House of Commons
Home Affairs Committee

The work of the Border Force

Sixth Report of Session 2012–13

Report, together with formal minutes

Ordered by the House of Commons
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The Home Affairs Committee

The Home Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies.

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Powers
The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication
The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/homeaffairscom.

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1 Introduction

1. In March this year—following concern about the routine suspension of border checks at Heathrow and other ports of entry—the Home Secretary separated the Border Force from the UK Border Agency. The Home Secretary intends that the split will engender a change in management culture and help Border Force to form a stronger identity as a law enforcement organisation.

2. As we have said in our previous reports we do not accept that the UK Border Agency is in practice an agency of the Home Office because it is integrated into the accountability structures of the department. Border Force, although now separate from the Agency, is also integrated into the Department’s accountability structures.

3. Alongside our regular scrutiny of the UK Border Agency we will now be monitoring the work of the Border Force on a biannual basis. Because of the chaotic scenes witnessed earlier this year, and again more recently, at ports across the UK, this report will focus on the issue of passport queues. We are also developing a set of measures which we will use to monitor the performance of the Border Force in all areas of its work. These will include: customs seizures, progress in rolling out e-Borders and its coordination with the National Crime Agency (NCA).

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1 See Home Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2010–12, UK Border Controls, HC 1647, for a detailed examination of these events.
2 HC Deb, 20 February 2012, col. 623
Passport queues

Background

4. In April this year port operators and carriers began to warn that passport queues for passengers entering the country were becoming unacceptably long. Pictures of long queues at Heathrow Airport, where some passengers had to wait for two to three hours to enter the UK, were beamed around the world. Other airports, such as Gatwick, Stansted and London City also experienced difficulties. At Birmingham Airport on 29 March “technical difficulties” resulted in passengers being held in the immigration hall for so long that 25 crossed the border without waiting to be checked. Similar, serious problems had also been experienced by Eurotunnel on 2 January, when passengers had to queue for up to four hours to pass through the UK border controls. British Airways, the British Airports Authority and Virgin Atlantic told us that, although the problem had become particularly acute only fairly recently, they had been concerned about the build-up of passport queues since 2010.

5. The Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) and Immigration Services Union, representing staff in the Border Force, blamed cuts in staffing for the long queues, Border Force management blamed carriers, at least in part, for providing inaccurate information about arrivals while the Immigration Minister emphasised external factors, such as prevailing winds affecting the order in which flights landed. After intervention by the Prime Minister, the Home Office introduced new measures to address excessive queues. Mobile teams were introduced at Heathrow and the construction of a central control room there was announced. This model enables extra staff to be deployed to different parts of the airport as queues build up. Employment of new Border Force staff for the reopening of Heathrow Terminal 2 has also been brought forward to give a continued boost to staffing levels after temporary Olympic staff have left.

6. This report examines the evidence about the extent of the problem and the contributing factors. It will also assess possible solutions to improve queue times and the experience of passengers arriving in the UK.

Queue times

7. The Border Force has service standard targets to process 95% of non-EEA passengers through immigration within 45 minutes and 95% of EEA passengers through immigration within 25 minutes. There was dispute throughout April as to how long immigration
queues actually were and what proportion of passengers were being processed within service-standard times.

**Border Force’s queue times**

**Heathrow**

8. The Immigration Minister said in his statement to Parliament that, in the first two weeks of April, 99% of EEA passengers had cleared immigration in less than 25 minutes and 96% of non-EEA passengers in less than 45 minutes. He stated that the maximum queuing time over the preceding weekend had been one hour and thirty minutes on 27 April. This, he said, bore “no resemblance” to some of the “wilder suggestions” that were being bandied around.

9. The Minister’s figures relate to Heathrow only and were taken from Border Force data. Border Force monitor queues on an hourly basis by handing a ticket to the last person in the queue and recording how long it takes them to get to the immigration desks. Using these measurements, Border Force calculate that at Heathrow in the first two weeks of April it met its service standards for EEA passengers every day, and on 11 out of 15 days for non-EEA passengers.

**Nationwide**

10. Border Force state that nationally in the 2011/12 financial year, 98.4% of EEA passengers and 95.6% of non-EEA passengers cleared immigration within their respective target times. Maximum queue times experienced by both EEA and non-EEA passengers over the previous year were stated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2011</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2011</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2011</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2011</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1:55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2011</td>
<td>2:30</td>
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</table>

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11 HC Deb, 30 April 2012, col 1258
12 HC Deb, 30 April 2012, col 1258
13 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 64
14 HC Deb, 30 April 2012, col 1258
15 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 62
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Maximum queuing time (hours : minutes)</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2012</td>
<td>2:15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 2012</td>
<td>2:53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 2012</td>
<td>2:30</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>2:18</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Maximum queue times for 2011–2012 EEA and non-EEA passengers at all UK ports

11. We acknowledge that maximum queue times may only be experienced by a small proportion of passengers although the evidence is not as clear as it should be. However we are alarmed that maximum times have been consistently very high for the last 12 months. Maximum queue times of two hours or more should be a rare occurrence, corresponding to extraordinary levels of traffic, a security alert or a problem at one or more major ports. It is unacceptable for these long queue times to recur on a monthly basis.

**BAA’s queue times**

12. The only port for which we have a set of measures of queue times other than those of the Border Force is Heathrow, where BAA hands out a ticket to the last person in line every 15 minutes. The airport operator started to measure queue times last summer as it became increasingly concerned about passenger reactions to the long queues. BAA also conducts a monthly passenger survey, which shows declining passenger satisfaction with immigration waiting times.

13. On the basis of its own measurements, BAA reported that, during April 2012, the Border Force met its service standards for EEA passengers but consistently missed its targets for all non-EEA passengers at every terminal. Terminal 5 appeared to have the worst performance, where only 75.7% of non EEA passengers were processed within target times, a shortfall of 19.3% on the 95% target.

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16 Home Affairs Committee, The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012), HC 71, Q6
17 Home Affairs Committee, The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012), HC 71, Ev 68
14. We understand that, using its measurements, BAA also calculated the maximum waiting times for non-EEA passengers throughout April:

- 1 hour and 15 minutes at Terminal 1 on 12 April
- 2 hours and 20 minutes at Terminal 3 on 25 April
- 3 hours at Terminal 4 on 30 April
- 2 hrs and 35 minutes at Heathrow Terminal 5 on 17 April

15. BAA believes that its queue measurements are conservative as it cannot begin to measure queues until they reach the arrivals hall, where passengers split into EEA and non-EEA groups. This means that actual maximum queue times could be significantly longer, as passengers may be queuing to get into the arrivals hall and some might have already been held on aircraft as there is no space for them to wait in the terminal. It is therefore possible that real queue lengths are significantly longer than both BAA’s and Border Force’s measurements.\textsuperscript{18}

**Establishing accurate metrics**

16. The Border Force must establish accurate measures of how long passengers are waiting to pass through immigration. Their current figures, which are only measured once an hour, are likely to be less accurate than those of BAA, which measures, using the same method, every 15 minutes. Measuring queues only once an hour allows them to substantially subside in-between, giving a distorted picture of the number of people who have had to wait for a long time. As BAA points out it is also important to measure the

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\textsuperscript{18} Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q6
maximum queue times as well as the average or the proportion processed within service standards. If Border Force only publish the latter then poor performance at peak times may be disguised.19 Border Force is now working with BAA and others to improve its process for measuring waiting times in immigration queues.20

17. Border Force’s figures fail the acid test for reliability: they contradict the experience of passengers. BAA’s passenger survey shows a correlation between the growing queue times it is recording and passenger dissatisfaction with immigration waiting time.21 A bad situation is made worse if the public believe that the scale of the problem is being underestimated by those responsible. It is no use the Immigration Minister rejecting what he described as “wild suggestions” of long waiting times if passengers know from experience that they are true.

18. We acknowledge that Border Force is working with BAA and others to improve its process for measuring waiting times in immigration queues. We recommend that it adopts, in consultation with port operators, a more frequent measurement in order to improve accuracy and to inform staff rostering decisions more fully. We recommend that a consistent measurement be used at all major UK ports and that the figures be published monthly so that passengers can see if the situation is improving. We also recommend that maximum queue lengths be measured and published on a monthly basis for all UK ports. This will enable people to judge how well Border Force is performing at peak times as well as overall.

19. We note that BAA has introduced “waiting time” boards at Terminal 4 Heathrow Airport. We recommend that Border Force installs “waiting time” boards in all arrivals halls at major ports that tell passengers how long the queue will take from the point they are at. Whilst this won’t help to reduce waiting times it would at least be courteous to passengers and helpful to those who have made onward travel arrangements for a specific time.

Potential costs of long immigration queues

20. There are widespread concerns about the potential costs that long immigration queues may have for the UK. Concerns raised to date include: a corresponding relaxation of customs checks, investment and revenue loss for carriers and operators and a loss of international business for the UK. There are also concerns that the situation will deteriorate over the Olympics and afterwards.

A decline in secondary customs checks and seizures

21. Border Force unions have claimed that secondary customs checks are being scaled back at ports as staff are deployed to deal with the long passenger queues.22 Pressed on the issue of drugs seizures when he gave evidence to the Committee, Brian Moore, interim head of

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19 Home Affairs Committee, The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012), HC 71, Q17
20 Home Affairs Committee, The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012), HC 71, Ev 64
21 Home Affairs Committee, The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012), HC 71, Q17
22 Home Affairs Committee, The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012), HC 71, Q128
the Border Force, spoke of the ‘very, very impressive’ figures he had that related to the Easter period in 2012. However neither he nor the Minister could provide us with a comparable set of figures from the same period the previous year as Border Force’s automated systems were still being rolled out in April 2011. Since the Home Office releases annual statistics on drug seizures going back to 2001 we assume that reliable information is in existence to verify its claims and are concerned about the Home Office’s reluctance to provide us with this information as published statistics show that seizure figures for the previous years, 2010/11 and 2009/10, are the lowest since 2001.

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<td>5,543</td>
<td>4,756</td>
<td>4,465</td>
<td>5,869</td>
<td>6,516</td>
<td>6,588</td>
<td>7,680</td>
<td>3,948</td>
<td>3,954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3: Number of seizures of controlled drugs by seizing authority and year, 2001 to 2010–11*

22. Mr Moore also told us that:

> We seize about five tonnes of class A drugs a year. That is a very, very large amount indeed.

However, he did not know how this related to the amount of drugs that are estimated to pass through customs into the UK:

> The data about what drugs does the United Kingdom want for its drug-related communities as against what we seize is not agreed or clear[...] The country’s need for drugs, I have not seen agreed data on the size of that cohort, actually, so I don’t want to speculate about it.

23. It is unhelpful for the head of the Border Force to promote his organisation’s success in seizing illegal drugs if he is unable to contextualise the figures to indicate what proportion of illegal drugs they are seizing, or even whether or not this in an improvement on previous performance. We recommend that the Government publish in full such data as is available to it about the estimated proportion of drugs which are seized by the Border Force as they are smuggled into the UK, and the year-on-year performance overall. Parliament, and the public must know whether efforts against drug trafficking are improving or even succeeding.

*Wasted investment and loss of revenue*

24. Eurotunnel and TUI Travel (which includes Thomson and several Europe-based travel brands) have submitted evidence to this Committee which demonstrates how the current...
situation both wastes money that they have invested previously and reduces their revenue opportunities.

**Wasted investment**

25. TUI spent £750,000 in capital investment in order to become compliant with e-Borders and have “significant annual operating costs in the region of £100k”. It argues that this is a wasted investment if 100% checking of passengers against the Home Office Warnings Index is then carried out in arrival at UK ports, as it has already been done in their submission to e-Borders.28 This unnecessary duplication means that the expedited service TUI’s investment was meant to offer to passengers is not realised.

**Loss of revenue**

26. Eurotunnel has told us that it had to undersell the capacity on its trains over the weekend of 9–10 June due to the lack of capacity at the UK Border Controls. It estimates that this amounts to a lost revenue opportunity of over £100,000. It is also incurring additional costs of hiring extra staff to help manage the queues.29 Eurotunnel fears that the current situation is undermining the competitiveness of its business as the delays at UK Border controls often exceed the 35-minute crossing time, losing the tunnel its competitive advantage in speed.30

27. We are concerned that carriers are resigning themselves to reducing their revenue because the Border Force does not have the capacity to provide them with an adequate service. Any impact on the capacity of goods and passengers to enter the country could have implications for the wider economy, not just the travel industry. It is imperative that the problems are resolved before more companies find themselves facing the same choice.

**Effect on international business**

28. The business community is very concerned about the negative affect chaotic images of arrivals halls are having on Britain’s reputation as an international hub for business. Membership organisations such as the CBI and the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) say that the current situation inconveniences their members’ international clients and projects a shambolic image of inefficiency.31 Airlines and operators also complain of the negative effect the long queues are having on their businesses, stating that immigration queues are now the largest customer dissatisfaction area for airline customers.32

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28 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev w1
29 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev w7
30 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev w1
31 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev w2 and LCCI case studies submitted to the HASC
32 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev w2
29. There is also widespread concern that the UK should seek to maximise the opportunities presented by the Olympics to project a positive picture of the UK as a place to do business and as a springboard to encourage growth and expand exports.

30. Since the government has set targets of doubling the UK’s annual exports to £1 trillion by 2020 and getting a further 100,000 UK firms exporting, it should not want to make getting into the UK an ordeal for potential international clients. This applies equally to legitimate overseas visitors of all kinds—tourists, students, employees and business people—all of whom contribute to the UK economy. We recommend that the Border Force should adopt a target for reducing the maximum queuing time at the border, applying to all ports of entry, in addition to its existing service standards.

**Post-Olympic fears**

31. Many port operators and carriers operating elsewhere are concerned that the situation will deteriorate over the Olympics, as more staff are moved to Heathrow, and in the weeks following the Olympic and Paralympic Games, when staff are finally able to take their leave. This is a particular concern as operators are reporting an increase in the number of bookings on last year. Eurostar report an 18% increase in bookings over the Olympics and a 30% increase on the bank holiday weekend in August.

32. We are concerned that the Border Force is not adequately prepared to deal with this issue at major UK ports other than Heathrow. We are also concerned that it does not have sufficient plans going forward after the Olympics. When he gave evidence to this Committee, Brian Moore agreed that Border Force must keep up an improved performance but failed to offer any suggestion as to how it would do so.33

33. The Immigration Minister offered assurances that the employment of 70 staff who will be posted to Heathrow Terminal 2 when it reopens in 2014 has been brought forward to this year, ready for the post-Olympic period.34 The Minister also said that there would be a sufficient number of staff at all major ports over the Olympic period as staffing levels were determined for the needs of all ports.35

34. We welcome the move by the Minister to bring forward the recruitment of 70 new border officers for Heathrow. However we are concerned that other ports have already experienced significant problems with their staffing levels at peak times this year. We recommend that a full reappraisal of the number of Border Force staff needed across the UK be carried out immediately if the Home Office wishes to persist with 100% entry checks for all passengers.

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33 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q235

34 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q54

35 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Qq79–80
Possible solutions

Return to risk-based entry checks

35. The Home Secretary had piloted a risk based approach to entry checks which authorised Border Force officials to waive checking EEA national children against the Warnings Index when they were travelling with parents or in school parties. The pilot also permitted officials to make their own judgement over whether or not to open the biometric chip, containing a second photograph, in the passports of EEA nationals. This was intended to concentrate resources on high risk passengers and journeys and enable low risk groups to proceed quickly through immigration. Initial assessments of the pilot were apparently positive and, in November 2011, the Prime Minister told Parliament it had resulted in a 10% increase in arrests, a 100% increase in firearms detection and a 48% increase in the detection of forged documents on the same period the previous year. However, following revelations that the Border Force had regularly suspended a number of checks that went beyond what had been authorised by the pilot, ministers decided that the data pointing to the pilot’s success were not reliable and it reinstated 100% entry checks on all arriving passengers.

36. Airlines and airport operators have observed the “increased stringency” in checks since 2011 and the resulting increase in processing times. Some travel operators have been reluctant to enter the debate about a return to risk-based controls but others have firmly advocated it. They point out that checking all passengers against the Warnings Index simply duplicates the work they have done by submitting passenger data to e-Borders on departure.

37. We agree with the Immigration Minister that risk-based controls must not cross the line into being queue-based. However we believe that it is perfectly possible to maintain robust border controls while operating a risk-based model. The Home Secretary should start by immediately reintroducing the pilot she suspended in November 2011. The pilot was very limited in terms of which checks it authorised officers to drop at their own discretion but would nonetheless have been effective in processing large, low-risk parties such as school children through immigration much more quickly.

Increase the size of the Border Force

38. Unions have been quick to point to the staff cuts in the Border Force as a major cause of the current problems. Brian Moore however denies these claims on the grounds that
unions always ask for more staff." The Border Force has reduced the number of staff it employs since March 2011 as Figure 4 below shows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>March 2011</th>
<th>March 2012</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border Operations &amp; Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Services</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>7333</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4: Border Force staff totals, March 2011 and March 2012*

39. There are 457 fewer staff working for the Border Force in 2012 and 177 of these have been lost from Heathrow. Border Force cannot be exempt from the spending cuts taking place across the public sector. However we are concerned that the calculations about the number of officers needed were not predicated on the current mandate to carry out 100% entry checks on all passengers.

**Change the Border Force’s rostering pattern**

40. Unions have called the Border Force’s current rostering system “rigid and difficult”, arguing that it does not deploy staff when it is supposed to and makes it difficult for staff to maintain a work-life balance. Border Force officers, they say, have always opposed the current rostering model as they did not believe it would deliver the benefits sought. BAA found that:

> On the two recent strike days, we used our planning resources to support that and we ended up with rosters that were well adapted to the actual flow of passengers. It is one thing to have the data, but you need to have the resources, the people, who can turn those data into useful roster patterns. That is the key thing that would be constructive and take us forward.

41. The majority of Border Force officers work on a system of annualised hours working (AHW). On this model rosters are agreed a year in advance but are subject to change up to seven days before the start of the shift so that they can be adapted to the latest passenger

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43 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q271
44 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q123
45 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q122
46 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q127
47 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q21
numbers. Border Force tell us that this is the point at which it can increase the number of staff on duty, but also that the model still gives flexibility to change, extend or curtail shifts with less than seven days notice. 48 Given the evidence we have heard we look to the Border Force to demonstrate to us that they have instigated a more efficient and flexible style of rostering.

42. Border Force needs to have the capability to respond rapidly to changes in passenger numbers. Brian Moore doubted that an “on call” system would work very well within the Border Force, due to many ports being a considerable distance from the residential areas where its staff live. 49 His analysis is that there is a problem with “regional autonomy” as different regions are reluctant to ask for support from each other to boost staffing levels. Mr Moore’s proposed solution to this is to expand on the current control room model that has been introduced at Heathrow by introducing a national command and control centre to move staff around in response to demand. 50 The control room at Heathrow enables “mobile squads” of staff to be dispatched to different parts of the airport in response to increases in passenger numbers. We acknowledge that it is working well at Heathrow as BAA and airlines report signs of improvement since its introduction. 51 However we are uncertain as to the benefits this model would have on a national scale due to the need for a very fast response. We are not convinced that it would result in back-up staff being deployed more quickly than they would through a local on-call scheme and the transport would be likely to cost a lot more.

43. We recommend that if the control room at Heathrow continues to be a success than the model should be adopted at other major ports where appropriate. For smaller ports we recommend that the Border Force instigate an on-call scheme to increase the numbers of staff on duty quickly should chronic queues start to build. We are sceptical however that a national command and control room would have much to offer. It would take too long to re-deploy staff and the cost to the taxpayer would be far higher than if it were done on a local level.

Information provided by airlines

44. The accuracy of passenger information provided to the Border Force ahead of arrival is vital to help it properly roster shifts. The government has suggested that the accuracy of this information needs to be improved. The Immigration Minister told this Committee that the previous day he had spoken to a Border Force officer in charge of organising the rosters for the new mobile teams who had told him that arrival projections for 6am Monday morning had increased from 2,500 to 5,000 passengers over the weekend and, in the event was 7,500. This meant that the Border Force would have needed to process three times as many passengers as it had been expecting to a few days beforehand. The late notice of this, it being discovered at midnight on Sunday, meant that it was not easily possible to draft in additional staff. 52 However, when we sought clarification from the Minister, he
corrected the figures he gave us and conceded that the original projections had been for 7,800, and the actual number of passengers who arrived at the time was 7,600, so there were in fact 200 fewer passengers than projected. His original evidence had been given in good faith—the mix up was apparently due to the officer confusing the different types of data available.53

45. Airlines have argued that the information they provide to Border Force is already very accurate. Advanced Passenger Information (API) and the total number of passengers being carried is supplied to the e-Border operations centre on departure. Airlines further point out that any carrier flying to the United States has had to provide accurate Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for years, as aircraft are not allowed to depart if accurate information has not been received.54 They also argue that it is in their interest to have accurate information about the passengers they are carrying, both for the safety of their aircraft and to comply with their liabilities as carriers. Furthermore they dispute the argument that “bunching” of flights at Heathrow is a serious contributor to the problem as an aircraft lands there every 90 seconds.55

46. We are of the opinion that the information airlines are providing the Border Force with is largely accurate, though it may be subject to small last-minute variations as additional tickets are sold shortly before departure. Many airlines have years of experience in providing advanced passenger information to the United States and are now obliged to provide advanced information to e-Borders before departure. The issue lies more with the Border Force’s ability to use the information properly. It is important that Border Force staff, especially those in charge of rosters, fully understand the information that is available to them to help plan shifts, and how best to use it. Border Force must use this information to ensure all desks are manned at peak times. We recommend that the Border Force immediately provide training on these topics to its officers so as to manage the number of staff more effectively.

**Better use of Technology**

47. Many stakeholders have argued that better use of technology will be key to reducing queue lengths. In particular they are calling for more e-gates and the reintroduction of “smart zones” following the suspension of the risk-based pilot.

**E-gates**

48. E-gates, or e-passport gates, are automated gates that use facial recognition technology to compare a scan of a passenger’s face to the photograph in their passport. If the scans match the gate will open and enable the passenger to pass through immigration control. e-gates are currently only available for EEA passengers who hold a biometric passport. There are currently 63 e-gates in operation around the UK at 15 different terminals.56 BAA has told us that they are working well and that passengers are taking them up at a faster rate

53 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 72
54 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q9 and Q24
55 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q24
56 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 59
than expected, particularly at Heathrow.\textsuperscript{57} BAA states that passengers prefer the automatic experience to immigration desks and it therefore advocates developing an equivalent for regular, non-EU travellers.\textsuperscript{58} The Border Force has provided us with information on the usage of e-gates, a summary of which can be seen below for Heathrow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec-11</th>
<th>Jan-12</th>
<th>Feb-12</th>
<th>Mar-12</th>
<th>Apr-12</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1 successful users</td>
<td>33,870</td>
<td>42,299</td>
<td>37,736</td>
<td>43,814</td>
<td>44,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 referrals</td>
<td>9,256</td>
<td>12,132</td>
<td>11,011</td>
<td>11,850</td>
<td>9,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 eligible passengers who did not use gates</td>
<td>56,047</td>
<td>59,578</td>
<td>55,500</td>
<td>64,008</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3 successful users</td>
<td>49,039</td>
<td>60,024</td>
<td>63,998</td>
<td>72,099</td>
<td>74,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3 referrals</td>
<td>6,959</td>
<td>8,753</td>
<td>8,439</td>
<td>8,135</td>
<td>5,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3 eligible passengers who did not use gates</td>
<td>128,346</td>
<td>132,138</td>
<td>115,725</td>
<td>138,442</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4 successful users</td>
<td>34,403</td>
<td>37,613</td>
<td>39,508</td>
<td>41,428</td>
<td>46,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4 referrals</td>
<td>7,687</td>
<td>7,130</td>
<td>7,471</td>
<td>6,473</td>
<td>3,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4 eligible passengers who did not use gates</td>
<td>67,143</td>
<td>70,936</td>
<td>64,031</td>
<td>73,082</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T5 successful users</td>
<td>63,106</td>
<td>66,905</td>
<td>71,548</td>
<td>89,556</td>
<td>89,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T5 referrals</td>
<td>12,060</td>
<td>14,430</td>
<td>15,150</td>
<td>10,868</td>
<td>7,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T5 eligible passengers who did not use gates</td>
<td>117,305</td>
<td>115,181</td>
<td>112,097</td>
<td>128,003</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Passenger use of e-Gates at Heathrow December 2011–April 2012

49. We can see that the number of passengers successfully using e-gates is increasing. Between December 2011 and March 2012 there was an increase of:

- 32% in Terminal 1
- 52% in Terminal 3
- 35% in Terminal 4
- 42% in Terminal 5

50. However there has also been an increase in the number of eligible passengers who are not using e-gates, so the proportion of passengers using e-gates is increasing more slowly. Over the same period there was an increase of:

- 3 percentage points in Terminal 1

\textsuperscript{57} Home Affairs Committee, \textit{The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)}, HC 71, Q14
\textsuperscript{58} Home Affairs Committee, \textit{The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)}, HC 71, Q14
• 8 percentage points in Terminal 3
• 1 percentage point in Terminal 4
• 6 percentage points in Terminal 5

51. However not all passengers know that they are eligible to use e-gates, or are yet to have confidence in them. Border Force’s data shows that over the period December 2011–March 2012, e-gates were only unavailable for 1.17% of their maximum potential availability suggesting that this is not a major factor limiting take up.59

52. **We recommend that the Border Force works with airport operators to identify the reasons why more people are not using e-gates and to ensure that clear information is on display at airports for members of the public about who is eligible to use e-gates and how they should be used.** Border Force should also seek to ensure that e-gates remain operational at all times when flights are arriving.

53. Border Force unions are concerned that the number of facial recognition checks e-Gates perform are sometimes reduced by staff. This is done to reduce the number of passengers referred to Border Force officers as it makes the recognition check less sensitive. This processes people more quickly but could also make it easier for someone to get through the gates using false documents.60 The Minister disputed this stating that the only adjustments that can be made are to increase the sensitivity61. However, union representatives state that this is a practice that is widely known about by officers and they refer to it as “the gain”.62 Furthermore it has been highlighted by the Independent Chief Inspector of the Border Agency and Border Force in a previous report on Heathrow Terminal 3.63 Whilst the practice may be being carried out responsibly we are concerned that, after the events of last year, the Minister does not seem to be aware of key operational processes affecting security.

**Smart zones**

54. The “smart zone” trials undertaken in 2011 enabled passengers on low-risk routes to be screened by immigration in advance of their arrival in the UK on the basis of information submitted to the Border Force by carriers. Officers are able to decide if there are any passengers they want to see face to face before they are cleared and the rest are able to be cleared quickly using minimum checks.

55. **Advance clearance offers great gains in fast processing, especially on low-risk flights. It seems unwise to waste the investment we have made in technology that allows passengers to be processed quickly.** We are pleased to see that the Home Office has committed to developing smart zones by December 2012 in the latest update of its

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59 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 59
60 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q132
61 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q77
62 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q132
63 Independent Chief Inspector of the Border Agency, ‘*Inspection of Border Control Operations at Terminal 3 Heathrow Airport*’, August–November 2011, p27
Departmental Business Plan. However, given the current difficulties with reducing queue times, we recommend that it brings this work forward as a matter of urgency.
Progress with e-Borders

56. As of March 2012, e-Borders now covers all flights arriving from outside of the EU. Due to the delays that have beset the e-Borders programme we will continue to monitor the progress of its roll-out across other transport sectors.

Non-canalised traffic

57. Non-canalised traffic refers to private maritime and aviation traffic that does not pass through immigration on arrival in the UK (also known as General Maritime and General Aviation). As of April 2012, e-Borders is able to collect data from General Maritime and General Aviation traffic. E-Borders has worked with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) to develop an interface which will soon be used to submit a General Aviation Reports to the Border Force. Border Force is now rolling e-Borders out to cover general commercial shipping but has not given us a date for completion.

Canalised maritime traffic

58. Canalised maritime traffic refers to scheduled commercial and passenger services that do pass through immigration on arrival. June 2012 was the Border Force’s target for the Freight Targeting System being ready to transmit passenger data to e-Borders. A number of carriers already use the system to transmit data about freight and this will now be extended to cover passenger data as well. Ferry operators will also provide passenger data using this system.

Rail

59. The Border Force has not committed to a firm deadline for extending e-Borders to cover the rail sector as roll-out dates are subject to agreement with individual operators. Border Force expects e-Borders to be able to receive data from international rail providers by the end of 2012 and is working with them to ensure their business processes will be aligned with e-Border’s requirements.

60. We welcome the full coverage of flights from outside the EU in time for the Olympics. We are also reassured by the progress made in covering private maritime and aviation as well as canalised maritime traffic. We are however concerned about the lack of specific commitments over the roll out to commercial general maritime traffic and international rail. We recommend that Border Force should liaise with the rail providers in question and establish specific dates on which the roll-out will be achieved. We have waited too long already for the e-Borders programme to yield benefits and it is not acceptable for vague commitments to disguise any further delay.

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64 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 58
65 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 58
66 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 58
67 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 58
4 Border Force and the National Crime Agency

61. We are aware of nine changes to the model for policing the UK’s borders since 2004, the splitting-off of the Border Force from the UK Border Agency being the most recent. 68 The National Crime Agency (NCA), which will be operational from 2013, will see another organisation added to the picture. There are currently 17 agencies working to secure our border. 69 We will be watching to see how the Border Policing Command within the NCA develops to make sure that it improves border policing instead of simply adding to the crowd of organisations already involved. A key part of its success will be a co-operative relationship with the Border Force.

How the organisations will work together

62. The Director General of the National Crime Agency, Keith Bristow, tells us that the Border Policing Command will be the national lead for border security. It will oversee the development of a single comprehensive intelligence picture, coordinate and task other organisations involved in delivering border security and work with overseas partners to enable early disruption of those who pose a threat to our border security. The Border Force will concentrate on screening and managing all goods and passengers arriving in the UK. 70

63. Mr Bristow is confident that the two organisations will work well together and reports that early working arrangements between them have proved successful. 71 We are pleased to hear that progress to date has been good and we look forward to further updates on how the two organisations will work together as the plans for the National Crime Agency progress.
5 Other issues

National Border Targeting Centre alerts

64. The National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC) has been operational since March 2010. It checks the passenger data submitted to e-Borders against the Home Office Warnings Index and issues any security alerts that are flagged up to the Border Force. It hopes to be able to cover 100% of passengers arriving in the UK by 2014.

65. We were told by the Immigration Services Union that a significant number of the alerts about passenger arrivals that were issued by the NBTC were never received by the relevant people at the port of arrival. Their information came from border officers at Heathrow who were reporting their own experiences. In order to clarify these reports we asked the Border Force to tell us what proportion of the alerts issued by the NBTC were subsequently encountered at the border. Border Force told us that between November 2011 and April 2012, 27,759 alerts relating to inbound and outbound passengers were issued but that any further detail would be a threat to security.

66. If large numbers of alerts about passengers who pose a potential threat to our national security are being issued, but the passengers concerned are not being intercepted, then either the alert system is deficient or the passengers in question are passing through undetected. Either of these scenarios would be alarming. Things will not improve however if the Border Force is allowed to sweep failure under the carpet. We recommend that an assessment of alerts that have not been intercepted be carried out at once to identify what the core issues are and that Border Force make itself accountable to Parliament for its performance in this crucial area of its role.

“Lille Loophole”

67. Once again we have asked Border Force for an update on its progress in closing down the “Lille loophole”. The loophole is enabled by the Schengen Agreement which allows for free travel within its member countries, two of which are France and Belgium. Passengers buying a ticket from Brussels to Lille therefore do not have their passports checked. If they remain on the service after Lille they may be able to enter the UK without the proper documentation unless a ticket inspector identifies that the ticket is invalid. When this situation first came to light Eurostar suspended the sale of all tickets from Brussels to Lille other than season tickets. However the sale of these tickets has now been restarted, for three services a day after representations from France and Belgium. The limited number of services for which these tickets are sold enables Border Force to target its resources on these trains. Other measures used include reconciling the number of Lille tickets sold with disembarkations and full ticket checks being carried out between Lille and Calais where those without a valid ticket will have to disembark.
68. Border Force now provides the Immigration Minister with a weekly update on the situation and states that it has seen a significant reduction in the number of migrants seeking to abuse this route. However the abuse of this route by people traffickers and illegal migrants continues. Border Force has refused to provide this Committee with information about the number of illegal migrants detected trying to enter the country on this route on the basis that this could provide potentially useful information to those seeking to evade immigration controls. It seems clear to us that the opportunities for abuse offered by the Lille route are an open secret and it is unlikely potential criminals will learn anymore from a select committee report than they do already. However the withholding of this information prevents us from properly holding the Border Force to account for its progress, or otherwise in closing down this loophole. It would be possible for this information to be redacted prior to publication but it is unacceptable for members of this Committee, responsible for scrutinising the performance of the Border Force, to not be given access to it.

**Governance and accountability**

69. Border Force is an operational law enforcement command within the Home Office. It is run by its Director General (currently Brian Moore on an interim basis) who reports to the Permanent Secretary, Home Office ministers and the Home Secretary. Alongside the UK Border Agency the Border Force will also be inspected by the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, John Vine. Mr Moore has told this Committee that he intends to strengthen independent oversight further by setting up a Board structure. He aims to have this in place by September 2012.

70. Mr Moore also told this Committee that he intended to apply for the permanent post of Director General of the Border Force.

**Chair:** You are indicating today that you will apply for this job. Is that right?

**Brian Moore:** I am intending to apply, yes.

71. However, we have subsequently learnt that Mr Moore will in fact step down when his interim contract ends in September. We were surprised at this decision. It is vital that this Committee is kept informed of changes to the leadership of the Border Force and to its governance and accountability structures. We are concerned to hear that this further change is taking place at the helm of the Border Force when it is struggling to maintain performance and we are uncertain as to the implications this may have for the new Board structure proposed by Mr Moore and any other new initiatives undertaken at his instruction. We will expect to hear from the Home Secretary, at the earliest opportunity, about who is going to replace Mr Moore. As with the Border Agency, we will frequently

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76 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 61
77 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Ev 61
78 Home Affairs Committee, *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)*, HC 71, Q234
79 Home Secretary, Written Statement to Parliament, 1 March 2012, col 43WS
80 Q244
81 Home Affairs Committee, *Immigration policy*, HC 493-i, Q25
monitor the Border Force’s progress as it works to improve its performance and we look forward to hearing from its new Director General about how improvements will be achieved.
Conclusions and recommendations

Border Force’s queue times

1. We acknowledge that maximum queue times may only be experienced by a small proportion of passengers although the evidence is not as clear as it should be. However we are alarmed that maximum times have been consistently very high for the last 12 months. Maximum queue times of two hours or more should be a rare occurrence, corresponding to extraordinary levels of traffic, a security alert or a problem at one or more major ports. It is unacceptable for these long queue times to recur on a monthly basis (Paragraph 11)

Establishing accurate metrics

2. We acknowledge that Border Force is working with BAA and others to improve its process for measuring waiting times in immigration queues. We recommend that it adopts, in consultation with port operators, a more frequent measurement in order to improve accuracy and to inform staff rostering decisions more fully. We recommend that a consistent measurement be used at all major UK ports and that the figures be published monthly so that passengers can see if the situation is improving. We also recommend that maximum queue lengths be measured and published on a monthly basis for all UK ports. This will enable people to judge how well Border Force is performing at peak times as well as overall. (Paragraph 18)

3. We note that BAA has introduced “waiting time” boards at Terminal 4 Heathrow Airport. We recommend that Border Force installs “waiting time” boards in all arrivals halls at major ports that tell passengers how long the queue will take from the point they are at. Whilst this won’t help to reduce waiting times it would at least be courteous to passengers and helpful to those who have made onward travel arrangements for a specific time. (Paragraph 19)

A decline in secondary customs checks and seizures

4. It is unhelpful for the head of the Border Force to promote his organisation’s success in seizing illegal drugs if he is unable to contextualise the figures to indicate what proportion of illegal drugs they are seizing, or even whether or not this in an improvement on previous performance. We recommend that the Government publish in full such data as is available to it about the estimated proportion of drugs which are seized by the Border Force as they are smuggled into the UK, and the year-on-year performance overall. Parliament, and the public must know whether efforts against drug trafficking are improving or even succeeding. (Paragraph 23)

Loss of revenue

5. We are concerned that carriers are resigning themselves to reducing their revenue because the Border Force does not have the capacity to provide them with an adequate service. Any impact on the capacity of goods and passengers to enter the country could have implications for the wider economy, not just the travel industry.
It is imperative that the problems are resolved before more companies find themselves facing the same choice. (Paragraph 27)

**Effect on international business**

6. Since the government has set targets of doubling the UK’s annual exports to £1 trillion by 2020 and getting a further 100,000 UK firms exporting, it should not want to make getting into the UK an ordeal for potential international clients. This applies equally to legitimate overseas visitors of all kinds—tourists, students, employees and business people—all of whom contribute to the UK economy. We recommend that the Border Force should adopt a target for reducing the maximum queuing time at the border, applying to all ports of entry, in addition to its existing service standards. (Paragraph 30)

**Post-Olympic fears**

7. We welcome the move by the Minister to bring forward the recruitment of 70 new border officers for Heathrow. However we are concerned that other ports have already experienced significant problems with their staffing levels at peak times this year. We recommend that a full reappraisal of the number of Border Force staff needed across the UK be carried out immediately if the Home Office wishes to persist with 100% entry checks for all passengers. (Paragraph 34)

**Return to risk-based immigration checks**

8. We agree with the Immigration Minister that risk-based controls must not cross the line into being queue-based. However we believe that it is perfectly possible to maintain robust border controls while operating a risk-based model. The Home Secretary should start by immediately reintroducing the pilot she suspended in November 2011. The pilot was very limited in terms of which checks it authorised officers to drop at their own discretion but would nonetheless have been effective in processing large, low-risk parties such as school children through immigration much more quickly. (Paragraph 37)

**Change the Border Force’s rostering pattern**

9. We recommend that if the control room at Heathrow continues to be a success than the model should be adopted at other major ports where appropriate. For smaller ports we recommend that the Border Force instigate an on-call scheme to increase the numbers of staff on duty quickly should chronic queues start to build. We are sceptical however that a national command and control room would have much to offer. It would take too long to re-deploy staff and the cost to the taxpayer would be far higher than if it were done on a local level. (Paragraph 43)

**Information provided by airlines**

10. We are of the opinion that the information airlines are providing the Border Force with is largely accurate, though it may be subject to small last-minute variations as additional tickets are sold shortly before departure. Many airlines have years of experience in providing advanced passenger information to the United States and are now obliged to provide advanced information to e-Borders before departure. The
issue lies more with the Border Force’s ability to use the information properly. It is important that Border Force staff, especially those in charge of rosters, fully understand the information that is available to them to help plan shifts, and how best to use it. Border Force must use this information to ensure all desks are manned at peak times. We recommend that the Border Force immediately provide training on these topics to its officers so as to manage the number of staff more effectively. (Paragraph 46)

e-Gates

11. We recommend that the Border Force works with airport operators to identify the reasons why more people are not using e-gates and to ensure that clear information is on display at airports for members of the public about who is eligible to use e-gates and how they should be used. Border Force should also seek to ensure that e-gates remain operational at all times when flights are arriving. (Paragraph 52)

Smart zones

12. Advance clearance offers great gains in fast processing, especially on low-risk flights. It seems unwise to waste the investment we have made in technology that allows passengers to be processed quickly. We are pleased to see that the Home Office has committed to developing smart zones by December 2012 in the latest update of its Departmental Business Plan. However, given the current difficulties with reducing queue times, we recommend that it brings this work forward as a matter of urgency.
(Paragraph 55)

**Rail**

13. We welcome the full coverage of flights from outside the EU in time for the Olympics. We are also reassured by the progress made in covering private maritime and aviation as well as canalised maritime traffic. We are however concerned about the lack of specific commitments over the roll out to commercial general maritime traffic and international rail. We recommend that Border Force should liaise with the rail providers in question and establish specific dates on which the roll-out will be achieved. We have waited too long already for the e-Borders programme to yield benefits and it is not acceptable for vague commitments to disguise any further delay. (Paragraph 60)

**National Border Targeting Centre alerts**

14. If large numbers of alerts about passengers who pose a potential threat to our national security are being issued, but the passengers concerned are not being intercepted, then either the alert system is deficient or the passengers in question are passing through undetected. Either of these scenarios would be alarming. Things will not improve however if the Border Force is allowed to sweep failure under the carpet. We recommend that an assessment of alerts that have not been intercepted be carried out at once to identify what the core issues are and that Border Force make itself accountable to Parliament for its performance in this crucial area of its role. (Paragraph 66)
Formal Minutes

Monday 16 July 2012

Members present:

Keith Vaz, in the Chair

James Clappison
Michael Ellis
Dr Julian Huppert
Alun Michael

Bridget Phillipson
Mark Reckless
Mr David Winnick

Draft Report (The work of the Border Force), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 71 read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 17 July at 10.10 am]
Witnesses

The oral and written evidence can be found in the Committee’s Report on *The work of the UK Border Agency (December 2011–March 2012)* (HC 71 2012–13). The Ev reference numbers below relate to the evidence published with that Report.

**Tuesday 15 May 2012**

Corneel Koster, Director of Operations, Safety and Security, Virgin Atlantic, Andrew Lord, Director of Operations, British Airways, and Colin Matthews, Chief Executive, BAA

Damian Green MP, Minister of State for Immigration

Lucy Moreton, Head of Litigation, Immigration Services Union, and Paul O’Connor, National Officer for the Home Office, Public and Commercial Services Union

Rob Whiteman, Chief Executive, UK Border Agency

**Tuesday 22 May 2012**

Brian Moore QPM, Director General, Border Force

**List of printed written evidence**

1. UK Border Agency Ev 40, Ev 55
2. Border Force Ev 58, Ev 62
3. BAA Ev 67
4. Home Office Ev 68, Ev 71, Ev 72

**List of additional written evidence**

(published in HC 71 Volume II on the Committee’s website: www.parliament.uk/homeaffairs)

1. TUI Travel Ev w1
2. CBI Ev w2
3. Eurotunnel Ev w4
4. National Crime Agency Ev w7
List of unprinted evidence

The following written evidence has been reported to the House, but to save printing costs has not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Parliamentary Archives (www.parliament.uk/archives), and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to The Parliamentary Archives, Houses of Parliament, London SW1A 0PW (tel. 020 7219 3074; email archives@parliament.uk). Opening hours are from 9.30 am to 5.00 pm on Mondays to Fridays.

London Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Case Studies
### List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

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