

AA12CR33

AS (2012) CR 33

Provisional edition

2012 ORDINARY SESSION

(Fourth part)

REPORT

Thirty-third Sitting

Wednesday 3 October 2012 at 3.30 p.m.

In this report:

1. Speeches in English are reported in full.
2. Speeches in other languages are summarised.
3. Speeches in German and Italian are reproduced in full in a separate document.
4. Corrections should be handed in at Room 1059A not later than 24 hours after the report has been circulated.

The contents page for this sitting is given at the end of the verbatim report.

Mr Mignon, President of the Assembly, took the Chair at 3.35 p.m.

1. Address by Mr Nicolae Timofti, President of the Republic of Moldova

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – The sitting is open.

We now come to the address by Mr Nicolae Timofti, President of the Republic of Moldova. After his speech, Mr Timofti will reply to questions from members of the Assembly.

Mr President, welcome to Strasbourg! I will say what I said to you this morning and over the course of the meal we shared with the Secretary-General. We are very glad to have you here along with the Moldovan delegation and your ambassador. I would like to say, here in the Assembly, that she does wonderful work in the Committee of Ministers.

Your election last March put an end to three years of institutional stalemate in your country – a period in which the Republic of Moldova had three general elections and a referendum on amending the constitution.

Since then the democratic institutions of the Republic of Moldova have been working normally and, thanks to the engagement of both you personally and Mr Filat's government in these reforms, the Republic of Moldova can at last make progress on the road to European integration, which you care about so much.

We are therefore very happy to welcome you among us today to consider together concrete ways in which your beautiful country can be supported on that road.

There is another subject, Mr President, on which our Assembly is ready to support you. It is the resolution of the conflict in your country's Transnistrian region, a so-called "frozen conflict". We welcomed, with a great deal of hope and enthusiasm, last December's resumption of negotiations in the 5+2 format, and we have been following the development of the discussions with a great deal of interest ever since. We discussed this at length earlier, as I did with your Speaker, Mr Lupu, when I met him recently.

The atmosphere now seems favourable for dialogue and the meeting which took place on 25 September between the Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Mr Filat, and the leader of the Transnistrian region, Mr Shevchuk, is an excellent demonstration of this.

I assure you, Mr President, that while supporting the 5+2 negotiations, the Assembly is equally ready to play an

active role in the search for the solution to the Transnistrian conflict by, for example, helping to re-establish confidence and dialogue between parliamentarians on both banks of the Dniestr. I am personally committed to taking this process forward and I hope that in the coming months we can move forward on this issue.

I would like to express my gratitude for the welcome you extended to me and the assistance given by the Moldovan authorities, who bent over backwards to facilitate my visit earlier in the year. I was particularly touched by my meeting with the parents of the young man who lost his life in January. There are solutions out there to this problem you care so much about. You have a reputation as a wise man and I hope that Moldova will continue to move forward. The standards of the Council of Europe are becoming a reality in your country and we have great faith in your ability to continue this work.

Mr President, you have the floor.

Mr TIMOFTI (*President of Moldova*) (Translation) – Mr President, Secretary General, distinguished members of the Parliamentary Assembly, ambassadors and excellencies, I am honoured to be here among you and to address you on behalf of the people of the Republic of Moldova. We are a small country, with limited natural resources, but our people are fully determined to build a modern, democratic and prosperous society.

The events of April 2009 put to a serious test the national capacities and European aspirations of our citizens. Today, after three years of democratic governance, I am firmly convinced that the European course that the people of the Republic of Moldova have chosen is irreversible. I would therefore like to extend my sincere gratitude to you, distinguished parliamentarians, as well as to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's President, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and the Venice Commission for the interest that you have shown in the developments in the Republic of Moldova, and particularly for your involvement in and personal contribution to finding a solution for overcoming the constitutional stalemate in my country.

The governing coalition in the Republic of Moldova, which is called the Alliance for European Integration, is taking action to promote transformational reforms to ensure genuine, democratic and European rule of law.

Today I can state that after a relatively short period of time, the changes in my country have become visible. Now we are focusing on judicial reform, stimulation of business opportunities and the fight against corruption. We are well aware of the fact that these actions fall within a broader, complex process that involves considerable effort, and sometimes sacrifices. At the same time, we are determined to carry through these important reforms for the welfare of the Republic of Moldova.

The democratic development of my country is possible due to our membership of the Council of Europe, which is an honour for us. The standards and requirements of the Organisation have helped us to achieve modern institutional reforms. Our vision is for the Republic of Moldova to become a fully fledged member of the European Union, which will ensure better conditions for our citizens and contribute to greater regional and international efforts for security, and a solid ground for trust and prosperity.

On its accession to the Council of Europe 17 years ago, my country undertook a number of commitments regarding the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. To ensure a democratic transformation of our society, concrete actions have been undertaken: we have developed a legislative framework and put in place appropriate mechanisms for the effective implementation of reforms.

Having identified shortcomings in our judiciary system, we considered it necessary to develop and adopt a justice sector reform strategy for the period from 2011 to 2016, aimed at ensuring the sustainability and integrity of that sector. The overall objective of the reform is to make justice accessible, effective, independent, transparent, professional and accountable to citizens. We want to build a justice system that meets European standards, ensures the rule of law, and restores society's trust in the judiciary. Since the beginning of this year, the first normative acts aimed at promoting reforms were adopted, including measures to combat corruption. Clear procedures for the selection of judges and the evaluation of their performance were designed. We have amended our legislation to make it possible to waive judges' immunity in cases of corruption. This package of legislation will also increase the transparency of the Moldovan courts and of the Superior Council of Magistracy.

We are working hard to reform the prosecutorial service and the law enforcement agencies, particularly the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police. The draft budget for 2013, approved by the government last week, provides a 55% increase in funding for justice. That will be the biggest budget that the judicial system of the Republic of Moldova has ever had.

Let me turn to human rights. In 2010, we initiated a structured dialogue with the European Union on the subject. Within the framework of this dialogue, there is participation from Moldovan experts and representatives of the major international actors – the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations. The assistance the Council of Europe has given us in order to improve human rights is valuable. The Council of Europe Facility, launched on the basis of the political priorities outlined in the Eastern Partnership, provides added value and strengthens the synergy between the two organisations, including on the issue of upholding European values.

We believe that the joint programmes of two European organisations have a consolidated impact on democratic transformations. For instance, the Council of Europe and European Union joint programme on democracy support for the Republic of Moldova, which was initiated after the April 2009 events, has brought good results in a relatively short time. As an example, I would like to mention that the pluralism of opinions and freedom of the media have clearly developed. This progress became possible after the Council of Europe and the European Union supported Moldova in establishing a press council. We also received assistance to develop a code of ethics for journalists. At the same time, we also passed a number of laws on the de-nationalisation of media outlets and on enhancing the freedom of expression. Those laws transpose into our national legislation the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The laws are an important achievement for our national media organisations; they compel public authorities to de-nationalise media outlets that are funded by public money, thus encouraging fair and open competition in the printed media. During the past three years, freedom of expression, which is primarily an achievement of the Moldovan citizens, has been improved considerably – a fact recognised equally by civil society and international organisations. I wish to highlight that our government has placed human rights at the core of its national policies – this is our primary objective. We believe that citizens and their welfare should be at the forefront of our actions.

I shall now discuss the global perspective. We have followed closely the events in northern Africa and the Middle East. More recently, we have seen hate speech, intolerance and instigation to violence. Those things show, once again, the importance of keeping human rights at the top of our agenda. The Council of Europe is the Organisation with the tools and capacities to carry out the purpose of maintaining human rights. We will follow closely the first World Forum for Democracy, which is due to start two days from now and has been initiated by the Council of Europe. We believe that this forum should emphasise the importance of dialogue, negotiation and compromise, because those values should be used at the European level and worldwide to avoid misinterpretations and abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

For Council of Europe member states, including the Republic of Moldova, there is one justice institution: the European Court of Human Rights. Many Moldovan citizens have submitted applications to the ECHR, as a result of which our state has been reminded of its primary responsibility to ensure compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. In this context, I wish to say that we support the reform of the ECHR and the actions recommended following the Interlaken, Izmir and Brighton conferences.

We understand that the reform of the ECHR depends not only on the activity of the Council of Europe, but on the willingness of each member state to ensure the effective protection of human rights at the national level. I am referring not only to the adoption of some European and international standards, but to their implementation and proper enforcement. This is also the case for the Republic of Moldova, and I can confirm on behalf of our democratic government and political leadership, of which I am a member, that there is political will to implement these standards.

On the other hand, there are deficiencies in terms of respecting human rights and the pursuit of democratic transformations in the eastern regions of our country. The perpetuation of the Transnistrian conflict undermines our national security and territorial integrity, and it hampers economic development and divides our society. Our policy is focused on promoting dialogue and consolidating confidence and trust between those on the two sides of the Nistru River, in order to reintegrate Moldova within its internationally recognised borders so that our state becomes a functional one with clear European perspectives. The Transnistrian region should be granted a special status within the Republic of Moldova. That will provide the region with a high level of self-governance. Defining a special status is the core task of the political negotiations in the 5+2 format, which should generate a reasonable compromise based on the principles of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.

The Council of Europe has an important role in this process through the confidence-building measures on both sides of the River Nistru. We express our gratitude for the valuable support provided by its member states and count on their further voluntary contributions so that this confidence-building project can be expanded and prolonged. We also believe that it is essential to transform the existing peacekeeping mechanism into an international civilian mission aimed at building confidence rather than separating the sides. We are counting on the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the European Union and the United States to combine their efforts towards finding a lasting solution for the Transnistrian conflict and the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova. Equally, it is important to reiterate that the Russian forces that are present on the territory of Moldova without the consent of our state – of the host nation – and contrary to our constitutional framework and to Russia's international commitments should be finally withdrawn.

We welcome the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution adopted yesterday – on 2 October – on the report regarding the honouring of obligations and commitments undertaken by the Russian Federation, particularly those on the need for the withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions from the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

Distinguished audience, the Republic of Moldova is making progress on its path towards European integration. We continue our negotiations on the Association Agreement with the EU, and earlier this year we launched the negotiations on the creation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area. Together with the European Union, we have set ourselves an intensive agenda of negotiations, and we will make concerted efforts to meet the established timetable and to achieve the ambitious goal to complete negotiations by the next summit of the Eastern Partnership, which will take place next year.

At the same time, I can speak of the progress that Moldova has made in implementing a visa liberalisation conditionality regime. We are waiting for the European Commission and the European Council to take an official decision to move to the second phase of this dialogue. We appreciate the results obtained under the Mobility Partnership with the Republic of Moldova, and we would like to encourage all member states of the European Union to join the partnership in order to strengthen the co-operation in the area of migration.

We are fully aware that Moldova will have a better European perspective if we fully implements its commitments assumed upon our accession to the Council of Europe. Our priority in our relations with the Council of Europe is to complete this monitoring process and to move on to a post-monitoring phase, because these goals have been consistently reflected in our government's programmes. Based on this objective, and in order to monitor strictly the implementation of obligations, the parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted an action plan on 13 July 2012 on the honouring by the Republic of Moldova of its commitments to the Council of Europe. This document represents a consolidated message about the commitment of the Moldovan authorities to promote systemic reforms despite the consequences of the global financial crisis. This exercise constitutes a platform for action in which each institution has a role, and it shows the political maturity of the political leadership and the entire society.

We count on the further support of the Parliamentary Assembly in the implementation of reforms and to help Moldova move on to the post-monitoring dialogue. I assure you the time is right for this step, because we have the arguments and the evidence to support this natural objective. The Republic of Moldova has real potential and should therefore be offered a differentiated approach. Its citizens deserve to be encouraged and assured that they have their place in the space of European democratic values.

Personally, I look forward to the forthcoming visit to Chişinău by the PACE co-rapporteurs for the Republic of Moldova, and I am convinced that they will be able to see for themselves the progress that my country has made in fulfilling its commitments, as the distinguished Parliamentary Assembly confirmed in [Resolution 1895](#) of 2012. I have noted with satisfaction the findings and the encouragement in that report.

Finally, I wish to congratulate the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and all its representatives for their continuous and noble work. It is, I assure you, highly appreciated in member states. Thank you for disseminating the fundamental values of our Organisation, and I encourage you to continue to reform the Parliamentary Assembly to make it more effective and more visible. We all need to combine our efforts to provide a better future for our citizens and our countries.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Timofti, for your interesting address. Members of the Assembly now have questions to put to you.

The first question is from Mr Vareikis on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party.

Mr VAREIKIS (*Lithuania*) – As a former rapporteur for Moldova, I am very interested in the action plan for switching from monitoring to the post-monitoring procedure. Can you say a little bit more about that? What is the timetable for the plan, and what are the most important remaining problems that need to be solved before the switch is made?

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI said that Moldova was fully aware of its obligations, and of course all the issues about which it had to be careful were still at the forefront of their minds. Plans of action to address these would be developed in due time. However, on a few issues they lagged behind, such as the reform of judicial powers and of the prosecutors' offices. He was sure that in time the country would solve those problems too. The task of reforming the prosecutors' offices was difficult: they were state bodies with long traditions and deep roots in the old social system. Nevertheless Moldova was now able to find solutions that would overcome such difficulties. A new package of laws would implement new values in the prosecutors' offices, and introduce new procedures for the selection and promotion of prosecutors. It was proposed that a General Prosecutor be appointed, and the Prosecutors' Council would suggest candidates for other positions.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. The next question is from Ms Durrieu, on behalf of the Socialist Group.

Ms DURRIEU (*France*) said that Moldova was an extremely courageous country. It was very dependent on the Russian Federation for energy and trade. It had experienced profound institutional problems but had demonstrated that it was anchored to democratic values and deserved to be in the post-monitoring process. She asked Mr Timofti what his expectations were from Russia on the one hand, and from Europe on the other.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI recalled that he and Mrs Durrieu had worked together in the 1990's in the field of judicial reforms, among other topics. As for expectations of Russia, there was room for the two countries' already good relations to improve further. When he had been elected, he had organised meetings with Russian leaders, and he was always open to peaceful talks. This would mean finding solutions for the outstanding issues between the two countries. Russia was a very important economic partner for Moldova, and many Russian citizens lived in the territory of the

Republic of Moldova. When holding discussions with Russia, the Moldovan Government repeatedly asked that the Transnistrian problem be resolved through peaceful talks. Russian forces on the territory of the Republic of Moldova should be withdrawn according to international standards. He hoped that this would lead to peace, and that it would be possible to keep developing good relations with both the Russian Federation and Europe. He looked forward to further support from Europe for integration and Moldova's eventual accession to the European Union, towards which Moldova continued to work. Recently Moldova had become more stable; having overcome a difficult moment, it could look forward to peace and calm times. He looked to Europe for support in implementing reforms.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Timofti. The next question is from Ms Guțu, on behalf the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

Ms GUTJU (*Republic of Moldova*) asked what Mr Timofti's view was on the possibility of solving the Transnistrian conflict in the medium and long terms, especially given recent developments. The self-proclaimed leader of that region had instituted customs taxes on goods moving from the right bank to the left bank, and had adopted the Russian flag for the Transnistrian region.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI said that recently the Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova had adopted measures, which he supported, which would lead to the improvement of the lives of citizens on both sides of the Dniestr River. It was unfortunate that the authorities on the other side of the river had imposed customs duties. When the duties had been imposed he had been in Washington and had not been able to discuss the issue, but he knew that the Prime Minister was taking steps to solve the issue. The trend now was for open dialogue.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Timofti. The next question is from Mr Leonid Kalashnikov.

Mr L. KALASHNIKOV (*Russian Federation*) said that three days earlier Moldova had banned the symbols of the Communist Party of Moldova. Mr Timofti had signed that proposal into law. Was not this law undemocratic? Would it encourage those in Transnistria?

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI said that in signing the law, he had taken into account the difference between fascism and communism. Under the symbols of both, whether the swastika, or the hammer and sickle, millions had died. The law was just and necessary.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Timofti. The next question is from Mr Badea.

Mr BADEA (*Romania*) asked what measures were in place in Chișinău to protect schools teaching in Romanian on the other bank of the river. He also asked how the Council of Europe could help.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI said that there were very few schools under control of the Moldovan authorities: only seven high schools. The others were under the control of those on the left bank of the river. He regretted that the population which spoke Romanian – his and Mr Badea's language – could not study in Romanian in those schools as lessons were taught in Russian. The problem was not only with schools: there were all sorts of human rights infringements on the left bank of the Dniestr.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Timofti. The next question is from Ms Christoffersen.

Ms CHRISTOFFERSEN (*Norway*) – Thank you for a most interesting speech. How will high-level politicians in Moldova proceed to fight harassment, violence and hate speech towards LGBT people, create the necessary atmosphere of tolerance and give LGBT people decent protection under law, in line with your commitments to universal human rights as members of this human rights Organisation?

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI said that he was always sorry for any violations of human rights in Moldova. When his government adopted a new law they first considered the human rights implications, including for minorities. In specific answer to Ms Christoffersen's question, most recent laws passed in Moldova were in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. When a party considered a law non-constitutional they were able to challenge it in the light of international legislation. Some of these challenges were currently at the European Court of Human Rights.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – I do not see Ms Quintanilla in the Chamber, so I will move on to Mr Gaudi Nagy.

Mr GAUDI NAGY (*Hungary*) – In your country, Mr President, there is a progressive and successful model of autonomy, Gagauzia, that could serve as a perfect example to member countries of how to solve the problem of the co-existence of more than one nation in one country. It was established following two referendums and negotiations and bloody conflicts were avoided according to the relevant standards of international law. The autonomy of Gagauzia is guaranteed in the Moldovan Constitution and regulated by the Gagauz Autonomy Act, which ensures a wide range of collective rights for about 150 000 Gagauz people of Turkish extraction. What are the key elements of that model of autonomy and what is the current situation in Gagauzia? Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI said that he had been born in a Moldovan village but had later lived in a Ukrainian village and then in a Russian village. He had never seen any inter-ethnic conflict. Accusations of inter-ethnic conflict had arisen only after Moldovan independence: they were figments of the imagination, used by politicians for their own ends. The Transnistrian conflict had no ethnic causes: they were political.

As for the Gagauz, it was important that if there were a population in a territory they should be allowed to acquaint themselves with their own culture. There was a state budget allocated to assist this, but the Gagauz people seemed keener to learn Russian than their own language.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – The next question is from Mr Petrenco.

Mr PETRENCO (*Republic of Moldova*) said that the Moldovan opposition did not recognise Mr Timofti as President because of irregularities in his election.

Mr Timofti had been all over the world but had not yet visited Moldova. When would he satisfy the demands of the Moldovan people and join the customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan?

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI did not know whether to answer the question as a private citizen or as a President. He did not understand how Mr Petrenco could adopt such a position: the whole world recognised him as the President. Mr Petrenco's attitude was not in the interest of the citizens of Moldova.

He had visited Moscow, Kiev and Bucharest, as well as many towns in Moldova. He reminded Mr Petrenco that Moldova had a road map to EU accession.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – The next question is from Mr Kayatürk.

Mr KAYATÜRK (*Turkey*) – We support the political and economic reform process in Moldova and Moldova's future integration in the European institutions will no doubt help to improve the welfare of the Moldovan people. Turkey also supports and encourages Moldova's western orientation. How would you evaluate your course of reforms in the context of Moldova's European aspirations?

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI had recently had the opportunity to visit Istanbul, where he had met President Gül and discussed bilateral issues. President Gül had offered words of encouragement for the reforms in Moldova.

He had always considered reform in the light of European standards. This was fully accepted in the European Union and other European states.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – The next question is from Mr Mogens Jensen.

Mr Mogens JENSEN (*Denmark*) – Unfortunately, there have been severe examples of homophobic speech in the Moldovan Parliament as well as legislation that excludes information on sexual minorities. That is a clear violation of human rights. Will you, as president, support the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation in Moldova that establishes sexual orientation and gender identity as protected rights?

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. Would you like to answer that question Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI said he would give Mr Jensen a comprehensive answer. He respected the opinions of others. He had been a judge for 36 years and had always respected the opinions of others. Various views had been expressed in the Moldovan Parliament which demonstrated how democratic the country was. But those words stayed words and did not become action. He did not want such words to become actions. Sexual minorities had been discussed by the population and parliament and a new law had made peace among all the parties concerned.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. The next question is from Mr Schennach.

Mr SCHENNACH (*Austria*) both knew and loved Moldova, and therefore wanted to know when a proper social welfare system would be introduced, so that the trade in human organs from Moldova to western European nations could end.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer the question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI said that there had been cases in the past where such transactions had led to prosecutions. Moldova had adopted tough measures in respect of the trade in human organs and no longer wanted it to take place. The economic circumstances meant that Moldova could not currently afford a high level of health care. A minimum standard was guaranteed but he hoped to achieve a higher level, ideally with the help of other countries. If Moldova acceded to the European Union, such problems would be resolved at a very high level.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. The next question is from Mr Kox.

Mr KOX (*Netherlands*) – Mr President, one of the things that worries this Assembly is the very antagonistic relations between the opposition and the coalition in your country. That hinders the development of democracy severely, in my opinion. The coalition and the opposition blame each other for everything that goes wrong in your country; I can understand that, but it is not very helpful. May we expect from you as the new president to try to overcome this antagonistic relationship between the opposition and the coalition?

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer the question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI agreed that elements of Moldovan politics were indeed antagonistic. This did not serve Moldovan society and legislative steps were being taken to resolve the issue. A draft bill was currently under public discussion, and it was hoped that it would be introduced into parliament shortly. It would also be important to increase the standard of political education, as politicians needed to continue improving their professional skills.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. The next question is from Mr Connarty.

Mr CONNARTY (*United Kingdom*) – The Human Trafficking Foundation report today says that Moldova is a substantial source, transit and destination country for women and girls subjected to sex trafficking and for men, women and children subject to conditions of forced labour and forced begging. The Government of Moldova does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. The government does not show sufficient progress in addressing complicity in trafficking by law enforcement and other government officials, including the former director of the government's anti-trafficking agency. What will Moldova do to improve?

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. Would you like to answer the question, Mr Timofti?

Mr TIMOFTI saw things differently. Things had changed in Moldova and measures had been adopted in respect of human trafficking. From his position as Head of State he could assure the Assembly that this was the case. He was working hard to tackle trafficking and knew that Moldova held all of its citizens dear. Some had to work abroad for economic reasons but in an ideal world they would all return to Moldova to add value to the Moldovan economy. The number of trafficking cases had dropped dramatically in recent times.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you very much indeed, Mr President.

Dear colleagues, I am very sorry but I now have to conclude the list. Those of you who were on the list but were unable to put your question to the president will appreciate that we are already way over time. I thank you most warmly, Mr President, for joining us here, for your statement and for being so kind as to answer all the questions that were put to you. We wish you all the best for the future and hope that you enjoy the rest of your stay here in Strasbourg.

2. The definition of political prisoner

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – The next item of business this afternoon is the debate on the report entitled "The definition of political prisoner", Document 13011, presented by Mr Strässer on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. May I remind colleagues that speaking time in the debates today is limited to three minutes?

I shall interrupt the list of speakers at about 6.00 p.m. to allow time for the reply and the vote.

Will colleagues please place their cards in the voting slots? We wish to check whether the system is working, so that we do not end up in the unfortunate situation that we were in yesterday when it came to the vote.

I now call Mr Strässer, the rapporteur. You have 13 minutes in total, which you may divide between presentation of the report and your reply to the debate.

Mr STRÄSSER (*Germany*) recalled that it was three years since the Committee had given him his remit to look into the subject of political prisoners. The Committee had assumed two things: first, that such prisoners existed, and secondly, that the Council of Europe should take action. He was very interested in the issue and recalled that in 2001–02 a committee of experts had agreed upon a definition which had subsequently been used in four resolutions and recommendations adopted between 2001–05 on Azerbaijan and Armenia. There was no ambiguity over the definition of a political prisoner and any questioning undermined the work of the Assembly over the previous 10 years. It was, therefore, not enough to talk only about the term itself. The debate should rather be about the direction the Council of Europe wished to go. He opposed the view advocated by some that the Parliamentary Assembly should refrain from talking about the matter on the grounds that it was more properly within the remit of the European Court of Human Rights. If this position were adopted members might as well go home. It was right that the Assembly should be active in this area, on which it had a good track record. He urged members to support this approach, of which he was proud.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Strässer. You have five and a half minutes remaining to answer to the debate.

I now call Mr Conde, who will speak on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party.

Mr CONDE (*Spain*), said that the group did not have a common position on the report, so its members would vote according to individual conscience.

THE PRESIDENT said that Mr Conde had appealed to the wisdom of the members of his group, and indeed to the whole Assembly. He called Mr Marcenaro to speak on behalf of the Socialist Group.

Mr MARCENARO (*Italy*) said that the socialist group had decided, virtually unanimously, to support the report emphatically. It was difficult for everyone to accept that in civilised countries there could exist torture, or political prisoners, but these things did exist. The victims of such repression looked to the Council of Europe as one potential source of help in their fight. There was much talk of human rights defenders: who were these political prisoners if not defenders of human rights? Mr Strässer had quoted the views of Amnesty International. Given the importance attached to civil society, the stance of such authoritative organisations should give food for thought. Their expert opinions were not expressed lightly.

The amendment aimed to neuter the report and to mortgage the future activity of the Council of Europe. What did those who tabled the amendment hope to achieve by this? Did they want to deny hope to political prisoners? Everyone had a duty to take a stand and to resist the lobbying which had affected this whole discussion.

THE PRESIDENT noted that Rule 33(4) could perhaps have been used to render the amendment inadmissible, but a Committee had voted in favour of it, and he could not ride roughshod over their opinion. Were he able to speak from the floor he might speak against the amendment, but this was a purely hypothetical scenario.

Mr MARCENARO (*Italy*) said that it had not been his intention to cast aspersions on the administration or the President. He had been making a political point to all those who were trying to sabotage the report rather than criticising procedural shortcomings.

THE PRESIDENT thanked Mr Marcenaro for his clarification and said that as far as he was concerned, it had cleared the slate.

He called Ms Reps to speak on behalf of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

Ms REPS (*Estonia*) – Thank you, Mr President. We have a very sensitive question before us: what things can we agree in this Council of Europe? I hope that we can all agree that this is the institution of the rule of law, democracy and human rights – our values and principles. Based on that, I hope that we can all agree that having political prisoners is unacceptable, in whatever country, be it one under monitoring or one not being monitored. I hope that we can agree that this institution does not believe that having political prisoners is acceptable.

The second question before us is: who are these prisoners? The question raised in the report is whether or not we need a definition. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has agreed that we need one. By an overwhelming majority we agreed a few years ago that we needed to look into this matter. Today, we have a proposal before us for the Parliamentary Assembly to establish the definition of "political prisoner". That is where all the mess begins – the confusion; the pause; the not getting a visa for Azerbaijan; the unfair treatment; and all the different procedural questions.

However, the issue is: if we do not vote for the resolution today, we are giving a right to these people – whether we are talking about the result of lobbying, threatening, blackmailing or any other means – to say that the issue of political prisoners is not to be dealt with by this Parliamentary Assembly. I hope that we can all agree that that

should not be the case. It should not be for the European Court of Human Rights alone to discuss and "assess violations of fundamental rights and freedoms". I am sorry that that is what we are being asked to agree here. In every debate, every report and every resolution we are assessing the status of human rights and how countries are dealing with that area. We are monitoring a number of countries and we sometimes lift the monitoring of countries that have finished the process, but we are assessing human rights in every report. I ask colleagues to read Amendment 2, because it suggests that the only authority to assess violations of fundamental rights and freedoms should be the European Court of Human Rights. That is nonsense, and anyone who sensibly reads that amendment cannot vote for it.

Some people like the definition, others think it is too vague and some would like to amend it. However, it was proposed by the committee and if we do not vote for the resolution, we send the message that the issue of political prisoners should not be dealt with by the Parliamentary Assembly. That would be a disaster.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Ms Reps. I now call Ms Nikolaeva, who will speak on behalf of the European Democrat Group.

Ms NIKOLAEVA (*Russian Federation*) thanked Mr Strässer, who had been guided by the best intentions in his consideration of these complicated issues. International law did not have the concept of political prisoners. This made it possible to politicise the term, which had happened in a number of Council of Europe countries. Interpreting the criteria relating to political prisoners fell within the remit of the European Court of Human Rights. It was doubtful whether someone who was habitually involved in political activity but had committed a crime should escape without punishment. Political involvement should not exempt a person from responsibility under the law. It was necessary to comply with the principle of punishment applying to all. The EDG group had doubts about the resolution, but was happy with the amendment, so would vote accordingly.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Ms Nikolaeva. I call Mr Kox, on behalf of the Group of the United European Left.

Mr KOX (*Netherlands*) – On Monday I said in the Assembly that parliamentarians should be put not into prison but into parliaments, because that is the very essence of democracy and the rule of law. There are far too many parliamentarians who are put into prisons in member states. Not only parliamentarians are put into prison, but so are many other people involved in politics. That is the essence of political prisoners. In this Assembly, it is our duty to stand firm on the protection of the political rights of all the citizens of our member states and against brutal violations of those rights, such as arresting, convicting and imprisoning political opponents. It happens throughout Europe, we know it, and we should do something about it.

I say to our rapporteur, Mr Strässer, that the problem is that we try to stand firm, but the governments involved say that they do not have political prisoners. They always deny that. They say that people are put into prison not for political reasons, but for violations of the penal code. Let me give you the example of Leyla Zana, who was put in prison in Turkey for, it was claimed, violations of the penal code. She appealed to the court and won. Then she received the Sakharov prize from the European Parliament as a defender of human rights. What are we dealing with? What is she? Is she a political prisoner or not? We are looking for a definition of "political prisoner".

Mr Strässer knows that we want to deal with political prisoners in a certain member state, but it says that it does not have political prisoners. That is why we came up with this proposal to define political prisoners. I thank Mr Strässer for all the work he has done, but my group is not convinced that his report and resolution are a solution to the problem. We all know that history shows that the adoption of the report will not lead governments to release political prisoners. It is also not clear on the role of the European Court of Human Rights, which is, according to our convention, the final legal authority.

It is also strange that we are trying to define "political prisoner", while in paragraph 4 we exclude terrorism, but we have no definition of terrorism. Again, I thank Mr Strässer for all his good work, but this resolution and report are not yet ready for a final decision by this Chamber. What happened today in the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights emphasises that point, so on behalf of my group I propose that the Assembly refers the report and the resolution back to the committee. This is not a matter on which we can go 50:50, as it should have the broad support of the whole Assembly.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Do you wish to respond at this stage, Mr Strässer? Mr Kox, you have proposed that the report be referred back to the committee. Are you suggesting that we hold a vote at the end of the debate on that point?

Mr KOX (*Netherlands*) – I think it would be reasonable to ask the rapporteur whether that would help, but we do need a vote, I think.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – The debate will continue, and at the end we will come to the rapporteur on that subject, unless he wishes to reply straight away.

The rapporteur indicates that he will reply at the end of the debate.

I now call Ms Postanjyan.

Ms POSTANJYAN (*Armenia*) – The issue of political prisoners in the Council of Europe dates back many years, therefore the main subject and agenda for the Council of Europe must be the adoption of measures of condemnation that restrict the rights and opportunities for the heads of authoritarian regimes, ruling political forces and all government representatives involved in the illegal imprisonment of people who dare to express another opinion or who belong to other political groups.

We deplore the continued detention of many journalists, human rights activists, politicians and deputies. If we study seriously the situation in prisons, we see many terrible violations of human rights, such as torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, which in some cases also leads to death. We have seen examples of all the above-mentioned violations in the video from the prison in Georgia and the Magnitsky case.

Many political prisoners in different member states of the Council of Europe are waiting for our real actions. One of them is the Javakhk-Armenian social activist Vahagn Chakhalyan, who has become a political prisoner behind the "veil" of a criminal case. His imprisonment is in contradiction of the European Convention on Human Rights regarding the deprivation of liberty, freedom of speech and freedom of association.

The adoption of the report and resolution on the definition of "political prisoner" can be a good step towards the release of political prisoners. I welcome the report and resolution prepared by Mr Strässer. I remind you that many former and current political prisoners are following us and waiting for our solution. We need to take firm action in the fight against dictators and authoritarian regimes. It is a shame that the amendments have been proposed, and their adoption would discredit the Council of Europe and render all future work of the Assembly futile.

(Mr Walter, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr Mignon.)

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Ms Postanjyan. I call Mr Rustamyan.

Mr RUSTAMYAN (*Armenia*) congratulated Mr Strässer on the good job he had done despite the pressure he had been under and the very tense atmosphere in which he had had to work. He had shown great boldness. The criteria proposed for the definition of political prisoners were completely acceptable, and all that was left to do was to apply them in all countries and to individual cases. The presence of an electoral system which allowed a change of power was an essential feature of the rule of law. He wished to consider in particular the position of Azerbaijan. Any country that sincerely wanted to develop democracy should never create obstacles. The rapporteur had been prevented from visiting Azerbaijan in the course of his work, which was a violation of the rules of the Assembly. Azerbaijan was doing all it could to prevent the adoption of the definition of political prisoner, even though this was not directed against any one country. The reason was clear: once adopted, the definition would apply to all countries, including Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan claimed to be a democracy with a legitimate government, and therefore could not have any political prisoners. For this reason, it was trying to bury the report. The Council of Europe was being tested. He would vote against Amendment 2 which would totally compromise the authority of the Assembly and annihilate the report.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Rustamyan. The next speaker is Mr Çavuşoğlu.

Mr ÇAVUŞOĞLU (*Turkey*) – I think that everyone in this Chamber agrees that we do not want any political prisoners in the member states. That is why we have been working for that and why the Assembly needed a proper definition of political prisoners. We gave a mandate to our rapporteur and, as he said, he has been working on the report for three years. When we look at the resolution, we see that it is only five paragraphs long, and some of them are amendments from colleagues, especially our Spanish colleagues. He brought it to the committee and to this Assembly as a definition of political prisoners, but I would like to ask whether members see any such definition here.

Please do not connect this to any country. We are a standard-setting Organisation. When we set a standard, we set it not only for the 47 member states, but for the European Union, other international organisations, including the United Nations, the courts, academic circles and think tanks. Suppose an academic, a judge or a student researcher tries to find a definition of political prisoners on this Organisation's website for their work or research. What they will see are references to previous definitions. Colleagues, we all know that some definitions and criteria were set out before, so why do we need another definition now? It is because we needed to update this one. We are not stupid; the rapporteur does not need to remind us of the previous definitions. We know how to find and access those.

In the three years, did the rapporteur organise any hearings in the committee? No. Did he bring the judges together? No. Did he work with experts or academics? No. Everyone accepts that he was supposed to bring the judges of the Court together to make the proper definition. In the end, he came to the Assembly with what I am sorry to say is nonsense. This is nonsense. This undermines the credibility of this Organisation. We cannot set standards like this. This is not the standard we should be setting. People say that if we do not accept the resolution, the Assembly will lose its credibility. I think that if we do accept it, the Assembly will lose its credibility. Therefore, until an appropriate definition is made after serious work, we should accept the decisions and the standard *acquis* of the European Court of Human Rights, whose judgments we always ask countries to implement. When we make the proper definition we can rely on it. This is not the definition.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Çavuşoğlu. The next speaker is Ms Schuster.

Ms SCHUSTER (*Germany*) thanked the rapporteur for having carried out an extraordinarily difficult task. The Committee had entrusted him with this task because it wanted a definition to exist.

In response to Mr Çavuşoğlu she said that it was not true that no hearings had taken place with experts. In July 2010 the Committee had heard from experts: the definition had not been arrived at out of nowhere. The experts had concluded that the criteria previously in use were acceptable.

Human Rights Watch supported the definition and had called on the Assembly to speak out.

Lobbying in this case by Azerbaijan had been unmatched in its brazenness. The Assembly should not be influenced by it. It was time to nail its colours to the mast.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Ms von Cramon-Taubadel.

Ms von CRAMON-TAUBADEL (*Germany*) said that Mr Çavuşoğlu's speech had been incredible. As a former President of the Assembly, he should have known better than to make such a speech. She would never have thought that a former President could talk such nonsense.

In response to Mr Kox she said that if one asked the Turkish or Azeri governments whether they had any political prisoners they would not admit it. But it was clear that such people existed, sometimes held on remand or in an administrative detention, but political prisoners nonetheless.

It was a key task of the Assembly to define the term. The amendment agreed in Committee earlier in the day would mean that members of the Assembly would not be able to discuss the matter in future. Only the Court would be able to discuss it. This would undermine the mandate of the Assembly. She supported the report but opposed the amendments. She did not understand Mr Kox's proposal and thought it questionable.

She criticised the intimidation of the rapporteur and argued that it would undermine the role of the Assembly.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Herkel.

Mr HERKEL (*Estonia*) – Mr Strässer and I have similar backgrounds and we both learnt a lot about political prisoners from Azerbaijan. Several years ago, when I became the monitoring rapporteur in Azerbaijan, I visited many former politicians in prison. For us, they were, of course, political prisoners but when we talked to President Aliiev or Mr Rasizade, they told us that they did not have political prisoners and, as the Council of Europe did not have any clear definition of who was a political prisoner, we used the term "alleged political prisoners" so that we could continue our interesting dialogues. The need for a clear definition is obvious.

Even on this occasion, our Organisation used very high-level expertise to identify who was who. The report before us now is based on that long-held high-level expertise, as were the hearings of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. I was a member of that committee when Mr Çavuşoğlu was President of the Assembly and we used the expertise of Mr Trechsel and other eminent scholars.

The amendments tabled by Mr Moriau seem to have the sole aim of destroying the report. I strongly support Mr Strässer and the report and call on members to do the same today.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. I call Mr Michel.

Mr MICHEL (*France*) noted that the rapporteur had withstood great pressure and produced a balanced report. The Assembly was competent to take a decision on the definition: it was within its powers. The definition would apply to all countries including democracies. In democracies people would not be able to oppose the state through criminal acts and expect to get away with that by availing of themselves of the label "political prisoner". He hoped this would reassure Turkish and Spanish colleagues. He noted that in the past those who had resisted fascism were labelled as terrorists but were now considered heroes. But the situation was different now.

He said to Mr Kox that a definition could not encompass everything and argued that it would be cowardly to refer the report back to the Committee. It was surprising that Mr Kox had suggested that as it would send the wrong message to the international community.

The Assembly should adopt the resolution but he would not discuss Amendment 2. The situation reflected no credit on the Assembly.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Knyshov.

Mr KNYSHOV (*Russian Federation*) said that political repression still existed and that all those imprisoned for political reasons needed support. However, he also drew attention to attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of countries

such as Russia, which had been inspired by improper motives.

He argued that if there were no definition criminals would claim to be political prisoners, so it would be useful to have a definition which could not be abused. However, the work undertaken by the Committee in this case had not improved matters. For instance reference to extremely harsh punishment had remained in the definition. He was not convinced that this would be useful in determining whether a person was a political prisoner.

With the two proposed amendments the resolution would be more balanced. He would therefore support the resolution if the two amendments were agreed.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Vejkey.

Mr VEJKEY (*Hungary*) – Today, there is no widely accepted definition of political prisoners in the international community and so in June and September 2002 the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights discussed it. We Hungarians have often fought for our freedom and we know what it means to be a political prisoner. We Hungarians have a flag with a hole in it, which is a symbol of freedom. This flag was given to the Council of Europe on 23 June 1999. It is the original flag from 1956, which saw one of the greatest fights for freedom by Hungarians in recent times. You can see that flag here on the first floor of this building.

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was the most important event of the entire Cold War period. In that revolution hundreds of political prisoners were freed, including Cardinal József Mindszenty, who was a cardinal in the Catholic church as the Archbishop of Esztergom in Hungary, who had been in prison since 1948. One cannot describe the enthusiasm of those Hungarians who were free again.

Let us hold a minute's silence for the memory of millions of victims of Nazism and Communism, for the millions of Hungarians, Germans, Russians, Finns, Poles, Austrians, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, Italians, Croatians, Serbians and so many other nations of Europe, Asia, American and Africa who lost their lives fighting for freedom.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. I call Mr Hancock.

Mr HANCOCK (*United Kingdom*) – Why are we here today discussing this report? Because there is an unclear view of what a "political prisoner" is. And what does the report say to us? It asks us to reaffirm support for the criteria that we have been working to up till now. How does reaffirming the thing that has led to so much confusion help the situation in the Parliamentary Assembly?

Why has this debate been obsessed with political prisoners who may or not be in prison in Azerbaijan, when this Assembly knows that so many countries have alleged political prisoners? The rapporteur shakes his head, but in his opening remarks he mentioned the country of Azerbaijan by name four times. He mentioned that there were other countries but he did not name them. Why this obsession with political prisoners in Azerbaijan? I think it is because he was, wrongly, refused a visa there, but the instruction from the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights was quite clear: to come up with a unified, recognisable and simple definition of "political prisoner".

Mr Kox made the point that terrorists could still get an exemption clause under the definition in Mr Strässer's report. We in the United Kingdom have had many terrorists over the years; 13 of them starved themselves to death to prove that they were not terrorists, but political prisoners. That was not 100 years ago but 20 years ago, and the British Government stood by and allowed these men to commit suicide by starving themselves to death because we did not recognise any international definition of what a political prisoner was.

You say in your report, "Oh, it's not a problem for Spain, because ETA can be dealt with"; "Oh, it's not a problem for Turkey, because the PKK can be dealt with". How? Your report is very thin, Mr Strässer – it does not go into any detail. I was hoping that it would be an all-embracing and inclusive examination of the issue so that international organisations, from the UN to the UNHCR to the Red Cross, along with the Court, could clearly define what a political prisoner was. To say today that, after three years of debate and dialogue, the best we can do as an Assembly of parliamentarians is simply to redefine something that is already internationally recognised as a failure cannot be good enough. We could and should have done better, and those political prisoners who are being held in many of the countries of this Assembly will not benefit from the reaffirming of what we cannot deliver on now. They were expecting a more precise definition that no one could fail to understand. That is the failure of your report, Mr Strässer.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Slutsky.

Mr SLUTSKY (*Russian Federation*) noted that great emphasis was put in the Assembly on avoiding division between delegations and committees, and that a written declaration had been tabled to this effect. The definition of a political prisoner was not yet clear and there remained too much room for manoeuvre. Whatever the outcome of the afternoon's debate, the text of the resolution would be used for political pressure and it was unfortunate that any drug dealer, terrorist or murderer, such as Anders Behring Breivik, would be able to claim that they were in fact a political prisoner. He recalled the saying that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions". He regretted that this Resolution would lead only to division and recommended that a joint committee of the Assembly and the European

Court of Human Rights be appointed to consider the matter in greater detail.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I now call Mr Sobolev.

Mr SOBOLEV (*Ukraine*) – Mr Strässer, you are a brave man, and I thank you for such an excellent report. You can hear in this Chamber how many people want to pressure you not to make this decision, but remember that those who opposed fascists and communists who killed millions of people were political prisoners. Remember that in the Soviet Union, when millions of people were killed by the Stalinist and other regimes, all of them, according to the resolution of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries, were declared to be political prisoners. So when we hear now that we do not have such a definition, that is a lie – all parliaments have their own definition of what “political prisoner” means.

If the Council of Europe does not adopt this definition, that will be the start of a very dangerous process that began in the 1930s in Germany and the Soviet Union, when millions of people were killed because of their ideological or other point of view. I shall not mention Tymoshenko or Lukashenko, but a month ago the Communists and Yanukovich’s party quickly passed a law according to which any journalist could receive seven years in jail for putting out false information. Our honest courts in Ukraine will make these decisions only in respect of the opposition press and journalists. This horrible decision was dismissed yesterday, but then it was announced that elections will be held, and the decision will be put again to the Ukrainian Parliament. How many political prisoners do we need? Or do we need a repeat of the case of Gongadze? The methods and procedures of the regime in Ukraine and in other countries is not so open.

If we agree to the second amendment, thousands of people will wait years for a decision from the European Court of Human Rights. Look at the case of Tymoshenko: she has heard the decision of the so-called Ukrainian courts, but she will have to wait, perhaps for years, for the decision of the ECHR, if there is not another decision in the meantime. If we want to agree the second amendment, we will have to say that the ECHR has to decide on such cases in three months – or half a year, maximum. Otherwise, for years and years, people will die in prison, but will not be called political prisoners.

The report is brave and timely. With regard to all four items, there should be no political prisoners across our continent. Why is this Organisation comprised of 47 members and not 48? It is because Lukashenko’s regime is a regime of political prisoners. We have to make sure that we do not go down to 40, 30, or 15 members, or to just one member. This report is a way out of the problem. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Sobolev. I call Mr Plotnikov.

Mr PLOTNIKOV (*Ukraine*) – The issue that we are discussing is very important, and it goes far beyond the Council of Europe’s walls. The term “political prisoner” is interpreted quite freely by many international organisations, which use very different, often contradictory, criteria.

First, I should like to outline which misdeeds cannot in any way be said to relate to the category of political prisoner. They include what we traditionally understand to be crimes against humanity, terrorism in all its forms, the illegal arms trade, drug trafficking, and trafficking in human beings. There is a rather stable understanding of those crimes across the world, so it would not be reasonable to politicise those crimes.

I emphasise that those convicted of corruption, or of economic crimes committed by virtue of a person’s position, should be taken out of the category of political prisoner. Inflicting damage on the state while occupying a position on a body of authority should be regarded as a felony, and should not have any political colouring. Once again, I should like to stress the importance of this issue. I believe that through joint efforts, we will find adequate solutions to the problem. Thank you for your attention.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Plotnikov. I call Mr Rochebloine.

Mr ROCHEBLOINE (*France*) believed that there was a paradox at the heart of the debate, the object of which was both to achieve consensus and to consolidate the definition of a political prisoner. The committee had chosen not to go for a compromise and further work was required to achieve a conclusion. It was not surprising that Azerbaijan had been mentioned so frequently, as the authorities in Baku were demonstrating some of the characteristics of a totalitarian regime. It was also a matter of concern that so many members of Parliament in Turkey were currently imprisoned. He urged the Assembly to adopt the resolution.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Rochebloine. I call Mr Xuclà.

Mr XUCLÀ (*Spain*) said that Mr Strässer had indeed faced a difficult challenge, as many members saw this issue as one on which they would need to demonstrate their political allegiances. This was unfortunate since the subject at hand was deserving of a more considered approach. What was really needed was a useful definition, perhaps even a new one so as not to lose the opportunity of the moment. The group of experts convened in 2001 had not agreed and this report did itself not provide a definition. All members of the Spanish delegation were united in their opposition to terrorism, but it was ultimately the European Court which would determine how future cases would be handled.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Xuclà. I now call Mr Iwiński.

Mr IWINSKI (*Poland*) – Thank you, Mr President. Mr Strässer's report has its own long story. This issue first appeared years ago in relation to the accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan to our Organisation. Later on, it was transformed into this separate, broader and theoretical problem, and I am speaking as a scholar rather than as a politician. It is difficult to get everyone's agreement on any definition in the social sciences. For example, although the definition of "prisoner of war" seems to be clear and based on several international conventions, we still encounter bizarre interpretations of it even today. The categories "prisoner of conscience" and "political prisoner" belong to more heterogeneous groups. The definition of "political prisoner" seems, to some extent at least, to belong to a political category – it is delicate or even "tricky", as the Americans would say. Many Spaniards could see it in the light of ETA's activities, Britons could see it in the light of the IRA's operations and Turks could consider it in the light of the PKK.

Yesterday, we adopted a valuable report on Russia. Many people could perceive the members of the band Pussy Riot as political prisoners, and the Tymoshenko case in Ukraine could be seen as equally controversial. The rapporteur is right to state in paragraph 4: "Those deprived of their personal liberty for terrorist crimes shall not be considered political prisoners if they have been prosecuted and sentenced for such crimes according to national legislation and the European Convention on Human Rights". However, as has been mentioned, there is no approved definition of "terrorism" – no such definition has been approved by the UN, for example. As a result, and only following 11 September, western countries recognised the separatists in Chechnya as terrorists – that issue had previously been a significant bone of contention, which had had an impact on international relations.

It is true to say that the criteria proposed in the report were based on the specific circumstances of the civil war in Namibia in 1989. It is also true to say that that does not automatically undermine the validity of the criteria and the definition as a whole. Their usefulness for individual cases within the Council of Europe should be considered, depending on compatibility or incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights.

The two amendments proposed to the draft resolution are reasonable. By and large, we need to avoid the situation described colourfully in the Chinese proverb about two people sleeping in the same bed but having quite different dreams.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Iwiński. The next speaker is Mr Leonid Kalashnikov.

Mr Leonid KALASHNIKOV (*Russian Federation*) said that previous speaker had referred to the history of the definition of terrorism, and the decades it had taken to achieve this. Probably he also thought that decades would be needed to arrive at a definition of political prisoner. However, in the United States, a definition of terrorism did exist, and was the type of thing that the founders of the US might have agreed with. Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was inaccurate since it wrongly claimed that the Committee of Ministers had agreed with the criteria put forward by the independent experts. Paragraph 17 of the report referred to the Deputies "welcoming" the experts' report, but crucially they had not agreed at all with the proposed criteria.

Extremism had been defined in Russian law No. 288. Many organisations believed that this definition was very wide. The Venice Commission, working under the aegis of the European Court of Human Rights, had said six weeks previously that in its opinion the rule on extremism was very widely couched and too broadly interpreted, which could lead to inconsistent implementation. The Assembly should respect the opinion of its own bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights, and give it the opportunity to bring experts together to define the concept of political prisoner, and only then give its support to the outcome. Earlier that day he had questioned the President of the Republic of Moldova about symbols of Nazism and communism. Communism had freed Europe from fascism. The Assembly should respect the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, such as that relating to Hungary. The matter of a definition of political prisoner should be referred to the European Court of Human Rights before it was discussed by the Assembly.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you Mr Kalashnikov. I see that Mr Khader is not here, so the next speaker is Ms Christoffersen.

Ms CHRISTOFFERSEN (*Norway*) – Mr President, dear colleagues, this report from the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on the definition of political prisoner has somehow turned out to be controversial, and I wonder why. The term "political prisoner" is not the easiest to define; "prisoner of conscience" is another term that is used, by Amnesty International among others. Nevertheless, we all have an intuitive understanding of the content of this term; it means people who are being persecuted and imprisoned on political grounds. We are aware that someone wants to silence these people's voices, and we all agree that that is a serious violation of fundamental human rights.

Council of Europe members must commit themselves to releasing or re-trying these prisoners – that happened in 2001 when Azerbaijan and Armenia became Council of Europe members. As was described in the report, the Committee of Ministers, in accordance with the advice of three independent experts on human rights, at that time drew up a list of criteria, in the light of European Court of Human Rights case law, determining who could be defined as a "political prisoner". All the relevant bodies of the Council of Europe agreed on this, including the Assembly.

The advice in the draft resolution is to make no changes to the criteria and so to keep them as they are. It urges all

member states to reassess cases of alleged political prisoners – in other words, this is business as usual. So why do we have this controversy? What will be the consequences of rejecting this advice? When considering seemingly difficult questions, I find it useful to ask two questions – who gains, and who loses? We need to consider who gains from casting doubt on and getting rid of our 10-year-old agreement on the criteria defining a political prisoner, and who loses. The answer is obvious, is it not? We could also consider a further question: why was the appointed rapporteur denied access to one of the most relevant countries to visit when he was fact-finding? I find the answers to these things obvious. Political prisoners – prisoners of conscience – will be the losers, as their cases will be weakened. The authorities of some of the member states still subject to monitoring for breaking fundamental human rights will gain. Yesterday, we all received a letter from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Those well-regarded human rights organisations urged us to support the report and keep the criteria alive, and that is more than good enough for me.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Agramunt.

Mr AGRAMUNT (*Spain*) said that he had not been able to vote on this report in the Committee on Legal Affairs, but he intended to do so here. His colleague Mr Conde had been elegant in his choice of words when he had said that members of the EPP/CD Group had a free vote according to their conscience. His concern was exclusively the problem of terrorism: this was the crucial issue for Spain. Two days ago a claim had been made in the Spanish press that ETA prisoners were political prisoners. Paragraph 3 might make it easier for some of the people serving sentences for terrorism in Spain being given the status of political prisoners. Persons deemed to be in a problematic category by countries such as Spain and the USA had been even invited to this Assembly. This was a concern shared by his Spanish colleagues. In Spain, the lines were drawn by the Constitutional Court. Mr Conde's amendment seemed, therefore, to be in line with practice in that country. He agreed with the other speakers who had said that this matter had been dealt with over-hastily by the Assembly. Haste in politics was a poor counsel; the implications of this report should have been debated at some length, but this had not been the case.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Schennach, who will be the last speaker in the debate.

Mr SCHENNACH (*Austria*) said that this report demonstrated how sometimes the Assembly's Committees occupied themselves with cosmetic matters, whereas the Council of Europe should be about upholding human rights. It was the job of the Council of Europe to interfere everywhere that human rights were being trampled; it was its core concern. No country would ever admit to having political prisoners, so different terminology was used. If the state was manipulating court rulings, then of course that was creating political prisoners. Pussy Riot were political prisoners because the court in that case had come under pressure. Hundreds of journalists could be described as terrorists. A law instituted by the British in Israel could be used today to oppress members of parliament, accusing them of terrorism and putting them in pre-trial detention. The two amendments should not be agreed. A great deal of political pressure had been applied to this report, which brought the Assembly down to earth in reminding it of its own core activity. He urged the Assembly to vote in favour of the resolution.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you.

I must now interrupt the list of speakers. The speeches of members on the speakers' list who have been present during the debate but have not been able to speak may be given to the Table Office for publication in the Official Report.

I call Mr Strässer to reply. You have five and a half minutes.

Mr STRÄSSER (*Germany*) thanked all those who had taken part in the debate for their constructive comments which would help the Committee in its work. He also thanked those who had opposed the resolution. As a parliamentarian he had been affected by this. He had been particularly affected by a former President of the Assembly condemning something which had been used in the past by the Assembly, but he did not wish to say anything else on that topic.

The point of departure was important: the report and the rapporteur should not be confused with each other. The definition of political prisoner was not new; he as rapporteur had been asked to provide a report on something that already existed. A number of members of the Assembly had been at the Committee hearings at which this had been discussed. The definition had been used previously in this Assembly and had not been criticised. He found it difficult to understand why some members thought the process had been hasty when it had taken three years. He would have been happy to receive motions that could have led to consensus, as Mr Kox had suggested, but none had arrived. He was sure that no consensus would be reached, and there were different approaches to this issue.

He did not want to act as an extended arm of his own government. He did not have any executive power, and no members of the Assembly should act in that way. He had heard no criticism of the substance of the criteria. The past three years showed that it was difficult to reach consensus. He asked Mr. Agramunt to look again at paragraph 4. He almost regretted including the verbatim text, which he had done as a compromise at the behest of Mr Agramunt's colleague. Now a new proposal to amend this passage had been tabled, which he could not understand.

Ms Christoffersen had commented that there would be winners and losers: if the Assembly did not act decisively the losers would be those affected by its indecision.

Mr Hancock had talked about Azerbaijan. Mr Strässer had said he had been criticised by human rights institutions for not having spent enough time in Azerbaijan. In January he would submit a separate report on that country.

If Amendment 2 were accepted the whole substance of the report would have disappeared. He called upon the Assembly to reject the report in its entirety if Amendment 2 were agreed.

THE PRESIDENT – Does the Chairperson of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Mr Choqe, want to speak? You have two minutes.

Mr CHOPE (*United Kingdom*) – I would first like to thank the rapporteur for all his work on this very contentious subject. The committee has been struggling with the issue for the best part of three years and, frankly, I do not think that it would come up with a better solution if it was given more time. It is deeply regrettable that on a matter on which we all agree – we are all against the imprisonment of political prisoners – we cannot reach a consensus on a definition. I think that the problem lies in the fact that many members of this Assembly are concerned that any definition of political prisoners will somehow be hijacked by members of organisations that have terrorist links. That is really what underlies many people's concerns.

However, we are where we are on this. I do not think that any further delay would assist us. I do not think that we should allow ourselves to condemn those who vote either to support the various amendments or against them, because all their motives are the same. We all want to try to do the best to ensure that prisoners of conscience, which I think is a better definition, are rooted out and that those countries that have such prisoners are put to shame. It is interesting that Amnesty International still proposes the definition "prisoners of conscience", rather than adopting the phrase "political prisoners", which of course was brought in at the very outset and before Armenia and Azerbaijan became members of this Assembly and signed up to the European Convention on Human Rights. I say: keep calm, hold your nerve and do whatever you think is best in this vote, because I do not think that delaying it any further will necessarily make things better.

THE PRESIDENT – The debate is now closed.

Mr Kox wishes to move a reference of the report back to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. Does anyone wish to oppose this motion? Somebody does wish to do so.

Under Rule 36.3, only the proposer of the motion, one speaker against and the rapporteur or chairperson concerned have the right to speak on the motion.

I call Ms Reps to oppose the motion. You have 30 seconds.

Ms REPS (*Estonia*) – Members of the Assembly, the Chairperson of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has already given a very clear message. We have discussed this for three years. We have come down to a definition with the best of our knowledge and the best expertise, based on the opinions of different experts, and it is here for us to vote on. Further delay will not help.

THE PRESIDENT – What is the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights?

Mr CHOPE (*United Kingdom*) – The rapporteur has already made his opinion on this clear. As chairman, I have already expressed my view that the idea that we could reach a consensus on the report by referring it back is wishful thinking.

THE PRESIDENT – The Assembly will now vote on the motion to refer the report "The Definition of Political Prisoner," Document 13011, back to the committee. Those who vote yes are in favour of the reference back. Those who vote no are against the reference back and are ready for us to vote on the other provisions on the motion.

The vote is open.

The procedural motion has been defeated and we shall therefore proceed.

The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has presented a draft resolution in Document 13011 to which two amendments, and two written sub-amendments, have been tabled.

We will begin by considering Amendment 1 and its two written sub-amendments.

We come to Amendment 1, tabled by Mr Moriau, Mr Nessa, Mr Loutfi, Mr Conde, Mr Vaksdal and Mr Loukaides, which is, in the draft resolution, replace paragraph 2 with the following paragraph:

"The Parliamentary Assembly notes that the criteria put forward by the above-mentioned experts were based on the specific circumstances of the civil war in Namibia in 1989. Whereas they were applied to individual cases with regard

to two countries during their accession to the Council of Europe, they have never been subject to comprehensive debate or approval by the Parliamentary Assembly.”

Explanatory note: Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution is factually inaccurate. The general criteria and the related document referred to were never approved by the Parliamentary Assembly. Neither a debate nor a vote on this document has been held since 2001.

I call Mr Vitali to support Amendment 1. You have 30 seconds.

Mr VITALI (*Italy*) said that although Mr Strässer had taken a different view to him, this was not only his report. If it were adopted it would be the report of the whole Assembly. He therefore supported the amendment.

THE PRESIDENT – We come to Sub-Amendment 1 to Amendment 1, tabled by Mr Strässer, Mr Montag, Mr McNamara, Ms Strik, Mr Rouquet, Mr Cilevičs and Mr Sasi, which is, in the proposed amendment, in the first sentence, to replace the words “were based on” with the following words: “were inspired by, inter alia,”

Explanatory note: The text as it stands is factually wrong. In actual fact, only one of the Secretary General’s Independent Experts who participated in formulating the criteria developed for the Council of Europe had previously worked with an expert who had acted as the UN Security Council’s expert on the situation of political prisoners in Namibia.

I call Mr Strässer to support Sub-Amendment 1. You have 30 seconds.

Mr STRÄSSER (*Germany*) said that Amendment 1 was corrected by two sub-amendments to make clear that the question was not solely related to Namibia in the 1980s.

THE PRESIDENT – Does anyone wish to speak against the sub-amendment? That is not the case.

What is the opinion of the mover of the sub-amendment?

Mr VITALI (*Italy*) (Translation) – I am against it.

THE PRESIDENT – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr CHOPE (*United Kingdom*) – The committee was in favour by 27 votes to 22.

THE PRESIDENT – The vote is open.

The sub-amendment is adopted.

We come to Sub-Amendment 2 to Amendment 1, tabled by Mr Strässer, Mr Montag, Mr McNamara, Ms Strik, Mr Rouquet, Mr Cilevičs and Mr Sasi, which is, in the proposed amendment, replace the second sentence with the following sentence:

“They were applied to cases with regard to two countries during their accession to the Council of Europe and have not until now been subject to comprehensive debate or explicit approval by the Parliamentary Assembly.”

Explanatory note: The sub-amendment aims to correct a factual inaccuracy whilst maintaining as much as possible of the text. The criteria were applied to well over 800 cases during the accession of two countries to the Council of Europe, and were subject to implicit approval by the Parliamentary Assembly when it approved the two previous reports on political prisoners.

I call Mr Strässer to support Sub-Amendment 2. You have 30 seconds.

Mr STRÄSSER (*Germany*) said that his amendment was only intended to correct a factual inaccuracy.

THE PRESIDENT – Does anyone wish to speak against the sub-amendment? That is not the case.

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr CHOPE (*United Kingdom*) – The committee was in favour by 28 votes to 27.

THE PRESIDENT – What is the opinion of the mover of the sub-amendment?

Mr VITALI (*Italy*) (Translation) – I leave it to the members.

THE PRESIDENT – The vote is open.

The sub-amendment is adopted.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 1, as amended? That is not the case.

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr CHOPE (*United Kingdom*) – The committee was in favour by 34 votes to eight.

THE PRESIDENT – The vote is open.

Amendment 1, as amended, is adopted.

We come to Amendment 2, tabled by Mr Moriau, Mr Nessa, Mr Loutfi, Mr Conde, Mr Vaksdal and Mr Loukaides, which is, in the draft resolution, replace paragraph 3 with the following paragraph:

“The Parliamentary Assembly confirms that the interpretation and application of any criteria defining a political prisoner are the exclusive competence of the European Court of Human Rights, which is the only authority to assess violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, as stipulated in the European Convention for Human Rights and its Protocols.”

Explanatory note: A civil war in southern Africa some 25 years ago should not form the basis of objective standards for all Council of Europe member States in the present day. Only the current case-law of the European Court of Human Rights should be considered as the ‘gold standard’ in this regard.

I call Mr Conde to support Amendment 2.

Mr CONDE (*Spain*) said that he was in favour of the report. His only objection was encapsulated by the amendment. The European Convention on Human Rights said that all matters of interpretation should be decided by the European Court of Human Rights. The amendment would not deprive the Assembly of any powers.

THE PRESIDENT – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

I call Mr Strässer.

Mr STRÄSSER (*Germany*) said that Mr Conde had suggested that the Assembly should not discuss such matters. He disagreed with Mr Conde and urged the Assembly not to emasculate itself.

THE PRESIDENT – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr CHOPE (*United Kingdom*) – The committee supported the amendment by 30 to 28.

THE PRESIDENT – The vote is open. The result is 89 for, 89 against and five abstentions.

Under the Rules of Procedure, Amendment 2 is rejected.

We will now proceed to vote on the whole of the draft resolution contained in Document 13011, as amended.

The vote is open.

The draft resolution in Document 13011, as amended, is adopted with 100 votes for, 64 against and 12 abstentions.

(Mr Kox, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr Walker.)

3. Human rights and foreign policy

THE PRESIDENT – I ask all those who are still in this chamber either to take their seats or to go to other premises so that we can do our work. That is a matter of decency to the colleagues who are going to deal with the next item.

The next item of business this afternoon is the debate on the report entitled, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy", Document 13020. It will be presented by Mr Marcenaro on behalf of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy. I remind colleagues that speaking time is limited to three minutes. In order to finish by 8.10 p.m., we must interrupt the list of speakers at about 8 p.m. to allow time for the reply and the vote. I call Mr Marcenaro, Rapporteur. You have 13 minutes in total, which you may divide between the presentation of the report and the reply to the debate.

Mr MARCENARO (*Italy*) said that his report dealt with the link between human rights and foreign policy, and even between principles and interests. The world was coming to an end of a particular period of foreign policy which had begun with the attack on the United States of 9 September 2001. With the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, the world was entering a new phase and the Council of Europe could contribute to the formulation of a new foreign policy which would be based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This window of opportunity offered the prospect of change and the Council of Europe could be part of that process, if the clash between principles and interests could first be acknowledged. There had been a tendency in recent years to only look at human rights in cases where there had been a complete failure or disaster, such as Srebrenica. It was just as important to address human rights outside crisis situations, and all 47 member states should do this to make human rights truly universal.

Democracy was emphatically not a commodity merely for export but rather a permanent structural element of Western civilisation. The greatest challenge to this was the application of double standards and he had spoken in Helsinki of the difficulty of standing up to rising powers such as China. The creation of the European External Action Service was a positive step and the European Union had an important role to play, as even such a strong country as Germany would not be able to make the case for human rights on its own. He hoped the report would be adopted and looked forward to following up the subject again later in the year.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Marcenaro. You have three minutes remaining.

In the debate I first call Lord Anderson, who will speak on behalf of the Socialist Group. You have three minutes.

Lord ANDERSON (*United Kingdom*) – It is a pleasure to be the first to congratulate the rapporteur, and to commend him on what he said, particularly as he realistically sees the need to balance human rights and national interests. Is it not part of our craft as politicians to understand the case for compromise and trade-offs, to make progress where we can – where doors are open, as they are in the Arab world – and to co-operate and work with partners? I am confident that as individuals and members of the Council of Europe, we can make a difference in promoting global, rather than European, values.

I sound three notes of caution to the Assembly. First, of course, there is the new context – the shift of global power from west to east. The emerging powers are much stronger on national sovereignty than human rights, as we have seen in the case of China, which avoided conditionality in trade and aid policies when there was conflict in Sri Lanka. The instruments available to us Europeans are more limited in times of austerity.

Secondly, we should avoid the temptation to be strong on weak countries such as Belarus, and weak on strong countries such as China. We need solidarity – think of the way that Denmark was isolated after the cartoons. We need confidence that human rights are seen as universal; torture is torture is torture, wherever it is found.

Thirdly – this was recognised by the rapporteur in his new amendment – as the good book says, we should be wary of pointing out the mote in someone else's eye when we have a beam in ours. It is clear that our influence outside the Council of Europe member states is limited. Where we do have influence is within the 47 – within the family of the Council of Europe. We should seek the very highest standards within the 47 countries. We should press our countries to honour judgments of the European Court, to co-operate with the Commissioner, the Venice Commission and non-governmental organisations, to assist in election monitoring, and to bring new life into the Partnership for Democracy. Above all, I stress that to have credibility with other countries we must first turn the searchlight on ourselves and look at ourselves in the mirror. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Lord Anderson. I call Mr Hanson, who will speak on behalf of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

Mr HANSON (*Estonia*) – On behalf of the ALDE group, I thank Mr Marcenaro for his very important report on a subject that has, in its various aspects, been the focus of our Assembly for many years. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law are universal values; it is worth saying that time and again when speaking about foreign policy strategies and practices.

It is obvious that the aim of diplomacy and foreign policy is to safeguard national interests. However, economic relations – and, say, energy deals – between states are becoming increasingly important, even more important than security and humanitarian interests. There is a need to find the right balance between member states' national interests and respect for human rights in states' foreign policies, as the rapporteur remarks in his draft resolution.

Sometimes it is difficult to find the right balance. Too often, value-based foreign policies change to so-called realpolitik that is driven by states' economic interests and other needs. We should not avoid criticism of double standards.

A second point, also stressed in the report, is that even within member state democracies, there is often a gap between a declaration and the implementation of human rights and democratic principles. That undermines our credibility when it comes to achieving our goals. Once more, I stress that we should criticise double standards.

I agree that democracy should be nurtured from the inside through support for human rights and civil society movements. The rapporteur proposes a conditionality clause in all bilateral agreements, and proposes that member states should consider human rights violations in the round in their political and economic dialogue with other countries. That would be an effective tool for promoting human rights in foreign policy practice. Thank you for your attention.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Hanson. I call Mr Leigh, who will speak on behalf of the European Democrat Group.

Mr LEIGH (*United Kingdom*) – Sometimes when one is about to give a speech, one is a bit irritated if an earlier speaker takes one's best line, although I do not feel irritation in this case. I had not discussed with Lord Anderson what I would say today, but I was going to end my speech with the comment that he made: beware of pointing out the mote in someone else's eye when there is a beam in one's own. That is the text on which I wish to speak today. Although Lord Anderson is a Socialist and I am a Conservative, I agreed with much of what he had to say.

This is a very worthy report; there is nothing with which someone could disagree violently. One might even say that it was full of motherhood and apple pie – I am not sure how that will translate into other languages, but it is a phrase that is very familiar to English people. There is a danger, however, in paragraph 7.12 of the report, which says that we should bring political pressure to bear on states when we believe that there have been abuses of human rights. What does that mean exactly? There is no point in framing a report unless you are quite clear about what kinds of political pressure that you are prepared to apply. Does that amount to force? We are all aware by now of the evil and dangers of liberal imperialism – we saw that in the invasion of Iraq and I believe that we have seen it in Libya. We are all aware of the danger of setting ourselves up as the judges of human rights in other countries. Our motives may be worthy, but when we take action, certainly to the extent of using force, we may unleash dangerous forces that result in enormous human rights abuses that were not occurring before. So we must be aware of our own limitations. What might be appropriate in a mono-ethnic, established democracy in Scandinavia might not be appropriate in a large, diffuse country containing many nationalities, such as Russia.

We should be very wary about lecturing other people and about being prepared to take action against what we perceive to be abuses of human rights. As Lord Anderson says, we should be aware of our own shortcomings. It has often been said that although Britain is a well-established democracy, it has, in many senses, an elected dictatorship; there is an enormous centralisation of power, and human rights abuses occur, even in the United Kingdom. So perhaps we should start by concentrating on where we act and know best: our own countries.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Leigh. I now call Ms Werner, who will speak on behalf of the Group of the Unified European Left.

Ms WERNER (*Germany*) said that the group intended to support the report. However, some of the statements contained in the report were very general and too hypothetical, and she wanted to consider the consequences. If a closer tie was sought between foreign policy and human rights, then it would be necessary to guard against double standards. It was wrong to criticise the state of human rights abroad while continuing to privilege economic rights over human rights at home. For example, despite denials it was the case that German police had been supporting the security services of Belarus. Both social and economic human rights also needed emphasis. A great deal of money was earned through the provision of armaments and supplies. The amount spent on armaments was out of all proportion to that spent on, for example, soup kitchens to alleviate poverty.

Countries ought not to allow child labour, just so that Western Europe could have a supply of cheap textiles. Clear guidance was needed for business, and industry should bring its influence to bear to tackle undignified living conditions and child labour, and industries that encouraged such conditions should be boycotted. Countries should be self-critical. Young people were often forced into trafficking or prostitution. Support for human rights had to go beyond good intentions. A credible human rights policy must begin at home: only then could foreign policy built on human rights be convincing.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Ms Werner. The next speaker is Mr Beneyto, who will speak on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party.

Mr BENEYTO (*Spain*) speaking on behalf of the EPP/CD group, said that the report was broadly positive, especially its attempt to balance principles, values and national interests. However, he was not as optimistic as the rapporteur had been concerning progress over the previous decade. Notwithstanding the Arab Spring, it was not possible to say that human rights were now universal in nature, and there continued to be some resistance. Involving human rights in foreign policy decisions could make humanitarian action more effective, for example, with respect to Syria. This was, however, sometimes difficult to achieve. It would be interesting to explore further how neighbourhood policy and monitoring mechanisms could be employed. He noted the rapporteur's suggestion of co-operation with the EU strategic plan for diplomacy, and his proposal for a conference which could debate these issues and lead to greater commitment from diplomats. Diplomats would always have their particular perspective, but they could do a lot to promote human rights. The other report on human rights which would be discussed by the Assembly later was also

very helpful.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Beneyto. That concludes the speakers on behalf of the political groups. If the rapporteur does not wish to respond at this stage, we will proceed with the debate. I call Mr Fournier.

Mr FOURNIER (*France*) cited the philosopher Raymond Aron, who suggested that diplomacy should be neutral. In the 1970s, US diplomacy under President Jimmy Carter had disguised the failure of Realpolitik by emphasising human rights, but this had not been wholly successful either. We should not be naïve: diplomats tried to attenuate and make more bearable the differences between their own country and the country in which they worked. However, human rights were not relative. The end of the Cold War had reinforced the ambiguity between universal values and a country's own interests. Activity carried out in the name of human rights had for the most part failed – for example, the Taliban had not been thrown out of Afghanistan.

Intervention in Iraq had been an example of a messianic approach. It had had multiple aims including eradicating weapons of mass destruction and overthrowing a dictatorship, but that same military action had ended up terrorising the population. The heroes of human rights had become torturers. Discussions in the Assembly attested to the difficulty of setting an example. Foreign policy with a human rights element could be seen as cynical neo-colonialism. It was necessary to do everything possible to ensure that Realpolitik was offset by action to protect human rights.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Fournier. I call Ms Bourzai.

Ms BOURZAI (*France*) said that the title of the report perhaps represented a pious hope. There were variable geographies in the foreign policies of member States. The example of Syria showed that moral diplomacy was not yet effective, and it was difficult even to speak openly about the atrocities in that country. No common position had been reached on Kosovo. In trying not to offend anyone, the Council of Europe undermined itself by failing to recognise that country. Latent conflicts in Europe also undermined the development of a common approach. Therefore, she was somewhat disillusioned.

She questioned whether the Assembly should welcome the EU strategic framework on human rights and democracy. The Council of Europe was ignored by Brussels. The days of the memorandum of understanding between the two institutions seemed to be in the distant past, and the EU appeared to be duplicating the work and institutions of the Council of Europe. For example, the special representative for human rights appeared to have an identical role to the Council. She fully supported the Rapporteur in saying that the memorandum of understanding should be used wisely, but there was a need to go further and faster. The two institutions should pool their scarce resources. Otherwise, there would be doubts about the long-term viability of this body.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. As Mr Sidiyakin is not with us, I call Ms Postanjyan.

Ms POSTANJYAN (*Armenia*) – Self-criticism and innovation are necessary approaches for Europe to respect foreign policy and human rights. My speech will be dedicated to the issue of the threats from Azerbaijan in respect of the human rights and foreign policy of member states of the Council of Europe.

I welcome the upcoming opening of the Stepanakert airport in the Mountainous Karabakh Republic, and call on the Parliamentary Assembly to take measures with respect to the authorities of Azerbaijan to guarantee no violent acts against flights into Artsakh Mountainous Karabakh Republic.

The most obvious example of the threat from Azerbaijan is the Ramil Safarov case. Perhaps we should institute an impunity prize for dictators and their regimes in member states of the Council of Europe. How long will we endure dictators such as Aliyev? Aliyev's activities are the very symbol of impunity. If we do not condemn those activities, the threats by the Azerbaijani government to shoot down civilian aircraft to and from Karabakh airport may be realised.

Foreign affairs ministries of Council of Europe member states can play an important role in improving the effectiveness of international efforts to promote and protect human rights worldwide, by launching specific initiatives aimed at developing universal human rights standards and ensuring a joint approach in the Council of Europe area. Regional stability and development require a principled position in support of the opening of the Artsakh airport, which will serve as an important lifeline for the Mountainous Karabakh Republic to the world, as Azerbaijan continues its 24-year blockade and ongoing threats, not forgetting the Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia and Karabakh.

The Stepanakert airport was originally built in 1974 and primarily served flights from Yerevan and Baku. The airport had been idle since 1992. I repeat my call to put an end to threats by Aliyev, directed not only against Armenia but to Azerbaijan as well. The Azeri people do not want war. The opening of the airport is a testament to stability, prosperity and peace. I congratulate the Mountainous Karabakh Republic on the impressive renovation and imminent reopening of the airport in Stepanakert.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you. I call Ms Zohrabyan.

Ms ZOHRABYAN (*Armenia*) said that this was one of the most important reports of this Assembly sitting. When

foreign policy rode roughshod over human rights and democracy, crises would result. Economic interests often took precedence over human rights. On 31 August this year, Hungary had agreed to extradite Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan: this shameful agreement had shown that Azerbaijan's foreign policy did not take into account human rights. Perhaps Hungary should also be criticised, despite the Hungarian President claiming that all the arrangements had been above board, giving rise to concerns about that country's values.

Foreign policy should revolve around human rights. What sort of country however, held up a murderer as a national hero and example of patriotism? A particular interpretation of the Strasbourg Convention had been used as the basis of the extradition. International instruments should not be used unlawfully for political ends

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Ms Zohrabyan. The next speaker is Mr Díaz Tejera.

Mr DÍAZ TEJERA (*Spain*) noted that Mr Leigh had agreed with Lord Anderson: both had used the word "credible" in discussing the best way to instil good human rights practice. It was necessary to practise what one preached. A good way to explain the benefits of parliamentary democracy was to demonstrate that in one's home parliament one might disagree with others, but differences of opinion were tolerated and discussion did not degenerate to the level of insult.

It was undeniable that all sorts of interests were trying to lobby parliamentarians. It was necessary not just to condemn but also to understand. He said that Mr Schmidt, a great academic, had said that there was no need for a friend/enemy dialectic.

When talking about embezzlement, organised crime, financial fraud and other examples of corruption it was necessary to be credible. These discussions should encompass the issue of tax havens.

Lord Anderson had spoken of the mote and the beam. Equal standards had to be applied to all countries whether they were big or small.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Díaz Tejera. The next speaker is Mr Nikoloski.

Mr NIKOLOSKI (*"the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"*) – I will start where Mr Díaz Tejera ended by talking about the double standards that are discussed at the core of the document. We should look very carefully at these documents because, as members of the Council of Europe, we must respect them and act in accordance with them. I think that it should be the goal of European democracy in the 21st century to respect what we have signed, as our obligations are not only to this Organisation, but to the citizens in our countries. Promoting democracy is just as important at home as it is here. That is why we should continue to urge member states to respect what they have signed.

I speak very often here about my neighbouring country, Greece, and how it respects these documents. That is not because of our neighbourly relations, but because of the people who live there. Greece has not signed or ratified the following documents: Protocol No. 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the Council of Europe's Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, the European Social Charter and the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. Greece has also failed to promote progress on the implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. That is one example of how some of the member states of this Organisation are not respecting what they promote abroad or in foreign policy, which is the core of this document. That is why I respect and support this document.

Although there are no direct mechanisms for ensuring implementation of the documents adopted by the Council of Europe, we must think of the future and open a debate, which must never be ended, about creative mechanisms for somehow ensuring the implementation or ratification of these documents. Otherwise, they will be nothing more than nice words on paper that will have no direct influence on our citizens. If we are part of Europe, which is probably the best place in the world for promoting democracy, we must fulfil what we are speaking about, because otherwise the double standards that are the main focus of the document will continue to exist in our foreign and domestic politics.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation) – Thank you, Mr Nikoloski. The next speaker is Mr McNamara

Mr McNAMARA (*Ireland*) – At the outset, I would like to commend Mr Marcenaro for the report and resolution and thank him for the work he has done, particularly the call on member states to frame foreign policy around universal human rights principles that are applicable to all states. Nowhere is that needed more than in our approach to development, particularly the need to develop a rights-based approach, rather than the needs-based approach currently used by the great majority of our member states. The principal goal of a needs-based approach is the delivery of services – building hospitals and training medical professionals, for example – that address and identify need. However, this approach inevitably reinforces a perspective whereby beneficiaries come to be viewed as passive recipients of help, rather than dynamic actors who can be empowered to bring about change in their own lives, communities and societies.

A recent UK inter-agency review of the human rights-based approaches taken by a number of projects over a number

of years in Malawi, Bangladesh and Peru compared rights-based and traditional welfare-based projects and programmes and came to a number of interesting conclusions. The study found that both sets of projects had a positive impact on the lives of poor people, but the results reached through a rights-based approach proved to be deeper, more empowering and more sustainable in a variety of ways. The increased knowledge and skills acquired in rights-based projects were used and transferred to non-project issues and actions. The increased social and political capital led to an increased ability to take, negotiate and manage risk.

In working for the rights of poor and marginalised people, rights-based projects inevitably engage with power issues and help to improve accountability and the willingness to fulfill obligations among power-holders and citizens. They increase political agency among marginalised groups and redefine citizenship. Perhaps the most interesting finding was that when people's agency is meaningful and part of a process that improves the accountability of all stakeholders, it appears to increase stability and promote social cohesion rather than cause conflict.

The need to increase knowledge and transfer the skills that I have mentioned has become clear in recent data from the African Development Bank which show that notwithstanding the increase in oil exports from Africa, net oil exporters are now performing worse in terms of growth than net oil importers. Natural resource exports in Africa positively correlate with poverty in Africa rather than poverty reduction and with unemployment rates.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Varvitsiotis.

Mr VARVITSIOTIS (*Greece*) said that the measures suggested in the report would all contribute to the incorporation of human rights in foreign policy. But it was important to avoid double standards, which were still in evidence. For instance, the previous year the entire world had protested against the regime of Colonel Gaddafi and he had been toppled. However in Syria, which had no oil, and no significant economic relations with the outside world, the Assad regime had not been dealt with by Council of Europe members or members of the United Nations Security Council.

There should be a legally binding framework for human rights. But if this were not possible it would be better to stay with Realpolitik.

One of the better ways of incorporating human rights into foreign policy was through humanitarianism, as had already been mentioned by Mr McNamara.

The lack of action in regard to the crisis in Syria was a missed opportunity to deliver justice.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Huseynov.

Mr HUSEYNOV (*Azerbaijan*) – The report makes us think and at the same time generates numerous questions – some with obvious replies and others that are hardly answerable.

Every country defines its foreign policy based on its interests as a state and nation above all, but obeying international law and order certainly appears among the basic terms of reference. However, international law and order also require states to respect human rights. Those two factors might not suggest any antagonism when one sees them, but they engender many paradoxes in reality. There is no diplomatic relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia, two Council of Europe member states, but Azerbaijan, with its 20% occupied territories, pursues a concrete foreign policy on Armenia.

Economically, Azerbaijan is one of the decision-making countries in the region as well as being a decision-making party in most regional and global energy, transport and commercial projects. Azerbaijan is pursuing a policy of economic isolation for Armenia and is not hiding its will about continuing that policy in future. That is my direct answer to our Armenian colleague's question about the airports. Azerbaijan is not keen on a military solution to the conflict and Armenia impedes by any means the conflict resolution negotiations, benefiting from the economic leverages that appear to be the single way out for a country that is subject to aggression.

Having turned nearly 1 million Azerbaijani people into refugees and internally displaced people and entirely harassed the elementary human rights of such a large group of people, Armenia has facilitated the violation of the rights of its citizens. The Armenia that has made Nakhichevan, an important part of Azerbaijan, live within a blockade for more than 20 years and that has turned 20% of Azerbaijani territories into a death zone should guess that the opposite side would not thank it for creating that situation. The outcome appears frustrating as not hundreds of thousands but millions of humans on both sides undergo suffering.

Heads of state and government signed the norm called "responsibility to protect" during the UN Global Summit in 2005. In line with that document, a state that is unable to protect the sovereign and human rights of its nation can charge the international association with that duty. Armenia, by violating the rights of its nation and instigating its neighbours to deepen the situation, has turned the undesirable situation reflected in the UN document into reality.

Today, it has already become clear that it is necessary for an international association to undertake the responsibility to protect the Armenian population from Armenian authorities. We used to talk about the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories, but now reality shows that the Armenian authorities and the forces collaborating with them

have occupied the Armenian nation too. That is a sin, to be soft, and a crime, to be exact, performed by those who are unable or unwilling to correct the balance between foreign policy and human rights in Armenia.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Szabó.

Mr SZABÓ (*Hungary*) said that the questions in the report were those which one found all the time. Council of Europe member states should not only adhere to fundamental principles but also provide positive examples. To do this, member states should implement human rights internally.

In foreign policy there needed to be a greater use of preventive measures to stop human rights abuses before they started. However, humanitarian intervention should be avoided.

Hungary had made strides in human rights. Between 2009 and 2012 it had been a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council. Hungary had also supported the UN Minority Forum. However since 2010 the Hungarian government had restricted human rights and had eroded the rule of law, and had made only minor corrections in the face of international criticism.

Hungary had also made a poor foreign policy decision when it agreed to extradite to Azerbaijan an Azeri convicted of murdering an Armenian on Hungarian soil. It had done this without having made any contact with either Armenia or the Council of Europe and had not received any guarantees that the murderer would not be released on his return to Azerbaijan.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I now call Ms Huovinen.

Ms HUOVINEN (*Finland*) – I start by thanking the Rapporteur of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, Mr Marcenaro, for his report on human rights and foreign policy, which the Committee dealt with at the recent meeting in Helsinki. I also thank all members who participated in that meeting for their visit and for an inspiring debate. It was a great honour and privilege for us in the Finnish delegation to have you in Finland.

The report raises many important points. It is important that all member states of the Council of Europe realise that they can and should do more to put human rights issues at the top of the foreign policy agenda. It is true that we need common standards and practices in order to improve respect for human rights worldwide. In his report the rapporteur presents concrete suggestions, such as more information, the organisation of hearings and public debates, but also a more coherent follow-up on human rights issues.

In Finland, the government regularly presents a report to parliament on Finland's human rights policy and it is debated in parliament, while the Foreign Affairs Ministry has a special ambassador for human rights who deals with these questions. Also, every November the ministry organises Ahtisaari days, the purpose of which is to make peace mediation work more widely known. The day consists of a gathering of international experts, events for the public and happenings that are held in schools.

I underline again the work of our own Organisation, the Council of Europe. In countries where democracy is respected and people can freely meet and express their opinions, we seldom see violent confrontations among citizens or between citizens and governments. The conclusion that we can draw from this is that respect for democracy is essential for maintaining peace and social stability.

Unfortunately, peace at the global level is a remote dream. We are discussing the situation in Syria tomorrow but I have to mention now that the situation there, particularly regarding women and children, is difficult. We have to admit that the possibilities for the international community to intervene are limited, and for many Europeans this is extremely frustrating. We in the Council of Europe therefore have to think of concrete ways and means to work more effectively in foreign policy.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I now call Ms Kanelli.

Ms KANELLI (*Greece*) – Whenever I come here, big ideas such as human rights are discussed, reported and built up, but I feel that I am contributing to a logical contradiction. Do you truly believe that there is no price for human rights in the modern world, where the only free thing is the free market and when companies called, let us say, PricewaterhouseCoopers or Salomon Brothers – or perhaps "Sisters" – can turn whole nations into garbage? When we talk about diplomacy, are we truly being honest with ourselves when we have PIIG states, rogue states and BRIC states? When we talk about diplomacy, we are talking about energy – oil – and when we talk about human rights and deaths, there is always a smell of oil – it all smells of petroleum. We accept the idea of offshore companies in Europe, but we cannot and should not afford offshore zones and offshore citizens who are outside our logic.

Yes, let us talk about these issues and vote on them, but let us find the weapons to implement equality in the world when billions of people are affected by wars such as the one between Apple and Samsung, and you can get a better price when you have children working for you. Indeed, if you want to find things that are cheap, go to the coffee shop of this institution. We are paid by our voters, yet we buy the coffee cheaper than they do outside this building.

The issue of human rights and diplomacy is like a discussion between hawks and pigeons. We have to decide as the Council of Europe whether or not we are going to disintegrate into eternal talks about definitions of things like genocide. Is it diplomacy to have such freedom of expression in the world, apart from for political ideas, that the hanging of Saddam Hussein is nothing but a show? What was the lesson from that in international diplomacy? It was denial. We have seen the bodies of Gaddafi and dictators all over the world who have been killed in a way that avenges mass killings.

We have to change our attitude: let us be honest and firm and find the weapons to implement human rights aside from the free market.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I now call Mr Tilson, Observer from Canada.

Mr TILSON (*Observer from Canada*) – Canada has been a strong voice for the protection of human rights ever since it played a central role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Today the promotion of democracy, human rights, freedom and the rule of law continues to remain a key priority in Canadian foreign policy.

In his report the rapporteur highlights a fundamental challenge in foreign policy: how do we respond to the violation of human rights in other countries in the face of other competing foreign policy considerations? One of the ways in which Canada responds to that challenge is by providing support to projects that support local efforts to promote democracy in priority countries. Through the democracy envelope of the Glyn Berry Program we fund projects in some autocratic and restricted environments which provide support to civil society, independent media, parliaments, political parties and electoral processes to enhance the capacity of citizens to engage in the public arena and influence decision-making.

Canada also promotes human rights in its bilateral relations with Council of Europe member states. For example, the Government of Canada has taken every opportunity to register its deep and ongoing concerns about the deterioration of democracy in Ukraine. Canada is particularly concerned about the Ukrainian Government's arrest and detention of several high-ranking members of the opposition, and in particular about the trial and sentencing of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The Government of Canada has raised this issue with the Ukrainian Government through letters from the Prime Minister and from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as through ministerial statements. In July 2012, Canada's Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs travelled to Ukraine to observe Ms Tymoshenko's appeal hearing.

Mr President, I am pleased to have shared with you these important initiatives, as they reflect deeply held Canadian values. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Tilson. I call Ms Mogherini Rebesani.

Ms MOGHERINI REBESANI (*Italy*) – Including human rights in foreign policy is in our national interests – strategic, economic and geographical interests. Making human rights the core of foreign policy is not a matter of good intentions; I am sorry to disagree with colleagues on that point. The violation of any human rights – civil, social, economic, political and environmental human rights – is one of the major threats to our security, as it says in the report. The only way to have effective foreign and security policies nowadays is through the prevention of conflicts. As Pietro Marcenaro said very effectively, military interventions are not effective solutions any more. They are not the only possible solution; they are a last, difficult and expensive solution, in terms of money and lives. They do not work in complex situations – look at the 11 years that we have spent in Afghanistan, and the situation in Syria; as has been said, there, we have been assisting without managing to do anything to prevent the death of women, children, and many others.

If the responsibility to protect is still a moral duty, the question is how we do that. How do we develop long-term strategies to protect our security and the security of everyone in the world? The only way is to make human rights the core of our foreign policies, but that is not all: human rights should be at the core of not only foreign policy but trade, migration and asylum, energy, environmental and economic policy. There is also what we normally call the coherence of policy. It is not enough to make human rights the core of foreign affairs, although that would be something. The line between domestic politics and foreign affairs policy is not as defined as it used to be, and we have to think that through comprehensively.

I particularly like the part in the text where it says that democracy must develop from the inside, and that we have to do that by supporting human rights movements, non-governmental organisations and civil society. That is the effective and realistic way to do it. Finally, let me thank you, Pietro, for this extremely important report. I have two hopes: first, that we manage to implement the measures – there are many important concrete measures in the report – so that we gain credibility and are seen to be coherent and, secondly, that we manage to mainstream human rights in all our policies. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Ms Mogherini Rebesani. Mr Zourabian is not with us, so I call Ms Andersen.

Ms ANDERSEN (*Norway*) – First, I agree with my Italian colleague that human rights have to be at the core of all policies. As my colleague from Greece, Ms Kanelli, said, money talks. If we are to protect human rights, we have to put them into every policy, and we also have to control what economics and money do in society. This morning, the

representative from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development said that had we known years ago what was going to happen to our economy, we would have done something else, but we did know. We know that if we do not supervise what is going on in the financial markets and the banking sector, we cannot protect human rights. Even with the best diplomacy in the world, we could not protect human rights, if we did not take control of the money.

We can see that, in many countries, the rug has been pulled from under the feet of the government, and of course that hits poor people and human rights very hard. Human rights have to be put into trade policy. I have been working a lot on what I call a "decent work" strategy, because decent work and having decent conditions in the labour market is a basic floor for developing human rights. However, the International Labour Organization has no measures in place in that respect. We can talk, and say what the standards should be, but world trade organisations have tools. If you interfere with the free market, we can punish you, but we cannot punish you if you are violating the rights of workers – if you are not paying them, use child labour or do other things that really hurt human rights. We will have to make human rights a core value in our trade policy, and we will have to look to international instruments for the tools to do that.

Norway is, as colleagues know, very much capitalist. We have a lot of money, and we invest it. The government has ethical rules for investment. That is important. The rules are not perfect, but it is necessary to have them. Everyone in the west should have standards for investment. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Ms Andersen. I call Ms Giannakaki.

Ms GIANNAKAKI (*Greece*) considered that much of what she had planned to say had already been said by other members, although she did wish to congratulate Mr Marcanero on his insightful analysis of the link between foreign policy and human rights. Promotion of human rights should not be overruled by national interests or national goals. Countries which were not free could not be equal partners even if they served an important strategic role. The Council of Europe had embarked on its own "good neighbourhood policy" in accordance with the Copenhagen principles. Comparisons were odious but different countries could not have different processes as human rights were universal and indivisible.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Ms Giannakaki. The next speaker is Ms Lundgren.

Ms LUNDGREN (*Sweden*) – Thank you, Mr President. Dear colleagues, it is late in the evening but this is an important report on a vital issue to discuss. We all know that when human rights are stamped on and when rights are oppressed, there will be an uprising. Attempts to bring about change could be smashed down by tough means, but that will also drive forces to find violent answers. Council of Europe members are looking at our own experiences, and we know the signals that people are giving out there and we are aware of their call to be noticed. If we do not hear it and if we do not act and react, worse will follow.

There is a responsibility to blow the whistle, which we, too, have in this Assembly, even when dealing with foreign policy. As a result of the UN Charter and our membership of the Council of Europe, every state here has a responsibility to defend human rights, rather than the right of rulers to act against their people. We have learned the lessons; this body is built upon those lessons. We must use every possible method available to us to ensure that these violations do not happen again. We must also ensure that in our foreign policy we also look into human rights abuses and promote human rights for everyone. We must do so because that will bring about the sustainable future that we all want for the people of the world.

I hope that all member states will fulfil their responsibilities, be it here in the Assembly or in another body, such as the EU or the UN. We must take the responsibility, to which we have signed up, to protect human rights everywhere. When states are not able to act, we must do something – we must take responsibility and protect people. I also hope that all member states will respect international law, because our aim is to protect the rule of law and so we should also seek to protect international law. The International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute is very important in that regard – I hope that everyone will accede to that.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Ms Lundgren. Ms Guțu and Mr Yatim are not here, so I now call Mr Gaudi Nagy.

Mr GAUDI NAGY (*Hungary*) – Thank you, Mr President. I adored the rapporteur for his naïvety in believing that by producing this kind of report or any resolution such as this the system will be changed. I strongly agreed with Ms Kanelli, from Greece, when she talked about the view "We try to do our best, so let's adopt this resolution about the need to promote human rights, even though foreign policy is made by powers such as the United States and the leading European countries." In everyday practice, there is always a dominant economic interest. Things are always about the global companies' influence in European decision-making. We must not forget that all member states that are also members of the European Union are deeply oppressed and deeply influenced by the European Union's policy, so we cannot pretend that we are independent. It would be good if all the nations represented in the Council of Europe were free to follow their common ways at an interparliamentary level but that is not what happens. The European Union is heading towards a supra-national state.

I must agree with the following important sentence in the report: "when foreign policy neglects human rights for too long and focuses solely on strategic economic and geopolitical interests, human rights crises may erupt and

'humanitarian interventions' become urgent and moral necessities." That reflects the current or recent history of the middle-European area, which comprises the former communist countries. They have a really strong heritage but they have no chance to cope with the new tasks. That is why our countries were somehow colonised using ideas of human rights and the free market, and so on. We should be strongly devoted to spreading human rights, but we should stop the global companies influencing our politics. The European people must influence European politics – that is the path we must follow.

THE PRESIDENT – The next speaker is Mr Ameur from Morocco, a Partner for Democracy.

Mr AMEUR (*Partner for Democracy from Morocco*) said that the issue of human rights and Europe's foreign policy was very topical given the recent upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean, Europe's backyard. Recent history should not be forgotten. Europe's approach had prioritised economic aims over others, and had given only feeble support to forces struggling against despotism. The assumption had always been that only strong regimes could produce economic development and contain radical Islam. There should be coherence between development objectives, human rights and foreign relations, but Europe's approach to the countries involved in the Arab Spring had not evolved. The Arab Spring movements had been a response to the failure of regimes, but also a result of the economic and financial policies of decades. A review of Europe's foreign policy was needed. Priority ought to be given to strengthening production capability and securing a more equitable distribution of wealth. Migration was central to Europe's human rights policy: a new, global approach was needed on this issue to uphold human rights and promote integration and social cohesion.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I should now interrupt the list of speakers, because we also need to respect the human rights of our interpreters, who have already been working too long. If the next four speakers would be as short as possible, we can continue for the moment.

I call Ms el Ouafi.

Ms EL OUAFI (*Partner for Democracy from Morocco*) said that the Arab Spring had been brought about by the collapse of authoritarian regimes. The unbalanced relationship between Europe and the Arab world had to come to an end. In the past, economic interests had trumped all others, without any support being shown for the aspirations for democracy of the inhabitants of the Arab world. Europe should revise its foreign policy and ensure its consistency with human rights. History had shown that human rights should not be put to one side. Attempts had been made to prop up totalitarian regimes.

The Assembly was bound to uphold human rights, but concrete results were few and far between, as for example with support to women's movements in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Calls for equality in the Arab world had remained pipe dreams. Europe's image of the Arab world did not coincide with reality, especially over the position of women. It should not be forgotten that the cultural heritage of the Arab world was founded on universal values.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Sabella.

Mr SABELLA (*Partner for Democracy from the Palestinian National Council*) – In today's world, states cannot claim to espouse certain values and then apply double standards when it comes to their foreign policy. If a state subscribes to human rights and their protection, then this should be reflected in relations with other states, irrespective of interests and other considerations. This is a very difficult commitment indeed, but aside from giving credence to pronouncements and declarations on respect for human rights, it also sends a clear message to millions of people across the world who now have access to the Internet and monitor both the pronouncements of states and the positions they adopt and the actions they take in the international arena, to see whether such and such a state is serious about and consistent in its human rights policies.

Often the sense of injustice felt by Palestinians is tied to the policies of influential states who say one thing about human rights, but fail to apply that when it comes to our Palestinian people. Instead, rewards are given to those who perpetuate injustice and deny our people the fulfilment of their rights. The sense of injustice leads to mass emotions and feelings, often destructive and unforgivable, that further polarise peoples and states.

We are all called upon – and Mr Marcenaro's well-rounded report highlights this – to be consistent and to treat human rights with one yardstick for all, irrespective of possible costs in the interim. In the end, if we all succeed in upholding human rights unconditionally, we can achieve a better and more humane world for all.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you. I call Mr Khader.

Mr KHADER (*Palestinian National Council*) – Out of respect for the human rights of all present, I withdraw my request to speak.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you very much. We come to the last speaker in the debate, Mr Ángulo Parra.

Mr ÁNGULO PARRA (*Observer from Mexico*) wanted to update the Assembly about democratic developments in Mexico. A strategic framework for human rights and democracy had been adopted, and the country had stepped up

its international effort to improve the enforcement of human rights at the highest level. These were things in which the Assembly was expert. The recent federal elections in Mexico had resulted in the winning party not achieving an absolute majority. Since 2000, Mexico had achieved real democratic independence. Now there had been a return to the party which had been in power for the previous 70 years, leading to a very particular situation. The party in power had only one third of the seats in the bicameral legislature. On 1 December power would be handed to the new administration. The left had not recognised the outcome of the elections, and had had to form a coalition to secure a majority. Under the terms of President Calderon's Preferential Initiative, 30 days would be allotted in each chamber for the resolution of the deadlock. There were two very important issues: the economy, and trade union freedom. Democratic development depended on the involvement of free trade unions, and the Council of Europe should bear this in mind when considering the future development of Mexico.

THE PRESIDENT – Thank you, Mr Ángulo Parra. That concludes the list of speakers. I call Mr Marcenaro, rapporteur, to reply. You have three minutes.

Mr MARCENARO (*Italy*) said that all that remained was to thank those who had taken part in the debate. As someone ripe in years he could tell Mr Gaudi Nagy that in politics there was no worse accusation than one of naivety. But when talking about human rights in foreign policy, as opposed to the exercise of Realpolitik, there was always the risk of being dubbed naive.

THE PRESIDENT – The debate is closed.

The Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy has presented a draft resolution in Document 13020, to which one amendment has been tabled, and a draft recommendation to which one amendment has been tabled. We will consider first the amendment to the draft resolution.

I understand that the chairperson of the committee wishes to propose to the Assembly that the amendment, which was unanimously approved by the committee, should be declared as agreed by the Assembly under Rule 33.11. Is that so, Mr Marcenaro?

Mr MARCENARO (*Italy*) (Translation) – It is.

THE PRESIDENT – Does anyone object? That is not the case.

As there is no objection, I declare that Amendment 1 to the draft resolution has been agreed.

The following amendment has been adopted:

Amendment 1, tabled by Mr von Sydow, Mr Gunnarsson, Ms Ohlsson, Ms Huovinen, Mr Mogens Jensen, Ms Christoffersen and Mr Saar, which is, in the draft resolution, to replace paragraph 11 with the following paragraph:

"It further takes note of the recent adoption of a European Union Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, which identifies the Council of Europe as a strategic partner to achieve greater policy coherence, and trusts that this represents an opportunity to improve synergies between the Council of Europe and the European Union and to improve significantly the effectiveness of international efforts to promote and protect human rights worldwide."

We will now proceed to vote on the whole of the draft resolution contained in Document 13020, as amended.

The vote is open.

The draft resolution in Document 13020, as amended, is adopted with 38 votes for, 0 against and 2 abstentions.

We now come to Amendment 2, tabled by Mr Marcenaro, Mr von Sydow, Mr Gross, Lord Tomlinson and Mr Toshev, which is, in the draft recommendation, to replace paragraph 3 with the following paragraphs:

"The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers invite Council of Europe member States to:

- strive to ensure consistency between the democratic and human rights principles that they have vowed to respect internally and the conduct of their external relations and foreign policy strategies;
- implement the recommendations contained in Resolution...(2012), where they have not already done so, in particular with regard to specific initiatives of their foreign affairs ministries and their diplomatic services;

Finally, the Assembly stresses that the recent creation of the European External Action Service represents a unique opportunity to improve the relationship between human rights and foreign policy, which should not be missed."

I call Mr Marcenaro to support Amendment 2. You have 30 seconds.

Mr MARCENARO (*Italy*) (Translation) – I support the amendment.

THE PRESIDENT – I have been informed that the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy wishes to propose an oral sub-amendment as follows: in Amendment 2, after the words “strive to ensure”, to insert the word “greater”.

In my opinion the oral sub-amendment is in order under our rules. However, do 10 or more members object to the oral sub-amendment being debated? That is not the case.

I call Mr Marcenaro to support the oral sub-amendment.

Mr MARCENARO (*Italy*) (Translation) – I am in favour of the oral sub-amendment.

THE PRESIDENT – Does anyone wish to speak against the oral sub-amendment? That is not the case.

What is the opinion of the mover of the amendment?

Mr MARCENARO (*Italy*) (Translation) – I am in favour.

THE PRESIDENT – The committee is obviously in favour.

The vote is open.

The oral sub-amendment is adopted.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 2, as amended? That is not the case.

The opinion of the committee is clear.

The vote is open.

Amendment 2, as amended, is adopted.

We will now proceed to vote on the whole of the draft recommendation contained in Document 13020, as amended.

The vote is open.

The draft recommendation in Document 13020, as amended, is adopted, with 38 votes for, 1 against and 1 abstention.

4. Date, time and agenda of the next sitting

THE PRESIDENT – The Assembly will hold its next public sitting tomorrow at 10.00 a.m. with the agenda which was approved on Monday.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 8.15 p.m.)

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Mr Leonid Kalashnikov (Russian Federation)

Mr Badea (Romania)

Ms Christoffersen (Norway)

Mr Gaudi Nagy (Hungary)

Mr Petrenco (Republic of Moldova)

Mr Kayatürk (Turkey)

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Mr Schennach (Austria)

Mr Kox (Netherlands)

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Mr Slutsky (Russian Federation)

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Mr Xuclà (Spain)

Mr Iwiński (Poland)

Mr Leonid Kalashnikov (Russian Federation)

Ms Christoffersen (Norway)

Mr Agramunt (Spain)

Mr Schennach (Austria)

Mr Chope (United Kingdom)

Amendment 1, as amended, adopted.

Draft resolution contained in Document 13011, as amended, adopted.

3. Human rights and foreign policy

Presentation by Mr Marcenaro of report, Document 13020, on behalf of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy

Speakers:

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Mr Hanson (Estonia)

Mr Leigh (United Kingdom)

Ms Werner (Germany)

Mr Beneyto (Spain)

Mr Fournier (France)

Ms Bourzai (France)

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Ms Zohrabyan (Armenia)

Mr Díaz Tejera (Spain)

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Mr Gaudi Nagy (Hungary)

Mr Ameer (Partner for Democracy from Morocco)

Ms El Ouafi (Partner for Democracy from Morocco)

Mr Sabella (Partner for Democracy from the Palestinian National Council)

Mr Ángelullo Parra (Observer from Mexico)

Amendment 1 to the draft resolution contained in Document 13020 adopted.

Draft resolution contained in Document 13020, as amended, adopted.

Amendment 2 to the draft recommendation contained in Document 13020 adopted.

Draft recommendation contained in Document 13020, as amended, adopted.

4. Date, time and agenda of the next sitting

Appendix

Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Attendance Register in accordance with Rule 11.2 of the Rules of Procedure. The names of Substitutes who replaced absent Representatives are printed in small letters. The names of those who were absent or apologised for absence are followed by an asterisk.

Francis AGIUS*

Pedro AGRAMUNT

Arben AHMETAJ/Kastriot Islami

Alexey Ivanovich ALEKSANDROV*

Miloš ALIGRUDIĆ

José Antonio ALONSO*

Karin ANDERSEN

Donald ANDERSON

Florin Serghei ANGHEL*

Khadija ARIB*

Mörður ÁRNASON*

Francisco ASSIS*

Danielle AUROI*

puriður BACKMAN

Daniel BACQUELAINE*

Viorel Riceard BADEA

Pelin Gündeş BAKIR

Theodora BAKOYANNIS/Maria Giannakaki

Gérard BAPT/Bernard Fournier

Gerard BARCIA DUEDRA/Sílvia Eloïsa Bonet Perot

Doris BARNETT/Frank Schwabe

José Manuel BARREIRO/Ángel Pintado

Deniz BAYKAL

Marieluise BECK

José María BENEYTO

Deborah BERGAMINI*

Robert BIEDROŃ

Grzegorz BIERECKI/Marek Borowski

Gülsün BİLGEHAN

Oksana BILOZIR

Brian BINLEY*

Ľuboš BLAHA

Jean-Marie BOCKEL

Eric BOCQUET*

Olena BONDARENKO

Olga BORZOVA

Mladen BOSIĆ/Ismeta Dervoz

António BRAGA

Anne BRASSEUR

Márton BRAUN*

Federico BRICOLO/Rossana Boldi

Ankie BROEKERS-KNOL

Piet DE BRUYN*

Patrizia BUGNANO/Paolo Corsini

André BUGNON/Luc Recordon

Natalia BURYKINA

Sylvia CANEL*

Mevlüt ÇAVUŞOĞLU

Mikael CEDERBRATT/Kerstin Lundgren

Otto CHLOUPKA

Vannino CHITI*

Christopher CHOPE

Lise CHRISTOFFERSEN

Desislav CHUKOLOV*

Lolita ČIGĀNE*

Boriss CILEVIČS

James CLAPPISON*

Deirdre CLUNE

Agustín CONDE

Igor CORMAN*

Telmo CORREIA*

Carlos COSTA NEVES*

Joseph DEBONO GRECH

Giovanna DEBONO*

Armand De DECKER*

Arcadio DÍAZ TEJERA

Peter van DIJK

Klaas DIJKHOFF*

Şaban DİŞLİ

Karl DONABAUER

Ioannis DRAGASAKIS*

Daphné DUMERY*

Alexander [The Earl of] DUNDEE*

Josette DURRIEU

Mikuláš DZURINDA

Diana ECCLES*

József ÉKES/Imre Vejkey

Tülin ERKAL KARA

Gianni FARINA

Relu FENECHIU*

Vyacheslav FETISOV

Doris FIALA/Eric Voruz

Daniela FILIPIOVÁ/Kateřina Konečná

Axel E. FISCHER

Jana FISCHEROVÁ

Gvozden Srećko FLEGO*

Paul FLYNN/Michael Connarty

Hans FRANKEN

Jean-Claude FRÉCON*

Erich Georg FRITZ

György FRUNDA

Giorgi GABASHVILI*

Alena GAJDŮŠKOVÁ/Dana Váhalová

Roger GALE

Jean-Charles GARDETTO*

Tamás GAUDI NAGY

Valeriu GHILETCHI

Paolo GIARETTA

Jean GLAVANY*

Michael GLOS*

Pavol GOGA

Obrad GOJKOVIĆ*

Jarosław GÓRCZYŃSKI

Svetlana GORYACHEVA/Alexey Knyshov

Martin GRAF

Sylvi GRAHAM/Ingjerd Schou

Andreas GROSS

Arlette GROSSKOST*

Dzhema GROZDANOVA

Attila GRUBER*

Antonio GUTIÉRREZ

Ana GUJU

Carina HÄGG

Sabir HAJIYEV

Andrzej HALICKI

Mike HANCOCK

Margus HANSON

Davit HARUTYUNYAN/Zaruhi Postanjyan

Håkon HAUGLI

Norbert HAUPERT

Oliver HEALD/Edward Leigh

Alfred HEER

Olha HERASYM'YUK*

Andres HERKEL

Adam HOFMAN*

Serhiy HOLOVATY

Jim HOOD/Joe Benton

Joachim HÖRSTER

Arpine HOVHANNISYAN/Armen Rustamyan

Anette HÜBINGER

Andrej HUNKO

Susanna HUOVINEN

Ali HUSEYNLI/Aydin Abbasov

Rafael HUSEYNOV

Stanisław HUSKOWSKI*

Shpëtim IDRIZI

Igor IVANOVSKI

Tadeusz IWIŃSKI

Denis JACQUAT/André Schneider

Roman JAKIČ*

Ramón JÁUREGUI

Michael Aastrup JENSEN*

Mogens JENSEN

Mats JOHANSSON/Jonas Gunnarsson

Birkir Jón JÓNSSON

Čedomir JOVANOVIĆ/Vesna Marjanović

Antti KAIKKONEN*

Ferenc KALMÁR

Božidar KALMETA*

Mariusz KAMIŃSKI*

Marietta KARAMANLI/Jean-Pierre Michel

Burhan KAYATÜRK

Bogdan KLICH*

Haluk KOÇ

Igor KOLMAN*

Alev KORUN/Sonja Ablinger

Tiny KOX

Marie KRARUP*

Borjana KRIŠTO*

Dmitry KRYVITSKY*

Václav KUBATA/Rom Kostřica

Dalia KUODYTĚ

Ertuğrul KÜRKCÜ

Athina KYRIAKIDOU

Jean-Yves LE DÉAUT*

Igor LEBEDEV*

Harald LEIBRECHT/Viola Von Cramon-Taubadel

Terry LEYDEN

Inese LĪBIŅA-EGNERE*

Lone LOKLINDT*

François LONCLE*

Jean-Louis LORRAIN

George LOUKAIDES

Younal LOUTFI

Yuliya L'OVOCHKINA

Saša MAGAZINOVIĆ*

Philippe MAHOUX*

Gennaro MALGIERI*

Nicole MANZONE-SAQUET/Bernard Marquet

Pietro MARCENARO

Thierry MARIANI

Konstantinos MARKOPOULOS/Liana Kanelli

Milica MARKOVIĆ

Meritxell MATEU PI/ Josep Anton Bardina Pau

Pirkko MATTILA*

Frano MATUŠIĆ

Liliane MAURY PASQUIER

Michael McNAMARA

Sir Alan MEALE

Ermira MEHMETI DEVAJA/Imer Aliu

Ivan MELNIKOV/Leonid Kalashnikov

Nursuna MEMECAN

José MENDES BOTA

Jean-Claude MIGNON/Marie-Jo Zimmermann

Dangutė MIKUTIENĖ/Egidijus Vareikis

Djordje MILIĆEVIĆ*

Akaki MINASHVILI*

Federica MOGHERINI REBESANI

Andrey MOLCHANOV/Svetlana Zhurova

Jerzy MONTAG

Patrick MORIAU

João Bosco MOTA AMARAL*

Arkadiusz MULARCZYK*

Alejandro MUÑOZ-ALONSO

Lydia MUTSCH

Philippe NACHBAR*

Oľga NACHTMANNOVÁ

Adrian NĂSTASE/Tudor Panțiru

Gebhard NEGELE

Aleksandar NENKOV/Irena Sokolova

Pasquale NESSA

Fritz NEUGEBAUER

Baroness Emma NICHOLSON/Charles Kennedy

Elena NIKOLAEVA

Aleksandar NIKOLOSKI

Carina OHLSSON

Joseph O'REILLY*

Sandra OSBORNE

Nadia OTTAVIANI*

Liliana PALIHOVICI

Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS*

Eva PARERA

Ganira PASHAYEVA*

Lajla PERNASKA

Johannes PFLUG

Foteini PIPILI*

Alexander POCHINOK/Yury Solonin

Ivan POPESCU

Lisbeth Bech POULSEN/Nikolaj Villumsen

Marietta de POURBAIX-LUNDIN

Cezar Florin PREDA

Lord John PRESCOTT/Jim Dobbin

Jakob PRESEČNIK*

Radoslav PROCHÁZKA/Darina Gabániová

Gabino PUCHE/Jordi Xuclà

Alexey PUSHKOV*

Valeriy PYSARENKO

Valentina RADULOVIĆ-ŠĆEPANOVIĆ

Elżbieta RADZISZEWSKA*

Mailis REPS

Andrea RIGONI

François ROCHEBLOINE

Maria de Belém ROSEIRA/Ana Catarina Mendonça

René ROUQUET

Marlene RUPPRECHT

Ilir RUSMALI/Arenca Trashani

Volodymyr RYBAK/Oleksiy Plotnikov

Rovshan RZAYEV

Džavid ŠABOVIĆ*

Giacomo SANTINI

Giuseppe SARO

Kimmo SASI

Stefan SCHENNACH

Marina SCHUSTER

Urs SCHWALLER

Senad ŠEPIĆ*

Samad SEYIDOV*

Jim SHERIDAN

Mykola SHERSHUN*

Adalbi SHKHAGOVEV/Nadezda Gerasimova

Robert SHLEGEL/Alexander Sidyakin

Ladislav SKOPAL

Leonid SLUTSKY

Serhiy SOBOLEV

Maria STAVROSITU*

Arūnė STIRBLYTĖ

Yanaki STOILOV

Fiorenzo STOLFI

Christoph STRÄSSER

Karin STRENZ

Giacomo STUCCHI*

Valeriy SUDARENKOV

Björn von SYDOW

Petro SYMONENKO/Yevhen Marmazov

Vilmos SZABÓ

Melinda SZÉKYNÉ SZTRÉMI*

Chiora TAKTAKISHVILI*

Giorgi TARGAMADZÉ*

Romana TOMC*

Lord John E. TOMLINSON

Latchezar TOSHEV

Petré TSISKARISHVILI*

Mihai TUDOSE*

Ahmet Kutalmış TÜRKEŞ

Tuğrul TÜRKEŞ*

Theodora TZAKRI

Tomáš ÚLEHLA*

Ilyas UMAKHANOV

Giuseppe VALENTINO*

Miltiadis VARVITSIOTIS

Ljubica VASIĆ*

Stefaan VERCAMER*

Anne-Mari VIROLAINEN

Luigi VITALI

Luca VOLONTÈ

Vladimir VORONIN/Grigore Petrenco

Varujan VOSGANIAN*

Tanja VRBAT*

Klaas de VRIES

Nataša VUČKOVIĆ*

Piotr WACH

Johann WADEPHUL

Robert WALTER

Katrin WERNER

Renate WOHLWEND/Doris Frommelt

Karin S. WOLDSETH/Øyvind Vaksdal

Gisela WURM*

Karl ZELLER

Kostiantyn ZHEVAHO*

Emanuelis ZINGERIS*

Guennady ZIUGANOV/Anvar Makhmutov

Naira ZOHRABYAN

Levon ZOURABIAN

Vacant Seat, Cyprus*

Vacant Seat, Spain*

Vacant Seat, Romania*

Vacant Seat, Serbia*

Vacant Seat, Serbia*

ALSO PRESENT

Representatives and Substitutes not authorised to vote:

Terence FLANAGAN

Eleni RAPTI

Konstantinos TRIANTAFYLLOS

Observers:

Carlos Fernando ÁNGULO PARRA

Aldo GIORDANO

Hervé Pierre GUILLOT

Héctor LARIOS CÓRDOVA

David TILSON

Partners for democracy:

Ms Najat ALASTAL
