

Sweden's national counter-terrorism strategy

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


REGERINGSKANSLIET

**Government Offices
of Sweden**

Government Communication 2011/12:73

Responsibility and commitment
– a national counter-terrorism strategy



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Communica-
tion
2011/12:73

The Government submits this Communication to the Riksdag.

Stockholm, 9 February 2012

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Main contents of the Communication

In this Communication the Government presents a national strategy to prevent the emergence of terrorism, to pursue terrorist attacks and to prepare for the eventuality of a terrorist attack occurring nevertheless. In the strategy the Government sets out its view of the starting points, objectives and direction of Swedish counter-terrorism. In it the Government gives an overview of the measures already taken, started or planned to address future challenges.

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1 Summary

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In this Communication the Government sets out its view of the principles, objectives and direction of Swedish counter-terrorism. Sweden's national counter-terrorism strategy adopts a broad approach and covers all forms of terrorism, irrespective of the background to or motives for the terrorist threat.

This Communication updates the Government Communication *National responsibility and international commitment – A national strategy to meet the threat of terrorism (Govt. Comm. 2007/08:64)*. The Government is making this update in order to react to international change and to present implemented and coming action. The strategy is divided into three main parts – threats to Sweden, starting points for the fight against terrorism and objectives and measures.

The threat from terrorism changes over time. Attacks carried out and thwarted plans for attacks have shown that there is a real risk of terrorist attacks in Sweden or on Swedish interests.

One starting point is that terrorism can only be countered effectively using means and aims that have a place in an open and democratic society based on the rule of law. International law, including human rights, must be respected nationally and internationally. Democracy must be protected without harming the values to be defended. This Communication describes how Sweden intends to meet the threat from terrorism under three headings: *preventing*, *stopping* and *preparing*.

Preventing terrorism is intended to reduce the will of individuals or groups to commit or support terrorist crime. This work includes efforts to try to identify and reduce potential breeding grounds for terrorism. Preventive work also includes strengthening democratic values. One aim is to contribute to a well-functioning democracy and an open and tolerant society where discussion and debate are possible.

Pursuing terrorist attacks is intended to discover and reduce threats and to stop ongoing attacks or preparations. Stopping attacks also means investigating terrorist crime and calling the people responsible to account for their actions. One aim is to enable the responsible authorities in the justice system to discover and stop plans for terrorist attacks in an effective way consistent with the rule of law.

Preparing for the eventuality of a terrorist attack occurring is intended to put adequate protection in place for individuals and for functions, IT systems and installations that are essential to the operation of society. Preparatory work also involves making effective use of the combined resources of society so as to be able to deal with the consequences of an attack. The Government's objectives include improving and increasing cross-sectoral planning and exercises, thus establishing protection and enhancing the capability to resist and manage disruptions to society that may result from a terrorist attack.

By adopting this unified view of terrorism the Government is endeavouring to meet this threat effectively with unswerving respect for our fundamental values.

2 A national counter-terrorism strategy

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An explosive charge detonated in central Stockholm on 11 December 2010. The suicide bomber died. In Norway a home-made bomb and firearms were used to take the lives of 77 people on 22 July 2011. A terrorist attack on a newspaper office in Denmark could be prevented shortly before it was committed thanks to effective work in Sweden and cooperation with Danish authorities. The perpetrators, including three Swedish citizens, were arrested in 2010. The terrorist attacks and the attempt were aimed at the values on which our society is built. It is important to address the threat of terrorism through preventive measures, well-coordinated preparations and a capability to pursue attacks.

Sweden's capability to meet the threat of terrorism is well developed. Attacks in Sweden and on Swedish interests have been averted. Sweden has assisted other countries in pursuing attacks. In February 2008 the Government gave an account of its view of Swedish counter-terrorism in a communication to the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) (Govt. Com. 2007/08:64). Since then the Government has created the conditions for more effective counter-terrorism. At the same time, improvements have been introduced in due process and supervision in the area. Sweden's capability can be developed and improved even more by drawing on lessons we have learned from attacks and other incidents.

This Communication presents an updated national counter-terrorism strategy so as to clarify the Government's starting points and give an account of how Sweden is meeting the threat of terrorism. These objectives indicate the main strategic direction of future work and will be followed up continually.

Terrorism is one of several threats directed at human life and health, property, the capability of society to function and, ultimately, national security and our fundamental values. It is up to every responsible state to assume responsibility for security in its own territory. The Swedish Security Service is responsible for countering terrorist crime and for pursuing attacks in Sweden and on Swedish interests.

Terrorist crime can be detected, investigated and prosecuted through the combined capability of the justice system and the intelligence services. However, it is not possible to have complete security as an objective since this would result in unacceptable restrictions on our rights and freedoms. A number of government agencies and other actors are responsible for preparatory work, such as the protection of functions essential to the operation of society and effective consequence management if Sweden suffers a major attack. In preventive work all parties have a responsibility for not allowing the originators of terrorist attacks or violent extremism to set the agenda and for ensuring that public debate is conducted within the framework of democracy. Sweden also has a responsibility to help other countries. Moreover, a commitment to international cooperation is necessary in order to be able to safeguard Swedish interests both in Sweden and abroad.

The national counter-terrorism strategy adopts a broad approach and covers a range of government agencies and other parts of society. The

strategy also covers all forms of terrorism and violent extremism, irrespective of their motive or other background factors.

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The strategy is divided into three main parts: threats to Sweden, principles for the fight against terrorism and objectives and measures. Objectives and measures to meet the threat of terrorism are structured under three main headings: *preventing* the occurrence of terrorism, *pursuing* terrorist attacks and *preparing* for the eventuality of an attack occurring.

3 Threats to Sweden

In brief: From an international perspective, most terrorist attacks occur in areas affected by conflict outside Europe. In Europe, local nationalist and separatist groups account for most of the attacks. In Sweden neither the white power environment, the autonomous environment nor violent Islamic extremism, are currently a serious threat to the democratic system. Actors inspired by al-Qaeda aim to carry out attacks resulting in a high number of civilian deaths and they still constitute a threat. The threat from terrorism has changed in recent years with an increased risk of attacks by people mainly acting alone.

Most terrorist attacks still occur in areas affected by conflict outside Europe. Every year many civilians are hit by attacks in widely spread areas of the world such as parts of the Middle East, Africa, Asia and South America, for example.

Cross-border and global terrorism have had a great impact in the past ten years. The network that has been most prominent is al-Qaida. Other terrorist networks have also demonstrated the intent and capability to carry out attacks in and against Europe. Since the large-scale attacks in the US in 2001, Europe has experienced a number of attacks deliberately striking at the civilian population. The most prominent attacks with civilian victims were carried out in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 by perpetrators who can be characterised as violent Islamists.

In general terrorism inspired by al-Qaida continues to strive for attacks resulting in a large number of civilian deaths. However, the capability to carry out attacks, i.e. to plan, acquire knowledge and weapons, and take other similar measures has decreased slightly in recent years, in part as a result of greater global cooperation and more effective counter-terrorism.

The reduced capability to carry out large-scale attacks has led to a change of tactics. Today actors inspired by al-Qaida often try to carry out smaller, more limited attacks and, generally speaking, the individuals involved have less training and experience. In several cases these groups and networks have also made use of conflict areas to build up their capacity through training and acts of violence. At the same time, developments in the past decade have resulted in an increase in the intent and will among additional violent Islamists to support or commit terrorist

acts. The various measures implemented around the world to limit this capability may also have contributed to this development.

The use of the Internet has grown in importance for violent groups and networks, partly as a means for their own communication but perhaps especially as a platform for spreading messages and propaganda. Moreover, several manuals containing instructions for planning and carrying out attacks, such as bomb-making, are to be found on the Internet. In general, however, additional skills and knowledge, over and above what can be obtained only by using the Internet, are required to be able to convert these instructions into the intended result, for example a working explosive charge. Through the Internet it has been possible for individuals both to be influenced by propaganda and to acquire knowledge without necessarily having contacts with established environments.

Most attacks in Europe are planned or implemented by European actors that are driven by other political ideologies than those inspired by al-Qaida. These actors seem primarily to operate in the countries or areas that are the focus of their political objectives. The most active groups primarily have separatist motives, but actors in anarchism and left-wing extremism regularly commit attacks. These groups chiefly attack symbols of the exercise of public authority, such as the police or military or people who are politically involved. In Norway in summer 2011 two large scale attacks that primarily had anti-Islamic overtones were carried out. The perpetrator in Norway appears to have planned and carried out the attacks on his own.

In recent years several completed or thwarted attacks in Europe and the western world have been planned and carried out by people working on their own. The background to attacks carried out by individuals mainly acting alone can vary. They may involve perpetrators who are allied to established terrorist organisations but who make a conscious choice to act alone so as to avoid discovery. They may also involve individuals acting on their own initiative without any real interaction with other groups or networks. The risk of attacks by individuals acting mainly on their own makes the threat picture more complex and difficult to assess.

Violent extremism in Sweden is often divided into three different types of environments: white power, left-wing autonomous movements and violent Islamic extremism. At present none of these three environments is a serious threat to the democratic system in Sweden. However, persons operating in these environments do subject individuals to threats or serious crimes.

Money and other resources are needed to carry out attacks. This is why it is problematic that individuals in Sweden are providing continuing financial and logistical support for terrorist-related activities abroad.

Another set of problems that has been viewed more seriously in recent years is that individuals travel to conflict areas from Sweden and other parts of the western world in order to be given training in armed combat.

The threat from terrorism changes over time. Attacks carried out and thwarted plans for attacks have shown that there is a real risk of terrorist attacks in Sweden or on Swedish interests. Developments in recent years have made it more complicated to assess the threat profile.

4 Starting points in the fight against terrorism

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In brief: Counter-terrorism must be characterised by openness and transparency. The starting points for counter-terrorism in Sweden include:

- creating security through effectiveness and the rule of law;
- only working according to the goals and means that are acceptable in an open, democratic society based on the rule of law; and
- national and international cooperation and collaboration.

Terrorism threatens our fundamental rights and freedoms. Respect for and the defence of these rights and freedoms, including the human rights expressed in several international commitments, are a precondition for effective counter-terrorism, an obligation for the state and an explicit will in our country. The fight against terrorist crime sometimes means striking difficult balances between different interests and objectives. The Government has identified starting points and principles that will guide Swedish work and cooperation against terrorism, at both national and international level.

– *Respect for human rights and our constitutional rights and freedoms.* Respect for the principle of the rule of law and our fundamental rights and freedoms is one of the foundations for counter-terrorism work. Action in the fight against terrorism must be taken with full respect for these fundamental rights and freedoms so that the measures cannot be called into question. Moreover, everyone concerned should avoid branding any particular group of people and should instead develop a dialogue so as to promote mutual awareness and understanding.

– *Maintenance of the rule of law.* One linchpin of our society is that legal rules constitute a guarantee against injustices committed by the state. Some of our rights and freedoms are inviolable and some of them may be restricted in law under certain specific conditions. These restrictions may only be imposed to satisfy purposes acceptable in a democratic society. The purposes may never be so far-reaching that they are a threat to the fundamentals of democracy, such as the free formation of opinion. There must also be an urgent need in society of the particular legislation. This need must be tested against the arguments to the contrary. The laws must also be clear, accessible to the general public and formulated with precision so that the restrictions of rights are predictable.

– *Legal security.* Private individuals, companies and others must be protected from criminal attacks on life, health, freedom, integrity and property.

– *Proportional application.* Every single measure must be in proportion to the purpose of the measure, irrespective of whether it involves a new general statute or the application of existing regulations in a specific instance.

– *Effectiveness and flexibility.* Society must fight terrorism in a modern and effective manner. It must be possible to adapt measures to what the threat picture is like and develops over time. Measures and adaptations must be resource- and cost-effective. Regulations will be overhauled when required.

– *Openness and transparency are watchwords.* What the challenges are and how society meets the threat of terrorism must be stated as clearly as possible without risking harm to national security, law enforcement activities and private individuals.

– *Insight, supervision and control.* There must be acceptable and reliable functions for insight, supervision and independent scrutiny of the activities of the responsible authorities.

– *A robust society with a good capability for recovery.* The protection of installations, functions and people must be given priority and be adapted to relevant assessments of risk, needs and other matters. At the same time, reasonable accessibility must be maintained. The principle of responsibility, which means that the party that bears responsibility in normal conditions also bears it in a crisis, is the starting point.

– *National collaboration.* It is a well-established principle that the responsible authorities and other resources in society must cooperate and collaborate in order to effectively achieve the objectives adopted by the Government and Riksdag, this is also an important aspect of the principle of responsibility. This principle requires regular exercises and the review of regulations when needed.

– *International cooperation.* International cooperation is an important precondition for counter-terrorism and Sweden actively supports further and extended cooperation. The starting points and principles for Swedish counter-terrorism are just as applicable in our international commitments. International law must be promoted at both national and international level.

– *Promote our fundamental values and democracy.* By promoting democracy, tolerance, dialogue and participation we can generate resistance to intolerance, discrimination and exclusion.

5 Objectives and measures

The specific objectives and direction of the fight against terrorism and the Government's measures are presented under three headings: *preventing, pursuing* and *preparing*. The presentation of these measures is not intended to give a comprehensive description of all work that could be viewed as part of combating terrorism and the management of its consequences. Instead, it is intended to give an overview of ongoing and coming measures in the fight against terrorism.

In brief: Preventing terrorism is intended to reduce the will of individuals or groups to commit or support terrorist crimes. This work includes efforts to try to identify and reduce potential breeding grounds for terrorism and violent extremism. Preventive work also includes strengthening the values on which our democracy rests. Some of the measures planned or implemented are:

- a national action plan to defend democracy from violence-promoting extremism;
- the development of the measures and cooperation undertaken by several authorities; and
- support for and the development of cooperation with other countries.

One integral part of work to counter terrorism is preventing its emergence and countering the driving forces behind it. This includes the challenge of addressing the phenomena that are manifested in violent extremism and that conflict with fundamental democratic values and the principle of the equal worth of every individual. The responsibility of law enforcement agencies for preventing and combating terrorism is focused on the activities carried out by people in Sweden that threaten security rather than on the arguments and ideas that are used as grounds and justifications for these activities. Therefore the task goes beyond traditional law enforcement measures. Valuable work can be conducted by other actors in society such as schools, social services and municipalities as well as by voluntary organisations and the research community.

Preventive work is important for several reasons. Above all, the risk of terrorist attacks decreases when fewer individuals develop a will to commit or support terrorist crime.

Free access to the Internet, mobile networks, etc. is an important tool for countering anti-democratic and extremist tendencies. Open and democratic societies with free flows of information are better equipped to withstand propaganda and misleading information.

Preventive measures should provide further scope for reporting suspicious behaviour and establishing contacts with individuals who have shown by their actions a will to commit or support terrorist crimes. Moreover, this work should contribute to greater awareness of the fundamentals of democracy and to a society that questions the propaganda about intolerance, threats and violence spread by violent extremism. Over and above work to safeguard and strengthen democracy in general, measures should have a particular focus on the individuals who have shown by their actions that they have started a process of supporting or participating in some form of violent extremism and associated violent acts. At the same time, it is important to follow up the questions concerning freedom of opinion and association that work on preventing violent extremism may raise. It is important that preventive work is based on scientific and scholarly studies and proven methods.

The objectives in this area stem from an endeavour to:

- Increase people's security;

- be more effective in assisting individuals to avoid being drawn into violent extremism and in providing support when they want to leave such an environment;
- increase knowledge about provocations and recruitment to terrorism and violent extremism, in particular the importance of the Internet in this context;
- disseminate knowledge to the general public, private actors and government agencies about the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism.
- strengthen awareness of the fundamentals of the democratic system, especially among young people; and
- improve coordination and cooperation between all actors working on preventing terrorism, in part through increased cross-sectoral planning.

Measures

A national action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism

In December 2011 the Government presented its Communication *An action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism* (Govt. Comm. 2011/12:44). The Action Plan presents measures that the Government has taken or intends to take to strengthen awareness of democracy and safeguard democracy from violence-promoting extremism. The overall purpose of the Action Plan is to protect and strengthen democracy in the long term, thereby making society more resistant to violence-promoting extremism. The Government intends to implement the measures in 2012–2014. The Action Plan includes measures to increase knowledge of violence-promoting extremism, to prevent individuals joining violence-promoting extremist groups and to make it easier for those who have already joined to leave such groups. In addition, the Action Plan contains measures to strengthen structures for cooperation and measures to counter the breeding grounds of ideologically motivated violence.

One measure has been that, in cooperation with the Government Offices, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) has identified local examples of how various actors have countered and prevented violence promoting extremism (*Local action against the promotion of violent extremism, SALAR 2010*).

The Government has also tasked the National Board for Youth Affairs with allocating funds to civil society organisations carrying out activities to strengthen the democratic values of young people, thereby preventing young people from being recruited to the promotion of violent extremism. Funding has also been allocated to organisations that provide democracy and leadership training programmes for young people who can act as models. The National Board for Youth Affairs also allocates funding to activities for defectors.

An inquiry will be appointed to produce training material on methods of preventing violence-promoting extremism. It will be possible to use the training material in the training of professionals in, for example,

schools, social services, the prison and probation services, municipalities and civil society organisations.

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The Swedish National Defence College (FHS) has been given a government assignment that includes a study of good examples of preventive methods focusing on countering individuals joining groups in other countries that promote violent extremism.

Another example is the government assignment to the Living History Forum to develop and spread methods to counter pupils developing values that are in conflict with democracy.

The work of the Police and responsibility for developing measures and cooperation

No single agency can have sole responsibility for everything that needs to be done to retain a free and open society. The action taken by a number of agencies demonstrates the breadth of this work. There are many indications that there is scope to develop and improve existing measures to prevent terrorism and violent extremism.

Even though there are clear limitations on what the Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Swedish Police can achieve, these agencies have a central role in preventive work. Activities intended to build trust and establish contacts are a natural part of police crime-prevention work and have been conducted in the Police over many years. The Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Swedish Police carry out a range of measures to prevent different forms of violent extremism.

The Security Service has long-established dialogue and contact-promoting activities that form part of work to counter terrorism. Their dialogue activities are intended to build trust and good relations between different organisations and parts of society. Contact-promoting activities mean that the Security Service maintains a visible presence in contexts where there may be people, particularly young people, who are drifting into circles where violence is advocated as a means of changing society. The Security Service has contributed actively to a more nuanced picture of terrorism and violent extremism through its participation in discussions, debates, interviews and lectures.

The Swedish Police take part in cooperation and develops methods intended to provide support for people who want to leave destructive environments. Measures aimed at young people who risk becoming criminals can also help to reduce the risk of recruitment to violent extremism. On 3 March 2011 the Government decided that the Police Service will initiate a pilot scheme consisting of social teams for young people at risk of becoming criminals. The Police will consult with the National Board of Health and Welfare, the National Agency for Education, the Swedish Employment Service, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, the National Board of Institutional Care, the National Board for Youth Affairs, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions and other relevant government agencies that the Police see as important to attach to the project. In addition, the government decision states that, after holding consultations with the Police and other agencies affected, the Board of Health and Welfare is to develop a risk assessment manual so as to be better able to identify young people who are at risk of being recruited to criminal networks or want to defect from a criminal

network and to produce guidance concerning what support should be available to young people included in the work of the social teams.

The Police in the counties of Stockholm, Västra Götaland and Skåne have set up special dialogue police as a link between police commanders and the arrangers of various expressions of opinion, such as demonstrations. This often involves groups in the white power environment and in the autonomous environment. The dialogue police are also in touch with the groups that risk being attacked. This work builds on an open dialogue and cooperation with several other actors, such as municipalities, the social services, community workers, parents' associations, local public transport providers and business operators who risk having their property damaged. The work of the dialogue police has turned out to be successful in establishing greater trust and security for everyone involved when the freedom to demonstrate is being exercised.

The Police make particular efforts to combat crime with the motive of violating a person on grounds of colour, national origin, sexual orientation or other similar circumstances. In Stockholm work on hate crimes is coordinated under an expert service for hate crimes. This service cooperates with various organisations, special interest associations, researchers and authorities, and a liaison group consisting of representatives of civil society organisations has been established.

The presence of the Police in social media and other forums on the Internet contributes to greater visibility, accessibility and better information to the general public or certain groups. With the help of Internet and social media contacts the Police can take preventive action in time so that some crimes can be avoided. The presence of the Police on the Internet and in social media can be developed further.

Several projects are under way in the EU to counter violent extremism. A police in-service training course in discovering and preventing radicalisation at local level is going to be produced. The content of the course is being drawn from an EU-funded project with eleven EU countries participating called Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism (Copptra) that the Security Service and the Swedish police have taken part in.

The Swedish Prison and Probation Service is working on identifying people, groups and phenomena that are signs of ongoing recruitment to violent extremism in the prison and probation service environment. Expertise in handling this set of problems has been developed in recent years. Moreover, under the Prisons Act (2010:610) the Government can order restrictions in a prisoner's contacts with the outside world if this is required in view of national security or the risk that the prisoner will be complicit, during the enforcement of his or her sentence in a prison, in a terrorist offence. The capability of the Prison and Probation Service to provide person-centred modern and humane prison and probation services is also assessed as being of importance for preventive work. The Prison and Probation Service also participates in a range of international cooperation that provides opportunities for the exchange of knowledge and experience about preventive measures. For example, the Service hosted a conference on radicalisation and rehabilitation in a prison and probation environment and participated in the production of a handbook on countering radicalisation in that environment.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) participates in preventive work through, for example, training for instructors. The Agency also coordinates a consultation group for faith communities that works on dialogue and the exchange of experience.

The Swedish National Defence College (FHS) is running a project aimed at producing new knowledge about terrorism prevention and has conducted systematic research and study activities concerning non-state actors since 2003. The ambition is to measure the effectiveness of preventive measures in Sweden and abroad.

Along with FHS and other partners, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) is running projects with the objective of providing knowledge about threats regarding the use by non-state actors of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) substances for the purpose of terrorism.

Government policies in other areas can help to counter violent extremism. In 2008 the Government initiated a dialogue on the fundamental values of society. The overall intention was to stimulate a dialogue on the principles of human rights and democracy, and a presentation was made in the Government Communication *A dialogue on the fundamental values of society (Govt. Com. 2009/10:106)*. An inquiry has been appointed to propose how work against xenophobia and similar forms of intolerance can be made more effective (Terms of Reference (ToR) 2011:39). One input to this inquiry is a survey of the state of knowledge and research concerning antisemitism and islamophobia conducted by the Living History Forum as a government assignment.

When required the Government may take further action to intensify preventive work, and especially to improve the conditions for collaboration between actors concerned.

The involvement of the community

Civil society organisations, private individuals and other actors often have unique knowledge of current conditions in local communities. They can offer opportunities for people to be included and become involved so as to influence their life situation or society as a whole. Here the state can, for example, provide funding,

Schools are another natural place to reach young people. In 2011 the Riksdag adopted a new Education Act that clarifies the responsibility of schools for communicating democratic values.

The Government also provides funding for organisations that conduct activities in opposition to discrimination, racism and similar forms of intolerance. The EXIT organisation in a foundation called KFUM Söder Fryshuset has received funding to provide help for defectors from the white power environment as part of its activities.

Another part of the community that has grown in importance is the Internet and social media. Here it is important that participants take responsibility for ensuring that the agenda is not set by those who advocate violence as a means of realising their policies and that justifications given by terrorists are not allowed to go unchallenged.

The Government may consider further funding for actors in the community doing important preventive work. Work with civil actors should cover all types of extremist environments and conditions for long-term action should be put in place. The activities that receive government funding will be evaluated and reviewed regularly so that the measures taken have the intended effect.

Cooperation with and support to other countries

International cooperation is a channel for the exchange of knowledge and experience of modern and effective preventive work. Moreover, efforts to prevent terrorism are often affected by events abroad. Contributions are therefore needed to action in other countries to counter the breeding grounds of terrorism.

There is a well developed international regulatory framework for preventing and combating terrorism, including a number of UN conventions and resolutions. Both the UN and the EU have also adopted strategies and action plans in the area. Sweden has contributed actively to them, including the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2006. This plan recognises that action to resolve prolonged conflicts contributes to the global fight against terrorism. The most recent UN resolution on Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (A/RES/65/221) sets out the starting points for national and international action. The resolution affirms the importance of respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons and that all measures taken in countering terrorism must be consistent with international law. The resolution also affirms the importance of international cooperation and the role of the UN in this context.

Sweden's general action to combat poverty; develop stable democracies; prevent and solve conflicts; and strengthen human rights and the idea of the rule of law as a functioning social system can contribute to preventing terrorism. Several government agencies contribute to this. The participation of the Swedish Armed Forces and civilian agencies in international peace-support operations is therefore an important part of the fight against international terrorism. Our involvement in Afghanistan is of particular importance and Sweden participates in the operations of the international community by providing both civilian and military resources. Another example is the work of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority in certain countries on strengthening institutions and public authorities that are responsible for the control of nuclear and radioactive material and the Agency's implementation of a number of projects intended to discover illegal trade in radioactive and nuclear material.

Sweden places special emphasis on support for countries in particularly vulnerable regions and works for capacity-building measures in judicial authorities and elsewhere focusing on the rule of law in cases concerning terrorist crimes. This has taken place in the form of bilateral projects and projects with the EU as well as through support to the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime – Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC-TPB). Direct funding has been provided for the Counter-Terrorism International Task Force (CTITF), a coordinating institution, and the working group on Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism, where Sweden is the largest donor. Bilateral projects that can be mentioned are the completed training of staff from the Central Bank of Pakistan and a group of Afghani judges and prosecutors in matters related to countering terrorism. Sweden has also safeguarded the involvement of civil society in the discussion of measures to address the breeding grounds of terrorism, which has resulted in funding for the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), for example. Grants have also been provided for work on establishing a regional training centre in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to prevent and counter terrorism.

In the EU a special network, the Radicalisation and Awareness Network (RAN) has been set up to contribute to cooperation against violent radicalisation and recruitment by facilitating exchanges of experience, spreading knowledge and providing inspiration. Sweden has also contributed actively to the earmarking of special funds in the EU Instrument for Stability for action intended to counter terrorism. The EU Instrument for Stability is a financial resource in the area that is, for example, used for action in Pakistan, Yemen and the Sahel.

The activities being carried out for dialogue between cultures and societies can be another important part of preventive work. One example is the UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAoC), an intergovernmental network that currently has more than 100 member countries and is engaged in open dialogue on inter-cultural issues. Other examples in this area are the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures and the Swedish Institute in Alexandria.

Sweden's cooperation with other countries is mainly intended to reduce the threat to Sweden and Swedish interests. This cooperation should therefore be aligned with Swedish assessments of the threat posed by terrorism to Sweden and Swedish interest. Moreover, Sweden will contribute through international cooperation to democracy-building, terrorism prevention in other countries and increasing the capability of other countries to counter terrorism, and in particular to improving the conditions for establishing the rule of law and promoting human rights, in accordance with international law.

In brief: Pursuing terrorist attacks is intended to discover and reduce threats and to stop ongoing attacks. Pursuing attacks also means investigating terrorist crime and calling the people responsible to account for their actions.

In this area it is important to

- ensure modern methods for gathering information;
- expand the supervisory tasks of the Swedish Commission on Security and Integrity Protection; and
- review the three temporary acts containing special provisions on covert surveillance.

In principle there are two possible ways of pursuing attacks. One is to reduce the intent and will of the individual to commit attacks, which is primarily achieved through preventive measures as described above. The other is to restrict the capability and opportunity of individuals or groups to carry out attacks.

In order to pursue attacks it is therefore necessary for society to have the capability, through responsible authorities, to discover the ongoing planning of terrorist attacks and identify the perpetrators at an early stage. This work presupposes knowledge, intelligence, perseverance, tools for investigations and cooperation.

Once attack preparations or attempted attacks have been discovered the capability to intervene to stop the criminal plans is needed. The task of the Police is to intervene to stop crimes both at the planning stage and when the crime is in the process of being completed. This can, for example, involve conspiracy, preparation or attempt to commit a crime. If a person is reasonably suspected of, for example, preparation of a terrorist crime there are grounds to apprehend the person and investigate the suspected offence in a preliminary investigation. The earlier the discovery, the better are the opportunities of pursuing and stopping the attack. Generally there is no prior information before an attack takes place. It is particularly difficult to discover plans for attacks in cases where the individuals are mainly acting on their own.

Work on pursuing terrorist attacks includes calling the individuals who are guilty of terrorist crimes to account for their actions. Terrorist offences are defined in the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences (2003:148). Moreover, there are relevant regulations in the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruitment and Training concerning Terrorist Offences and other Particularly Serious Crime (2010:299) and in the Act on Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Particularly Serious Crime in Certain Cases (2002:444).

The Swedish Security Service is responsible for countering terrorist offences and other terrorist crime. The Police are responsible for making relevant contributions to this law enforcement work. The other parts of the justice system are responsible, within their respective remits, for investigation, prosecution, trial and enforcement of penalties. The agencies in the justice system must be equipped to conduct modern and

effective activities that are in line with our fundamental rights and freedoms.

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The Government's objectives in this area stem from an endeavour to:

- reduce the risk of terrorist attacks in Sweden or against Swedish interests and increase the capability for the early discovery of terrorist crimes;
- increase the difficulty of using Sweden as a base for support for terrorism, for example the financing of terrorism;
- clarify the division of responsibility between the Swedish Security Service, and the responsibility of other parts of the Swedish Police, other agencies and other actors for pursuing terrorism;
- improve collaboration and cooperation at local and national level so as to be able to be more effective at pursuing terrorist attacks;
- deepen international cooperation to reduce the threat to Sweden and Swedish interests and to make relevant contributions to legitimate work by other countries to pursue terrorist attacks;
- increase confidence in the capability of the authorities in the justice system to meet the threat from terrorism in a proportionate way consistent with the rule of law; and
- increase knowledge about how terrorist crime can be pursued by drawing on documented experience of exercises and incidents, basing work on science and proven methods to a greater extent, making use of the opportunities provided by the Internet, ensuring criminal investigations of high quality and maintaining a high level of forensic knowledge and expertise.

Measures

Resources and inter-agency collaboration

The Government has successively increased the financial resources of the Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Swedish Police. This funding has been provided in order to increase the impact of law enforcement work in general but also specifically to improve the capability to pursue terrorist attacks. In addition, the Security Service has undergone an organisational transformation so as to be able to discharge more effectively its task of protecting democracy.

For a long time the Government has stressed the importance of collaboration in order to achieve an effective capability to discover, investigate and stop terrorist attacks in Sweden and on Swedish interests. In particular, effective collaboration is required between the Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Police Service. Collaboration is needed, for example, because it may sometimes be unclear, especially at an early stage of a criminal attack, whether it involves a terrorist offence or some other kind of serious crime, including cross-border organised crime. Cooperation may also be needed with other actors with responsibility in areas that may be affected when crimes are committed, such as trade in certain substances. Cooperation is also required in the light of resources and effectiveness; for example the Security Service may need to engage the National Task Force (NTF) in interventions.

Moreover, the Police are responsible for many other activities, parts of which are of great importance in the general fight against terrorism, such as border controls and supervision under firearms legislation. There is scope to develop cooperation at senior management level between the Security Police and other parts of the Police Service in connection with operations.

The NTF is Sweden's ultimate police resource for handling serious situations such as an ongoing terrorist attack or hostage situations. In organisational terms the Force comes under the National Police Board and has the main task of countering terrorist attacks. The NTF is a knowledge- and exercise-intensive force and therefore cooperates closely with, for example, the National Centre for Assessing Terror Threats, the Security Police and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. The NTF has, for instance, adapted its capability with respect to command and control during movements, marine capability, capability in a CBRN environment, bomb-making capability and capability for cooperation with police air services, the Swedish Coast Guard and the Swedish Security Service. The capacity to continually modify this type of task force is key to being able to meet the threats of tomorrow. For this to happen in an effective way continued close cooperation is required with other agencies. This cooperation enables the NTF to quickly obtain a situation overview report as well as knowledge about the right way to manage different kinds of serious situations. Rapid transfer capacity is often crucial, and effective cooperation with other agencies can contribute to that capacity. Access to immediately available transport resources through the Swedish Armed Forces will increase as the defence reform is implemented. The NTF also holds national training courses on the handling of suspected explosive substances or operations in mass transport, for example. Sweden will maintain a satisfactory level of preparedness to be able to handle effectively serious incidents such as a terrorist attack through the type of function provided in the NTF.

The Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council, which started work in 2005, brings together the agencies that have important functions in the fight against terrorism. The Swedish Security Service leads the work of the Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council, whose task is to better coordinate the activities of these agencies and to coordinate the exchange of information. The Council has therefore produced an inter-agency action plan in order to make their work more effective. At present the Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council includes the following 14 agencies: the Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, the Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish Migration Board, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the National Criminal Police, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the Swedish Security Service, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish Transport Agency, the Swedish Customs and the Swedish Prosecution Authority.

The Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council has evolved into an effective forum for inter-agency collaboration in order to improve the capability to pursue terrorist attacks. Moreover, the Council is a hub in collaboration in the other two areas of preventing terrorism and preparing

for the eventuality of an attack occurring. The Council has carried out common exercises and training programmes and been an important forum for the exchange of information between the agencies. The Government supports continued and deeper cooperation in the Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council.

A central function for threat assessments with respect to terrorism with a bearing on Sweden and Swedish interests exists in the form of a permanent working group called the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT). It consists of representatives from the Swedish Security Service, the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) and the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). The NCT analyses terrorist threats to Sweden and Swedish interests and makes continuous assessments based on relevant information available at the three agencies. These assessments are presented to the Government Offices and other parties affected in order to give early warnings of changes that can affect the threat picture and require action.

The Swedish Prosecution Authority has a special prosecution office, the Prosecution Office for National Security, with specialist prosecutors that have special responsibility for investigating terrorist crime, bringing prosecutions and conducting trials. Sufficient specialist expertise in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist crime is necessary in order to achieve satisfactory quality in these investigations and guarantee due process for the individual.

Situations can arise where interventions require resources that the Police do not have access to. The Act on Swedish Armed Forces' Support to the Swedish Police Service in Combating Terrorism (2006:343) contains provisions on such support in the form of operations that may entail the use of force or coercion against individuals. The National Police Board may request support from the Swedish Armed Forces if the support is needed to stop or otherwise intervene against an action that may constitute an offence under the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences, the intervention requires resources of a particular type to which the Swedish Police Service does not have access and the Government has given its approval. The Swedish Armed Forces are undergoing a transition from depot-based invasion defence to deployable operational defence. This improves the capability of the Swedish Armed Forces to assist other parts of society and other agencies with its existing capacity and resources, when required, with tasks including counter-terrorism and the management of the consequences of attacks. For example, since 2010 the Swedish Armed Forces have been manned by employed personnel so that the previous restrictions on the use of conscript personnel have gone. The Swedish Armed Forces also have special expertise and international experience that can contribute to law enforcement activities. Use should be made of the existing possibilities for cooperation and exercises. This will ensure that all available resources in the fight against terrorism are used effectively.

Effective inter-agency coordination is necessary to achieve good results, and the Government expects agencies to collaborate. Cross-sectoral planning and exercises should take place continually, especially between the Swedish Police Service and the Swedish Armed Forces. When required, the Government may consider measures to remove

obstacles to effective and modern inter-agency cooperation. This can involve improving the possibilities of exchanging information between the agencies affected. The three agencies represented in the NCT have pointed to the need for such an improvement, so there is reason to progress that matter.

The Government intends to be more clearly involved in coordinating and initiating collaboration between agencies and other parties affected in work to stop terrorist attacks, including the pursuit of terrorism.

International cooperation

To a great extent international cooperation is about the exchange of information. This can either be the exchange of information of a more general nature and strategic analyses or relate to specific information in a particular operational matter. Countries in the EU in particular exchange information about valuable experience of counter-terrorism. In Sweden there is a statutory possibility for government agencies, including the Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Police, to exchange information with other countries under certain conditions. Sweden also has modern legislation that enables judicial authorities, such as prosecutors and courts, to apply for and obtain international judicial assistance and cooperate in other ways in criminal investigations.

The Swedish Security Service represents Sweden in a number of multilateral bodies and cooperation groups. Examples include the Club de Berne and the Counter-terrorism Group (CTG). By participating in these groups and in bilateral cooperation the Swedish Security Service can establish international cooperation that is of crucial importance for the capability to effectively discover and pursue terrorist attacks in Sweden and against Swedish interests.

Sweden supports the work of the EU in the general fight against terrorism. EU counter-terrorism cooperation is mainly based on the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy from 2005. There is also cooperation and coordination in the EU Terrorism Working Group (TWG) and Counter Terrorism Group (COTER) on matters concerning funding for counter-terrorism in Member States and in countries outside the EU. The national special forces in the Atlas Network have been given greater opportunities for voluntary cooperation in the EU. The EU's Prüm Council Decision improves cross-border collaboration between agencies and the possibilities of effectively and securely sharing information in vehicle registers and fingerprint and DNA registers. The EU proposal for a European Investigation Order is intended to make obtaining of evidence located in another EU country more effective. Legislation is under preparation in the EU to permit the collection and use of air passenger information under regulated forms in order to discover and investigate terrorist crime and other serious crime. The EU has also regulated the possibilities for law enforcement agencies to access the VIS visa information database on certain conditions. The European Arrest Warrant has resulted in a clear improvement in the handling of the transfer of suspected or convicted persons from one EU country to another. The EU External Action Service and particularly the

Joint Situation Centre contribute to a joint information and knowledge platform in EU counter-terrorism cooperation, both for measures within the Union and for measures within the framework of the Union's external relations. In the EU action is also being taken to maintain a high level of security at external borders. Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) sets up entry conditions for third country nationals. One of these conditions is that they are not considered to be a threat to the public policy or internal security of Member States, which is checked in the Schengen Information System (SIS) and other sources. Checks in the SIS at border controls can also show whether a person is wanted for a crime or subject to covert surveillance, for example if the Swedish Security Service is trying to avert a serious danger to the internal or external security of the state. Under the Schengen Borders Code a further check may be reintroduced temporarily at internal borders where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security. For example, Sweden reintroduced controls at its internal borders on 22–23 July 2011 on account of the terrorist attacks in Norway.

In the EU there are two important cooperation bodies for law enforcement: Europol and Eurojust. Europol has been given a clear mandate and greater trust to handle police cooperation in the Union. The work of Europol includes analysing and sharing information about terrorism at European level. Eurojust, which is a body for better cooperation between prosecutors in cross-border criminal investigations, is also undergoing a transformation and will be given new powers and tools that will provide more possibilities of obtaining faster and more certain results.

In an EU without borders more people risk being involved in legal proceedings, about terrorist crime for example, in a country other than their country of origin. To enhance confidence in the legal system of other countries it is therefore important that all EU Member State have fundamental due process guarantees. During the Swedish Presidency of the European Union, Sweden worked to progress the issue of stronger protection for procedural rights of suspects. A political agreement was reached on a road map containing proposals for regulations on the right to interpretation, information about legal procedure, access to defence counsel and communication when deprived of liberty.

The UN can contribute to the capacity to pursue attacks by facilitating international cooperation. Several UN resolutions underline the importance of close and effective cooperation to meet the threat from terrorism. Sweden is working actively to reach agreement on a general UN anti-terrorism convention. In addition, Several UN bodies are working on capacity-building for police services and prison and probation services in countries of interest with regard to the fight against terrorism. Often these are countries with an under-dimensioned or weak justice system. The support provided may be crucial in enabling these countries to detect and pursue attacks or handle the consequences of an attack.

Dialogue on the importance of strengthening human rights and respect for international law while countering terrorism has been and is a high-priority issue for Sweden. The issue is raised in negotiations on agreements and at summit meetings. Sweden contributes actively to the dialogue in international cooperation on counter-terrorism as well as within the framework of security, development assistance and trade policies.

Further improvements can be made to international cooperation on information and analysis work. One possibility is to establish certain standards so as to work in a more uniform way as far as possible. This can facilitate a comparative analysis of incidents, individuals and networks, etc. When required, the Government may consider further measures to facilitate international cooperation.

Investigatory measures and other tools

Investigatory measures can consist of searches of premises, the seizure of objects, apprehending and arresting a person, telecommunications interception or intrusive surveillance, etc. Effective action to counter terrorist crime requires that law enforcement agencies have access to effective investigatory measures. Moreover, under certain legislation the law enforcement agencies can request access to information held by companies, for example information from telecommunications operators or transport companies. The law enforcement agencies also need to be able to structure this information by creating databases.

The Penal Code contains a number of provisions on investigatory measures. Three acts contain special provisions on secret surveillance in order to prevent, stop and investigate particularly serious crime or crime that is a particular threat to society: The Act on Electronic Eavesdropping (2007:978), the Act on Measures to Prevent Certain Particularly Serious Crimes (2007:979) and the Act on Measures to Investigate Certain Crimes that are Threats to Society (2008:854). These acts are limited in time and are in force until 31 December 2013. An inquiry has been appointed to evaluate how these Acts have been applied and analyse whether the regulation of secret surveillance for particularly serious crime or other crime that is particular threat to society should be amended in any way or ways (ToR 2010:62). The purpose of appointing this inquiry is to make a final decision on the future validity and formulation of these acts. The inquiry is to report on its assignment by 30 June 2012 at the latest.

There is no doubt that the Swedish Security Service is dependent on intelligence about conditions abroad to be able to fulfil its remit effectively. Whilst there is a need for such information, the Swedish Security Service does not have powers to operate outside Sweden's borders. Some information can be obtained through international cooperation, but the Swedish Security Service is then dependent on the other country's assessment of what information to gather and has limited possibilities of checking the information. As part of defence intelligence work, information about conditions abroad is gathered through the Military Intelligence and Security Service and the National Defence

Radio Establishment. The Ministry of Justice has circulated the ministry memorandum *The Police Service's access to signals surveillance in defence intelligence activities (Ministry Communication Ds 2011:44)*-for comment. The memorandum proposes that the Swedish Security Service and the National Criminal Police again be given the possibility of targeting signals surveillance by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), in accordance with the regulatory framework that is already in force today in other respects in the Act on Signals Surveillance in Defence Intelligence Work (2008:717). Under the Act signals surveillance can be carried out in order to map certain phenomena, including strategic conditions with respect to terrorism and other serious cross-border crime that can threaten important national interests. The amendment, which is proposed to enter into force on October 2012, is intended to make the Swedish Security Service better able to map terrorism and therefore pursue terrorist crimes. The proposed amendment would also mean that, via their targeted assignments to the FRA, the Swedish Security Service and the National Criminal Police will be able to contribute important information, which will, in turn, make the FRA better able to conduct more effective and accurate signals surveillance with regard to terrorism.

In a Bill to the Riksdag (Govt. Bill 2011/12:55) the Government has proposed a new act on the gathering by the law enforcement agencies of information about electronic communication in intelligence activities. To be able to pursue crime that is a particular threat to society the Swedish Security Service has, in some cases, a special need of access to such information at an early stage. The Government has therefore proposed an expanded possibility for the Swedish Security Service to obtain information about electronic communication in the intelligence phase as regards criminal activity that includes certain crime that is a particular threat to society, for example terrorist crime.

In December 2010 the Police Methods Inquiry presented its report *Special surveillance methods (SOU 2010:103)*. The report proposes the regulation in law of certain surveillance methods whose use will be permitted in intelligence activities and in preliminary investigations regarding serious crime, such as terrorist offences. The methods that the report proposes regulating include certain technical surveillance methods such as hidden sound and image recording and localisation, the use of provocation and certain measures that could be taken in infiltration operations. The report has been circulated for comments and is now being processed in the Government Offices.

The EU has adopted a directive that is intended to harmonise Member States' provisions concerning the obligations of providers of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks to store traffic and localisation data and information needed to identify a subscriber or user in order to ensure that the information is available for the detection, investigation and prosecution of serious crime. Put simply, the information to be retained mainly answers questions about who communicated with whom, when it happened, where the people communicating were and what type of communication was used. The information must not reveal the content of a communication. The Government has presented a proposal for the

implementation of the Directive. Special provisions are also proposed to provide satisfactory protection for the information stored.

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The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and the European Union Framework Decision amending the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, etc. are of central importance for preventing recruitment to terrorism and aim increasing the possibilities of intervening before a terrorist attack is committed. The Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruitment and Training concerning Terrorist Offences and other Particularly Serious Crime, which entered into force on 1 December 2010, contains provisions that mean that Sweden lives up to these regulations. This Act criminalises public provocation of and recruitment for terrorism, organisation of training camps and dissemination for terrorist purposes of knowledge about bomb-making etc.

As indicated in the previous strategy, the Government has considered a proposal to make it possible to revoke the Swedish citizenship of a person who has, for example, supplied false information in their citizenship application in order to conceal terrorist links. However, the report of the Working Committee on Constitutional Reform did not propose such an amendment to the Constitution and the proposal has not been implemented. When an application is made for Swedish citizenship, an investigation is made of whether there are any security obstacles; such obstacles can concern links to terrorist offences or other circumstances relating to national security.

In common with many other states, Sweden has undertaken not to be a sanctuary where terrorist crime can become established. This includes ensuring that the individuals who intend to support terrorism or plan attacks from Sweden are not given asylum or residence permits in the country. The rules of aliens legislation are also applicable with respect to residence permit cases that are linked to terrorist activities and provide, in most cases, a possibility of taking account of this type of security aspects when examining the application. For example, an alien may be refused a residence permit on the grounds of serious criminality or with reference to national security, even if the circumstances otherwise are such that a permit could be approved. An alien who is in Sweden can also be expelled under the Act concerning Special Controls in Respect of Aliens (1991:572) if specially warranted on grounds of national security or if it can be feared that he or she will commit or be complicit in a terrorist offence. Possibilities for control and appeal are in place, in part through the new system for appeals and procedures implemented in the area of migration law in 2006. To further improve due process an expanded right of judicial review was introduced in 2010; this means that it will be possible for a court to examine most cases that have security aspects in a way corresponding to other aliens cases. Every year the Government gives an account in a communication to the Riksdag of the application of the Act concerning Special Controls in Respect of Aliens.

In recent years action has been taken to make Swedish government agencies more effective in work to pursue the financing of terrorism. The resources of the Financial Intelligence Unit of the National Criminal Police have increased; *Finansinspektionen* (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) has been given broader possibilities of intervening and imposing sanctions; the demands on companies to counter and report the financing of terrorism have been tightened; and important improvements have been made with respect to international sanctions.

The Act on Measures against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (2009:62), known as the Money Laundering Act, contains provisions on administrative measures intended to prevent financial activities and other business activities being exploited for money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The regulations have been designed on the basis that the risks are different for different companies and that companies assess the risk in their own business by analysing customers, products, services, distribution channels, geographical areas, etc. Certain payment services, such as money transfers, can be exploited for criminal activities. The regulations have been tightened in the Payment Services Act (2010:751), which entered into force on 1 August 2010. The new Act makes higher demands across the board on these companies concerning competence and experience, for example, Sweden has signed the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. The question of Sweden's accession to the Convention is being considered within the framework of the 2010 Money Laundering Inquiry (ToR 2010:80). According to its terms of reference the Inquiry is to present its findings no later than 20 February 2012.

A cross-agency national specialist function has been established for matters relating to the proceeds of crime. It consists of experts from the National Police Board, the Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau, the Swedish Prosecution Authority, the Swedish Customs, the Swedish Tax Agency and the Swedish Enforcement Authority. The activities of this function are an important part of the possibilities of effectively tracing, securing, confiscating and returning proceeds made from crime, including the financing of terrorism.

Work on evaluating and improving the system for countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism will continue to have priority.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an important forum for international cooperation to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FATF is an inter-governmental body that was formed in 1989 and currently has 36 members. At present the FATF has 40 recommendations concerning money laundering and 9 recommendations specially concerned with the financing of terrorism. These politically binding recommendations make far-reaching demands on member countries' legislation and organisation in areas including the criminalisation of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, customer due diligence for actors in financial services and other business activities, reporting requirements concerning suspicious transactions to

the Financial Intelligence Units and requirements for supervisory authorities and effective sanction systems. The FATF also has a process for the evaluation of members' compliance with the requirements in its recommendations. An evaluation completed in 2010 showed that Sweden was in compliance with FATF requirements under 47 of 49 recommendations and therefore belongs to a limited group of countries that are in compliance with the regulations to such a high degree.

Cooperation in the EU includes measures to detect and counter the financing of terrorism. For example, the Commission has started an investigation on the possibilities of presenting a proposal for a Terrorist Finance Tracking System that is intended to be able to trace and obtain information about monetary transactions carried out to finance terrorist crime. Other measures include common regulatory frameworks, for example Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community.

Targeted sanctions – the freezing of suspected terrorists' assets – have increasingly come to be used as an additional method of preventing the collection of funds for terrorists and their activities. Freezing mechanisms exist under both EU and UN regimes. Sweden is bound by international and EU law to apply these sanctions and also does so. The legal basis in the EU for this type of measure has changed as a result of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty of Lisbon). Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides the single legal basis for taking restrictive measures of all kinds, including the freezing of assets, in order to implement the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and these measures can be used against a third country and natural and legal persons that are not states. According to the new Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU may establish, within the framework of measures to make the EU an area of freedom, security and justice, a special mechanism for implementing certain economic sanctions against natural persons or legal non-state entities also within the EU. Sweden is following developments in this matter carefully and is in favour of the EU starting as soon as possible a process towards a common sanctions process in the EU consistent with the rule of law also in accordance with the new possibilities provided by the Treaty of Lisbon.

Like many other countries, Sweden has expressed criticism of due process deficiencies in the sanctions systems. Under the impression of various judgments and following strong pressure from Sweden and other like-minded countries the Security Council has gradually improved the procedures in the UN system and thereby also in the EU system. Now reasons are issued for UN decisions and the list of individuals and groups subject to sanctions is reviewed regularly. An ombudsperson function has been set up at the UN to assist in investigations of delisting cases. The Ombudsperson has also been given a right to make recommendations. Unlike the system in the EU, it is still not possible in the UN system for a party to have their case heard by an impartial court. Sweden's efforts have contributed to improvements, but some deficiencies remain. The Government intends to continue to call for improvement and refinement of the international sanctions instruments

so as to guarantee due process and respect for international law, including human rights. This is primarily to be done by further strengthening the role of the Ombudsperson, working for clear criteria at EU level for which persons, groups and entities, etc. can be put on the sanctions lists and ensuring that those listed are given clear reasons. Delisting processes should also be simplified and due process should be ensured, for example, by improving the possibilities of a reviewing freezing decisions.

Knowledge and intelligence

The responsible agencies need to be able to form a relevant picture of potential threats. Knowledge and intelligence is needed about suspects, possible methods, environments where perpetrators operate and what their possible motives and drivers may be. It should be possible to identify perpetrators who intend to carry out terrorist attacks irrespective of whether they have a political agenda, are driven by hate of society or are so mentally ill that they are a danger to other people's lives. The application of the various tools, procedural investigatory measures and other bodies of regulations is another area that needs to be followed up continually

In general it is important that the development of police methods is based on documented experience from exercises and real incidents and on proven methods and science. This requires, for example, relevant expertise among individuals and effective monitoring and evaluation of working methods. It is just as important that the knowledge is shared with actors affected in a satisfactory way. The Swedish Security Service and Swedish Police are following up and evaluating the terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011 and the suicide attack in Stockholm in December 2010. Following up of incidents and exercises can answer questions about why something could happen and how the incident was managed. Over and above this, there is scope for research that does more to answer questions about how threats and perpetrators can be discovered and identified in time to be able to prevent attacks or reduce threats. This can include how existing information is structured, analysed and assessed and the use made of the expertise available within the police organisation and other relevant agencies.

The National Laboratory of Forensic Science (SKL) has expert knowledge of forensic methods, which is a knowledge-intensive area. The SKL has, for example, considerable expertise regarding the detection of explosives. It remains of great importance to continually maintain and improve knowledge in that area. The SKL can further broaden its knowledge through international cooperation. The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Armed Forces also have expert knowledge and experience of forensic methods that have, for example, been used in the operation in Afghanistan. There is scope for more developed collaboration between the agencies affected in this area.

The importance of the Internet has an impact in many areas of counter-terrorism. The Internet provides possibilities of communication to and from the general public, which is positive. The Internet gives both

government agencies and the general public some insight into extremist environments, too. The Internet has also created more possibilities for advocates of terrorism to relatively easily spread their messages, try to recruit and communicate some knowledge about, for example, carrying out attacks or manufacturing explosives. To be able to identify potential threats the law enforcement agencies must conduct targeted surveillance and intelligence work in environments where the threats may appear. One of these environments is the Internet. More knowledge is needed about how the Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Swedish Police can identify individuals on the Internet who intend to commit terrorist crimes without violating the fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly the right to a private life, and freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

There is also a need of knowledge among the general public about what terrorism is and how the Swedish Security Service and other agencies are working to counter terrorism. If the general public has an insight into the threat picture and counter-terrorism work, greater understanding can be established both for what terrorism is and for the measures taken by the agencies. This will create conditions to enable the general public to contribute to agencies' work on discovering and stopping attacks. If there is a will to contribute information to the law enforcement agencies, there should be clear and modern channels for doing so. The attention of the general public is an important resource for the police and can sometimes play a crucial role in law enforcement. This area can be developed. The Government therefore stresses the need to further develop the possibilities for the general public to contact law enforcement agencies so as to be able to contribute to the discovery of, for example, preparations for terrorist crime.

Special control of activities to pursue attacks

The control of and insight into the activities conducted by the law enforcement agencies to pursue terrorist attacks is a central part of work to build up confidence in these activities. This is done in several different ways. It is also important for the Swedish Government to monitor that existing and future international cooperation is conducted while retaining full protection for personal details and the right to private life.

The Parliamentary Ombudsmen, the Chancellor of Justice and the Swedish National Audit Office exercise different forms of regular supervision of government agencies and officials, including the Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Swedish Police. They can, for example, carry out investigations on their own initiative or investigate complaints made by individuals. The Riksdag receives information about the activities of the Swedish Security Service through the consultations held each year with representatives of the Riksdag parties that sit in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. In addition, the Swedish Commission on Security and Integrity Protection, which has parliamentary governance, has been set up. The special task of this Commission is to exercise supervision of the use by the law enforcement agencies of covert surveillance. Its supervision also covers qualified

assumed identities and associated activities and the processing of personal data by the Swedish Security Service. At the request of an individual, the Commission is obliged to check whether he or she has been the subject of covert surveillance or subject to processing of personal data by the Swedish Security Service. This control includes an assessment of whether the use of surveillance or the processing of personal data was in accordance with a law or other statute. On 1 March 2012 a new Police Data Act (2010:361) will enter into force. The Act will bring important improvements in the possibilities for the Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Swedish Police to use personal data in an appropriate way without violating personal integrity. The Commission on Security and Integrity Protection will be given new tasks in connection with the entry into force of the Act. Then both the Commission and the Swedish Data Inspection Board will exercise supervision of the processing of personal data in the activities of both the Swedish Security Service and other parts of the Swedish Police.

The Government follows the activities of the law enforcement agencies regularly and regulations may be reviewed when required. From time to time more extensive examinations are conducted, for example as was done through the Security Commission and the Insight Inquiry.

5.3 Preparing for the eventuality of an attack occurring

In brief: *Preparing* for the eventuality of a terrorist attack occurring is intended to put adequate protection in place for individuals and for essential functions, IT systems and installations. Preparing also involves being able to manage the consequences of an attack effectively. Important measures include:

- reducing the risk that dangerous chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances are used in terrorist attacks and improving the consequence management of such an incident;
- increasing the control of firearms, explosives and substances that can be important components of explosives;
- strengthening IT security; and
- improving cross-sectoral planning and exercises.

In open society, vulnerability to terrorist attacks is high and protecting society from such attacks is a complex task. Protective security issues are particularly demanding since the Government wants to retain our open society with accessibility to the different institutions in society. Society is vulnerable not only to terrorist attacks but, perhaps primarily, to serious accidents and natural disasters. To achieve success in work to prepare and protect society effectively should a terrorist attack occur, protection needs to be geared to handle a broad spectrum of threats, one of which is the threat from terrorism.

Making relevant preparations also requires a good early warning capability and a structure for sounding the alarm in time and in the right way. Effective protection therefore presupposes intelligence about threats and a correct assessment of the threats both in the short term and in a longer strategic perspective. It is also important to assess the risks and

vulnerabilities in society and make preparations on the basis of that assessment. If Sweden or Swedish interests abroad are hit by a serious terrorist attack, a capability to manage its consequences effectively is needed. A rapid return to normality helps to reduce the effects of a terrorist attack. The better prepared the responsible authorities and other parties are, the better such an incident can be managed.

A range of agencies are responsible for their important public installations and functions and they therefore also have responsibility for preparations in the light of the risks and vulnerabilities in their case. The overall protection and preparedness activities relate to all types of situations that threaten essential services or test preparedness, such as natural disasters and accidents. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) has a special responsibility for developing, coordinating and supporting the capability of society to manage accidents and crises. In this context the Government wishes to stress the ongoing reform of the Swedish Armed Forces, under which the resources in the form of personnel and equipment developed for its operational organisation will, when required, be made more accessible to assist other parts of society and other agencies within the framework of the relevant regulations. It is therefore important to include the Swedish Armed Forces in preparatory work, including planning and exercises. Municipalities and county councils have a special responsibility for reducing vulnerability in their services and have good capacity to manage crisis situations. Private actors need to continue to take their responsibility in efforts to attain reduced vulnerability and satisfactory consequence management. The responsible authorities should assist them in their work in the way that each responsible authority assesses as appropriate.

The Government's objectives stem from an endeavour to:

- protect essential functions and installations more effectively and adapt protection to an assessment of the threat picture and vulnerability and set priorities based on protection value;
- more effectively impede and prevent unauthorised persons from gaining access to firearms, explosives or dangerous substances that can be used in attacks;
- increase the understanding of the meaning of the responsibility principle;
- organise more exercises for crisis management at different levels and with the relevant agencies in different contexts and make use of documented experience of exercises, actual incidents and evaluations;
- improve the security of essential IT systems in society
- deepen and improve collaboration and cooperation between the responsible authorities, civil society and private actors and clarify the division of responsibility in preparatory and operational work;
- develop the capability to communicate both between agencies and with the general public;
- ensure resource-effective preparedness that has sustainable, long-term funding; and
- increase efforts to identify, plan, conduct joint exercises and make use of the resources currently available at the agencies

affected, especially their possibilities of drawing on relevant resources held by the Swedish Armed Forces.

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Measures

National and international cooperation and collaboration

National and local collaboration in the event of an incident like a terrorist attack can be developed further. Cross-sectoral planning and exercises improve the capability for cooperation between agencies and other actors involved. Collaboration is needed to be able to encompass all the needs of command, control and coordination of operations, information, medical care, transport, evidence preservation and fire defence, etc. Collaboration based on the responsibility principle functions well, but with respect to the management of the consequences of a terrorist attack there is scope to further develop cooperation. Over and above this, strategies and special action plans, be they cross-agency plans or specific plans, can contribute to a satisfactory level of preparedness.

The Government has strengthened civil emergency preparedness through the formation of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in January 2009. The MSB is responsible for questions of accident protection, emergency preparedness and civil defence where no other agency has that responsibility. Before, during and after crises the MSB has coordinating and supporting tasks. The MSB is to develop and support civil emergency preparedness for accidents and crises and take a proactive role in work to reduce vulnerability. The MSB also has to work on coordination between the actors affected in society, help to reduce consequences, follow up and evaluate work on emergency preparedness and ensure that training and exercises are conducted in the Agency's area of responsibility. The reform of the Swedish Armed Forces improves the possibilities of using its resources in support of other agencies.

To improve coordination in the Government Offices a Crisis Management Coordination Secretariat has also been established. The senior official for crisis management is responsible for developing, coordinating and following up crisis management in the Government Offices and for the necessary preparations for this. The overall objective of the Secretariat is to always be able to support the Government in ensuring effective crisis management.

The Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council is a good point of contact between the agencies affected. The Council has initiated exercises and decided on evaluations. For example, the FOI is carrying out an evaluation for the Council of collaboration between its agencies in the cases of the increase of the threat level on 1 October 2010 and the attack in Stockholm on 11 December 2010. Exercises conducted have, for example, dealt with serious situations in the metro in Stockholm or the capability to receive help from or give resources to another country.

The Duty Officer function is in place at the agencies that have a specially designated responsibility for our capacity to manage a crisis situation, including the Government Offices. This function is on standby around the clock so as to be able to act in the event of serious accidents,

crises and disasters in Sweden and abroad. It is to be able to assist and provide support for coordination between Swedish agencies in crisis situations and certain officials are to be able to assist EU and UN bodies. This function responds to or brokers inquiries about support in the form of resources or experts for operations nationally, in the EU and internationally.

In recent years consular preparedness has also been developed and improved so as to be able to rapidly and adequately look after Swedes who have been affected by a major crisis abroad. The Act on State Responsibility in the Event of Disasters Abroad (2010:813) regulates and clarifies the task of the state in the event of a crisis abroad. The emergency preparedness obligations of missions abroad include preparedness planning including consular risk and vulnerability analyses. There is well-developed collaboration between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' own consular task force and the Joint Response Team coordinated by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. This Team includes the Police and the National Board of Health and Welfare. Extensive training and exercise programmes have been conducted for several years in this area.

In the EU there is great potential for relief actions in the spirit of solidarity if required. A number of activities are under way in the area; for example, the Commission has presented a Communication on a stronger European response capacity focusing on civil protection and humanitarian assistance. With the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon an obligation was introduced in the EU for Member States to help one another in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster under the "solidarity clause" in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Work is in progress in the EU on adopting more detailed rules for when and how Member States will be able to assist one another. Moreover, effective cooperation requires international planning and exercises.

The experience of the influenza pandemic in 2009 has clearly shown that cooperation at EU level and internationally is necessary to be able to manage different types of spread of infections and also other substances, which can also be relevant for counter-terrorism. The International Health Regulations (IHR) are intended to provide protection against international threats to public health and cover all types of infectious agents or other substances irrespective of their origin and source that can be a serious threat to human health.

The capability to manage crises that may arise as a result of a terrorist attack will also be developed in accordance with the Government Communication *Civil emergency preparedness – stronger collaboration for increased security* (Govt. Comm. 2009/10:124).

Research and development

It is essential to conduct research and development in order to be able to prepare effectively for future threats. Every agency is responsible for retaining and developing knowledge of preparatory work in its area. The responsible agencies need to have access to expert support and to be able

to benefit in an adequate way from previously documented lessons learned. The results of evaluations of exercises and incidents need to be taken on board and transformed into new knowledge that is shared with the persons affected, government agencies and other parties affected. Scientific research is also needed to obtain a higher level of knowledge about how people in Sweden react to a terrorist attack. This can involve confidence in various modes of transport, the banking system or being in crowds and ultimately confidence in the functions of society. A large number of actors are conducting research and knowledge development work that can contribute to this preparatory work. Some of them are mentioned below and some under other headings in this section.

The Swedish Security Service is responsible for maintaining detailed knowledge about the threat picture. In this context the Service has close contact with the research community and other relevant actors.

The National Laboratory of Forensic Science (SKL) has special expertise for forensic methods that are of crucial importance for the capability to collect evidence of suspected terrorist crime in the event of an incident.

The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) is an important actor in this research area. By means of budget appropriations and as directed by the Government the FOI maintains extensive expertise with respect to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances and explosives and the potential criminal use of these substances. The FOI also participates in the EU's security research programme, which includes terrorism. Area surveillance, mass transport security, border and airport controls, security in goods transport and operational crisis management are areas in which the FOI is involved. For example, together with the Swedish Transport Agency and Swedavia and other actors the FOI has examined the possibilities of improving airport protection in order to discover and locate interference with communication and positioning systems. The FOI also provides expert support to various other agencies, including training for CBRN instructors, support for the Police concerning firearms and explosives and forensic support to the SKL.

Through the Total Defence NBC Centre the Swedish Armed Forces arrange extensive training in the CBRN area. These activities, which are also offered to other Swedish agencies, include possibilities of carrying out qualified training and exercise activities in a live operational environment.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) finances and coordinates a number of research projects as part of the national security research programme. This research includes remote detection of explosive substances, monitoring of drinking water, virus detection, the monitoring of nuclear power plants using IR cameras, information security and forensic methods. The Agency has also developed methods for cross-sectoral impact analyses regarding risks and vulnerabilities in society and as support for decision-makers in the event of different incidents.

Several higher education institutions are conducting study and analysis activities, holding conferences and providing training programmes, etc. in this area. For example, the Swedish National Defence College as well as Chalmers University of Technology and Uppsala University that are

doing research work in the area of non-proliferation with funding from the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority.

Research and development is also taking place through international agreements, for example the Swedish-American agreement on research and development questions in the area of civil security. The Government may need to enter into further similar international agreements with other countries on research and development. Large parts of the research community need funding to be able to make well-founded assessments of what preparations are required so as to also be able to meet the threat of terrorism in the future.

Information security

Today almost all information, both open and secret, is handled in IT systems, in many cases in web-based systems. A number of essential services are dependent on IT systems for control, regulation and monitoring. These IT systems risk being exposed to unauthorised impacts and may be targets for terrorist attacks. IT systems can also be used as means for attacks. Important parts of general work on information security are relevant to action to meet the threat from terrorism, for instance so as to be able to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.

According to the responsibility principle, responsibility for IT security rests on the party responsible for a particular service or activity. However, some agencies have a specially designated responsibility for information security (the Swedish Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Defence Materiel Administration, the Swedish Post and Telecom Agency and the Swedish Security Service).

In recent years the Swedish Security Service has also focused, in the context of its advisory and supervisory responsibility, on preventing serious electronic attacks aimed at essential IT systems. This work is carried out in cooperation with the high-value services. The Swedish Security Service also analyses and investigates the serious electronic attacks that have affected and are affecting essential services.

The National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) have special knowledge about and access to unique information in the area of information security. For example, the FRA has developed a technical detection and warning system for essential services and critical infrastructure. The FRA supports information security work in government agencies and state-owned companies that handle sensitive information and is the state resource for technical information security. This support can consist of penetration tests, network mapping and technical advice. To increase awareness in society the FRA holds lectures, technical demonstrations and training courses. The FRA provides expert support to other agencies in questions concerning regulatory and encryption expertise in cooperation with the MUST and the MSB. In addition, the FRA plays an operational role by supporting the Swedish Security Service, for example, in managing serious IT incidents, breaches of data security and

other types of attacks. Together with the Swedish Security Service and the MSB, the Swedish Armed Forces have the right to issue regulations in the area of information security. As part of their supervisory responsibility the Swedish Security Service and the Swedish Armed Forces support other government agencies and the defence industry in security protection matters, including in the IT area. The Swedish Armed Forces also lead and coordinate the signals protection service and work on encryption for high-value information for defence purposes.

The Swedish Post and Telecom Agency (PTS) has the right to issue regulations regarding the operational reliability of telecommunications operators and protection of information in electronic communication. PTS is responsible for convening a national telecommunications liaison group in the event of serious incidents. PTS also works on network security and Internet security.

Information security is closely linked to cross-sectoral crisis management since the consequences of a serious IT incident after an attack can affect essential services in several sectors. The MSB is therefore responsible for the coordination of work on society's information security and for analysing and assessing international developments in the area. The MSB has to provide advice and support for the preventive work being carried out by other government agencies, municipalities, county councils and by companies and organisations. The MSB has also worked on a strategy for society's information security, an action plan for society's information security and a national management plan for serious IT incidents. The MSB contributes to collaboration between agencies with special responsibility for society's information security (SAMFI) and liaison groups for information sharing in various sectors. Via the Computer Emergency Response Team – Sweden (CERT-SE) – the MSB can obtain information about incidents and vulnerability. The Swedish Armed Forces' knowledge and experience of running and protecting valuable information systems can be used for preventive purposes or as support in the event of serious attacks on essential services. One example of this is the Swedish Armed Forces' special IT defence unit that is intended to protect their activities, but could also be used as support for other agencies.

The Government considers that exercises are an important feature of work to strengthen society's information security. Sweden has participated in several international exercises in the area of information security, for example Cyber Europe 2010 and the US exercise Cyberstorm III. At national level the MSB has arranged NISÖ, an information security exercise, with participants from the public and private sectors. Another example is the exercises that the PTS holds every other year with telecommunications operators and, most recently, also with the electricity industry. The Government also considers that it is important to include information security issues in work on risk, vulnerability and security analyses.

On 8 December 2011 the Government decided to conduct a review of the Protective Security Act. The remit of the Inquiry includes reviewing what activities are of importance for national security or need to be protected from terrorism and are therefore in need of protection. One

important part of the review will relate to information security. The inquiry is to report on its assignment by 30 April 2014 at the latest.

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Effective crisis communication and medical care

One of the most serious consequences of a terrorist attack, over and above the direct damage caused by the attack, is the worry that affects the population. Crisis communication is needed to establish trust, prevent disinformation, communicate decisions, help those affected among other reasons. If the general public is deeply worried, this can have hard to foresee consequences for essential services and may also hamper society's crisis management. In the event of a terrorist attack it is therefore very important that agencies and the other actors responsible communicate well-considered, correct and consistent information to the general public and the media.

The question of communication between agencies and with the general public may be of crucial importance for the course of a crisis or incident after a terrorist attack. Communication with the general public should be characterised by openness and speed and be correct and coordinated among responsible actors.

In the case of the attack on 11 December 2010 in Stockholm the Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council played an important role for the exchange of information between government agencies. The Council can help to strengthen the planning and structure for communication between agencies and with the general public, for example by means of a common communication strategy for the Council. Clear routines for communication between agencies can be strengthened by joint operational exercises.

The MSB is to provide assistance in the form of supporting resources in connection with serious accidents and support the coordination of measures taken by the relevant agencies in a crisis. The MSB exercises its coordinating role in various ways, including support for coordinated decision-making for the authorities responsible and liaison conferences with both county administrative boards and nationwide agencies. The MSB also provides methods, networks and services that can be used by agencies affected in contact with the general public, such as the website www.krisinformation.se and a cross-agency telephone service that is set up when incidents occur to handle questions from the general public. The MSB works on developing preparedness, receiving alarms, maintaining a continuously updated situation overview, conducting horizon scanning and making in-depth analyses. The MSB has continued to develop WIS, which is a national web-based information system for facilitating information-sharing between actors in the Swedish crisis management system before, during and after a crisis.

To strengthen Sweden's crisis management capability the Riksdag has decided to introduce a national communications system for command, control and collaboration – RAKEL (Radio communication for effective command and control). RAKEL facilitates communication in organisations working on public order, security, safety and health, and makes their collaboration more effective.

Preparatory work also includes the possibilities for individuals to receive care and be able to assist one another in the event of an attack. It is important for people to be aware of what to do to seek and receive help and for people to also have some training in fire extinguishing and first aid. Over and above a high general level of medical care, a disaster medicine capacity is also needed to be able to take care of individuals injured in an attack. The Swedish Air Ambulance Service (SNAM) has the capability to carry out air transport with intensive care capacity.

Protection of essential installations and functions

In order to protect essential installations and functions in society work has long been under way to reduce their vulnerability. As long ago as 1990 explicit protection against terrorist crime was added to the then Installations Protection Act. The present Installations Protection Act (2010:305) entered into force on 1 July 2010. The Act makes it possible to decide on qualified protection for certain protected objects, for example buildings, other installations and areas and military vessels and aircraft. The provisions of the Installations Protection Act make it legally possible to set up physical barriers to access, give security personnel certain powers and be able to guard protected sites with the assistance of police, military or other specially appointed staff. The Government has given the MSB the task of preparing a national strategy for the protection of services that are essential to the functioning of society.

The Government has instructed the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority to carry out a review in consultation with the National Police Board, the Swedish National Grid and the MSB of the capability of licence-holders and society to protect nuclear installations and transports of nuclear substances from antagonistic threats.

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has produced a plan for the management of all radioactive waste. One question that is being investigated is the need for better control of the import of radioactive substances from countries outside the EU.

Attacks on the food production can harm people or animals directly or indirectly. An attack on forest production can also entail similar risks. Drinking water has a unique capacity to spread infection and poisoning. These areas in particular are sensitive to attacks using biological or chemical substances; attacks that can cause major economic losses and human suffering. Moreover, new biotechnical applications risk leading to new threat pictures. The secure laboratories of the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control carry out diagnoses of certain rare infectious agents and unknown organisms and substances. The Institute also has 24/7 laboratory preparedness and can assist the Nordic and Baltic countries by analysing suspected highly infectious agents. There are also laboratories that are members of the European Laboratory Network for the monitoring and analysis of suspected serious infections.

The Government is taking precautions to prevent and alleviate the harm caused by sabotage and other property damage that can affect Sweden's food supply and to prevent the intentional pollution of drinking water. The Government intends to supplement the expertise currently

available in the agencies that usually work on emergency preparedness. The Ordinance for the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences has therefore been amended to state that the University shall identify and analyse, in the light of scientific findings, the risks of research results being used for antagonistic purposes against agricultural and food production.

The transport sector is another area with protection value. The Swedish Transport Agency is the authority responsible for several protective security regulations and great weight is given to being able to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack or other incident that can cause severe disruptions to the Swedish transport sector.

The protection of road and rail transport should be strengthened by more effective supervision of the transport of dangerous goods and better communication with industry about the protection regulations on transport security that are in force. The Government may consider whether the transport security regulations for dangerous goods should cover all modes of transport. The European Commission has initiated work on transport security in urban areas, rail and metro stations for example, where the Swedish Transport Administration is the Swedish focal point. The Police work to ensure security in traffic and especially commercial traffic, including the transport of dangerous goods. In the EU there is a network for cooperation on police road safety issues called TISPOL.

Shipping and ports make up an important part of the transport sector. In this area the Swedish Maritime Administration is responsible for important infrastructure. The Police, Swedish Coast Guard and Swedish Customs meet regularly to discuss the need for changes to legislation and the application of existing regulations for the marine environment and to conduct exercises, etc. The Police also take part in the network for police force collaboration in marine and port issues funded by the EU. The general Swedish Marine Initiative deals with questions concerning terrorism aimed at shipping.

Aviation requires special protection on account of its vulnerability. The Swedish Police participate in regular meetings with the Swedish Transport Agency to develop protection and discuss the need for regulatory change, for example. The Police also participate in international cooperation in Airpol, which is a network for police cooperation on air security. In the EU work is in progress on strengthening security concerning air freight transport based on current threat and risk assessments for points of departure and destinations, etc. Several incidents and exercises have demonstrated the need for effectiveness in maintaining security at airports and on board aircraft. There is scope for further efforts by all the actors responsible so as to meet the requirement of satisfactory security at our airports.

The EU has put in place a Directive on the protection of critical infrastructure, the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, EPCIP. The risks of terrorist attacks are an important part of the EPCIP, even though the Directive covers all types of risks including natural disasters and accidents. Together with other authorities, the MSB has tested a pilot version of special IT support for information about warnings, which is included in EPCIP and is called the Critical

Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). Moreover, the EU has begun work on stress tests in the security area in with Sweden as a participant.

A large part of work to secure the protection and operation of essential installations and functions is carried out by private actors. It is important that private actors also take their responsibility as owners or operators of these critical functions and installations, for example the infrastructure that underlies electricity supply and telecommunications. They should therefore be involved in collaboration work in the way that is assessed by the responsible authorities as appropriate in each individual case.

Control of dangerous substances and weapons

Attacks using some form of weapon involving CBRN substances can cause great damage even when the design is primitive. The risk of terrorists acquiring such weapons is low, but the impact if they were to do so can be considerable, at both the mental and the physical level. The attacks in the Tokyo metro in 1995 and the anthrax letters in 2001 clearly demonstrate the consequences of the use of CBRN substances. Sweden has played a proactive role in realising the EU Action Plan on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security. This Action Plan is intended to counter the use of such substances in terrorist attacks and to improve the consequence management of any CBRN incident. Sweden is deeply involved in implementing the Action Plan on a broad national footing.

The coordinating role of the MSB in crisis preparedness also covers the area of CBRN and explosive substances with collaboration taking place in the dangerous substances collaboration area, for instance. This coordination also includes situation reports and the leadership of liaison groups. The MSB has been instructed by the Government to report compilations of measures planned and taken in the CBRN and explosive substances area at all levels, including those linked to international cooperation and exercises. The Government has also instructed the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and the Swedish Customs to review society's capability to control radioactive substances at Sweden's borders; their report in this assignment is to be presented no later than 29 February 2012.

There is a Health Security Committee in the EU. In December 2011 the European Commission presented a proposal for a legal instrument on serious cross-border threats to health. The proposal involves extending the work of the Health Security Committee to cover all kinds of threats to human health, except threats of radiological or nuclear origin. In the proposal the Commission makes clear demands on Member States to coordinate their preparedness planning.

At EU level an action plan has also been produced to improve safety concerning explosives. The action plan has a crime-prevention perspective, focusing especially on the threat from terrorism. At national level the MSB and the Police are leading a working group for the implementation of the action plan that includes the relevant agencies.

The European Commission has proposed a regulation on the marketing and use of explosives precursors. The purpose of the regulation is to limit access by the general public to high concentrations of certain chemicals that can be misused by being used in the manufacture of explosives.

Work on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) contributes to the general fight against terrorism. A range of multilateral cooperation is under way in this area, including cooperation through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the conventions that ban biological, toxic and chemical weapons and a number of international export control regimes. Sweden also takes part in international initiatives that have been taken to counter what is described as WMD terrorism. This includes the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540, action in the G8 Global Partnership on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the Global Initiative to combat nuclear terrorism. Other important instruments are the International Convention on Combating Nuclear Terrorism, which Sweden signed in 2005, and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to which Sweden has been a party since 1980. One purpose of that Convention is to stop nuclear material falling into the wrong hands. The question of Sweden's accession to the Convention on Combating Nuclear Terrorism is currently being processed in the Government Offices. Sweden is also taking part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which was launched in 2003 with the purpose of preventing weapons of mass destruction or components of such weapons being transported to or from unauthorised destinations.

One important part of the implementation of measures in this area involves informing companies and research institutes that have advanced knowledge in this area of what the risks are. In April 2010 Sweden took part, as one of 47 countries, in a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington to consider how states should minimise the risk of terrorists gaining access to sensitive nuclear or radioactive material for the purpose of causing mass destruction or spreading radioactivity. The participating states agreed on a number of measures to strengthen the protection of particularly sensitive nuclear material in order to prevent terrorists gaining access to the material. Sweden participates actively in this cooperation and is going to take part in the follow-up summit to be held in Seoul in 2012. At national level a range of agencies work on non-proliferation, in addition to the Government Offices. They include the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the Swedish Security Service, the Swedish Defence Research Agency and the Swedish Customs.

The Government has tightened the control of the handling of weapons in the country. Sweden recently acceded to the UN Firearms Protocol. This Protocol is intended to strengthen cooperation between states in order to prevent and counter the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms. The legislative amendments required to enable Sweden to accede to the Protocol entered into force on 1 July 2011. Briefly, under the amendments firearms, their parts and components and packages containing ammunition must be marked when manufactured. Firearms

and parts and components imported to Sweden permanently must also be marked. At the same time the Swedish Customs was given the right to carry out control visits and audits at any party who imports firearms to or exports firearms from Sweden. On 9 June 2011 the Government decided to instruct the National Police Board and the Swedish Customs to jointly map the scale of illicit firearm imports and the methods used. The purpose of this assignment is to reduce the illicit import of firearms into Sweden. The report on this assignment is to be submitted on 30 September 2012 at the latest. The Government has recently decided to obtain the opinion of the Council on Legislation on proposed amendments to firearms legislation. The proposals referred to the Council on Legislation in *Certain measures to counter illicit weapons* include clarifying the crime of serious firearm offence and tightening the requirements for firearms dealers.

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6 Continuous follow-up

The Government will follow up the national counter-terrorism strategy. The agencies concerned are expected to report relevant measures to the Government and follow up these measures continuously in the usual reporting process in annual reports, presentations of assignments, reports and in other ways. Other follow-up and evaluation methods may also be applied when appropriate. Success will be assessed against the objectives set out in the strategy.

Ministry of Justice

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Extract from the minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, 9 February 2012

Present: Minister Björklund, chair, and Ministers Bildt, Ask, Larsson, Erlandsson, Carlsson, Borg, Sabuni, Adelsohn Liljeroth, Tolgfors, Ohlsson, Attefall, Engström, Kristersson, Hatt, Ek, Lööf

Minister responsible: Minister Ask

The Government adopts Communication 2011/12:73 Responsibility and commitment – a national counter-terrorism strategy

This Communication presents an updated national counter-terrorism strategy so as to clarify the Government's starting points and give an account of how Sweden is meeting the threat of terrorism.

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