"I/A" ITEM NOTE

from: General Secretariat
to: COREPER/Council
Subject: Draft Annex to the Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension

1. At its meetings on 12 July, 15 September, 19 October and 1 December, the Terrorism Working Party discussed the Presidency proposal for a draft Annex to the Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension¹, prepared on the basis of responses to a questionnaire (CM 3061/11). The Law Enforcement Working Party was consulted at its meeting on 24 October. In the subsequent written procedure, the text of the draft Annex, as annexed to this note, was agreed.

2. Mass sports events with international dimension require the organising Member State to make careful preparations well in advance, including strategic planning, threat analysis and risk assessment and to mobilise a range of competent national authorities. There is also a need to put in place special precautions and counter-measures to protect attendees and sports venues. The new Annex to the existing Handbook covers these aspects from the perspective of counter terrorism protection of these events and thus fills the gap in EU guidelines on sporting events.

3. On this basis, COREPER is requested to invite the Council
   - to adopt the Draft Annex to the Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension set out in annex, and
   - to ensure that this Annex is incorporated in the next revision of the Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension.
Draft Annex

Protection of mass sports events with an international dimension from terrorist attacks

Aim

The purpose of this Annex is to provide recommendations and share best practices derived from the experiences of Member States in counter-terrorism activities at major sports events. The Annex was developed as a source of guidelines for competent national authorities in the field of counter-terrorism protection at mass sports events supplementing the existing procedures on general security issues at other mass events.

Bearing in mind distinctive features of such public gatherings like mass sports events, which can be highly exposed to terrorist attacks, it is desirable to broaden the knowledge and exchange expertise in the field of protecting all participants of such events – sportsmen, spectators, organizers and bystanders. Therefore, this Annex aims to consolidate and broaden the current experiences of Member States’ competent national authorities concerning counter-terrorism protection at mass sports events. With respect to the existing legal framework in the Member States it takes into consideration the role of institutions such as counter-terrorism coordination centres in contributing essentially to security at mass sports events.
Basic principles

All counter-terrorist actions, regardless of their scope, undertaken to minimise terrorist threat at mass sports events should be carried out in accordance with basic rules (legality, proportionality) and human rights as set out in the Handbook, particularly taking into consideration the right to assemble in a peaceful manner.

Although the host Member State is primarily responsible for providing security and counter-terrorism protection for the event, given its international character all other Member States have a responsibility to assist and support the provision of such security.

This Annex is without prejudice to the existing arrangements as mentioned in the Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved.

Bearing in mind the international dimension of mass sports events, it is nevertheless the Member State hosting the event solely responsible for its own counter-terrorism protection. However, responsibility for cooperation (e.g. information exchange and providing specific support if requested and where appropriate) lies to a certain extent with other Member States, whose representations and spectators take part in the event. They should endeavour – where appropriate and according to the provisions of international law, EU regulations, bilateral agreements and national law - to help the host Member State provide security at the event to the best extent possible. Only an approach involving all stakeholders makes it feasible to substantially boost the efficiency of the fight against terrorism or to prevent terrorist attacks from taking place.

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2  Point I.2 [Basic principles].

3  OJ 165, 3.06.2010.
The subject

The area of interest of this Annex is the protection of mass sports events with an international dimension from terrorist threat. Although preparedness and consequence management measures\(^4\) of civil protection authorities or non-police disaster management agencies in the event of a terrorist attack is out of the scope of this Annex, some of these measures are shortly addressed in this document for overview reasons.

International mass sports events have a few characteristic traits distinguishing them from other types of major events of cultural or political nature\(^5\). Furthermore, a terrorist attack is a specific kind of disturbances of public order and thus requires to a large extent different counter-measures than those regarding non-terrorist unlawful acts.

Each Member State that has already hosted a mass sports event with an international dimension\(^6\) or will organise it in the future is confronted with the challenge of protecting these events from terrorism.

Responsible bodies

Combating terrorism requires a comprehensive, multi-agency approach involving all available capacities. Competent national authorities have a statutory obligation to counter terrorism as such, certain aspects of it or eliminate its consequences. Taking into consideration this outreach policy, fighting terrorism is relatively dispersed at the national level among various stakeholders. Accordingly, there may be potential overlaps, conflicts of competence and responsibility and other issues arising from different responsibilities and possible inconsistencies between different security bodies.

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\(^4\) For general information on the preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack see doc. 6090/10 RESTREINT EU ENFOPOL 38 PROCIV 15.

\(^5\) One of the main traits of mass sports events distinguishing them from other types of public gatherings is a specific kind of attendees i.e. sports fans who can be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, prone to disturb public order by clashes with fans of opposite teams or to commit other unlawful acts. In such an environment it is relatively easy for a range of extremists or terrorists to blend into the crowd and conduct an attack.

\(^6\) 16 Member States out of 21 which answered the questionnaire have already hosted at least one international mass sports event (as of July 2011).
Member States should develop their own general national counter-terrorism strategies in a way that would help avoid such difficulties, by explicitly defining the competences of all the entities responsible for countering terrorism and ensuring that there is no unnecessary overlap.

Bearing in mind the national competences of the host Member State and depending on the scale of the international mass sports event, setting up a coordinating project group\(^7\) (e.g. task force, central coordination contact point) consisting of all competent national authorities should be considered for the purpose of coordination of all measures relating to the protection of the event. If a similar organisational structure has already been established on a permanent basis, this one should be tasked with these coordination responsibilities. In addition, crisis management structures should be considered on a national level with a 24/7 national information centre. Optionally, a representative of the event organiser, owners of the competition venues and private entities could be invited to take part in the group’s work. The involvement of local authorities\(^8\) should also be considered since close cooperation between the organiser and local authorities is of utmost importance.

In addition and depending on national competencies, the group could be responsible for the measures taken by the relevant agencies in the field of maintaining public order and handling all security-related issues at the event and would thus play the role of a coordinator and a supervisor.

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\(^7\) As set out in the Handbook, point III.1 [Responsibilities of involved authorities and services in the Organising State].

\(^8\) Local authorities could play a crucial role in the strategic planning as they are "closest" to the competition venues and thus possess the broadest knowledge of local conditions and specificities as well as of neighbouring communities – their problems, tendencies, attitude, outlook on life etc. All these pieces of information are essential for an assessment of the terrorist threats posed by individuals or groups from local communities.
Considering the number of competent national authorities involved both in the prevention and combating of terrorist attacks and the mitigation of their consequences and bearing in mind the services’ network of mutual interdependencies, the coordinating function of the group is crucial. If a similar organisational structure does not yet exist on a permanent basis, Member states should consider setting up a group under the auspices of the governmental body or institution which is primarily responsible in the area of security within the Member State hosting the event.

In order to ensure an appropriate response to terrorist threats, a counter-terrorism unit should be considered either within or outside the group. However, if the host Member State has a permanent counter-terrorism centre, it could play the role of this event-related counter-terrorism unit. In any case it should consist of all competent national authorities responsible for combating terrorism. The main tasks of this event-related counter-terrorism unit could on the basis of the existing legal framework include:

- collecting, processing, analysing and disseminating all relevant information concerning terrorist threats related to the event;
- close cooperation with the group as far as the counter-terrorist aspect of the event is concerned;
- the elaboration of a terrorist threat assessment and risk analysis to get an overview of all predictable terrorist threats related to the event;
- working out a counter-terrorism plan for the event based on information received by the group from all services involved, i.e. strategic planning;
- anticipation of potential terrorist threats and risks;
- discussing possible scenarios and creating basic models for action;
- coordination of counter-terrorist security arrangements and preparations, for example by tasking certain competent national authorities to certain assignments;

In this context, it is also important to respect the specialization and clear division of competences between operational/intelligence services and other entities involved in ensuring security at the event. Provisions of information flow should guarantee confidentiality particularly in handling reports, analyses and other documents based on sensitive information gained by operational/intelligence measures.

Ten Member States out of the 24 that submitted answers to the questionnaire have established counter-terrorism centres. All these centres are involved in the counter-terrorism protection at mass sports events.
settling conflicts of competence among the entities involved in counter-terrorism protection at the event;

- supervision of all counter-terrorist efforts;

- mobilisation of additional forces, measures and assets when needed;

- follow-up and ex post evaluation of security at the event in terms of counter-terrorism.

It is of paramount importance to collect and streamline all pertinent information into a single spot. Strategic planning and commands coming from a coordination centre would make the work of competent national authorities involved in counter-terrorism protection at the event substantially more efficient. Furthermore, placing the counter-terrorism unit within a group responsible for all security-related issues could allow the unit if and insofar as admitted by the existing legal framework to have access to data required to draw a full picture of terrorist threats related to the event. On this basis all terrorist-related hazards can be tackled more easily and efficiently.

**Terrorist threat assessment**

In addition to the fact that the Handbook suggests drawing up a general threat assessment giving an overview of a range of event-related security matters\(^\text{11}\), a special terrorist threat assessment should also be worked out by the relevant national expert body. It should be focused solely on the terrorism threat. The terrorism threat assessment could either be incorporated into the general security assessment or exist as a separate evaluation. If the second option is selected, it is essential to avoid potential overlaps.

The host Member State should use all means available to draw up a terrorism threat assessment well in advance of the event, at the earliest possible stage and keep it under review. Not only should the terrorism threat assessment incorporate information possessed by the organising Member State, it should also include information provided by other Member States and EU competent bodies, managed in accordance with existing information handling processes. With that in mind, Member States and EU bodies within the existing legal framework should report to the host Member State any credible, assessed information on potential terrorist threats related to the event. The assessment should include all event-related risks posed by terrorism.

\(^{11}\) The general threat assessment should be developed according to the principles outlined in the Handbook, point II.3 [Threat assessment and risk analysis], whereas terrorist threat assessment should be based on the specific advice pointed out in III.2.3 [Terrorist threats].
It is recommended that the information should include credible, assessed data on:

- terrorist groups, lone-wolves or extremists, known to competent national authorities, intending to conduct an attack during the event;
- terrorists having financial, logistical and technical ability to conduct an attack using CBRN materials;
- groups of radically-oriented individuals pretending to be sports fans;
- other groups, organisations and individuals potentially ready to resort to terrorism and take advantage of the event in order to present their ideologies;
- individuals displaying unusual interest in competition venues, their plans, schemes, capacities, security arrangements, evacuation routes etc. on internet or other communication channels;
- people, premises, venues, and places at risk in terms of a potential terrorist attack;
- the probability and the extent of the potential harm caused by terrorists.

This information should be conveyed to the host Member State as soon as possible through relevant contact point(s) or existing secure communication channels, as far as permitted by national law and even before a formal request by the host Member State. Terrorism analyses, evaluations and assessments made by Europol and SitCen should also be readily available for the host Member State.

It must be underscored that the terrorism threat assessment should not be viewed as a means in itself but as a useful tool for strategic, operational and tactical planning, coordination and counter-terrorist security arrangements prior to, during and after the event.
The timetable\textsuperscript{12} outlined in the Handbook regarding the drafting of a general threat assessment corresponds to establishing more effective provisions against terrorism. These threat assessments should be made available to contributing Member States and EU competent bodies upon request. Terrorist threat assessment provides a basis for the development of a comprehensive counter-terrorism plan for the event which should encompass assignment of precise tasks and duties to every competent national authorities involved. Different potential and conceivable courses of events in case of terrorist attacks and basic models for action by the services involved should be reflected in scenarios. This would help different partners focus on their respective roles and provide answers on how to cooperate in various situations so that there is a clear understanding of competences and responsibilities.

**Soft targets related to the mass sports event**

Soft targets are highly exposed to diverse risks and unlawful acts, including terrorist attacks. It is inevitable that public venues, fan zones, public viewing areas, squares, traffic and evacuation routes, means of public transport etc. are significantly more crowded, i.e above normal level, during mass sports events as spectators and fans move towards and gather in competition venues. Therefore, monitoring of these soft targets, alongside the monitoring of the competition venues, should be considered as one of the main preventive and security measures.

Bearing this in mind, an overall security assessment, risk analysis and general plan for the event should also encompass issues related to the protection of soft targets. Member States may wish to split the area surrounding sports venues into special security zones according to the general rule that the closer to the sports venue the tighter security measures are implemented. The outer security zone should be demarcated in proportion to the scale of a given sports event, particularly taking into account the anticipated number of spectators. The threat evaluation and risk analysis carried out prior to the event provide additional information on which areas should be incorporated into the security zones and where they should be marked out. Competent national authorities should be deployed at the perimeter of the zones as well as patrol the area inside.

\textsuperscript{12} Point II.3 Threat assessment and risk analysis
On the other hand, according to the principle of proportionality, a large amount of uniformed security staff at the event might destroy the peaceful and friendly atmosphere among spectators. Thus, it is essential to avoid overreaction and strike a balance between ensuring safety and security at the event, which obviously is the priority, and a pleasant atmosphere. The solution might be to carry out constant patrols of security zones partly by staff wearing civilian clothes and with the use of stewards\(^\text{13}\).

Special fan zones with large outdoor screens for watching and supporting favourite teams and other event-related public gatherings of this kind also have to be secured by appropriate means. Transit routes and means of transport to reach sports venues should also be taken into consideration in strategic, operational and tactical event planning and coordination of security measures. In each environment where the event is taking place, premises, buildings, facilities, installations with special significance should be identified as they might be targeted by different risk groups or individuals.

\(^{13}\) Helpful option could be to hire stewards – auxiliary staff (civilian volunteers) dealing with ticket checks, leading spectators to their sectors and seats, giving information on the location of eateries, toilets etc. They could also be used for search for suspicious parcels, packages or bags during the event without drawing anybody’s attention.
Measures against CBRN threats

The possibility that a terrorist attack at a mass sports event would be carried out with the use of CBRN materials should also be taken into account while strategic planning, evaluating the terrorist threat, operational activities and deploying counter-terrorism measures. Awareness of these kinds of threats and diligent planning is fundamental to effective counter-terrorism protection of the event. Hence, CBRN threats should be properly emphasized in the terrorist threat assessment, risk analysis and counter-terrorism strategy for the event. On this basis coherent procedures for the emergency response by competent national authorities should be drafted. Their emergency response plans in the event of a terrorist attack should also reflect CBRN aspects.

According to Action H. 29 set out in the EU CBRN Action Plan14 “each Member State should assess CBRN emergency response plans for high-risk public locations and high-risk public events”15. With regard to this recommendation, the organising Member State should pay appropriate attention to the development of risk analysis and harm projections regarding the probability of the use of CBRN at the event and potential damage. If there are emergency plans drawn up by local authorities in designated towns or even contingency and evacuation plans of particular sports venues already in place, they should be incorporated to the general, overall crisis management and emergency strategy for the event.

All national authorities having statutory obligations to tackle CBRN issues should be involved in preventive actions aimed at mitigating risk and consequences of a potential attack. It should be considered whether to appoint an event-related crisis emergency response body coordinating activities carried out by competent national authorities dealing with CBRN. Optionally, representatives of local authorities, private entities and holders of competition venues might also be involved on the basis of public-private partnerships.

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14 Action H.29 within the Goal 1 [Improve emergency planning] of Council conclusions on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan, doc. 15505/1/09 REV 1. See also Council conclusions of 8 and 9 November 2010 on preparedness and response in the event of a CBRN attack.
15 The EU CBRN Action Plan provides general guidelines regarding CBRN issues that could be useful while organizing mass sports event.
The remit of the body would include:

- coordination of all efforts undertaken to prevent CBRN attacks during the event and minimizing their effects;
- civil emergency planning, development of scenarios and contingency plans, including evacuation plans, for actions in the event of a CBRN attack;
- immediate settling of disputes concerning the responsibilities of services involved in CBRN protection;
- oversight of all services dealing with CBRN issues at the event;
- development of guidelines regarding the technical and equipment issues at the event.

The body, if created outside the coordinating group responsible for all matters relating to security at the event, should maintain a close cooperation with the latter. Collaboration with the event-related counter-terrorism unit is crucial and key decisions should be taken with all stakeholders involved.

According to the rule that the entire security system is as strong as its weakest component, it might be considered to deploy in advance technical equipment, appropriate to the perceived risk, preventing and deterring spectators from bringing dangerous substances and mixtures to the sports venues. Precautionary measures could include the below, in addition to more specialist CBRN equipment and capability if appropriate\(^{16}\):

- metal detectors;
- CBRN detectors;
- x-ray scanners;
- decontamination equipment;
- monitoring cameras;
- searching, screening and checking procedures;
- canine corps;
- fencing.

\(^{16}\) Measures need to be taken in a targeted way according to a dynamic risk and situation assessment.
Units specialized in CBRN materials, including decontamination, for instance bomb squads and fire brigades should be in place or at least put on the alert. Where there is a specific, intelligence-led threat and when proportionate and necessary, it may be necessary to conduct searches once spectators have entered sports venues. Continuous monitoring of the venues and vigilant searches for suspicious items, abandoned bags, packages, devices or parcels should be carried out. Some search personnel, including stewards, CBRN-specialized units should wear civilian clothes in order to be able to move among spectators freely, i.e. without arising suspicion or panic behaviours. The point is to have constant supervision over potential security threats while at the same time keeping the organisation running smoothly.

Taking into consideration on one hand the threats that are connected with international mass events and on the other hand the necessity to create the relevant counter-terrorism protection of such events, Member States should use tools and solutions in CBRN that are already in place at the EU level.

**Cooperation with foreign partners and private entities**

Combating contemporary terrorism as an international phenomenon requires cooperation on international level. The sum of fragmentary information from different foreign partners give a clearer picture of the overall terrorist threat.

As already mentioned, information is a crucial element in the development of a terrorist threat assessment, risk analysis, strategic planning of all preventive measures aimed at providing security at mass sports events. Large-scale mass sports events attended by a number of foreign national representations and spectators from abroad entail an even greater need for exhaustive data also from other Member States and third states on potential threats to the security of the event. Competent national authorities responsible for preventing a terrorist attack should in accordance with the relevant legal framework acquire as much relevant information as necessary from both national intelligence and operational units and their foreign counterparts.

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17 Such as the EU Bomb Data System (EBDS) and the Early Warning System on Explosives, CBRN and Firearms (EWS).
The guidelines set out in the Handbook provide a range of useful recommendations concerning the effective procedures for the exchange and use of information as well as regarding international cooperation prior to and during mass events, which apply also to mass sports events\textsuperscript{18}. Taking into account these suggestions, information considered to be of relevance to the security of a mass sports event should be conveyed without delay to the host Member State through event-related contact points or liaison officers seconded by each Member State into the host Member State international liaison officers centre. The information should be exchanged in strict compliance with the provisions of national and international laws and treaties. One of the most basic rules is to fulfil all necessary obligations in terms of confidentiality of exchanged information and prevention of unauthorised access.

To ensure preparedness for a future mass sports event, the authorities of a Member State organising such an event at an earlier stage should consider inviting observers from other Member States.

\textsuperscript{18} Point II.1 [Contact points], II.2 [Exchange of information], III.3 [Operational cooperation with other Member States].
The principles of sending observers set out in the Handbook should be followed\textsuperscript{19}. Where appropriate and proportionate, it makes it possible to watch the way counter-terrorism issues are handled by partner services at mass sports events and helps to identify potential setbacks and problems, recognising which aspects need improvement or more attention.

Apart from cooperation with competent national authorities from other Member States, there are competent EU bodies, more specifically Europol and SitCen that could make a significant contribution to ensuring security at the event. Close cooperation with these bodies via agreed channels should be considered.

In the case of two or more Member States co-hosting a mass sports event, regular meetings of the competent national authorities responsible for counter-terrorist security of the event should be held along with enhanced cooperation of all relevant bodies, including above all respective counter-terrorism coordination centres.

The involvement of private entities in the host Member State providing counter-terrorism protection stems mostly from the need for cooperation with owners, managers and administrators of sports venues. Their emergency response strategies, evacuation and contingency plans should be taken into account in the general emergency plan for the whole event. Administrators of venues or event organizers hire private security companies whose employees should also be obliged to report to competent services about abandoned bags, suspicious parcels, packages or substances. Security clearances for employees of private companies or contractors working inside the security zones should be obligatory within the accreditation procedure. Stewards temporarily hired for auxiliary support at the event can also play a crucial role in counter-terrorism protection at the event. The general training of the stewards could include a specific part on dealing with explosives. The private entities responsible for critical premises, particularly those possessing security cameras (CCTV), should participate in security planning and be trained to spot irregular behaviour and strange placement of suspicion-arousing items.

\textsuperscript{19} Point III.3.4 [Observers].
Mass media

Media policy and communication strategy, including provisions for a crisis communication plan, directed toward the public in the Member State organising the mass sports event play a very important role both before and once a terrorist attack occurs. Basic principles of the media strategy outlined in the Handbook20 apply and should be taken into account as far as counter-terrorist event-related issues are concerned.

A single media strategy as a coordinated system of information management based on openness and transparency should also encompass counter-terrorist aspects of the event. Nonetheless, the strategy should determine which information on counter-terrorist precautions should be given to the public, as a certain part of them are of an intelligence and operational nature. Openness to the media should not undermine the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures and hence a balance must be found between transparency and efficiency. An appropriate campaign in mass media to raise public awareness of the negative consequences of insufficient cooperation in security matters is also advisable.

A single point of contact appointed for the media to ensure a coordinated media coverage should be used for counter terrorism purposes to convey to the public all relevant information on security measures which spectators and fans would have to undergo. This would help maintain a friendly atmosphere between the organisers and attendees of a mass sport event without jeopardising the security of the event. The media point of contact should hold press conferences, issue press releases, written communications and statements and use all available means of communication, among others TV, the Internet and radio, to reach as many people as possible. It is of paramount importance to avoid sending contradictory or mixed media messages to the society, therefore contacts with the mass media should be coordinated.

20 Point III.4 [Media strategy].
In the event that a terrorist attack occurs, it is crucial to shape the social perception of the attack in order to avoid panic. Bearing this in mind, regardless of the means of communication with the public used to convey information on the attack, media coverage could:

- inform the public of what has happened and appeal for information from the public;
- underscore the fact that competent national authorities are doing everything possible to alleviate the attack’s consequences and minimise its repercussions;
- appeal to national values making it possible to remain united towards the enemy;
- point to positive effects of counter-measures and actions taken by competent national authorities;
- encourage further preventive actions;
- highlight efforts aimed at the apprehension of the perpetrators.

The communication should be clear, comprehensible, consistent and unambiguous.