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Subject : Security handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events

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Introduction

1. The current document sets out a proposal for a security handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events, which integrates the *2001 Security Handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events such as meetings of the European Council* and the *2004 Handbook for the cooperation between MS to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and comparable sporting events*. The "football handbook", a revised version of which was approved by the Council on 4-5 December 2006 has not been integrated.
2. The scope of the manual is now such that it applies to the security (both from a public order point of view as well as counter-terrorism) of all major international events, be it political, sporting, social, cultural or other.

## Procedure

3. The 2001 Security Handbook was taken as a basis as it had the broader scope and the 2004 Handbook was included in it. In accordance with document 12798/06 ENFOPOL 153, the content of the handbooks has not been changed except for the necessary textual amendments to reflect the changed scope, sometimes by deleting examples that were specific to one kind of events, sometimes by using more general wording or adding references to counter-terrorism measures or requirements, etc.
  
4. Concerning the formatting of the handbook, the following changes have been made:
  - chapters I.2 and I.3 of the 2001 Handbook have been moved to an annex with reference documents
  - the last sentence of chapter I.4 (now I.2) was deleted
  - chapter I.5 of the 2001 Handbook has been included in chapter III (information management) as chapter III.2.D
  - chapters IV.2 (measures related to the crossing of borders), IV.3 (preventive measures) and IV.5 (criminal investigation and prosecution) have been moved to chapter V on operational measures, where necessary using more general language or ensuring that the wording could cover more than only political events
  - the last two paragraphs of chapter V.1 of the 2001 Handbook have been deleted
  - the old chapter V.3 on training has been turned into a separate chapter VI
  - chapter VIII (logistics) has been moved into the chapter on "operational cooperation with other Member States" (old chapter V.2, now chapter V.6)
  - chapter 3 of the 2004 Handbook has been included in the chapter on operational measures as chapter V.2, deleting specific references to the Olympic Games
  - chapter 4 of the 2004 Handbook (basic tasks for information management related to counter-terrorism) has been included as chapter III.3 in the current handbook
  - annex A of the 2001 Handbook and the annexes of the 2004 Handbook have been gathered in annex B of the current version
  - annex B of the 2001 Handbook has become annex A.

5. However, following comments by delegations and discussions by the experts at an informal drafting meeting 15 December 2006, some changes have been made to the content of the handbook, beyond those following from merging the two handbooks:
- in chapter II, a paragraph has been added about the relationship between the permanent contact points set up pursuant to Joint Action 97/339/JHA (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1) and the contact points set up for a specific event
  - in chapter V.4, reference has been made to websites as a means of informing foreign visitors in their own language
  - in chapter V.6.A, reference has been made to the possibility of having liaison officers from non-EU bodies
  - in chapter V.6.B (operational support), the deadline for submitting requests or operational support has been deleted, as well as the deadline for appoint supporting officers, the examples of necessary knowledge and experience and the paragraph on the need for officers accompanying travelling groups
  - the list of contact points set up pursuant to Joint Action 97/339/JHA (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1) is added in annex D.

#### Way forward

6. The above-mentioned discussions also showed that there is a need for updating the *content* of the manual and adapt it to the most recent experiences of policing major events and to new, further-reaching forms of cooperation in this field.
7. **Delegations are invited to examine the current version of the handbook, including the necessary consultations with their colleagues from the TWG, which had originally drawn up the 2004 Handbook. Written comments should be sent in by 31 January 2007.**

DRAFT

**SECURITY HANDBOOK**  
**FOR THE USE OF POLICE AUTHORITIES AND SERVICES**  
**AT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS**

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **I.1 PURPOSE**

The purpose of this handbook is to serve as a practical instrument or check-list providing guidelines and inspiration for law enforcement authorities in Europe undertaking the responsibility for security at international events (such as meetings of the European Council or other political events, Olympic Games or other major sporting events or major social events)<sup>1</sup> or providing assistance for the host authorities. **Accordingly, the principles set out in this handbook should only be applied where appropriate and useful as well as in full compliance with national legislation.**

The handbook is an evolving instrument (living document) to be amended and adjusted over time in accordance with future experiences and development of best practices with reference to relevant Council working parties. To this end, the handbook should be evaluated and updated on a regular basis.

### **I.2 BASIC PRINCIPLES**

Maintaining law and order and providing security within the territory of a Member State is a national responsibility and prerogative, which must always be a key consideration for any international co-operation on security at international events such as meetings of the European Council or other political events, Olympic Games or other major sporting events or major social events.

Although the host Member State has primary responsibility for providing for the security of the event, given its international character, all other Member States and EU competent bodies have a responsibility to assist and support the provision of such security.

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<sup>1</sup> Recommendations for international police cooperation in connection with international football matches are set out in a separate handbook: Council resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ ...)

The authorities of the organising country should seek to ensure the safe and uninterrupted course of international events.

The enforcement of law and order should be guided by the principles of proportionality and moderation preferring the less intrusive approach. When possible, a de-escalating police approach should be chosen.

Law enforcement authorities of the Member States responsible for security at international events, in particular at political events, must seek to ensure that the right freely to express opinions and to assemble in a peaceful manner<sup>2</sup> in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights is respected. Interference from elements whose objectives or actions are of a violent or other forms of criminal nature should to the furthest possible extent be prevented.

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<sup>2</sup> Conclusions of the JHA Council of 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and similar events (10916/01 JAI 82, paragraph I).

## **II. CONTACT POINTS**<sup>3</sup>

### **II.1 DESIGNATION**

For each event, each Member State should designate one or more contact points. Depending on national legislation or structures, this may be the same as the permanent contact point(s) designated pursuant to Joint Action 97/339/JHA (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1) (see annex D).

The organising Member State informs the permanent contact points of the other Member States (see Annex D) of the details of the event-related contact point(s). Each Member State then informs the organising Member State of their own contact point(s) related to that event.

Contact details and other relevant information on the permanent contact point(s) should be provided to the General Secretariat of the Council for distribution to the Member States. Any relevant changes regarding the permanent contact point(s) of a Member State, should be reported in the same way.

### **II.2 TASKS**

The tasks of the national contact point(s) could include facilitating the:

- collection and analysis of information nationally as well as from other Member States, third countries, relevant EU bodies and other sources of information,
- establishment of reliable and efficient lines of communication to relevant key players nationally and internationally – if necessary also secure lines,
- the exchange of information through the existing secure communication lines
- exchange of information in cooperation with other Member States, third countries, relevant EU bodies and other international institutions,
- dissemination of processed information to their respective security services, police authorities and other services, such services of the organising state, as well as authorities and services in other Member States and relevant EU bodies, as appropriate

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<sup>3</sup> Conclusions of the JHA Council of 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and similar events (10916/01 JAI 82, paragraph II, point 1(a)).



- provision of risk analysis on potential demonstrators and other groupings for the organising Member State,
- observation, evaluation and follow-up on the event.

### **II.3 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS**

The contact point(s) should be able to meet the following standards:

- 24-hour availability (to the necessary extent before, during and after an event),
- staff with sufficient language skills, with knowledge of at least one other EU language,
- permanently operational lines of communication and information structure including phone, fax and e-mail, where relevant secured via encryption, and access to the internet
- sufficient translation capacities for the exchange of information.

### **III. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT**

#### **III.1 BASIC OBLIGATIONS**

A Member State should without delay forward information, which its national authority considers to be relevant for the security of an event<sup>4</sup> in another Member State, to its counterpart in this State. Member States when forwarding information should be conscious of their obligations in terms of its confidentiality.

The exchange of information should be carried out through existing communication channels and structures. The exchange of information, including personal data, should be conducted in strict compliance with the national and international law applicable in each case.

The exchange of information should be facilitated by the contact points of the involved Member States. After being processed, the collected information as appropriate should be distributed to relevant authorities and services. Contacts between security services, police authorities and services in different Member States may be coordinated and, if needed, organised by their respective contact points.

#### **III.2 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE EVENT**

##### **III.2.A RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ORGANISING MEMBER STATE**

The contact point(s) in the organising Member State should facilitate the collection, analysis and exchange of relevant information on the event with other Member States, third countries and relevant EU-bodies or other international institutions. (II.1) The information could, inter alia, include:

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<sup>4</sup> Article 46 of the Schengen Convention (OJ L 239, 22.9.00, p. 19).

- information and intelligence obtained prior to the event that can potentially affect the course of the event or the maintenance of law and order and security in general,
- information obtained or requested during the event relating to persons suspected of having committed a criminal offence, including their name, date of birth, place of residence, background, circumstances of arrest and/or an exact description of the committed offence,
- information on applicable legislation and police policy on law-enforcement (to other Member States or third countries),
- incident and evaluation reports and contributions for these.

### **III.2.B RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER MEMBER STATES**

At the earliest possible stage prior to the international event, each contact point should provide to its counterpart in the organising State a permanent risk analysis on individuals or groups expected to travel to the event and deemed to pose a potential threat to the maintenance of public law and order and/or security (such as known potential demonstrators and other groupings). The analysis should be forwarded to the organising Member State as well as other affected countries – i.e. transit or neighbouring countries. This analysis can be structured in accordance with the framework analysis in Annex B. If no such information is available, the organising State should be informed accordingly.

As the event approaches, the information should be updated on a regular basis. A monthly analysis should be forwarded in each of the last 3 months before the event. To the necessary extent, the analysis may be forwarded, during the last month, on a weekly basis, followed by daily reports the last week before, during and after the event. The information should be as comprehensive as the available information allows.

### **III.2.C EUROPOL CONTRIBUTION**

Europol can, in accordance with the mandate of Europol and the Europol Convention, provide relevant information and analysis as well as draw up general threat assessments on the basis of contributions by Member States. This information should be available at the earliest possible stage. A threat assessment to be drawn up by Europol should be incorporated in the initial risk analysis drawn up by the organising State six months prior to the event. If no such information is available, the organising State may be informed accordingly.

As the event approaches, the information should be updated on a regular basis. At least a monthly analysis should be forwarded in each of the last 3 months before the event. To the necessary extent, the analysis may be forwarded, during the last month, on a weekly basis, followed by daily reports the last week before, during and after the event.

### **III.2.D RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GSC (GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL) SECURITY OFFICE AND THE SECURITY OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION**

With regard to meetings of the European Council, EU Council, EU Ministerial or other important EU meetings, the Council's Security Regulations (OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1) provide in Section IX that the GSC Security Office has the following responsibilities:

*"5. The GSC Security Office should act as an adviser on security for the preparation of the meeting; it should be represented there to help and advise the meeting security officer and delegations as necessary.*

*6. Each delegation to a meeting should designate a security officer, who will be responsible for dealing with security matters within his/her delegation and for maintaining liaison with the meeting security officer, as well as with the GSC Security Office representative as required."*

In order to allow the GSC Security Office to fulfil the aforementioned tasks it should be allowed to avail itself, wherever possible, of the possibilities foreseen in this Security handbook, it being understood that the GSC Security Office is not a police force and that the GSC Security Office operates in relation to the Council.

The Security Office of the European Commission can also be involved, where necessary.

### **III.3. BASIC TASKS FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT RELATED TO COUNTER-TERRORISM**

Considering that information is a key instrument in preventing terrorist actions, and that information can be provided prior to, during and after the events, the following tasks are essential:

- information collection;
- information evaluation; and
- information dissemination .

In this regard the following information should be prioritised:

- persons involved in terrorist organisations, terrorist actions or other major criminal activities, which might be indirectly related to terrorism;
- the level of threat against officials (heads of states and governments, members of parliament, other VIPS etc.), athletes, visitors/spectators and venues. In addition to the host Member State, which has primary responsibility, all other Member States shall independently contribute relevant information in respect to these persons; and
- other information on targets and interests of EU Member States or of third countries in the organising country with a view to their better protection.

## **IV. POLICY AND STRATEGIC MEASURES**

### **IV.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVOLVED AUTHORITIES AND SERVICES IN THE ORGANISING STATE**

Prior to an event, the organising Member State should ensure that the roles of all involved authorities and services are clearly defined and that their respective responsibilities are communicated to all relevant parties.

The organising State could produce an overall matrix to reflect all involved processes and key players, (i.e. organisation of the meeting, security provision, maintenance of law and order, judicial services, social and preventive services, health services, public transportation and other infra-structural matters). This "blueprint" is a useful tool to visualise the planning framework as well as ensure that all necessary processes are covered.

A coordinating project group for the event could be set up comprising representatives of all authorities and services involved. The group should meet regularly prior to, during and after the actual event, in order to ensure that decisions are made in a coherent and co-ordinated way. A prime responsibility of the group will be to ensure efficient lines of communication between all authorities and services.

The responsible authorities and services should ensure the presence of material, technical and personnel resources that are required to perform the assigned duties with the necessary efficiency, quality and swiftness. A database on all available resources and corresponding contact points is a very useful tool for the organising Member States.

The police authorities of the organising Member States should ensure that all necessary agreements and arrangements regarding policing efforts are made with the practical organiser of the event. The arrangements could, *inter alia*, include:

- locations of the event where no public disturbances should occur (meeting facilities, hotels),
- entrance control, perhaps perimeter security and the responsibility of each of these,
- security measures to be undertaken by the organiser, i.e. internal video surveillance,

- a complete and constantly updated exchange of information on delegates and other participants in the event (name, function, length of stay, accommodation, transport etc.),
- all arrangements with regards to VIP's and hotel security.

## **IV.2 POLICY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT**

Adhering to the basic principles stated under section I.2, the competent authorities of the organising state should establish a clear overall policy for the police approach at international events. The overall policy can include policies such as:

- the right to gather and demonstrate and to free speech is respected,
- the police actions must meet the principle of proportionality,
- the police actions are characterised by dialogue and assistance for the organisation of demonstrations,
- the police should, through dialogue and a credible stage of preparedness, maintain the initiative thereby limiting or preventing riots or larger disturbances,
- the police should, at its discretion and when appropriate, demonstrate a low level of police visibility and a high level of tolerance regarding peaceful gathering and demonstrations,
- arrests should be made with the purpose of criminal prosecution or temporary detention etc. in accordance with national legislation,
- the police efforts should, in general, be concentrated on groupings that are planning or demonstrate the will to instigate disturbances,
- cooperation with other Member States, third countries, EU-bodies and international institutions should be promoted on relevant areas.

In general, a consequent approach to maintaining law and order during an event is desirable which is why the stated policy on law-enforcement (also communicated to the public) should be strictly complied with.

The organising Member State of more than one event on its territory should ensure that the police policy on law-enforcement, to the furthest possible extent, is harmonised for the different events. If this is deemed to be appropriate, the policy may also be coordinated with other Member States.

## **V. OPERATIONAL MEASURES**

### **V.1 OPERATIONAL PLANNING**

The competent authorities of the concerned Member State(s) should establish a set of plans covering the policy level (*strategic*) as well as the overall operational level (*operational*) and the actual level of deployment on the ground (*tactical*). The planning procedure should commence at the earliest possible stage.

The competent authority of the organising MS should draft an overall operational plan on the basis of which all further detailed plans are made.

### **V.2 THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RISK ANALYSIS**

An appropriate and timely assessment of the threats (related to terrorism, public order, organised crime and others) posed to the international event is of central importance in security terms. Alongside the specific assessment of the relevant threat, an analysis covering the collection, evaluation and dissemination of security-relevant information referring to a given specific situation must be made.

For this reason, the responsible organising State, supported where appropriate by other Member States and EU competent bodies, shall draw up an updated threat assessment and risk analysis six months before the relevant event at the latest. This should be updated again one month before the event and, if necessary, on a weekly basis before the event. During the event, daily situation reports should be issued. The aforementioned reports should be based on information provided by the host State, other Member States and EU competent bodies.

Such assessments and analyses should be shared among contributing States and bodies.

Apart from the intelligence available to the organising State itself, information and evaluations provided by other Member States will be the basis for the analysis. The Member States will send it to the organising State as soon as possible by telephonic or other appropriate means using existing secure communication lines.



In order to optimise the timeliness of the analysis, information and evaluations should also be provided in the form of round table enquiries among the liaison officers during the event.

The selection of suitable, necessary and appropriate security measures shall be based on the risk analysis.

The threat assessments and risk analyses will serve as a basis for coordinated public relations work with the press and the media while, at all times, maintaining the confidentiality of information.

### **V.3 MEASURES RELATING TO THE CROSSING OF BORDERS**

Subject to national laws and applicable European legislation the Member States should utilise the available and appropriate legislative measures to prevent individuals or groups who are considered to pose a potential threat to the maintenance of public law and order and/or security from travelling to the location of the event. For parties to the Schengen Convention, article 2.2 of the Schengen Convention can be a useful instrument.

The organising Member State and its neighbouring countries may implement a flexible, joint border regime intensifying the police efforts in the border regions adapted to the concrete situation or threat. When this is deemed useful and appropriate, common or co-ordinated preventive patrols and controls may be carried out.

The necessary arrangements for a quick and efficient implementation of the potential expulsion measures should be made well in advance of the event including cooperation with other national authorities and other Member States.

### **V.4 PREVENTIVE MEASURES**

The police authorities in the organising Member State should at an early stage initiate a dialogue with individuals and groups (including activist groups and demonstrators), local authorities, relevant infrastructural services, the local population and other key players in order to ensure that gatherings and legitimate demonstrations are carried out peacefully.

The establishment of a constructive and mutually respectful network will serve to prevent potential disturbances as well as serve as an instrument for mediation in a confrontational situation. The above-mentioned dialogue should be based on shared responsibility. It should commence at an early preparatory stage and be utilised as a tool before, during and after an event.

Dialogue structures or teams should be established at the national level and take into account the different cultures in the different Member States in their preparation and implementation of their task<sup>5</sup>.

Channels of communication between the law-enforcement authorities and the various organisations, civil associations and representatives of demonstrators should be set up. The organisers of demonstrations and all relevant parties may be advised on:

- practical matters – i.e. accommodation and logistics,
- relevant applicable legislation regarding demonstration, freedom of speech, civil disobedience etc.,
- police policy on law-enforcement in matters where discretion can be exercised and instructions on the use of force of the police,
- contact points within the police and other relevant authorities.

Distribution of the above information in different languages is a measure to be considered (e.g. through folders, websites). The information may be supplied to foreign visitors through the respective contact points.

## **V.5 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION**

The Member States Law Enforcement Agencies should aim for a consequent criminal investigative process towards offences committed in connection with violent demonstrations or other disturbances during international events such as meetings of the European Council in accordance with the applicable legislation and the stated policies.

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<sup>5</sup> Doc. 14917/01 JAI 161, elements listed on page 3.

All defined and sustainable criminal offences should, in principle and in full accordance with national law, lead to criminal prosecution in the organising country or by competent legal authorities in another country. If an immediate law-enforcement action in the organising Member State is not possible, the other Member States should make every effort to identify and prosecute their own nationals in accordance with national legislation, the present evidence and the circumstances of each case.

The organising Member State should make arrangements to ensure that sufficient resources are available for the arrest and investigation of criminal offences and that sufficient facilities are available for custody and pre-trial detention. It is recommendable to plan for a worst-case scenario with larger quantities of perpetrators.

Accordingly, the legal authorities must be geared to tackle a larger quantity of work and have the appropriate capacity to, for example:

- make speedy decisions on the use of pre-trial detention,
- make speedy decisions on investigation measures requiring a decision from a court of law,
- try a larger number of criminal cases,
- respond to legal requests from other States.

## **V.6 OPERATIONAL COOPERATION WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES**

### **V.6.A LIAISON OFFICERS<sup>6</sup>**

At the request of the organising Member State, each Member State or EU/other competent organisations may appoint liaison officers for an event, when relevant (e.g. if larger groups from the State are expected to travel to the event). A request for liaison officers should be made at the earliest possible stage and, if possible, no later than 6 weeks prior to the event. To this end, a standard form is annexed to this document (Annex A).

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<sup>6</sup> Conclusions of the JHA Council of 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and similar events (10916/01 JAI 82, paragraph II, point 1(c)).

Interested Member States may request an invitation to send a liaison officer to the organising Member State.

Liaison officers may be exchanged in accordance with bilateral arrangements between the Host State and other Member State involved.

The liaison officer should be appointed no later than 2 weeks before an event at which point the cooperation should commence. The organising State should, in close collaboration with the other Member States, decide upon the appointment and tasks of the liaison officers through their respective contact points.

The liaison officer can be assigned to (any of) the host contact point(s) to be in charge of communication with the home State in which case the appropriate means of communication should be provided by the organising Member State.

Liaison officers should play an advisory and assistance role. The foreign liaison officers should be unarmed and have no official police authority in the host country<sup>7</sup>. Depending on their specific task, liaison officers should have appropriate experience in the maintenance of law and order or the field of counter-terrorism and, in particular, with:

- a thorough knowledge of their national organisation and authorities,
- experience in maintaining public law and order at high profile events,
- access to all useful information sources in his home State, including on extremism and other relevant groupings from police as well as other relevant sources,
- the ability to organise intelligence efforts nationally prior to and during the event and analyse relevant information,
- good working knowledge of the working language(s) chosen by the organising Member State,
- other specific skills relevant to designated tasks.

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<sup>7</sup> Joint Action 97/339/JHA, article 2 (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1).

## V.6.B OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

The organising Member State may, in accordance with national legislation, request the deployment of police or intelligence officers for operational support from another Member State for a specific event or for the fight against specific terrorist scenarios. A detailed request for operational support, including an account of the reasons for the request, should be made at the earliest possible stage. To this end a standard form is annexed to this document (Annex A).

Depending on the type of requested support, the appointed officer(s) should have the necessary knowledge and experience relevant to the designated tasks.

Any operational support provided by foreign officers should be included in the operational plans of the competent authorities of the organising State. Accordingly, foreign officers should:

- be included to the furthest possible extent in the operational information structure,
- be briefed on the operational plans and relevant policies including instructions on the use of force etc. in one of their working languages,
- be offered the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the venue and deployed police forces etc. prior to the event,
- attend all relevant briefing sessions (i.e. relevant to their task and if it is in a language they understand),
- where appropriate, be actively included in the police deployment on the ground.

The organising competent authorities are responsible for the physical security of the foreign officers. It is the responsibility of the foreign officers to ensure that their actions are not causing unnecessary conflict, danger or unjustified risks.

When deployed on the ground, foreign officers must at all times refer to and be under the supervision of members of the host competent authorities that are properly briefed on the operational plan and able to communicate in a language that the foreign officer understands. The communication lines between foreign officers, the host contact(s), the management of the deployed police forces and other key players should be efficient and fully functional during an event and, to the necessary extent, also before and after the event.

## V.6.C OBSERVERS

Member States may, with the consent of the organising Member State, send observers to gather experience in security and the maintenance of law and order at international events for future events in their home countries. If so requested, the observer may provide an input for the evaluation undertaken by the organising Member State.

Observers should, to the furthest possible extent, be permitted to attend planning sessions, briefings, coordination meetings, operational deployments and other activities in order to maximise the benefit of the visit.

The contact point(s) of the organising State should, within their means, endeavour to provide the necessary means of communication and other facilities for the foreign observers.

## V.6.D LOGISTICS

Immediately upon arrival in the organising country, officers from other Member States should report their arrival, designated tasks and mandate to the relevant contact point in order to clarify the role of each foreign officer (i.e. liaison officer, operational support/spotters or observers etc.). The organising State as the responsible one will undertake this accreditation process.

The organising State should normally cover accommodation and subsistence costs of invited foreign officers travelling to its territory. Travelling costs are normally covered by the home country. All costs related to observers sent to the organising Member State should be borne by the sending State.

The organising Member States may arrange for support from other Member States when possible through bilateral/multilateral agreements on temporary provision of equipment or other resources.

## VI. TRAINING

A high professional level of training of the units involved in security at major international events should be achieved, inter alia, through:

- thorough and timely general as well as scenario-oriented training and preparation at all levels, possibly including experienced officers from other Member States,
- deployment of observers to events in other Member States that can provide valuable experience to the home State,
- participation of key officers in relevant courses under the authority of relevant institutions, i.e. CEPOL .

## **VII. MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION**

### **VII.1 MEDIA STRATEGY**

In order to ensure an accurate and timely media coverage of international events, a pre-defined strategy for relations with the media must be in place before, during and after an event.

The media should be given the fullest possible degree of freedom to cover the event, thus safeguarding the right to freely express opinions in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. The media strategy should be geared towards openness and transparency.

It is recommended that a single point of contact is appointed for the media to ensure a coordinated media coverage. Well in advance of the event, the organising Member State should establish an overall media strategy regulating:

- designation of a point of contact for the media which will direct the media to the relevant spokespersons,
- area of competence for each spokesperson,
- the information to be given to the public on police measures and the steps which will be taken in case of disturbances,
- other relevant issues.

### **VII.2 COMMUNICATION PLAN (OTHER PARTIES)**

In order to ensure the dissemination of information to all key players including those described under section IV.3. (Preventive measures) and under IV.1. (Responsibilities of involved authorities and services) the organising Member State should well in advance of the event set up a comprehensive communication plan mapping the lines of communication to all key players.

When possible, all involved parties within the organising Member State should develop a common communication strategy to avoid overlaps or the dissemination of incomplete information. The strategy should include arrangements for general reports to be distributed nationally on the course of the event and incidents etc. as well as specific reports for the local population regarding events and measures affecting them.



It is also highly recommendable that an adequate flow of information internally to police authorities and services is secured through a detailed communication plan.

## **VIII. EVALUATION AND MONITORING**

The organising Member State should initiate an evaluation of the security efforts during an event and other relevant factors. All key players should be invited to contribute to the evaluation, which should be based on the prior planning of the event.

As soon as possible after disturbances of law and order or a terrorist incident have occurred, the organising Member State should organise the drafting of an incident report and subsequently an evaluation report.

A debriefing should be organised and a written overall evaluation report on relevant aspects of security should be produced after the event, where possible in at least two official EU-languages, and referring in particular to disturbances or absence of such, criminal offences, involved groupings and lessons learned.

The report should be distributed through the permanent contact point(s) to the relevant EU bodies and other involved or otherwise interested countries or bodies in order to ensure that lessons learned or recommendations are made available for future organisers of an event.

**STANDARD FORM FOR THE REQUEST FOR LIAISON OFFICERS OR OFFICERS TO  
PROVIDE OTHER TYPES OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT**

1. Type of support requested (liaison officer, spotter, mediator or other)
2. Event(s)
3. Period
4. Place of station
5. Description of tasks (as detailed as possible)
6. Language skills (working languages of the event)
7. Other specific skills (knowledge of particular groups, mediation experience etc.)
8. Tasks to prepare ahead of arrival
  - communication with the home State
  - gathering of specific types of information
  - other tasks
9. Means of communication (mobile, internet)
10. Other types of required equipment
11. Please provide a reply by:

\_\_\_\_\_

**RISK ANALYSIS ON POTENTIAL DEMONSTRATORS AND OTHER GROUPINGS**

1. Name of group known and likely to demonstrate or in other ways affect the event
2. Composition, number of members
3. Distinguishing marks (clothes, logos, flags, slogans or other external characteristics)
4. Nature of the group (violent – risk of disturbances?)
5. Demonstration methods and/or activist methods
6. Internal organisation and functioning of the group
  - leadership
  - communication means
  - other structural information
7. Links to other groups (national or international)
8. Members previously involved in relevant incidents
  - type of incident
  - place (country)
  - individually or in a group
  - convictions with reference to the above, in accordance with national law
9. Behaviour
  - towards police services and actions
  - towards the local population
  - use of weapons
  - alcohol or drug consumption
  - wearing masks
  - pattern of behaviour at different types of events

10. Links and attitude towards the media (media strategy, spokesperson etc.)
  11. Internet websites and bulletin boards etc.
  12. Choice of travel route
  13. Means of transport
  14. Choice of accommodation
  15. Length of stay
  16. Information supplied by liaison officers in third countries on possible demonstrators or activists from these countries.
  17. Other relevant information
  18. Sources of the information and analysis of the accuracy and reliability of the provided information
-

**STANDARD FORM FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION REGARDING INDIVIDUALS  
POSING A TERRORIST THREAT<sup>8</sup>**

Issuing Information Country	
Event	
Date of the event	

<b>Personal details of the subject</b>	Name	
	Surname	
	Date of birth	
	Nationality	
	Passport 's Number	
	Criminal Record	
	Violent acts	
	Transport used	
	Name of the Organisation/ Support Network	
	Physical Features: * Height * Build * Colour of eyes * Scars	
	Observations	
	Others	

**PHOTO**  
**Fingerprint**

\_\_\_\_\_

<sup>8</sup> Reminder: the information in this form is confidential and must never be transferred to third parties without permission of the first sending country.

**STANDARD FORM FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION REGARDING GROUPS**  
**POSING A TERRORIST THREAT<sup>9</sup>**

Issuing Information Country	
Event	
Date of the event	

<b>Details of the Group</b>	Name of Group	
	Origin and aim of Group	
	Brief note on previous activities	
	Modus operandii	
	Observations	

<sup>9</sup> Reminder: the information in this form is confidential and must never be transferred to third parties without permission of the first sending country.

**REFERENCES**

- Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union (OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p.93)
- Joint Action 97/339/JHA of 26 May 1997 regarding cooperation on public law and order and security (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1)
- Conclusions of the Council (JHA) of 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and similar events (10916/01 JAI 82)
- Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations (OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p.1)
- Treaty of Nice, Declaration on the venue of European Councils (OJ C 80 of 10.3.2001, p. 85)
- Council resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ ...)
- Europol Support to Member States - Major International Sporting Events (File no: 2570-50r1)
- Prüm Treaty (document ...)
- Benelux Treaty (...)
- Council of Europe (...)

**WORKING DOCUMENTS**

- Conflict management manual of guidance (7047/01 ENFOPOL 21 + COR 1(en, el))
- Conclusions of the JHA Council of 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and similar events (10916/01 JAI 82)
- Checklist regarding possible measures on the occasion of European Councils and other comparable events (11572/01 ENFOPOL 90)
- Strategic information concerning European Councils and other comparable events – Risk analysis (11694/01 ENFOPOL 92)
- Conclusions of the sub-workgroup EUCPN JAI 82 (14917/01 JAI 161)
- Security at meetings of the European Council and other comparable events – International cooperation at the Laeken European Council (9029/02 ENFOPOL 65)



- Security handbook for European Councils and other similar events (9069/02 ENFOPOL 66)
- Security at meetings of the European Council (11836/02 ENFOPOL 116)

## PERMANENT CONTACT POINTS CONCERNING PUBLIC SECURITY (Article 3(b) of Joint Action 97/339/JHA (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1))

MS	SERVICE	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE	FAX	MAIL
BE	DGS/DSO/Permanence	Quatre Bras 13 1000 Brussels	32.2.508.7447	32.2.508.7650	<a href="mailto:dsoliaperm@skynet.be">dsoliaperm@skynet.be</a>
CZ	Police Presidium of the Czech Republic International Police Co-operation Division	Strojnická 27 P.O. Box 62/MPS Prague 7	420 974 834 210	420 974 834 716	<a href="mailto:sirene@mvr.cz">sirene@mvr.cz</a>
DK	National Commissioner of the Danish Police, Sirene	Polititorvet 14 1780 Copenhagen V	45.33.148.888	45.33.322.771	
DE	BKA, ZD 43-IZ	Thaerstr. 11 65193 Wiesbaden	49.611.55.13101	49.611.55.12141	
	BMI	Lagezentrum, Alt-Moabit 101 D, 10559 Berlin	49.188.8681.1077	49.188.8681.2926	
	<i>Baden-Württ</i> Landespolizeipräsidium, Lagezentrum	Dorotheenstr. 6 73173 Stuttgart	49.711.2313333	49.711.2313399	
	<i>Bayern</i> Bayerisches LKA	Mailingerstr. 15 80636 München	49.89.1212.2510	49.89.1212.2356	
	<i>Berlin</i> Landesschutzpolizeiamt, Lagezentrum Polizei	Platz der Luftbrücke 6 12101 Berlin	49.30.4664.907.110	49.30.4664.907.199	
	<i>Brandenburg</i> Min. des Innern, Lagezentrum	H.v.Tresckowstr 9-13 14467 Potsdam	49.331.866.2871	49.331.866.2878	
	<i>Bremen</i> Landeskriminalamt, Kriminaldauerdienst	In der Vahr 76 28329 Bremen	49.421.362.3810	49.421.362.3889	<a href="mailto:kdd@polizei.bremen.de">kdd@polizei.bremen.de</a>
	<i>Hamburg</i> Polizeipräsidium Hamburg, Landeseinsatzdirektion	Bruno-Georges-Platz 1 22202 Hamburg	49.40.4286.66050	49.40.4286.66039	
<i>Hessen</i> Innenmin., Lagezentrum	Fr.-Ebert-Allee 12 65185 Wiesbaden	49.611.353.2150	49.611.353.1766		

MS	SERVICE	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE	FAX	MAIL
	<i>Mecklenb.-Vorpom</i> Innenministerium, Arsenal am Pfaffenteich, Lagezentrum	Karl-Marx-Str. 1 19055 Schwerin	49.385.5882.471	49.385.5882.480	<a href="mailto:lagezentrum@im.mv-regierung.de">lagezentrum@im.mv-regierung.de</a>
	<i>Niedersachsen</i> LKA	Schützenstr. 25 30161 Hannover	49.511.26262.2112	49.511.26262.2115	
	<i>Nordrh.-W.</i> LKA	Völklinger Str. 49 40221 Düsseldorf	49.211.9396.411	49.211.9396.941	
	<i>Rheinl.-Pf</i> LKA	Valenciaplatz 1-7 55118 Mainz	49.613.165.2350	49.613.165.2480	
	<i>Saarland</i> Landespolizeidirektion, Leitstelle/Lagezentrum  LKA	Mainzer Str. 136 66121 Saarbrücken	49.681.962.1260  49.681.962.3333	49.681.962.205  49.681.962.3005	<a href="mailto:leitstelle@slpol.de">leitstelle@slpol.de</a>
	<i>Sachsen</i> Landespolizeipräsidium, Lagezentrum	Albertstr. 4 01097 Dresden	49.351.564.3775	49.351.564.3779	
	<i>Sachsen-An.</i> Innenmin., Lagezentrum,	Halberstädter Str. 2 39112 Magdeburg	49.391.567.5292	49.391.567.5290	
	<i>Schleswig-Ho.</i> Innenmin., Lagezentrum	Mühlenweg 166 24116 Kiel	49.431.160.5020	49.431.160.5029	
	<i>Thüringen</i> Innenmin., Lagezentrum	Andreasstr. 38 99084 Erfurt	49.361.379.3615	49.361.379.3617	
<b>EE</b>	Central Law Enforcement Police	Ādala 4E, Tallinn, 10614	372 612 3900	372 612 3990	<a href="mailto:julgestuspolitsei@jp.pol.ee">julgestuspolitsei@jp.pol.ee</a>
<b>EL</b>	Min. of Public Order, YDT/3e	Kanellopoulou 4 10177 Athens	301.692.5030	301.692.2466	
<b>ES</b>	Dirección general de la policía, Comisaría general de seguridad ciudadana, Centro nac. de coordinación	C/Francos Rodríguez 104 28039 Madrid	34.91.3227190	34.91.3227188	<a href="mailto:cgsc.cgeneral@policia.es">cgsc.cgeneral@policia.es</a>
<b>FR</b>	Min de l'Intérieur, Dir. Générale de la Police Nationale, Cabinet « Ordre Public »	11 rue des Saussaies 75008 Paris	33.1.40.07.22.84	33.1.40.07.64.99	
<b>IE</b>	Office of Liaison and Protection Section, An Garda Siochana	Dublin 8	353.1.666.2842	353.1.666.2843	

<b>MS</b>	<b>SERVICE</b>	<b>ADDRESS</b>	<b>TELEPHONE</b>	<b>FAX</b>	<b>MAIL</b>
<b>IT</b>	Min. dell'Interno, Pubblica Sicurezza	Via Agostino Depretis 00184 Rome	39.06.-4654.7510, - 4651	39.06.485.560	
<b>CY</b>	Ministry of Justice and Public Order, Police Headquarters, European Union and International Police Cooperation Directorate, Police Cooperation Office	Nicosia, 1478, Cyprus	357 2280 8573	357 2280 8605	cyipcc@cytanet.com.cy.
<b>LV</b>	Unit for Protection of Public Order and Safety, Central Public Order Police Department, State Police	Brivibas sr 61, 1010 Riga	371 707 5408	371 707 5059	sksn@vp.gov.lv
<b>LT</b>	Police Department under the MoI, Management Board	Saltoniskiu str. 19 LT-08105, Vilnius	+370 5 271 78 95. +370 5 2719867	+370 5 2719765	info@viesoji.policija.lt
<b>LU</b>	Direction Générale de la Police G-D, Direction des Opérations, Centre d'Intervention National	2957 Luxembourg	352.4997.2346	352.4997.2398	<a href="mailto:cin@police.etat.lu">cin@police.etat.lu</a>
<b>HU</b>					
<b>MT</b>					
<b>NL</b>	Min. of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Coordination Centre	PO Box 20011 2500 EA The Hague	31.70.3454.400	31.70.3614.464	
<b>AT</b>	BMI, Journdienst der GD. für die Öffentliche Sicherheit	Herrengasse 7, Postfach 100, 1014 Wien	43.1.531.263.200	43.1.531.263.120	<a href="mailto:GD-Journal@bmi.gv.at">GD-Journal@bmi.gv.at</a>
<b>PL</b>	General Headquarters of the Police, Bureau of International Police Co-operation	02624 Warsaw Ul.Pulawska 148/150	+4822, 6012577	+4822, 6012674	sirenepoland@policja.gov.pl
<b>PT</b>	Sirene, Lote 175 Flamenga	S. Antonio dos Cavaleiros 2670 Loures	351.21.989.8800	351.21.989.0825	

<b>MS</b>	<b>SERVICE</b>	<b>ADDRESS</b>	<b>TELEPHONE</b>	<b>FAX</b>	<b>MAIL</b>
	Min. Admin. Interna, Gabinete Coord. Seg.	Praça do Comercio 1194-015 Lisboa	351.09178.15098		<a href="mailto:gsc@sg.mai.gov.pt">gsc@sg.mai.gov.pt</a>
<b>SI</b>	International Police Cooperation Sector in Criminal Police Directorate	Štefanova 2 1000 Ljubljana	386 1 472 4780	386 1 2517 516	interpol.ljubljana@policija.si
<b>SK</b>					
<b>FI</b>	National Bureau of Investigation, Sirene	POB 285 01301 Vantaa	3589.8388.6910	358.9.8388.6911	krp-sirene@krp.poliisi.fi
<b>SE</b>	NCID, ILO	POB 12256 10226 Stockholm	468.401.3700	468.651.4203	<a href="mailto:nsk@rkp.police.se">nsk@rkp.police.se</a>
<b>UK</b>	Metropolitan Police, Eur. Liaison Section	Room 1601 London SW1 H 0BG	44.207.230.4475	44.207.230.3255	