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INTRODUCTION

The objective of this report is to outline the terrorism situation in the European Union over the last twelve months and analyse the trends established. The report is intended to inform the European Parliament on the phenomenon of terrorism targeting the Member States. This is an open report based on contributions from the Member States, complemented from open source material, where necessary. An overview of terrorist activities is offered in two parts, the first of which relates to activities carried out by various indigenous groups within the European Union Member States, while the second part focuses on international terrorist activities affecting the European Union (EU). For the first time, the content of this report reflects contributions from new Member States.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The terrorist threat to the European Union is posed by a wide number of groups and organisations ranging from international Jihadist networks and large scale nationalist groups to violent political extremist activists, generally involved in acts of sabotage and criminal damage.

While the European Union as an entity may not be subject to a specific threat from al-Qaeda and/or its affiliates, these groups continue to threaten EU Member States that are perceived as enemies of Islam and designated as “legitimate” targets due to their involvement in Iraq or in Afghanistan.

Messages and declarations issued recently by al-Qaeda and/or its affiliates could be seen as the underlying reason for change in the activity of Islamist networks within the European Union, from “supply and support” networks to more ‘operational’ cells.

The events in London in July 2005 clearly demonstrate the continuing will the strike within the European Union boundaries and influence governments’ policies and the day to day life of its inhabitants. The London attacks suggest that soft targets continue to be favoured by Islamist extremist networks in Europe. They also mark an innovation, insofar as they were the first instance of the use of suicide bombers in Western Europe.

Disruptive actions against Islamist networks continue in Member States and the number of arrests of Islamist terrorists or their supporters in the European Union remains significant; the more recent arrests have been in the area of support for the so-called Jihad in Iraq.

Interesting developments in the field of Islamic extremist activities, over the period of reporting, include a potential change in the structure of cells. There are indications that members of cells and networks come from increasingly diverse backgrounds and are not limited to members of one particular nationality. It should also be borne in mind that the suicide bombers in London were established British citizens from immigrant families.
Law enforcement successes and very close cooperation between Spain and France against ETA have brought a noticeable decline in the capability of the organisation to carry out a sustained campaign.

The most significant Irish terrorist organisation, the Provisional IRA (PIRA), remains committed to the political process and continues to observe a cessation of military activities. Decommissioning activities continue.

The main dissident groups, the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA), currently remain opposed to the political process and seek to carry out terrorist attacks.

There are indications that secessionist terrorism in the autonomous region of Galicia may be resurfacing.

The phenomenon of anarchist terrorism is still present in the so-called Mediterranean triangle of Greece, Italy and Spain, where it appears to present a high level of threat.

The current level of violence in Corsica is similar to that of the same period in 2004 and ministerial buildings remain the main targets.

Despite the fact that no right-wing terrorist attacks have been reported, some activities have nevertheless been identified. Specific concerns linked to the ‘skinhead’ movement have been reported by a number of Member States.

Although the PKK continues to regard military operations as legitimate means to achieve its goals, as demonstrated by the announcement of the end of the “phase of non-activity” (in place since August 2005), there appear to be no indications that members of the PKK or KONGRA GEL in Europe intend to return to violence.
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE EU

1. SEPARATIST TERRORISM

EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA (ETA)
The strong co-operation between Spain and France has resulted in continuing successes of law enforcement operations against ETA. The capabilities of the organisation remain weakened as demonstrated by the low level of attacks during the period of reporting. However, the will to strike still exists.

Belgium
In July 2005, two suspects of Spanish nationality were extradited to Spain. They had been arrested at the end of March 2004 in the municipality of Colfontaine while driving a car that had been reported stolen in France.

The two men were wanted by the Spanish authorities, who issued a European arrest warrant for them. One of the suspects was sentenced to 17 years in prison for urban violence in Spain, while the other is suspected of being a member of the "Ituren" commando, responsible for the murder of a regional Socialist Member of Parliament and his bodyguard in an attack by car bomb in February 2000.

For the third year in a row, ETA repeated its threats against the Spanish tourism industry. A travel agency in Brussels and two others in Brugges already received letters from ETA sympathisers warning tourists of the dangers of traveling to Spain during the holiday period.

France
ETA still considers the French territory as a rear base used by its leaders for their criminal activities.

Whilst in 2004 no violent action by ETA had been reported in France, two violent incidents were recorded in the French Basque Country in 2005:

- In June, an inflammable substance thrown against a real-estate agency in Ascain, and
- In August, there was an attempted attack attempt against the Tourism Office of Bayonne.

These incidents are ascribable to a group close to the movement of young independentists Segi, who protest against real-estate speculation.

It is also suspected that ETA is using France for logistical support, as demonstrated by:

- The stealing of vehicles in France for use in car bomb attacks in Spain;
- The identification of a number of safe houses in the southern region of France; and
- An armed robbery with hostage-taking in October 2005 at Rivière-sur-Tarn targeting “Fasver Industrie”, a firm specialised in the manufacturing of protection systems for administrative documents (there is strong suspicion linking this incident to the group).

- Close to thirty active ETA militants have been arrested in France in 2005, in connection with the discovery of arms and false documents.

**Germany**

In February 2005, the German Embassy in Madrid received a threat letter by ETA, in which the organisation announced attacks in Spain and demanded that potential tourists be warned not to travel to Spain.

In July 2005, threat letters, in which ETA renewed the warning to tourists, were received by seven travel agencies in Germany. Similar threats had been received in 2002 and 2004.

**Spain**

In recent years, the home-grown terrorism in Spain has been dominated mainly by the Basque independence terrorist organisation Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), which has continuously been supported by a series of associations under the umbrella of what has become known as the Basque National Liberation Movement (MLNV). Under an appearance of legality, these associations have contributed in an effective manner to the survival of the terrorist organisation, giving it important social support, providing it with activists, and representing its interests in the institutions of the state. At the same time, they are leading a sort of parallel fight, committing several acts of vandalism against persons and property under the label of ETA.

As far as the “military” aspect is concerned, several law enforcement operations have taken place in France and Spain and were able to hamper the logistical support and to considerably diminish ETA’s operational capacity. These law enforcement achievements have particularly affected its infrastructure in France, as well as its armed commandos and recruitment structures in Spain.

Since March 2004, one hundred and forty seven ETA members have been arrested in Spain; an important landmark was the detention, in October 2004, of the organisation’s top leaders.

The decline of ETA has equally affected the support environment, which is identical with the structures constituted by the MLNV. In recent years, apart from important blows on ETA’s business network inflicted by law enforcement and the courts, associations like the youth organisation JARRAI/SEGI/HAIKA, the international relations body XAKI, the coordination board EKIN, the support association for prisoners and their family members Gestoras Pro Amnistía (GPA) and even the political party Herri Batasuna (H.B.) have been declared “illegal”. This has brought about a severe crisis within the MLNV, which has experienced various setbacks, ranging from the dismantling of the near-totality of its structures in Spain to the complete lack of representation in the elections.
This situation has triggered a change of mind within ETA which, in the course of this year, has, at least in appearance, given signs of openness to dialogue. In 2005, the organisation issued nine communiqués, in most of which it declares itself in favour, more or less openly, of the initiation of a period of dialogue and negotiation with the Spanish government. In June, it even went as far as to declare an “armed ceasefire” on political party office holders, which follows the announcement of an ending of armed operations in the Catalan Community declared by the organisation in February 2004. Nevertheless, in all its communiqués, ETA reaffirms its demands for the self-determination of the Basque Country.

This new position of ETA, which could well be a true change of attitude or – to the contrary – simply a new strategy, has also been reflected in the design and the nature of its armed struggle. Although since March 2004 there have been as many attacks executed by ETA in Spain as in preceding years, their purpose has been purely alarmist and propagandistic. ETA has made sure not to cause casualties.

However, the organisation still deploys an important activity of rearmament and self-procurement, and has increased extortions of businessmen in the Basque Country and Navarre to enhance its financial resources.

GALICIA SEPARATISM

Recently there have been attempts to revive secessionist terrorism in the Autonomous Region of Galicia. The initiative originated from radical nationalist quarters.

Spain

Two incidents involving explosives were reported:

- In the beginning of July in La Coruña, a letter bomb was sent to the former member of one of the most active secessionist groups; and

- At the end of July in Santiago de Compostela, an explosive device was placed in a bank.

Two presumed suspects for the last incident, members of a radical group fighting for independence, were detained.

NORTHERN IRELAND

The political process in Northern Ireland is ongoing and the main participants appear to be committed to its success. However, some radical elements, such as the Continuity IRA (CIRA) and the Real IRA (RIRA), remain active and capable of attempting to disrupt the peace process.
**Ireland**

**Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)**

The situation in relation to PIRA remains unchanged. The ceasefire continues to hold and there are no indications of any major discontent despite the recent act of decommissioning.

On 26th September, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that they were totally satisfied that the PIRA had put the totality of its weapons beyond use. Reportedly the amount of ordnance destroyed was consistent with those intelligence estimates of the PIRA arsenal supplied by the Intelligence Services in both Ireland and the United Kingdom.

Sinn Fein remains fully committed to the full implementation of the Good Friday agreement and seeks the restoration of the Northern Assembly. The leadership of the Provisional Sinn Fein has welcomed the positive end to the recent consultation process and the final act of PIRA decommissioning.

**Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) Report Issued 19/10/05**

The Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) continues with its task of monitoring paramilitary activity. In its current report, while acknowledging that ‘initial signs following the PIRA statement are encouraging’, it also admits that ‘it is too early to draw firm conclusions about possible overall changes in behaviour and that this can only be judged over a sustained period of time’.

**Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) - McKevitt Faction**

The RIRA (McKevitt) faction continues to maintain its strongholds. While outwardly there is little evidence of activity from this group, it is believed that the leadership is pursuing a long-term strategy of regrouping and rebuilding.

This group is assessed as a threat to state security.

**Real Irish Republican Army - Campbell Faction**

RIRA (Campbell Faction) members continue to pose a threat to the security of the state.

**Continuity Irish Republican Army**

CIRA continues to maintain its traditional strongholds and continues to make efforts to both source and research explosive material. They continue to recruit and train and are still assessed as a significant threat, although the continued lack of cohesion and discipline in their ranks reduces their capability to mount a sustained campaign.

**Ireland National Liberation Army (INLA)**

INLA remains diminutive and weak organisationally. Individual members continue to be involved in criminality, including drug trafficking for personal gain.
**United Kingdom**

**Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)**

The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that it had witnessed a significant act of decommissioning by PIRA. A statement was subsequently released by PIRA in which it said “The IRA leadership can now confirm that the process of putting our arms verifiably beyond use has been completed.”

Two PIRA members have been arrested in separate incidents by Spanish authorities during the period of reporting. Both men were subject to an International Arrest Warrant.

**Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)**

Police activity continues to disrupt RIRA activity:

- In June 2005 a South Armagh Real IRA (RIRA) member received a prison sentence of 3 years and 3 months for fuel smuggling and bail offences on the UK mainland
- Also in June 2005 police disrupted two counterfeiting operations in Northern Ireland that resulted in the arrest of three RIRA members.

**Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)**

In October, the Continuity IRA (CIRA) claimed responsibility for a crude hoax device placed underneath a vehicle belonging to a part-time member of the Royal Irish Regiment near Enniskillen.

**Germany**

**Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)**

An Irish national was arrested in Torremolinos (Spain) in August 2005 on the basis of a European arrest warrant issued by the German Federal Attorney General. There is reasonable and probable cause that the suspect was involved in a PIRA bomb attack on the Quebec Barracks in the German city of Osnabrück (Lower Saxony) in 1989.¹

**CORSICAN SEPARATISM**

**France**

For the period between the 1st of June and the 1st of October 2005, 47 violent incidents were recorded, including 20 against public properties, mainly buildings of “territorial authorities” and of ministries. Among these attacks, 8 were claimed by the Front Libération National Corse (FLNC) du 22 Octobre and 6 by the Fighters’ Union (l’Union des combattants).

Although most of these actions remain symbolic, some of them are indeed potentially deadly, like the attack with a rocket against the Prefect’s offices in Ajaccio in September 2005.

The current level of violence is similar to that of the same period in 2004, when 53 actions were recorded (including 16 against public

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¹ The accused was charged and on 4 April 2006 sentenced by the Court of Appeal of the town Celle, to six years in jail for involvement in the bomb attack
property) and 17 actions were claimed.

The FLNC – Fighters’ Union confirmed its return on the clandestine scene with a communiqué published in July 2005 and with a statement in October related to the social conflict of the S.N.C.M. (Société Nationale Maritime Corse-Méditerranée), which claimed responsibility for the rocket attack in Ajaccio.

This movement adopts a threatening approach towards the regional prefect and has confirmed the still unannounced break in the ceasefire.

In July, the FLNC “du 22 Octobre” – the most prolific group in this area - claimed responsibility for 7 actions. In August they distributed leaflets calling the youth to join the armed fight and in October they issued a communiqué claiming the attack against the Customs’ boat in Bastia.

2. ANARCHIST TERRORIST MOVEMENTS

The phenomenon of anarchist terrorism is still present in the so-called Mediterranean triangle of Greece, Italy and Spain, where it appears to present a high level of threat. However, as far as the rest of the EU in concerned, the actions of anarchists do not amount to terrorism.

**Greece**

Following the dismantling of terrorist organizations ‘Revolutionary Organisation 17 November’ (EO17N) and ‘Revolutionary Popular Struggle’ (ELA), terrorist activity in Greece is limited to the extremist actions of two organizations--‘Revolutionary Struggle’ and ‘Revolutionary Popular Action’--that are sporadically active using low-impact improvised explosive devices against low-profile targets.

Their ideology leans towards the extreme left; ‘Revolutionary Struggle’ also displays anti-imperialist characteristics. However, their methodology points to a rudimentary infrastructure and their organizational and operational capabilities are limited.

To date, (some of) the actions of these organizations have only caused material damage; there have never been casualties. There have been warning phone calls before each attack.

- In October 2004, an improvised explosive device was placed on a pavement in Athens. The explosion was controlled remotely and happened as two police cars were driving past. The explosion caused no casualties and no material damage to the police cars. Responsibility for the incident was claimed by the organization ‘Revolutionary Struggle’.
- In December 2004, there was a controlled explosion of a low-impact improvised explosive device placed outside the yard of a building in Alimos (Attica) housing the offices of a construction company. Responsibility for the incident was claimed by the organization ‘Revolutionary Popular Action’.
- In May 2005, an explosion outside a building housing the offices of a construction company in Athens caused no casualties or material
...damage. Responsibility for the incident was claimed by ‘Revolutionary Popular Action’.

- In June 2005, an improvised explosive device caused damage to the Ministry for Employment and Social Solidarity in Athens. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by ‘Revolutionary Struggle’.
- In July 2005, an explosion occurred outside the yard of a building site in Athens. The explosion caused no casualties or material damage. Responsibility for the incident was claimed by ‘Revolutionary Popular Action’.

**Italy**

The pro-insurrection anarchist circles continue to form one of the most active and dangerous subversive source of violence. They have been responsible for various attacks carried out this year by groups belonging to the “Federazione Anarchica Informale” (FAI)\(^2\) or Informal Anarchic Federation. This movement has probably a leading core and a network of functional connections to the development of their own subversive plan.

A number of successful investigations in relation to the anarchist circles were carried out during the period of reporting.

These police operations, together with an arrest of an Italian suspect\(^3\) in Barcelona (Spain) in May 2005, caused a series of small scale actions carried out during the summer period against Italian interests in Greece\(^4\) and Spain\(^5\) by the local pro-insurrection anarchist groups in protest against the repressive action of the Italian State concerning this

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\(^2\) This abbreviation appeared for the first time in 2003 in a document they published explaining their strategy and programme and entitled “who are we – open letter of the anarchic and anti-authoritarian movement”, which marked the beginning of the violent campaign of attacks against various targets representing the “repression” of the State. By the way, it should be noted that this subversive organisation presents itself as a body deprived of decision centres and of structured organisation that has, nevertheless, a “horizontal” and “informal” dimension supported by anarchic individuals and groups during the action phase against the State’s apparatus and sharing revolutionary campaigns.

\(^3\) This individual belongs to the clandestine group “Revolutionary Offensive Cell – C.O.R.”. This group came out in July 2003 by publishing various documents and claimed a series of minor attacks in Pisa and Rome against trade union offices, temporary employment agencies, Police buildings, and political members of the Party Alleanza Nazionale. The documents produced by the “cells” reveals the peculiar co-existence in the field of subversive organisations of ideological bodies of Marxist-Leninist and anarchist inspiration, each apparently contrasting with each other and belonging to the most radical extremism (topics such as anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism).

\(^4\) The premises of the Italian Cultural Institute in Athens were occupied on 17\(^{th}\) June 2005. On 26\(^{th}\) and 27\(^{th}\) July 2005, a Benetton shop and a FIAT model car were targeted by explosions. In the town of Salonika, a building allocated to the main office of the Honorary Consulate of Italy and of the local section of the Italian-Hellenic chamber of commerce was occupied on the 24\(^{th}\) June 2005.

\(^5\) In Barcelona, on 25\(^{th}\) June 2005, a demonstration was organised “in support to the Italian anarchist prisoners”. During this demonstration, the gates of the Italian Institute of Culture were damaged and the Spanish authorities arrested, among others, a member of the radical circle “Il Silvestre” of Pisa. On 12\(^{th}\) July, a bomb exploded damaging the main office of the local Istituto di Cultura Italiano, while on 15\(^{th}\) July 2005 a device, consisting of a pressure cooker and three gas containers, exploded in the premises of a car dealer selling Italian cars.
movement. Such actions reveal the close links between the Italian anarchist structures and those of Spain and Greece.

The Federation’s renewed dynamism has also coincided with a certain activism by other groupings of the multifaceted anarchic milieu. Though not in a concerted way, the pro-insurrection anarchist strategy is apparently focusing on attacks on high-speed railways, electricity pylons and telephone repeaters (the usual targets of ecologist and environmentalist campaigns).

Spain

Anarchist insurgence groups in Spain maintain close relationships – not only on an ideological level, but also as regards strategic support and co-operation – with groups of similar character in various European countries, mainly in Italy and Greece and, to a lesser extent, in France. Activists of these groups have carried out attacks on these countries’ interests, almost in all cases from within their own national territory, as an act of solidarity with the demands of their ideological counterparts in the rest of the states affected.

In Spain, the last twelve months have seen the following acts of terrorism perpetrated by these groups – apart from other minor incidents – (in chronological order):

October 2004:
- Three attacks with Molotov cocktails against the DNI office at the Granada city centre police station, the Guardia Civil headquarters and a “Burger King” restaurant in the same city;
- Explosion of a device in a high-voltage pylon in San Quintín de Mediona (Barcelona);
- Attack with two Molotov cocktails against a building of the Generalitat de Cataluña in Barcelona.

December 2004:
- Explosion of two devices in the offices of real estate agencies in Barcelona;
- Explosion of a device in a real estate agency in Barcelona.

January 2005:
- Explosion of a device in the Centro de Iniciativas para la Reinserción (Centre for Initiatives for Social Rehabilitation) of the Justice Department of the Generalitat in Barcelona.

April 2005:
- Deactivation of an explosive device at a courier and urgent delivery service in Barcelona;
- Explosion of a device near a real estate agency in Barcelona on two separate occasions.

June 2005:
- Attack with three Molotov cocktails against two vehicles of the National Police Corps (CNP) and one of the Barcelona Local Police which at the time were entering a car park in Condal city.
July 2005:
- Explosion of a device at the door of the Italian Cultural Institute in Barcelona;
- Explosion of a device at an authorised “Fiat” car dealer located at el Prat de Llobregat (Barcelona).

As in former incidents, the attacks were carried out by placing explosive devices and throwing Molotov cocktails, as well as sending parcel bombs. The similarities, which have become evident in the technical reports on the composition of the explosive devices, substantiate the hypothesis that the individuals who built them had received very similar training, which may be the result of connections and interactions between them or the access to common sources (manuals, pamphlets, web pages, etc.). They even point to the possibility that the attacks on real estate agencies in Catalonia were perpetrated by the same individuals.

The majority of anarchist terrorist acts continue to obey motivations and objectives which are shared by all members of these groups, such as:
- The continued detention of ORAI members in Spanish prisons;
- The application of the Ficheros de Internos de Especial Seguimento – Control Directo (FIES-CD) penitentiary system;
- Acts demonstrating “solidarity” with anarchists imprisoned in Spain and abroad;
- Specific campaigns against the holding of international events (G-8 or IMF meetings, etc.).

The explosion that took place at the Italian Cultural Institute in Barcelona in June 2005, as well as the one that occurred at the door of an Italian authorised car dealer in El Prat de Llobregat (Barcelona) in July 2005, could fit perfectly well into the particular context of
- the detention of a suspect;
- the latest law enforcement operations targeting anarchist groups in Italy (more particularly those of May 2005);
- the protests of people arrested at a demonstration in Barcelona on 25 June (the demonstration had been organised to protest against the law enforcement operations by the Italian police, referred to above).

Controls on foreign nationals present at various acts of protest or demand, such as conferences, demonstrations or other actions taking place in Spain, as well as exchange of information with foreign agencies have shed light on the existence of close contacts between activists and members of anarchist groups mainly in Spain, Greece and Italy.

These connections lead them to carry out coinciding plans and operations, relying on permanent and smooth communication channels. In this context, it is important to emphasise the use of the Internet, since there are Internet addresses and web pages used systematically by the groups in question to call for meetings, publish demands, organise campaigns and spread the postulates of their ideology.
It has equally been noticed that communication between activists usually takes place via e-mail accounts.

3. CRIMES IN FURTHERANCE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS - ECO TERRORISM

While some Member States reported criminal activities related to Animal Rights, none of these activities could be assessed as acts of terrorism.

4. BIO TERRORISM

No case of bio terrorism has been reported by the Member States.

5. CYBER TERRORISM

No case of cyber terrorism has been reported by the Member States.

6. LEFT-WING EXTREMISM

Estonia

In Estonia there is a security risk from a Russian extremist organization called the National Bolshevik Party (NBP). They engage in acts of hooliganism and vandalism.

France

During the reporting period, the movements of the extreme left organised six different actions, as many as for the same period last year. These actions resulted in minor damages, a fact which confirms the tendency for a decrease in activity over the previous few months.

However, two members of a dissident branch of the Spanish 'Antifascist Resistance Groups of the 1st October' or GRAPO were arrested in France in October 2005 for their operational connections with the leading structure of the Italian clandestine political organisation “Preparatory Committee of the Congress for the Foundation of the (new) Italian Communist Party”. This organisation is suspected of having links with militants of the Italian terrorist group “Red Brigades – Fighting Communist Party” (BR-PCC).

There is no evidence that violent activities will increase in the coming months, although there could be an upsurge, like the impromptu campaigns led by the autonomous anarchist movement at the end of 2004 and beginning of 2005 in protest against the detention conditions of fellow militants. As regards the radical extreme left, all requests for active members of the former Action Directe to be released on parole were rejected. This could incite different supporting structures to increase their activities, although
these would be limited to the media environment.

**Germany**

Since 1995, the ‘militante gruppe (mg)’, having first changed its group names, has been trying to get the autonomous extreme left scene to agree with them with militant actions; since June 2001, they have also been trying to organise this scene through the so-called ‘militancy debate’. So far, this terrorist group has been accused of perpetrating at least 25 attacks in the Berlin area–mostly arson attacks on vehicles, district authority offices, tax and revenue offices, social security offices as well as judicial authorities. The strategy of the group is based on an ideological synthesis of social revolution, anti-imperialism, and practical internationalism. It aims at establishing a militant platform with the participation of other militant groups.

Among other issues, the “mg” is concerned with the compensation of forced labourers under the Nazi regime, the problem of prisoners, the deployment of the Bundeswehr outside Germany, as well as questions related to asylum and social policies. A dominant theme of the attacks in 2004 and 2005 was the fight against the “social technocracy” in relation to the reform of the social security (HARTZ IV) and the unemployment (ALG II) systems in Germany.

More attacks by the “mg” targeting property in Berlin and the surrounding state of Brandenburg are likely to occur in the future.

**Italy**

The level of terrorist threat posed by the different forms of internal subversion remains permanently high, despite the recent trials against the new Red Brigade – Fighting Communist Party (Brigate Rosse- Partito Communista Combatente PCC), which was responsible for the most serious violent events of terrorist character carried out in the recent years, which led to significant successes against this criminal organisation and caused an important vacuum in the field of subversive actions performed by extreme left groups. In this context, there appears to be an attempt to reintroduce a “jail front” which consists of old and new members detained and considered to be “unrepentant” that would form the base for militants still at large or for structures capable to take over the revolutionary heritage of the Red Brigade to resume the armed struggle.

**Netherlands**

During the first part of the reporting period (until the end of 2004), the Netherlands held the presidency of the Council of the European Union. This was expected to trigger various activities from left-wing activist quarters. Nothing proved to be further from the truth: practically nothing happened.

During the second part (2005) of the reporting period however, increased activity of left-wing extremist groups has been observed. This involved groups with anti-military objectives (the war in Iraq and the presence of Dutch troops in Afghanistan led to several acts of vandalism), anti-globalists (several dozens of Dutch protestors participated in peaceful demonstrations at the G8 summit in Scotland) and left-wing groups that oppose to the immigration and
integration policies of the Dutch government (as a result there was, amongst other actions, one attempt to commit arson to a town hall in March 2005).

Still, there are no active left-wing extremist groups in the Netherlands that may be labelled terrorists.

**Poland**

One day in October 2005, the police were informed of the existence of 13 suspicious packages placed in different locations in Warsaw, mainly on bus stations as well as inside buses and trams. All these packages contained dummy bombs (hoax bombs).

Later on, in the Internet, the organization calling itself “Brigade Power Gay” claimed responsibility for setting up the dummies. Additionally, they said that the reasons for their actions lie with the social and political situation regarding the gay community in Poland. They also believe that they will be persecuted in Poland and warn that they will plant real bombs in the near future.

**Spain**

There is a continuous decrease in the activities of the Communist Party of Spain (reconstituted) – Antifascist Resistance Groups First of October (PCE(r)–GRAPO) due to the lack of elements capable of replacing the important and continuous losses which the terrorist group has incurred in recent years.

At present, the priority of PCE(r)-GRAPO is the recruitment and integration of new members, as evidenced in the documentation seized in May from the head of the General Party Committee in Spain. It is very likely that armed operations by GRAPO will continue to aim principally at obtaining economic resources, since they have shown a keen interest in reorganising and strengthening their structures.

The following is of note concerning law enforcement operations against the PCE(r)–GRAPO network in the period under review:

- On 30 May 2005, in the town of Port Bou near Gerona, officers of the National Police Corps (CNP) detained a suspect who occupied a position of high responsibility within the clandestine structure of PCE(r)-GRAPO. At the time of his arrest, he was in possession of several copies of forged National Identity Documents, alongside extensive documentation on the organisation, which he probably received during meetings held in France with leaders of the Central Committee, as well as the printing plates of the network’s official publication, “Resistencia”, which was to be produced and distributed in Spain.

- In October 2005, a member of PCE(r)-GRAPO was handed over by France for a period of six months. During his stay in Spain he will be tried on three indictments at the national high court (Audiencia Nacional).

- In October 2005, 2 members of the October Fraction of PCE(r) – GRAPO were arrested in Paris. The arrests followed the analysis of documents seized during a
previous arrest, from which it had become clear that the two individuals were members of the Italian organisation “Preparatory Commission for the Founding Conference of the New Communist Party of Italy”.

**Sweden**

During the past year, an organisation within the autonomous movement carried out a number of attacks aiming at foreign interests in Sweden. Still, there are no active domestic groups that may be labelled terrorists. However, several of the groups and organisations of the left do aim at obtaining political change by using threats and violence against their opponents, thus posing a threat to internal security.

In general, in the last year, the autonomous movement has focused on anti-fascist actions rather than on anti-globalisation activities. As a result, high numbers of violent confrontations have been maintained.

In comparison to earlier years, when most confrontations took place in the context of big, annual manifestations, most clashes these days occur between small groups or between individuals on ordinary days. Since the strength and motivation remain high on both sides, there is as of today no sign of any decrease in confrontations.

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### 7. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

In spite of the sentencing of a number of individuals in Germany, no acts of right-wing terrorism or activities of right-wing terrorist organisations have been reported by Member States. However, there is evidence of a large number of racist and anti-Semitic actions throughout the EU. Specific concerns linked to the ‘skinhead’ movement have been reported by a number of Member States.

**Belgium**

In January, the burgomaster of Molenbeek-St-Jean received two letters from the Charleroi region. One of them contained powder (the analysis of which showed it to be harmless), and the other contained a small calibre bullet. It is not the first time that this burgomaster has been the victim of such threats, most of which are attributed to the extreme right.

More letters, containing powder in aluminum foil, were sent to two British MEPs. These letters belong to a series of letters sent from a fake address in the United Kingdom. Certain of these letters contained a document marked with a swastika. An Italian MEP also received one such letter.

**France**

The number of violent incidents targeting immigrants has halved bringing the level of racist incidents to that of anti-Semitic incidents, which has been at its lowest since the beginning of the year. Likewise, minor incidents drastically decreased within the last four months. The increase in number and severity of the sentences
against persons writing Nazi slogans greatly contributed towards a
decrease in recurrence of these offences which are targeting mainly
Jewish and Muslim religious symbols. However, their number
remains a source of concern.

Only the very boisterous “Jeunesses Identitaires” maintain a certain
level of activity: they organised some minor demonstrations in Paris,
Nice and Grenoble to condemn the opening of negotiations for the
EU membership of Turkey. They also protested against “anti-white
racism” by distributing leaflets.

**Germany**

The Bavarian Higher Regional Court in Munich sentenced a total of
eight members of the right-wing extremist “Kameradschaft Süd”
(“Comradeship South”) to prison for planning a bomb attack on the
occasion of the laying of the foundation stone of the Munich Jewish
Cultural Centre. The leader of the group was sentenced to seven
years imprisonment for being member and ringleader of a terrorist
association.

The Brandenburg Higher Regional Court sentenced eleven
members of the right-wing association “Freikorps Havelland” for
terrorist association. The defendants had committed twelve arson
attacks and attacks on property against fast food stalls and shops
owned by foreigners in the Havelland region of the state of
Brandenburg.

Currently, right-wing extremist circles reject terrorist violence as a
means to achieve their goals. This may be motivated by tactical
considerations.

Intelligence indicating the existence of right-wing terrorist
organisations and structures on a national level is not available.
Individual terrorist operations by members of the right-wing
spectrum, however, cannot be ruled out in the future.

**Sweden**

In January 2005, four persons within the White Power movement
were charged with offences against the Terrorist Act, and during the
past year a number of attacks aiming at foreign interests in Sweden
have been carried out by an organisation within the autonomous
movement. Still, there are no active domestic groups that may be
labelled terrorists. However, several of the groups and
organisations on the right do aim at obtaining political change by the
means of threat and violence against their opponents, thus posing a
threat to internal security.

The visibility of the White Power movement continues to be high,
mainly thanks to the propaganda spread by these organisations, but
also the organisation of concerts and the increased number of
annual manifestations.

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6 In six cases the sentence has become final, in five cases the decision is pending. One
member, not charged with terrorist association, was charged with serious arson.
8. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

While the scope of international terrorism which could impact on the European Union is very wide, no mention was made in the contributions received of terrorist movements in Latin America or in Asia and Africa.

FUNDAMENTALIST JIHADIST TERRORISM

The threat from al-Qaeda and its affiliates and followers appears to be the main concern for the security of the European-Union. However, the assessment of the threat level varies depending on the Member States, some of which still consider that they are under no direct threat but could witness attacks on their territory against foreign targets such as US or Jewish interests.

Austria

The terrorist threat to Austria’s security cannot be seen in isolation from the pan-European security situation. After the Madrid attacks in March 2004, the Van Gogh murder in November 2004 and the London attacks in July 2005—the first coordinated suicide attacks in Europe—an increased threat of terrorism has to be assumed in Europe.

In view of its forthcoming presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2006 and the general European security situation, a heightened threat of terrorism to Austria has to be assumed.

Some Muslim circles tend to show an increasing degree of radicalisation, entailing a certain risk potential for Austria. However, there are no indications that extremist Muslims in Austria are used for the purposes of the international Jihad; that is, however, possible in principle. There is also evidence that sympathisers and activists are breaking away from Islamic organisations in order to form independent groups. These developments require constant observation and could potentially pose a threat.

Belgium

Law enforcement operations and judicial cases clearly demonstrate that Belgium remains an important focal point for Islamist extremists operating on a European level.

- In January 2005, the Correctional Tribunal of Brussels found a suspect guilty of falsifying documents. The sentence pronounced against him runs concurrently with the one of June 2004, when he was found guilty of planning an attack in Belgium and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

- A suspect was arrested in Brussels in February 2005 following a European arrest warrant issued by the Spanish judicial authorities for his alleged participation in attacks. He is believed to be the spokesman of al-Qaeda in Europe and is also known as ‘Abu Dujanah’, the man who, his face hidden, had claimed responsibility for the Madrid attacks on videotapes. He was
extradited to Spain in April.

- In May 2005, the Court of Appeal of Brussels gave its verdict in the trial of Islamist activists found guilty of having provided logistical support to radical Islamist factions. The abovementioned three defendants had been sentenced to 5 years in prison by the Correctional Tribunal of Brussels in October 2004.

The Council Chamber of Brussels ordered 13 individuals to appear before the Correctional Tribunal; they are believed to be members of the GICM and are accused of belonging to a terrorist organisation.

The investigation brought to light that they had been in touch with or had offered refuge to the persons implicated in the attacks in Madrid and Casablanca or persons who are wanted in Morocco. They may have offered logistical support to active cells abroad. The links established with the accused also lead to France and The Netherlands.

This referral of the thirteen to the Correctional Tribunal is the first to be ordered under the new anti-terrorism law.

Czech Republic

International cooperation revealed several links and subjects who visited the Czech territory and were later arrested, detained or interviewed in connection to terrorism activities in several EU countries.

There were no criminal, political or public order issues connected to a small Kurdish community in the Czech Republic.

Denmark

In October 2005, two persons were arrested in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The arrest triggered an intensified investigation which led to the arrest of seven known individuals. Suspicious and conspicuous behaviour indicated that one or more of these young men were involved in terrorism-related activities.

Circumstantial evidence indicated that one individual had possibly been tasked with the selection of an adequate target for a terrorist attack; however, the potential target has not been identified.

The cell at work in this case consists of very young members. None of the suspects exceeds 22 years of age and two of the suspects are only just above the minimum age for criminal punishment. This aspect fits well with the experience gained from the attacks on London earlier this year where the perpetrators were also very young.

Based on the assessment of the people currently detained, it does not seem likely that they have acted completely on their own. However, contrary to what has been seen in other European countries, there is no pattern in the national backgrounds of the seven suspects: four are Danish nationals, of whom two are of
Palestinian, one of Moroccan and one of Ugandan background, while three have yet to receive Danish citizenship, currently holding a Russian and a Bosnian citizenship.

It appears that the group has met and moulded through various Islamic institutions, including mosques, in Copenhagen, but more importantly through Islamic education facilities run by self-proclaimed clerics.

On a number of occasions, threats related to the Danish presence in Iraq have been issued over the Internet. No information as to the more precise nature of the threat has been offered and it is generally assessed that these kind of threats do not originate from actual terrorist organisations or networks. They do, however, potentially serve as rallying calls for networks or individuals and are thus regarded as real threats and thorough investigations have been carried out with the assistance of liaison services in several countries.

With regard to the support of terrorist groups in Iraq, the indications of different kinds of support coming from Denmark, mainly in the area of recruitment, possibly financial support and procurement of falsified or stolen identity documents are still present. Danish authorities have carried out preventive measures and have conducted several investigations related to persons supporting efforts directed against coalition forces/personnel in Iraq.

A Somali resident suspected of having close connections to the al-Ittihad al-Islami was the object of an investigation in 2005 indicating that he travelled to Somalia in early 2003 in order to receive training in armament and the use of explosives with the aim of giving similar training to Islamists in Denmark. Additionally, this Somali individual was suspected of procuring Danish passports to individuals with connections to al-Ittihad al-Islami and al-Qaeda.

Possibly more than 5,000 Danes have converted to Islam, but only a minor number of these subscribe to a radical, Islamist version of this religion. With European looks and passports converts may pass unnoticed through check points, customs etc. and assist extremists with logistic support and the dissemination of propaganda.

The Danish Public Prosecutor carried out an investigation that was to determine whether it is possible to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir in accordance with the stipulations of the Danish Penal Code. The Public Prosecutor assessed that the required evidence cannot be furnished to prove that Hizb ut-Tahrir exists on the basis of illegal funds or that the organisation carries out illegal activities. The assessment also concluded that a decisive piece of evidence cannot be presented to prove that the objective of Hizb ut-Tahrir is illegal.

Finland

In September 2005, a documentary depicting the activities of a Western Finland based group sympathising with Ansar al-Islam
was broadcast on national television. According to the documentary, the group consists of a few dozen persons of Kurdish origin and occupies itself mostly with Islamist agitation and fund-raising activities. The documentary maintained that the funds raised by the group’s members ends up in Iraq but that the users are unknown, as are the purposes for which the money is used. No evidence to the effect that the group finances terrorism was presented. It was also maintained that individual members of the group frequently travel to Iraq, where some of them have been arrested by the PUK security services for having unspecified links with the Iraqi insurgency. All of these persons have however been later released without any charges having been brought against them. In newspaper interviews following the broadcasting of the documentary, members of the group vehemently denied having any links to international terrorism. Former Ansar al-Islam leader Mullah Krekar, who in the documentary was named as a mentor of sorts for the group, also denied having had any contacts with Kurds living in Finland.

Beside the Kurdish sympathisers of Ansar al-Islam, a number of individuals living in Finland have had occasional contacts with members of Jihad networks in Europe and outside Europe. However, there is no evidence to link Finnish residents to any of the terrorist attacks committed abroad by extreme Islamists, nor that the contacts between Finland and other countries have involved terrorist planning.

**France**

In France, the dismantling of recruiting networks involved in the transfer to Iraq of volunteers ready to fight the Jihad there remains a major concern: three different networks were uncovered. Last January, a network made up of young people from problem suburbs in the 19th district of Paris was dismantled. The young people involved had been indoctrinated by a young self-proclaimed Imam. Two of the people taken for questioning were about to leave for Iraq and some others admitted having been considering terrorist attacks on the French territory.

On the other hand, it appeared that several individuals, mainly of Moroccan origin, had left France during summer 2004 to join Islamic groups active in Iraq and they had used a network operating from Birmingham in Great Britain. One of the members of this group was arrested in the Paris area. The suspect was already involved in international Jihad networks and had contacts with several activists in jail serving a sentence for their involvement in attack projects in France.

Finally, in June 2005, a Moroccan national who had visited Syria in June 2004 was arrested in Montpellier; a house search at his home recovered a list of components for explosives. He refused to travel to Iraq and become a martyr to the Jihad but instead accepted to organise attacks in France or in another European country.

Indeed, as confirmed by the arrests performed during the
dismantling of these networks, some of these individuals are not only prepared to die as martyrs in Iraq against the coalition forces but also to carry out attacks on French territory.

The Algerian group “Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat” (G.S.P.C) swore allegiance to al Qaeda in November 2003 and its chief Abdelmalek DROUKDAL obtained the support of Abu Mussab AL ZARKAWI. The group also welcomes fighters from other North African countries, especially Tunisia, Morocco and Libya, as evidenced by recent arrests in Algeria. The group leaders’ determination to have their struggle fall within the framework of a global Jihad was confirmed in June 2005 with the attack against the garrison barracks in El Mreiti in Mauritania.

Abdelmalek DROUKDAL declared in his last communiqué published on the group’s Internet site, “France is our number one enemy, the enemy of our religion and the enemy of our community. The only way to discipline France is the Jihad and martyrdom for Islam”.

Converts or individuals from the immigration community, who have been radicalised by ideologues from GIA, formed an organisation to organise attacks in France. This structure, called “Ansar Al Fath”, has been dismantled. The investigations revealed that some members of the group, especially former common law criminals, were in charge of financing, mainly through extortion of money, armed robbery and credit card copying. One of them had even followed training in the handling of explosives in a camp in Lebanon and he came back to France with plans to carry out attacks in the country.

Since the 1st January 2005, the investigations related to Islamist extremism resulted in the arrest of 130 people in France, including 30 who were remanded in custody and 21 Islamic activists, including 2 Imams and one preacher, who were requested to leave the country.

**Germany**

- In June 2005, three presumed members of the Iraqi terror organisation “Ansar al-Islam” (AAI) were arrested. The three Iraqis are accused of supporting AAI with considerable financial means stemming from their personal assets as well as from the collection of donations. According to the Federal Attorney General (GBA), the funds were used to finance terror attacks in Iraq and to strengthen the logistical and structural base of the group.

- In September 2005, the Federal Ministry of the Interior issued a writ stating that the Essen-based association “YATIM-Kinderhilfe e.V.” was a successor organisation of the association “Al-Aqsa e.V.”, banned by decree of July 2002.

- Furthermore, an investigation into the “Islamische Wohlfahrtsorganisation e.V.” (IWO – Islamic Welfare Organisation), based in Herne, was initiated. The measures taken against the two associations were accompanied by raids on the organisations’ premises and private residences. “Yatim-
Kinderhilfe e.V.” and IWO are suspected of collecting donations for the Palestinian terror organisation HAMAS.

- The Iraqi Prime Minister, accompanied by five of his ministers, visited the Federal Republic of Germany from 2 to 3 December 2004. On the occasion of this visit, intelligence gave rise to the suspicion that presumed members of “Ansar al-Islam” (AAI), residing in Germany, were preparing an attempt on his life. As a consequence, investigative procedures against a total of fifteen individuals, among them two of the arrested Iraqi nationals, were initiated.

- In January 2005, 24 individuals were arrested. Among the properties searched were three mosques as well as several so-called “call centres”. Apart from equipment used for counterfeiting, a large number of other potential evidence and banned objects were found. An investigation had been undertaken into members of an Islamist extremist network, who were joining forces with the aim to systematically commit illegal acts. The members of the criminal association concerned are accused of providing the logistics for Islamist networks via falsification of documents, property and financial crime as well as illegal immigration. Another charge levelled against them is financing the Islamist networks and—in particular—supplying them with falsified documents. These activities enable the individuals concerned to illegally travel and reside in Germany and other countries. The individuals arrested are also accused of spreading their ideology in a manner amounting to instigation of hatred, and of recruiting people for the Jihad.

- In January 2005, a suspect arrested in Mainz was accused of recruiting people for suicide attacks in the current focal areas of Jihad on the orders of al-Qaeda. He had identified a Palestinian volunteer; the two individuals had already engaged in the concrete planning of a suicide attack in Iraq. The attacks were to be funded by insurance fraud.

- In April 2005, the Berlin State Supreme Court sentenced a Tunisian national for, among others, illegal possession of weapons and falsification of documents.

- In August 2005, the Hamburg Higher Regional Court sentenced a suspect on appeal for membership in a terrorist association. He had previously been sentenced to 15 years in prison in connection with the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA. The Federal Court of Justice had annulled the sentence in March 2004 and remanded the case to the Hamburg Higher Regional Court for renewed main proceedings.

- In October 2005, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced three presumed members of the al-Tawhid group for terrorist association, falsification of documents and other criminal offences. A fourth defendant was sentenced for support of a terrorist association and other offences. The judges ruled that it had been established that three of the defendants had been
involved in the planning and preparation of terrorist attacks against the Jewish community centre in Berlin and a gastronomical business in Düsseldorf in their capacity as members of al-Tawhid. The identification of al-Tawhid as a terrorist organisation was pointed out unambiguously in the sentence. Already in November 2003, another member of the cell had received a prison sentence for membership in a terrorist organisation concomitantly with the preparation, as member of a gang, of the falsification of official identity documents.

**Ireland**

There exists in the state a ‘central grouping’ of individuals who are sympathetic to and support Islamic extremism. Adverse comments by members of the Islamic community on the continued use of Shannon airport by the US military were reported in the media. This statement was made by the spokesperson for the UK-based al-Mujaharoun group. He repeated these sentiments at a debate held in Trinity College, Dublin.

Whilst no active cells have been identified, given the multi-national Islamic presence in Ireland, there is the real possibility that those like-minded individuals who have arrived here will set aside national differences and coalesce in the name of Islamic fundamentalism. The potential for any such coalition to actively support terrorism cannot be ignored.

**Italy**

Although no information from intelligence or investigation sources is available to substantiate this, the probability of a serious terrorist attack in Italy is considered as a very realistic scenario, especially considering upcoming major events, such as the 2006 Winter Olympic games in Turin and the elections next spring. These events could offer an ideal platform for actions with a major media impact and have an effective political and psychological result.

As far as Italy is concerned, the most recent investigations on international terrorism have confirmed that radical cells in this country with links to foreign terrorist organisations use centres of religious gathering, such as mosques, and Islamic cultural associations for the conversion into Islam, the collection of funds and logistical support.

In this respect, operations “Revenge” and “Bazar” appear to have been particularly important. In May 2005, they led to the dismantlement of a cell of the “Islamic Group of Moroccan Fighters – GICM”, which was active in Piedmont, as well as an extremist group operating in Lombardy with plans to strike Milan and Cremona. These plans were only foiled thanks to the disruptive actions carried out in the last few years by the Police Force following prior investigations.

During this time, Italy has also been the victim of a violent campaign of media intimidation organised mainly by the “ABU HAFS AL-MASRI brigades”. Their name was on a number of published claims
for terrorist attacks, including those in London; however, this name does not seem to refer to an actual terrorist group.

Twelve arrest warrants were issued against foreign nationals, mostly Tunisians, in Milan, as a result of investigations into a radical Islamic group in May 2005.

Besides the immediate and direct risk resulting from the presence of Italian troops in Iraq there is the issue of “Iraq bleed-out” or insurgents returning from Iraq to other countries, including Italy, as was the case at the end of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia.

A further cause for concern is the presence of extremists that are highly qualified in the fields of politics and religion. These leaders are often greatly charismatic and find consensus and support inside the communities where they actively proselytise and carry out propaganda activities, persuading their followers to reject any form of “Western contamination”.

Within the framework of the fight against terrorism, the most important operation conducted in this period was the arrest of one of the perpetrators of the failed attack against the London transport system (Shepherd’s Bush underground station) on 21 July 2005. The arrest took place in Rome, on 29 July 2005, two days after his entry into Italy. Subject was extradited to the United Kingdom on 21 September 2005, less than two months after his arrest.

Three important investigations were carried out in the first semester of 2005, all concerning illegal networks transferring money abroad; the investigations uncovered three unlicensed banks with a seat in Milan and several branches in Central and Northern Italy. Their main features were as follows:

- The first investigation concerned a clandestine bank accessible exclusively to Chinese nationals, with a yearly turnover of more than 40 million euro. The clandestine bank in question, renamed Chinatown, was led by two Chinese nationals.

- The second operation concerned the illegal financial and banking activity of a fake Moroccan bank called Wafabank that had its HQ in Milan. The investigators seized assets held on current bank accounts used for the illegal collection and transfer of funds abroad. The investigation was initiated following indications that one of the members of the organization was recycling the profits of drugs trafficking.

- The third operation concerns a bank operating in ways similar to those governing the operation of Wafabank. In particular, the investigations showed that the clandestine bank had been carrying out banking and financial activities since 1999, although it was not authorized to do so by the Bank of Italy.

The threat from international terrorism in the Netherlands increased, and the Dutch services’ focus on radical Islamist networks was given the highest priority. The murder of Theo van Gogh on 2
November 2004 shocked the Netherlands.

The assassin was in contact with a network that plotted attacks on Ms Hirsi Ali and Mr Wilders, Members of Parliament. The arrest of members of the so-called Hofstad network in The Hague, Amsterdam and Amersfoort removed an immediate further threat, but there are still more radical Islamic networks active in the Netherlands. The Dutch authorities continue to monitor these networks. A clear trend in the threat from international terrorism in the Netherlands is the development of a home-grown, self-inspired, bottom-up jihadism which focuses at local issues and targets. Investigations into networks that are linked to this jihadist movement resulted in Mid-October 2005 in the arrest of seven persons in connection with the attempt to carry out attacks against the Dutch Parliament and the building of the Dutch security and intelligence service (AIVD).

Currently, an important trend is the overriding importance role of the use of modern information- and communication technologies in the development of the jihadist terrorist threat. The internet is now one of the most important drivers of autonomous radicalisation and recruitment processes.

Poland

There were no terrorist incidents related to the activity of Islamist terrorist organizations in Poland in 2005. At present, the Polish police do not have any reliable information available on planned terrorist attacks, including those planned by Islamist terrorists.

However, the authorities have received information concerning individuals now living in Poland who, in the past, had connections with terrorist organizations.

Enquiries in relation to the abovementioned individuals did not indicate that they were actively involved in terrorist activity, including support activities.

Portugal

Several individuals who are living in Portugal and are possibly linked to En-Nahda7 and to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) are believed to be actively involved in criminal activity in support of illegal immigrants, sustaining contacts with Portuguese and foreign nationals in order to acquire documents and building up a network of international contacts in African, Asian and European countries, to develop activities such as smuggling of cigarettes and trafficking of vehicles.

The history of some individuals involved in the abovementioned groups, especially the alleged leader, create the suspicion of a connection to Islamist extremist terrorism.

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7 Previous name given to the Front Islamique Tunisien (FIT)
A group of Moroccan suspects, allegedly members of Taqfir Wal-Hijra pertaining to the so-called Dutch Hofstad group, was detained in Porto in June 2004. One of these suspects was also arrested in Amsterdam in November 2004 in connection with the murder of Van Gogh. Current investigative activity in Porto, related to the Hofstad group, is focused on two Moroccan nationals believed to be involved in activities of support or fundraising.

**Slovak Republic**

Members of the faith of Islam living in the Republic of Slovakia probably do not exceed 0.1% of the population. Islam as a religion is not officially registered in Slovakia, as there is a law requiring 20,000 signatures of followers. Whilst there are no mosques in the Slovak republic, there are around 30 Muslim civil associations and one foundation active in the country.

The activities of individuals believed to provide ideological or logistical support to either radical or militant organisations in their mother countries or third countries are monitored. There are indications to suggest that there have been attempts to implant members of terrorist groups or to recruit terrorists and/or sympathisers within the risk community over the period of reporting.

It would appear that provisional houses of worship have predominantly been used to recruit new members into Islamic circles. Personal and financial ties between some individuals and international Islamic organisations have been identified.

**Spain**

Since the events of 11 March 2004, the dismantling of Islamist cells in Spain has continued. There are now several dozen Islamist militants and common criminals sympathetic to al-Qaeda or its affiliates in prison in Spain, as was underlined following an operation which dismantled cells formed inside those prisons. The members of these cells were common criminals and had been planning violent attacks against the Audiencia Nacional, the Santiago Bernabeu football ground, and the Supreme Court.

A further investigation by Spanish authorities disrupted the activities of an organisation recruiting Mujahedin to be sent to Iraq to join the ranks of the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-led organisations.

**Sweden**

Islamic extremist networks continue to be represented in Sweden alongside traditional, hierarchical groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Militant Islamic networks also continue to maintain recruiting structures in Sweden, focusing primarily on attracting second-generation Muslim immigrants. A new type of radical group, consisting of “born-again” second-generation Muslim immigrants and a number of Swedish converts to radical Islam, has also emerged in Sweden during the last few years. However, little is known at present about the specific character or scope of these
groups.

There is a distinct possibility that Sweden may be used as a territorial base for supporting, planning and possibly even carrying out terrorist activities elsewhere. Many Islamic extremists in Sweden take great interest in the developments in Iraq and various activities attempting to support the armed resistance groups there have been observed. Two men were sentenced to 4.5 and 5 years’ imprisonment in May 2005 for providing financial support to Ansar al-Islam in Iraq.

Several similar investigations regarding support activities to different terrorist groups or networks are presently ongoing.

**United Kingdom**

On 7 July 2005 three almost simultaneous explosions occurred in London on three separate Underground trains, with a fourth explosion occurring almost an hour later on the upper deck of a bus. 56 people (including the terrorists) are confirmed to have died as a result of the explosions. Three of the men responsible were British citizens of Pakistani descent from West Yorkshire. The fourth was a British citizen of Jamaican origin from Buckinghamshire. All four men died in the attacks.

On 21 July a series of four explosions took place in London, three almost simultaneously on Underground trains and one some time later on a London bus. At each location, a device contained in a rucksack was found with each one appearing to have only partially detonated. There were no fatalities or casualties. The four suspected terrorists fled each scene after the devices failed to explode. On 23 July, a fifth device very similar to the four recovered from the 21 July attempted attacks was found in bushes at Wormwood Scrubs in north west London, having apparently been abandoned. One individual, suspected of having attempted to carry out the attack at Warren Street, was arrested on 27 July, and three further individuals, suspected of having carried out the other attempted bombings, were arrested on 29 July, two in London and one in Rome. An individual suspected of having abandoned the fifth device was also arrested.

A number of additional individuals were also arrested in the aftermath of the attacks, the majority of whom were subsequently released. In September 2005 a further individual was arrested in London in connection with the attempted bombings of 21 July 2005. Investigations into the attacks are ongoing.

In September 2005, a video was broadcast by the Arabic satellite television channel Al Jazeera, featuring two separate statements, one by the person responsible for the bombing at Edgware Road on 7 July, and one by Dr Ayman Al ZAWAHIRI, believed to be the deputy head of Al Qaida (AQ). The statements seek to justify the attacks. In a separate statement, broadcast by Al Jazeera in September 2005, Al ZAWAHIRI for the first time appeared to claim
responsibility for the London bombings for AQ.

During the period of reporting, there have been several successful prosecutions of individuals suspected of terrorist activity, including a man originally arrested for immigration offences, who was later found to have material on the construction of an improvised explosive device (IED) for use on an aeroplane.

A separate incident led to the conviction of a man for conspiring to damage or destroy an aircraft. A third man was convicted of possessing information of use to terrorists. The charges referred to a notebook containing details on how to fire mortar bombs and a terrorist code list.

In March a suicide bomber detonated a VBIED outside the Doha Players Theatre in Qatar. A British national was killed and 12 other people were injured. It was the first attack of this type to occur in Qatar. Claims of responsibility made on the internet by a group calling itself Tanzim Jund Al Sham were not judged to be credible.

TURKISH-KURD GROUPS

**Germany**  PKK / KADEK / KONGRA GEL

In January 2005, the vice-president of KONGRA GEL was arrested in a train in the vicinity of Würzburg (Bavaria) on the basis of a request for arrest and extradition issued by Turkey in August 2004. In the last few days of January 2005, minor demonstrations were held in several German cities and also in front of German diplomatic missions in Helsinki (Finland), Vienna (Austria) and Bern (Switzerland). In March 2005, the Bamberg Higher Regional Court lifted the arrest warrant against the suspect as the Turkish extradition documents were not in order.

At present, there are no indications that violent acts are planned, prepared or will be carried out by members of PKK or KONGRA GEL in Europe.

However, the end of the “phase of non-activity” (in place since August 2005) was announced in October 2005, indicating that the PKK continues to regard military operations as legitimate means to achieve its goal.