DRAFT REPORT

with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on the problem of profiling, notably on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counter-terrorism, law enforcement, immigration, customs and border control (2008/2020(INI))

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Rapporteur: Sarah Ludford
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PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDATION TO THE COUNCIL

on the problem of profiling, notably on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counter-terrorism, law enforcement, immigration, customs and border control (2008/2020(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the proposal for a recommendation to the Council by Sarah Ludford on behalf of the ALDE Group on the problem of profiling, notably on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counter-terrorism, law enforcement, immigration, customs and border control (B6-0483/2007),

– having regard to international, European and national human rights instruments: in particular to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); the Treaty on European Union; the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty); the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) and the national constitutions of the Member States, and to rights and guarantees which they confer on individuals in the field of privacy, data protection, non-discrimination and free movement,

– having regard to European data protection measures from the Council of Europe: Article 8 of the ECHR, Council of Europe Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Recommendations of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers to member states R(87)15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector¹, R (97) 18 concerning the protection of personal data collected and processed for statistical purposes² and R(2001) 10 on the European Code of Police Ethics³,

– having regard to EU data protection provisions: Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data⁴, and Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,⁵


¹ Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 September 1987 at the 410th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.
² Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 September 1997 at the 602nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
³ Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 September 2001 at the 765th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin,

− having regard to EU instruments in the field of security and the fight against terrorism, including police and judicial cooperation and exchange of information and intelligence, such as Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences\(^1\), Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union\(^2\) Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on stepping up of cross border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross border crime\(^3\) and its implementing Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008\(^4\);

− having regard to existing and planned EU databases such as the Schengen Information System, Eurodac and the Visa Information System, and to biometric data collection measures such as those for residence permits and passports, which will also allow the creation of databases,

− having regard to the proposal to create ‘e-borders’ as mentioned in the Commission Communication on "Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union", where integrated border management envisaging the creation of automated border controls including a registered traveller programme and an entry-exit system are proposed,\(^5\)

− having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement)\(^6\), as well as to the proposal for a Council framework decision on the use of Passenger Name Records (PNR) for law enforcement purposes\(^7\) as well as the opinions on that proposal by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (the Fundamental Rights Agency), the European Data Protection Supervisor and the Article 29 Working Party and the Working Party on Police and Justice,

− having regard to relevant national case-law such as the Decision of the German Constitutional Court on *polizeiliche präventive Rasterfahndung*\(^8\) and the judgement of the UK House of Lords on the Czech Roma\(^9\) and to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in particular *Timishev v. Russia*\(^10\), *Nachova and others v. Bulgaria*\(^11\), *D.H and others v. the Czech Republic*\(^1\) and *S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom*\(^12\).

\(^1\) OJ L 253, 29.9.2005, p.22.
\(^6\) OJ L 204, 4.8.2007, p. 18.
\(^7\) COM (2007)0654.
\(^8\) Decision of the German Constitutional Court, BVerfG, 1 BvR 518/02 of 4.4.2006, Absatz-Nr. (1-184).
\(^9\) House of Lords, 9 December 2004, R v. Immigration Office at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and other (Appellants) [2004], UKHL 55, paragraph 101.
\(^10\) *Timishev v. Russia*, 13 December 2005, nos.. 55762/00 and 55974/00, ECHR 2005-XII.
\(^11\) *Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria* [GC], 26 February 2004, nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, ECHR 2005-VII.
Kingdom,\(^2\) and of the European Court of Justice of the European Communities, particularly in \textit{Huber v. Germany,}\(^3\)

– having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin\(^4\), to the paper on “Protecting the right to Privacy in the fight against terrorism” by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg\(^5\), to the General Policy Recommendations No 8 on Combating racism while fighting terrorism\(^6\) and No 11 on Combating racism and racial discrimination in policing of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) of the Council of Europe and to the report on "Ethnic profiling" by the European Union Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights\(^8\),

– having regard to Rule 114(3) and Rule 94 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6-0000/2008).

\textbf{Profiling and data mining}

A. Whereas the practice of profiling, which is often carried out through the automated 'mining' of computer-held data, merits examination since it controversially departs from the general rule that law enforcement decisions should be based on an individual's personal conduct; profiling is an investigative technique taking information from various sources about people, which may include their ethnicity, race, nationality and religion, as a basis for trying to identify and potentially sanction those among them who may be criminal or terrorist suspects, and can be defined as:

\begin{quote}
\textit{‘the systematic association of sets of physical, behavioural or psychological characteristics with particular offences and their use as a basis for making law enforcement decisions’}\(^9\)
\end{quote}

or, making clear the relationship between data-mining and profiling:

\begin{quote}
\textit{‘a technique whereby a set of characteristics of a particular class of person is inferred from past experience, and data-holdings are then searched for individuals with a close fit to that set of characteristics’}\(^10\).
\end{quote}

\(^1\) \textit{D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic}, 13 November 2007, no. 57325/00.
\(^2\) \textit{S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom}, 4 December 2008, nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04.
\(^3\) Case C-524/06, [2008] ECR I-0000.
\(^9\) Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, paragraph 35.
B. Whereas profiling, which has a specifically racial or ethnic basis and thus raises deep concerns about conflict with non-discrimination norms, can be defined as:

"the practice of using ‘race’ or ethnic origin, religion, or national origin, as either the sole factor, or one of several factors in law enforcement decisions, on a systematic basis, whether or not concerned individuals are identified by automatic means"¹

or

"the use by the police, with no objective and reasonable justification, of grounds such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin, in control, surveillance or investigation activities"²;

C. Whereas profiling, whether through data-mining or the practices of police and other agencies, is increasingly used as a tool for law enforcement and border control, insufficient regard is being given to the evaluation of its effectiveness and to the development and application of legal safeguards to ensure respect for rights of privacy and the avoidance of discrimination;

D. Whereas profiles can be:

i) descriptive, when they are based on witness and other information about perpetrators or characteristics of crimes that have been committed, and thus support the apprehension of specific suspects or the detection of current criminal activities that follow the same pattern; or

ii) predictive, when they make correlations between observable variables from past events and current data and intelligence in order to draw inferences believed to identify those who may be involved in some future, or as-yet-undiscovered crime³;

Legal obligations

E. Whereas law enforcement must always be conducted with respect for fundamental rights, including rights to private and family life, the protection of personal data and non-discrimination; believes that while close international cooperation is indispensable in the fight against terrorism and serious crime, all such cooperation must comply with international law as well as European norms and values on equal treatment and proper legal protection, not least so that the EU does not undermine its credibility as a promoter of international human rights;

F. Whereas both, descriptive and predictive profiling, may be legitimate investigative tools when they are based on specific, reliable and timely information reflecting “factors that

² European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) General policy recommendation No 11, above-mentioned, paragraph 1.
³ Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, paragraph 33.
are statistically proven to correlate with certain criminal conduct and when the actions taken on the basis of such profiles meet the legal tests of necessity and proportionality;

G. Whereas, the guidance in the European Code of Police Ethics that ‘police investigations shall as a minimum be based upon reasonable suspicion of an actual or possible offence or crime’, and whereas it is asserted that a likelihood of breach of human rights threatening individuals and society as whole arises in the absence of such reasonable suspicion, when profiling is based on stereotypes or prejudice;

H. Whereas ‘predictive profiling’, using broad profiles developed through cross-referencing between databases and reflecting untested generalisations or patterns of behaviour judged likely to indicate the commission of some future or as-yet-undiscovered crime or terrorist act raises strong privacy concerns and may constitute an interference with the rights to respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter;

I. Whereas the ECtHR case-law makes clear that derogations under article 8(2) ECHR are only allowed if they are in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society, as confirmed in its recent judgment in S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, above-mentioned, when it held to be a violation of article 8 ECHR "Blanket and indiscriminate (...) powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences";

J. Whereas the ECtHR's finding in S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, above-mentioned, of a 'risk of stigmatisation' from the fact that persons not convicted of any offence are treated in the same way as convicted criminals in the UK DNA database must also raise questions about the legality of profiling operations based on processing of personal data of persons not found guilty by the courts;

K. Whereas the Rasterfahndung programme, in which German police authorities collected personal records from public and private databases of males between 18 and 40 who were current or former students of presumed Muslim faith in an (unsuccessful) attempt to identify terrorist suspects was deemed unconstitutional by the German Constitutional Court in its above-mentioned decision, which ruled that data mining is an illegal intrusion into personal data and privacy that cannot be justified as a response to a general threat situation of the kind that has existed continually in regard to terrorist attacks since 9/11, but requires demonstration of a “concrete danger” such as the preparation or commission of terrorist attacks;

**Effectiveness**

1 Ibid.
3 Opinion of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, paragraph 4.
5 Judgment of the ECtHR in Case S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, above-mentioned, paragraph 125.
L. Whereas a doubt has been cast on the usefulness of data-mining and profiling in various American studies among which:

(i) A study for the Cato Institute observed:

“though data mining has many valuable uses, it is not well suited to the terrorist discovery problem. It would be unfortunate if data mining for terrorism discovery had currency within national security, law enforcement, and technology circles because pursuing this use of data mining would waste taxpayer dollars, needlessly infringe on privacy and civil liberties, and misdirect the valuable time and energy of the men and women in the national security community”¹;

(ii) A US National Research Council study of data-mining and behavioural surveillance technologies for the Department of Homeland Security concluded that:

‘automated identification of terrorists through data mining...is neither feasible as an objective nor desirable as a goal of technology development efforts.’²;

M. Whereas the effectiveness of data-mining is weakened by the ‘needle in the haystack’ problem of analysts having to filter through the huge quantity of available data; that the extent of ‘digital tracks’ left by law-abiding citizens is even greater than that of criminals and terrorists who make considerable efforts to conceal their identities; and that there are significant rates of ‘false positives’ whereby not only do wholly innocent people come under suspicion resulting in potential invasion of individual privacy but real suspects meanwhile remain unidentified;

N. Whereas the inverse problem is the possibility of missing perpetrators who do not fit the profile, an example being the ringleader of the 7 July 2005 London bombings who “had come to the attention of the intelligence services as an associate of other men who were suspected of involvement in a terrorist bomb plot...but ...was not pursued because he did not tick enough of the boxes in the pre-July 2005 profile of the terror suspect”³;

O. Whereas profiling that upsets good community relations and alienates certain communities from cooperation with law enforcement agencies would be counter-productive in hampering the gathering of intelligence and effective action against crime and terrorism⁴;

P. Whereas the efficient collection of information about specific suspects and following of specific leads is the best approach to detect and preempt terrorism and as a supplement to this, random checks and controls which affect everyone equally and are impossible for terrorists to evade may be more effective than profiling in preventive counter-terrorism

⁴ Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, paragraph 62
efforts\(^1\);

**Ethnic profiling**

Q. Whereas the use of ethnicity, national origin or religion as factors in law enforcement investigations is not precluded as long as such use conforms to non-discrimination standards, including Article 14 of the ECHR, but that it must pass the scrutiny tests of effectiveness, necessity and proportionality if it is to constitute a legitimate difference of treatment that does not constitute discrimination;

R. Whereas profiling based on stereotypical assumptions may exacerbate sentiments of hostility and xenophobia in the general public towards persons of certain ethnic, national or religious background\(^2\);

S. Whereas the ECtHR case-law has established that where race constitutes an *exclusive* basis for law enforcement action it amounts to prohibited discrimination\(^3\); although recalls that in practice it is not always clear if race or ethnicity was the exclusive or decisive basis for such action and it is often only when patterns of law enforcement practice are analysed that the predominant weight of these factors clearly emerges;

T. Whereas while there is no international or European norm which expressly forbids ‘ethnic profiling’, ECtHR case-law would suggest that conclusion and both ICERD) and ECRI have made clear that such practice does violate the prohibition against discrimination\(^4\);

U. Whereas the Programme of Action adopted at the 2000 World Conference against Racism urged States "to design, implement and enforce effective measures to eliminate "racial profiling"\(^5\); that ECRI, in its above-mentioned Recommendation No. 8 on Combating racism while fighting terrorism, has asked governments to ensure that no discrimination ensues from legislation and regulations or their implementation in the field of law-enforcement; and that the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights believes that terrorist profiles on the basis of characteristics such as nationality, age or birthplace "presents a major risk of discrimination"\(^6\);

V. Whereas there is a need for comprehensive evaluation of investigative practices and data-processing systems within the EU and Member States which employ or supply the basis for profiling techniques, in order to ensure full compliance with national, European and international legal obligations and avoid unjustified discriminatory or privacy-invading impacts;

W. Whereas the following guidelines should be applied to such operations and whereas a

\(^1\) Idem, paragraph 61.
\(^2\) Idem, paragraph 40.
\(^3\) E.g., judgment of the ECtHR in Case *Timishev v. Russia*, above-mentioned.
\(^4\) Opinion of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Council Framework Decision for a Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, paragraph 39.
combination of all these protections is required in order to provide full and effective protection;

1. Addresses the following recommendations to the Council:

   (a) all processing of personal data for law enforcement and anti-terrorist purposes must be based on published legal rules which are clear, specific and binding and subject to close and effective supervision by independent data protection authorities;

   (b) the collection of data and use of profiling techniques in respect of persons not suspected of a specific crime or threat must be subject to a particularly strict “necessity” and “proportionality” test;

   (c) factual and intelligence data, and data on different categories of data subjects, should be clearly distinguished;

   (d) access to police and secret service files should be allowed only on a case-by-case basis, for specified purposes, and be under judicial control in the Member States;

   (e) there must be time limits on the retention of personal information;

   (f) the collection of data on individuals solely on the basis that they have a particular racial or ethnic origin, religious conviction, sexual orientation or behaviour, political opinions or are members of particular movements or organisations which are not proscribed by law should be prohibited;

   (g) reliance by private or public bodies on computers to take decisions on individuals without human assessment should only be allowed exceptionally under strict safeguards;

   (h) there must be strong safeguards established by law which ensure appropriate and effective judicial and parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the police and the secret services, including their counter-terrorism activities;

   (i) in view of the possible consequences for individuals, redress must be effective and accessible with clear information to the data subject on the applicable procedures accompanied by rights of access and rectification;

   (j) existing EC legislation should be examined for the scope it gives for profiling, and law reform should be considered if necessary to avoid any infringement of fundamental rights; the Fundamental Rights Agency should be charged with undertaking such a study in conjunction with the European Data Protection Supervisor;

2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, and, for information, to the Commission and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
19.12.2007

PROPOSAL FOR A RECOMMENDATION TO THE COUNCIL (B6-0483/2007)

pursuant to Rule 114(1) of the Rules of Procedure

by Sarah Ludford

on behalf of the ALDE Group

on the problem of profiling, notably on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counter-terrorism, law enforcement, immigration, customs and border control

The European Parliament,

− having regard to international, European and national human rights instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and having regard to the rights and guarantees provided to individuals in the field of privacy, data protection and non-discrimination, as well as the related case law,

− having regard to European instruments in the field of the fight against terrorism, including police and judicial cooperation and exchange of information and intelligence between Member States, such as Council Decision 2005/671/JHA on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, in particular as regards serious offences including terrorist acts, and the Council Decision on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (Integration of the Prüm Treaty into the Union Legal Order),

− having regard to the EU-US PNR Agreement and the Commission's EU PNR proposal (COM(2007)0654),

− having regard to data protection guarantees, in particular Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, and the proposed Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,

− having regard to the EU anti-discrimination policies, and notably to Race Equality Directive 2000/43/EC and Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC,

− having regard to Rule 114(1) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. recognising that the effectiveness of cooperation between law enforcement authorities in combating crime and terrorism depends to a large extent on their ability to obtain and exchange information and intelligence in good time,
B. whereas data on ethnicity, religion and national origin is sensitive personal data that is strictly protected under European regulations, but this information is sometimes considered relevant to criminal investigations and prevention of terrorism, and research by NGOs suggests that profiling is growing as a practice in the field of law enforcement and policing, targeting specific ethnic, race and religious groups, as well as protestors and travellers,

C. conscious that the effort to acquire information from communities that is vital to success in combating crime and terrorism can be seriously undermined by a lack of trust in law enforcement, and in particular the fear of a discriminatory impact,

D. concerned, therefore, that the Commission's proposal for an EU PNR system providing for the collection of personal data of passengers travelling to the EU could provide a basis for profiling, including on the basis of race or ethnicity, since it envisages 'running the PNR data of passengers against a combination of characteristics and behavioural patterns, aimed at creating a risk-assessment' and states that 'when a passenger fits within a certain risk-assessment, then he could be identified as a high-risk passenger',

E. concerned that some Member States and the Commission have announced plans to collect and retain data concerning travellers entering or leaving, which may also lead to the creation of profiles based on personal, including sensitive, data,

F. whereas the Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights advises in its Opinion 4/2006 that ethnic or racial profiling should be considered unlawful under any circumstances,

G. whereas it is essential to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the right to privacy and the prohibition of discrimination, in laws and policies on security and law enforcement,

H. regretting that repeated concerns raised by Parliament in connection with racial, ethnic and behavioural profiling in the context of data protection, law enforcement cooperation, exchange of data and intelligence, aviation and transport security, immigration and border management and anti-discrimination measures have not so far been adequately addressed in order to reach agreement on legitimate practice and identify any legal gaps,

1. Addresses the following recommendations to the Council:

(a) law enforcement must always be conducted with due respect for data protection, fundamental rights and the principle of non-discrimination;

(b) current law enforcement and security practices which entail racial, ethnic and behavioural profiling and risk assessment should be subjected to research, analysis and political discussion, with the justification and benefits weighed against the harm from these practices;

(c) existing laws should be examined for the scope they give for profiling, and consideration given to law reform if necessary to ensure that discriminatory impact is avoided;
(d) there is a need to establish a clear definition of legitimate versus illegal uses of sensitive personal data in the security field and to encourage greater cooperation between relevant security agencies in understanding and addressing profiling, and working with relevant communities in this effort;

2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council and, for information, to the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.