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The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

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CONTEST is our strategic response to the threat from international terrorism. The aim of the strategy is ‘to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence’.

In March 2009 we published a revised version of CONTEST. This described the terrorist threat to this country and our overseas interests and the factors that sustain it and explained the four main areas of our counter-terrorism work. These are known as Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. When the revised strategy was published, my predecessor Jacqui Smith committed to publishing an Annual Report setting out our progress against its objectives.

The aim of this Annual Report is to make public the work that Departments and agencies have undertaken over the last 12 months. During this period there have been no attacks in the UK by international terrorist groups or individuals associated with or influenced by them. But we continue to face a significant terrorist threat and there have been many terrorist attacks in other countries in which thousands of people, including British citizens, have been killed or injured.

Our success in responding to the terrorist threat at home and abroad depends on men and women across law enforcement, the security and intelligence agencies and the Armed Forces. But it also reflects the work of many other people throughout communities in this country as well as overseas. I pay tribute to them and their achievements in the last 12 months.

The primary duty of Government is the nation’s security. This Annual Report clearly demonstrates the Government’s unwavering commitment to keep British citizens safe and secure and to protect the freedoms we all enjoy.

Alan Johnson MP
The UK’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

Aim
The aim of CONTEST is:

. . . ‘to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interest overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.’

Principles
CONTEST is based on principles that reflect our core values, the lessons we and others have drawn from experiences of terrorism to date, and the broader security principles set out in the National Security Strategy:

• We will continue to regard the protection of human rights as central to our counter-terrorism work in this country and overseas.
• Our response to terrorism will be based upon the rule of law.
• We will always aim to prosecute those responsible for terrorist attacks in this country.
• Our strategy will tackle the causes as well as the symptoms of terrorism.
• Reducing support for terrorism and preventing people becoming terrorists are vital: without popular support terrorism is unsustainable.
• Our strategy must be responsive to the threat which can be created by rapidly evolving technology.
• We recognise that partnerships in this country and overseas are essential to our success and that these partnerships depend on openness and trust.
• The threat we face crosses our borders and is international in scope. We will depend upon our allies as they will depend on us.

Response
Delivery of the strategy continues to be organised around four principal workstreams:

• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks
• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism
• Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack
• Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact
1.01 In March 2009 the Government published a revised version of CONTeST – the UK’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism. This Annual Report, the first of its kind, summarises progress made in the last 12 months against the programmes set out in CONTeST and identifies priorities for the future. This report should therefore be read in conjunction with the 2009 strategy. In some areas details have had to be withheld for security reasons.

1.02 Over the past year more detailed documents have been produced on specific aspects of CONTeST, including Prevent local delivery, CONTeST Science and Technology Strategy and Industry requirements for CONTeST work. Most of these are publicly available on the Home Office website.

Strategic context

1.03 The National Security Strategy states that terrorism remains the pre-eminent security threat to the UK. The CONTeST strategy identifies four principal threats to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism: the Al Qa’ida core leadership group; Al Qa’ida affiliates; Al Qa’ida inspired threats; and other terrorist groups. It argued that the international terrorist threat has been and will continue to be driven by four strategic factors: conflict and instability; ideology; technology and radicalisation.

1.04 The strategy set out a series of planning assumptions for counter-terrorist work during the next three years. It suggested that: the Al Qa’ida core organisation was likely to fragment and might not survive in its current form; the stability, security and prosperity of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan would significantly determine the future of Al Qa’ida and of the insurgency in Afghanistan; Al Qa’ida affiliates were likely to develop more autonomy and challenge failed and failing states, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia; terrorist organisations would have access to more lethal technology; the ideology associated with Al Qa’ida would outlive changes to its structure; and our success in challenging that ideology would significantly determine the shape of the future terrorist threat.

1.05 These assumptions remain valid and have been reflected in events over the past year.

1.06 The Al Qa’ida core group in Pakistan has come under severe pressure from US activities and Pakistani military and intelligence operations. Since January 2008 seven of Al Qa’ida’s most senior leaders have been killed. The organisation has suffered from a shortage of funds and safe havens in which to train and plan attacks. Operations by Afghan, UK and other coalition forces in Afghanistan have not only curtailed Taliban insurgent activity but also prevented Al Qa’ida from returning to the safe havens from which they were removed in 2001/02.

1.07 But Al Qa’ida has continued to try to conduct significant terrorist operations in and outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qa’ida operational activity has been disrupted in the US, Europe – including the UK – and in Africa and South East Asia.

1.08 Some of Al Qa’ida’s affiliates and associated groups have continued to grow over the past year:

- Al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQ-AP), formed by a merger of Saudi Arabian and Yemeni Al Qa’ida cells in January 2009, has conducted a series of operations and attempted operations in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, including an attempt to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Security Minister in August
2009. AQ-AP subsequently claimed responsibility for the attempted attack on flight NW253 from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. That attack demonstrated not only AQ-AP intent but also its capability to conduct attacks in the West when and where opportunities arise.

- Al Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQ-M), based in Algeria, has conducted attacks in other North African countries and has been implicated in high profile kidnappings of westerners including French, Spanish, Belgian and Swiss nationals. AQ-M has used the funds raised from ransom payments to expand and increase their capacity. AQ-M kidnapped a British citizen, Edwin Dyer, in Mali in January 2009: he was murdered in May 2009.

- The insurgency directed against the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia has continued through the year. Many casualties have been caused by Al-Shabaab, an insurgent group that is not formally affiliated with Al Qa’ida but which shares Al Qa’ida’s global ideology. In February 2010 Al-Shabaab announced their intention to coordinate their operations in the Horn of Africa with Al Qa’ida and they have publicly offered support to Islamic extremists in Yemen. Al Qa’ida senior leaders have provided public and private advice and encouragement to them.

1.09 Following improvements during 2008, the security situation in Iraq continued to stabilise during 2009 but there have been significantly more terrorist attacks and casualties than in any other country. Over 2,500 people are known to have died in well over 2,000 terrorist attacks during 2009. The general level of politically-motivated violence rose over the election period, but the increasing capability of the Iraqi Security Forces allowed a high turnout. Al Qa’ida in Iraq’s (AQ-I) recent focus has been on high profile attacks against government targets: in 2009, the group claimed responsibility for the mass casualty attacks in Baghdad on 19 August, 25 October and 8 December. AQ-I still pose a significant threat to security in Iraq but many other terrorist groups are also active.

1.10 Al Qa’ida associated and inspired individuals and groups have continued to conduct attacks around the world. Organisations based in and around the FATA, notably the Pakistan Taliban, have conducted repeated terrorist attacks in Pakistan leading to over 2,500 fatalities among civilians and police. There were over 80 suicide bombing attacks during 2009 alone; further terrorist operations have been constrained by Pakistani military action. Lashkar-e Tayiiba (LeT) have been responsible for a number of attacks in India in recent years, probably including those in Mumbai of November 2008. LeT continue to be active in the region.

1.11 In Europe there has been an attempted attack in Italy and continued arrests for a range of terrorist offences in many other countries, notably Spain and France: in 12 European countries (excluding the UK) in 2008 over 750 people were arrested for offences relating to all kinds of terrorism, including almost 200 for terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida, Al Qa’ida affiliates or with groups sharing Al Qa’ida’s ideology. Statistics are not yet available for 2009 but may be lower.

1.12 Further afield, Australian Police arrested four men for allegedly planning a suicide attack on an army barracks in Melbourne in August 2009. Terrorist attacks continued in Indonesia against both western and other targets.

1.13 Globally, there were almost 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009 causing approximately 15,000 fatalities and injuring over 30,000 people. The figures for 2008 were slightly higher: some 11,770 terrorist attacks caused 15,765 fatalities.

The threat to the UK

1.14 In the 12 months to 30 September 2009 there were more than 200 arrests in the UK for all forms of terrorism (compared with 178 in the previous 12 month period) which led to charges being brought against 66 people, 24 for terrorism-related offences and 42 for other criminal offences. By the end of the year 11 people had been convicted: some trials have yet to take place. The majority of those arrested and convicted were
engaged in Al Qa’ida associated or influenced activity.

1.15 The Government continues to judge that the UK and UK interests overseas face a significant terrorist threat from a range of terrorist organisations identified in the CONTEST strategy including Al Qa’ida. During the year planned terrorist operations against the UK have been successfully disrupted.

1.16 The UK threat level is set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), which operates independently of Ministers and the Home Office. When CONTEST was published in March 2009 the threat level was SEVERE, meaning that JTAC judged a terrorist attack to be highly likely. On 20 July 2009 the threat level was reduced to SUBSTANTIAL (meaning an attack is a strong possibility). It was raised again to SEVERE on 22 January 2010. JTAC’s assessment is based on a broad range of factors, including the intent and capabilities of international terrorist groups.
2.01 The 2009 CONTEST strategy identifies six main priorities for Pursue-related work: increasing covert detection and investigation capability and capacity; improving the effectiveness of the UK prosecution process; developing more effective non-prosecution actions; improving capability to disrupt terrorist activities overseas; strengthening the coherence between our counter-terrorism work and counter-insurgency and capacity building overseas; and enhancing inter-agency coordination on this workstream. Some of the key developments against these priorities are outlined below.

Enhancing inter-agency coordination and increasing detection and investigation capability and capacity

2.02 Resources allocated to this aspect of our counter-terrorism work have continued to increase. Structures have remained largely unchanged although the counter-terrorism network has been reinforced by the establishment of a fourth Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU) modelled on the three existing and proven CTUs in the North-East, North-West, West Midlands and the Counter-Terrorism Command in London.

2.03 The Government has continued to consider whether existing capabilities and capacity are sufficient to manage the terrorist threat we face. In April 2009, a consultation paper was issued seeking views on a specific requirement to continue to collect communications data, not just for terrorism but for the investigation of all serious crime. The results of the consultation were published on 9 November 2009.

2.04 Where covert techniques intrude on privacy, authorisation is required under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). A consultation was launched in April 2009 to ensure that techniques are used only when they are strictly necessary and proportionate to the offence under investigation. Following this consultation, the Government took seven statutory instruments through Parliament. These set out exactly who in each public authority may authorise certain covert techniques and for what purpose. They give clear guidance on when authorisation under RIPA is – and when it is not – required, and provide enhanced controls for local authority use of RIPA.

2.05 In January 2010, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (providing powers to stop and search) breached Article 8 (Right to privacy) of the European Convention. Stop and search is an important power in countering terrorism and the Government is seeking to appeal. But the Government also wishes to use this stop and search in a way that is proportionate to the threat: in 2009 the Metropolitan Police Service changed the way it uses this power, leading to a fall of 40% in stops made during the first quarter of 2009/10.

Improving the effectiveness of the UK prosecution process (from evidential collection to post-prison supervision)

2.06 The main provisions of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 have now been brought into force. These include: enhanced sentencing for individuals convicted of offences that are non-terrorist but connected with terrorism (for example, an explosives-related offence); the establishment of new foreign travel restriction orders designed to restrict, where necessary, persons convicted of terrorism-related offences from travelling overseas; new notification requirements to help monitor convicted terrorists on their release from prison; and new powers for HM Treasury to direct financial institutions
to take action against terrorist financing and money laundering.

2.07 Following the recommendations of a Privy Council review, the Prime Minister stated on 6 February 2008 that the Government wished to see intercept material admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings in this country, subject to the proposed legal model meeting what the Privy Councillors judged to be essential operational and legal requirements. Work was subsequently completed on the practical implementation of the recommended model and the results of that work were published in December 2009: it concluded that the model was not legally viable. Given the potential gains from intercept as evidence, the Government confirmed that further work was necessary to see whether the identified obstacles could be overcome. This is underway and a further report back to Parliament is due before the Easter recess.

**Developing more effective non-prosecution actions**

2.08 The Government considers that non-prosecution actions remain essential for managing the terrorist threat, specifically where identified individuals are suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activity but where it is not possible to prosecute or deport them. In June 2009, the House of Lords (in AF & Others) set out a test for control order proceedings to comply with ECHR Article 6 (Right to a fair trial). The Government continues to take the view that the control order regime remains legally viable and operationally necessary: that view has been endorsed by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, in his annual report on the operation of control orders legislation, published on 1 February 2010.

2.09 In cases where foreign nationals pose a risk to UK security, the Government’s aim is to deport them. Where there have been concerns about the safety of such people on return to their country of origin, arrangements are in place to ensure our human rights obligations are met. To date, nine people have been deported under ‘Deportation with Assurances’ arrangements. Further deportation proceedings continue.

2.10 The Government continues to take action against organisations that are concerned in terrorism. The proscription of terrorist organisations helps make the UK a more hostile environment for terrorism: over the last year Al Muhajiroun (with its alternative titles, including Islam4UK) and Al-Shabaab were both proscribed.

2.11 The Government continues to coordinate efforts to tackle terrorist finance. Work was completed on a new terrorist financing strategy, foreshadowed in the CONTeST strategy. The Charity Commission published guidance to charities on how to minimise the risk of financial abuse from terrorists; Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs have extended circulation of registered Money Service Businesses. Supported by the UK, the UN Security Council explicitly confirmed in Resolution 1904 that the payment of ransoms to terrorist groups is prohibited. The Financial Action Task Force published two lists of countries which need to do more to enhance their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance regimes: as a result a number of countries have introduced stronger legislation.

2.12 Asset freezing makes an important contribution to national security by preventing suspected terrorists from accessing their own funds or being given funds by third parties. A Supreme Court judgment in January 2010 quashed the secondary legislation which HM Treasury had used to freeze terrorist assets. The Government is committed to maintaining an effective and proportionate asset freezing regime that meets our UN obligations, protects national security and safeguards human rights. The Government therefore passed emergency legislation in response to the Supreme Court’s judgment, restoring the domestic asset freezing regime until December 2010. We have also published a draft Terrorist Asset Freezing Bill which will make provision for the UK to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists in the future.
2.13 The overseas work of Departments and agencies on all aspects of counter-terrorism continues to be coordinated through an Overseas CONTEST Group (OCG). Building the Pursue-related capacity of key partner countries overseas to deal with the threat of terrorism remains a high priority. Pakistan has been the largest single recipient of funding, followed by Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) overseas counter-terrorism budget has increased from £35million in 2008/09, to £36.9million in 2009/10 and is projected to around £38million in 2010/11.

2.14 Since 9/11 the UK has received valuable intelligence from people detained overseas for terrorist-related activities. In some cases that intelligence has enabled the disruption of terrorist attacks in this country. The Government is committed to publishing as soon as possible our consolidated guidance to personnel about the standards we apply during the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) has provided a comprehensive and insightful review of this guidance in line with its important intelligence oversight role and has raised a number of issues which require further consideration. The Government will therefore work with the ISC to ensure that our position on these complex issues is properly understood. The Government condemns unreservedly the use of torture as a matter of fundamental principle and our clear policy is not to participate in, solicit, encourage or condone torture. We work hard with our international partners to eradicate this abhorrent practice.

2.15 Since 9/11 the agencies in the UK with responsibility for operational counter-terrorism work have collaborated closely together. Following the attempted attack over Detroit in December 2009, arrangements for joint working have again been reviewed. On 20 January 2010, the Prime Minister announced that the intelligence agencies were further developing joint operational work to address potential terrorist threats overseas, before the individuals concerned might reach our shores.
3.01 The Government continues to believe that it is a vital part of our counter-terrorism strategy to dissuade people from turning to or supporting terrorism and violent extremism. Neither the continued disruption of terrorist attacks nor protective security work will alone provide a long term solution to the threats which we face. This position is shared by many other governments around the world.

3.02 The purpose of the Prevent strand of CONTEST is therefore to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and violent extremism. It reflects the application of some of the principles of crime prevention to the world of counter-terrorism. The strategy was developed in 2007, based on the current evidence of what causes people to turn to terrorism in this country. While we continue to review and strengthen the evidence base, the Government is satisfied that the strategy is correct.

3.03 The most significant international terrorist threat to the UK continues to come from groups who claim to act in the name of Islam and who try to recruit people of Muslim faith to the cause of violent extremism. Previous terrorist organisations have sought to recruit people from other ethnic and faith groups and communities in this country and overseas. The number of people prepared to support terrorism and violent extremism in this country is and always has been very small but the effect they can have is disproportionately large.

3.04 During this year the Government has again made clear that Prevent must be based upon a collaborative partnership between Government, policing and communities. Prevent must enable and support communities to continue to actively challenge the small minority who espouse violent extremism. But the Prevent strategy must not be the only or the main context in which Government and Muslim communities work and talk together:

specifically, Prevent must not absorb the vital cohesion work that has been underway for many years and on which, in reality, Prevent depends. And a preventative programme must be further developed for other domestic forms of violent extremism, notably associated with the far right, although formally these will remain outside the scope of CONTEST which remains a strategy for countering international terrorism.

3.05 Over the past year the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations have continued to build a wide ranging network at local and national level to deliver Prevent programmes. That network now includes local authorities, Government Offices, many Government Departments, policing and diplomatic posts overseas. The network has established local and national partnerships with an increasingly broad range of community groups and organisations, successfully delivering over 1,000 projects.

Challenging the ideology behind violent extremism

3.06 The Government has continued to support organisations who are challenging claims made by terrorist organisations and an ideology that supports violent extremism. Some funded programmes have raised awareness of extremist ideology and have supported those who can best explain how to rebut it. Others have generated debate and thinking about Islam in the UK today. Some programmes have supported activities to undermine violent extremist narratives, or supported platforms for mainstream voices to be heard.
Disrupting those who promote violent extremism

3.07 Work has progressed with programmes intended to sensitise sectors and institutions where propagandists for violence have been active in the past and may be in the future – for example, higher and further education. In this country as in many others, prisons hold a significant number of individuals for terrorism offences (as at 30 September 2009, there were 110 people in prisons in England and Wales remanded or sentenced under terrorism or terrorism-related legislation). These prisoners are held alongside many vulnerable and disaffected individuals who may be sympathetic to the language of violent extremism. The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) has therefore continued its programme to combat violent extremism amongst offenders.

3.08 The Home Office has continued to work with industry and communities on a range of activities to disrupt violent extremist activity on the internet. Companies marketing filtering products have continued to receive support. In February 2010 a new police-led pilot website was established for members of the public to refer violent extremist internet-based material. Where that material is or may be illegal the police will take action; where it is legal but undesirable, guidance is provided on action that can be taken with Internet Service Providers under their acceptable use guidelines.

Supporting individuals who are at risk of recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists

3.09 The Prevent strategy continues to offer support to people who are assessed to be at risk of being drawn into violent extremism. This is consistent with much broader principles of crime prevention. The Channel programme is a network of locally-based partnerships between the police, local authority, statutory bodies and communities which aims to identify and support those at risk of being recruited by violent extremists. Channel now operates across some 75 local authorities/12 police forces, in England and Wales, supported by a wide range of local community organisations. Channel has also seen an increase in referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into right wing violent extremism.

3.10 Guidance for local authorities and policing on developing such programmes in the future will be published shortly, emphasising the need to enable and encourage local authorities and community partners to take on a leading role.

Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism

3.11 The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) has continued to fund local projects and organisations working on a range of projects across all Prevent objectives. This includes projects to build the capacity of Muslim faith leaders, and to empower Muslim women and young people in their localities, their communities and online. Work to support community organisations to improve governance standards in mosques is continuing. All this work is supported through national grants to community organisations and through a £16.5 million Government grant to local authorities in 2009/10 (set to rise to £24 million in 2010/11).

Addressing grievances

3.12 The CONTEST strategy recognised that apologists for violent extremism exploit both real and perceived grievances to justify acts of terrorism. Work has continued this year to address issues about foreign policy and domestic counter-terrorism issues in particular, with the responsible Departments arranging regular events for this purpose around the country. Changes have been made to the application of some policing powers, for example the use of section 44 in Metropolitan police areas (para 2.05 above). Additional guidance has been issued on other powers, notably Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which governs the questioning of people at borders.

3.13 The absence of clear and active leadership which addresses local grievances can be exploited by those who
promote community division, as we have seen in some areas targeted by far right extremist groups. The CLG ‘Connecting Communities Programme’ has increased the resources available to develop community leadership which can tackle difficult issues and increase community awareness of local opportunities including in employment and housing.

**Prevent overseas**

3.14 There has also been significant progress in Prevent overseas, which addresses the international dimension of the Prevent strands listed above. The Counter Terrorism Programme Fund has supported over 250 overseas projects in countries and regions which are most significant for the threat to the UK and our interests. During 2009, this has included counter-ideology projects to undermine the terrorist narrative and work to tackle radicalisation in countries and communities which have strong ties to the UK.

**Information and evidence**

3.15 The CONTEST strategy recognised that a major challenge for Prevent was making more classified information available to a much wider group of people in local authorities and statutory bodies. During this year, reporting has been made available in new formats by police and the agencies. And more open source and academic research has been commissioned, including further work by the FCO and Department for International Development (DFID) into drivers of radicalisation overseas. In March 2010 the Government published social science research requirements arising from CONTEST as part of a series of brochures on science, technology and counter-terrorism.
Afghanistan/Pakistan

The core Al Qa'ida group based in the FATA on the Pakistan and Afghanistan border remains one of the most significant security threats to the UK and its interests overseas. Al Qa'ida members based in the FATA continue to plan operations in this country and further afield and to provide training and materials. Al Qa'ida relocated to the FATA following coalition action in Afghanistan.

Pakistan

During 2009 the Government of Pakistan successfully took military action in Swat North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and South Waziristan (part of the FATA) to dislodge the Pakistan Taliban and smaller groups allied to it, who have been responsible for many terrorist attacks and civilian casualties. Further action has also been taken against Al Qa'ida elsewhere in Pakistan, leading to significant disruption of the organisation.

The Government continues to support the Pakistani Government with assistance across all aspects of counter-terrorism strategy, including organisational development, legislation, forensics police capacity building and communications.

UK development assistance will help the Government of Pakistan to tackle the grievances that can fuel violent extremism. The international community also provides support through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan process, notably the funding of reconstruction following military action in NWFP.

Afghanistan

The focus of Afghan and coalition activity during 2009 has been on protecting and supporting the people, economy and state of Afghanistan and on military operations to remove the Taliban infrastructure. But the Taliban and associated anti-Government insurgent and terrorist organisations continue to cause very significant Afghan civilian casualties, estimated to be over 1,600 during 2009\(^\text{10}\). Considerable progress has been made in developing Afghan National Security and Police Forces. Military resources have also been increased, culminating in an additional 37,500 NATO International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) troops by December 2009 bringing the total number of NATO ISAF troops to over 84,000, including 9,500 British personnel.

The Afghan Government and international community met in London on 28 January 2010 to agree on collaborative work, based on Afghan Government proposals, in four key areas: security; building the political processes in Kabul and the provinces; fostering economic growth; and improving regional engagement.

It is in the UK's national interest for Afghanistan to develop the capacity and capabilities to resist the Taliban and prevent the return of Al Qa'ida. This will take time and, tragically, has and will continue to cost the lives of our own troops, those of our allies and those of Afghan troops and citizens: as at 18 March 2010, a total of 275 British forces personnel have died while serving in Afghanistan since the start of operations in October 2001.
4.01 The aim of Protect is to reduce the vulnerability of the UK and its interests overseas to terrorist attacks. The CONTEST strategy outlined that our objectives for Protect are to further reduce the vulnerability of:

- our critical national infrastructure
- crowded places
- the transport system
- and our borders.

4.02 The attempted attack against a US airliner in December 2009 has led to a programme of work broadly relating to protective security at borders and on transport systems. This is summarised below.

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)

4.03 CNI protection is well established with programmes to review security and provide advice across all nine sectors (communications; emergency services; energy; finance; food; government; health; transport and water). Government Departments, and the Devolved Administrations supported by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), continue to work closely with CNI operators to identify and mitigate significant vulnerabilities.

4.04 Progress has been made towards delivery of an extensive programme of security enhancements at critical sites across the national gas and electricity transmission network. In the water sector, enhancements have been made to improve physical security and prevent malicious access. Good progress has also been made in the government sector on the installation of protective security stand-off measures within the Whitehall streetscape.

4.05 In other sectors (communications, finance and emergency services) a rolling programme of site visits and security surveys has been delivered by CPNI with advice provided to sites on protective security enhancements.

4.06 A self-assessment tool designed to identify vulnerabilities in infrastructure process control systems has also been developed and rolled out.

4.07 Arrangements for engagement and dialogue about protective security across Government and with industry continue to be enhanced, for example through a growing range of industry ‘Information Exchanges’. During 2009, a new protective security awareness DVD was launched by CPNI to raise awareness of security issues across government and the private sector.

Crowded places

4.08 In March 2010, the Government published final guidance on protecting crowded places, based on public responses to a consultation document issued in April 2009 (in this context crowded places mean locations accessible to the public which may potentially be liable to terrorist attack by virtue of their crowd density). One of the documents explains how and by whom risks to crowded places in the UK will be assessed and what action will then be taken. Appropriate local partnerships to develop this work are identified and explained. The two other documents provide guidance for planning officers in England and for architects and designers. Central to the success of this process will be the sharing of risk and vulnerability assessments to local partners: the documents also offer guidance on this point.

4.09 During 2009, crowded places have continued to be evaluated using the risk assessment process. Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) have continued to deliver Project Argus events, providing advice to businesses on the terrorist threat, business continuity and measures to mitigate vulnerabilities.
4.10 A new cross-government INSTINCT (Innovative Science and Technology in Counter Terrorism) Programme, coordinated out of the Office for Security Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office, seeks novel technical solutions to address challenges identified in CONTEST. This year INSTINCT addressed issues relating to the vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack and used a Technology Demonstrator to evaluate and showcase new and emerging technologies in the field of prediction and detection of abnormal crowd behaviour. This process was widely regarded as setting new standards for industry and Government joint work on counter-terrorism related issues.

**Transport security**

4.11 The Department for Transport (DfT) and the Home Office are working to implement The Policing and Crime Act 2009 which made changes to airport security planning and, for those airports where there is a need for a dedicated police resource, introduced police service agreements. These agreements, to be in place by 2011, will set out the detailed activities and costs of the police resources agreed in airport security plans.

4.12 In respect of maritime security, the Port Security Regulations 2009 transposed into UK law the requirements of EU Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security. These Regulations extend previous security requirements beyond the ‘ship-port interface’ and further into relevant areas within the port itself.

4.13 Following the attempted attack on a flight over Detroit on December 2009, the Government directed airports to increase the proportion of passengers being searched by hand, and having their baggage tested for traces of explosives. Body scanners have been deployed at Heathrow and Manchester airports and more are being rolled out over the coming months. These scanners will enable the detection of a range of threat items, especially those concealed close to the body. DfT has introduced an Interim Code of Practice for their use covering privacy, health and safety, data protection and equality issues. A formal consultation on a final Code of Practice will begin shortly.

4.14 In addition to the changes introduced in the UK we continue to work with a number of foreign governments to improve their transport security capabilities. In the past year the DfT has undertaken overseas capacity building in aviation security, including hosting visits to the UK to discuss and observe UK aviation security practice, aviation security training and where appropriate the provision of equipment. Yemenia Airways suspended its direct service from Sana’a to the UK in January 2010 while progress is made on their own aviation security.

**Borders**

4.15 The e-Borders programme, which provides information on who is travelling into or out of the UK, continues to roll out. As anticipated in the CONTEST strategy, the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and the police established the National Border Targeting Centre in March 2010 as a central hub for data collection and analysis. Because e-Borders checks passengers travelling to and from this country it enables the arrest of people for whom there are outstanding arrest warrants here. To date there have been over 5,000 arrests for crimes including murder, rape and assault, some on warrants dating back many years.

4.16 The e-Borders programme depends on the provision to the system of Advance Passenger Information (API) from aviation, maritime and rail carriers providing services to and from the UK. In 2009, the legal basis for the provision of that data was challenged with the European Commission. In December 2009 the Commission confirmed that it is lawful to collect API data for all EU citizens who do not specifically object. Where an objection is made the UK can still collect passenger data to the extent the carrier already collects it. Since then UKBA have been engaging with the Commission to seek clarity on their decision, and have also been working bilaterally with EU Member States and their national Data Protection Authorities, to get approval for passenger...
data collected and held by that Member State to be transferred to the UK.

4.17 Following the attempted attack over Detroit, the Home Secretary conducted an urgent review of the UK counter-terrorist watchlist system. The Prime Minister reported on the main conclusions of the first stage of that review on 20 January 2010, confirming the intention of the Government to extend the UKBA Watchlist to include a no-fly list and enhanced screening list, allowing these actions to be taken at an overseas port of embarkation. Further work is underway in the Home Office to implement these measures.

4.18 The new student tier of the Points Based System is intended to ensure that only genuine foreign students can travel to the UK. No institution can bring students into the country without approval of that institution by an accredited body, and assessment of their premises, courses and teaching staff.

4.19 The major programme for installation of equipment to detect the illicit importation of radiological and nuclear material is nearing completion. In addition to the five early sites in the southeast, there are now over 30 in or available for live operations and more will be completed by the end of the financial year. This fixed capability continues to be supported by a fleet of mobile radiation detection units that can be deployed nationally to any location in the UK and in support of police operations.

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**Personnel security**

4.20 The CPNI (para 4.03) has allocated additional resources to provide advice to companies and organisations on personnel security in a terrorism context, building on personnel security measures already in place to prevent fraud or theft. Guidance has been disseminated through the CPNI public website and other material shared through ‘Industry Information Exchanges’ and online industry publications.

4.21 In August 2009, DfT introduced overseas criminal record checks as part of the assurance process for certain aviation security staff, where applicants had spent significant recent periods of time abroad.
5.01 The Prepare workstream seeks to minimise the impact of a terrorist attack where it cannot be stopped. This includes work to manage an ongoing attack as well as recovery from its aftermath. An effective and efficient response saves lives and reduces injuries.

5.02 The Home Office is the lead Department, for ensuring that this country is well prepared for a terrorist attack. The Home Office works closely with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the Cabinet Office which is responsible for the larger national resilience programme, including planning for natural hazards and major accidents.

5.03 CCS is also responsible for preparing the National Risk Assessment (NRA), on the basis of advice from other Government Departments. The NRA assesses the impact and likelihood of a range of risks to the safety and security of the UK. A public version of the NRA is available as the National Risk Register (NRR). The NRR includes four terrorism-related risks: attacks on transport; crowded places; infrastructure; and non-conventional attacks. The NRR has been updated and is being published alongside this Review.

5.04 The NRR and accompanying planning assumptions guide the contingency planning work of 47 Local Resilience Forums in England and Wales, nine English Regional Resilience Forums, and the equivalent structures in Scotland.

5.05 The 2009 CONTEST strategy identified four principal objectives for our work in this area: capabilities should be in place to deal with the consequences of the highest impact terrorist threats; and central, regional and local crisis management structures should be appropriately equipped and trained.

**Building capabilities**

5.06 Prepare relies on effective interoperability, communication and information-sharing among emergency responders. As foreshadowed in CONTEST, improvements in the resilience of telecommunications have been made, including through the initial roll out of the National Resilience Extranet project which will assist emergency responders to share information during routine planning and in the response to emergencies. Agreements are also in place with mobile telephone service providers to ensure that key emergency responders have protected access to telecommunications in the event of a terrorist incident.

5.07 Other programmes to improve the capability of emergency responders to deal with terrorist emergencies have also progressed. These include improved capability to deal with casualties and fatalities, both generally and specifically in incidents involving chemical, biological or radiological devices. Work has been completed to roll out medical consumables to 190 transport hubs and key locations across England to be used by responders in the event of a mass casualty incident. Roll out of Ambulance Service Hazardous Area Response Teams and the Urban Search and Rescue Programme continues. Planning for evacuation and shelter, for mutual aid, humanitarian assistance and recovery is more widespread.

5.08 Delivery of the Counter Terrorism National Exercises Programme has continued to test the abilities of the police service and other key stakeholders to prepare for, respond to, and manage terrorist investigations and incidents. Three national level ‘live-play’ exercises were held...
in 2009 and a further three major exercises will be delivered this year. The scale of these exercises can be considerable, involving 200–1,000 participants. Exercises are designed to engage police forces within the regions together with central Government Departments and agencies. Each national-level exercise is followed by a comprehensive debriefing and reporting process so that the issues and learning arising are taken forward by the appropriate organisations for further action as necessary.

Response to an ongoing attack: Implications of the Mumbai attacks

5.09 We continue to absorb the lessons arising from recent terrorist attacks, notably those in Mumbai in November 2008 (subsequently replicated in more recent attacks including in Kabul). The police and other emergency responders, including fire and ambulance services, have been working together to enhance their response to a terrorist firearms attack in the UK. This work has involved joint exercises, at local and national level, including with the military, whose specialist assets are held at high readiness to assist the police in dealing with an attack.

5.10 The police priority is always to save lives and protect the public. In certain extreme circumstances where an attack cannot be stopped in advance, and where there is an immediate threat to life from well-armed and determined attackers, the police will need to intervene to bring the attack to an end as quickly as possible. Ministers have supported the continuing development of a wider range of police tactical options to respond to a Mumbai style attack as swiftly and effectively as possible.

5.11 An ongoing programme of work coordinated by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) develops police interoperability across the counter-terrorism policing network and between the police and other emergency providers. Interoperability is tested within the National Counter Terrorism Exercise Programme. A similar programme of work is underway in Scotland.

5.12 The National Counter Terrorism Security Office has expanded its protective security advice to a range of sectors (including for hotels and restaurants) to include advice on action that should be taken to mitigate firearm and weapon attacks. Additionally, a firearms component has been added to the Project Argus training exercise (para 4.09 above).

CNI preparedness

5.13 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat has been working with Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and CPNI to support and encourage owners of CNI to increase their resilience, by reducing their vulnerability to a wide range of hazards and adopting effective business continuity management planning. This critical infrastructure resilience programme, originally conceived in response to the lessons learnt from the 2007 floods, will improve resilience both to natural hazards and malicious threats. A strategic framework and policy statement and a summary of the nine Sector Resilience Plans (see para 4.03) will be published alongside this Report.

Improving capabilities to deal with highest impact threats

5.14 Most of our work in these areas is classified and cannot be published for security and safety reasons. But we have continued to adapt our Prepare planning and capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents which the NRA indicates are likely to cause the most serious and widespread impact. These plans build on a national response framework similar to that which has been developed for major flu and flooding emergencies, and are being informed by a programme of specific research to understand better the challenges posed by these threats, which are mainly Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) related.
Crisis response arrangements and structures

5.15 We have continued to improve central, regional and local crisis response arrangements and structures in the light of experience, including by upgrading national facilities in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. Crisis management arrangements have been set out in a revised concept of operations – Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency, published by the Cabinet Office – and in updated Emergency Response and Recovery guidance for local and regional resilience organisations. Work will also continue to ensure effective linkages between the resilience network and the police counter-terrorism network, notably the Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisers.

5.16 The FCO coordinates the Government’s response to terrorist incidents and kidnaps overseas. Travel Advice informs British nationals about terrorist threats including the threat of terrorist kidnap. The FCO led the Government’s response to a number of terrorist kidnaps overseas in 2009, including the long-running Iraq hostages case. The Government does not make substantive concessions to hostage takers but we will talk to anyone we believe can help secure release. In December 2009, working closely with Algeria, we pushed to make ransom payments to Al Qa’ida more difficult. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1904 was adopted on 17 December 2009 and is explicit that ransom payments to Al Qa’ida contravene the sanctions regime.
Delivering CONTEST overseas

Terrorism is international. Terrorists operating here may travel from overseas and very often receive instructions from and training in other countries. People from this country have been recruited to participate in terrorist organisations and terrorist attacks around the world. Working internationally, with partner governments and multilateral organisations, is therefore a vital part of CONTEST.

Through the Overseas CONTEST Group, chaired by the FCO, Departments with counter-terrorism responsibilities identify priorities and programmes reflecting an agreed analysis of the threat. This means that effort and resources are now concentrated in countries and regions such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, East Africa and North Africa.

The Government’s counter-terrorism work overseas calls upon the full range of our capabilities: diplomatic, military, intelligence, police, communications and development. The FCO Counter Terrorism and Radicalisation Programme (CTRP) is one part of this overall effort, supporting the delivery of CONTEST overseas across the four workstreams.

The most serious threat to the UK and its interests continues to come from Al Qa’ida core leadership located in the FATA. Pakistan is therefore a key partner in our nation’s security. The UK and Pakistan are committed to working together to overcome threats from militancy, terrorism and extremism. Intensive UK engagement has helped address the terrorist threat in Pakistan, in particular by tackling the Pakistan Taleban in the border areas with Afghanistan.

The attempted attack over Detroit in December 2009 demonstrates that the threat from international terrorism is complex, diverse and rapidly evolving. The UK worked with key international partners to coordinate our protective security measures as well as building consensus with partners around the need to support Yemen in enhancing its law enforcement, intelligence and security capabilities, and in tackling the wider causes of instability. We have also worked with the European Commission and EU partners to ensure that EU stability funding is more effectively targeted towards key areas of concern, e.g. in Pakistan, Yemen, and the Sahel.
6.01 The CONTEST strategy recognises that some important counter-terrorist programmes do not easily fit into any of the four main workstreams and are in effect ‘cross-cutting’. Progress against some of the most important of these is set out below.

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons and Explosives (CBRNE)**

6.02 Contemporary terrorist organisations aspire to use chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons and have also developed new types of explosives and ways of using them. The use of some CBRN materials has the potential to have very serious and widespread consequences. The 2009 CONTEST strategy for the first time brought CBRNe initiatives across the four main CONTEST workstreams together into a single programme coordinated by an inter-agency unit.

6.03 The CONTEST strategy identified factors which have increased the risk that terrorists may acquire and use CBRN weapons: the significant increase in the illicit trafficking of radiological materials; the availability of CBRN related technologies on the internet; and the increasing use of CBRN material for legitimate purposes, increasing the risk that these might be acquired by terrorist organisations. These factors remain important. The strategy highlighted the growing use of home made explosives, the increasing use of suicide bombing as a terrorist tactic and the extent to which the technology of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) has developed rapidly in recent conflicts, notably Afghanistan, and migrated around the world through the internet.

6.04 As indicated in CONTEST the Government has this year completed a classified review and assessment of all its counter-terrorist CBRN work since 9/11. For security reasons this has to remain unpublished. The Government is about to publish a cross-Government CBRN strategy, which draws on some of the conclusions of the review and sets out our overall priorities for the next three to five years. The aim of the strategy is to reduce the likelihood of a CBRN attack and, if an attack should occur, respond quickly to minimise harm and restore public confidence.

6.05 We have strengthened our international relationships including with the US and EU Member States to gain leverage from other nations’ programmes, to share best practice and to benefit from collaborative programmes of work.

**CBRNE: Pursue**

6.06 The security and intelligence agencies play a key role in countering CBRNe terrorism. The agencies have produced a CBRN intelligence strategy which, for security reasons, will not be published.

6.07 We continue to learn from the way that attacks have developed in Afghanistan using IEDs. Some of this analysis is carried out at the Forensic Explosives Laboratory, based at Fort Halstead. Although this work is primarily aimed at protecting UK forces, there are broader benefits to domestic security.

**CBRNE: Protect**

6.08 The roll out of equipment to detect the illicit movement of radiological substances (para 4.19 above) is nearing completion.

6.09 We continue to work with the explosives and chemical industries to secure materials that could be used by terrorists. We have developed an awareness-raising programme for the academic sector, facilitated by police Counter Terrorism Security Advisers. We have participated in EU work on material security through the EU CBRN Action Plan.
We have updated the list of protected pathogens within the scope of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.

**CBRNE: Prepare**

6.10 The CBRN Resilience Programme seeks to build and improve the UK’s ability to respond to and recover from a terrorist CBRN attack. The Government has equipped 18 sites nationwide with trained officers to improve the multi-agency response to a CBRN attack. In the past year, we have also improved our command procedures through multi-agency training and exercising, in addition to developing and delivering tactics and doctrine.

6.11 The national CBRN response centre, run by the police but available to other emergency services, is now well established. It has delivered into service a range of CBRN response equipment and has met its target of having over 10,000 CBRN trained police officers by 2010. The centre continues to run a 24/7 operations and advice facility which, in the last 12 months has provided support to over 100 incidents where suspected CBRN materials have been found.

6.12 The Home Office’s National Network of Laboratories enables suspected chemical and biological material to be analysed more quickly, to accredited standards. Scientific techniques are always developing, and during the past year we have reviewed the network and begun a series of projects to ensure that these facilities and analytical methods continue to meet police requirements.

6.13 Research has sought to define the level of tolerable hazard to allow public reoccupation of an area previously contaminated by a biological agent; this will aid local authorities in contingency planning and the recovery process.

**Olympic safety and security programme**

6.14 The CONTEST strategy identifies security for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games as one of the most significant challenges we will face over the next two years. Development and implementation of the Olympic security programme is closely coordinated with and draws on CONTEST programmes and capabilities. It also includes significant projects to manage risks relating to public order, crime and natural hazards.

6.15 The Olympic and Paralympic Security Directorate (OSD) within OSCT remains the lead agency coordinating security planning. The Olympic Safety and Security Strategy was published in July 2009 and sets out our approach to safeguarding the Games. This is the first time that we have published a strategy for a live security operation. The document sets out the governance of the programme, its scope, our planning assumptions, and the way we will evaluate risks to the Games.

6.16 The Government is working on the assumption that the greatest threat to the Games is international terrorism and that the threat in 2012 will be high. The Strategy covers all Government agencies, the police and emergency services, and the London 2012 Organising Committee (LOCOG) responsible for staging the Games. In response to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) recommendations all agencies with significant security responsibilities are co-located alongside LOCOG and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA). We have taken part in regular inspections over the past year by the IOC, who are content with progress on security and other relevant areas.

6.17 The programme structure is deliberately mapped onto CONTEST methodology, with direct linkages between core Protect and Prepare activity and their Olympic counterparts. Similarly, there are very close relationships between core Pursue work and the Identify and Disrupt Olympic projects and between Prevent activity and elements of the Engage Programme. The core programme currently comprises projects built around five strategic objectives: Protect; Prepare; Identify and Disrupt; Command, Control, Plan and Resource; and Engage.
6.18 The projects cover a range of issues, from identity assurance, through resilience for critical Olympics infrastructure, to countering serious and organised crime. Many of the most challenging projects are related to command and control and to resources: ensuring that we have the right number of people with the right training available at the right time. Successful security operations are underway at the Olympic Park, with a dedicated policing team working closely with the UKBA. These will ensure the park is properly protected during the build phase and prepared for a successful security operation in 2012.

6.19 The overall security programme and the individual projects within it are progressing on time and within budget. We have been working closely with LOCOG and other stakeholders to ensure that all aspects of security are properly covered and resourced, ensuring good value for money, and that security is an integral part of all aspects of Olympic preparation.

6.20 As well as the IOC, the programme also receives regular independent review from the Office of Government Commerce: their confidence in the delivery of a successful programme has risen progressively over the past 18 months. The report by the National Audit Office on Olympic planning delivered at the end of February 2010 comments favourably on security planning and preparations\textsuperscript{13}.

Communications

6.21 Communications research has provided baseline data on audiences, appropriate messages and channels for cross-Government counter-terrorism communications, both in the UK and internationally. Drawing on this the Government has communicated with key audiences on counter-terrorist issues, sharing information more widely wherever possible. This Annual Report is evidence of that approach. The Government supports a network of community organisations in the UK and overseas, to tell their own stories in a more deliberate and professional way to challenge terrorist ideologies and build resilience to violent extremism. Much of this work is carried out by the Research, Information and Communications Unit, a cross-departmental unit established in June 2007.
Performance management

7.01 Public Service Agreement 26 (PSA 26) was introduced for the 2008/11 spending round to assess and measure the progress of our counter-terrorist work against specific intended outcomes. It is the first PSA the first strategic performance management framework devoted to counter-terrorism. As outlined in the 2009 CONTEST strategy, the PSA is structured around the four main CONTEST workstreams. Within each workstream, there are a number of key outcomes against which progress is assessed.

- **Pursue** outcomes focus on our ability to detect and disrupt terrorist networks;
- **Prevent** outcomes focus on improving resilience to violent extremism, including in key sectors and overseas;
- **Protect** outcomes focus on reducing the vulnerability of key sites, such as crowded places, transport systems and the CNI; and
- **Prepare** outcomes focus on our capability to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack.

7.02 Selected performance indicators enable us to assess progress against these outcomes. Both they and the biannual assessments of performance are classified.

Governance

7.03 Ministerial oversight of CONTEST remains with the Home Secretary and the National Security and International Relations and Development Committee (NSID). During this year the Home Affairs Select Committee and the Communities and Local Government Select Committee have considered aspects of CONTEST, as has the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). Official oversight of delivery remains with the CONTEST Board chaired by Director-General OSCT as Senior Responsible Owner for CONTEST, supported by other boards chaired by Directors in OSCT, Civil Contingence Secretariat and elsewhere. Other boards focus on cross-cutting issues (such as policing and science). Tactical coordination is facilitated by a Weekly Security Meeting, chaired by the Home Secretary with senior representatives from the intelligence and security agencies, policing and relevant Departments.

7.04 The CONTEST Board – and the supporting sub-boards for each of the workstreams – maintains oversight of strategic issues, performance and implementation of annual delivery plans. For 2009/10 these plans established 53 priority deliverables across CONTEST, progress against which was assessed quarterly from both a delivery and a financial perspective. For security reasons these plans and priorities are not published. The overseas work of Departments and agencies on counter-terrorism continues to be coordinated through the Overseas CONTEST Group.

7.05 Counter-terrorism has seen a significant increase in resources in recent years: the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review set out planned increases in funding (for security and counter-terrorism) to £3.5 billion by 2011. Counter-terrorism is a high priority for the Government and continues to be resourced accordingly.
Conclusion

During 2009 thousands of people were murdered around the world in terrorist attacks and many more were injured. Terrorism has not only caused extensive loss of life but led to the disruption of good governance, economic hardship and the breakdown of law and order. The indirect effects of terrorism are extensive.

There have been no attacks by international terrorist groups or individuals associated with them in the UK during the period covered by this report. This does not reflect the absence of a threat: rather it reflects the resources and capabilities put in place to deal with it.

Our response continues to be based at all times on principles set out in the National Security Strategy. These reflect the core values of the UK, including human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all.

We recognise that our response must continue to be founded on local, national and international partnerships and collaboration. Communities, local and central Government, Devolved Administrations and the private sector all have a key part to play in the delivery of this strategy.

We judge that to date CONTEST has achieved its aim – to reduce the risk to the UK and to its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.
Endnotes

1. http://www.security.homeoffice.gov.uk. CONTEST related documents include:

1. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, March 2009
5. London 2012: A Safe and Secure Games for All, July 2009
6. The United Kingdom’s Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, August 2009
9. Safeguarding Online: Explaining the Risk Posed by Violent Extremism, August 2009
12. Countering the Terrorist Threat: Social and Behavioural Science – How Industry and Academia can Play their Part, March 2010
14. Crowded Places: A Response to the Consultation, March 2010
17. Crowded Places: The Planning System and Counter-Terrorism, March 2010
18. Working Together to Protect Crowded Places, March 2010
20. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, March 2010


3. Estimates of casualties from terrorism in Iraq vary; www.iraqbodycount.org suggests that 2,972 civilians and police were killed in acts of ‘everyday terrorism’ during 2009: the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) puts the number higher, at over 3,500. Definitions of terrorism and data quality can both vary. NCTC definitions and supporting statistical methodology are set out in detail in the forward to their 2008 Report on Terrorism (available at nctc.gov). The 2009 report (which will provide more precise statistics on Iraq) is forthcoming.

4. 2009 Report on Terrorism, NCTC (forthcoming). Different methodology and data sources are involved, www.satp.org puts fatalities over 3000; as this includes some members of the security forces.

5. This data is drawn from Te-SAT 2009, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, produced by Europol and available at www.europol.europa.eu; this report provides some further data on verdicts and convictions for terrorist offences (page 11) which reflects returns from 10 countries including the UK. In 2008 there were 190 verdicts for what the report describes as ‘Islamist’ terrorism and an acquittal rate of 36%. The number of verdicts does not relate directly to the number of suspects tried or to those arrested in 2008 itself.

6. 2008 data can be found in the NCTC 2008 Report on Terrorism (nctc.gov). NCTC data is reproduced in the US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism (statistical annex).


9 This figure is from UNAMA, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and specifically relates to casualties caused by ‘anti government’ groups. UNAMA puts total civilian deaths higher at 2412. www.unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Protection%20of%20Civilian%20report%20English.pdf. NCTC statistics (see endnote 3) estimate of casualties from terrorism is over 2,700.


