• An email from between officials dated 11 September 2002, sent at 11:09 titled ‘DOSSIER JIC SECTION’

Just some suggested minor changes to the new JIC Summary section - we are generally happy though.


[redacted] and [redacted] have come up with the following on the BW question - hope it helps a bit - suspect the text is more use than the attachments.

• An email between officials dated 11 September 2002, sent at 11:26 titled ‘RE Iraq Dossier – Extra Questions’

We do have examples however it is all dual-use, there is nothing we can point to that we know for sure is going to the BW programme.

1997 UK export licence and various UN contracts
Was for refurbishment of Helicopter borne pesticide sprayers. Such equipment had been used to carry out field trials for the BW programme and could be used for the delivery of BW agents. Somewhere there are pictures of these devices. (see attached memo written at the time)

Growth media One of the key drivers for UNSCOM in uncovering the programme was Iraq’s problems in accounting for growth media. Iraq has sought significant quantities of growth media in the last few years. Examples include 1001956, 702665, we are currently getting assessments of potential from CBD Porton. This caused a big public fuss in 1996 (see attached on germ warfare jelly)

I am not sure how much help this has been, It is difficult to sort the wheat from the chaff

Agree - no sign of anything being published yet on any US site - once it appears, we will need to look at the specific wording and go forward. Suspect however there will be a significant difference in the UK/US views on effectiveness of sanctions.

• An email between officials dated 13 September 2002, sent at 13:21 titled 'IRAQ UK / US NUCLEAR ESTIMATES – IMPLICATIONS FOR SANCTIONS'.

[redacted] makes a very good point about how comparisons of the UK and US positions on nuclear estimates could have fallout(!) in terms of follow on questioning about the effectiveness of sanctions. (Depending on the actual text of the US NIE/White paper).

It unrolls thus.

UK says Iraq could build a bomb in 5 years if sanctions have gone away.

US says Iraq could build a bomb in 5 years

The implication of the US statement is that this can be achieved whether sanctions are in place or not.

The potential line of follow on questioning is therefore - are we in disagreement with the US about whether sanctions are achieving anything?

I know that there is already a first draft of a Q&A pack to support the publication of the dossier, and that the Cabinet Office may circulate it soon for comment. This is one area that might need some attention.

Rgds.

I’m not sure that the differences will be that great. Remember US & UK signed up to maintaining sanctions US can hardly do that and then turn round and say that they are having no effect.


Agree - no sign of anything being published yet on any US site - once it appears, we will need to look at the specific wording and go forward. Suspect however there will be a significant difference in the UK/US views on effectiveness of sanctions.


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Rgds.
• An email between officials dated 16 September 2002, sent at 9:26 titled 'US Document on Iraqi's WMD Programmes'

Little to comment on.

Page 5 last sentence of para at top of page. I understood that only the single store of stockpiled uranium oxide (at Tuwaitha) was inspected. Perhaps [redacted] could advise.

Page 5. Box - BW testing

Test 1: I have the agent as being Clostridium Botulinum (ie Botulinum toxin).
Test 8 (al-Muhammadiyat – Nov 89 (Botulinum toxin)). I have the date as Aug 90
Test 9 (al-Muhammadiyat - Nov 89 (Aflatoxin) I have the date as Aug 90
Test 10 (Jurf al-Sakr Foring Range) I have the date as Aug or Nov 90.

Page 10. Note that in the box, they have reverted to their previously published casualties at Halabja of "hundreds". (Also previously they added a note that some casualties may have resulted from Iranian use of chemicals.)


• An email between officials dated 13 September 2002, sent at 19:54 titled 'US Document on Iraqi's Nuclear Weapons Programme'

Please find attached a scanned copy of the latest US Doc. Summary + nuclear section.
Please note on the very last page of the hard copy document there is a reference to neutron generators. This was in the earlier version Do we have the intelligence on this?

Many thanks and good-night

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Many thanks and good-night
- An email between officials dated 16 September 2002, sent at 22:00 titled 'DOSSIER – NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY REVELATION'

Proper comments sent to [redacted] for fusion, however, I note that the paper suggests that Saddam’s biotech efforts have gone much further than we ever feared. Page 4 Bullet 4.: “[Iraq] has assembled specialists to work on its nuclear programme” – Dr Frankenstein, I presume? Sorry. It’s getting late...

- An email between officials dated 16 September 2002, sent at 23:35 titled ‘FW: COMMENTS ON DOSSIER – CHAPTER THREE AND AFTER’

Can you have a look at the last point only) of [redacted]’s message. We will address some of his other points separately.

- An email between officials dated 16 September 2002, sent at 21:42 titled ‘COMMENTS ON DOSSIER – CHAPTER THREE AND AFTER’


Regarding the changes proposed by [redacted] I entirely agree, but would note that we have suggested moderating the same language in much the same way on drafts from the dim and distant past without success. Feel free to try again!

Page 20: “The Problem of Dual Use Facilities” – realise that I am probably fighting a losing battle on this one, but I maintain that putting a box with a big picture of Ash Sharqat in the middle of the CBW section – regardless of what the small text on it actually says – is likely to give a misleading impression. I do not imagine that it is going to disappear at this stage but would still prefer it moved. Also, use of the word “rebuilt” implies a link to its past application and, as noted previously, the phrase “Intelligence reports indicate” is spurious in this instance.

Page 26: Free floating top paragraph on RDDs, following the box on the previous page. This is ancient history – following the “logic” of how the text is organised this should be in the previous chapter. Either that, or move into the RDD box.

Page 26 Para 27: Lots of “ranges” close together - iffy drafting. Given how long we have been drafting this paper, I think we could probably say “We judge that at least fifty, probably more, have been produced” instead of “Intelligence indicates that at least fifty have been produced” (50 was JIC judgement, very approximate).

Page 27 Para 28: Where did the line “although the fact that at least some require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how many could be available for use” come from? First I’ve seen of it! If we want to express a degree of ambiguity about availability of retained Al Hussein for use, I suggest “We do not know their true state of readiness” instead. This formula has been used in previous assessments and covers variables other than just whether all are fully assembled.
Page 27 Para 29: "efforts to regenerate the long range ballistic missile programme probably began in 1995" - one occasion I would favour upping "probably" to "intelligence indicates that". More could then be made of the point in the previous chapter on the programme up until 1998 and Part 2 on deception of UNSCOM.

Page 29 Para 31: Insert wording "the Indian authorities have recently suspended its export licence AND THE US HAS IMPOSED SANCTIONS ON ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR. HOWEVER, affiliated individuals ..."

Page 29 Para 32: Following the previous draft, I understood that the grounds given for blocking the purchases of magnesium powder and ammonium chloride were to be included - assume on grounds of propellant applications, but not privy to details or the case.

Page 29 Para 32: Following previous point, too many "somes" and "items" in the next sentence - suggest "dual use"

Charles

Handing and Timing

I have sent this out to the Foreign Sec’s party to see whether they think it is along the right lines (tone, content etc)

I spoke to Alistair Campbell earlier about timing. He agreed we need to keep our options open on bringing forward publication from w/b 23 September (which would coincide with the possible recall of Parliament) to next week

Drafting Comments

The draft looks to me to be heading in the right direction and is much better than earlier drafts. I think the tone could move further in the direction of factual analysis

Specific comments

Foreword Suggest we gel upfront UNSCR 687’s demand that Iraq disarm. We need to make a key issue Saddam’s defiance of the UN (one thing which distinguishes him from other dictators and holders of WMD), his persistent obstruction of the weapons inspectors and the 23/27 obligations (and however many specifically on WMD) unmet.

Executive Summary Looks pretty good Could be tweaked a bit in places
The first bullet of para 6 (the importance of WMD) should be strengthened to explain the centrality of WMD to SH’s rule - the projection of power etc I am a supporter of para 8, although I would drop the last phrase which takes it into policy rather than analysis This document needs to set out the problem rather than a solution People should conclude that for themselves.

Sections 1 & 2: I would combine these Most of Section 2 (paras 1-12) should go after para 7 of Section 1. Paras 13-15 or Section 2 should follow Para 10 of Section 1 The passage on Saddam’s Iraq (paras 8-15 of Section 1) needs amplifying A wiring diagram showing the structure of the regime the role and nature of the SRG, SSA (explaining that they are made on the SS and Gestapo etc) and Saddam’s fedayeen etc, pictures of Saddam in his various guises (para 14) Crucially this section should explain the role of WMD in the political mythology which has sustained the regime, implicitly why giving it up would amount to a change of regime and how responsibility for WMD rests with those parts of the apparatus on which Saddam depends for his own security [redaction]
Section 3 looks pretty good. I would depersonalise it a bit. Maybe use “the regime” instead of “SH” more. Para 5 could become a text box explaining more vividly the effects of the various agents. It does not sit very easily amidst the narrative.

I would combine Sections 3 and 4 to demonstrate more explicitly the link between UNSC action and persistent Iraqi obstruction. I would put in a text box listing UNSCRs, Iraq’s non-compliance or late compliance with them. I would expand the history of weapons inspections. It is an interesting story and would give the media a better feel for the difficulties they faced and the persistence of the Iraqi obstruction – Hussein Kamal and the chicken farmer etc. We might also get a couple of ex-inspectors to recount their experiences. Could we get the UK’s UNSCOM Commissioner to do a piece? The blocking by armed guards of Ritter’s team’s attempt to get access to the SSA in October 1997 to track BW after the Iraqis had tried to run off with documents would be a good vignette. Include Annex C.

Section 6 is the crux of this and needs to be as factual as possible. I would lose the sub-title “Why are we concerned?” We need a very simple table somewhere (perhaps to be repeated in the Executive Summary) bringing together the unaccounted stuff with what we know since. This should be brief enough to get onto the Sky wall ie, no more than 5 bullets.

Annex A Suggest this is divided up into so it is obviously a set of case histories.

Annex B should come into the main text – probably into the amplified Section 2.

Annex C should be brought into the combined Section 3 & 4

Hope this is useful

Mark
Mark Sedwill
Private Secretary
Minister (TO7934) from Desmond Bowen to John Scarlett copied to Alastair Campbell, Jonathan Powell and David Manning titled 'The Iraq Dossier' dated 11 September 2002

Thank you for a sight of the revised draft of the Dossier. I thought you might find it helpful to have a few comments on the draft as it stands now, accepting that you have more work to do on it.

I take it as read that the foreword is a political piece, signed by the Prime Minister or another Minister. In that text it would be useful to make the point that what follows is the work of officials, drawing on sensitive intelligence material. The foreword can be as loaded as we like in terms of the political message (provided it is consistent with the dossier itself), whereas the text itself should be the judgement of the experts.

As regards the wickedness of Saddam and his regime, I wonder if there are documents or statements which we can cite that clearly indicate his ambitions regionally and his intentions internally. The bit of the jigsaw that doesn’t quite hang together is what Saddam, intends to do with the WMD he has been so intent on acquiring. It is one thing to ask the rhetorical question: what could they be used for except making mischief regionally; it is another to be able to point to stated objectives either from intelligence or public documents. It is, of course, the case that you point to the facts of Saddam’s aggression and repression and use of WMD, perhaps we can make more of this and his unpredictability.

In looking at the WMD sections, you clearly want to be as firm and authoritative as you can be. You will need to judge the extent to which you need to hedge your judgements with, for example, “it is almost certain” and similar caveats. I appreciate that this can increase the authenticity of the document in terms of it being a proper assessment, but that needs to be weighed against the use that will be made by the opponents of action who will add up the number of judgements on which we do not have absolute clarity.

In the current stage of the draft there are two key sections on pages 30 and 36 which will need to be given proper prominence, probably at the end of that section. The sub-sections are entitled: Why Are We Concerned and Conclusions. I think it would be helpful to draw together the state of advancement of both chemical and biological capability, with military thinking and the delivery means. It would be helpful if there was more about where ballistic missiles are likely to be targeted rather than what countries are in range. The map on page 41 gives a good idea of the potential coverage. This also links back to the point at paragraph 3 above on intentions.

There may be an additional point about Human Rights, probably for the FCO to elaborate, which is less about abuses and more about the year on year degradation of Iraqi economic conditions such that more and more of the population have been falling below the poverty line because of Saddam’s policies.

Finally, the question which we have to have in the back of our mind is “Why Now?”. I think we have moved away from promoting the idea that we are in
imminent danger of attack and therefore intend to act in pre-emptive self
defence. The approach is rather that Saddam has failed to abide by
UNSCRS and his flouting of international law and continuing acquisition of
WMD cannot be tolerated any longer. This difference is important because
the focus shifts to Saddam's continuing efforts to equip himself with WMD,
which is what the evidence shows.
An email between officials dated 11 September 2002, sent at 11:32 titled 'Questions from [redacted]'

IND

[redacted] will not give the idea of an IND time of day. We have assessed that this would not be on the agenda for Saddam. Further discussion only diverts attention and efforts away from much more important issues. [redacted] assesses that there are only two scenarios to consider:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS - WHY ARE THEY DIFFICULT TO MAKE?

This must incorporate the difficulty of the science and engineering of the design, the need to check that all the parts and the complete weapon can withstand delivery, and that the warhead will work. And do all this safely (ie more than once!). How about the following, which is rather more than 2 sentences!

A nuclear warhead requires sophisticated science and engineering, complex calculations and meticulous experimentation to convert the simplistic concepts seen in text books into a reliable bomb or missile warhead. Many of the hundreds of finely-engineered specialist components are unique and have to be individually developed, made and tested rigorously. The warhead needs to be designed and tested to withstand accelerations, temperatures, vibrations and weather, and finally fired, using inert materials in place of the nuclear core, to prove that it works. All this involves many dangerous nuclear and explosive materials which need specialised facilities and techniques to ensure safe handing and production.
• A letter from a FCO official at the UK Mission to the UN to Mark Sedwill copied to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Stewart Eldon, Adam Thomson and a FCO official, titled 'Iraq: The Dossier' sent on 12 September 2002

Thank you for giving us an opportunity to comment on the Iraq dossier.

Our views

Like others, we believe the report is a substantial improvement. It would probably be a bit much to deposit the whole report with the Security Council, though we could deposit something like Section 6 if this were felt useful (of course you may want to deposit the report with Parliament).

Some further thoughts:

- we wonder if it might be worth making more of the Iraqi Committee on Concealment that existed (and presumably still exists) simply to hide WMD and long range missiles from the eyes of the UN inspectors. Something showing the elaborate Iraqi apparatus of concealment would demonstrate to just what lengths this government was going to keep its hands on WMD;

- in section 6 para 2 we wonder if we might make more of a virtue of the necessity to protect our sources. Spelling out what would be a barrier to any human sources if caught by Saddam’s Iraq (death, torture, etc) would highlight that the UK can not take realising such information lightly;

- in section 6 para 4 we wonder whether it would be better to say “recent intelligence”. Talking about the last few weeks might either imply we got lucky or lead to a purge of anyone the regime thought had acted oddly in that period;

- [redacted] that it would be desirable to give more details of dodgy procurements, along the lines of NEC. Can we name more companies that have been involved in shady dealing and/or subject to prosecution? Can we specify which countries in Africa Iraq sought to buy uranium from? We need to show the lengths Iraq has been willing to go to get its hands on WMD components;

- in section 5 para 10 we say the examples of Iraqi obstruction are too numerous to list then only two;

- in section 5 para 13 we might explain why the unilateral destruction by Iraq of its WMD was of such concern — i.e. it allowed Iraq to obscure its WMD stocks and capabilities, e.g. by claiming to have destroyed more items than was actually the case (the Butler report is full of this sort of thing).