1. Introduction

The changes to EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law (which concerns immigration and asylum, civil law, policing and criminal law) in the draft Reform Treaty are more far-reaching than the changes which that Treaty would make to any other areas of EU law.

As described in detail in Statewatch Reform Treaty analysis no. 1, these changes entail a shift to qualified majority voting (QMV) of the Member States in the EU Council as regards legal migration and most areas of criminal law and policing, along with much increased powers for the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice in this area, as well as revised EU competences in this field - which will in many cases increase the EU’s powers.

Since JHA subjects are all areas of great public concern, and JHA law raises important questions about where to strike the right balance between the protection of civil liberties on the one hand and effective immigration controls and law enforcement on the other, the changes to JHA law are among the most controversial changes which the Reform Treaty would make to the existing Treaties. The issue is already the subject of public debate, which is likely to continue throughout the process of completing negotiations on the Reform Treaty and then ratifying it through Member States’ national parliaments (and, at least in Ireland, through a public referendum).

However, the debate on this issue in the UK, Ireland and Denmark should not ignore the fact that these three countries will have opt-outs from the entire area of EU Justice and Home Affairs law (although this analysis does not examine the Danish opt-out, which differs in some respects from the opt-out which the UK and Ireland will have).

The purpose of this Statewatch analysis is first of all to describe how these opt-outs will work and their likely impact, and secondly to make available the annotated
text of the three Protocols which govern the UK and Irish opt-outs, following the amendment of these Protocols by the draft Reform Treaty.

The key points explained in this analysis are as follows:

a) the UK and Ireland will be able to choose whether to opt-in or opt-out of any individual proposal of in all areas of JHA law under the draft Reform Treaty;

b) the UK and Ireland already have an opt-out from any individual proposal regarding immigration, asylum and civil law;

c) the UK and Ireland are therefore not ‘giving up a veto’ as regards immigration, asylum and civil law, since they already gave that veto up, in return for an opt-out, at the time of the Treaty of Amsterdam;

d) the UK and Ireland will get a new opt-out from any individual proposal regarding policing and criminal law;

e) in the areas of policing and criminal law, the UK and Ireland are in most cases giving up a veto in return for an opt-out in the draft Reform Treaty;

f) the UK and Ireland secured the opt-out from policing and criminal law proposals as part of the deal to negotiate the draft Reform Treaty; this opt-out was NOT part of the Constitutional Treaty and at no point was such an opt-out even the subject of discussion as part of negotiations for the Constitutional Treaty; and

g) the UK and Ireland will be subject to the expanded jurisdiction of the Court of Justice as regards asylum and civil law legislation which they have already opted into (or will opt into in future), as well as any future policing and criminal law legislation which they opt into; but it is not clear whether the UK and Ireland will be subject to any expanded jurisdiction of the Court of Justice as regards existing policing and criminal law legislation.

This analysis looks in turn at:

1) UK and Irish JHA opt-outs prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam
2) UK and Irish JHA opt-outs in the Treaty of Amsterdam
3) The current UK and Irish JHA opt-outs in practice
4) UK and Irish JHA opt-outs in the draft Reform Treaty
5) The likely impact of the UK and Irish JHA opt-outs in the draft Reform Treaty
6) The JHA jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the UK and Irish opt-outs

1. Opt-outs prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam

Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam - which entered into force on 1 May 1999 - the UK and Ireland had no opt-out from EU Justice and Home Affairs cooperation, as it was originally provided for in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, also known as the original
version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which entered into force on 1 November 1993.

Instead, most of the other Member States had set up the ‘Schengen’ system for taking forward JHA cooperation amongst themselves, starting with the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and as further detailed in the Schengen Convention of 1990, which was applied in practice by some Member States from March 1995, with other Member States applying it later. This Convention abolished internal border controls on persons between the participating States, and also provided for harmonised rules on visa policy, external border control, and aspects of illegal migration, as well as rules on criminal and police cooperation and the creation of the Schengen Information System (SIS), a database containing policing, criminal law and immigration information to be shared between Member States.

2) UK and Irish JHA opt-outs in the Treaty of Amsterdam

The Treaty of Amsterdam attached to the TEU and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) three separate Protocols setting out overlapping opt-outs for the UK and Ireland from aspects of EU JHA law.

a) The Schengen ‘acquis’

The Treaty of Amsterdam brought the Schengen treaties, along with the measures implementing them (the Schengen acquis), into the EU legal order, by means of a Protocol on the Schengen acquis. This Protocol allows the UK and Ireland to participate in part or all of the Schengen acquis, subject to the unanimous approval of the Member States fully participating in that acquis (ie, the ‘Schengen States’). The text of the Protocol, with the amendments which would be made to it by the draft Reform Treaty, can be found as Annex I to this analysis.

Applying this Protocol, the UK applied to participate in parts of the Schengen acquis in 1999 and the Schengen States approved this in 2000 in the form of an EU Council Decision. This Council Decision provides that the UK participates in the Schengen rules concerning illegal immigration, policing and criminal law (except for cross-border ‘hot pursuit’ by police officers) and the policing and criminal law parts of the Schengen Information System (which provide for a database on extradition requests, wanted persons, missing persons, persons to be kept under surveillance and stolen objects, for example stolen cars). It has applied since 1 January 2005, except for the UK’s participation in the Schengen Information System, which is not likely to apply in practice until 2010.

A further Council Decision of 2002 admits Ireland to participate in all the same parts of the Schengen acquis as the UK, except Ireland does not participate in cross-border undercover surveillance by police officers. However, none of this Decision has yet been applied in practice.

b) Border controls

A second Protocol specifies clearly that nothing can oblige the UK and Ireland to abolish their border controls with other Member States. The text of the Protocol, with the amendments which would be made to it by the draft Reform Treaty, can be found as Annex II to this analysis.
c) Immigration, asylum and civil law legislation

A third Protocol allows the UK and Ireland to choose whether or not to opt in to proposed EC immigration, asylum and civil law legislation. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, these subjects have been dealt with in a special section of the TEC (Articles 61-69 in Title IV of Part Three of that Treaty, known in practice as ‘Title IV’).

When a legislative proposal is made, the UK and Ireland have three months to decide whether they wish to opt in to discussions. If they do not opt in, they are deemed to have opted out, and discussions simply go ahead without them. Any legislation which is adopted then binds the other Member States.

If the UK and Ireland opt in, then discussions go ahead with their full participation. But if the UK and Ireland block agreement on the proposed text, then the other Member States can go ahead and adopt the proposed legislation without them. For that reason, it cannot be said that the UK and Ireland have a veto over the adoption of EC immigration, asylum or civil law legislation, or that they ever had one, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Finally, if legislation is adopted without the participation of the UK and Ireland, those Member States can still opt in to that legislation at any time afterwards, with the permission of the European Commission (the opinion of the other Member States about this is irrelevant).

The UK and Ireland do not have to act together, but can take separate decisions on opting into discussions on proposed legislation, or into legislation which has been adopted.

The text of the Protocol on the UK and Irish opt-out from proposed immigration, asylum and civil law legislation (the ‘Title IV Protocol’), with the amendments which would be made to it by the draft Reform Treaty, can be found as Annex III to this analysis.

3) The current UK and Irish JHA opt-outs in practice

Usually the UK and Ireland take the same view about opting in or out of proposals concerning immigration, asylum or civil law, but in several cases they have taken different views. In practice, to date the UK and Ireland have opted into most civil law measures, all asylum measures (for the UK; Ireland opted out of one asylum measure), and most measures concerning illegal migration. But they have opted out of most measures concerning legal migration or visas and border controls.

Annex IV to this analysis presents a complete record of the UK and Irish decisions to opt in or out of all adopted or currently proposed measures covered by the ‘Title IV opt-out’.

There has been no case where after the UK or Ireland opted in to a proposal, they blocked agreement on that proposal, resulting in the other Member States going ahead without them. It is understood that the UK Home Office is particularly keen to avoid this ever happening, and so far it has succeeded.

The dynamics of this issue have changed since qualified majority voting (QMV) has been introduced into most areas of immigration, asylum and civil law, from 2003-
2005 (unanimous voting still applies to legislation on legal immigration and family law). If the UK or Ireland opt in to discussions where QMV applies, then it is impossible for either Member State, or both Member States together, to block a legislative proposal (they would only have about a third of the votes needed to form a ‘blocking minority’). They would have to hope that they could put together a blocking minority with other Member States, and that this coalition would stay together.

So it is riskier for the UK or Ireland to opt in where QMV applies, as they might well be outvoted and forced to accept legislation they do not want -- not just because of the views of the other Member States, but because of the position of the European Parliament, which usually has ‘co-decision’ (joint decision-making) powers where QMV applies. In fact, the UK has already been outvoted in two cases concerning EU funding legislation (the Refugee Fund and the Return Fund), although in these cases the UK only voted against the legislation because the House of Commons still maintained a parliamentary scrutiny reserve, not because of any objections to the text of the measures.

In contrast, where unanimity applied and the UK or Ireland opted in and then objected to the text, then either a) the text would be considered blocked or b) the other Member States would go ahead without the UK and/or Ireland or c) the other Member States would compromise so that the UK and Ireland would vote in favour of the text, and it could be adopted with their participation. In practice the latter happened. Certainly it was impossible, where unanimity applied, for the UK and Ireland to be bound by legislation without their consent.

It appears that, perhaps because of the risk of being outvoted now that QMV applies, the UK and Ireland have been generally less willing to opt in to proposed legislation in the last two years. But it should be emphasized that the decision to opt out of proposed legislation means that the UK and Ireland cannot possibly be bound by a proposal (if it is adopted) without their consent. That risk only applies if the UK or Ireland choose to opt in to a proposal - and that decision is up to them.

However, it is sometimes suggested that under the ‘opt-out’ system, the UK and Ireland will be pressured to opt in to legislation by other Member States, and this pressure might prove politically impossible to resist. But the evidence of eight years of applying the Title IV opt-out system is that this is simply not true. **There is no evidence whatsoever that the UK and Ireland have ever been pressured to opt in to proposed or adopted legislation against their will.** It could be added that the UK and Ireland have also not been pressured to abolish border controls, or to adopt other aspects of Schengen cooperation, or (outside the field of JHA) to adopt monetary union (in the UK’s case) without their consent. No doubt the other Member States, and the EU institutions, would prefer the UK and Ireland to opt fully in to all JHA measures, and (in the UK’s case) to opt in to monetary union too. But they have been willing to live with the UK’s and Ireland’s non-participation in many measures, just as the UK and Ireland have been willing to live with other Member States going ahead without them.

On the contrary, there are some cases where the UK wished to participate in EU measures, and was denied the ability to do so. So there has been **forced exclusion, not forced inclusion.** This happened in two cases: the Regulation establishing a European borders agency, and the Regulation establishing security standards for national passports (within the context of the standard EU format for these passports). The reason for the exclusion was that, in the view of the Council
and the Commission, the UK could not opt in to these measures because they were adding to parts of the Schengen acquis in which the UK did not participate (ie, standard external border controls).

Put another way, in the Council’s and Commission’s view, the rules on participation in the Schengen acquis (the unanimous consent of the Schengen States) applied, rather than the rules on participation in the Title IV Protocol (the will of the UK alone). And anyway, the UK would have to opt in to all the Schengen rules on external border controls (with the consent of all the Schengen States) before it could opt in to the legislation building on those rules.

The alternative argument, made by the UK, is that the Title IV Protocol applies rather than the Schengen Protocol, so the UK should have been able to opt in to these two measures without previously applying the Schengen external border control rules following the consent of all the Schengen States.

This dispute has gone to the Court of Justice (Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05 UK v Council), where the view of an Advocate-General of the Court of Justice, issued on 10 July, was unfavourable to the UK. However, the Opinions of Advocates-General are not binding on the Court’s judges, and so it remains to be seen what view the Court takes of the argument.

Furthermore, the UK has expressed an interest in greater access to SIS immigration data (ie, data on individuals who are in principle to be refused entry into all of the Schengen States), and data held in the Visa Information System (holding information on applicants for Schengen visas) which will soon be set up. The Council and Commission argue that this is not legally possible under the current Treaty framework, because the UK has not opted in to the Schengen policy on visas and common border controls.

Finally, it should be noted that the decision by the Irish government to opt in to individual Title IV proposals is subject to approval by the Irish parliament (Article 29(4)(6) of the Irish Constitution). In contrast, that decision in the UK is up to the government alone. It is up to the UK parliament whether it wishes to change that situation, by amending the European Communities Act.

4) UK and Irish JHA opt-outs in the draft Reform Treaty

The Constitutional Treaty, as signed in 2004, included all three of the Protocols referred to above. It made only made minor substantive amendments to those Protocols, to give the UK and Ireland power also to opt out of measures concerning the exchange of police information and the evaluation of JHA policies. Although the Constitutional Treaty extended majority voting to most aspects of criminal law and policing, the UK and Ireland did not press for their opt-out to be extended to these areas of law. Rather they argued for the creation of so-called ‘emergency brakes’ – rules that would allow a Member State with a fundamental objection to a draft text to stop discussion and refer the issue to the EU leaders (the ‘European Council’). After that discussion, the legislation would either be adopted by the Council and European Parliament and be applicable to all Member States (if the dispute had been solved), or (if the dispute had not been solved), the Council and European Parliament could adopt the legislation to cover only some Member States who were willing to go ahead with the legislation without the participation of the objectors.
These ‘emergency brakes’ did not apply to all areas of policing and criminal law. They applied only to the harmonization of domestic criminal procedure and the harmonization of substantive criminal law. They did not, on the other hand, apply to legislation concerning cross-border criminal procedural measures (ie measures such as the European arrest warrant), Europol (the EU’s police agency), Eurojust (the EU’s prosecutors’ agency), or those aspects of police cooperation that would have been subject to QMV. All those measures could therefore have been adopted by QMV with no prospect of an ‘emergency brake’. Also, the ‘emergency brakes’ did not apply to legislation that would have had to be adopted by unanimity (other aspects of police cooperation, and the European public prosecutor), simply because the ‘emergency brake’ system was unnecessary - where unanimity applied, an objecting Member State would simply veto a proposal instead.

On the other hand, in the Reform Treaty mandate agreed in June 2007, the EU leaders clearly agreed that the current UK and Irish opt-out from immigration, asylum and civil law will be extended to cover policing and criminal law for the UK (section III, point 12 of the mandate). Considering that, as pointed out in the introduction, the extension of QMV, co-decision and enhanced powers for the Commission and the Court of Justice into the area of policing and criminal law is the biggest single change to the existing Treaties which would result from the Reform Treaty (or which would have resulted from the Constitutional Treaty), it is clear that the introduction of a British opt-out from this area of law is a major change from the text of the Constitutional Treaty.

The draft Reform Treaty, as made public on 23 July 2007, puts the British opt-out agreed as part of the Reform Treaty mandate into clear legal language (see Annex III). In fact, the draft Treaty extends the policing and criminal law opt-out to Ireland, whereas the Reform Treaty mandate had earlier left open the question of whether Ireland wished to join the UK in partaking of the extended opt-out. It is not clear whether in fact the Irish government has already made the decision that it wants to join the UK in this extended opt out. If Ireland decides that it does not wish to join the UK, the text of the Reform Treaty can always be amended on this point before the draft Treaty is signed (at present, the signature is planned for December).

Also the draft Treaty has amended the rules on the ‘emergency brake’ that would apply to most criminal law legislation, and furthermore provided for an easier process for some Member States to go ahead without the others in the event that a proposal concerning the European Public Prosecutor or aspects of police cooperation is vetoed. But these changes do not matter as much to the UK and Ireland now that we have an opt-out from all proposed legislation in this area.

These changes do have a limited relevance in case the UK and Ireland opt in to a proposal and then find they have objections to the text as it is amended during the negotiations, or in case a new government takes office in either country that has greater misgivings about the proposed text. In that case the UK or Ireland could pull the emergency brake, where one exists, or block a decision to proceed by unanimity, as regards the European public prosecutor or aspects of police cooperation. In the former case, other Member States would go ahead without us, if there was no agreement on settling the dispute at the level of EU leaders. In the latter case, other Member States would go ahead without us without any referral of the dispute to the EU leaders’ level.
In one case it is not entirely clear whether the UK and Ireland in fact have an opt-out or not. This is the provision allowing for substantive criminal law measures to be adopted where this is necessary for the implementation of another Union policy, where harmonization measures have been adopted (Article 69f(2) of the TEC/TFU). Since this paragraph says that the relevant decision-making procedure is found elsewhere in the Treaty (ie the rules on adopting environmental law generally will apply to the adoption of a Directive establishing criminal sanctions to combat environmental crime), it might be arguable that the UK and Irish opt-out from criminal law measures will not therefore apply (although even if this interpretation is correct, if the proposals relate to immigration law or, in the case of the UK, monetary union, the UK or Ireland could still rely on other opt-outs if they wish).

Under the current Treaty rules, the Court of Justice has confirmed that the EC has competence under the current TEC to adopt legislation on environmental crime using EC environmental law powers, and an Advocate-General in a pending case has argued that this principle applies to any area of EC law where criminal law sanctions are necessary to enforce a Community policy. This would mean that under the current Treaties, the UK or Ireland could be outvoted on such criminal law matters without an opt-out or an emergency brake (unless the opt-outs relating to immigration or monetary union apply). At least, under the Reform Treaty, the UK and Ireland (like any Member State) will be able to pull an ‘emergency brake’ to stop discussions on any proposal in this area, which they cannot do at present. If they can clarify that they also have access to an opt-out, then their position would be even further improved as compared to the status quo.

There are several such proposals currently under discussion and others are planned by the Commission - the UK and Ireland may wish to argue that the discussion of the current proposals, and the issue of any further proposals, should be put on hold until the Reform Treaty enters into force. The UK and Ireland might also wish to argue that the Reform Treaty should make explicitly clear that they will have an opt-out over such proposals - as arguably this was covered by the Reform Treaty mandate which agreed that the UK and Ireland would have an opt-out from all criminal law and policing measures.

On two issues, the Reform Treaty mandate left open the possibility of discussing further substantive changes to the UK and Irish opt-outs during the Reform Treaty negotiations. The first such point is clarifying the ability of the UK and Ireland to opt out of proposed legislation which would amend earlier legislation which the UK and/or Ireland have already opted into. This would clarify, for instance, that the UK and Ireland would not have to participate in the second phase of legislation to establish the Common European Asylum System, even though they have participated in the first phase of legislation.

In practice, the UK and Ireland have already in several cases opted out of proposed legislation which amends legislation which they have already opted into, so such an amendment would simply confirm the legal correctness of this position. It would also be useful to address the issue of what happens to the UK’s and Ireland’s obligations under the prior legislation under this scenario, if the prior legislation has been partly or wholly repealed (this is also relevant as regards other Member States’ obligations towards the UK and Ireland. For example, if the UK and Ireland opt out of legislation which revises the legislation establishing the European arrest warrant, would we still apply all of the old rules relating to the warrant as regards the other Member States, and would those other Member States still apply all the
old rules when they send warrants to, and receive warrants from, the UK and Ireland?

The second issue which might be discussed is the clarification of the relationship between the Title IV opt-out and the Schengen acquis Protocol. This discussion would presumably clarify the question of whether the UK can opt in to measures like the Regulations on the border agency and the passports regulation, as well as obtain greater access to SIS immigration data and Visa Information System data (see the discussion above on these issues).

The amendments to the various Protocols tabled in the draft Reform Treaty do not yet address either issue. Presumably it will be up to the UK (likely supported by Ireland) to table proposed amendments during the negotiations, and see if it can convince other Member States to go along with them. If the government is successful in pushing for such amendments then it could claim that it has won a significant victory from a British law enforcement and security perspective, changing the rules as compared to the status quo and the Constitutional Treaty. This claim would clearly be wholly justified if the UK loses its pending cases in which it argues that it had a right to opt-in to the border agency and passports legislation, but it would only be partly justified if the UK wins those cases (the claim would still be partly justified because winning those cases will not necessarily mean that the UK would also win the argument about access to SIS immigration data and fuller access to VIS data).

On the other hand, from a civil liberties perspective, there are significant doubts about the accuracy of these databases, the legality of their use, the accessibility of public knowledge of how they are used, the proportionality of their impact on individuals and the extent of procedural rights which individuals have.

A final point to mention is that even when the UK and Ireland opt out of legislation, the Members of the European Parliament from those countries can still vote on legislation. It is possible in theory that the MEPs from those states could even make the difference in a close vote. This could be compared to the controversial issue of Scottish MPs voting on ‘English’ legislation in the UK Parliament.

5) The likely impact of the UK and Irish JHA opt-outs in the draft Reform Treaty

The likely impact of the UK and Irish opt-outs is that the UK and Ireland (not always together) will opt out of some (but probably not all) proposed policing and criminal law measures, and will continue their current practice as regards asylum, immigration and civil law opting out.

It should be emphasized that all proposed criminal law and policing measures which have not been adopted at the time of the entry into force of the Reform Treaty will simply lapse at that time (this was the case with the Treaty of Amsterdam, since, like the Reform Treaty, it terminated the ‘third pillar’ as it had previously existed). So, if any of these lapsed proposals are reintroduced after the entry into force of the Treaty, the UK and Ireland will have the opportunity to opt out of them, whereas they did not have this opportunity under the current legal framework.
It is difficult to guess in advance of any concrete proposals when the UK and Ireland are likely to opt in and opt out of those proposals, but two concrete examples can be imagined.

The first is a proposed Framework Decision on the rights of criminal suspects. The UK led about six Member States (including Ireland) in opposition to this measure, blocking any change of its adoption under the current legal framework (which, of course, requires unanimity of all Member States). The German Presidency suggested informally, in June 2007, that instead it might be possible to adopt this measure by means of the general ‘flexibility’ rules, which allow some Member States to go ahead without the others. These general rules are distinct from the specific rules on flexibility in specific areas (the UK and Danish opt-outs from monetary union, the UK, Irish and Danish opt-outs concerning immigration, asylum and civil law, and the rules on the Schengen acquis) and are currently set out (as regards the third pillar) in Articles 40, 40a and 40b TEU.

Such general rules have existed since the Treaty of Amsterdam, and were amended by the Treaty of Nice, in force 1 February 2003. They have never been used. For the ‘third pillar’, the use of these provisions requires a qualified majority vote of Member States in favour. However, in the case of the suspects’ rights proposal, there was not enough support to obtain a qualified majority of Member States in favour of adopting the measures under the general flexibility rules, even though there was a qualified majority in favour of adopting the legislation. Presumably some of the Member States which supported the proposal did not want to adopt it without a fuller participation by all (or at least more) Member States.

What if the Commission proposed this measure again after the Reform Treaty entered into force? If the UK and Ireland still had misgivings about it, they could opt out. The other dissenting Member States, lacking any facility to opt out, could potentially be outvoted on the measure, since qualified majority voting would apply. These Member States would have greater difficulty obtaining a ‘blocking minority’, since the UK and Ireland would not be voting (in fact, there would not be a blocking minority even if the UK and Ireland participated, but at least the dissenters would be closer to obtaining one, if they could convince more Member States to join their point of view). One or more of the remaining dissenters, if they wished, could pull the ‘emergency brake’ and insist that the issue be discussed by EU leaders. In the event of ‘consensus’, the legislation would go ahead with the participation of all Member States except the UK and Ireland, but in the event of ‘disagreement’ the legislation would not be adopted by all of those Member States.

But then there is a new twist: Article 69e(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union provides that in this scenario (continued disagreement after the emergency brake is pulled and the EU leaders have discussed the issue) authorization for as few as nine Member States to go ahead and adopt the legislation so that it was applicable between them, according to the general flexibility rules, would automatically be granted if at least nine Member States wanted to go ahead with this. So those Member States would not have to obtain a qualified majority of all Member States to support their desire to go ahead without the others. Nor would they have to obtain the consent of the European Parliament, which is a new requirement that would apply to the use of the general flexibility rules under the draft Reform Treaty (this new rule would also have applied under the Constitutional Treaty). The same rules apply if the ‘emergency brake’ is pulled as regards substantive criminal law.
Under the Constitutional Treaty, the UK and Ireland would have been in a weaker position, since they would not have had an opt-out and would have had to pull the ‘emergency brake’ instead. The consequences of pulling the emergency brake were also less clear under the Constitutional Treaty than under the Reform Treaty.

The second example concerns the European Public Prosecutor, provided for by Article 69i of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, as amended by the Reform Treaty. The power to create a European Public Prosecutor does not exist at present, and so no legislative proposal has ever been made on this issue (although there have been Commission discussion papers). Under the Constitutional Treaty, the UK and Ireland would not have had an opt-out on this proposal, but would have had a veto. If they used the veto, it is possible that those Member States who supported the idea of the Public Prosecutor would have used the general flexibility rules instead to adopt legislation on this issue.

It is sometimes argued that that the UK’s and Ireland’s opt-out is ‘weaker’ than a veto, because a veto can terminate any prospect of legislation being adopted, whereas an opt-out cannot - it can only prevent that legislation applying to the UK or Ireland. But this example demonstrates that this argument is incorrect - the UK or Irish veto would just have meant that the other Member States, if they were sufficiently interested, would have used the general flexibility rules instead to adopt that legislation. It might be argued that to prevent this from happening, the UK should never have agreed to general flexibility rules in the Treaties; but if there were no such rules, then groups of Member States would just go ahead and reach agreements between themselves outside the EU legal framework, as they did with Schengen and other cases. Such agreements usually entail less transparency, less involvement of national and European parliaments and less judicial control than flexibility within the EU legal system, and provide less protection for the rights and interests of non-participants.

However, it is probably accurate to say that if the UK and Ireland are potentially interested in participating in proposed legislation in a particular field (rather than simply blocking it, as would perhaps be the case for the European Public Prosecutor), then a veto provides them with more capacity to influence the legislation to their liking than an opt-out does. Of course, in this scenario, every other Member State has a veto too, and some of those Member States could have a different view on key issues than the UK and Ireland.

While it is therefore accurate to say that an opt-out is weaker than a veto where the UK and Ireland are interested in participating in legislation, it should also be recognized that an opt-out is stronger than ‘pure’ qualified majority voting - for the opt-out obviously still enables the UK and Ireland to avoid being bound by legislation against their will. And if the UK and Ireland had refused to accept qualified majority voting on criminal law and policing issues in the draft Reform Treaty, even with the safeguards of opt-outs and emergency brakes, then it is possible that other Member States would again have contemplated setting up another parallel system for cooperation on this issue outside the EU legal framework, which would involve qualified majority voting for participating States.

What would happen under the draft Reform Treaty? The UK and Ireland would probably opt-out of a proposal to establish the European Public Prosecutor rather than opt in to it. If the UK and Ireland did opt-in, and then blocked the adoption of legislation, the other Member States could just go ahead without them. If, following a British and Irish opt-out, other Member States had misgivings and issued
a veto, then in the draft Reform Treaty (but not in the Constitutional Treaty), this is treated as a form of ‘emergency brake’, entailing discussion by EU leaders, and then (in the event of continued disagreement) the same simplified process for other Member States, if at least nine of them are interested, to apply the general flexibility rules (again, authorization for this would be granted automatically, avoiding the need to obtain a qualified majority vote of all Member States and consent of the European Parliament).

Then there is a further twist: the participating Member States could decide to change the voting rules relating to legislation concerning the European Public Prosecutor, so that (for them) the legislation in this area would be adopted by a qualified majority vote, or alternatively by a qualified majority vote along with the co-decision of the European Parliament (see Article 280h of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union: this possibility is an amendment to the existing rules on general flexibility which would added by the draft Reform Treaty; it was also in the Constitutional Treaty). The participating Member States would have to be unanimous to agree on this, but they would not need the consent of the non-participating Member States, or the European Parliament, and there would be no requirement to inform national parliaments and give them a chance to block the decision (as there would be, in the draft Reform Treaty, if all Member States decide to change voting rules set out in the Treaty to extend majority voting and co-decision). The same rules apply to operational police cooperation. This further twist only applies if the ‘emergency brake’ is pulled, not if the UK or Ireland simply opt out from a proposal. Also, it is not possible via this route to change the requirement of unanimous voting in order to give the European Public Prosecutor powers over areas besides fraud against the EU.

6) The JHA jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the UK and Irish opt-outs

A final issue is the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice as regards the opt-outs. At present there is a distinct set of rules for the Court’s jurisdiction over immigration, asylum and civil law, and another set of rules for its jurisdiction over criminal law and policing. Both these sets of rules are different from the normal rules on the Court’s jurisdiction.

For immigration, asylum and civil law, the normal jurisdiction applies, except as regards references from national courts on the validity and interpretation of Community acts. Under the normal rules, any court or tribunal can send such questions; for immigration, asylum and civil law, only the final courts can send questions. In practice, this has meant that the Court has received only one reference to date on immigration or asylum law, and about a dozen civil law cases. This Court’s jurisdiction in this area applies equally to all Member States, so the UK and Ireland are covered by it - but only to the extent that they have opted into the legislation. So, for instance, the final British courts cannot ask the Court of Justice questions concerning the family reunion of third-country nationals, since the UK has opted out of the Directive on this issue - but they can ask the Court of Justice about civil jurisdiction issues (for instance).

As for policing and criminal law, Member States have an option as to whether they permit their national courts to send references to the Court of Justice. Twelve of the first fifteen Member States have done so (all except the UK, Ireland and Denmark), as have two of the new Member States (the Czech Republic and Hungary). Of the fourteen Member States accepting such jurisdiction, twelve have
decided that all their courts can send questions to the Court of Justice, while two have opted to limit that power to final courts only (Spain and Hungary). Under these rules, the Court has received around ten references from national courts. It is worth emphasizing that clearly the widespread belief that the Court has no current jurisdiction over criminal law is undoubtedly wrong. However, the Court has no jurisdiction over infringement actions (actions brought by the Commission against Member States to argue that they are breaching EU law) in the area of policing and criminal law.

Under the Reform Treaty (as under the Constitutional Treaty) the Court will have its normal jurisdiction concerning all JHA areas, except for a restriction on ruling on national police operations. There will no longer be any capacity for Member States to opt out of the Court’s jurisdiction (as they currently can in relation to references from national courts in the area of policing and criminal law), and moreover any court or tribunal in any Member State will be able to send questions to the Court on JHA matters.

This will apply equally to the UK and Ireland, except of course that their capacity to opt out of legislation - now extended to policing and criminal law legislation - will mean that the Court’s jurisdiction is only relevant to them when they have opted in to the legislation.

An important question arises in respect of the Court’s jurisdiction over third pillar measures adopted before the entry into force of the Reform Treaty (like, for instance, the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant). The Reform Treaty (like the Constitutional Treaty) is silent on which jurisdictional rules apply. The answer must be one of the following:

- a) the Reform Treaty rules apply
- b) the old, pre-Reform Treaty rules continue to apply
- c) the Court has no jurisdiction
- d) some other type of jurisdiction applies.

It would be possible to allow each Member State to choose between some or all of these options (except surely a Member State which wished to apply option (d) should be required to specify what precisely that option would mean).

If there is no rule in the Reform Treaty, then sooner or later the issue is likely to arise in practice, and it would have to be resolved by the Court of Justice.

In a very recent judgment (Case C-119/05 Lucchini Siderurgica, judgment of 18 July 2007), the Court has ruled on a similar issue: its jurisdiction to rule on acts adopted pursuant to the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community, which expired in 2002. It ruled (para. 41 of the judgment):

By way of preliminary point, it should be noted that the Court retains jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings on questions referred to it concerning the interpretation and application of the ECSC Treaty and on measures adopted under that Treaty, even if those questions are referred to it after the expiry of the ECSC Treaty. Although Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty may no longer be applied in those circumstances to confer jurisdiction on the Court, it would be contrary to the objectives and the coherence of the Treaties and irreconcilable with the continuity of the Community legal order if the Court did not have jurisdiction to ensure uniform interpretation of the
rules deriving from the ECSC Treaty, which continue to produce effects even after the expiry of that Treaty (see, to that effect, Case C-221/88 Busseni [1990] ECR I-495, paragraph 16). None of the parties which submitted observations has, moreover, disputed the Court’s jurisdiction in that regard.

The Court then went on to refer to the jurisdiction rules under the EC Treaty (which now apply to coal and steel issues) and under the ECSC Treaty. It was not clear which of those two sets of rules applied, and it is even possible that neither applied, but that the Court was applying some free-standing rule of jurisdiction which was based by analogy upon the EC and ECSC rules. So, applying this case to the existing third pillar, option (c) (no jurisdiction) is ruled out, but any of options (a), (b) or (d) could apply, as the Court’s judgment simply is not clear enough to indicate which of these options is applicable.

While the distinction between the Court’s jurisdiction under the TEC and the ECSC Treaty (as interpreted by the Court) does not matter very much, since the jurisdiction under the two Treaties is not very different, the new and old rules relating to policing and criminal law are very different, particularly for countries like the UK and Ireland, who have opted entirely out of the Court’s jurisdiction as regards policing and criminal law. Even for countries like France and Germany, where there is no difference between the new and old rules as regards references from national courts, there is a difference as regards infringement actions.

So, for example, if the new jurisdiction rules in the Reform Treaty apply to third pillar measures adopted before the entry into force of the Reform Treaty, that could mean that the Commission could sue Member States for failure to implement correctly the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant.

In any event, unless option (a) applies (the Reform Treaty rules apply to measures adopted beforehand), then there will be awkward cases of ‘mixed jurisdiction’ in future. For instance, if the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant is amended by some future Directive, different jurisdictional rules would apply to the original and to the amended part of the text. There might also be cases which concern both the Framework Decision on the arrest warrant and some separate post-Reform Treaty measure; the same issue would arise.

There is still time to amend the draft Reform Treaty to clarify this issue before the Treaty is signed, either by choosing one of the four options listed above or by allowing Member States to choose between them. If option (d) (other jurisdiction) is chosen, ideally the Treaty should specify what this option involves, or Member States (if they are given a choice to choose this option) should be required to specify what it involves.

If the UK and Ireland wish to ensure that the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction over pre-Reform Treaty measures as regards those Member States, it would be wise for them to argue for the draft Reform Treaty to be amended so that options (b) or (c) apply, or that Member States (or at least the UK and Ireland) have a choice in this matter.
Annex I

Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

NOTING that the Agreements on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders signed by some Member States of the European Union in Schengen on 14 June 1985 and on 19 June 1990, as well as related agreements and the rules adopted on the basis of these agreements, are aimed at enhancing European integration and, in particular, at enabling the European Union to develop more rapidly into an area of freedom, security and justice, have been integrated into the framework of the European Union by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997.

DESIRING to incorporate the abovementioned agreements and rules into the framework of the European Union,

DESIRING to preserve the Schengen acquis, as developed since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, and to develop this acquis in order to contribute towards achieving the objective of offering citizens of the Union an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders;

CONFIRMING that the provisions of the Schengen acquis are applicable only if and as far as they are compatible with the European Union and Community law,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the special position of Denmark,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the fact that Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are not parties to and have not signed the abovementioned agreements do not participate in all the provisions of the Schengen acquis; that provision should, however, be made to allow those Member States to accept some or all of the provisions thereof to accept other provisions of the acquis in full or in part,

RECOGNISING that, as a consequence, it is necessary to make use of the provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European Community – the Treaties concerning closer cooperation between some Member States and that those provisions should only be used as a last resort,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the need to maintain a special relationship with the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway, both States having confirmed their intention to become bound by the provisions mentioned above, on the basis of the Agreement signed in Luxembourg on 19 December 1996 both States being bound by the provisions of the Nordic passport union, together with the Nordic States which are members of the European Union,

HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community and to the Treaty on European Union the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union,

Article 1

The Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, signatories to the Schengen agreements, are authorised to establish closer cooperation among themselves within the scope of those agreements and related provisions, as they are listed in the Annex to this Protocol, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Schengen acquis’.
The Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden shall be authorised to implement closer cooperation among themselves in areas covered by provisions defined by the Council which constitute the Schengen acquis.

This cooperation shall be conducted within the institutional and legal framework of the European Union and with respect for the relevant provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European Community—the Treaties.

**Article 2**

1. From the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen acquis, including the decisions of the Executive Committee established by the Schengen agreements which have been adopted before this date, shall immediately apply to the thirteen Member States referred to in Article 1, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article. From the same date, the Council will substitute itself for the said Executive Committee.

The Council, acting by the unanimity of its Members referred to in Article 1, shall take any measure necessary for the implementation of this paragraph. The Council, acting unanimously, shall determine, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaties, the legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the Schengen acquis.

With regard to such provisions and decisions and in accordance with that determination, the Court of Justice of the European Communities shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by the relevant applicable provisions of the Treaties. In any event, the Court of Justice shall have no jurisdiction on measures or decisions relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.

As long as the measures referred to above have not been taken and without prejudice to Article 5(2), the provisions or decisions which constitute the Schengen acquis shall be regarded as acts based on Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall apply to the Member States which have signed accession protocols to the Schengen agreements, from the dates decided by the Council, acting with the unanimity of its Members mentioned in Article 1, unless the conditions for the accession of any of those States to the Schengen acquis are met before the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The Schengen acquis shall apply to the Member States referred to in Article 1, without prejudice to Article 3 of the Act of Accession of 16 April 2003 or Article 4 of the Act of Accession of 25 April 2005. The Council will substitute itself for the Executive Committee established by the Schengen agreements.

**Article 3**

Following the determination referred to in Article 2(1), second subparagraph, Denmark shall maintain the same rights and obligations in relation to the other signatories to the Schengen agreements, as before the said determination with
regard to those parts of the Schengen acquis that are determined to have a legal basis in Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

With regard to those parts of the Schengen acquis that are determined to have legal base in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, Denmark shall continue to have the same rights and obligations as the other signatories to the Schengen agreements.

The participation of Denmark in the adoption of measures constituting a development of the Schengen acquis, as well as the implementation of these measures and their application to Denmark, shall be governed by the relevant provisions of the Protocol on the position of Denmark.

Article 4

Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are not bound by the Schengen acquis, may at any time request to take part in some or all of the provisions of this acquis.

The Council shall decide on the request with the unanimity of its members referred to in Article 1 and of the representative of the Government of the State concerned.

Article 5

1. Proposals and initiatives to build upon the Schengen acquis shall be subject to the relevant provisions of the Treaties of the Treaties of the Treaties. In this context, where either Ireland or the United Kingdom or both have not notified the President of the Council in writing within a reasonable period that they wish to take part, the authorisation referred to in Article 5a of the Treaty establishing the European Community or Article K.12 of the Treaty on European Union – Article 280(x) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union – shall be deemed to have been granted to the Member States referred to in Article 1 and to Ireland or the United Kingdom where either of them wishes to take part in the areas of cooperation in question.

2. The relevant provisions of the Treaties referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall apply even if the Council has not adopted the measures referred to in Article 2(1), second subparagraph.

Article 6

The Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway shall be associated with the implementation of the Schengen acquis and its further development on the basis of the Agreement signed in Luxembourg on 19 December 1996. Appropriate procedures shall be agreed to that effect in an Agreement to be concluded with those States by the Council, acting by the unanimity of its Members mentioned in Article 1. Such Agreement shall include provisions on the contribution of Iceland and Norway to any financial consequences resulting from the implementation of this Protocol.

A separate Agreement shall be concluded with Iceland and Norway by the Council, acting unanimously, for the establishment of rights and obligations between Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the one hand, and Iceland and Norway on the other, in domains of the Schengen acquis which apply to these States.
**Article 7**

The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority, adopt the detailed arrangements for the integration of the Schengen Secretariat into the General Secretariat of the Council.

**Article 8**

For the purposes of the negotiations for the admission of new Member States into the European Union, the Schengen acquis and further measures taken by the institutions within its scope shall be regarded as an acquis which must be accepted in full by all States candidates for admission.

**ANNEX**

**SCHENGEN ACQUIS**

1. The Agreement, signed in Schengen on 14 June 1985, between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders.

2. The Convention, signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990, between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, implementing the Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed in Schengen on 14 June 1985, with related Final Act and common declarations.

3. The Accession Protocols and Agreements to the 1985 Agreement and the 1990 Implementation Convention with Italy (signed in Paris on 27 November 1990), Spain and Portugal (signed in Bonn on 25 June 1991), Greece (signed in Madrid on 6 November 1992), Austria (signed in Brussels on 28 April 1995) and Denmark, Finland and Sweden (signed in Luxembourg on 19 December 1996), with related Final Acts and declarations.

4. Decisions and declarations adopted by the Executive Committee established by the 1990 Implementation Convention, as well as acts adopted for the implementation of the Convention by the organs upon which the Executive Committee has conferred decision making powers.

**Comments:**

*The amendments to this Protocol update it in light of the integration of the Schengen acquis to the EU legal order that took place with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, as well as the accession of new Member States, the association of Norway and Iceland and the partial application of the acquis by the UK and Ireland.*

*It should be emphasized that the special rules on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the residual powers of the Council set out in Article 2(1) of the Protocol would be repealed.*

**Annex II**

Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Article 14 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 22a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union to the United Kingdom and to Ireland
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

DESIRING to settle certain questions relating to the United Kingdom and Ireland,
HAVING REGARD to the existence for many years of special travel arrangements
between the United Kingdom and Ireland,
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty
establishing the European Community and to the Treaty on European Union the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union,

Article 1

The United Kingdom shall be entitled, notwithstanding Article 14 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community Articles 22a and 69 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the Union, any other provision of that Treaty or of the Treaty on
European Union, any measure adopted under those Treaties, or any international
agreement concluded by the Community Union or by the Community Union and its
Member States with one or more third States, to exercise at its frontiers with other
Member States such controls on persons seeking to enter the United Kingdom as it
may consider necessary for the purpose:

(a) of verifying the right to enter the United Kingdom of citizens of States which
are Contracting Parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area Member
States and of their dependants exercising rights conferred by Community Union law, as well as citizens of other States on whom such rights have been conferred by
an agreement by which the United Kingdom is bound; and
(b) of determining whether or not to grant other persons permission to enter the
United Kingdom.

Nothing in Article 14 of the Treaty establishing the European Community Articles
22a or 69 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union or in any other provision
of that Treaty or of the Treaty on European Union or in any measure adopted under
them shall prejudice the right of the United Kingdom to adopt or exercise any such
controls. References to the United Kingdom in this Article shall include territories
for whose external relations the United Kingdom is responsible.

Article 2

The United Kingdom and Ireland may continue to make arrangements between
themselves relating to the movement of persons between their territories (‘the
Common Travel Area’), while fully respecting the rights of persons referred to in
Article 1, first paragraph, point (a) of this Protocol. Accordingly, as long as they
maintain such arrangements, the provisions of Article 1 of this Protocol shall apply
to Ireland under the same terms and conditions as for the United Kingdom. Nothing
in Article 14 of the Treaty establishing the European Community Articles 22a or 69
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, in any other provision of that
Treaty or of the Treaty on European Union or in any measure adopted under them,
shall affect any such arrangements.

Article 3

The other Member States shall be entitled to exercise at their frontiers or at any
point of entry into their territory such controls on persons seeking to enter their
territory from the United Kingdom or any territories whose external relations are
under its responsibility for the same purposes stated in Article 1 of this Protocol, or
from Ireland as long as the provisions of Article 1 of this Protocol apply to Ireland.
Nothing in Article 14 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Articles 22a or 69 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union or in any other provision of that Treaty or of the Treaty on European Union or in any measure adopted under them shall prejudice the right of the other Member States to adopt or exercise any such controls.

Comments:

This Protocol is merely updated as regards the cross-references to Treaty provisions.

Annex III

Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

DESIRING to settle certain questions relating to the United Kingdom and Ireland, HAVING REGARD to the Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Article 7a of the Treaty establishing the European Community Article 22a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union to the United Kingdom and to Ireland, HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions which shall be annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community and to the Treaty on European Union the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.

Article 1

Subject to Article 3, the United Kingdom and Ireland shall not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union. By way of derogation from Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a qualified majority shall be defined as the same proportion of the weighted votes of the members of the Council concerned as laid down in the said Article 148(2). The unanimity of the members of the Council, with the exception of the representatives of the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland, shall be necessary for decisions of the Council which must be adopted unanimously.

For the purposes of this Article, a qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 205(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.

Article 2

In consequence of Article 1 and subject to Articles 3, 4 and 6, none of the provisions of Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, no measure adopted pursuant to that Title, no provision of any international agreement concluded by the Community Union pursuant to that Title, and no decision of the Court of Justice interpreting any such provision or measure shall be binding upon or applicable in the United Kingdom or Ireland; and no such provision, measure or
decision shall in any way affect the competences, rights and obligations of those States; and no such provision, measure or decision shall in any way affect the acquis communautaire Community or Union acquis nor form part of Community or Union law as they apply to the United Kingdom or Ireland.

Article 3

1. The United Kingdom or Ireland may notify the President of the Council in writing, within three months after a proposal or initiative has been presented to the Council pursuant to Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, that it wishes to take part in the adoption and application of any such proposed measure, whereupon that State shall be entitled to do so. By way of derogation from Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a qualified majority shall be defined as the same proportion of the weighted votes of the members of the Council concerned as laid down in the said Article 148(2).

The unanimity of the members of the Council, with the exception of a member which has not made such a notification, shall be necessary for decisions of the Council which must be adopted unanimously. A measure adopted under this paragraph shall be binding upon all Member States which took part in its adoption. Measures adopted pursuant to Article 64 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union shall lay down the conditions for the participation of the United Kingdom and Ireland in the evaluations concerning the areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty.

For the purposes of this Article, a qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 205(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.

2. If after a reasonable period of time a measure referred to in paragraph 1 cannot be adopted with the United Kingdom or Ireland taking part, the Council may adopt such measure in accordance with Article 1 without the participation of the United Kingdom or Ireland. In that case Article 2 applies.

Article 4

The United Kingdom or Ireland may at any time after the adoption of a measure by the Council pursuant to Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty [establishing the European Community Union] notify its intention to the Council and to the Commission that it wishes to accept that measure. In that case, the procedure provided for in Article 11(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community Article [280(x)] of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Article 5

A Member State which is not bound by a measure adopted pursuant to Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty [establishing the European Community Union] shall bear no financial consequences of that measure other than administrative costs entailed for the institutions, unless all members of the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, decide otherwise.

Article 6

Where, in cases referred to in this Protocol, the United Kingdom or Ireland is bound by a measure adopted by the Council pursuant to Title IV of Part Three of the...
[Treaty establishing the European Community Union], the relevant provisions of that Treaty, including Article 68, the relevant provisions of the Treaties shall apply to that State in relation to that measure.

Article 7

Articles 3 and 4 shall be without prejudice to the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.

Article 8

Ireland may notify the President of the Council in writing that it no longer wishes to be covered by the terms of this Protocol. In that case, the normal treaty provisions will apply to Ireland.

Comments:

Although the text of this Protocol continues to refer to Title IV of the TEC (updated to refer to Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, except in Articles 4, 5 and 6 where there is a technical error in the draft Reform Treaty - see the provisions in square brackets), this amounts to widening the scope of the Protocol because Title IV will now include provisions relating to police and criminal law.

This can be compared to Protocol 19 of the Constitutional Treaty, which limited its scope as follows:

Subject to Article 3, the United Kingdom and Ireland shall not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Section 2 or Section 3 of Chapter IV of Title III of Part III of the Constitution or to Article III-260 thereof, insofar as that Article relates to the areas covered by those Sections, to Article III-263 or to Article III-275(2)(a) of the Constitution.

This referred to measures concerning asylum and immigration law, civil law, evaluation of JHA policies, administrative cooperation, and the exchange of police information. There was no opt-out for the UK or Ireland regarding any other aspect of policing or criminal law.

Otherwise the amendments to the Protocol merely update cross-references to Treaty Articles.

Annex IV

UK and Irish opt-outs over immigration, asylum and civil law in practice

1. Asylum

a) Adopted measures (UK opt in to all; Ireland opt in to all except no. 4, including opt-in to 3 after its adoption)

2. Regulation 2725/2000 on Eurodac (OJ 2000 L 316/1)
5. Dublin II Regulation 343/2003 (OJ 2003 L 50/1)
7. Decision on second European Refugee Fund (OJ 2004 L 252/12)
9. Refugee Fund Decision (OJ 2007 L 144/1)

2. Legal Migration

   a) Adopted measures (UK opt in to 1, 2, 8 and 9; Ireland opt in to 2, 6, 8 and 9)

1. Reg. 1030/2002 on residence permit format (OJ 2002 L 157/1)
7. Recommendation on admission of researchers (OJ 2005 L 289/26)
8. Decision on asylum and immigration information exchange (OJ 2006 L 283/40)

Proposed measures


3. Borders and Visas

   a) Adopted measures [UK & Ireland have opted out of all measures except UK opt in to 6, 7]

1. Reg. 539/2001 establishing visa list (OJ 2001 L 81/1)
4. Reg. 1091/2001 on freedom to travel for holders of long-term visas (OJ 2001 L 150/4)
5. Reg. 2414/2001 moving Romania to ‘white list’ not requiring visas (OJ 2001 L 327/1)
8. Reg. 415/2003 on visas at the border and visas for seamen (OJ 2003 L 64/1)
17. Reg. 2252/2004 requiring stamping of passports at external borders (OJ 2004 L 385/1)
22. Two decisions on transit through new Member States, Switzerland (OJ 2006 L 167)
23. Reg on local border traffic within enlarged EU/at external borders of EU (OJ 2006 L 405)
24. Reg amending visa list (OJ 2006 L 405)
25. Border Fund Decision (OJ 2007 L 144/22)

b) Proposed measures [UK, Ire opt out of all]

2. Regulation on biometrics and visa applications, and common visa application centres (COM (2006) 269, 31.5.06)
3. Regulation on visa code (COM (2006) 403, 19.7.06)

4. Irregular Migration

a) Adopted measures [UK opt-in to all except 5, 9, 10 and 14; Ire opt-in to all except 1,2,3,5,8, 9, 10 and 14; Ire will participate in 1-3 when the decision on Irish part-participation in Schengen is applicable]

3. Regulation 2424/2001 on funding SIS II (OJ 2001 L 328/4)
8. Decision on costs of expulsion (OJ 2004 L 60/55)
12. Decision on joint flights for expulsion (OJ 2004 L 261/28)
14. SIS II Regulation (OJ 2006 L 381)
15. Return Fund Decision (OJ 2007 L 144/45)
b) Proposed measures


5. External treaties

Readmission

- Hong Kong [UK opt in] (OJ 2004 L 17/23): in force 1.3.04 (OJ 2004 L 64/38)
- Macao - [UK opt in] (OJ 2004 L 143/97); in force 1.6.2004
- Sri Lanka [UK opt in] (OJ 2005 L 124/43); in force 1.5.2005
- Albania - [UK opt in] (OJ 2005 L 124); in force 1.5.2006
- Russia - [UK opt in] (OJ 2007 L 129)
- Ukraine - treaty signed; UK position unknown
- Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: proposed, spring 2007: time to opt in is pending

Other external treaties

- EC/Norway/Iceland re: Dublin Convention (OJ 2001 L 93): UK, Ire opt in
- EC & Switzerland treaties re Schengen, Dublin: not yet in force; UK, Ire position not clear
- ‘Approved Destination Status’ treaty with China: (OJ 2004 L 83/12); in force 1.5.2004: UK, Ire opt out
- Dublin treaty with Denmark: in force, 1 April 2006 (OJ 2006 L 66/38): UK, Ire opt in
- visa facilitation agreement with Russia OJ 2007 L 129: UK, Ire opt out
- visa facilitation agreement with Ukraine signed: likely UK, Ire opt out
- visa facilitation treaties proposed with Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, spring 2007: likely UK, Ire opt out

6. Institutional Decision

Decision changing decision-making rules on immigration and asylum (OJ 2004 L 396/47): UK, Ire opt in

Proposed Decision on Court of Justice jurisdiction, June 2006: UK opt out; Irish position unknown

7. Other


8. Civil law

a) adopted measures (UK, Ire opt in to all)
1. Regulation 1346/2000 on jurisdiction over and enforcement of insolvency proceedings (OJ 2000 L 160/1)
2. Regulation 1347/2000 on jurisdiction over and enforcement of matrimonial and custody judgments (OJ 2000 L 160/19)
4. Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction over and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments (OJ 2001 L 12/1)
5. Regulation 290/2001 on Grotius programme for civil law in 2001 (OJ 2001 L 43/1)
8. Regulation 743/2002 on a general framework for EC activity on civil law (OJ 2002 L 115/1)
10. Regulation 2201/2003 on parental responsibility (OJ 2003 L 338/1)
12. Regulation 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure (OJ 2006 L 399/1)
13. Regulation 861/2007 establishing a European small claims procedure (OJ 2007 L 199/1)

b) Proposed Measures (UK and Ire opt-in to 1, 2 and 3; Ire opt in to 4 and 5)