Council of the European Union

COVER NOTE

From:	European External Action Service
To:	European Union Military Committee
Subject:	EU Military Rapid Response Concept

Delegations will find attached EEAS document 02168/3/14 REV 3.

———————————

Encl.: EEAS document 02168/3/14 REV 3

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

**EUROPEAN UNION
MILITARY STAFF**

Brussels, 17 December 2014

**EEAS 02168/3/14
REV 3**

CSDP/PSDC

NOTE

From:	European Union Military Committee
To:	European Union Military Committee
No. Prev. doc.:	11406/14, dated 27 June 2014
Subject:	EU Military Rapid Response Concept

Delegations will find attached the EU Military Rapid Response Concept, as agreed by the EUMC on 17 December 2014.

EUROPEAN UNION

MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE

CONCEPT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. REFERENCES

A. Presidency reports to the Helsinki European Council - on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence – non-military crisis management of the European Union (doc. 13619/1/99 REV 1, dated 8 December 1999).

B. EU Framework Nation Concept (doc. 16276/10, dated 22 November 2010).

C. EU Military Rapid Response Concept (doc. 5454/1/09 REV 1, dated 27 April 2009).

D. Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 6309/6/04 REV 6, dated 4 May 2004).

E. The Treaty on European Union.

F. EU Battlegroups Concept (doc. 13618/06, dated 5 October 2006).

G. EU Maritime Rapid Response Concept (15294/07, dated 15 November 2007).

H. EU Air Rapid Response Concept (16838/07, dated 21 December 2007).

I. EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010 (Doc. 17127/10, dated 7 December 2010).

J. European Council 19/20 December 2013 – Conclusions (doc. EUCO 217/13, dated 20 December 2013).

K. Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (doc. 15992/13, dated 25 November 2013).

L. Revised EEAS note on EU Rapid Response Capabilities and EU Battlegroups (doc. 16289/13, dated 15 November 2013).

M. PMG recommendations on EU Rapid Response Capabilities and EU Battlegroups (doc. 14968/13, dated 6 November 2013).

N. Military Advice on EEAS note EU Rapid Response Capabilities and EU Battlegroups including Supporting Documents (doc. EEAS 02182/13 FINAL COR 1 dated 14 November 2013).

O. Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (doc. 7660/2/13 REV 2, dated 18 June 2013).

P. EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level (doc. 10687/08, dated 16 June 2008).

Q.   EU Concept for Military Command and Control (doc. 10688/5/08, dated 24 September 2012).

R.   EU Concept for Force Generation (doc. 10690/08, dated 16 June 2008).

S.   EU Concept for Military Intelligence Structures in EU Crisis Management and EU-led Military Operations/Missions (doc. 16361/13, dated 18 November 2013).

T.   EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations (doc. 8641/11, dated 4 April 2011).

U.   Host Nation Support (HNS) Concept for EU-led Military Operations (doc.7374/12, dated 6 March 2012).

V.   EU Concept for Strategic Movement and Transportation for EU-led Military Operations (doc. 9798/12, dated 11 May 2012).

W.   EU Concept for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) for EU led Military Operations (doc. 9844/12, dated 11 May 2012).

X.   Military Engineering Concept for EU-led Military Operations (doc. 11242/12, dated 12 June 2012).

Y.   EU Concept for Contractor Support to EU-led military operations (Doc. 8628/14, dated 07 April 2014)

Z.   Comprehensive Health and Medical Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations (doc. 10530/14, dated 3 June 2014).

AA.   EU Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations (9971/12, dated 14 May 2012).

BB.   Requirements Catalogue (RC 05) (doc. 13732/05, dated 7 November 2005).

CC.   European Security Strategy (doc. 15895/03, dated 5 December 2003).

DD.   Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in Changing World (16823/1/08 REV 1, dated 5 December 2008).

EE.   PMG recommendations on EU Battle Groups (doc. 17150/11, dated 17 November 2011).

FF.   Evaluation Handbook (doc. 8923/07, dated 25 April 2007).

GG.   Supplement to the RC05 (doc. 13076/05, dated 7 November 2005).

HH.   Translation from EU Capability Codes and Statements to Reference Units (doc. EEAS 00681/1/12 REV 1, dated 25 April 2013).

II.   GAERC conclusions (doc. 90004/05, dated 23 May 2005).

JJ. Council Conclusions on Military Capability Development (doc. 15281/12, dated 19 November 2012).

KK. EU Principles for EU Headquarters (doc. 9983/14, dated 16 May 2014).

LL. Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP of 19 December 2011 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena).

MM. EU Capability Codes and Statements (EU CCS) (doc. EEAS 01021/1/12 REV 1, dated 11 July 2012).

NN. EU Maritime Dimension Study (doc. 6794/07, dated 2 March 2007).

OO. EU Maritime Security Operations (MSO) Concept (doc. 8592/12, 17 April 2012).

PP. European Union Maritime Security Strategy (doc. 11205/14, 24 June 2014).

QQ. EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan (doc. 15658/14, 24 November 2014).

RR. European Union Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions (doc. EEAS 00990/4/14, 30 October 2014).

SS. Mandate and Methodology for a study of the Rapid Response Air Initiative in ESDP (doc. 11774/06, dated 18 July 2006).

TT. Rapid Response Air Initiative Paper (doc. PLP 4198/07 dated 20 September 2007).

UU. Concept for the Implementation of a European Union Air Deployable Operating Base (doc. 6908/1/10 REV 1, dated 19 March 2010).

VV. Concept for Air Operations in support of the Common Security and Defence Policy (doc. 8569/11, dated 5 March 2011).

B. INTRODUCTION

THE OPERATIONAL BIRTH OF EU MILITARY RESPONSE

In 2003, following a long period of turmoil in the Ituri province in North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a rebel group took control of the provincial capital Bunia. Due to ethnic cleansing a massive flow of refugees was started which led to a critical humanitarian situation. A relatively small UN force already in place in DRC, MONUC, neither had the strength nor the mandate to deal with this very critical situation. The UN decided to deploy a larger force with a stronger mandate but it needed time for the process. Therefore the UN approached France and asked it to lead an interim force to bridge the gap until the UN had its new force in place. This led, on **19 May**, to a mandate for PSC to explore the potential for an EU operation. On 30 May there was a UN Security Council resolution (1484) adopted that gave the legal mandate for an EU operation. The EU Council adopted the Joint Action on 5 June 2003 designating France as Framework Nation for the operation, appointing the Operation Commander (OpCdr) and designating Operation Headquarters (OHQ) and Force Commander (FCdr). In the period between 8 and 10 June the OPLAN was presented to MS by the OpCdr and revised in order to be approved by the EU Council on 11 June, the very same day as a Force generation Conference took place in Paris. On **12 June** the Operation was launched (seven days after the Council adoption of the Joint Action) and the first elements of the force were deployed to theatre. It is worth taking note of the fact that it took until 14 July for the force to develop Full Operational Capability. This was mainly due to the very remote location of Bunia and the logistical challenges in deploying and sustaining the force.

The rapidity in assessment, **MS political support**, decision making, planning, force generation, **MS force contributions** and deployment were identified as critical criteria for success in future operations. The complexity of this kind of crisis indicates that the EU needs to have the capabilities, in all dimensions, in order to be able to act/react in a flexible manner which could be adapted to the uniqueness of each situation and to the tasks that need to be undertaken. A holistic approach, which the revision of the Concept for EU Military Rapid Response is aiming at, will facilitate this.

CONTEXT

1. At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, **Rapid Response** (RR) was identified as an important aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the *Helsinki Headline Goal 2003* (Ref. A) assigned to Member States (MS) the objective of being able to provide rapid response elements available and deployable at very high levels of readiness. The existing gap in the RR capabilities was bridged by the EU Framework Nation Concept from 2002 (Ref. B). Subsequently the first **EU Military Rapid Response[1] Concept** (MRRC) (Ref. C) was agreed in early 2003[2].

2. In June 2003, the first EU military quick reaction and very expeditionary operation, **Operation Artemis**, was launched. It very successfully demonstrated the EU's ability to operate with a rather small force at a distance of more than 6,000 km from Brussels. Moreover, it highlighted the need for the further development of RR capabilities. Subsequently, Operation Artemis became a reference model for the development of a **Battlegroup-sized** Rapid Response capability.

3. In 2004, MS committed themselves to the *Headline Goal 2010* (Ref. D) to be able to respond with rapid, decisive and coherent action across the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Ref. E). Furthermore, the ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as a part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases was considered a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal. Subsequently the first **EU Battlegroups (EU BG) Concept** (Ref. F) was agreed in 2004.

4. The RR conceptual framework was complemented in 2007, when the **EU Maritime Rapid Response Concept** (Ref. G) and the **EU Air Rapid Response Concept** (Ref. H) were agreed.

5. Additionally, in the *EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010* (Ref. I) the Council remains fully committed to the comprehensive civil-military **level of ambition**, aiming at being able to plan and conduct simultaneously a series of operations and missions, of varying scope, including: two RR[3] operations of limited duration using, inter alia, EU BGs.

6. For the first time since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council held a thematic debate on defence in December 2013. This proved to be the catalyst for thoroughly

---

[1] Rapid Response was defined as: The acceleration of the overall approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in the field of decision-making, planning, force identification, generation/activation and deployment, together with the availability of assets and capabilities, and potential C2 options, in order to enable a swift and decisive military reaction to a crisis.

[2] This original concept was revised and agreed by the EUMC in 2009 (Ref. C).

[3] The requirement for smaller, faster response elements has been refined and is now known as Rapid Response.

revising and strengthening the complete suite of RR tools. In this vein, with a view to **improving the EU Military RR capabilities including the usability of EU BG,** the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 endorsed (Ref. J) the Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy (Ref. K) in which it endorsed the proposals set out in the EEAS note on EU RR capabilities and BG (Ref. L). This proposal constitutes the mandate for the new revision and the development of the EU Military RR capability. The framework is complemented by the PMG recommendations on EU Rapid Response Capabilities and EU Battlegroups (Ref. M) and the related Military Advice on EEAS note EU Rapid Response Capabilities and EU Battlegroups (Ref. N).

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE REVISION

7. To achieve an overall EU RR both the political reaction and the EU Military Response need to be fast and effective. While this concept addresses the Military Response it also identifies preparation and planning issues that can contribute to reducing the reaction time.

8. Therefore this revision will endeavour to refine the RR suite, the main elements as listed below:

-   identifies the decisions that initiate a RR;

-   establishes the procedures to be followed and measures to be taken in order to facilitate the timely commitment and generation of RR forces.

-   suggests the early identification and activation of OHQ/OpCdr and Force Headquarters (FHQ)/FCdr; or, where applicable, Mission Headquarters (MHQ)/Mission Commander (MCdr); and the early involvement of the respective liaison elements in order to enable timely operation planning;

-   develops the modular approach and aligns timelines and readiness to enable flexibility, complementarity, jointness and timeliness;

-   distributes the generic RR tasks among the different RR tools in order to facilitate effective preparation;

-   develops a Land Rapid Response Concept in order to complete the RR suite;

-   revises the Air and the Maritime Rapid Response Concepts to adapt them to the new RR suite.

C. AIM

9. This concept provides the conceptual framework for the preparation and conduct of CSDP joint[4] and single service military operations/missions requiring a Rapid Response in the land, maritime and air domains, and including special operations, as a part of the EU multidimensional response.

D. SCOPE

10. This document describes the EU's approach to Military Rapid Response and how it could be delivered. This EU Military RR action may either involve EU BGs (Joint Land Centric RR), Single Service RR elements (Land, Maritime or Air), Joint RR (combining EU BG and Single Services RR elements, or combining Single Service RR elements) or any other RR elements offered by volunteered MSs.

11. It will define Military Rapid Response, its nature, characteristics, principles and procedures. This will be compared with the standard EU Military Response and its relationship to other EU instruments and the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) (Ref. O).

12. It will establish the framework within which subordinate Military Rapid Response concepts sit, in accordance with three principal EU military concepts: EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level (Ref. P), EU Concept for Military Command and Control (Ref. Q), and EU Concept for Force Generation (Ref. R).

13. Although the EU has both the increased potential and the ambition - by drawing on the full range of its civilian and military instruments and resources - to make its external action more consistent, more effective, more strategic and more comprehensive, only the military instruments and associated factors are considered in this concept. Whilst taking into account the characteristics and the autonomy of the EU, to ensure interoperability and to avoid unnecessary duplication, the document aims to be coherent with NATO definitions and procedures, to the extent possible.

---

[4] Activities, operations/missions and organisations in which elements of at least two (military) services participate.

E. DEFINITIONS

14. <u>Standard Military Response</u>. The ability to be able to deploy up to 60.000 troops within 60 days, requirement confirmed in the *EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010* (Ref. I), as a part of the EU multidimensional response is defined as a standard Military Response.

15. <u>Rapid Response</u>. Rapid Response is a process that delivers the required effects, in a particular crisis, quicker than a standard response (within 30 days or whichever timelines set by the political authorities, depending on the EU level of ambition).

16. <u>Military Rapid Response</u>. Military Rapid Response is the acceleration of the overall military approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in the field of Intelligence collection, decision-making, planning, force generation and deployment, together with the availability of assets and capabilities, and potential Command and Control (C2) options, in order to enable a decisive military response to a crisis within 30 days, as a part of the EU multidimensional response.

F. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE CONCEPTS HIERARCHY

17. The EU MRRC is the parent document for all other related Rapid Response concepts: EU BG Concept (Ref. F), Land RR Concept, Maritime RR Concept and Air RR Concept. The EU RR Concepts hierarchy is at Figure 1. Its aim is to ensure consistency, interconnection, compatibility, interoperability, complementarity and standardisation across the full spectrum of EU Military RR in order to facilitate a co-ordinated, effective and timely response to any given crisis.


Figure 1: Military Rapid Response Concepts Hierarchy

18. While the subordinated Land RR Concept along with the former independent Maritime and Air RR Concepts are included as Annexes C, D and E respectively in the parent document, the also included and subordinated EU BG Concept (Annex B, which is the reference to the stand alone agreed EU BG concept (Ref. F)) will be maintained as an independent part of the MRRC.

G. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS

19. <u>Speed</u>. There is the need to generate suitable and available forces, equipment and C2 structures quickly to enable a Military Rapid Response. The mechanism to generate forces quickly is a primary requirement for Military Rapid Response. Without it, the time needed for planning, organisation and preparation could exceed the time available.

20. <u>Risks</u>. Military Rapid Response Forces' operational advantage is their increased agility but they might face or take a calculated risk, in combat engagement and sustainability, in comparison to those forces employed in a standard Military Response. Although force protection, logistic, health and medical, and intelligence support, CBRN and other combat or combat service support capabilities will be tailored accordingly there may be associated risks in conducting a Military Rapid Response and consequently on how the force can be employed.

21. <u>Concurrency</u>. Planning and Force Generation of available and suitable forces must be conducted concurrently if a Military Rapid Response is to be achieved. This is greatly assisted by as much Advance Planning and advanced Force Packaging as possible.

22. <u>Readiness Matching</u>. The readiness of military units offered or on stand-by must match the timings of the political decision making process, in particular those designated for specific cases of Military Rapid Response such as the EU BG. The readiness and early availability of the supporting elements in such cases, e.g. logistic and intelligence support or other enablers like air and sea lift assets, must also match. Without appropriate readiness, forces may not be available, in the right sequence, at the right time. Until forces are assigned to the OpCdr by a Transfer of Authority (TOA), changes in their readiness to meet the timeline for an operation remain a national responsibility.

23. <u>Intelligence Support</u>. Intelligence support is conducted in accordance with the EU Concept for Military Intelligence Structures in EU Crisis Management and EU-led Military Operations/ Missions (Ref. S). Intelligence support has to provide an analysis of the current situation, consider potential and emerging issues and include an evaluation of their possible development. A Military Rapid Response operation may be confronted with a particularly fluid operational environment and limited time available for a comprehensive Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlespace (IPB), which is of utmost importance for planning and decision making at strategic and operational level. To enhance situational awareness of the deployed force and enable to mitigate effects of rapidly changing conditions related to the specific characteristics and risks involved in a Military Rapid Response operation, the deployed forces must have integral Intelligence capabilities (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, etc.) and appropriate analytical capabilities to provide Intelligence support locally. Reach-back capabilities (from MS or partners) will provide crucial support in particular during situational assessment phase, the planning phase and in particular during the initial phase of the operation until integral Intelligence support is fully established.

24. <u>Logistic Support and Health and Medical Support</u>. Logistic support is conducted in accordance with the EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations (Ref. T) and other subordinate and related EU logistic Concepts (Host Nation Support (HNS) (Ref. U), Strategic Movement and Transportation (M&T) (Ref. V), Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) (Ref. W), Engineering (Ref. X) and EU Concept for Contractor Support to EU-led military operations (Ref. Y)). Health and Medical Support is conducted in accordance with the Comprehensive Health and Medical Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations (Ref. Z).

25. A Military Rapid Response force must be initially self-sustaining. Consequently, logistic support and medical capabilities assigned to a Military RR force should be sufficient to achieve the designated levels of autonomy and sustainability, and the same degree of mobility, of the force necessary for a Military RR operation.

26. The whole array of multinational logistic structures available to the EU will be examined and the use of appropriate multinational solutions will be considered to the maximum extent and will be sought at the earliest opportunity to define the military logistic support and to optimise the logistic footprint in relation to the operational needs. Pre-planned multinational logistics, encompassing all functions of Logistic Support may provide the most efficient response in CSDP military operations/missions. These capabilities are developed, negotiated and agreed during Advance Planning, finalised in Crisis Management Planning, and implemented in advance of deployment for operations/missions.

27. Logistic and medical support for Military RR forces should be defined and agreed before a crisis. This should either be conceptually (as in the EU BG) or as part of multinational logistic and medical cooperative arrangements described above. Hence, military logisticians and medical planners need to be involved from the very beginning of the planning process for

Military RR operations/missions; at the Advance Planning stage. Logistics support may influence the selection of the Course of Action (COA), the approach and the rate at which it can be achieved.

28. The non-availability of the required logistic and medical support/arrangements will invariably have a negative impact on the ability to launch a Military Rapid Response operation.

29. Military Rapid Response Forces Employment. Military RR Forces may be used in a stand-alone operation, typically with a decided desired end state. It is possible to use a Military RR operation (such as the EU BG) as a precursor to a more deliberate, larger operation (a standard Military Response) which may require the full period of 60 days for planning, force generation and deployment. In this case, the planning, generation and at least the initial deployment of the follow-on forces should be concurrent with the initial Military RR as the endurance of the Military RR forces may be limited.

30. Synergies between the EU and NATO[5]. The EU will remain in close contact with NATO to develop proposals for synergies between the two entities in the field of rapid response where requirements overlap, retain best practices, and avoid unnecessary duplication, with due respect to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO in this context.

H. CHARACTERISTICS AND RISKS

31. Considerations and factors that influence the risk to RR forces are; preparation, sustainability, intelligence picture (Ref. S), force protection, availability and vulnerability of CIS infrastructure (Ref. AA), logistic support (Ref. T), health and medical (Ref. Z) and other support. The planning for an operation should match the capabilities of the force relevant to the expected level of risk. The risk factors for each operation should be quantified in the Military Advice provided by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The risk to an operation can be assessed and briefed at any stage in the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP).

32. Where the MS have decided that a Military Rapid Response is appropriate, the timeliness of the response is a combination of the readiness of their forces, their willingness to commit forces plus Force Generation or balancing required to ensure a full, coherent and capable force and the preparation in theatre to receive the force (if appropriate). This is concurrent with, and derived from, the operational requirements out of Advance Planning and Crisis Response Planning. These must include preplanning of deployment options to ensure the timeliness of response.

---

[5] Ref. K, p. 9, para 12 b.

33. Additional concurrent preparation will include the integration of the force, its structure and task grouping as tasks emerge from the planning process. The sequence of the operation will also determine the order in which tasks, especially preliminary or enabling tasks, must be undertaken and the desired order of arrival of forces. At the same time, the dynamics of the parallel planning process require the availability of real time information at all levels involved, continuous communication and explanation, while the events of the crisis unfold. This is a period of high activity and preparation.

34. Once the commitment to deploy is made, the time taken to arrive, and be ready in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) is determined by the nature and scale of the force plus the strategic lift made available by MS and the distance to the JOA. The role of MS as enablers and the provision of logistic and medical support will also contribute to how well prepared the Force is on arrival. The readiness of the assigned forces and the flexibility to cope with changes in circumstances and the unforeseen will depend upon the depth and quality of planning and the preparation, both conceptual and operational.

I. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE TASKS

CSDP SCENARIOS

35. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) states in Art. 42.1 that the operational capacity of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) drawing on civilian and military assets may be used on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

36. In addition, TEU Art. 43.1 states that the aforementioned tasks shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

37. The EU identified 5 illustrative scenarios from the Requirements Catalogue 05 (RC 05) (Ref. BB) where it may consider using military means to address a crisis in a standard military response:

    -   Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF);

    -   Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice to third countries (SR);

    -   Conflict Prevention (CP);

- Evacuation Operations (EO);

- Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HA).

38. The European Security Strategy (ESS) (Ref. CC) included situations not considered in the RC 05 scenarios: Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Organised Crime. Military assets may be used in support of the civil authorities for these situations. Such involvement is not considered further in this concept.

39. In addition, the *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* (Ref. DD) further identified a range of new threats and challenges to EU security interests such as: Cyber Security, Energy security, Climate change and Piracy.

40. Furthermore, the Council recognized the importance of networks in today's globalized world and the need for the EU to engage in all domains – land, air, maritime, space and cyber (Ref. K). New security challenges continue to emerge (*inter alia* cyber, maritime, illegal migration and border management). Europe's internal and external security dimensions are increasingly interlinked (Ref. J).

41. RR requirements will be derived from an analysis of the required capabilities on the initial deployment force requirements of the agreed illustrative scenarios.

42. The potential use of EU Rapid Response elements (for example EU Battlegroups) could, under exceptional circumstances, ultimately be envisaged in support of CSDP missions and operations. It should be done in accordance with EU existing concepts, following a voluntary approach, applied on a case-by-case basis, and subject to Council agreement[6].

FORMAL DECISION ON RAPID RESPONSE

43. In accordance with the CMP (Ref. O) there are two options to formally initiate the RR process:

- The EU might decide that required effects are to be delivered faster than in a CSPD Standard Response in case of urgency. In this case, Rapid Response option is formalised by a PSC decision to directly develop a Crisis Management Concept (CMC), excluding the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA). This option is called *Option for Urgent Response*[7] (see Fig. 2).

---

[6] *PMG recommendations on EU Battle Group* (Ref. EE, paragraphs 14 and 19.g). The recommendations of this document were endorsed by the PSC on 18 November 2011.

[7] Ref.O, p. 16, paragraph 22.

- Under specific circumstances the PSC might decide to utilise the CMP *fast-track process* for the operation planning notably because of the speed of reaction required[8]. This PSC decision (which could be taken after a PFCA has been produced) also formalises the transformation of a CSDP standard response into a <u>Rapid Response</u> (see Fig. 2).

---

[8] Ref.O, p. 28, paragraph 68.

Figure 2: CSDP crisis management procedures phases' scheme and Rapid Response process

MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE TASKS AND REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

44. Taking into account that <u>Rapid Response</u> is decided by a PSC decision, either choosing the *Option for Urgent Response* and/or the *fast-track process,* it is considered that the agreed illustrative scenarios and related documents are deemed suitable for *refining the likely tasks and force packages*, if they are complemented with an assignment of tasks among the different RR domains.

45. The agreed <u>distribution of military generic tasks</u>[9] among the different RR domains (EUBG, Land, Maritime and Air RR), to guide MS contributions' training, is developed in Annex A. Each military generic task has an associated list of subordinated tasks included in the agreed list of *"generic tasks"* (Ref. FF, Annex B).

46. <u>Force packages of capabilities</u> required to accomplish each RR subordinated task for each illustrative scenario are established in the agreed list of *"generic tasks"* (Ref. FF, Annex B).

47. The <u>Reference Units</u> (RU) for each capability will be extracted from the *Requirements Catalogue 05* (Ref. BB, Chapter V). These RUs deliver totally or partially the capability as defined in the *Reference Units List*[10](Ref. GG, Chapter 7) (see example in Fig. 3). RR mechanisms (e.g. databases) will use a translation of RU to Capability Codes[11].

---

[9] The subordinate tasks of the illustrative scenarios are grouped by nature and effect delivered, and aggregated into a list of "generic tasks". This list indicates, for each generic task, the scenarios where it is required and the capabilities necessary to accomplish it.

[10] It includes: EU RU designation, NC3A Cap. Category, Unit description, size, Component (L, M, A or General), Ref. system-Formation Attributes-Equipment Ref., No of Ref. Systems, DLRC Code/s and Capability Statements. The translation from EU Capability Codes and Statements (CCS) to RUs is established in Ref. HH, Annex B (doc. EEAS00681/12 ADD 1, 25 April 2013).

[11] In accordance with the *EU Capability Codes and Statement* (EU CCS) 2012 (Doc. EEAS 01021/1/12 dated on 11 July 2012, agreed by EUMC on 18 July 2012).

ANNEX A – RAPID RESPONSE "GENERIC TASKS"

No	RAPID RESPONSE "GENERIC TASK"	RESPONSIBLE RAPID RESPONSE (X) REQUIRED (-) desirable			
		EU BG	Land RR	Mar RR	Air RR
2	Assist in re-establishment essential state functions (e.g. advisory functions)		X		

Generic Task

Rapid Response Responsible for the task

SUPPLEMENT RC05 - REF. UNITS (Ref. GG, Chapter 7)

Reference Unit (EU)	NC3A Capability Category	Unit Description	Size	Co	Reference System Formation Attributes Equipment Reference	No. of Ref. Sys.	DLRC Code	Capability Statements
RU - A								
RU - B								

Reference Units

LIST OF "GENERIC TASK" (Ref. FF, Annex B)

Generic Task

Assist in re-establishing essential state functions (e.g. advisory functions)

SR

Assist in re-establishing essential state functions (e.g. advisory functions)

C441

Subordinated Task

Assist in re-establishing essential state functions (e.g. advisory functions)

	EO/L	EO/H	HA	CP	SR	SOPF/A	SOPF/B
C441	☐	☐	☐	☐	☑	☐	☐

Required Capabilities

Illustrative Scenarios

RC05 – Detailed List of Required Capabilities (DLRC) (Ref. BB, Chapter V)

Cap. Code	Required Capability	Description and operating conditions for the capability	Ref. Unit
C441			•RU-A •RU-B

Required Capability

Reference Units

Figure 3: Linkage between Rapid Response Tasks and Required Capabilities

J. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE TIMELINES

RESPONSE TIMES

48. <u>Overall EU Response Time</u>. The Overall EU Response Time to a crisis encompasses political reaction time and response time (the latter could be civilian, military or both) (see Fig. 4).

49. <u>Political Reaction Time</u>. Political Reaction Time is the period between a crisis being identified and when the Council makes the decision to launch an operation. To support a political decision, civil and military advance planning will have started prior to EU action being considered appropriate (see Fig. 4).

50. <u>Military Response Time</u>. The time for a Military Response is measured from when the Council makes the decision to launch the operation to when forces start implementing their mission in the JOA (see Fig. 4).

REQUIRED RAPID RESPONSE TIMES

51. Noting that a standard Military Response is a period of up to 60 days (not later than (NLT) 60 days) (see Fig. 4), in addition there are three levels of required RR times:

52. <u>Required generic Military Rapid Response Time</u> is a period up to 25 days (NLT 25 days) after the EU decision to launch the operation (see Fig. 4). It would require the use of forces which are already held at very high readiness by MS and are made available for a specific case (committed or generated as soon as possible after the approval of the CMC). Likewise, with respect to decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days, in this case not earlier than (NET) 5 days, of the approval of the CMC by the Council (Ref. D). Hence, if the political decision to launch the operation is taken within 5 days from the CMC approval, the total amount from the CMC approval to when forces start implementing their mission in the JOA would be 30 days (5 + 25).

53. <u>Required Express Response Time</u> is a period up to 10 days (NLT 10 days) after the EU decision to launch the operation (see Fig. 4). This more challenging timeline was agreed by MS in the Headline Goal 2010 (Ref. D), primarily for EU Battlegroups. This more demanding requirement shall also apply to previously fully committed and identified Rapid Response capabilities which could mainly complement and facilitate the EU BG usability (e.g. Strategic Lift) or other Express Joint as well as single Service-led Rapid Response operations/missions held at the appropriate readiness.

54. <u>Emergency Response Time</u>. Certain emergencies could necessitate an immediate reaction (less than 5 days after the EU decision to launch the operation). Therefore the forces and capabilities required would need either to be already pre-positioned or to use assets with an immediate global reach capability. Due to the flexibility required in these cases, this kind of response is neither further developed nor represented in the graphics.

REQUIRED "EU BG OPERATION" PLANNING TIME

55. In addition, in the Headline Goal 2010 (Ref. D), MS also agreed on a more challenging planning timeline, primarily for EU Battlegroups operations;

> On decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council (see Fig. 4).

56. 23 May 2005 GAERC[12] conclusions. Further to the Headline Goal 2010 timeline the GAERC agreed on 23 May 2005 (Ref. II) that the:

> *MRRC will ensure that the EU decision-making and planning process can be completed in five days, from approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council to the decision to launch an operation, in particular for operations involving Battlegroups.*

57. The Headline Goal 2010 timeline and the 23 May 2005 GAERC conclusions make for a significant challenge even when only applied to the specific case of the EU Battlegroup. It is even more challenging if the Council demands a planning period of 5 days for operations other than those utilising the EU BG. In that case, it is essential that the OHQ and the OpCdr, and the FHQ and the FCdr; or, where applicable, the MHQ and a MCdr have been previously identified[13], are activated and are involved in the EUMS' military input delivery to CMC development process (see Main Body, chapter P, para 119-120).

---

[12] General Affairs External Relations Council, predecessor to Foreign Affairs Council (FAC).

[13] EU rapid response will require rapid access to resources, in particular an early PSC and national decision making on the selection and designation of a military OpCdr and activation of an OHQ, …and/or military Mission or Force Cdr (Ref. O, page 28, para 68 and footnote 22).

Figure 4: Military Rapid Response timelines

K. READINESS

READINESS STATUS

58. <u>Readiness</u>. Readiness is a military state that allows for adequate military planning and preparation in order to achieve the required response time for forces and units. The readiness of a Headquarters (HQ) or a unit is the period of time measured from an initiation order to the moment when an HQ or unit is ready, either to commence its task from its peacetime location or to move to the Airport/Sea Port of Embarkation (APOE/SPOE). <u>This does not include the time to move to and within the JOA (transit time), nor the time to be ready to perform its mission once deployed</u>.

59. Therefore, in order to be able to commence operations/missions in the JOA in the required Rapid Response times it is mandatory to establish the following readiness sub-categories within the EU Very high readiness (V) category (ready to deploy between 1 and 20 days):

   - <u>Rapid Response readiness</u>[14]. Military forces held at a readiness of 20 days. These forces are to respond not later than 20 days after the Council decision to launch the operation and commence the operation/mission in the JOA within a total of 25 days from this Council decision (in order to meet the generic Military RR requirement).

   - <u>Express readiness</u>[15]. Military forces held at a readiness of 5 days. These forces are to respond not later than 5 days after the Council decision to launch the operation and commence the operation/mission in the JOA within a total of 10 days from this Council decision (in order to meet the Express Response requirement).

60. Until forces are assigned to the OpCdr by a Transfer of Authority (TOA), changes in their readiness to meet the timeline for an operation remain a national responsibility. Taking into account that high readiness places strains on military units and on MS' cost and without prejudice to the overall Rapid Response effect, <u>personnel</u> of forces held at a Express readiness could be held by MS, on voluntary basis, at a Rapid Response readiness, 20 days notice to move (NTM), until the formal identification of an EU RR or a significant change in the situation.

---

[14] For the MS concerned, this is coherent with NATO readiness category 4 included in the EU Military Capability Questionnaire (EU MCQ) 2013 (Doc. EEAS 00420/1/13 REV1 dated 23 April 2013, Annex C, Table S1), agreed by the EUMC on 24 April 2013.

[15] For the MS concerned, this is coherent with NATO readiness category 2 included in the EU Military Capability Questionnaire (EU MCQ) 2013 (Doc. EEAS 00420/1/13 REV1 dated 23 April 2013, Annex C, Table S1), agreed by the EUMC on 24 April 2013.

L. MODULARITY

61. A way to enhance flexibility and thus usability of the RR suite without reducing the level of ambition is to adopt the modular approach. Modules are most likely to be capability-based. They may or may not have utility on their own, but are most likely to be used as building blocks for a force designed to tackle all the assigned tasks when responding to a particular crisis.

MODULAR APPROACH IN EU BG OPERATIONS

62. The scope and scale of possible operations that could be undertaken by the EU BG are broad, and the EU BGs are offered by MS without knowing the exact nature of the tasks for which they could be tasked by Council. Thus, flexibility of design is key to providing the EU with appropriate tools that are readily available in an appropriate timescale.

63. The EU BG will be considered as the main building block or cornerstone of such an EU BG RR to a crisis; this approach seeks to add to its (and wider EU RR) potential and not to propose the EU BG's dismemberment into separate modules.

64. While the EU BG core elements[16] constitute a capable and autonomous force under some circumstances, without additional enablers, its ability to tackle the full spectrum of possible tasks is constrained (Ref. F).

65. In addition there is a list of suggested Strategic enablers[17]. The requirement for these depends on the characteristics of the operation and which, generally, are not registered, prepared and pre-warned as the core elements are. In these cases, the modular approach will allow the addition of these elements or other capabilities to the EU BG, if required, from the Single Service RR mechanisms under certain circumstances.

66. Furthermore, the addition to the activated EU BG of capability modules included in the Single Service RR mechanisms (Land, Maritime and Air) could enhance the utility and flexibility of EU BG RR if those non-core capabilities are required at the time of crisis. Thus, with a wider selection of enablers available for deployment, the EU BG package, mission tailored, becomes

---

[16] Namely:
  1. Command & Control: a nominated Operation HQ (OHQ) and a dedicated Force HQ (FHQ), including a Communication and Information Systems (CIS) element;
  2. Combat: an infantry battalion;
  3. Combat Support: not formally defined, but modules could cover the following capabilities: fire support, engineer, air defence, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, human intelligence (HUMINT), aviation, forward air control, chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear defence (CBRN);
  4. Combat Service Support: geographical support, medical specialists, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), military police and logistics.

[17] Strategic/Operational Enablers: combat aircraft/helicopters, transport aircraft/helicopters, strategic air/sealift, naval combat assets, special forces, air-and sea-related logistic support and infrastructures special forces, gendarmerie and civ-mil capabilities.

more usable, in that it is able to respond just as rapidly but can cover a wider set of tasks (assigned in Annex A).

67. Unlike the EU BG roster, the Land, the Maritime and Air RR mechanisms would work by MS offering modules on a voluntary basis from a pre-agreed list. In order to enable this adding of modules to the main building block (namely the EU BG), the modules have to be timely committed[18] and be at the same Express readiness as the EU BG forces. The donor MS would be warned by EUMS of this possibility in order to allow them to increase their preparedness, which could include making contact with the EU BG FN. Integration would be aided if such modules had joined an EU BG preparatory exercise(s) - on arrangement between the respective MS. An example of a modular EU RR force composition, based on EU BG operation, is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 – Example of modular EU RR force composition based in an EU BG operation

---

[18] See Military RR Initiation Procedures, Main Body, chapter M: commitment either specifically indicated by MS at the time of their contribution to RR databases, or confirmed by MS after EUMC agreement of the request (RR initiation measure) to commit the indicated potentially available modules included in RR databases (standard contributions).

68. The scope and scale of possible operations/missions that could be undertaken by a Single Service RR are broad. However, the Single Service RR contributions offered by MS might not be able to tackle all the tasks requested by Council. Thus, flexibility of force design is key to providing the EU with appropriate tools that are readily available in an appropriate timescale.

69. Depending on the situation, the available required Single Service RR capabilities could be considered as the main building blocks of such a Single Service RR to a crisis; this approach seeks to add to its (and wider EU RR) potential.

70. While the Single Service RR core elements[19] and required capabilities constitute a capable and autonomous force under certain circumstances, without additional enablers and capabilities, its ability to execute the full spectrum of possible tasks could be constrained (e.g. Air RR from a Deployment Operating Base (DOB) without adequate organic Force Protection that could be provided by a Land RR module).

71. Thus Single Service RR mechanisms will include a list of Single Service RR core elements and potentially required capabilities. These required capabilities in each domain will be deduced from the assignment of tasks among the Single Service RR tools (Annex A).

72. The requirement for other complementary capabilities depends on the characteristics of the operation. These complementary capabilities could be part of the other Single Service RR mechanisms. In this case, the modular approach will allow these elements to be added to the selected or core Single Service RR.

73. The Land, the Maritime and Air RR mechanisms would work with MS offering modules on a voluntary basis from a pre-agreed list. In order to enable this adding of modules to the main building block (core or selected Single Service RR), the modules have to be timely committed[20] and be at the same readiness than the core or selected Single Service RR forces. Schemes of modular Single Service RR force composition, based on Single Service RR operation, are shown in Figure 6.

---

[19] Namely: Command and Control (C2): including a Communication and Information Systems (CIS) element; Core capabilities to fulfil the possible tasks; along with Combat Service Support: including logistic (transport, supply, maintenance), medical and administrative groups.

[20] See Military RR Initiation Procedures, Main Body, chapter M: commitment either specifically indicated by MS at the time of their contribution to RR databases, or confirmed by MS after EUMC agreement of the request (RR initiation measure) to commit the indicated potentially available modules included in RR databases (standard contributions).

Figure 6 – Schemes of modular force composition based in Single Service RR missions/operations

M. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE MECHANISMS

74. The availability of forces offered by MS, at the correct readiness, will dictate whether a Military Rapid Response is possible.

75. Forces and HQs offered at high readiness are more likely to be used in Military Rapid Response operations/missions than those required for standard Military Response. For operations/missions using forces which are not pre-agreed (e.g. all Military RR except those using the EU BG) it remains a national decision which forces and at what readiness they might be offered to the EU for Military Rapid Response.

76. MS are to offer , on voluntary basis, such Military Rapid Response forces by means of a pre-agreed roster (as in the case in the EU BG), the Land, Maritime and Air RR Databases along with the related RR Force Generation Conference, if it is required (see Fig. 7). Under determined circumstances, alternate RR recourse mechanisms could be employed (e.g. Framework Nation[21] and TEU Art.44).

Figure 7: Military Rapid Response Mechanisms

77. In order to enable joint as well as one service-led RR actions, it is necessary to avoid mismatches between EU BG roster and Land, Maritime and Air Databases (commitment and response times).

78. Changes in the readiness (to meet the timeline for an operation) of the forces provided through the RR Force Generation Conference, until their assignment to the OpCdr by a Transfer of Authority (TOA), remain a national responsibility.

---

[21] Defined in the EU Framework Nation Concept (Ref. B) as "A MS or group of MS that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control".

79. MS contributions to RR (Land, Maritime and Air) Databases may be completed through RR Questionnaires issued on a timely basis by the EUMS. In order to facilitate advance planning and the RR force generation process, MS contributions to the RR mechanisms will include the Capability Codes[22] related to the units/elements which constitute the whole contribution and caveats, if necessary. Furthermore, committed EU BG packages are always identified (Ref. F) in detail to facilitate other MS contributions into the package or the RR databases. In addition, any double-hatting of MS contributions for the EU RR mechanisms and other international commitment (e.g. NATO Response Force) should be indicated as a remark.

80. RR Questionnaires will allow MS to contribute with capabilities and facilities not included in the *EU CCS capability code list* (e.g. National and Overseas Airfields).

81. MS Express contributions to RR databases could be linked to a preferred EU BG committed in the same stand-by six month period[23] of the year.

82. MS Contributions to EU BG rosters and Land, Maritime and Air RR databases will be consolidated by six month periods at least 13 months in advance of the beginning of the first semester of the related year. This timeline will enable RR capabilities to train with their respective preferred EU BG, committed during the same stand-by period, if desired, with the agreement of the related EU BG Framework Nation (FN).

83. Extending the availability up to 120 days over the envisaged end of standby if activated. MS committed Contributions to EU BG roster and RR databases are in principle deployable until and thus beyond the last day of the standby period. This implies that a RR operation could be extended for a maximum of 120 days beyond the standby period[24]. MS will state the non-availability of their contributions beyond the standby period in the related questionnaires, which will then be indicated on the EU BG roster and RR databases.

84. Under determined arrangements and with the EUMC/PSC agreement, non-EU MS could contribute to EU BG rosters and RR databases but cannot be the FN of the contributed capability.

---

[22] In accordance with the *EU Capability Codes and Statement* (EU CCS) 2012 (Doc. EEAS 01021/1/12 dated on 11 July 2012, agreed by EUMC on 18 July 2012).

[23] From 1st January to 30th June and from 1st July to 31st December.

[24] Ref. F, para 9 d.

EU BG ROSTER[25]

85. MS EU BG contributions will be included in a pre-agreed roster of committed and identified capabilities. The EU BG generation process[26] is defined in the EU Battlegroup Concept (Ref. F). EU BG equipment will be prepared and held at Express readiness during the whole stand-by period. Although not precluded, units that are committed to more than one roster (national or international) would not necessarily guarantee the required level of availability.

RAPID RESPONSE DATABASES

86. Land, Maritime and Air RR databases could offer an indication of the potential availability (EU affirmed[27]) of assets and capabilities, including the necessary C2 arrangements, in order to support a more informed decision making, as well as advance planning. Therefore, they are initially only to be considered as planning tools. MS can contribute with varying degrees of commitment (from potentially available to committed). RR databases should be designed to be interoperable with the appropriate Planning Tools used by the EU HQs, where practicable.

87. RR Questionnaires to contribute to RR databases will allow MS, on a voluntary basis, to commit[28] their contributions (EU committed). Additionally, it will be possible for MS to assign their contributions to the Express sub-category which in turn could enable a Joint Express response. MS Express committed contributions to RR databases could also be linked to a preferred EU BG committed in the same stand-by semester of the year.

88. Blank RR Questionnaire templates should be sent to MS 21 months in advance of the beginning of the first semester of the related stand-by year to facilitate the consolidation of the RR databases 18 months in advance of the beginning of the first semester of the related stand-by year.

89. Military Rapid Response Coordination Conference (MilRRCC). This conference aim is to contribute and refine RR databases, and it may also be an opportunity to highlight, discuss and resolve any related issues. This conference will be chaired by the EUMS and linked to the EU BG Coordination Conferences (EU BGCC) in order to improve the effects of the whole RR suite. After each MilRRCC, the EUMC will report the results together with its evaluation to the

---

[25] EU BG roster is officially called *EU Battlegroup Offers and Commitments*.

[26] Ref. F, Annex B.

[27] RR contributions which nations have offered to EU RR databases, subject to case-by-case political decitions, for future EU RR operations and missions.

[28] Although not precluded, units that are committed to more than one roster (national or international) would not necessarily guarantee the required level of availability.

PSC. In addition, MS shall update their contributions to the RR Databases in between conferences and on their own initiative as necessary.

RAPID RESPONSE FORCE GENERATION

90. Force Generation for CSDP military operations/missions is described in the EU Concept for Force Generation (Ref. R). EUMS planners and MS will have to strive to ensure that Force Generation for Military Rapid Response takes place quickly to achieve the required response time. The availability of forces, equipment and C2 from MS, and their readiness, together with the availability of Strategic Lift will be the dominant factors in determining the likely structure of the military force for a Military Rapid Response. In particular the early availability and suitability of a potential OHQ/FHQ and their staff and an OpCdr and FCdr will be key factors.

91. Thus, the early identification of critical assets or shortfalls in the force package is essential. RR force generation should alleviate any weakness or gaps that would compound the risks associated with a faster deployment.

92. In the absence of further specific Force Generation mechanisms for Military Rapid Response, proactive coordination/dialogue between military planners of the EUMS and MS to identify the best suited OHQ, FHQ and forces for a potential operation is vital, in accordance with the EU Concept for Military Command and Control (Ref. Q). It is in this context, based on transparent information provided by MS and on accurate information with regard to available NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin plus arrangements[29], that valuable planning time can be lost or saved. Finally MS and other troop contributors should confirm the level and quality of their contributions at the Force Generation Conferences (Ref. O, para 61).

---

[29] If using the Berlin Plus construct, a PSC/NAC meeting will confirm, if appropriate, the availability of pre-identified NATO common assets and capabilities, beyond those used in the planning phase, and all the practical arrangements, including hand-over and recall (Ref. O, para 62).

ALTERNATE RAPID RESPONSE MECHANISMS

93. In most operations/missions in which the most important criterion is urgency, the recourse to a Framework Nation[30] operation (Ref. B) could be envisaged, enabling the EU to mount multinational operations/missions at relatively short notice. This alternate mechanism requires a volunteer MS or group of MS and Council agreement.

94. In addition, another alternate RR recourse mechanism could be Article 44 operations. In accordance with Article 44.1 of the TEU (Ref. E) "…the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task."

95. MS that have broad capability spectrum and specific concerns over a given crisis could be the Framework Nation for a CSDP joint military operation on the basis of the Framework Nation Concept. This approach guarantees that all participating MS have the political will, the capacity and the motivation to proactively resolve the crisis. All concerned and voluntary MS would act as a coalition able to pool the necessary military capacities to address the crisis.

N. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE INITIATION PROCEDURES

96. In order to enable joint as well as one service-led RR actions, it is required to establish procedures to allow early MS commitment of their potentially available (not-committed) Land, Maritime and Air contributions to databases. In addition, these procedures should facilitate the ability to anticipate an emerging crisis and to adequately increase the readiness posture or alert status of voluntary committed RR elements. Furthermore, in order to facilitate an effective Rapid Response Force Generation Conference, RR initiation procedures should include MS force-sensing to contribute with critical assets or shortfalls in the force package to prepare the Provisional Statement of Requirement (PSOR) or the recourse to the alternate RR mechanisms.

97. In accordance with the EU Concept for Force Generation (Ref. R), force generation (FG) is integral to the planning of the operation and it should be considered at the earliest stages of the planning process. Therefore during the Advance Planning phase, if required, the EUMS will support CMPD to tailor a PSOR (see Fig. 8). This PSOR should pre-identify:

- an OHQ and an OpCdr, and a FHQ and a FCdr; or, where applicable, a MHQ and a MCdr

---

[30] Defined in the EU Framework Nation Concept (Ref. B) as "A MS or group of MS that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control".

- the necessary already committed RR elements from the EU BG roster and (Land, Maritime and Air) RR databases

- the necessary potentially available RR elements from (Land, Maritime and Air) RR databases

- other not available RR critical elements or shortfalls.

98. As a result of the initiation of an EU Military RR by PSC decision on choosing *Option for Urgent Response* and/or a *Fast-track Process*, ideally the PSC will agree subsequently[31] the designation of OHQ/OpCdr and FHQ/FCdr; or, where applicable, MHQ/MCdr. Additionally the EUMC will as soon as possible agree the following RR initiation measures (see Fig. 8):

- Establish OHQ and FHQ/(F)HQ/MHQ liaison elements to EUMS.

- Establish OHQ Advance Planning Teams (APT) to EEAS/EUMS.

- Recommend to move (national responsibility) to Express readiness (5 days) the personnel of committed RR elements required from the EU BG roster and (Land, Maritime and Air) RR databases.

- Request the related MS commitment of the necessary potentially available RR elements from (Land, Maritime and Air) RR databases and recheck/reaffirm MS potential caveats for those RR elements based on the concrete operation.

- Conduct an informal force-sensing[32] on the other not available RR critical elements or the recourse to the alternate RR mechanisms.

99. If the initiation of an EU Military RR is made by PSC decision on choosing a Fast Track Process at the same time that the PSC agrees the CMC: it will not be possible to meet an "EU BG operation" planning time (5 days) if the OHQ and the OpCdr, and a FHQ and a FCdr (or, where applicable, a MHQ and a MCdr) were not previously identified and activated (except in the case of EU BG) and were not involved in the EUMS' military input delivery to the CMC development process (see Main Body, chapter P, para 119-120).

100. After the approval of the CMC and in accordance with the results of RR initiation measures the OpCdr with the assistance of the EUMS will conduct the RR Force Generation Conference

---

[31] EU rapid response will require rapid access to resources, in particular an early PSC and national decision making on the selection and designation of a military OpCdr and activation of an OHQ, and/or military Mission or Force Cdr (Ref. O, page 28, para 68 and footnote 22).

[32] Ref. O, page 17, para 25.

taking into account the EUMS preparatory work[33]. To that effect the EUMS will have previously provided the OpCdr with a PSOR draft based on the following (see Fig. 8):

- already committed RR elements from the EU BG roster, if appropriate, and (Land, Maritime and Air) RR databases already at Express readiness (5 days) and at Rapid Response readiness (20 days)

- MS (Land, Maritime and Air) RR database elements committed after EUMC request

- MS offered contributions after conducting a force-sensing on not available RR critical elements or shortfalls.

---

[33] Ref. R, para 23.

Figure 8: Military Rapid Response initiation procedures scheme

O. FACILITATING OFFERS AND COMMITMENTS TO THE EU BG CONCEPT

101. MS agreed a procedure for filling EU BG rosters and RR databases more systematically by planning contributions on the basis of regularly recurring, voluntary commitments, called *Framework Nation approach*. This approach allows other MS to join them on a regional or partnership basis and it takes into account the provision of specialised capabilities in order to strengthen the procedure.

102. This approach promotes, <u>on a voluntary basis</u>, recurrent commitments for 6-months or, when possible, 12 months stand-by periods. Thus, this procedure will mitigate gaps, will make more effective use of resources and will improve the effectiveness of MS training efforts. Furthermore, it encourages experienced FNs to support MS that take on the FN responsibilities for the first time.

103. Cooperation at bilateral/multilateral level on a permanent basis optimised for some regions could also help to mitigate gaps in the EU BG roster and service databases. Within this approach, the leading MS[34] will be the one responsible to make the initial offer to the roster/database.

EU BG CONTEXT

104. This approach for the EU BG roster was agreed in the European Council on 19 November 2012[35]. The European Council on 19-20 December 2013[36] again encouraged MS to use this approach which promotes predictability, consistency and a more fair share of the burden (Ref. L, para 8).

105. In order to fulfil the agreed level of ambition of having two EU BGs on stand-by at any one time, if applying the usual 6-months stand-by period, there is a need for a minimum of 12 MS volunteering as FN, each recurring on the roster every three years. When there are fewer than 12 MS willing to act as FN, this will result in gaps in the roster unless some FN MS offer a stand-by period of 12 months or volunteer as FN more frequently.

---

[34] All MS operating under a multinational formation must in advance formally approve their database offer following their appropriate procedures as agreed by its framework agreement.

[35] On 19 November 2012, the Council adopted the Council Conclusions on military Capability Development (Ref. JJ, para 14).

[36] "taking forward the agreed Framework Nation approach to fill the EU BG Roster more systematically" (Ref. K, para 12 b, adopted on 20 December 2013 by the European Council in Ref. J).

RR CONTEXT

106. In addition, a similar approach could also apply to the provision of specialised/niche capabilities (Ref. L, para 8) in the RR databases.

P. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE PLANNING

CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

107. The military contribution to the EU CMP (Ref. O) is described in the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level (Ref. P).

108. The EUMS is the source of integrated military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS). As an integral component of the EEAS, the EUMS conducts early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, with particular focus on *inter alia* operations / missions (both military and those requiring military support).

EARLY WARNING AND SITUATION ASSESSMENT

109. Situation Assessment is the evaluation and interpretation of information gathered from a variety of sources. The product of this assessment is used to inform decision makers in order that they may provide particular direction in the production of plans.

110. Early Warning is the communication of prioritised risks to those with the capacity to act based on the forecasting of the probability and severity of a latent conflict escalating into violence[37]. Early warning contributes to the avoidance of strategic surprise.

111. Initial work can be stimulated by PSC/MS or by initiative of the HR. This initiative of the HR is the start point for the development of the PFCA.

112. In case of urgency, the PSC option to decide to move directly to development of a CMC excluding the PFCA is called Option for Urgent Response. If this is the situation, then a broad understanding of the EU's potential comprehensive and multidimensional approach would be required as soon as possible.

---

[37] Or escalating into a state with severe consequences.

ADVANCE PLANNING

113. <u>Advance planning</u> is conducted continuously at differing levels (strategic, operational, tactical) to allow the EU to deal with potential crises in a timely manner. The products of advance planning can range from country books, in their most generic form[38], to possible military and/or civilian actions suitable for dealing with specific crises, in their most detailed form[39]. These products inform and allow a smooth transition to crisis response planning for an identified crisis. <u>EU's response time is significantly reduced by the use of advance planning</u>. CMPD will ensure political strategic coherence of advance planning. Notwithstanding the tight timelines of Military Rapid Response the speed must be compatible with the integrity of military planning for each particular operation.

114. Advance planning can either be conducted at the request of Member States or by the initiative of the EEAS services themselves.

115. Where appropriate the EEAS will consult with international organisations (UN, AU, NATO etc), and third states that may have a role/interest in the resolution of the crisis.

116. Contingency Planning is the production of detailed planning documents for potential operations/missions where the planning factors have been identified or have been assumed. They include an indication of resources needed (e.g. PSOR) and the deployment options. They may form the basis for subsequent planning.

117. The deployment to the EUMS, at least during crisis, of <u>liaison elements</u> and APT from designated OHQs and stand-by EU BGs to work alongside the EEAS CSDP services is highly recommended. This more structured involvement will facilitate the understanding of the contingency planning in progress by the potential military commanders and it will also enable them to adequately shape the EU BG or other RR force package. Furthermore, these liaison elements and APT will be crucial during the transfer of planning responsibility after the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) is agreed.

CRISIS RESPONSE PLANNING

118. In order to ensure appropriate response times, in cases of high intensity crisis and if RR is required, the CMP (Ref. O) contains a <u>Fast-track planning process</u>. This fast-track process is initiated by a PSC decision.

---

[38] Generic planning.
[39] Contingency planning.

ADVANCE PLANNING TEAMS

119. Recommendations concerning the identification and/or the designation of an OHQ and the appointment of an OpCdr may be made in the process at any suitable moment, and when appropriate. EU RR will require rapid access to resources, in particular an early PSC or Council and national decision on the activation of an OHQ and the selection and designation of a military OpCdr, and a FHQ and a FCdr; or, where applicable, a MHQ and a MCdr. Additionally, the CMP (Ref. O) allows the flexibility that may be required to augment the planning services with additional planners or financial resources should that be deemed necessary.

120. A designated OpCdr / MCdr should opt to embed an OHQ / MHQ APT within the EUMS. This team should be fully incorporated into the EUMS Crisis Planning Teams (CPT) to allow a broad understanding of the planning issues and to progressively allow a comprehensive handover of responsibilities from the CPT to the OpCdr / MCdr up to the point when he declares that the OHQ/MHQ is at Initial Operational Capability (IOC).

Q. COMMAND AND CONTROL

121. Command and Control arrangements for CSDP military operations/missions are described in the EU Concept for Military Command and Control (Ref. Q) and the guidelines for the establishment and operation of EU Headquarters are described in the EU Principles for EU Headquarters (Ref. KK). The early availability and activation of the C2 structure is essential to Military Rapid Response.

122. The C2 for Military Rapid Response may involve the compression of the chain of the command; more than one level of military command may be conducted by a specific commander (e.g. the functions of FCdr and Component Commander (CC) may be combined).

123. Advance Planning will consider what are the optimal C2 arrangements for a Military Rapid Response operation. Where time is short, the FHQ options may also have to be considered, even before an OpCdr is appointed, to avoid delays in planning.

124. Any Component Commands in service databases should be able to deploy a Command and Control element to an FHQ in order to enable joint operations.

125. Component Commands in service databases could be employed as FHQ in case of single service or single service heavy operations.

R. STANDARDS, TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION

DEFINITIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

126. Standards. Commonly defined and agreed detailed military capability standards for EU BG and RR modules are a necessity. The standards and criteria are laid down in the respective RR concept. When possible and necessary, the commonality between EU and NATO standards and criteria will be preserved and improved[40], with due respect to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO in this context. If they are not explicitly indicated, Framework Nation standards or MS standards will be applied.

127. Training. Exercises are the primary means by which military capability prepares for its potential tasks. The necessary training and preparation of contributions to meet the requirements remains the responsibility of the contributing FN, MS and third states. Enhancing and streamlining the exercises involving all elements of an EU BG force package and RR capabilities would improve the interoperability, readiness and effectiveness of the MS' forces.

128. Certification is a process whereby the authorized commander informs the higher level of command that the military elements are ready for their tasks. Formally, it should follow a thorough examination of capabilities (evaluation) and the provision of objective evidence of capabilities and performance (validation). Certification will remain the responsibility of the participating MS/Third State or the FN in accordance with the respective RR concept. All MS/Third State contributions must be certified before the first day of their assigned stand-by period[41].

EU BG PEER-REVIEW

129. In order to improve the certification process of the EU BGs, the responsible FN may decide to implement a peer review. Thus the FN could invite a multi-national evaluation team which would include representatives of EU BGs on stand-by or in a more advanced state of preparedness on the roster to conduct a peer review. Its aim would be to make recommendations

---

[40] Ref. K, page 9, para 2 b.

[41] EU BG FN is responsible to coordinate a message to the CEUMC that the forces are certified and thereby ready for the standby-period.

to the FN on the suitability and preparedness of the EU BG to meet its likely tasks, using the agreed standards and criteria. This team should also include EUMS personnel.

TRAINING OF RR CAPABILITIES

130. It is recommended that committed RR capabilities train with their respective preferred EU BG committed in the same stand-by period to improve interoperability. This training will require the agreement of the related EU BG FN. If RR modules do not exercise and prepare with the preferred EU BG, they are required to be well-prepared, certified, and be on the appropriate state of readiness. In addition, they could also invite a team with representatives of a capability on stand-by or in a more advanced state of preparedness to conduct a peer review.

EXERCISING PREFERRED OHQs AND EU BG (F)HQs

131. It is encouraged that preferred OHQs are exercised, on voluntary basis, at EU level during their preparatory year. Therefore there should be a formal linkage between the Roster and the EU Exercise Programme. To this effect, the annual EU exercises could try to facilitate a number of OHQs and (F)HQs to be exercised simultaneously, if it is agreed by the PSC in the *European Union Exercise Programme*. This option would require determined arrangements and exercise design, as the proportional reinforcement by MS of the OHQs, increasing appropriately the *multinational OHQ personnel Database,* and of the exercise DISTAFF in accordance with the number of OHQs to be exercised simultaneously. This practice would improve interaction between OHQs and the EU strategic level in Brussels level. Exercised OHQs would benefit from sharing After Action Review, Lessons Identified, etc. In addition, if it is possible, it is also recommended that the preferred OHQs take responsibility for exercising the related (F)HQs in their preparatory year, based on bilateral agreements.

POLITICAL EXERCISES (POLEX)

132. The engagement of the political-military high level, on a voluntary basis and if so desired by the FN, through an exercise as POLEX as a part of the EU BG preparation is deemed to be beneficial[42] in order to consider potentially contentious issues[43]. The attendance of the OpCdr and EUMS staff at POLEX increases the level of awareness of the EU BG and would be advantageous to all stakeholders. POLEX could provide a good opportunity to train accelerated decision making, which is key to EU RR as a whole.

---

[42] POLEXs were identified as a best practice after its employment by Swedish and UK BG hierarchy.
[43] States represented at ministerial and CHOD level. The OpCdr, the FCdr and the EUMS planning staff are also involved.

S. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE FINANCE

133. Similar to other operations/missions having military or defence implications, common costs[44] of military rapid response operations/missions are financed according the Athena mechanism (Ref. LL), which includes an early fund specifically designed for RR operations/missions for which contributions are rapidly needed. The Athena decision is revised every three years.

---

[44] Lists of common costs are included in Annexes I, II, III and IV of Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP (Ref. LL).

T. ANNEX A – MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE "GENERIC TASKS"

MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE "GENERIC TASKS"

No	RAPID RESPONSE "GENERIC TASK"	RESPONSIBLE RAPID RESPONSE (X) REQUIRED (-) desirable			
		EU BG	Land RR	Mar RR	Air RR
1	Assist and support IOs and NGOs in management of refugees and IDPs	-	X	X	-
2	Assist in re-establishment essential state functions (e.g. advisory functions)[45]	-	X	X	-
3	Command and Control to the Air Embargo		-		X
4	Conduct Amphibious Operations	-	X	X	X
5	Conduct CAS	-	X	X	X
6	Conduct CIMIC	X	X		
7	Conduct Counter Air Operations				X
8	Conduct Countermine Operations	-	X		
9	Conduct Crowd and Riot control[46]	-	X		
10	Conduct Deep Operations	-	X	X	X
11	Conduct extraction, personnel recovery and SAR/CSAR	X	X	X	X
12	Conduct GBAD	-	X		X
13	Conduct Information Operations	X	X	X	X
14	Conduct Interpositioning	X	X	-	
15	Conduct Land Operations	X	X		
16	Conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (incl. Embargo)			X	
17	Conduct MCM Operations			X	
18	Conduct Security Operations	X	X	X	X
19	Contribute to the training and education of security forces[47]	-	X	X	
20	Deploy enabling forces / APOD / SPOD	-	X	X	X
21	Deploy Fact Finding Elements ahead of the operation for information gathering (LOCs, key sites, risk assessment)	X	X	X	-
22	Deploy naval forces			X	
23	Deploy the Air component				X
24	Deter disruptive activities	X	X	X	X
25	Ensure and enforce military law and order (within EUFOR)	-	X		
26	Ensure EUFOR inter theatre movement			X	X
27	Ensure EUFOR intra theatre movement	X	X	X	X
28	Ensure Force Protection (including terrorist threat)	X	X	X	X
29	Ensure Freedom of Movement	X	X	X	X
30	Ensure ground counter mobility	X	X		

---

[45] It includes providing advice to third countries.
[46] This could be seen as a task for non-military forces.
[47] It includes providing training to third countries.

No	RAPID RESPONSE "GENERIC TASK"	RESPONSIBLE RAPID RESPONSE (X) REQUIRED (-) desirable			
		EU BG	Land RR	Mar RR	Air RR
31	Establish and control a DMZ	X	X	X	X
32	Establish and maintain a Forward Mounting Base (FMB)	X	X	X	X
33	Establish and maintain a Forward Operating Base (FOB)	X	X	X	X
34	Establish and maintain a Strategic Reserve	X	X	X	X
35	Establish and maintain AAR				X
36	Establish and maintain Air Superiority				X
37	Establish and maintain Airspace Control Measures (including AEW)				X
38	Establish and maintain an Operational Reserve	X	X		
39	Establish and maintain APODs and DOBs	-	X		X
40	Establish and maintain CAP			-	X
41	Establish and maintain communications	X	X	X	X
42	Establish and maintain cooperation and coordination with other relevant actors	X	X	X	X
43	Establish and maintain detention facilities	-	X	-	
44	Establish and maintain FHQ and tactical HQs	X	X	X	X
45	Establish and maintain Logistics C2	X	X	X	X
46	Establish and maintain OHQ				
47	Establish and maintain Reception Staging Onward movement & Integration (RSOI) facilities	-	X	X	X
48	Establish and maintain Sea Control			X	
49	Establish and maintain SEAD / EW				X
50	Establish and maintain SPODs	-	X	X	
51	Establish and maintain the Intelligence contribution to the Common Operational Picture and mechanism for sharing appropriate intelligence with other actors	X	X	X	X
52	Extract isolated citizens and/or release and secure EU hostages	X	X	X	X
53	Medical and health support	X	X	X	X
54	Perform Operational Planning	X	X	X	X
55	Provide border security and ensure former warring parties compliance with agreements	-	X	-	-
56	Provide environmental Info (Geo, Hydro…)	-	X	X	X
57	Provide humanitarian aid assistance	-	X	X	X
58	Provide logistic support	-	X	X	X
59	Provide support to the CBRN Inspection Teams	-	X		
60	Replenishment and sustainment at sea			X	
61	Restore infrastructure	-	X	-	
62	Search, collection, temporary storage and disposal of weapons and ammo	X	X	-	
63	Secure key sites and terrain	X	X	X	
64	Secure Land LOCs	X	X		
65	Secure Sea LOCs			X	-
66	Secure strategic Air LOCs		X	X	X

No	RAPID RESPONSE "GENERIC TASK"	RESPONSIBLE RAPID RESPONSE (X) REQUIRED (-) desirable			
		EU BG	Land RR	Mar RR	Air RR
67	Task and debrief ISTAR Collection Assets	X	X	X	X
68	Transport Enabling Force	-	X	X	X
69	Transport Evacuees	-	X	X	X

EUROPEAN UNION

BATTLEGROUPS

CONCEPT

(REF. F)

EUROPEAN UNION

LAND RAPID RESPONSE

CONCEPT

W. INTRODUCTION

1. In June 2003, Operation Artemis[48], a land-centric, expeditionary operation, became a reference model for the development of a Battlegroup-sized Rapid Response capability.

2. In 2003, in the context of the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Ref. CC), MS recognised that the credibility of EU foreign policy depends on the consolidation of its achievements abroad (e.g. in the Balkans), generally on the land domain.

3. In 2004 the EU Battlegroups (EU BG) Concept (Ref. F) developed the conceptual basis for the first EU Joint Land-centric rapid response and main building block within the overall approach of rapid response. This concept defines the EU BG as the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations.

4. In addition, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (Ref. DD) further identified in 2008 the close relationship between conflict and state fragility. As alluded to in that, some countries are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. In order to break this cycle of violence both development assistance, and measures to ensure better security, are required. Mainly land-centric tasks, like security sector reform and disarmament, are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. Likewise, it stresses that the EU is most successful when it operates in a timely manner, backed up by the right capabilities.

5. In 2013 a German Food for Thought Paper[49] underlined the need to develop and adapt the EU Battlegroup concept to the new challenges in order to be perceived as a credible security actor. In addition, based on recent operational experiences (e.g. EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali), it also highlighted the need to respond rapidly with relevant capacities, inter alia training and advisory capabilities, with a view to tackling the full range of CSDP tasks.

6. The endorsed proposals by the Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy (Ref. K) in 2013 constitute the mandate for the revision of the EU Military RR capability which includes the development of a modular approach in order to enable flexibility and complementarity with a view to increasing EU BG usability, along with the creation of an EU Land RR Concept in order to complete the RR suite on the land domain with additional

---

[48] *The first EU military rapid reaction operation.*
[49] *Capturing Complexity, a proposal to adapt the EU Battlegroup Concept* (dated 17 April 2013).

capabilities which could back the tasks not covered by the other RR options (EU BG, Maritime and Air RR).

X. PURPOSE

7. The purpose of this annex is to provide a basis in order to facilitate the generation of EU Land and Joint assets and capabilities to cater for Military RR, in addition to the EU Battlegroups Concept (Annex B), and also with a view to increase the EU BG usability.

Y. SCOPE

8. The annex highlights the key considerations that need to be examined for the implementation of Land RR.

9. This is complemented with a list of required Land and Joint RR capability modules and assets that could be employed to cater for the Land RR or the other different RR options, following the modular approach in these cases, which will be included in the Land RR Questionnaires to guide MS contributions.

Z. LAND CHARACTERISTICS IN RAPID RESPONSE

10. Land RR capabilities will always operate in a complex and demanding environment due to many factors (e.g. terrain, threats, hazards, population, the involvement of national and international organizations, governmental and non-governmental structures, and other actors in the region). The understanding of this environment is essential to overcome its complexity, particularly in the land domain, as part of the EU multidimensional response.

11. In land operations and missions a special emphasis must be placed on the human dimension of the response in order to be credible, well-accepted and effective. The presence of the population and media in the theatre add complexity to the achievement of the tasks. The land contribution to the EU response can be taken as a symbol of the EU commitment in the region. It can also facilitate other EU multidimensional or multinational actions in the crisis area (inter alia provide security and actions towards Host Nation (HN) /Third States (TS)[50]) .

12. Although one of the roles of the Land RR capabilities is to increase the usability of EU BGs, they can be involved in most of the RR operations, as a stand-alone component, as the core component of a Joint RR operation complemented by other services, or as a supporting

---

[50] e.g. *Contribute to the training and education of Third States'(TS) security forces*, generic task assigned to the Land and Maritime Rapid Response, see Annex A, No 19.

component complementing other Joint RR operations. In addition, in all kinds of RR operations, Land RR assets in being in the proximity of the JOA could be crucial both as strategic reserve for the operations/missions and project a political and strategic leverage in the resolution of the crisis. For example, the possible tasks that can be assigned to the Land RR capabilities can be identified in those tasks where the use of EU BG may be inadequate or oversized, or those tasks[51] that are not fulfilled by EU BGs but can be accomplished by land and/or joint modules. Concerning the Land RR structure, if deployed as BG follow-on element, the complementary Land RR package should have the required set of capabilities necessary to be integrated in the BG. If deployed independently, it should comprise the required set of capabilities to perform the assigned tasks.

13. In the event that MS commit their land and joint contributions to a particular CSDP activity, it is suggested that these MS take into account the possibility of initiating their deployment preparations and the early prepositioning [52]of the related Express readiness assets, in due time (if necessary, even before the Council decision to launch the operation/mission). This is in order to facilitate a timely effect; in particular in the case of MS assets and capabilities located further away from the foreseen JOA.

14. <u>Size of Land RR not complementing EU BG</u>. In this particular case, the Land RR will generally not involve a force package above or equal to the size of an EU BG. Taking into account that in the land domain the EU BG was defined as the minimum military force package capable of stand-alone operations, when employing Land RR forces below the EU BG size, both the area of responsibility and the tasks should be adjusted to the capabilities of the forces involved in the RR operation or mission. The optimum minimum size/unit level of the capability modules could be fixed for each RR operation/mission in accordance with the size of the required RR force package. This aims to ensure interoperability between modules.

AA. PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS

15. Initiation of the Land RR processes and mechanisms will follow the generic Military RR procedures (described in Main Body, Chapters L and M, para 74-100). In addition, in order to unlock the potential of the Land RR and the timely delivery of land effects and maximising the time available to react, it will be advisable to specify the location[53] of the committed assets

---

[51] *Assist in re-establishment essential state functions (e.g. advisory functions)*, generic task assigned to the Land and Maritime Rapid Response, see Annex A, No 2.
[52] It could be required a prior Council agreement due to the potential political impact of the force build-up.
[53] If RR Database classification meets MS security requirements regarding the identification of the location of MS units.

offered by MS to the Land RR Database during their stand-by period. Information of EU committed contributions must be kept current and updated if any significant change occurs[54].

16. Land RR Database will include, besides the specific land RR capabilities, all the joint and other military capabilities not included in the Maritime and Air RR databases that are necessary to carry out a RR mission or operation, inter alia special operation forces (SOF), stabilisation and reconstruction (S/R) and medical units.

17. MS land and joint contributions could also include assets and capabilities that are deployed nationally 'out of area' that could have utility in meeting CSDP military RR requirements[55].

BB. KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION

18. <u>Readiness</u>. Readiness categories and responsabilities are described in Main Body (Chapter J, para 58-60). Noting the foreseen time RR requirements derived from the EU Military RR Concept definitions and taking into consideration their importance to launch a RR operation or mission in order to complement other RR options (e.g. EU BG option), it would be desirable that MS assets and capabilities capable of increasing the EU BG usability[56] offered to the Land RR Databases have an assigned Express readiness.

19. <u>Command and Control</u>. From a land RR perspective, the C2 arrangements for any Land contribution to an endorsed EU operation will depend on the specific mission and require a case-by-case analysis making best use of land and joint command capabilities identified through the Land RR mechanisms. As a general rule, they will follow the generic Military RR C2 guidelines described in Main Body, Chapter P para 121-125.

20. <u>Multinational Initiatives/Formations</u>. There are a number of multinational land forces and initiatives which were developed on a bilateral or multinational basis. Within this approach, the leading MS will be the one responsible to make the initial offer to the Database. Further, it is acknowledged that those initiatives not contributed to the FC add value through training and

---

[54] e.g. change of basing location, readiness or commitment.
[55] e.g. remote overseas JOAs.
[56] List (non-exhaustive) of potential Auxiliary/Niche Capability Modules that could be Added to a Deploying or Deployed EU BG: Reconnaissance squadron, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) platoon/company, Artillery/mortar troop/battery, Air Defence (AD) troop/battery, Forward Air Controller (FAC) team, Special Forces (SF), Engineer horizontal construction troop/squadron (including airfield repair), Engineer vertical construction troop/squadron, Engineer Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) troop, Engineer Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) troop, Engineer water troop, Engineer search team, Engineer geographic support team, Signals Electronic Warfare (EW) troop, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) team, UAV-unit (IMINT SIGINT), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) team, Military Police/Gendarmerie platoon/company, Dog handling team, Logistics Air/Sea Port of Disembarkation (APOD/SPOD) team, Logistics medical: additional Role 1 and Role 2 hospitals and specialist teams, Mentoring, Advisory and Training Assessment (MATA) team and Training teams.

increasing familiarity and contributing to interoperability, and may add RR capacity if contributed to the Land RR Database.

21. Land RR Deployment Models. The varied nature of land RR military operations or missions requires that consideration be given to the different options for the deployment and employment of forces. Employment / deployment options will be influenced by factors such as the nature of the mission, the security situation, the components specific requirements, the political environment, the economic implications, the in-theatre infrastructure and associated geographical and climatic conditions. Any one or a combination of the following employment / deployment can be adapted for land RR military operations or missions:

- Strategic Deployment conducted directly into a JOA. RSOI of forces takes place in the JOA.

- Strategic Deployment to a Forward Mounting Base (FMB). RSOI of forces takes place to the maximum extent possible in the FMB, which is located within the JOA either on land or at sea.

- RSOI conducted at the Port of Embarkation (POE). Forces are subsequently strategically deployed directly into the JOA. This option is particularly applicable to Rapid Response.

22. Sustainability. MS contributions assets and capabilities should be able to sustain operations /missions from a minimum of 30 days up to a maximum of 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately. The generic Military RR Logistic Support guidelines are described in Main Body, Chapter F para 24-28.

23. Land and joint modules and capabilities. In order to guide MS contributions, a reference list of potentially required capabilities with their different desirable sizes and readiness sub-categories is included to the blank RR Questionnaires. In the aforementioned list, capability codes have been sorted by the six capability areas[57] defined in the document *EU Capability Codes and Statements* (EU CCS) (Ref. MM).

24. Training. It is particularly recommended that committed Land RR capabilities train with their respective preferred EU BG committed in the same stand-by period to improve interoperability. This training will require the agreement of the related EU BG FN (see Main Body, Chapter Q para 127 and 130). In addition, MS initiatives carried out on a voluntary basis (at national or

---

[57] Capability area is a term used to describe and group tasks or/and capabilities. The capability areas are: Command, Inform, Engage, Protect, Deploy and Sustain.

bi/multilateral level) focused on training and/or exercise activities aimed at improving the EU land and joint RR capacities are welcomed.

EUROPEAN UNION

MARITIME RAPID RESPONSE

CONCEPT

DD. INTRODUCTION

1. The EU's prosperity, its development and the well-being of its citizens are critically dependant on international trade and other multiple activities performed at sea (e.g. fisheries and energy resources exploitation). However, these maritime activities are highly vulnerable to threats and challenges to the security of the maritime environment. These threats and challenges have become more complex, irregular and interrelated.

2. In 2003, in the context of the *European Security Strategy (ESS)* (Ref. CC), MS recognised the threats and dangers of the international security environment and acknowledged the crucial role that military assets often play in crisis management. The sea and the EU's extensive littoral region will remain a key dimension in both economic and security terms. Significant threats, increasingly asymmetric in nature, can both emanate in and utilise the maritime domain to impact on the EU and its constituent MS.

3. Pursuant to the findings of the EU Maritime Dimension Study (Ref. NN) where the need of a maritime RR was identified, the EUMC tasked the EUMS to develop a Maritime RR Concept, which was agreed in 2007 (Ref. G).

4. In addition, the *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* (Ref. DD) further identified in 2008 a range of new threats and challenges to EU security interests that also related to the maritime domain such as: Energy security, Climate change and Piracy.

5. The role and associated tasks of EU Maritime Forces in supporting EU-led efforts in the framework of CSDP were identified in 2012 in the *EU Maritime Security Operations (MSO) Concept* (Ref. OO) with a view to improving global maritime security. This document also included the principles in which the contribution of EU Maritime Forces to maritime security is based on; inter alia the *Multilateralism* through international cooperation with international organisations and partnerships with key actors.

6. Furthermore, in 2013 the Council recognized the importance of networks in today's globalized world and the need for the EU to engage in all domains, including the maritime one (Ref. K). New security challenges continue to emerge (inter alia illegal migration and border management). Europe's internal and external security dimensions are increasingly interlinked. Hence, in order to enable the EU and its MS to respond to this situation and its maritime challenges, the European Council (Ref. J) called for an EU Maritime Security Strategy.

7. On 24 June 2014 the Council (General Affairs) adopted the *EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)* (Ref. PP), which covers both the internal and external aspects of the EU maritime security. It serves as a comprehensive framework, contributing to a stable and secure global maritime domain, in accordance with the ESS, while ensuring coherence with EU policies, in particular the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), and the Internal Security Strategy (ISS). In addition, the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan (Ref. QQ) includes one action[58] that calls to *evaluate a possible further improvement of the Rapid Response mechanism for a rapid reaction at sea*.

8. To conclude, the endorsed proposals by the Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy (Ref. K) in 2013 constitute the mandate for the revision of the EU Military RR capability which includes the respective revision of the Maritime RR Concept.

EE. PURPOSE

9. The purpose of this annex is to provide a basis in order to facilitate the generation of EU Maritime assets and capabilities to cater for Military RR.

FF. SCOPE

10. The annex highlights the key considerations that need to be examined for the implementation of Maritime RR.

11. This is complemented with a list of required Maritime RR capability modules and assets that could be employed to cater for the Maritime RR or the other different RR options, following the modular approach in these cases, which will be included in the Maritime RR Questionnaires to guide MS contributions.

GG. MARITIME CHARACTERISTICS IN RAPID RESPONSE

12. In an emerging crisis, where timely influence, deterrence, coercion or military intervention may help to prevent deterioration into conflict or mitigate the effects of a disaster, the early presence of a maritime force can be a significant factor in providing the necessary political and/or military leverage.

13. The MS maritime forces can contribute to the EU response providing *Naval Diplomacy*[59], *Crisis Response*[60] along with *Maritime Deterrence and Defence*[61]. It can also facilitate other

---

[58] See Ref. QQ, action para 1.5.1.
[59] Provide a visible symbol of national, EU and/or wide international commitment and support to political objectives i.e. conflict prevention and stabilisation. This is realised through port visits and common exercises or even the simple

multidimensional or multinational actions in the crisis area (inter alia provide security and actions towards Host Nation (HN) /Third States (TS) including capacity building [62]). With respect to the EUMSS, the Maritime RR is a relevant instrument available for future maritime contingencies and for mainstreaming maritime security into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in close cooperation with all relevant EU actors, in line with the EU's comprehensive approach.

14. Maritime RR capabilities can be involved in most of the RR operations, as a stand-alone component, as the core component of a Joint RR operation complemented by other services, or as a supporting component complementing other Joint RR operations. In addition, in all kinds of RR operations, Maritime RR assets assigned to a CSDP mission/operation within the range of influence of the JOA could be crucial both as strategic reserve for the operations; and as political and strategic leverage for the resolution of the crisis.

15. In the event that MS commit their maritime contributions to a particular CSDP activity, it is suggested that these MS take into account the possibility of initiating their deployment preparations and the early prepositioning of the related Express readiness assets, in due time (if necessary, even before the Council decision to launch the operation/mission). This is in order to facilitate a timely effect; in particular in the case of MS assets and capabilities located further away from the identified JOA.

HH. PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS

16. Initiation of the Maritime RR processes and mechanisms will follow the generic Military RR procedures (described in Main Body, Chapters L and M, para 74-100). In addition, in order to unlock the potential of the Maritime RR and the timely delivery of maritime effects and maximising the time available to react, it will be advisable to specify the routine area/region of activity[63] (e.g. Mediterranean Sea) of the EU committed maritime assets (without prescribing

---

presence of a naval ship (show of force) (Ref. OO, para 6).

[60] Participate in specific operations operations ranging from peacekeeping and peace enforcement, conflict prevention to humanirarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatatnt evacuation (Ref. OO, para 6).

[61] Deter by demonstrating decisive presence based on operational readiness and capability; protect and defend national sovereignity and integrity, as well as national security interests of the EU MS; contribute to safeguarding the EU and international interests through power projection at a global scale (Ref. OO, para 6), e.g. maritime surveillance, forward presence and the promotion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

[62] e.g. *Contribute to the training and education of Third States'(TS) security forces*, generic task assigned to the Land and Maritime Rapid Response, see Annex A, No 19.

[63] If RR Database classification meets MS security requirements regarding the identification of the routine area/region of activity of MS units.

the specific unit[64]) offered by MS to the Maritime RR Database during their stand-by period. Information of EU committed contributions must be kept current and updated if any significant change occurs[65].

17. MS maritime contributions could also include assets and capabilities that are deployed nationally 'out of area' that could have utility in meeting CSDP military RR requirements[66].

II. KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION

18. Maritime RR will allow the EU to provide a credible, coherent and interoperable RR Maritime element capable of carrying out a RR operation independent of land and air forces, of being part of other RR options, or efficiently supporting initial entry operations.

19. Readiness. Readiness categories and responsabilities are described in Main Body (Chapter J, para 58-60). Noting the foreseen time RR requirements derived from the EU Military RR Concept definitions and taking into consideration the inherent maritime transit delays (up to 15 days for 10000 km) if they are not prepositioned close to the crisis area before, it would be desirable that MS assets and capabilities offered to the Maritime RR Databases have an assigned Express readiness. Once the JOA has been established, it is suggested that participating MS take into account the possibility of initiating deployment preparations or increase readiness of generic RR readiness contributions in order to meet earlier response timelines.

20. Command and Control. They will follow the generic Military RR C2 guidelines described in Main Body, Chapter P para 121-125. From a maritime RR perspective, the C2 arrangements for any Maritime contribution to an endorsed EU operation will depend on the specific mission and require a case-by-case analysis making best use of maritime command capabilities identified through the Maritime RR mechanisms.

21. Multinational Initiatives/Formations. There are a number of multinational naval forces and initiatives which were developed on a bilateral or multinational basis, already serving some individual MS maritime interests, before the establishment of CSDP structures. Some of them contributed to the Force Catalogue (FC) and should therefore be considered as any asset and capability provided by MS in respect to RR. Within this approach, the leading MS[67] will be the one responsible to make the initial offer to the Database. Further, it is acknowledged that those

---

[64] Due to the continuous employment of this multirole kind of assets, the specification of their respective serial numbers/individual markings would reduce the flexibility required by the contributing MS.

[65] e.g. change of routine area/region of activity, readiness or commitment.

[66] e.g. remote overseas JOAs.

[67] All MS operating under a multinational formation must in advance formally approve their database offer following their appropriate procedures as agreed by its framework agreement.

initiatives not contributed to the FC add value through training and increasing familiarity and contributing to interoperability, and may add RR capacity if contributed to the Maritime RR Database.

22. <u>EU Sea Deployable Operating Base (DOB)</u> (Ref. RR). The joint use of seaborne platforms to project, support and sustain EU-led military forces could offer significant advantages for the conduct of EU-led military operations or missions. Such platforms could be located either over the horizon, in sight of shore, in port or utilising some combination of the three locations. Sea basing could help to ensure the expeditious deployment of the force with requisite support into a demanding environment. Depending on the nature of the operation sea basing could range in size from a single ship up to and including an entire fleet and could support an element of or the entire EU-led military force.

23. Sea basing can be used throughout all phases of an operation from initial entry to re-deployment and can provide capabilities such as Command and Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Sea Point of Disembarkation (SPOD), Force Protection (FP), Air Defence (AD), Naval Fire Support (NFS), as well as medical facilities, supplies and RSOI enablers. In addition, the sea basing capabilities, taking advantage of their dual-use conceptual nature, could be used for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief tasks.

24. <u>Sustainability</u>. MS contributions assets and capabilities should be able to sustain operations/missions from a minimum of 30 days up to a maximum of 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately. The generic Military RR Logistic Support guidelines are described in Main Body, Chapter F para 24-28.

25. <u>Maritime modules and capabilities</u>. In order to guide MS contributions, a reference list of potentially required capabilities with their different desirable sizes and readiness sub-categories in the Maritime RR domain is included to the blank RR Questionnaires. In this aforementioned list, capability codes have been sorted by the six capability areas[68] defined in the document *EU Capability Codes and Statements* (EU CCS) (Ref. MM).

26. <u>Training</u>. Consideration can be given to Maritime RR capabilities training with the respective preferred EU BG committed in the same stand-by period if there is mutual benefit and agreement between the maritime provider and the EU BG FN (see Main Body, Chapter Q para 127 and 130). Moreover, MS initiatives carried out on a voluntary basis (at national or

---

[68] Capability area is a term used to describe and group tasks or/and capabilities. The capability areas are: Command, Inform, Engage, Protect, Deploy and Sustain.

bi/multilateral level) focused on training and/or exercise activities aimed at improving the EU military RR capacities at sea and from the sea are welcomed.

EUROPEAN UNION

AIR RAPID RESPONSE

CONCEPT

KK. INTRODUCTION

1. In March 2006 a French-German Food for Thought Paper[69] proposed the development of an overarching concept dedicated at structuring air assets and capabilities at high readiness in order to generate Rapid Response Air elements based inter alia on capability modules with the aim to facilitate a joint rapid response.

2. As a result, the EUMC[70] invited the EUMS to develop a draft Mandate (Ref. SS) for elaborating a study of the RR Air Initiative (RRAI) in ESDP, including a Methodology and Roadmap. Furthermore, in May 2006, the Council[71] recognised that, in line with the EU Military RR Concept (Ref. C), consideration was given to a RRAI for further development within the framework of the Headline Goal 2010.

3. Pursuant to the findings of the RRAI (Ref. TT), the EUMC tasked[72] the EUMS to develop an Air RR Concept, which had to be coherent with the overarching EU Military RR Concept[73]. The Air RR Concept was agreed in 2007 (Ref. H). Due to its relevance in most of the Air RR operations, this concept also included the details on the generation and establishment of an EU Force Deployment Operating Base (EUFOR DOB).

4. With a view to providing planning guidelines to facilitate the activation, sustainment and recovery of an EUAirDOB and to constituting the link between the Air RR Concept (Ref. H) and appropriate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), the EUMC agreed in 2010 the Concept for the Implementation of a European Union Air Deployable Operating Base (Ref. UU).

5. In order to define the employment of military Air Power, including Space capabilities and to provide the conceptual framework for the use of the EU Air capabilities in Joint missions or operations in support of the CSDP, the EUMC agreed in 2011 the Concept for Air Operations in support of the Common Security and Defence Policy (Ref. VV).

6. To conclude, the endorsed proposals by the Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy (Ref. K) in 2013 constitute the mandate for the revision of the EU Military RR capability which includes the respective revision of the Air RR Concept.

---

[69] French-German Initiative on the rapid availability of Air elements in the conext of ESDP (dated 14 March 2006).
[70] Outcome of Proceedings EUMC 5 April 2006 (doc. 8237/06, dated 07 April 2006).
[71] General Affairs Council (GAC) conclusions on ESDP (2728th session of the GAC – Brussels, dated 15 May 2006).
[72] Outcome of Proceedings EUMC 24 October 2007(doc. 14365/07, dated 25 October 2007).
[73] Council Conclusions on ESDP (doc. 15417/07, dated 19 November 2007).

LL. PURPOSE

7. The purpose of this annex is to provide a basis in order to facilitate the generation of EU Air assets and capabilities to cater for Military RR.

MM. SCOPE

8. The annex highlights the key considerations that need to be examined for the implementation of Air RR.

9. This is complemented with a list of required Air RR capability modules and assets that could be employed to cater for the Air RR or the other different RR options, following the modular approach in these cases, which will be included in the Air RR Questionnaires to guide MS contributions.

NN. AIR POWER CHARACTERISTICS IN RAPID RESPONSE

10. Air power[74] is an essential element in all military operations. Air RR capabilities can be involved in most of the RR operations, as a stand-alone component, as the core component of a Joint RR operation complemented by other services, or as a supporting component complementing other Joint RR operations.

11. Air Power's unique capabilities are its speed, global reach, mobility and flexibility. Due to their inherent strategic characteristics Air Forces can pursue tactical, operational, or strategic objectives, in any combination, or all three simultaneously. The characteristics of air and space assets provide political and operational decision makers the options and the freedom to deliver the desired effects[75].

12. Air Power can also be considered as a force multiplier for deployed land and maritime forces and is also considered as a means to create a safer environment in which land and maritime forces can operate.

13. Due to its specific characteristics, air power has the ability to concentrate force over long distances in a short time. It can contribute towards a rapid response across the whole spectrum of EU Crisis Management tasks and facilitate other multidimensional or multinational actions in the crisis area.

---

[74] Air Power is defined within the framework of the EU as the capacity to project power from the air to shape and influence the course of CMO. It is an essential element in both civilian missions and military operations/missions to be employed over the full range of EU-led CMO (Ref. VV).

[75] Air and space assets provide the unique posibility of stand-off and stand-out ISR contributing to an early situation awareness.

14. The presence and readiness of air power can provide a strong deterrence in all phases of an EU-led Military CMO and may contribute to the stabilisation of the overall situation.

OO. PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS

15. Initiation of the Air RR processes and mechanisms will follow the generic Military RR procedures (described in Main Body, Chapters L and M, para 74-100).

16. Affirmed/committed air assets offered by MS to the Air RR Database during their stand-by period may be operating 'out of area' during their stand-by period, provided that the CSDP military rapid response requirements can still be met. In order to assure the potential of the Air RR and the timely delivery of air effects, contributing MS should be able to cater for supporting assets (e.g. air-to-air refuelling, air transport) for their redeployment in order to meet the CSDP military rapid response requirements.

17. The Air capabilities should be constructed on a modular basis (Ref. TT) to enable MS to take full responsibility for a module or for a number of MS to offer a multinational solution to the capability requirement.

PP. KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION

18. The successful use of Air RR will depend on the capacity to rapidly generate capabilities and set up an adequate EU C2 structure, and on the availability of adequate support[76] and infrastructure.

19. EU Air Deployable Operating Base (EUAirDOB). In a CSDP environment, an EUAirDOB is one way of organising an airbase operationally to serve Rapid Response requirements. It is crucial to enable the EU to mount military operations beyond its boundaries. An EUAirDOB should be seen as a combined, possibly joint, mission-tailored, modular and rapidly deployable asset drawn from the MS capabilities included in the RR databases. It is both a support platform for Rapid Response Air Elements and a support tool made available to the EU when responding to a crisis. An EUAirDOB would either serve as an Air Port of Debarkation (APOD)[77], a Deployed Operating Base (DOB)[78], or as a combination of the two. An EUAirDOB illustrative chart and the steps to its establishment are included in the Concept for the Implementation of a European Union Air Deployable Operating Base (Ref. UU). Training of the constituent EUAirDOB modules for deployment, either individually or collectively, by interested MS, in

---

[76] Support: the action of forces that aids, protects, complements or sustains any other force or unit.

[77] The APOD is the "entry point" for the Strategic Lift assets within the AO (Area of Operation).

[78] The DOB is located within the JOA and Movement and Transportation (M&T) is provided by Intra Theatre Airlift System (ITAS).

accordance with EU exercise policy, in anticipation of a contribution to EU-led operations/missions will enhance interoperability and increase effectiveness.

20. Sustainability. MS contributions assets and capabilities should be able to sustain operations /missions from a minimum of 30 days up to a maximum of 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately. The generic Military RR Logistic Support guidelines are described in Main Body, Chapter F para 24-28.

21. Command and Control. They will follow the generic Military RR C2 guidelines described in Main Body, Chapter P para 121-125. The C2 arrangements for any Air contribution to an endorsed EU mission will depend on the specific mission and require a case-by-case analysis. The selection of the Air C2, from those elements identified in the Air RR Database, should be made at the earliest opportunity; this should be concurrent with the EU decision to act.

22. The identification of the appropriate Air C2 structure, tailored to the mission, is essential and is mission dependent. Dependent on the number and variety of the committed Air resources this may range from an embedded Air Cell within the C2 structure at the operational level to a fully structured Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC)/(Deployable) Combined Air Operations Centre ((D)CAOC). The JFACC Commander (COMJFACC) is the responsible for commanding and controlling the subordinate forces apportioned to him. He will be vested with the appropriate command authority by the Force Commander over the allocated forces.

23. Readiness. Readiness categories and responsabilities are described in Main Body (Chapter J, para 58-60). Based on the EU operational experience , the lessons learned from EU operations/missions and the agreed illustrative scenarios, it would be advisable that MS assets and capabilities offered to the Air RR Databases have an assigned Express readiness.

24. Staging facilities. Air power can be applied over long distances and air-to-air refuelling can reduce dependence upon staging and forward basing requirements. Nevertheless, in order to apply air power in a responsive and visible manner, the availability of secure staging facilities sufficiently close to the theatre of operations and the associated support must be considered.

25. Protection. Air assets, being of high value both in monetary and operational terms, are likely to be scarce and vulnerable, particularly when on the ground. Therefore adequate capabilities must be present to provide effective protection of the assets when deployed in the JOA.

26. Advance planning and coordination. Air RR deployment requires advance planning and coordination on a number of issues by the EU. These issues comprise framework documents, covering diplomatic clearances, legal and contractual aspects; financial and operational aspects

(site survey teams, etc.).

27. Diplomatic clearances are normally a MS responsibility and granted by many countries on a case-by-case basis (i.e. national regulations). Clearance for CSDP operations, including the over-flight of EU assets will be required if they are to deploy. Such clearances will need to be considered early in the planning process and the arrangement of permanent diplomatic clearances for such operations, where possible, would greatly foster responsiveness.

28. The faster the response required, the more likely the Air RR assets and capabilities will have to rely on Host Nation Support (HNS). Such support could be available on civil as well as military airfields. The choice of the operating base will be dependent on a wide range of planning considerations which should form an integral part of the Force Generation.

29. Air modules and capabilities. In order to guide MS contributions, a reference list of potentially required capabilities with their different desirable sizes and readiness sub-categories in the Air RR domain is included to the blank RR Questionnaires. In the aforementioned list, capability codes have been sorted by the six capability areas[79] defined in the document EU Capability Codes and Statements (EU CCS) (Ref. MM).

30. Training. Consideration can be given to Air RR capabilities training with the respective preferred EU BG committed in the same stand-by period if there is mutual benefit and agreement between the air provider and the EU BG FN (see Main Body, Chapter Q para 127 and 130). Moreover, MS initiatives carried out on a voluntary basis (at national or bi/multilateral level) focused on training and/or exercise activities aimed at improving the EU air RR capacities are welcomed.

---

[79] Capability area is a term used to describe and group tasks or/and capabilities. The capability areas are: Command, Inform, Engage, Protect, Deploy and Sustain.