6 and the Defence Intelligence Secretariat (DIS) as well as of GCHQ.<sup>9</sup> Either directly or via the London Intelligence Signals Board (LSIB), the organisation has a direct feed into all intelligence oversight committees other than the Official Committee on Security (OCS) whose sole responsibility is oversight of the Security Service.<sup>10</sup>

#### 5.1.2 The Ministry of Defence

In 1983 the new Secretary of State for Defence set up Defence Secretariat 19 (DS19) in the Ministry of Defence. The purpose of the Secretariat was to counter CND and other Peace Movement propaganda. It is claimed that the Department obtained information from MI5, and that the Conservative Party subsequently used intelligence so collected in the election campaign of that year.<sup>11</sup>

DS19 was subsequently 'wound up'. However, its functions and presumably its direct links with the Security Service have been transferred to the Defence Arms Control Unit "in conjunction with other branches in the Department".<sup>12</sup>

In response to the activities of the Peace Movement, the MoD set up a "Working Party on the Control of Anti-Nuclear Demonstrations". It is chaired by the Assistant Under-Secretary (Air Staff) and "contains representatives of the security directorates, the single services, the Ministry of Defence Police, and the Defence Secretariat".<sup>13</sup>

Successive Government Ministers may have declared that they do not consider CMD to be a subversive organisation within the official meaning of that term.<sup>14</sup> It is clear however that the officials of the Ministry of Defence do not agree, and that the Security Service continues to collect intelligence on the membership and activities of the Peace Movement and its members, and to pass it on to the MoD, the MDP and other agencies.

### 5.1.3 The Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU)

Early in 1972 the Cabinet Office took over the rôle of Civil Contingency planning which had previously been under the wing of the Home Office, and set up the Civil Contingencies Unit. The 'official' version of this agency, which meets in the Cabinet Office, is that it co-ordinates government action in response to national industrial unrest. Its first action was response to the dock strike of August 1972, following the declaration of a 'state of emergency'.<sup>24</sup> It would almost certainly have been used during the most recent miners' strike.

CCU is chaired by Sir Arthur Goodall. Its membership includes Ministers from all major Ministries and it has the status of a Cabinet Committee. At national level it has links with the Security Service, the Civil Defence Structure and, via Cabinet Committee GEN 158, the Ministry of Defence. Regionally it has direct contact with the Emergency Committees and the Home Defence System. At military district level there are said to be direct communications links from the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBRA), for the use of CCU, to the Major-Generals and to the relevant Chief Constables.

Given the Unit's links, as well as its name, it would appear that it has duties over and above control of the effects of national strikes. Further confirmation is given by the current (or completed) building of a new war control bunker under High Holborn.<sup>25</sup> The bunker, codenamed PINDAR and com1 from the budget of the Ministry of Defence, is to rehouse both COBRA and the Ministry's Defence Situation Centre.

One may hypothesise that CCU has a central 'war emergency' function, and that its actions would include the co-ordination of

the removal of 'subversives' from society in any such situation. The extent to which it is fully briefed on individual possible 'trouble-makers', and the frequency of its meetings in periods of calm, is however not known.

## 5.2 OVERSEAS LINKS.

### 5.2.1. Government and Intelligence Connexions

It has been seen that there are close links between GCHQ and the American NSA in the collection and dissemination of intelligence. Other organised intelligence links with the United States include:

1. The 1946 UKUSA Treaty on intelligence exchange and co-operation between Great Britain, The United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. With the exception of the last (since her adoption of Nuclear-Free status) the agreement remains in force and representatives of the nations concerned attend meetings of the UK JIC.<sup>16</sup>
2. The 1952 trilateral UK/USA/France agreement introducing "positive vetting".<sup>16</sup>
3. Liaison of Special Branch officers with USAF Security Police and the (US) Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).<sup>17</sup>
4. Official liaison between MI5 Security Liaison Officers and (US) Central Intelligence Agency staffs.<sup>18</sup>

Other unofficial and semi-official links exist at many levels; it is reported for instance that MI6 plotted to kill Colonel Gadafy, but was prevented from so doing by the CIA.<sup>19</sup>

Detectable links to other nations' security and intelligence services also exist. Presumably affecting the anti-apartheid movement in this country, there has since 1975 been a UK/USA exchange of information on the African National Congress, and such information has been given to the South African authorities.<sup>20</sup>

The current British Administration in common with its predecessors enjoys a close co-operation with the United States, exemplified perhaps by the membership of Members of Parliament of all parties in the British Atlantic Committee. Certainly, alone amongst the NATO allies, Britain is noted to support the US vetoing of communist and non-aligned disarmament resolutions at the United Nations. United States 'planes leaving British airfields for the bombing raid on Libya had to make a wide detour in order to avoid overflying France, Spain and Portugal, who were unwilling to allow their airspace to be utilised for the purpose. The USUKLOC plan for wartime emergency permits the United States' forces unimpeded use of many British mainland hospitals, air force bases, airports and docks, and enables any Commander of those forces to take unilateral action "as (he) deems necessary" whilst indemnifying him against all civil legal proceedings.<sup>21</sup> These are draconian powers. But the extent of domination, of both Government and intelligence communities by their far richer and larger US counterparts, is unknown.

#### 5.2.2. Non-Governmental Organisations: Funding.

A number of independent and *quasi*-independent organisations are active in publicising the NATO argument on defence issues. Many are peopled by members who are above reproach. However, some demonstrate disturbing ties to the United States and in particular to organisations within that country which are recognised as being of the extreme political right wing.<sup>22</sup>

Organisations particularly of note in this respect are the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies (IEDSS), the Coalition for Peace through Security (CPS) and the International Freedom Fund Establishment (IFFE). All have received considerable funding from the (US) Heritage Foundation.

Of these organisations, perhaps the most worrying is the IEDSS. A research and publishing organisation, IEDSS is registered as a charity and therefore bound by rules which should ensure that it does not enter the political arena in a partisan way. Nevertheless, its advisory council and board of management are

uniformly of the right, and its publications uniformly uphold the current standing of NATO and of the Conservatives whilst often directly attacking the Peace Movement.<sup>23</sup>

Between 1982 and 1985, IEDSS received more than \$427 000 in subsidies from the Heritage Foundation. In the same period IFFE, which appears to be a 'laundering operation' for funds to other right-wing groups, received \$140 000; and CPS, whose sole aim appears to be action specifically against CND, received at least \$60 000.

It may be noted that, in a similar period (1983-86), 'Peace through NATO', a body similar in many respects to CPS, received British Government grants totalling £212 500. In the same years, the British Atlantic Committee was given £141 000 and the United Nations Association £72 000, all in Foreign Office grants. The UNA grant was the only one of these three which did not rise in line with inflation.<sup>26</sup>

### 5.3 STATE SECRECY, DISINFORMATION AND EFFECTS.

#### 5.3.1. British State Secrecy

It has been claimed that Britain maintains the greatest degree of State secrecy in the western world. Successive governments have promulgated three main provisions for this protection: The Official Secrets Acts, 1911, 1920 and 1939; The D-Notice Committee (1912); and reliance (as in the current Wright case) on contractual confidentiality. There are however many other statutes which make specific provision; the Franks Report lists 61 such Acts passed between 1920 and 1971.<sup>27</sup>

It is not intended that this section should deal in detail with the history or implications of a set of codes which are currently being questioned at great length in the press. Attempts to repeal or amend Section 2 of the 1911 Act have been made since 1939. The Defence Committee suggested in 1980 that the D-notice system "hardly serves a useful purpose".<sup>28</sup> Both provisions still stand and both continue to be used.<sup>29</sup>

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Beyond the provisions of the various Acts and conventions, secrecy is endemic in both government and the civil service. Cabinet decisions are discussed by a few individuals in code-numbered committees. Some (as the *Trident* decision) by fewer in committees so secret that no code number is allocated. In the Ministry of Defence, the detail of any particular aspect of nuclear weaponry will be known only to a handful of highly-departmentalised officials. The Secretary of State for Defence alone is permitted access to all nuclear weapons facts, and any other recipient of any such facts from the Ministry of Defence must be security cleared and a Privy Councillor.<sup>30</sup> It may safely be assumed that similar provisions apply to the equally secret Security Service and, to an extent, to Special Branch. Lack of knowledge by chief constables of the actions of the Branch were noted in the original submission. Leon Brittan admitted in 1985 that Lord Bridge was unable to check allegations that MI5 had conducted unauthorised telephone interception because "such allegations relate to the operation of the Security Services as a whole".<sup>31</sup>

Some aspects of security of information are logically necessary; others more difficult to understand; yet others ludicrous. Over the last year or two, the following are amongst those revealed, discovered or topical:

- refusal of the Home Office Ministers to detail occasions on which Metropolitan Police armoured cars were used in 1985;
- instructions to Social Security officers to avoid any statements which might be "interpreted as criticisms of government policy";
- refusal to publish details of the US/UK Memorandum of Understanding on 'Star Wars' research;
- refusal to allow "public scrutiny" of emergency plans for nuclear reactor emergency procedures;
- the vetting of future GCSE mathematics papers for 'political content';
- that the 1981 Broadcasting Act prevents a pressure group from advertising on television in direct response to 'State' advertisements;
- a submission by counsel for the Home Office that the High Court is precluded from investigating allegations of MI5 telephone tapping;
- stringent 'safeguards' attaching to the answering by civil servants of questions from House of Commons Select Committees;
- that the government has power under the BBC Charter to insist that the broadcasting service carry ministerial statement without adverse comment, and to require that the corporation refrain from publishing any "items or class of news";
- failure to release under the '30-year rule' 1956 Cabinet papers on government argument against nuclear weapons limits and prohibitions; on the effects of atmospheric testing; and on US co-operation on nuclear tests;



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- the victimisation of Trevor Brown, Rodney Fordham, Ross Hesketh, Barry Matthews and John Taylor for publicly dissenting from aspects of British nuclear policy whilst working for a State agency;
  - that the Comptroller and Auditor General has no direct oversight of security service payments from the Secret Vote;
  - the banning of the BBC 'Zircon' programme on grounds of national security, despite wide public showing and discussion of the issues;
  - that the government retains absolute control over information generated by contract research, and has prevented publication of the results of such research in the civil areas of radioactivity in the environment, the effects of fertilisers and of acid rain and dioxin, the concentrations of industrial chemicals in fish and of the effects of petrol lead in the diet;
  - a CEEB instruction to all station managers that telephone enquiries on the safety of nuclear reactors "received from the nuclear opposition or unknown callers" should receive a refusal of all information,

### 5.3.2 The Use of Disinformation

Disinformation may be defined as evidence which is either untrue or which is true but intentionally limited so as to give a misleading impression. When factual information is freely available and is to hand, disinformation may easily be counteracted. In conditions of extreme secrecy however, counter action is difficult not only because the full truth is unknown, but also because the sheer volume of such statements may both preclude effective response and create a groundrock of public opinion unwilling to listen to dissent.

In time of war, there may be a sound argument for the use of disinformation. Under such conditions, it is freely admitted by the government and the defence ministry that such methodology is utilised.<sup>32</sup> Similar considerations may be accepted as attaching to specific and limited aspects of the military and economic security of the nation in peacetime.

The wider the bounds of official secrecy however, the greater is the risk that, intentionally or otherwise, a government or its servants may resort to the use of disinformation. It may be done *with purpose* in order to present administrative decisions as fully competent, or so as to hide decisions which have been made; or *accidentally* in that the administration has its own set of values which may not correspond with those of the hearer; or *with malevolence* to demean an opposing body or opinion. Disinformation,

for whatever reason promulgated, may then be taken-up and used by the press and by researchers as factual information.

"A really efficient totalitarian state would be one in which the all-powerful executive of political bosses and their army of managers control a population of slaves who do not have to be coerced, because they love their servitude. To make them love it is the task assigned, in present-day totalitarian states, to ministries of propaganda, newspaper editors and schoolteachers."<sup>33</sup>

Britain is not a totalitarian state. However, it has maintained and still maintains at least departments of propaganda. The rôle of DS19 and its successor have already been noted. The 'Zinoviev letter' forgery, which sealed the fate of the Labour Party in 1924, was produced by collusion between MI5, MI6, the Conservative Party and the Foreign Office.<sup>34</sup> Twenty-four years later, the Foreign Office was again implicated in the release of a forgery - 'Protocol M' - which it alleged was a Soviet document inciting the West German populace to revolt against the Allied authorities.<sup>34\*</sup> The Foreign and Commonwealth Office currently maintains an 'Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit' whose prime purpose appears to be the publication of a Quarterly Review containing statements of Government Ministers which are generally critical of proposals from the Soviet Union, the Peace Movement, or both.

The majority of the British press is perceived as broadly supporting the Conservative Party. Thanks to the system of daily non-attributable briefings, there is in any case a general *reportage* support of the administration. Such briefing, whether given by a Cabinet member or a functionary of the Civil Service, is easily obtainable and, given its aura of secrecy, not immediately open to question.<sup>35</sup> It is perhaps fortunate that those of the 'Right' perceive a left-wing bias in broadcasting<sup>36</sup>, though difficult to understand how such bias could exist under the vetting system used by the BBC.<sup>37</sup>

The generality of schoolteachers in this country are, from personal experience, neither known for their militancy nor uniform supporters of government policy. There has in the past been a diversity of State education, due in part at least to the decentralisation of the education system. However, under the present administration there have been repeated attacks on the political attitudes of teachers and particularly on the notion of

Peace Education. This, coupled with the current imposition of a nationally-determined 'core curriculum' which leaves little room for subject study outside of mainstream notions, together with the new possibility that some schools may be removed altogether from Local Authority control, gives rise for the first time to the possibility of Central determination of that which is taught. It is additionally noted that grant reductions to universities and colleges have resulted in the reduction or elimination of departments and areas of study of which the current Administration disapproves.

If Huxley is correct in his assumption that control of information, the media and education is a prime demonstrator of totalitarianism, then there is considerable cause for concern in the case of the United Kingdom.

#### 5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BRITISH PEACE MOVEMENT

This section has considered the gathering of intelligence; the use to which that intelligence may be put; the methods by which it may subsequently be distributed; and the control of information. In all these areas, it has been seen that the Peace Movement is directly affected. Intelligence on members and groups is demonstrably collected; such data is used to misinform the public at large as to the aims, objectives and connexions of the movement; links exist, nationally and internationally, between government and right-wing 'anti-peace-group' organisations; and there is control over both press and broadcasting, with increasing central command of the education system.

There follow a few specific statements of particular concern to the Peace Movement, with correction and comment.

(a) The Movement Itself.

Sir Anthony Kershaw:

"Nobody denies that a high proportion of the CND Council are politically to the Left, or that there are some Communists and Trotskyists whose loyalty to this country cannot necessarily be assumed ...

... there are five people on the Council of CND who are of the extreme Left persuasion. There were eight members before the last election.<sup>38</sup>

The statement disinforms:

- by failing to define *either* "to the Left" *or* "a high proportion":
- by linking 'the Left' automatically with "Communists and Trotskyists":
- by suggesting that "loyalty to this country" presupposes a capitalist stance:
- by omitting to state the size of the Council (which has and had rather more than a hundred members).

A similar suggestion is made in a United States submission to the 1982 United Nations Special Session on Disarmament:

"Nearly a quarter of their 40-strong national council as well as some CND officials are members of the British communist party."<sup>39</sup>

The information was taken, apparently uncritically, from the *Daily Telegraph*. A British publication by Blake Baker of that newspaper devotes an entire chapter to a similar theme and, incorporating an infamous (and so far as is known, unfounded) NATO allegation, comes to a conclusion which attempts a further slur on CND:

"The truth is that with the fading of the Anti-Nazi League, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is the latest mass left-wing front organisation supported by, and exploiting, the anxieties of many young parents and other well-meaning people. There can be little doubt that, probably unwittingly, it actively serves the political, strategic and military aims of the Soviet Union, which last year is said, by Dr Joseph Luns, NATO General Secretary, to have provided £6 million for funding of the international nuclear disarmament movement, principally in Western Europe."<sup>40</sup>

The chapter concerned, if carefully read, demonstrates successful attempts of CND to resist any form of factionism or take-over from the 'far left', but Baker leaves the impression that his conclusions may be correct.

In 1981, following the (alleged) defection of 'Victor Suvarov', the Western allies discovered a new threat in the existence of *Spetsnaz*, a branch of the Soviet armed forces broadly comparable to our own SAS and SBS sections. It was not long before this new aspect became identified with the Peace Movement. In January 1986, *Jane's Defence Weekly*<sup>41</sup> announced that *Spetsnaz* Agents had been working under cover at Greenham Common Peace Camp since the deployment in 1983 of Cruise missiles. Although the *New Statesman* moved rapidly to determine the source of the allegation,<sup>42</sup> the message was taken up later in the year by Colonel Michael Hickey in

an IEDSS publication.<sup>43</sup> Speaking of 'sleepers' who would assist Soviet Special Forces, he says on page 20:

"There would be other helpers, drawn from the ranks of recognised political extremists, or those who might not even realise that they were aiding the enemy. *The "peace movements" include many of these,* and at any time of rising tension their demonstrations and protests would be an ideal cover for those with more sinister intentions."

(my italics). It is of course difficult to prove a negative. However, as has been indicated on many occasions, membership of the Peace Movement would prove a very negative asset in a time of National Emergency; and as the David Fairhall pointed out in *The Guardian* of 22 Jan 86, "any agents provocateurs sitting around the camp fires are more likely to have been from the Special Branch or the CIA, or just journalists looking for an inside story".

(b) Matters of Direct Concern to the Movement.

Outside the security and intelligence services themselves, official secrecy and disinformation are nowhere more paranoid than in the areas of military organisation, operation and finance or in matters nuclear. These naturally are the precise areas which concern the Peace Movement. Despite recent governmental assurances, it is still difficult to obtain details of reactor incidents even in the civil industry. It took the Atomic Energy Authority 27 years to release details of the Windscale fire, and following the Chernobyl meltdown it was incorrectly claimed that all Western reactors had secondary containment.<sup>44</sup> Immediately after that incident, whose radioactive release may have been comparable to the explosion of one small nuclear weapon, both the Prime Minister and the Environment Secretary claimed in parliament that Britain had escaped the effects.<sup>45</sup> At the same time it was misleadingly implied that no such graphite-moderated reactor had been built in the West.

Nuclear weapons materials are frequently the subject of misinformation. For many years, the British government unabashedly stated that no plutonium arising from the civil programme had ever been exported to the United States for military use.<sup>46</sup> However, thanks to the United States Freedom of Information Act, it was discovered that the 1958 UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement specifically stipulated that all plutonium received from the United Kingdom is to be used for Defence purposes.

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Again, in 1986 it was discovered that BNFL had been flying regular consignments of plutonium to Dounreay from Liverpool (civil) airport for eight years, having assured the 'Nuclear-Free' Local Authority that the load was only nuclear waste destined for Lyons.<sup>47</sup>

Sometimes the reason behind release of disinformation is unclear; it seems almost as if government agencies have become so accustomed to lying that it has become habitual. Thus when, in June 1985, twelve Greenham women spray-painted an Abbott self-propelled gun, the MoD stated in court that the weapon was top-secret. In fact, the gun had been first produced in 1964, was no longer in production, and was known to the public.<sup>48</sup>

#### 5.4.1 The Resultant.

Many more examples of censorship and disinformation concerning and of concern to the Peace Movement, existing both within and outside the Administration, could be quoted. However, the purpose of this section is to give an overall view rather than a detailed analysis. The above should suffice to indicate that the resultant effects are:

- (a) to create a false impression of the Peace Movement in the mind of the public:
- (b) to make campaigning difficult, since major items of fact are unknown and released information cannot be relied upon.

Under United States legislation, the first of these apparent government objectives is illegal.<sup>49</sup> Under their law, the second would be restrained. The present British government shows no sign of wishing to emulate its 'big brother' in legislating either to protect individual and group freedoms or to increase freedom of information.<sup>50</sup>

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References: Section 5

1. For example in the trials of Miller & Thompson (1958); of Campbell, Berry & Aubrey (1977); of Geoffrey Prime (1982); of Paul Davies (1983); and of the 'Cyprus 8'(1985): the embargo placed upon Cptn F W Winterbotham's tapes concerning wartime activities and placed in the Imperial War Museum (ca 1974): injunctions against Robert Hale banning the publication of his book on GCHQ security breaches (1983) and against Dennis Mitchell forbidding the disclosing of any "confidential" information (1987). Of these, only one (Prime) demonstrated the disclosure of 'state secrets' to a foreign power.
2. Nigel West: GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War 1900-86: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1986, ISBN 0 340 41197 x.
3. Peter Laurie: Beneath the City Streets: Revised edition, Granada 1979, ISBN 0 586 05055 8: page 262.
4. Campbell, Duncan: War Plan UK: Burnett/Hutchinson, 1982, ISBN 0 09 150670 0: figure 22, pp308-9.
5. James Bamford: The Puzzle Palace: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983, ISBN 0 283 98976 9: page 332-3.
6. Richard Norton-Taylor: Why you Can't always Tell who is Listening in *The Guardian*, 1 Aug 86.
7. Current equipment includes the Cray and CDC supercomputers, and linked IBM and Amdahl mainframes. For an analysis see David Barrett's article in *Computer Weekly* of 20 Feb 87.
8. *The Guardian*, 17 Jul 82. (See also Appendix 1).
9. Peter Hennessy: How to Control the Secret State: in *The Independent*, 3 Dec 86.
10. There are several models for linkage between the security and intelligence services and their oversight committees. All are in agreement on this point.
11. Claim originally made by Stephen Sedley, QC in the High Court 'telephone tapping' proceedings brought by CND against the government. See *The Guardian*, 29 Jul 86. The function and methods of DS19 have not been denied, though the exact methods used by the Conservative Party in obtaining information in order to discredit CND have been the subject of recent correspondence in the *New Statesman* (see issues of 31 Jul and 7 Aug 87).
12. *Hansard*, 25 Jul 86, c643-4w.
13. Second Report from the Defence Committee 1983-84, The Physical Security of Military Installations in the United Kingdom: HMSO 1984, ISBN 0 10 292784 7: para 914. The "Defence Secretariat" referred to is presumably the Defence Intelligence Secretariat.

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14. For example, Merlyn Rees, former (Labour) Home Secretary: "I had never regarded CND as a subversive organisation." - *Hansard* 3 Dec 85, c182.
  15. Jeffrey Richelson & Desmond Ball: The Ties that Bind: Allen & Unwin, 1985, ISBN 0 04 327092 1: Bamford, *op cit*: and Mark Rosselli: Britain's Post-War Spy History in *The Independent*, 3 Dec 86.
  16. *State Research Bulletin* v2 nr12, June 79.
  17. Duncan Campbell: The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: Michael Joseph, 1984, ISBN 0 7181 2289 5: pp279-80.
  18. Nigel West: *op cit*, p310.
  19. Richard Norton-Taylor: as ref.6.
  20. In exchange for South African intelligence on Soviet & Cuban activity in southern Africa. Research by Seymour Hersh of the *New York Times*, reported by Michael White in *The Guardian* of 24 Jul 86.
  21. Duncan Campbell & Patrick Forbes: "If War came close. We would have new Masters" in the *New Statesman*, 13 Sep 85.
  22. Most of the information in this section is taken from an 'Inter-Nation' report in the *New Statesman* of 29 May 87 entitled Conservative International: US funds British groups and written/reported by Arthur Gavshon, Mark Schapiro, David Corn and George Black.
  23. For example, Protest and Perish: a Critique of Unilateralism, published in direct response to E P Thompson's "Protest and Survive"; Peace Studies: a Critical Survey by Cox & Scruton; World Studies: Education or Indoctrination, again by Scruton.
  24. Perhaps the best account, and the book from which most of this section is taken, is by K Jeffery & P Hennessy: States of Emergency: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983: pp236-269.
  25. Duncan Campbell & Patrick Forbes: New Whitehall Bunker in the *New Statesman*, 26 July 85.
  26. *Hansard*, 28 Oct 85, c360w.
  27. Home Office: Departmental Committee on Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911: Vol 1: HMSO Cmnd 5104, Sep 72: Appendix V, para 8.
  28. Defence Committee: Third Report 1979/80: The D Notice System: HMSO HC773, 6 Aug 80: *Recommendations* para 24.
  29. *Additional* D-notices were issued in 1986, requesting the curbing of reportage on intelligence activities, nuclear weapons establishments and contingency plans for the military takeover of civilian resources. See the *New Statesman*, 14 Feb 86.



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30. Information from Clive Ponting at a workshop on Secrecy, Democracy and Nuclear Weapons, END Convention 1987.
  31. Parliamentary reply reported in the *New Statesman*, 5 Jul 85.
  32. See for instance the White Paper presented by the Secretary of State for Defence: The Protection of Military Information: HMSO Cmdd 9499, Apr 85.
  33. Aldous Huxley: Brave New World: Chatto & Windus 1932 // Granada 1981, ISBN 0 586 04434 5: *Introduction*, p12.
  34. (*inter alia*) Tony Bunyan: The Political Police in Britain: Quartet, 1977, ISBN 0 7043 3128 4: pp158-161.
  - 34a Laurant Paine: Britain's Intelligence Service: Robert Hale, 1979, ISBN 0 7091 7622 8: pp153-155.
  35. (In their defence): *The Guardian* was banned from the parliamentary collective briefings in 1986 for threatening to name the sources of information, and *The Independent* boycotted such briefings by the Downing Street press secretary. See Ian Aitken, The Inaudible Words of the Unprintable Source in *The Guardian*, 20 Oct 86.
  - 36 For instance by Chapman Pincher:  
"...there can be no doubt that television and radio in Britain today are deeply infiltrated by the left and the far left who are exerting deliberate political influence on the nature and content of programmes."  
[The Secret Offensive: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985: p143].
  - 37 According to David Leigh & Paul Lashmar, the BBC included amongst its *persona non grata* for employment all communists and sympathisers and, from the end of the 'sixties, members of the 'New Left', CND activists and a contributor to *Peace News*. See The Blacklist in Room 105 in *The Observer*, 18 Aug 85.
  38. *Hansard*, 3 Dec 85, c188.
  39. David Charters, Dominick Graham & Maurice Tugwell: No Substitute for Peace: Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1982. Footnote to p21 of the second edition.
  40. Blake Baker: The Far Left: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981, ISBN 0 297 78030 1: Ch 9, The Anti-Nuclear Movement, pp149-158. Quotation from p158.
  41. *Jane's Defence Weekly* v5 nr3, dated 25 Jan 86.
  42. Claudia Wright & Duncan Campbell: Spy Suspect Planted Greenham Spy Story in *New Statesman*, 24 Jan 86. The author of the original report making the allegations was Yossef Bodansky, an Israeli citizen living in the United States, who has been investigated in connexion with possible espionage by the FBI. According to the *Statesman* article, neither the British MoD nor Pentagon officials give credence to the allegation.
  43. Michael Hickey: The Spetsnaz Threat: Can Britain be Defended?: IEDSS, 1986, ISBN 0 907967 81 7.


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44. See for example Anthony Tucker, The Unquenchable Core of Fear Inside the Poisoned Furnace in *The Guardian* of 30 Apr 86.
45. Reported in *The Guardian*, 30 Apr 86.
46. Richard Norton-Taylor, The Plutonium Rod for the Government's Back in *The Guardian*, 25 Apr 86.
47. Alan Dunn, CND Calls for Nuclear Zone Check in *The Guardian*, 27 May 86.
48. *Sanity*, Jul 85.
49. Duncan Campbell, The Chilling Effect, in the *New Statesman*, 24 Jan 86:  
"If the conduct of (*United States*) government and other public agencies is such that the ordinary person may have cause to fear the intrusion of officials in the course of the lawful exercise of individual rights and individual liberties, then that government behaviour has an unlawful 'chilling effect' on freedom,
50. In fact quite the reverse. According to Clive Ponting, a *tightening* of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act has been mooted within the Ministry of Defence and Government circles. One unfortunate effect of the debacle of the Wright affair may be to bring forward precisely such legislation, under the guise of reform.

Appendix 1 : THE CONTROL AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE.

Sources: various. Main co-ordination links adapted from chart by Campbell in 'New Statesman' of 19 Nov 82.

Solid lines shew channels of information, control and co-ordination.


Broken lines indicate routes of information exchange only.



For key to abbreviations, see page 45.

Appendix 1a: US-UK SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE LINKS

Sources: various. Overlay to Appendix 1, showing information exchange routes between United Kingdom and United States intelligence and security agencies.



US Agencies are shown as triangles,  
 UK Agencies as rectangles.  
 Abbreviations key: page 45.


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**Appendix 1: Key to Abbreviations.**

AEAC	Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary
AFOSI	(US) Air Force Office of Special Investigations
C.Cs	Cabinet Committees
CIA	(US) Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Co-Ordinator, Intelligence & Security
DIS	Defence Intelligence Staff
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
LSIB	London Signals Intelligence Board
MDP	Ministry of Defence Police
MI5	The Security Service
NSA	(US) National Security Agency
OCS	Official Committee on Security
OEIC	Overseas Economic Intelligence Committee
P.M.	Prime Minister
Police	Other uniformed & non-uniformed sections of the civil police forces
PSIS	Permanent Secretaries' Committee on Intelligence Services
RAFP	Royal Air Force Police
SB	(Civil) Police Special Branches
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
UKUSA	(Other nations in) UK/USA Signals Intelligence Agreement: currently the United States, Canada & Australia
USAFSP	United States Air Force Security Police

  
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Appendix 2:

THE POLICE SPECIAL BRANCHES:  
Manning levels.



Appendix 3a:


MINISTRY OF DEFENCE POLICE:  
Manning levels and complements

 complement (= permitted level)  
 bearing (= actual force size)

source: Hansard, and Second Report of  
the Defence Committee 1983/84, and  
Report of the MoD Police Review Committee.

Numbers (thousands)

Before 1923, the Metropolitan Police had responsibility for protecting and policing military installations.



Appendix 3b:

UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY CONSTABULARY:  
Manning levels and compliments.

Numbers

Prior to 1954, the duties of the UKAEA were undertaken by the War Department / Ministry of Defence Police.

