



Towards Trustworthy RFID Security and Privacy by design


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RFID Workshop

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No lack of RFID threats

- Spam Triggering "Bluetooth" problem
- Insufficient RFID security Fraud & counterfeit
- Tagging, cloning, cracking, targeting etc.
- Lack of central data security model data abuse
- Attempts to monopolised name space
- Identity Theft Mafia Fraud Attacks

RFID is much more than a barcode and the security model need to reflect this.



A Context Security Framework


- Zeroleak[™] (Making Devices adapt to ambient context security needs)
 E.g. Citizen (multi-)Id Devices for anti-id theft
 RFID with PET access controls
- PrivacyId[™] (Making Trusted parties Trustworthy)
 - E.g. Privacy-enabled PKI & Mobile devices Anonymous Payments w/ anti- laundering
- PrivacyTrustTM (Resolving security assertions in Transaction Context)
 - E.g. Multi-hub Online Healthcare Crossborder eCommerce





RFID Value Chain

As we move closer to the end-user. Security requirements Change !!





Security in Context



"Zero-knowledge" Device Authentication

Low-computational PET even for passive RFID

- One-step Proof of knowledge of shared secret
- Many solutions & non-algorithmic key change against brute-force
- User device and RFID communicate without leaking identifier
- > RFID key structure change through value chain
 - RFID support multiple dynamic keys and "relationships"
 - ProducerKey, OwnerKey, application keys
 - RFID support different modes
 - Highspeed transparent mode / optimistic authentication
 - Privacy RFID silent unless first authorised by OWNER
- > RFID Control is transferred to the Consumer !
 - OwnerKey control access to other keys !!
 - No digital "pollution" RFID adapt to contexts



- **Second Second S**
- Solution When a product is transferred to consumer shopping basket,
 - RFID get a new Owner key and change to a silent "Privacy Mode". Product code is deleted from RFID for trust and security.
 - Consumer get the OwnerKey, that control access
- Afterwards (out of range) consumer changes the RFID Ownerkey to ensure exclusive knowledge of the key and RFID control.
- **The RFID remain silent unless Consumer authenticate**
- **Consumer can get services and communicate with RFID**
- **Content** End result: Security, Privacy AND Service



Security in Context

Making sense of Consent

Today – Informed Consent leads to blackmail Consent means Service OR Security

➢ With ZEROLEAK™ RFID, consumers can choose

- To "KILL" the RFID at POS (concern about technology)
- To receive the RFID Owner key (don't care or maybe useful)
- To transfer valuable to "collections" (e.g. Books, clothes etc.)
- To prepare one-time-only category information for disposal
- To validate an RFID over the Internet, e.g. Home Medication.

Tomorrow – Default is Service AND Security Consent means free choice, trust and acceptance of risk

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ZeroleakTM for RFID

Trust programme based on agreements



- Agreements/license to build trust in RFID
 - Each party in the value chain agree to principles,
 - agree to enforce on next step or "kill" the RFID,
 - and ensure RFID "transfer of control" to Owner

> Technical requirements to isolate RFID "contexts"

- RFID not allowed for authentication of people (Anti-Identity Theft require USER EMPOWERMENT)
- No out of context data leakage when communicating
- Fallback security for dependability
- Create a simple principle of control
 - If RFID communicate unauthorised -> trouble!



Security in Context

Open Naming Standards

- Ongoing attempts to control namespace(s)
 - E.g.: Manufacturer.Product.Serialnumber@monopolly.com
 - > monopolly.com translate to <manufacturer>.com for a fee and data
- Priway suggest URLs/DNS as default
 - [http://][product Ref].<provider.eu>
 - Example http://<Serial#>.<Product>.<Manufacturer>.eu
- Rationale Flexibility, security and innovation
 - Providers are already registered through in DNS another ICANN?
 - > XML product descriptions incl. Certificates
 - > Structured names spaces (e.g. EPC) as attribute certificates
 - Flexible and open to innovation [ref].<serviceprovider.com>





♥ With Zeroleak[™] consumers get control

Minimum requirement is Transfer of Control

- But take care of stakeholder risks such as anti-counterfeit
- Usability is vital but an application issue
 - MANY user application solutions in parallel
- RFID Security is critical infrastructure for Europe
 - > Make it trustworthy or kill it Prevent Digital "Pollution"
- People are not things turned into targets !!
 - > Design for trustworthiness Emergency is one-time-only!
- European Values built into technology
 - Vital support for SME Innovation & trust